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This thesis distinguishes between a scientistic-deterministic Marxism and a critical-emancipatory Marxism in order to establish Marx within the tradition of socialism from below, a conception which affirms the principle of self-emancipation. The thesis argues that Marx developed the most powerful practical critique of the capital system that exists. I shall demonstrate that the point of Marx's emancipatory project was to facilitate the recovery of human subjectivity from behind the alienated forms through which sociability has come to be expressed, thus affirming conscious, creative human agency in a self-made social world. I shall further argue that Marx could only go so far conceptually and theoretically so as to leave the space for the reality creating constitutive power of praxis. I shall argue that Marx belongs to the tradition of ‘socialism from below’, a tradition which emphasises democratisation as a process based upon the principle of self-emancipation. This tradition is defined against the tradition of ‘socialism from above’. I argue that the abandonment of the principle and the practice of self-emancipation lies behind the distortions and deviations of Marxism in the twentieth century. To demonstrate this clearly it is necessary but not sufficient to expose the failures of party political and state socialism. The thesis, therefore, also identifies some deep-rooted conceptual problems in the Marxist tradition, highlighting those principles which remain pertinent to emancipatory struggles in the modern world. Marx is shown to have made the move from theory to practical struggles in order to transform the world from within its own material sphere.  Marxism can, in this sense, reclaim its relevance as a viable emancipatory-revolutionary project capable of being a factor in the transformation of society. And it is as such that Marxism remains the most intellectually and politically cogent hope we have in the struggle against the rule of capital. 

The thesis divides into six parts.

Part 1 Marx on the Postmodern Terrain
Part 1 sets the ‘crisis of Marxism’ in the context of the ‘crisis of Modernity’. Here I distinguish between the different views that are discernible within Marxism, emphasising Marx’s emancipatory commitment and making the case for Marx’s class analysis in light of the postmodern and post-marxist reaction against Marxism. I argue for an open Marxism based on critique, praxis and dialectics as against a closed Marxism that emphasises economic determinism, structure over agency, fetishism and alienation. I show that for Marx the world is objectified subjectivity, a field of materialist immanence. I argue that, rather than writing theory, Marx developed a critique of capital’s social metabolic order of alien control. As against the fetishisation of structures and categories and the theorisation and naturalisation of complexity, Marx shows how we may see through and break through the fetish systems of politics, power and production and recover our subjectivity. The ‘philosophy of praxis’ is thus defined against the contemplative-passive approach to knowledge.

Part 2 Active Materialism
Part 2 argues for Marx’s critical and transformatory ‘philosophy of praxis’ as against the contemplative-passive approach to knowledge. I show how Marx’s praxis entails the democratisation of politics, philosophy and power, subverting alienation, fetishism and determinism. I argue for a dialectic of structure and struggle, showing how values are central to Marx’s dialectic. I show how Marx incorporated the active side of idealism into his materialist conception.

Part 3 Agency and Structure
Part 3 employs Marx’s active and affirmative materialism against naturalism and positivism. The argument examines capitalist crisis as a crisis transformative potential, demonstrating socialism as an immanent potentiality for Marx, whose realisation required the self-development of proletarian autonomy and subjectivity. 

Part 4 Alienation and Rationalisation
Part 4 develops Marx’s teleology of labour to make the case against alienating separations and dualisms. I compare and contrast Marx’s critique of alienation with the rationalisation thesis of Max Weber, showing how the substantive irrationality and unnatural spirit of capital's fetish relations also expresses a class rationality that can only be overcome by locating the problems not in reason but in an alienated system of production. I show how Marx affirmed the everyday social world of reciprocity and solidary exchange against the violence and tyranny of abstraction. In the process, I develop a concept of social self-determination as against capital's objective determinism, overcoming the monopolisation of power/alienation of control under the capital system through an emphasis on practical-sensuous experience embodied in the conscious, collective control of social relations.

Part 5 The Critique of Alien Politics
Part 5 develops Marx’s commitment to democratisation as a critique of alien politics. Defining the state as an alienated social power, Marx is shown to realise ‘the political’ through the political investment of civil society, overcoming the state-civil society dualism in the process.

Part 6 Associational Socialism
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MARX, PRAXIS AND SOCIALISM FROM BELOW

PART 1





BEYOND MODERNITY AND POSTMODERNITY 
Part 1 Marx on the Postmodern Terrain

1 INTRODUCTION
The ‘crisis of marxism’ we are witnessing in the present age is associated with three major developments. These developments have contributed to a gradual shift in theoretical paradigms and in political agendas.

 The first development is the collapse of state socialism. This is most commonly conceived as the end of Communism in Eastern Europe but it is applicable also to western parliamentary socialism. Parliamentary socialism, which presumes a reformable capitalism, is in crisis owing to its presupposition that capitalism and its institutional and systemic mechanisms are capable of being reformed. Despite a neo-Bernsteinism occurring at present (Aronowitz 1981), this view of a reformable capitalism is less and less plausible in an age of economic crisis. We are living in an age of slow economic apocalypse in which the scope for social reforms is increasingly narrowed. The social (parliamentary) democrats as good as concede this point by adopting business agendas as a substitute for the old politics of capitalism regulated by the public sphere.

 The second development is the collapse of Marxism and the rise of postmodernism. Postmodernism is a protean body of thought and is well-night impossible to criticise as such. Important to understand here is postmodernism’s critique of the essential characteristics defining modernity, which in many forms can often be indistinguishable from anti-modernism, and the repudiation of large, essential chunks of Marxism (Eder 1993:119 125). For Habermas, postmodernism represents one of the forms taken by the conservative reaction to the shortcomings of modernity. The postmodern signifies 'the end of the Enlightenment', a movement 'beyond the horizon of the tradition of reason in which European modernity once understood itself’ (Habermas 1990:4). As such postmodernism, appears unambiguously as an anti-modernism. 'Postmodernism might mean against rather than beyond modernism' (Turner 1993:16).

From another angle, however, postmodernism could be considered as exposing and challenging modernist rationality as an anti-humanism and an anti-ecologism. The logic of world mastery inherent in modernisation may thus be revealed as a threat to the planet. The holocaust is the logical outcome of modernisation; the gas chamber symbolises the triumph of instrumental rationality (Bauman 1989). Such a critique subjects the supposed connection between reason, freedom and emancipation to close critical scrutiny.

 Habermas himself acknowledges that the Enlightenment promise, the view that the development of ‘objective science, universal morality and law and autonomous art, according to their inner logic' (Habermas 1981:9) would lead to a more rational society has yet to be fulfilled. Indeed, the differentiation of science, art and morality which characterises the process of modernisation has ensured that these spheres have become the exclusive provinces of experts and professionals, divorced from the forms of interaction, communication and reciprocity intrinsic to human activity in the life world. For Habermas this does not mean that we should abandon 'modernity and its project as a lost cause’ (Habermas 1981:11). Such abandonment, which is the postmodern reaction, represents a 'totalising repudiation of modern forms of life', as totalising in its sweeping negation as any ‘reason’ ever claimed by modernists, and is 'insensitive to the highly ambivalent content of cultural and social modernity’ (Habermas 1990:338).

Modernity is indeed a 'double edged phenomenon' (Giddens 1990:7), providing benefits and imposing costs, opportunities and constraints, satisfactions and dissatisfactions, securities and risks. Modernity presents itself as order but is necessarily accompanied by disorder. In fine, 'existence is modern in so far as it contains the alternative of order and chaos .. [for] the negativity of chaos is a product, of order's self-constitution: its side-effect’, as Bauman puts it in Modernity and Ambivalence (Bauman 1991:6/7). The recognition that the 'modern' solutions of yesterday have become the modern problems of today, along with the realisation that the accumulation of information and knowledge do not, as promised, render the modern world more transparent precisely because they represent an 'interference' with the conditions themselves, has been described as symptomatic of a 'post-modern historical consciousness’ (Heller 1990:6) and identified with 'the passage of modernity into its postmodern stage’ (Bauman 1991:244). Acknowledging the force of these points, one can still affirm Habermas' criticism of postmodernist critique.





Further to this, some forms of postmodernism, in postmarxist form, have rediscovered pluralism in its uncritical 1950's form (Wood 1986:63; Fine et al 1984:9; Manley 1983:372). This ‘uncritical’ postmodernism asserts that Marxism leads directly to a totalitarian politics. Marxism, according to a number of writers from this perspective, shares a number of critical failings with the Western philosophical tradition, particularly the ambition to be a ‘master discourse’ – the idea that there is a sole theory or one descriptive vocabulary of social life, a single way to make sense of history and thus shape the future. This exclusive claim to truth is a form of domination which, ultimately, is expressed in the totalitarian politics of the all-powerful state. This criticism asserts that there is a direct and necessary line of development from Marxism to Stalinism. 

From a postmodernist perspective, there is no final, objective, or ultimately adequate system of interpretation. Reality is like a text in not being a knowable, given entity or system that can be revealed by science, knowledge or theory. Rather, reality is simply a continual play of possible interpretations. The claim to definitive knowledge of any text, to the authoritative interpretation, is actually a strategy in a system of power relationships. Thus, to claim definitive knowledge is an attempt to control, manipulate or exclude rival forms of interpretation. ‘Marxist discourse is as susceptible to this failing as any other; perhaps more so because it, as opposed to other philosophies, has been self-consciously identified with state power’ (Gottlieb 1992:192/3).

The postmodernist challenge to Marxism is, therefore, vigorous. The generalising aspirations of Marxism are questioned, its totalising claims rejected, its emancipatory scenario abandoned. A very large question mark is placed against the key move made within Marxism from denotative or knowledge statements - the interpretations of the world - to prescriptive or political statements as proposals for changing the world. There can be no deriving of an ‘ought-to-be’ from an ‘is’, no ‘ideal’ located within the ‘real’, no union of the actual and the rational. The postmodernists are not actually claiming that the world should not be changed; they are denying that political and ethical issues can be settled by scientific knowledge, by what Lenin called ‘correct theory' (Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; see also Makdisi et al 1996:51).

Even so, drawing upon the work of Marx, Hegel, Weber and Lukacs, I will argue that it still makes sense to distinguish between the emancipatory-reconciling aspects of social rationalisation and the repressive-alienating aspects. These modernist thinkers were quite aware of the paradoxical entanglement of these aspects as a defining feature of modernity. With its totalising rejection, postmodernism has blurred the distinctions within reason, rendering the paradoxes or contradictions which enable positive development invisible. But this is an example of how postmodernism operates to rationalise the surface level of appearances as the only reality. Failing to pick out the rationality inherent in the actual, postmodernism becomes complicit in a surface level irrationality.






Though distinct, these three developments are also closely related to each other. Together, they represent a repudiation of Marxism as a 'grand narrative' and as a totalitarian politics. Lyotard sees no hope of reconciling 'language games', of which narratives are a form: 'only the transcendental illusion (that of Hegel) can hope to totalize them into a real unity'; 'the price to pay for such an illusion is terror [and] the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much terror as we can take’ (Lyotard 1984:81).

Lyotard had been a member of the 'critical Marxist', 'quasi-Trotskyist' group Socialisme ou Barbarie (Veerman 1988; Callinicos 1989). But in the mid-sixties, Lyotard began to move rapidly beyond the analytical assumptions and political strategies of Marxism. Events from Berlin 1953 to Poland 1981 put serious doubts about Marxism in the mind of Lyotard (Lyotard 1988:179). The significance of these events was surpassed by the collapse of state socialism in 1989. The extent to which 1989 may be considered as a refutation of Marxism is a highly contentious point (Callinicos 1991). Not the collapse of state socialism but the existence of the statist conception of socialism in the first place could be considered to be a 'refutation' of Marxism. Marx, it should be emphasised, defined the state as an alienated social power and sought the realisation of commonality and universality in social bonds.

Nevertheless, in the collapse of state socialism, Lyotard had his doubts about Marxism as a grand narrative of emancipation confirmed. Lyotard, as a former Marxist, is open to the easy criticism of moving rightwards. More generously, Lyotard can be credited with drawing attention to a form of politics that are manifestly not furthering emancipation. As a political movement for changing the world, Marxism is clearly in trouble: 'the socialist project .. presented as the global emancipation of humanity .. has today gone into crisis' (Laclau 1990:225). Lyotard, from this perspective, is forcing us to ask the question as to what can be done. I can agree with much in this critical perspective. The problems come when healthy scepticism concerning the 'grand narrative' of emancipatory politics becomes a denial of emancipation and emancipatory politics. 

In putting the case for an emancipatory politics and in restating the validity of Marxism as such a politics, one risks doubting the motivations of the likes of Lyotard. He is not an anti-marxist, and it would be wrong to portray him as such. Rather, he raises the question of 'how must we read Marx today?' (Lyotard 1989:23). ‘Critically’ is his answer. 'Marxism has not come to an end' (Lyotard 1988:171). Marxism is quite capable of examining contemporary transformations in the capitalist mode of production (1989:21). What Lyotard does rule out is the universality in the figure of the proletariat: 'what we don't have is that universalisation' (Lyotard 1989:26). The problem is that this could indeed mark the end of Marxism as an emancipatory project. Without the universal class, we need to ask, what remains of Marxism? 


The Future For Socialism

The question is whether Marxism and socialism have any future. I will answer in the affirmative, but only if Marxism learns from its vicissitudes as Social (parliamentary) Democracy and Communism, and only if the socialist movement repudiates the flawed understanding of Marxism in the twentieth century. This may give the misleading impression that the problem is an intellectual one and that a ‘correct’ understanding of Marxism - which is a question begging conception if ever there was one - would resolve all difficulties. More than this, resolution is to insist, with Marx, that the proletariat constitutes itself as a class subject and develops itself its own political, organisational and intellectual capacities. The working class must resolve the crisis in its traditional agencies and organs which is the real crisis of socialist politics (Miliband 1989:223). 

‘Can socialism learn from the defeats and betrayals that resulted from its flawed understanding of its own profound truths?’ Michael Harrington asks. He answers that if it doesn’t learn, then ‘socialism will turn out to have been humankind's most noble and useful political Illusion, and its demise may well be followed by a scientifically organised unfreedom. But if it can learn from its own past about how to create the future, then there is hope for freedom, solidarity and justice’ (Harrington 1993:278).

I affirm that hope. Marxism is considered here as an emancipatory-critical project oriented towards the achievement of a defetishised and free social order of self-governing individuals. This is a definition that, in the light of modern developments, is problematic to say the least. There are those, who will be collected under the sign of neo-Bernsteinism, who unambiguously reject such a view as hopelessly Utopian. The lesson that they learn from modern developments is that Marxism as the project of human emancipation in general is dead. Many go further and abandon the notion of emancipation as such. This presumes that what has passed for Marxism in the twentieth century has been concerned with emancipation. The view presented in this thesis is that the Marxism of the twentieth century, whether in Social Democratic or Communist, reformist or revolutionary forms, quite soon detached itself from its emancipatory orientation and, indeed, from working class material organisations and hence from Marx's faith that the working class could emancipate itself (Clarke 1991:328). Where Marx saw the proletariat as the universal class, such a politics quickly reverted to a universalism more akin to Hegel’s state bureaucracy.

 The argument here is that Marxism must, in the first place, clear the massive deadweight of the party political/state socialist/socialism ‘from above’ tradition which has relocated socialism from the rooted social to the abstracted political realm, reproduced the classic bourgeois state-civil society dualism and hence replicated bourgeois modes of thought, action and organisation within the socialist movement; and, in the second place, Marxism must finally extinguish the positivistic, scientistic and deterministic character deriving from the Second International codification of 'orthodoxy’, which continued into the twentieth century under the auspices of Communism. Only then will it be possible to unambiguously reclaim Marxism as an emancipatory project, the original conception that Marx elaborated in his conception of revolutionary-critical praxis. And that will bring it into much closer relation to an associative conception of ‘socialism from below’.

The Different Marx's And Marxisms

One point that should be made early on is that my intention is not to provide another definition of ‘marxism’ as the Marxism, which not even Marx managed to do or even thought important to do. There is a sense in which to codify Marx's thought as 'marxism' is profoundly to misread the emancipatory character and thrust of Marx's argument. Marx's Marxism is not a better attempt to interpret the world, a worthy successor to Hegel's philosophy or Ricardo's political economy. There is no doubt that part of the problem has been the reduction of Marxism to this concern with interpretation, with some interpretations being no doubt more sophisticated than others. Of course, each interpretation is presented as the sole 'correct’ one and hence Marxism degenerates into a war within itself between its 'schools'. Texts, and lines from texts, come to be debated endlessly. And pointlessly. Not only does it no longer change the world, it ceases to be able even to interpret it.

To present another Marx and Marxism against all the others is not what is required at present, if it ever was. For this presentation of the sole and correct Marx and Marxism not only assumes that there is such a Marx and Marxism in Marx himself – doubtful, his views were alive to politics, although I would argue that his principles are consistent - but also comes with the corollary that once interpretation is given, then there the debate ends, thus denying the reality constituting human praxis which really is crucial to Marx. One merely ends with another orthodoxy, defined, finished, uniform and decaying from the start. That Marxism is rightly criticised and rejected as totalising.

The approach to Marx given here is that of acknowledging that there are tensions within Marx's work, that there are different Marx's and Marxism’s, and that Marx himself shifted his emphases as his practical and theoretical concerns shifted. This does not mean that one can read in Marx whatever one chooses to, for there is still a consistency of principle and purpose in Marx's thought and action. My intention, nevertheless, is less to present the Marx and establish what Marx really meant, as though one had found the philosopher's stone of Marxism, as though such a stone exists or could exist. Rather, my intention is to take the crisis, the failure and the criticism of Marxism in the modern world back into the roots of Marx's thought and to reconstitute Marxism through the development of the critical-emancipatory themes which have been lost under the deadweight of political practice.

These themes are considered highly pertinent in relaunching Marxism after the demise of party-state socialism. There is a lost tradition of thought and practice, long suffocated by the 'marxism' of the parties, that is to be recovered, though not necessarily restated. My intention is to free Marxism from its dogmatic, sterile intellectual and statist prisons (Post 1996:1; Clarke 1991:viii/x 51/2 328; Smith 1996:16; Thomas 1994:5/6).

The call for a 'return to Marx' has repeatedly been heard throughout the twentieth century whenever it dawned upon certain people that the dominant theoretical and political conceptions of Marxism have in some way deviated from Marx (Kolakowski III 1981:493/4). This was the call of the revolutionary syndicalists, like Lagardelle (Jennings 1990) and of the socialist humanists of the 1950's. Such a call, of course, begs a lot of questions. Is there a Marx or some pure, homogeneous Marxism, to return to? And what material processes were behind the departure from this Marxism in the first place and how can they be reversed? Indeed, it could be argued, that as a socially and historically relevant - and practical - 'philosophy of praxis' Marxism must necessarily pass beyond Marx.

So the cautions can be respected. The point is not to keep picking over Marx, referring developments back to the sacred texts. Marx is not a ‘mummy’, a dead figure more appropriate for excavation (Nietzsche in Stauth and Turner 1988). Interpretation should not become an archaeological dig (Aronowitz 1981:172/3; Farr in Carver 1991:107 but see Thomas in Carver 1991:53/4). If Marx's works are not to be treated as sacred texts, it is also the case that it is unacceptable to cobble together bits of Marx's writings to provide a recycled Marxism. The latter might appear to be more creative than the former, but the approach is very similar in treating the Marxist texts as something passive and inert, to be appropriated by the scholar and moulded this way and that. Marxism has been rendered as something of purely theoretical significance, the plaything of theorists divorced from the living content of Marx's work and divorced from creative human agency. 

Which is to approach the subject from the perspective that Marx was a socialist before he was a Marxist (Kitching 1988:230). It is to question whether Marx himself could be considered a Marxist; and it is to question the very notion of Marxism. For the relation of Marxism to socialism is not the relation of theory to practice, of theoreticians to politicians. Very early in his writings Marx expressed himself in left-Hegelian terms in referring to philosophy as the head and the proletariat as the heart of the revolution (Callinicos 1985:35/6). Very quickly, Marx identified this as dualism and rejected it at the level of practice, thus subverting the position of the philosophers in favour of the practical transformation of the social world through the agency of the proletarian movement (Callinicos 1985:36). It is here, in the transformatory action via the material organisations of the proletarian class subject that Marxism 'lives'. A ‘living marxism’ that exists only at the level of theory is a contradiction in terms. For the solutions to social problems are not to be found in theory, not even in Marx's (Bonefeld et al II 1992:xiii/xiv).

Of course, Marx can be treated as a political philosopher and can be treated in a scholarly fashion in the manner of a Plato, a Hobbes and a Hegel. And there is value in this approach, as a contribution to Marx scholarship. It is when this academic approach to dead political philosophers is allowed to freeze Marxism as an eternally valid doctrine that this becomes pernicious. Marxism becomes a politically obsolete theory. What is to be understood is that Marx, though clearly appropriating the work of the great political philosophers - Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel - was concerned to realise the philosophical idea he discerned in this tradition in the real world, not supplying a new political philosophy that theorised, rationalised and hence was restricted to the existing political and institutional order. As such, Marx could never be ‘orthodox’ given that reality continuously passes beyond the attempts of theory to apprehend it. It is not at all clear that Marx could even be said to have supplied a 'theory', something which underlines the irony of the Marxism of the epigones, attempting to preserve certain key texts and concepts from social and historical development.

There are numerous tensions within the entire body of Marx's thought and this, no doubt, has led to the proliferation of different schools within the Marxist tradition. One should expect this to be so given that Marx 'is a great synthesiser critically appropriating a vast and diverse intellectual heritage’ (Berki 1988:1/2) Is Marx, then, to be criticised for being ambiguous, inconsistent, even self-contradictory? There are those who would indeed blame Marx for leaving so many loose ends and hence for making life complicated for his interpreters. Many take Marx at his word and take him as arguing for a position beyond morality. Yet Marx does have an ethics. The problem is, as Kain argues, Marx combined several ethical themes, mainly Aristotle and Kant, without giving them systematic form (Kain 1988). The same point applies to Marx’s creative borrowings from philosophy and politics. Many of the classic conflicts within Marxism over reform and revolution, over party and class, politics and unions, over the state, its use and abolition can be 'blamed' upon Marx's refusal to resolve these questions.

The Breakthrough From Philosophy To Reality And Practice
But is this necessarily a vice on Marx's part? Marx could only have resolved these questions if they were of an intellectual or theoretical character, precisely what Marx had determined to deny with his emphasis on revolutionary-critical praxis.

Marx's understanding of the proletariat was, to begin with, shaped by his left-Hegelian background, which viewed the proletariat as Feuerbach, for example, viewed the senses: as instruments through which critical philosophy could overthrow abstract philosophy and religion. At first, Marx's conception of the proletariat shared some of the characteristics of this theoretico-elitist model. But Marx’s thought soon developed beyond this position.

The difference between Marx and the other left-Hegelians was that he ended this period of development by incorporating both elements - philosophy and the proletariat - in a social critique in which each draws upon the strengths and support of the other to resolve the weaknesses or partiality of its own predicament in favour of a radical democratic emphasis upon social transformation. Whilst Marx shared Feuerbach's view of religion and philosophy as expressions - in abstracto - of a real social problem, namely the problem of society, the Hegelian heritage persisted in his laying equal emphasis upon the social critique, upon the ability of the proletariat to utilize its understanding of reality - its philosophy - to overthrow that reality. In other words, Marx does not speak of philosophy in the abstract manner of the Hegelian tradition, and nor does he regard the proletariat as merely the social counterpart of this (abstract) philosophy. Rather, philosophy is moderated by its association with the proletariat and the proletariat moderated by its association with philosophy. Philosophy is no longer abstract, because it now enjoys this material embodiment, and the proletariat is no longer merely empirical because of its association with philosophy. The proletariat signifies the mediating concept between philosophy and the world, making possible true criticism, i.e. practical-critical activity, because its situation in the world is both actual and critical (Perkins 1993:25/6).

'Marx sought not to ignore the philosophical questions that dominated the German intellectual scene at the time, but to realize them in a social critique' (Perkins 1993:17). The tensions that exist in Marx are there because the problems with which Marx grapples with are not open to theoretical solution. They are social rather than philosophical questions. Moreover, since the whole point of Marx's emancipatory project was to facilitate the recovery of human subjectivity and affirm conscious, creative human agency in a self-made social world, Marx could only go so far conceptually and theoretically so as to leave the space for the reality creating constitutive power of praxis (Perkins 1993:27/8). Marx did not, in short, provide all the answers for all times, a view which would actually represent the denial rather than the affirmation of the creative and conscious human subject. And, in a capitalist society, this realisation of human subjectivity required the emancipatory class praxis of the proletariat. 

Simon Clarke makes an important argument in this respect: ‘The antinomies of modern sociology can be understood theoretically as an expression of the alienated forms of capitalist social relations. However, they cannot be overcome by theory, but only by overcoming the alienated forms of social relations in practice. This is what Marx meant when he wrote in his Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it’. Commodity fetishism cannot be overcome in consciousness, through the subjective recovery of the human meaning of alienated social forms, without overcoming it in practice, by developing new social forms in which the social character of human activity is expressed directly. For Marx this practice could only be that of the working class’ (Clarke 1991:326/7). 

Marx's determination to resolve philosophical questions at the level of practice and social transformation has the merit of premising history upon real individuals and their activity. The class praxis of the proletariat strikes a blow for human freedom.





That Marx is therefore the philosopher of praxis is the theme of a number of works (Korsch 1970; Lukacs 1971; Petrovic 1967).

Thus, if it is possible to produce a different Marxism for different occasions, putting the stress on different aspects of Marx's political career as well as his thought, one has to recognise the contradictory dynamics of the world with which Marx was grappling and with which human beings must continue to grapple for themselves. Marx, then, was not a theorist or a Marxist in the sense of providing a body of thought that provided all the answers for all time. What Marx was attempting to do was to provide for a principled practice that could relate socialism as a real ideal to the conditions and agencies for its realisation. This meant, intellectually, being abreast of the contradictory dynamics and developments of the capital system.

 Thus, if one reads Marx as philosophy, as political science, as political economy, or as social criticism, one makes the mistake of digging into Marx's texts in order to extract a theory (Cleaver 1979:11/2). Marx's intention, however, was to replace theory with a critique whose fundamental orientation is to go beyond the fetishistic world that theory expresses as a condition of its validity, towards the free social order. Marx's supposedly theoretical arguments and concepts are not ends in themselves, as though Marx's intention was to produce a new and superior social science, but are critical weapons in the practical struggles for human emancipation in general. Marx, in short, was not in the business of theorising as an end in itself, to the extent that theory is necessarily entangled in the fetishised world to be changed (Smith 1996:137/8; Bonefeld et al 1995:4). As Bertell Ollman argues, Marx's Capital represents the coherent and consistent development of the early critique of alienation. The critique of political economy proceeds in terms of alienated labour (Ollman 1971:174). Marx was concerned to overturn alienated social conditions and further the cause of human self-emancipation.

Philosophers have interpreted Marxism in various ways, the point, however, is to change it. This means that this Marxism which is constantly being interpreted and reinterpreted is, to all intents and purposes, dead when it comes to the politics of social transformation. Berki notes the highly sophisticated theoretical productions of the Godelier's and Goldmann's and Althusser's and Horkheimer's. And, indeed, Marxism does possess an enviable intellectual capital which is not to be dissipated in the cause of some crude practice. However, as Berki notes, philosophical sophistication is hardly what Marx intended. One sees here the dualism of theory and practice again, the sophistication but detachment of the thinkers from politics on the one hand and the crudeness of the practical organisation on the other (Berki 1975:72)





So a particular view of Marx's Marxism will be presented in this thesis, in full awareness of the view that other, 'scientific', rationalistic, economistic marxisms are possible. Marx's Marxism, insofar as that term has meaning, is to be presented as revolutionary-critical praxis. Emancipatory-critical themes will be recovered. Most importantly, this approach affirms the unity of theory and practice as against the dualism between the two which, arguably, has been a fault line running through twentieth century Marxism in its dominant forms (Negri 1991:137; Bonefeld et al 1995:159/60). Such a dualism, it is understood, could not but reproduce the alienating separations characterising the bourgeois epoch, between subject and object, between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, between philosophy and the world, form and content, the state and civil society. In the 'orthodox' tradition the dialectical unity that Marx upheld was destroyed. Instead, theory and practice were separated as quite distinct and remote from each other. 'Theory’ came to be the product of intellectuals operating independently of the class praxis of the proletariat, thus replicating the passive-contemplative conception of knowledge that Marx had rejected in the Theses on Feuerbach. The social validity of this knowledge related to the social world which was objectively conceived and considered to rest upon quasi-natural laws operating with inexorable necessity independently of human consciousness and action. In the view presented in this thesis, this 'objective’ conception of the world represents the continued inability of human beings to comprehend the world as their own product and subject to their conscious control. Instead, the passive-contemplative approach to knowledge, like empiricism, represents the way that alienation makes the world appear to be external to human beings, something to be studied from afar. Practice, meanwhile, came to be reduced to a kind of unenlightened and unenlightening pragmatism. For if the world operates according to its own laws then there is nothing for it but to discern the lines of development, knuckle under and march forward, which is hardly Marx's idea at all in that it reproduces the separation of human beings from the world that they have created. The 'objective' structures and relations are human, there is subjectivity in objectivity as well as vice versa, and it is possible for human agency to be creative (Sherman 1996:35/7; Albert and Hahnel 1978; Callinicos 1988; Larrain 1986; Sartre 1968; Sayer 1987; Sweezy 1992; Wood 1990; Wright, Levine, Sober 1992).

The ‘orthodox’ conception of theory and practice is flawed, in that it reproduces bourgeois dualism and maintains the separation between human beings and the world, the philosophical idea and the unphilosophical reality. Practice remains something that is considered to be untheoretical whilst, at the same time, theory is considered as something remote from practice, certainly from the class praxis of the proletariat. The result is that 'theory' once more becomes 'bourgeois’ in the sense that it remains an epistemology that is independent of its subject and can be applied to the social world and its objects from a position outside of this world. Theory and the world it apprehends remain external to each other.

 This dualism comes at a price. For the social validity of the knowledge obtained by theory depends upon conceiving the social world objectively as a 'thing' that may be apprehended from the outside, something that reifies both world and theory itself as 'things'.

The positivist interpretation of Marxism seriously deviated from Marx's dialectical, praxis philosophy. For the 'orthodox' Marxists of the Second International, social reality came to be interpreted as an external objective datum operating according to 'laws' of its own, independent of human agency. Human beings could intervene only in the sense of moral judgement or the utilization of technical knowledge, the knowledge of 'necessity' as freedom. It is in this sense that Marxism became 'scientific' socialism, regarding the historical process as independent of human intervention and evaluation. Kautsky gave classical expression to this view:

Nor can the social democratic organisation of the proletariat, in its class struggle, do without the moral ideal, without ethical indignation against exploitation and class oppression. But this ideal has nothing to do with scientific socialism, the scientific study of the laws of evolution of the social organism in order to know the trends and the necessary ends of the proletarian class struggle.
It is true that in the case of a socialist, the thinker is also a militant, and no man can be artificially cut in two parts of which one has nothing to do with the other; so sometimes even in Marx's scientific research we perceive a moral ideal. But he always, correctly, tries to exclude it as far as possible. For in science, the moral ideal becomes a course of errors, if it attempts to prescribe the ends of science.

Kautsky in Goldman 1968: 34 15/6

The Marxist theoreticians of the Second International thus produced a Marxist science which conceived social change as an organic evolutionary process whose outcome is predetermined. Here is Kautsky again:





This evolutionist turn within Marxism was both the product of a social process and an expression of political practice. The SPD had become a mass party of millions, a state within a state. Increasingly bureaucratic, social democracy became integrated in the existing political order. The practice, via a large full time apparatus, was increasingly one of negotiation and compromise rather than of conflict. The belief that socialism was inevitable 'served to justify the abstention from any activity which might provoke a direct confrontation between the workers movement and the State’ (Callinicos 1985:64). The evolutionist version of Hegel's dialectic which characterised the 'orthodox’ Marxism of the Second International thus served to provide both a guarantee of the eventual success of the socialist revolution in the long run and a justification of the essentially reformist and gradualist strategy pursued by the SPD and other European workers' parties in the short run (Callinicos 1985:64/5).

In this context it is worth underlining that Marx was not a positivist, did not uphold the division between fact and value and instead sought to close the gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, Sein and Sollen. By locating - and pursuing - the 'ought to be’ within the 'is', Marx's thought is never scientific in the positivist sense but always incorporates values and value judgements. Marx's theory and practice is constituted by values and in no way discards values as unscientific (Bonefeld et al 1995:4). Marx’s praxis is inherently moral.

The objective of this thesis is to recover the critical and emancipatory character of Marx's original project. It is to this extent, then, a 'return to Marx'. But it is more. For it has as its purpose the reconstitution not of Marxist theory but of the socialist movement. Perplexing as it may sound, a Marxist political theory will not be offered in these pages. Instead, the practical-critical character of Marx's project will be offered as relevant to the emancipatory social struggles and practices of the social world. Marx's critique of political and economic alienation is oriented towards the assertion of social control over the alien control exercised by the state and capital. The task, then, is to innovate the organs of self-government commensurate with the realisation of what Marx called 'active suffrage'. This is an active sovereignty as a thoroughgoing democratisation that removes the separation between the state and civil society, public and private, citoyen and bourgeois. This constitution of the free social order, what Gramsci called 'regulated society', is not a question of creating the appropriate institutions. It is not strictly an institutional question at all. Marx was concerned with the creation of the truly human society of truly human beings. Marx upheld a view of human species essence. Emancipation turns into freedom with the realisation of Marx's philosophical anthropology. The conscious life activity of human beings is to be expressed and realised directly through the self-mediated forms of the human subject rather than distorted through the alienated, indirect forms of the capital system. This is critique rather than theory. The problem of mediation is to be resolved in such a way as to valorise the life activity of the workers and the sovereignty of the demos.

To this extent, this thesis, despite my earlier denials, does indeed provide another interpretation of Marx, carving out another 'theory' from Marx's writings. I have, at times, been accused of using Marx selectively to produce a particular theory that the author would have preferred Marx to have written. The thesis is thus open to the criticism that it adopts a selective approach, taking from Marx only what supports a particular reading, concealing, denying or distorting other aspects which Marx thought important.

Against this, it is possible to argue that it is not so much the selective approach to Marx that is odious as the presentation of this particular reading as the Marx, dismissing or suppressing the various Marx's produced by other writers, parties and traditions. It is as well to be conscious of this. Marxists must necessarily be selective in what they take from Marx. Not only is it desirable that Marxists should be selective - indicating their intellectual and political creativity and responsibility as agents - but it is forced upon Marxists by the very fact that tensions and different emphases exist within Marx's work itself.


The Recovery Of Critical And Emancipatory Themes
One can portray the present work in various ways - the assertion of the libertarian over the Jacobin in Marx (Guerin in Goodway ed.1989:120/1; Guerin 1970:144/5); the exploration of the 'anarchist’ in Marx as against the party political/parliamentary socialist; the accentuation of critical and emancipatory themes as against the scientistic and deterministic shell that came to form over Marxism. What is given here is a political reading that prioritises what Negri called the self-valorisation of the proletariat (Negri 1991:xxvi; Bonefeld et al II 1992:129). Negri contrasted the way that Marx's Grundrisse supports a revolutionary politics with the way that the objectivist and determinist interpretation of Capital has justified the reactionary politics of the parties (Negri 1991; Cleaver 1979:25/6; Perkins 1993:8). But whilst recognising that Capital has been interpreted in such a way - provoking Gramsci to welcome the Bolshevik Revolution as the revolution against Marx's Capital - it is nevertheless the view taken here that a political reading of Capital itself is perfectly possible.

 Cleaver defines what is meant by a political reading of Marx.





One may go from here to argue that such a political reading is to be found in Capital and that practical struggles and proletarian subjectivity do find their way into Capital (Dunayevskaya 1988:103 109; Cleaver 1979:43 27/8; Negri 1991:xxv). The dialectic of living and dead labour is something of the highest relevance in the assertion of emancipatory-critical Marxism over scientistic-deterministic Marxism. 'Orthodox’ Marxism, both reformist and revolutionary, has possessed a vested political interest in stressing the objectivist character of Marx's Capital. This evolutionary turn suited the organisational form of ‘the party’, whether this party was engaged in a passive or active political practice.

In recovering critical and emancipatory themes, I criticise not only the traditional ‘objectivist’ Marxism but also the critical theory which all but abandons a working class as so irremediably caught up within mechanisms of social and cultural domination as to be incapable of ever operating as the revolutionary class. Such a critical theory replaces the political activity of the proletariat with the passivity of 'consciousness raising’. As Cleaver argues: 'It serves little purpose to study the structures of capitalist domination unless they are recognised as strategies that capital must struggle to impose. Revolutionary strategy cannot be created from an ideological critique; it develops within the actual ongoing growth of working class struggle. Blindness to this inevitably forces one back into the realm of 'consciousness raising' as the only way to bridge the perceived gap between working class powerlessness (capitalist hegemony) and working class victory (revolutionary defeat of capital) (Cleaver 1979:42/3). It theorises and rationalises domination in such a way as to make it untranscendable. Pessimism follows (see also Kearney 1986:207 218).

Marx's own commitment is understood here as accentuating the mechanisms of emancipation within the constantly renewed and renewable revolutionary class praxis of the proletariat. This means making a commitment to the emancipatory practices and struggles taking place in the real world against relations of domination and exploitation. As regards Marx, the perspective is that, cleared of the murk and bias of the Marxism of the schools and the parties, there remains an critical core which is able to clarify, inform, orient existing struggles and practices towards emancipation. Orthodox and western Marxism have stressed the exploitation and domination to which the proletariat are subject, western Marxism generalising the orthodox emphasis upon the economic to the social world in general.

As against this, Marx is used selectively here so as to recover the critical and emancipatory core. With the collapse of party-state socialism the point is made here that there is another Marx as distinct from the Marx of the schools and the parties. Provocatively, it could even be described as the exploration of the ‘anarchist’ in Marx in reaching out to the 'new politics' taking us into the next millennium. This does not entail the distortion of Marx, employing arguments and concepts contrary to their meaning. Indeed, Second International orthodoxy and Bolshevism will be criticised as a deformation of Marx's views, a criticism which presumes that there is a correct and incorrect approach to Marx, a consistent and coherent body of thought which may be identified as Marx's Marxism. To this extent, the ‘what Marx really meant' question is still retained. But the thesis does not remain here.

My intention, then, is to take Marx on his own terms, that is, in terms of the emancipatory commitment to change the world and the political commitment to proletarian self-emancipation. The argument thus moves beyond the theoretical as such - what Aronowitz depicts as an archaeological dig (1981:72/3) - to the practical political implications. Cleaver makes this great comment on the archaeological digs that have taken place within Marxism: 'This arcane spectacle is a bizarre one and has a distinct macabre character. One might have expected to find the “reappropriation” of Marxism to be something like an exercise in archaeology designed to uncover the nature of the political weapons developed during the history of class conflict with an eye to their possible usefulness today in a time of crisis. Instead what we find all too often is an exercise in necromancy in which one or another long dead spirit is summoned from the grave to direct the battles of the present. One might have expected to find attempts to grasp the theories and practice of these great historical figures of Marxism within, the class struggles of their time as input into the solving of our own problems (and leaving them at rest once the lessons they have to teach us have been learned). Instead time and again we see a very un-Marxist blindness to the historical specificity of our period and a desire to find the key to the present somewhere in the past' (Cleaver 1979:25).

The thesis presented here is thus an attempt to locate Marx's Marxism in the practical struggle for the emancipated social world. The question as to whether the Marx presented here is the 'right' one can be left to the scholars, those who Draper calls the marxologists as distinct from Marxists (Draper vol I 1977:11). Even here, however, one can doubt how 'correct’ the interpretations offered by the scholars really have been. Thus Gilbert makes a justified defence of Lenin as a Marxist as against the scholars who have systematically suppressed the revolutionary content of Marx's communism (Gilbert 1981:270).

In sum, the intention of this study is not primarily to produce an interpretation of Marx and to present this as 'Marx's political theory'. It is no part of the intention here to remain on the level of Marxist exegesis and indulge in marxology. I am not a Marxist, said Marx. I am not a marxologist. My intention is to explore and indicate an approach to structure, struggle, agency and reciprocity for the practical commitment to social transformation that is consistent with Marx's emancipatory critique of the alien control of the modern state and of capital as alienated social powers to be practically reappropriated by a self-organising social order. However, to be in a position to explore and delineate this socialism means necessarily assuming a position on Marx, a practical one too. For Marxism as critique rather than theory does not criticise the world from a position in abstraction from the world but is a force for change within that world (Walton and Gamble 1976:ix; Kitching 1988:230). 

It should by now be apparent that Marx's writings, abstracted from the central emancipatory thrust, could be used to support a fairly wide range of positions. Thus both the revisionists and the revolutionists, the social democrats and the communists, could cite textual evidence to support their position as Marxist. One has necessarily to be selective with regard to Marx. The unscrupulous, however, detach the texts selected from what could be considered the emancipatory premises that structured and oriented the whole argument. It is this emancipatory commitment that defines Marx (Kitching 1988:228/9), and which makes sense of the writings on particular topics. More than this, it will be argued that Marx consistently upheld the view that 'the working class is revolutionary or it is nothing' and built his Marxism upon proletarian class agency.

The Tyranny of Abstraction and its Critique
In the argument that follows, Marx will be presented as someone who critiqued abstraction in its ideological, political and social forms as destructive of human life (Cowling and Wilde ed.1989:17 24). Ideology and alienation under the regulation of the state and capital are characteristic features of the modern process of abstracting control from human beings and having it institutionalised in alienated forms of mediation. Again, this is understood as separating human beings from what it is to be human, i.e. as dehumanisation (Sayer 1987:78; Walliman 1981:119; Sekelj 1984:360). The perspective taken in the assessment of Marx's work here is that he sought primarily the abolition of alien control and the resolution of the state-civil society dualism at the level of social realm as a world of human reciprocity, exchange and interaction.

 To employ Habermas' terms, Marx valorised the life-world of human actors against the system world steered by the media of money and power (what Marx called the state and capital). Unlike Habermas, it is argued, Marx thought that the system world as such, the coercive and alienated, power infused, institutional and structural infrastructure could actually be dissolved into the self-organising society of human beings no longer separated from their powers. Thus Marx's project will be understood as an attempt to re-assert human subjectivity against the tyranny and violence of abstraction (Sayer 1987), within the objectivity of the world (i.e. overcoming the dualism of subject and object so that human beings can express and realise themselves as opposed to remaining the self-contained Romantic subject incapable of relating to the positive world) (Meszaros 1970). This enables Marx to take a view of individual autonomy and of individuality which overcomes the deficiencies of individualism, offering a deeper, richer conception than that available in liberal social thought (Forbes 1990:207/8 217/8 220). For Heller, Marx's concern with the expansion of the productive forces is not technocratic at all but humanist and rests upon a particular conception of 'wealth':





One final point worth considering by way of introduction is that expressed by Aronowitz: ‘The setting of research agendas is possibly one of the key political struggles of the forthcoming decade.’ (Aronowitz 1981:ix). For all of my emphasis on politics, practical struggle and social criticism, ideas matter. And ideas matter much more than eminently practical men think.





	I believe in the general encroachment of ideas. I believe that Marx’s ideas, so inadequately expressed, had powerful practical effects, for good and ill. I believe that an adequate expression of these ideas will have a much more substantial and enduring effect for the good. Ideas matter. And the ideas that are currently fashionable and dominant in politics and philosophy are, in my view, damaging, destructive of human freedom. So I make no apologies for being, for a while at least, an academic scribbler. We map the world we live in with ideas. We live by them or, indeed, die by them. It matters that these ideas are good rather than evil. I emphasise Marx’s praxis as a critical praxis which incorporates the truths of normative philosophy. And I emphasise Marx’s praxis as a moral praxis. There is a human subject, and it matters that this subject is free rather than enslaved.









2 MARX’S EMANCIPATORY COMMITMENT






The contentious point of my argument is that Marx did not write 'theories' (Smith 1996:111 135 137 126/8; Kitching 1988:152). He did not seek to contest with Comte the claim to be the father of sociology. He did not seek to replace Hegel's political philosophy or Ricardo's political economy with a political philosophy or a political economy of his own. Marx did not wish Marxism to become a school of social science. Of course, one can extract theories from Marx. And one can write books like Marx's Theory of Alienation (Meszaros) or Marx's Theory of Crisis (Clarke). And good books they are too. I highly recommend them. I am not repudiating scholarship at all. I value it as enriching, empowering intellectual capital. But as Clarke himself concludes, Marx possessed less a theory of crisis than a number of 'theories' - all of which do not amount to a theory in the sense of giving an explanatory framework and an interpretation. 

Similarly, the inadequacy of Marx's writing on the state has frequently been commented upon. Miliband (1977) draws attention to this. Marx does not possess a theory of the state, just a lot of scattered writings on politics which could be theorised in various ways. Elster thus lists different theories of the state that may be discerned in Marx, ‘the autonomy of the state’, ‘the instrumentalist theory of the state’, ‘the abdication theory of the state’, ‘the class-balance theory of the state’. He goes on to look at Marx’s theory of revolution and his conception of communism. (Elster 1985:398/428). Ironically, for all of his exhaustiveness, he misses out the conception which comprises the essential context of all of Marx's political writings - the state as alienated social power). 

As a theorist of politics, Marx is found wanting (Huntington 1968:336/42; Colletti intro to Marx EW 1975:44; Pierson 1986:24/5). Hindess pulls no punches, turning Colletti's point that Marx's political theory pre-dated the development of Marxism proper (Colletti Introduction to Marx EW 1975:46), against Marx. Politically speaking, Colletti points out, mature Marxism would have relatively little to add to the Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State. 

Hindess is scathing: ‘It would not be too unfair to say that Marxist discussions of popular democracy have barely advanced beyond Rousseau. What would the government of society as “a self-governing, mass workers' organisation” look like in, say, Lenin's Russia or in Britain today? As for the notion of “recall on demand”, proposed as an alternative to institutionalised and periodic elections, it is clearly unworkable for all but the most minute constituencies. Otherwise, it is in danger of being merely Utopian...”

Actually, Marx modelled much of his recommendations in politics on business practice, eminently practical and workable. Hindess chooses to hide in the thickets of ‘complexity’, the natural habitat for the bureaucrat of politics and philosophy.

“These and other such slogans gloss over the considerable problems of integration and coordination of numerous distinct and internally complex political and economic practices - which would be the more acute if both parliamentary-bureaucratic and commodity forms of organisation and distribution were to be excluded. I raise this point not in order to deny the possibility of popular-democratic forms of organisation but rather, as I have already suggested, to indicate the dangers of any all-or-nothing opposition between parliamentary democracy on the one hand and popular democracy on the other and the scale of the problems that have yet to be resolved. We have to develop both our conceptions of what the-democratisation of significant areas of social life would involve and the organisational forms in which we could begin to realise it” (Hindess 1983:44/5).

To which all I can say is that Marx did not engage in an ‘all-or-nothing opposition between parliamentary democracy on the one hand and popular democracy on the other’, and criticised the political abstentionism of the anarchists on this very point.

From the Leninist/Trotskyite perspective, Marx is found not to have supplied a theory of the party, for which we are supposed to be grateful to Lenin (Molyneux 1978:34 35 95).

In sum, Marx's deficiencies as a theorist of politics, government and revolution are apparent, from a theoretical perspective. But Marx's deficiencies as a theorist are, from an emancipatory perspective, virtues. Marx is approaching the world from another angle, not as a 'thing' to be theorised, the object of scientific investigation. And he is not furnishing answers, something which presupposes an a priori rationality to be imposed upon the social world, a fixity which constrains human subjects and denies their existence as conscious, creative agents. Marxism has operated in this manner in the twentieth century. But what Giddens, developing his work on structuration, affirms as Marx at his best - Marx as a praxis philosopher upholding the notion that individuals are knowledgeable agents that may become conscious of their situation, acting to change that situation, capable of breaking structural constraints (Giddens 1981:2; Giddens 1984:242) - is, it is argued here, the Marx, if any such Marx could be said to exist.

To the extent that Marxism is considered as a theory, entailing a set of ideas and concepts which seek to explain and interpret the world, Marxism itself may be considered to be approaching the world quite differently to Marx himself. Philosophers have sought to explain the world by their various philosophies and have consequently interpreted the world in various ways. But the problems that face philosophers and philosophy are not, for Marx, philosophical, they are social. Marx thus resolved philosophical critique, entailing the interpretive activity of the philosophers, into sociological critique, requiring the practical transformation of social reality by those whose praxis constitutes and reproduces that (Perkins 1993:25/6; Marx, The Holy Family MECW, vol 4 1975:85/6; Furedi in Jakubowski 1990:xxiii; Marx, The German Ideology 1970:83 94/5; Cowling and Wilde ed.1989:44/5).

In this sense, the question as to which Marx can be regarded as having provided an adequate ‘theory’, whether in general or of such particular things as crisis, the state, etc., can be regarded as a 'scholastic’ question in the sense that Marx uses the word in Theses on Feuerbach. And those who are sceptical in the first place as to whether Marx was in the business of offering theories with which to explain and interpret the world are unlikely to very much impressed by views that Marx's theory of the state or of economics or whatever is inadequate. Marx never offered his ‘marxism’ as a theory. Kitching is worth quoting here:





This has implications for the ongoing attempts to ‘update’ Marxism. For such attempts at 'reconstructing’ or 'reinventing’ Marxism (Wright, Levine, Sober 1992), importing theoretical insights deriving from social science, indeed from game theory as with the analytical Marxists, continue to presume that Marxism is theory merely, i.e. only, concerned with interpreting the world. The attempt to redefine Marxism through the introduction of analytical concepts drawn from rational choice theory is particularly subject to this criticism (Cohen 1978 1988; Przeworski 1985; Roemer 1981 1982; Elster 1985). The distance from actually changing the world expands enormously, with human agency conceived only in terms of the narrow and reductionist individualism of bourgeois social science.

The argument I present here will be badly misunderstood if it is taken as a contribution to Marxism considered as theory. For if there is a central point to my argument, it is that Marx adopts a revolutionary-critical approach that, whilst possessing genuine theoretical insight and a sophisticated conceptual apparatus, is not primarily theoretical at all. Marx's Marxism is not theory, and one extracts theory from it only by returning to the static models of bourgeois social science, adopting precisely that passive-contemplative approach to knowledge that Marx himself transcended (Bernstein 1972: ch 1 Praxis, Marx and the Hegelian Background; Rubinstein 1981).

Hence my scepticism with respect to phrases depicting Marxism as the 'philosophy of praxis' or as the 'unity of theory and practice', not because these are wrong depictions but because, in the first place, praxis is understood to incorporate philosophy (note, not to extinguish philosophy, which is how Femia argues the point Femia 1981:122) and, in the second place, as is implied by 'unity', 'theory' is not something separated from practice.

The argument that Marx's is a project of revolutionary-critical praxis is inevitably brought into collision with intellectual positions when applied to the body of theory that goes under the name of 'marxism'. At risk of simplification - brushing past the many different varieties and approaches concealed by this broad term 'marxism’ - the collision concerns diametrically opposed approaches to social reality.

Marx's praxis integrates theory and practice through actual involvement in struggles to transform the world, thus closing the various gaps between philosophy and the world, subject and object, human agency and the hitherto alienated world. Marx is not merely interpreting the world, generating a theory that furnishes an adequate understanding of this objectively conceived reality, i.e. the alien world that is a human creation but which is nevertheless considered as external to human beings (which is how both Hegel and Marx criticised empiricism Kitching 1988:15/6 17 26).

The Emancipatory Commitment
This is not to argue that Marx is untheoretical, for his critique patently involves theory. The point is that Marx's work is not actually theoretical but involves finding the philosophical idea within social reality via the conscious, creative agency of human beings struggling for emancipation in an alien world that is their own creation.

Marx does not, therefore, offer a 'theory’ with which one may agree or disagree. He was not out to make converts to his own social science, the new, improved successor to the social science of the would-be universal reformers he castigated in the Manifesto. One does not become a 'Marxist' by believing or being able to quote the ideas contained in Marx's texts. One needs to be participating in the emancipatory struggles and practices of those groups and classes contesting existing relations of exploitation and domination (Jakubowski 1990:63). The end is human emancipation in general.

 Which is stating again Harrington's view that Marx was a socialist before he was a Marxist. This means that the various 'theories' that one may extract from Marx are provisional, alterable, and not written in stone and are secondary to this concern with human emancipation and the material, transformatory practices of human actors. 

As Kitching has written with regard to his definition of Marxism as the 'philosophy of praxis': 





The theories that Kitching enumerates here as being subordinate to the practical project of human emancipation are part of the critique of the fetishised world that is to be transformed by emancipatory praxis. Kitching's formulation here gives the impression that Marx 'designed' theories to facilitate human emancipation, as though 'theory' was indeed one thing and emancipatory practice another. This implies a dualism where Marx upheld a unity.

The term that one should introduce here is 'critique'. Its importance should be stressed (Jakubowski 1990:61/2; Parekh 1982). It may thus be noted that Marx in the main worked through critique, as is reflected in the titles and subtitles of his books: Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State; A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right; The Holy Family, or a Critique of Critical Critique; Grundrisse, Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy; A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and, of course, Capital itself, which was subtitled A Critique of Political Economy. Marx's critique of political economy 'refers both to those thinkers who analyse the economic order and to the actual workings of the economic order, that is, to both theory and the reality it describes' (Stillman 1983:253).

Similarly, for Clarke: ‘Marx's critique is in fact a total critique in the sense that it is at one and the same time methodological, theoretical and political, attacking the very foundations of classical political economy in attacking the conception of society and of history on which it rests. Moreover it is not only a critique of political economy, it is a critique of liberal social theory in general, and at the same time a critique of the capitalist society which that theory serves to legitimate’ (Clarke 1991:51).

Kitching's argument has the merit of re-establishing human emancipation - as well as the centrality of praxis - as the whole point of Marx's Marxism. Gregor McLennan, who is no hostile critic of Marx, would strike out 'emancipation' from any reconstituted Marxism for the way that it invites dubious millenarian themes (McLennan 1989:137). It is not at all clear that anything particularly Marxist remains when this is done. Marxism may - or may not - have some kind of a life as a school of social science, an academic, bourgeois sociology whose cognitive validity derives from its ability to explain social reality in some objective way. But this amounts to a reversion to interpreting the world rather than appreciating the extent to which cognition and creation are interdependent for Marx. And it would also come to express and rationalise a bourgeois, i.e. fetishistic social reality, making it plainly ideological in Marx’s sense, concealing existing power structures (Kitching 1988:35; Bonefeld et al 1995:2/3).






As against the pragmatists or neo-Bernsteinians on the reformist wing of Left politics, I am more concerned with the way that ‘new social movements’ would appear to be outpacing Marxism on the left flank, succeeding in attracting and politicising increasing numbers in a way that the political parties are not (Levine 1987:3/4; Bookchin in Goodway ed.1989:263/9 274; Eder 1993:101/3 116). Here 'emancipation’ is not a totalitarian temptation to be dampened down but an ongoing struggle and practice. The extent to which some kind of rapprochement between the 'old’ and 'new' politics - actually both still highly contemporary - is possible has to be explored as a viable alternative to the liberal democratic turn demonstrated by parts of the Left. Moreover, it can be argued that Marxism and the 'old’ politics of class struggle remain invaluable if the new social movements are to realise their emancipatory promise (Miliband 1989; Meszaros 1995; Eagleton 1991). We live in a class society after all.

 The evidence is that, without an explicit anti-capitalist and class edge, the nsm’s are in serious danger of being co-opted within capitalism, as Murray Bookchin is quick to acknowledge, even as he opposes the nsm as an alternative to Marxism (Bookchin 1994). For Marxists to engage with the participatory revolution underway requires that Marxism be recovered as an emancipatory project centred upon the praxis of the human subjects, not necessarily restricted to the proletarian movement (Makdisi et al 1996:184/5 182 183 206/7; Eder 1993:190/2). 

For Chakrabarty, Marx's category of 'commodity' has a certain built-in openness to 'difference'. Reading 'real' as socially/culturally produced and, hence, not as natural and given, certain possibilities are opened up, especially that of writing difference back into Marx (Chakrabarty in Makdisi et al 1996:59/60).

Clearing away the positivism, scientism and determinism that has closed Marxism off from its emancipatory significance is a precondition of this opening out. Marxism is emancipatory and transformatory or it is nothing.

The Collapse Of Party-State Socialism
The collapse of state socialism has been the occasion for theorists and politicians to reprise the old view that Marxism is inherently totalitarian, in theory in its dogmatic claims to possess the sole truth, and in practice in the claims of ‘the party’ to monopolise truth and power (Femia 1993). That there is a subterranean tradition of Marxism, which those participating in the practical struggles against capital have spontaneously acknowledged, is not recognised by these critics. Instead, the preferred target of attack has been the Marxism of the parties, the Marxism that Marxists in the line of Luxemburg, Korsch, the revolutionary syndicalists and the council communists have also attacked. It is once more becoming the conventional wisdom that Marxism is identified with the political and bureaucratic control of society by an elite. I shall come later to challenge the views of certain postmodernist thinkers that Marxism offers little more than an updated version of Plato’s Philosopher King. 
For these critics, Marxism is less the theory and practice of proletarian revolution than the ideology of ‘the party’ aiming to constitute itself as a state. That Marxism can be used as an ideology by a 'new class’ is something with which one can agree from a Marxist perspective. That is, it is possible from the emancipatory perspective of Marxism to critique a situation in which the party has substituted itself for the proletariat and institutionalises the political extraction of surplus value at the level of the state. And this I shall certainly do.

 One can make this criticism quite logically from Marx's position, upholding Marxism as the theory and practice of proletarian self-emancipation against its degeneration into the ideology of party-state bureaucratisation. Indeed, critical-emancipatory Marxism has no preference for state capitalism (miscalled socialism) over private capitalism and what is written in criticism of private capitalism is as applicable to Marxism’s vicissitudes as state socialism. The target in both cases is the capital system (Mattick 1973:16 53 64/5 79 80/1 83 124; Post 1996:335/92 421; Smith 1996:59/60 231; Negri 1991:xxvi 25/6 26/7 53 166 204; Thomas 1994:15; Meszaros 1995:24/5 26 29 107 133 368/9 403 416/18 422 617 621 668 679/80 733 911 932). It may be useful to quote Bottomore and put down a marker on this point.





Giddens attempts to refute historical materialism by pointing to the history of state socialism as 'the institutional mediation of power created by the integration of economy and polity’ in order to ‘provide an escape route from class society' (Giddens 1981:282). This was no escape route at all given the extent to which state socialist regimes exhibited a high degree of social and economic inequality and political oppression. Marx explained such phenomena by reference to class and exploitative relations of production. Giddens' conclusion is that historical materialism is wrong. The matter can be cleared up quite simply by pointing out alienated state ownership of the means of production involves the politically enforced extraction of surplus value from the workers on the basis of still exploitative production relations (Meszaros 1995:24/5). Giddens' conclusion is awry. State ownership, the transfer of the title deeds to property, does nothing in itself to alter the production relations, the relations which are more fundamental than the property relations. Callinicos rightly opposes relations of effective possession to juridical property forms. And Callinicos makes the crucial point to be underlined here: 'for Marx the decisive step in the transition to a classless society came not with the introduction of state ownership of the means of production, but with the replacement of the repressive state apparatus by new forms of workers' power based on a popular militia and the election and recall of public officials' (Callinicos in Callinicos ed. 1989:144).

One can acknowledge the social and cultural dynamics of the modern world and the extent to which this creates a new class politics (Eder 1993). One can also affirm the positive contribution made by the new social movements in mobilising pressure from within civil society, driving processes of pluralisation and individualisation in the process, shifting the political agenda in an emancipatory direction, raising the prospects for the realisation of democratic participation and the development of true pluralism (Habermas 1994:89/91 92/3). However, the central focus is upon Marx and the future for socialism and working class politics. So heavy has been the theoretical assault upon this Marxism of workers and class struggles that one senses a defensive and apologetic posture in some Marxist writing. When even the likes of Ken Post suggests that Wood is guilty of 'blind faith’ for reaffirming the proletarian class subject one gains some understanding of how it is becoming increasingly difficult to put the case for the politics of the working class as against the new social movements (Post 1996:77). Post caricatures Marx’s argument - the revolution is 'inevitable' because the working class is 'bound' to spearhead it and drive history to its necessary goal. Post goes on to pay tribute to the pieties of the ‘new politics’ - the working class as one agent among others, at best prioritised, never privileged etc. Post 1996:27/3). What he lacks – or rejects - is an understanding of Marx’s essentialist metaphysics. Here, revolution is a necessary development but not inevitable. Lines of development are frustratable. There is no certainty that the working class will act to emancipate itself. It’s just that it should if it is to realise its essence and flourish. We have lost an understanding of essentialism, with the result that theorists attempting to make sense of Marx end up making a nonsense of him. 

What has given plausibility to the worst excesses of post-marxism has, of course, been the capitalist offensive against the organisations of the working class, undermining the proletariat's means of political, social and cultural resistance. Terry Eagleton has written well on the coincidence of the capitalist offensive and the rise of a post-marxism or poststructuralism devaluing the working class and workers struggles (Eagleton 1991:205). In this context, it has been argued that postmarxism and postmodernism, far from being variants of left wing thought, are actually ideological representations of the latest, 'flexible' phase of capitalist accumulation (Harvey 1990:173/9), the ‘cultural logic of late capitalism’ (Jameson 1985). I shall address this point later, noting that there is a need to separate different strands. But my views have clear affinities with those of Harvey and Jameson.

The Proletariat And Alternative Agents
Pushing past this debate for the moment, the reaffirmation of class politics requires more than defining struggle in terms of material interests. 'Emancipation’ as such means the conquest of necessity that structures human society around issues of scarcity. Adopting Sartre's insight here (Sartre 1968:175), one can return to Marx's conception of the proletariat as the emancipatory, the universal and the revolutionary class. Each of these terms is to be unpackaged so as to establish the content of Marx's claims here. One can simply dismiss Marx's privileging of the proletariat as a dogmatic assertion that has served to devalue other social groups and actors, arguing that such a privileging is no longer adequate to the modern world, if it ever was. Laclau and Mouffe do precisely this. But, to a certain extent, we have been here before. The proletariat have been written off and replaced before as revolutionary agent. The failure of Marcuse's Great Refusal ought to be a warning. The appeal to individuals and social groups who had the advantage of 'remaining free from the corporate blessings of advanced industrial society' ultimately failed as the revolutionary spirit of these groups was 'either coopted or compromised by the increasingly advanced affluence of the technocratic counter-revolution' (Kearney 1986:207 218). Marcuse's new revolutionary agents of the ‘unemployed, unemployable, poor and victims of discrimination’, the 'non-class of post-industrial neo-proletarians' (Frankel 1987:209/10) do not impress in the least. 

The search for revolutionary agents, moreover, may be pushed even wider. Thus Schwendter argues for the revolutionary potential of a counter- or sub - culture based upon the opposition of an 'alternative society' to the existing establishment and the subordinate class upon which it rests. 

This alternative comprises ‘various kinds of communes for production and distribution, residential communes, clubs, study circles, work groups, information centres, journals, health centres, legal aid centres, free alternative schools and 'universities' [etc., and it] .. has its own alternative norms which anticipate those of the socialist society’ (Schwendter cited in Sarker 1983:173).

The revolutionary agent is widened still further when Touraine opposes 'the public' to 'the system'. 'The system' includes not only the state but also the trade unions, the organisations of the exploited class. Clearly, we are quite a distance from Marxism. The working class, the traditional revolutionary class subject, is now expelled from the revolutionary project. New social movements are offered as the new revolutionary agents in the place of the working class. Some attempt to stem the tide by calling for alliances between the old and the new social agents (O Connor 1988).






One can quote Yeo here on the advantages of a class understanding: 

By a class understanding, I mean one which relates conflicts within and between socialisms to materially available directions of development rather than just to ideas or to social groups. Class in its distinctive Marxist usage .. is a political concept. It is adapted for determining which groups have real, material futurity or capacity to remake a whole society in their own interest. Where, at any one moment, are the clusters of rival society-making potential?

Yeo in Levy ed. 1987:220

Where, one needs to ask, is the society-making potential of the 'alternative' agents? The lack of a class understanding, arguably, emasculates projects for change and leads the likes of Capra to attack culture and Porritt to attack 'industrialism’ rather than capitalist class relations or, more deeply, alienated labour (Capra 1982; Porritt 1988). The opposition of ‘green’ to ‘industrialism’, indeed, represents the ecology movement's own 'end of ideology' thesis (Lowe and Worboys, 'Ecology and the End of Ideology' in Antipode 10, 2, pp 12/21).

One is dealing here with what Eder has called the crisis of class politics. If capital is considered as the foremost mechanism of the generation of developmental crises of modern society, then class is no longer considered as the remedy to these crises, as in Marxist discourse, but as part of these modern crises. There is, therefore, a crisis of class politics (Eder 1993:185) and this pertains to the 'self-blockage of society’, to the incapacity of society to act on its crises (Eder 1993:185). 'The connection between class and crisis is applied to class itself; class no longer is something outside the crisis of modern society, but part of and subject to its crisis; the connection of crisis and politics that has dominated much of much of class theory no longer holds. The discourse on a crisis of class politics claims there is a crisis because class and politics are decoupled, which erodes the capacity of classes to act on society and for society to overcome its endemic crises. The 'crisis of class politics' thus refers to the idea that the capacity of class specific collective action is systematically restricted’ (Eder 1993:185/6).

For Lash and Urry (1987), the root of any such crisis of class politics is the fact that the material conditions which could produce a politically conscious working class have disappeared. The relative decline in the numbers of the working class and the rise of the managerial classes is identified with the transition from 'organised’ to 'disorganised' capitalism (from fordism to post fordism and a flexible mode of accumulation). Thus, not only the political relevance but also the social-structural relevance of class is to be questioned as a result of this crisis of class politics. Classes may no longer - if they ever could - be accepted as political actors. Further, class is no longer the organising principle of society. Social movement theory replaces class theory as the new social movements are presented as the carriers of postfordism and postmaterialism, whether as conscious actors or functional mechanisms of such a change (Eder 1993:186; Inglehart 1990). Touraine presents the new social movements as the agents capable of resolving the crises inherent in modern society (Eder 1993:186; Touraine 1992).

The Case For Class Understanding
The question of what weight one allots to 'given' interests, or whether such class interests even exist, is of vital concern to practical politics. Terry Eagleton argues the case for marxism's class understanding well in this respect. ‘If there is no necessary relation between women and feminism, or the working class and socialism, then the upshot would be a disastrously eclectic, opportunistic politics, which simply drew into its project whatever social groups seamed currently most amenable to it. There would be no good reason why the struggle against patriarchy should not be spearheaded by men, or the fight against capitalism led by students [or, indeed, by capitalists for that matter]. 





 As the last sentence makes clear, there is a definite sense in which post-Marxism savours more than a little of the uncritical pluralism of the 1950s, setting up a straw-man Marxism for intellectual criticism in order to appear more radical and relevant than it actually is. 

Eagleton's final comment, it should be noted, also applies to the way that Post, bending over backwards to accommodate post-marxist 'fantasies', sets up Marxists like Wood for criticism on account of privileging the working class subject (Post 1996:77).

 Eagleton’s case for class understanding emphasises the centrality of class to Marxism and socialism and underlines the privileged, not merely prioritised, role of the working class on account of its material futurity and society making capacity. ‘Class struggle is the nucleus of Marxism. This is so in two inseparable senses: it is class struggle that for Marxism explains the dynamic of history, and it is the abolition of classes, the obverse or end product of class struggle, that is the ultimate objective of the revolutionary process’ (Wood 1986:12).

One should relate class struggle to relations of production, the exploitation and the alienation of labour and to the fettering of the forces of production in order to qualify Wood's claim that class struggle is the nucleus of Marxism. Nevertheless, it is a claim consistent with the political reading of Marxism argued for earlier.

 Wood argues for the privileged status of the working class in four respects.

(1) the working class is the social group with the most direct objective interest in bringing about the transition to socialism; (2) the working class, as the direct object of the most fundamental and determinative - though certainly not the only - form of oppression, and the one class whose interests do not rest on the oppression of other classes, can create the conditions for liberating all human beings in the struggle to liberate itself; (3) given the fundamental and ultimately unresolvable opposition between exploiting and exploited classes which lies at the heart of the structure of oppression, class struggle must be the principal motor of this emancipatory transformation; and (4) the working class is the one social force that has a strategic social power sufficient to permit its development into a revolutionary force. Underlying this analysis is an emancipatory vision which looks forward to the disalienation of power at every level of human endeavour, from the creative power of labour to the political power of the state (Wood 1986:14/5).

It is, perhaps, point (4) that is most contested. For, it is argued, the working class have not, so far at least, constituted themselves as a revolutionary force. There are a whole number of social and political processes involved before the strategic power claimed for the proletariat can actually be exercised (Levine and Wright in Callinicos ed.1989). Those proposing new social agents proceed from here to question the proletariat as revolutionary class and, indeed, repudiate the teleology involved in having the working class constitute itself as class-for-itself from being class-in-itself. I shall defend Marx’s claims with respect to the proletariat and proletarian self-emancipation, self-activity and self-organisation.


The Principle Of The Proletariat

Referring back to the original point, however, it is, in any case, perfectly possible to acknowledge the importance of new social agents from within a Marxist perspective based on class understanding. Thus Ken Post modifies the centrality of the proletariat, prioritising rather than privileging the proletariat within the emancipatory project (Post 1996:26 327). This may seem very plural, but there is a danger here of replacing real politics with an affirmation of 'new politics' pieties, searching for what Bookchin calls 'mindless mass constituencies' (Bookchin in Ehrlich ed.1996:26). It is worthwhile, then, to look again at Marx's 'proletariat'. Not just the proletariat as a social class whose material struggles and practices are contesting capital's control of the world, but the conception of the proletariat, the principles that Marx incorporated into his class politics. For it is a crude reductionism that interprets Marx as arguing that all that mattered was the conquest of state power by the proletariat and the victory of the material interest of the working class over the bourgeoisie. At risk of sounding like one of the German 'True Socialists', there is a greater, more moral and anthropological depth to Marx's politics than material interest (Geras in Callinicos 1989:252/3; Post 1996:306; Miller 1982:75 169 170 173 206 207 219 228; Meszaros 1989:260/1; Callinicos 1985:26 61). Revolution for Marx is not an event but a process. The event, the physical seizure of power, is a confirmation of a process in which the proletariat develops its political, organisational and intellectual capacities. But in emerging as this conscious class subject – the class-for-itself - the proletariat strikes a blow for human freedom and emancipates the world from the alien power of capital (Aronowitz 1981:28 69). There is, in short, an emancipatory point to class politics beyond victory in the class war.

In its political practice, 'Marxism’ lost sight of the connection between working class struggle and the struggle for human emancipation in general. In the contemporary world, it is difficult to discern this emancipatory dimension in the activity of the political and economic agencies of labour. There is a clear sense that the workers’ material interests not only can be satisfied within capitalism, but are best satisfied within capitalism. However, given the objective socialisation of the capital system, the potentiality of organising wage workers into a united social power keeps growing. For Marx, communism is both the practical struggle and outcome of the movement of the working class to emancipate itself from the alienated forms of thought, action and organisation engendered by capitalist social relations. Marx’s ‘communist political activity did not mean bringing socialist ideas into the struggle of the working class “from the outside”, but telling it, and anybody else who would listen, about the human meaning of what they were already doing’ (Smith 1996:94).

Given this emancipatory objective, the proletariat's victory as a class is simultaneously its dissolution as a class. Humanity thus emerges in a genuinely universal sense (Post 1996:328/9; West 41/2 43/5 152/3; Parekh 1982:172 174 222). Marx is not engaged in the ideological project of concealing particular interest behind the claim to universality, which is precisely the flaw he found in Hegel's defence of the state and the state bureaucracy. This is not to deny that ‘the party’, substituting itself for the proletariat, may become something akin to Hegel's state bureaucracy, the universal class. But this can easily be pointed out using Marx's own tools - and has been (Schecter 1994:9 10).

Having established the conception of the proletariat, the way that Marx brought the philosophical idea down to earth via working class agency, one can then go on to stress the structural and epistemological power that proletariat possesses in relation to capital. For the power of capital is secondary and derivative; capital is alien or 'dead’ labour and is always vulnerable, therefore, to the challenge of labour.

The active role of the proletariat in the emancipatory project thus indicates the extent to which Marx's revolutionary-critical praxis entails the subversion of the theoretico-elitist model of philosophy and politics. Thus Marx's conception of praxis may be presented as the democratisation of philosophy. The origins of philosophical problems are to be sought in the social world and hence are seen to require practical solution via the creative agents who produce and reproduce that world. Where once the complexity of the social world was asserted, justifying the elitist activity of the philosophers in interpreting the world, Marx now transforms philosophical critique into a sociological-practical critique that requires the transformation of the world and prioritises the transformatory activity of the proletariat.

The Repudiation Of The Theoretico-Elitist Model
The repudiation of the theoretico-elitist model of politics and philosophy in the revolutionary synthesis established by Marx must necessarily conflict with the Marxism of the political parties given the extent to which this Marxism devalued the political and epistemological capacity of the proletariat to challenge capital's domination. The extent to which the codification of Marxist orthodoxy was distanced from Marx's praxis as the democratisation of philosophy and politics could be considered the real tragedy of Marxism - what could be called the autonomisation of politics and theory from practice and Marxism’s consequent detachment from the collective organisation and struggle of the proletariat (Clarke 1991:328).

'Scientific socialism' therefore comes to stress the complexity of the world, and with it the need for scientists to grasp the 'laws' of the world conceived of as quasi-natural object. The philosophers have returned to the exalted position from which Marx had removed them. The proletariat once more are reduced to a position of epistemological dependence upon a socialist theory that is developed independently of its class praxis. And this epistemological dependence of the working class subject comes, in turn, to be associated with the political dependence of the class upon 'the party’. In other words, ‘the party’ is an alienated organisational form upon which the proletariat must depend for their emancipation, rather than the being the organisational form constituted by the proletariat in the process of it becoming the class-for-itself. Marx's critique of the theoretico-elitist model, the breakthrough he made to the proletariat and its movement, is thus of importance in criticising as well as throwing off the alienated political forms through which 'marxism’ has sought to channel or manipulate workers struggles.

This repudiation of the theoretico-elitist model in favour of the emancipatory commitment orients the practical project against relations and institutions of domination and towards a defetishised social world (Bonefeld et al ed.1995:1). 

Whatever Marx's historicist premises and whatever his, justified, refusal to bind future actors with a theoretical straightjacket that denies creativity and subjectivity, one can actually conceive, in broad terms, the organisational forms appropriate in the defetishised, emancipated world. In light of the experience of 'actually existing socialism', we may well be obliged to be clear about these forms. (Sayer 1991:147).

Marx's socialism is not about the imposition of a priori principles of political rationality upon a recalcitrant reality from the outside. However, we still need to demonstrate what socialism implies in terms of social relations, what structures, practices and institutions would be appropriate and which would not be. This means being clear as to the orienting principles of Marx's emancipatory project, principles which would evaluate the actually forms this project took. Anarchism has long affirmed the interpenetration of means and ends in a way that certain dominant traditions within Marxism have not. Indeed, by introducing the notion of political dictatorship in a transitional stage, the incongruity of means and ends could be traced back to Marx himself. The point that means and ends are, for Marx, closely integrated stands in need of demonstration. However, rather than simply defend Marx - which means that we fail to get beyond Marx - the more important objective is to take this criticism on board and to emphasise the extent to which, for Marx, the means are actually the ends in the process of becoming. 'Prefiguration' is a key notion in Marx's emancipatory project that seeks to transcend the structural and institutional constraints inherent in a fetishistic world.

Praxis
Marx's praxis is understood to be principled and to be constituted by values. This makes it possible to delineate, at least in general terms, the character of the emancipated socialist social world, what practices leading to this world are to designated 'emancipatory' and what sort of forms and relations would be appropriate and inappropriate.

There is a slight but significant shift here from the usual presentation of Marxism. For it changes the definition of validity in regard to Marx's work. Validity here is not the social validity of theory in explaining the social world from a position abstracted from it. Rather, validity is to be evaluated in terms of Marx's emancipatory project and how it informs or relates to the emancipatory struggles and practices of the social world. And it means that Marx's emancipatory project, his conception of human species essence as conscious, creative life activity and the vision of the defetishised socialist social world which would realise this essence (the human being not as passive product of 'objective' circumstances but as active producer of self-made social reality) possess priority over the body of ideas that could be designated 'marxist’ (Kitching 1988:230). 

Marx's Marxism centres around the anthropological significance of human activity, upon the creation of the social world and human self-creation. 'Labour' is a key concept as conscious life activity affirming essential humanity. This life activity is distorted within the alienated forms of mediation within the capital system. Here, Marx argues for the revolt of living labour against the domination of capital as 'dead' labour, against the capital system as dehumanisation in favour of the society of associated producers as a rehumanisation.

To arrange Marx's various concepts - the state and civil society, species essence and alienation, forces and relations of production, surplus and necessary labour – so as to constitute a theory or a body of ideas known as 'marxism’ is quite unmarxist and formed no part of Marx's intention. The concepts and ideas as such are integral to the critique that would be theoretical and practical at the same time and oriented towards the transformation of social reality. Thus the view that Marx was a socialist before he was a Marxist needs to be qualified insofar as this suggests a dualism between socialism as practice and Marxism as theory. Marx's Marxism was not theory but critique and, as such, was immanent in the socialist commitment and, going further, in the class consciousness of the proletariat in the process of constituting itself as a class-for-itself. To argue otherwise, to argue that socialism is a theoretical consciousness that can only be brought to the working class from without, breaks that connection between social being and consciousness upon which the emancipated social world depends. That is, human beings come to comprehend and control the 'external and hostile’ social world as their own world, not to have it comprehended and controlled for them. (Marx EPM EW 1975). It is, therefore, quite possible to be a socialist without being a 'marxist’. It is to change the sense of 'marxism' from being a theoretical commitment to understanding the world to being a practical commitment to changing it, as Marx argued in the Theses on Feuerbach.

Premises
A basic assumption in the argument presented here is that 'Marx’ as the subject of enquiry cannot be reduced to 'correct' interpretation without seriously misunderstanding the nature of Marx's emancipatory project. Of course, such an observation may itself be considered an attempt at 'correct' interpretation. However, the view presented here is that Marx's Marxism is not to be understood as theory awaiting the scholarly activity of theoreticians but must refer to emancipatory practices and struggles changing the world. Nor does this mean that Marx supplied a theory that has to be applied in practice, something which, again, implies a dualism where Marx sought to establish a unity.

Another angle on this is what may be called Marx's presentism. Marx's project was designed to be socially and historically specific and hence inherently revisionist in theoretical form. As Gilbert argues, Marx ruled out an empty politics of the will and also disdained waiting upon 'objective forces' in the attainment of socialism. Gilbert thus argues for the creativity of politics in definite situations:





The overriding concern is with human emancipation, the progress towards an emancipated social world. What this means is that any discussion of Marx's work must possess implications as regards present emancipatory struggles and practices, and must take a position on the forms through which these are expressed. The contemporary relevance of Marxism, then, is to be sought in relation to the collapse of state socialism, an examination of the socialism of the political parties, the crisis in the traditional agencies of labour (Miliband refers to political agencies, the parties, but it applies also to the trades unions 1989:223) and the promise of the 'new politics' of the new social movements.

The prefix 'post' in ‘post-marxism’ and ‘post-modernism’ implies too great a concern with change and a neglect of continuity. The capital system remains in all essentials what Marx’s critical analysis showed it to be, certainly in terms of its central, contradictory dynamics. For this reason there is every justification for continuing to consider the Marxian project as relevant (Sherman 1995:12; Meszaros 1995:702). Human emancipation, it  may well be argued, is a more complex process than Marx imagined, involving actors other than the working class and involving issues of cultural and social significance that transcend material interest and economics (Eder 1993:73 74 174 185/6). But even if this is true, Marx's capital-labour dialectic, the struggle on the part of the human subject against a dehumanising system of production, retains its centrality.

It is as a critical-emancipatory project that Marxism merits the designation ‘living’ (Korsch). This Marxism, then, is not so much a theory theorising the development of the capital system - though Marxism has been reduced to such a scientism and determinism - as an emancipatory project that is involved in the practical movement towards an emancipated social world. Or at least ought to be given the way that Marx closed the gap between is and ought, subject and object, theory and practice (Meszaros 1995:337/8 737 951; Jameson 1992:398/9; Bowles and Gintis 1986:101; Bonefeld et al 1995:12).

One can appreciate how the question of what Marx 'really' said could easily degenerate into a scholastic exercise that keeps academics occupied and the world unchanged (Callinicos ISJ 2:11 Winter 1981:123/6). Nor is it helpful to prove that Marx was right on all questions of importance. This is hardly the important question. Marx himself was quite heretical as regards his own conclusions and concepts (Aronowitz 1981). The error of those who wish to prove that Marx was really right on all - or, more modestly, most - things is the same error made by those who refute all that Marx has to say. This is to reduce Marx to the status of a scientistic prophet. One can disagree with Kolakowski that nearly all of Marx's predictions have been falsified (Kolakowski voI III 1981:526) or can agree with Lefebvre that most of Marx's predictions have come true (Lefebvre 1972:89). As though Marx really were in the prediction game, as though Marx really did argue that history possessed iron laws operating with inexorable necessity over against the consciousness, will and action of human beings. For Marx, what matters is making the future, not predicting it.

Popper notes the contradiction between Marx the prophet and Marx the maker (Popper 1962:201/2). After swallowing wholesale the Stalinist caricature of Marx and criticising Marxism as prophecy, what Popper finally comes to read of Marx, free from the distorting lenses of Stalinism, makes him suspect that Marx placed more emphasis human creative human agency. Popper never got round to resolving the contradiction in favour of Marx the maker as against the scientistic deformation of Marxism. But in The Open Society Popper frequently pauses on the verge of precisely this point.

My argument in this thesis unambiguously affirms 'Marx the maker' over 'Marx the prophet'. Popper's refutation has been directed against a target that Marxists may well join in refuting - the deterministic, scientistic and economistic deformation of Marxism deriving from Second International orthodoxy, which continued under the Third International (Corrigan, Ramsay, Sayer 1978:39/47).

The continuing existence of the capital system means that Marx's theoretical apparatus retains its relevance. But the relevance of Marx's work is based on more than this, which implies that Marx's 'theory' remains relevant for so long as the capital system remains in place. Marx's work is relevant less on account of its theoretical merits, however positively or negatively evaluated, than on the continuing struggle against relations of domination and exploitation.

The intention, then, is not to write 'Marx's political theory', to imply that Marx had a political theory or, more presumptuously, to collect Marx's scattered writings on politics so as to provide Marx with such a theory. If Marx is found deficient in establishing a political theory one needs to consider why this is so. Marx, after all, was a prolific writer and, as Heilbroner points out, a pedant who seems to have read every book and was capable to working even minor issues to the point of exhaustion (Heilbroner 1983:119). So if Marx provided no political theory it was because he sought to write no such theory. Of course, this is not to deny that the critique of the state, which Marx promised but never got round to writing, would have been valuable in filling a gap. The premises of such a critique are to be found in the concepts of the state-civil society dualism, the state as alienated social power, human species essence and the teleology of labour as conscious life activity (Levine in Lukacs 1991:4). The political implications are highly important in establishing party-state socialism, as practised through Social (parliamentary) Democracy and Communism as deformations of Marx's project which were unable to transcend the dualisms and separations of the bourgeois world and its fetishistic systems of productions and politics.





My contention is that there is a principled core to Marx's Marxism which is more important than the theoretical commitment to a body of ideas, on the one hand and the political commitment to the party as organisational form, on the other. To establish this means going to the critical and emancipatory roots of Marx's Marxism and grasping the premises which Marx developed in critiquing and transcending Hegel's political philosophy, Feuerbach's materialism and bourgeois political economy. All throughout this critical activity Marx had in mind the 'inverted' bourgeois reality of which the theory criticised was the expression. Marx's breakthrough from philosophy to reality, from the ‘ought to be’ of the philosophical idea to the immanence of material reality and constitutive significance of human praxis, was one which enabled Marx to conceive of the historical process as inherently human rather than 'objective' in an external sense.


The relation between theory and practice is of great significance. The unity as against the dualism of theory and practice is affirmed here; the one is inseparable from the other. The autonomisation of either, rendering theory impractical and external to reality and practice untheoretical and incapable of principled orientation, is rejected. A classic formulation, deriving from Lenin, is that Marxist theory is a scientific guide to practice. Callinicos presents this view well:





Here we have Marxism presented as scientific theory serving as the instrument of the proletarian party (Smith 1996:61; Bonefeld et al 1995:2/3; Bonefeld et al vol I 1992:xvii/xviii; Jakubowski 1990:61/3). It is the notion of Marxism as scientific theory with which one takes issue. Theory becomes here an instrument, a 'thing', which is created independently of the class subject and which may or may not be used by the class in its struggle to emancipate itself. One needs to establish the necessary relation between the self-activity of the proletariat and this 'theory'. Failure to do so means that no good reason is given as to why the proletariat should embrace Marxism as against another theory claiming scientific status.

The problem is not so much Lenin's refusal to bind his politics by a Marxism reduced to a paralysing dogma. Lenin struck a blow for political creativity against the passivity of the Second International social democrats and is to be commended for taking revolutionary seriously as a practical project. The problem is that Lenin was part of the Second International tradition and never shook off the conception of Marxism as scientific theory developed independently of the class praxis of the proletarian movement. Thus Lenin repeated Kautsky's view that the socialist consciousness can only be introduced into the working class from the outside. It is a damaging view that has devalued the creative agency of the proletariat, theorised proletarian epistemological incapacity and justified the substitution of the working class by the political party. Of course, if by socialist consciousness Lenin meant the theoretical consciousness of Marx's critique of the capital system - and this appears to be his meaning - then agreed, the working class does not spontaneously argue in terms of necessary and surplus labour etc. Here, Marx's theory would be a guide to the socialist practice of the proletariat. But the reason that such a 'theory' could 'take’ is precisely because the socialist consciousness is inherent in the social being of the proletariat. The theory derives from the material struggles and practices of the proletariat as much as it informs it. The phrase 'from the outside' is rendered neatly redundant; there is no outside in the unity of theory and practice, of social being and consciousness, of subject and object.

This view owes something to Horkheimer's definition of the relation between theory and practice:

If the theoretician and his specific object are seen as forming a dynamic unity with the oppressed class, so that his presentation of societal contradictions is not merely an expression of the concrete historical situation but also a force within it to stimulate change, then his real function emerges. The course of the conflict between advanced sectors of the class and the individuals who speak out the truth concerning it, as well as of the conflict between the most advanced sectors with their theoreticians and the rest of the class, is to be understood as a process of interactions in which awareness comes to flower along with its liberating but also its aggressive forces which incite while also requiring discipline.

Horkheimer Critical Theory: Selected Essays 1972:215

One has changed the register here from Lenin's notion of Marxism as scientific theory. Horkheimer's 'dynamic unity' between the theoretician and the object of study and the oppressed class suggests theory as a force within the practical movement for change, not an instrument to be introduced into that movement from the outside. The interactive relationship between theory and practice leaves no room for the autonomisation of theory and politics apart from the proletarian self-activity from which Callinicos rightly proceeds.

Marx's critical and emancipatory praxis will, then, be presented in terms of a revolutionary synthesis of the dualisms and separations characterising bourgeois thought and society and will be understood as integral to, actually constitutive of rather than a condition or basis for, revolutionary socialist praxis. This is quite a different notion to regarding theory as a guide to practice.

The Critical Assessment Of Social Democracy And Communism
In light of contemporary events it is tempting to ask if socialism itself is a viable or desirable project. Even more questionable is whether Marx's ideas possess any relevance to any such socialism that may be thought relevant. There is some confusion here in the thought of the Left. One wing has offered the completion of the project of liberal democracy as socialism's only future (Keane in McLellan and Sayers 1991). Another looks to people like G.D.H. Cole and the Guild Socialists (Hirst 1994:15). Marx, it seems, has been released from his Communist prison only to be treated as an outcast in what remains of the socialist movement. 

This, it has to be argued, is a great opportunity being missed. Marx has too long been the property of the theoretical schools and the political parties. Dissident and heretical thinkers and movements could never quite find an audience owing to the strength - and attractiveness - of parliamentary and Communist roads to socialism. This lost tradition can be now recovered. The problem is that so much was invested in the party-state socialism that relocated socialism from the social to the political that the will to retrace those steps may be lacking for a few generations. This will refers to the will to set about creating the organisational forms defining a new socialism, which ironically is the oldest socialism, the socialism from below of the working class (Rocker 1989:56/81; Harrington 1993:31/2).


The Demise Of Party-State Socialism
Of course socialism, as it has been organised and institutionalised, is on the retreat. What is surprising is that this should be cause for surprise. The party-state routes to socialism have come to a dead end. Moreover, this is an exhaustion presaged decades ago (Howard 'Introduction to Castoriadis', Telos, 23, 1975:117/8; Howard 'Introduction to Lefort', Telos, 22, 1974/5:2/30; Howard 1977:ch 9 & 10). One can doubt the efficacy of this party-state socialism. Capital, the supreme extra-political, extra-parliamentary power, was never challenged on its own material terrain and has consequently always possessed the potential for the counter-attack (Meszaros 1995:621 713). The radicals have always argued that the traditional agencies of labour in the west incorporate the working class within capitalism (Mattick 1978:218 219; Meszaros 1995:984/5) rather than aid the workers in transcending capitalism. The stark reality is that if the workers actually want socialism - and some doubt this (Walford 1990 and Yen 1990) - then they will need to create appropriate organisational forms. As regards the massive commentary accompanying the fall of the Berlin Wall, one can simply point out that if one was not only sceptical but actually hostile towards 'actually existing socialism' in the first place, then the emotional and intellectual disturbance caused by its collapse is unlikely to be very intense. Enough time has passed for a certain calm to have been recovered. The postmodernists have enjoyed their moment. The fact remains that we are still confronted by the capital system, with no obvious way out other than by socialism. To this extent Ralph Miliband was right in arguing that capitalism will continue to generate the problems which will put socialism back on the political agenda (Miliband 1989:213). At least if people choose to put it there. Time to re-examine Marx, recover lost traditions and alternatives, to move on with lessons having been learned. Nothing for it but to start all over again.

The conclusion of Jules Townshend’s The Politics of Marxism is apposite here: ‘Is it not better to follow the example, rather than the letter, of Marx? As a child of the Enlightenment he had an intense passion for freedom and knowledge in equal measure. He pursued knowledge in the name of freedom. This involved the destruction of any form of mystifying consciousness that sustained humanity's self-oppression, and the development of ideas that would be of practical use to the struggles of the oppressed and exploited. He would not have enjoyed the prospect of future generations looking to him not for inspiration, but for legitimation. Marx and the movement he created offer all those struggling for freedom and equality a treasure house of practical and theoretical wisdom - negative as well as positive. This movement is a constant reminder that the theory and practice of human freedom are always unfinished business. As long as capitalism remains in business, Marxism as a movement and doctrine, in whatever form, is likely to remain obstinately relevant’ (Townshend 1996).

Marx's Marxism is a critical and emancipatory project oriented towards involvement in the material practices and struggles of those challenging relations of domination and exploitation so as to create the defetishised and emancipated social world. As such there is need for the critical evaluation of twentieth century marxism's vicissitudes as Social Democracy and Communism.

There is a tendency to associate the frequently commented upon collapse of state socialism with Eastern Europe. Such a view facilitates the purposes of those 'neo-Bernsteinians' presiding over the liberal democratic turn in (post?) Left thought and politics. The perspective here is broader and embraces both East and West, both Communism and Social Democracy/Parliamentary Socialism. The crisis of (state) socialism embraces both Social (parliamentary) Democracy and Communism (Meszaros 1995:xiv 933). Of course, Parliamentary Socialism severed what tenuous links it once had with Marx a long, long time ago; so too, practically, did Communism for that matter (Birchall 1986). And there has been a powerful argument that parliamentary parties and politics could never serve as a vehicle for the attainment of a socialist society (Miliband 1987; Coates 1975; Cliff and Gluckstein 1988), an argument which parliamentary socialists have ignored or dismissed rather than addressed in terms of a defence of the character of Social Democracy (Hindess 1983; Pierson 1986).

But it is nevertheless the case that, for the working class as well as for the enemies of socialism, these two traditions of socialism, reformist and revolutionary (the terms are used very loosely), represented the traditional politics of labour in the pursuit of the socialist society. This is where the political capital of the socialistically inclined came to be invested. With the collapse of this ‘governmental socialism’ - a term used by Proudhon, by revolutionary syndicalists like Lagardelle and by council communists like Pannekoek (Bricianer 1978:126 160 161; Jennings 1990:91) - there is a need to criticise a good many of the old assumptions about the nature of the proletarian revolution, the transition to socialism, the organisational form, leadership and participation, the relation between proletarian self-activity and capitalist crisis. By looking once more at Marx, the assumption is that there is actually another way of approaching Marx than that of the bankrupted party-state socialist tradition. Rather than argue that Marx was right all along but contrived to be misunderstood along the way, there is no defensiveness here with respect to anarchism. With respect to anarchist criticisms that Marx and Marxism turned the workers movement towards parliamentary-party politics (Rocker 1989:79; Berkman 1989:33/6; Guerin 1970:74), Marx defended himself by pointing out that the workers were looking for legislative redress in any case, and that they were right to do so. Marx's castigation of Political Indifferentism clearly distinguished him from the anarchists. Nevertheless, there is an ‘anarchistic’ undercurrent to Marx's critique of political as well as social alienation. One can accept Draper's painstaking efforts to differentiate anarchism and Marx's Marxism, for Marx's critique of the state and his conception of the dissolution of the state power as a process of Aufhebung are certainly quite different to anarchist notions (Draper 1990:109 110/1 118/9/20/1 122 126). And one can underline Draper's point that the simple opposition of the social to the political corresponds to a primitive stage in the evolution of the workers movement. Marx did indeed look to generate a wider political movement and consciousness that would enable the working class to restructure society as a whole (Draper 1990:109 110 118/9; Draper 1977:178).

Nevertheless, anarchists may well feel that the history of party-state socialism in the twentieth century has proven them right in their warnings against a myopic concern with political action at the expense of associational activity. Berkman is worth quoting at length.

The Socialists' long political activity and cooperation with bourgeois parties gradually turned their thoughts and mental habits from Socialist ways of thinking... they forgot that Socialism was to be the Messiah who would drive darkness out of the minds and lives of men, lift them from the slough of ignorance and materialism, and rouse their natural idealism, the striving for justice and brotherhood, toward liberty and right.

They forgot it. They had to forget it in order to be 'practical', to 'accomplish' something, to become successful politicians. You cannot dive into a swamp and remain clean. They had to forget it, because their object had become to 'get results', to win elections, to secure power. They knew that they could not have success in politics by telling the people the whole truth about conditions - for the truth not only antagonizes the government, the church, and the school; it also offends the prejudices of the masses. These it is necessary to educate, and that is a slow and difficult process. But the political game demands success, quick results. The Socialists had to be careful not to come in too great conflict with the powers that be; they could not afford to lose time in educating the people.

It therefore became their main object to win votes. To achieve that they had to trim their sails. They had to lop off, little by little, those parts of Socialism which might result in persecution by the authorities, in disfavour from the church, or which would keep bigoted elements from joining their ranks. They had to compromise.

They did. First of all they stopped talking revolution. They knew that capitalism cannot be abolished without a bitter struggle, but they decided to tell the people that they could bring about Socialism by legislation, by law, and that all that is necessary is to put enough Socialists in the government.

They ceased denouncing government as an evil; they quit enlightening the workers about its real character as an agency for enslavement. Instead, they began asserting that they, the Socialists, are the staunchest upholders of 'the State’ and its best defenders...
Thus, instead of weakening the false and enslaving belief in law and government, to weaken it so that those institutions could be abolished as a means of oppression, the Socialists actually worked to strengthen the people's faith in forcible authority and government, so that to-day the members of the Socialist parties the world over are the strongest believers in the State and are therefore called Statists. Yet their great teachers, Marx and Engels, clearly taught that the State serves only to suppress, and that when the people will achieve real liberty the State will be abolished, will 'disappear’.

One by one those features of Socialism which were really significant, educational, and liberating were sacrificed in behalf of politics, to secure more favorable public opinion, lessen persecution, and accomplish 'something practical’; that is, to get more Socialists elected to office. In this process, which has been going on for years in every country, the Socialist parties in Europe acquired a membership that numbered millions. But these millions were not socialistic at all; they were party followers who had no real conception of the real spirit and meaning of Socialism..
It was inevitable that the policy of political, parliamentary activity should lead to such results. For in truth so-called political 'action’ is, so far as the cause of the workers and of true progress is concerned, worse than inaction. The very essence of politics is corruption, sail trimming, the sacrifice of your ideals and integrity for success. Bitter are the fruits of that 'success'..




Berkman's judgement from 1928 is as applicable today as it was then. The relocation of socialism from the social to the political realm comes to detach socialism from its social roots and constituency, with dire results. This is essentially the position we are in now, with the demise of party-state socialism.

The 'Anarchism' Of Marx
Marx is not an anarchist. I argue that his notion of freedom contains a principle of authority as legitimate government, anarchists criticise this as an inherent statism.  Nevertheless, there is a great deal of sense in playing up the 'anarchistic' aspect of Marx as against what came to be the practice of party-state socialism. To see how this is possible, we need to understand just what Marx grasped as 'the political'. If one takes the statement Marx made in On the Jewish Question as his most concise formulation of the socialist society he had in mind, then it can be pointed out that the self-organising society integrating political and social relationships, dissolving the state power, is not far removed at all from anarchism. Of course, sticking points remain. Alan Carter quite rightly points out that Marx is looking to society to absorb rather than destroy the state power, which for anarchists remains a form of the state (Carter 1988:193). I argue that, employing a relational conception of freedom which affirms the unity of the freedom of each individual and all individuals, Marx is attempting to separate a principle of (legitimate) authority from the state so as to embody this in a self-governing society. But even this would not necessarily negotiate a compromise with anarchism given that authority is as much a target of the anarchist attack as is the state (Fenn 1986).

Nevertheless, anarchists have shown the ability to distinguish between forms of authority rather than condemn authority as such in a general way. Interestingly, the notion of self-assumed obligation in governing for all has begun to crop up more regularly within anarchist thinking (Baugh 1990:97/106). I take this to be a significant development. Arguably, this offers a path forward in that it is not at all far from the way that Marx sought a way of critically appropriating the ethical approach to political obligation and law developed by the tradition of western political philosophy (Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel). How far this rapprochement between Marxism and anarchism can go - given that hostility of the one to the other continues on both sides - can be speculated upon. The theoretical modification required of both may be so drastic that an entirely new political perspective emerges. This would be to answer the question that Marcuse posed some time ago - and which the time since would have been profitably spent answering: ‘Today it is evident to what degree the Marxist-Leninist model for revolution has become historically obsolete.. Is it possible to develop another model of revolution on the basis of the current tendencies in class relations ?’ (Marcuse, Protosocialism and Late Capitalism 36/7).

The issues are tricky. One does not create and innovate ex nihilo. Whilst expressing scepticism as to the possibility of creating a 'model for revolution', Marcuse's question merits attention. Recognising the scepticism that there may be towards hewing yet another 'model for revolution’ out of Marx, it may still be argued that one reason we keep returning to Marx is that we have yet to get beyond him. Sartre wrote well when he noted that many attempts to go beyond Marx end up in positions some way behind Marx. 

Paul Thomas uses this point to illustrate the tendency of the new social movements - feminists, ecologists, community movements, anti-racists - to reject Marx as determinist and authoritarian (Thomas in Carver ed. 1991:52). The damage that positivism, scientism and economism within Marxist parties and schools has inflicted is evident here. For, to the extent that the new social movements are engaged in emancipatory struggles - and some demands may be realised within the institutional and structural constraints of the bourgeois state and capitalist relations - then they would benefit greatly from an appreciation of Marx's critique. Failing to so benefit means once more coming to fall short of Marx's own position - as well as of emancipatory social transformation.

Sartre himself made a highly important argument as to the conditions that would need to be fulfilled before one could go beyond Marxism. These conditions amount to nothing less than the achievement of the realm of freedom. ‘As soon as there will exist for everyone a margin of real freedom beyond the production of life, Marxism will have lived out its span; a philosophy of freedom will take its place. But we have no means, no intellectual instrument, no concrete experience which allows us to conceive of this freedom or of this philosophy’ (Sartre 1968:34).

Indeed, one could argue that Marxism is this 'philosophy of freedom' (Singer 1980:68/72; Dunayevskaya 1988; O Neill 1973:12/3), critiquing the artificial-social necessity that capital as an alienated system of production imposes as a second nature based upon exchange value (Schmidt 1971; Smith 1984; Redclift 1987). Marx's Marxism is concerned with the emancipatory struggle to throw off the rule by exchange value. This may have proved to be more difficult than Marx anticipated. Western Marxism, from Gramsci and his war of position to the Frankfurt School, discovered what may be called the intransigence of social institutions (Jay 1984:84). This may not be very far from asserting the 'objective indispensability' of these institutions, as Weber did for bureaucracy (Meszaros 1995:108/9 620/1 797 837 739). But Marx offers a way out in his appreciation of proletarian subjectivity and autonomy.

What encourages a continued 'faith' in the working class as the revolutionary agent is not merely the capital-labour dialectic or the continuing struggles of the class in face of the capitalist offensive but the admission that, whatever the deficiencies in the proletariat as revolutionary subject, the possible substitutes that have been proposed are even more deficient. All the criticisms that the post Marxists/radical democrats marshal against the class politics of Marxism apply with even greater force against the 'new politics' of the new social movements.

One feels justified, therefore, in reexamining Marx's Marxism, once more, for the help it may afford in developing a way out of the crisis of socialism and its traditional organisational forms.


3 MARXISM AND THE POSTMODERN POLITICAL TERRAIN

The growing importance of post-socialist 'new politics' based upon a post-materialist ethic (Eder 1993:73 74) together with the post-structuralist, post-marxist and post-modernist modes of thought are associated with not just the collapse of state socialism but with the collapse of Marxism itself as the central intellectual force. This collapse predates the fall of the Berlin Wall. The attitude of the Communists to the radicalism of the late 1960's raised questions about the emancipatory commitment of Marxism (Birchall 1986). The erosion of the social basis of the Communists in the industrial working class, the defeats inflicted upon the class with the onset of crisis in the early seventies could be interpreted as the death of the working class politics upon which Marxism rests. The working class is the driving force of Marxist politics; without the subjectivity of the working class, Marxism withers. 

The rise of the new social movements may be depicted as a new post-materialist politics (Eder 1993:185/6) - a view which is certainly challengeable when it comes to the importance of material interests, relations and class positions in these movements and their relation to the capitalist infrastructure. The new social movements may be considered as experiments in the transition from 'monological' to 'dialogical' modes of thought, action and organisation (Offe 1985:825/32 834). The criticism is that Marxism remains tied to the monological forms deriving from capitalist industrialisation, centralisation and bureaucratisation (Gombin 1975:14 19 78; Foucault in Makdisi 56; Lyotard in Appignanesi ed.1989; Lipietz 1992:ix 31). The criticism directed against Marx and Marxism refers to a top-down model of politics and society closely wedded to the productivist or industrial age (Gorz 1982 1980; Bahro 1984 1986; Toffler 1983 1984). Marxism thus appears to be part of the old world of capitalist industrialisation, unable to transcend the productivist paradigm and necessarily entangled in forms of organisation which are 'top down'. Marxism is thus seen as increasingly irrelevant to the perspective, the organisation and the direction of the new politics. As a mode of thought it is unable to disentangle itself from the quite specific problems of nineteenth century industrial capitalism; as a mode of political action it cannot but institutionalise the centralising and bureaucratising tendencies of the capital system. Marxism itself, to adopt an earlier libertarian criticism, is a bourgeois ideology, the ideology of the bureaucracy running a 'rational socialism' (Gombin 1975:14 19), masking the interests of a techno-bureaucratic class (Carter 1988). Bakunin wrote as much before the fact of state socialism. Weber, from a different angle, argued that socialism could only ever amount to such a statist conclusion, a dictatorship of the officials instead of a dictatorship of the proletariat. The problems now facing the world are, it is argued, well beyond the capacity of Marxism to resolve, either theoretically or practically. Marxism is an obstacle to emancipation at best, and should be discarded.

Postmodernism And Late Capitalism








Harvey traces the emergence of postmodernism to the dissolution of Fordism-Keynesianism and the transition to flexible forms of accumulation. The turning of the long boom into the long bust after 1973 'inaugurated a period of rapid change, flux and uncertainty' (Harvey 1989:124).

As with Harvey, Jameson (1985) associates the emergence of postmodernism to the developments within capitalist modernisation, more specifically, to a new, 'late, consumer, or multinational' stage in the capitalist mode of production. The rise of postmodernism is traced more specifically to that moment, in the 1960's, when high modernism was institutionalised in the bourgeois academy, and became mainstream, safe and a good investment. Harvey dates the moment later in arguing that the 'counter-cultural and anti-modernist movements of the 1960's’ prepared the ground for the emergence of postmodernism 'as a full blown though still incoherent movement’ (Harvey 1989:38).





In this thesis, I argue that Marx's project can be grasped in terms of the attempt to move from monological to dialogical modes. Although Marx does not use such terms, the contrast between ‘socialism from above’ and ‘socialism from below’, between ascending and descending themes of government, will be associated with the critique of the state's and capital's alien control to present a vision of the stateless, self-governing society as the end Marx has in view. In this study, it will be argued that Marx's was an emancipatory-critical project that gave more space to conscious, creative human agency in relation to structure, to human reciprocity within the everyday life-world of human beings, to sensualism and being as against abstract rationality and the institutional apparatus of the system world, and to the affirmation of humanity through conscious life activity than may be imagined from the criticisms of Marx as a product of industrialising, bureaucratising capitalism. The precondition of socialist advance via an emancipatory Marxist politics will, therefore, be considered to be dependent upon the use of these themes to subvert the determinism, the naive functionalism, the economism which transforms the self-made social world into an objective, external datum and thus reproduces alienation, the structuralism which eliminates human subjects from history.

In reexamining Marx in terms of the pursuit of a 'model for revolution’, the intention is to recover critical and emancipatory themes for the future orientation of the socialist movement. In a sense, there has been an apocalypse, an end of history for socialism. But apocalypse is revelation. And this brings grounds for optimism. For the socialism that has reached its end is a socialism that took the party-state route away from society and which increasingly distanced itself from the working class subject. This was the view of William Morris and the revolutionary syndicalists, who condemned such a move, and of the Webbs and of Durkheim, who welcomed such a move. The question of the ‘two socialisms’ is being put again - a workers socialism looking to fight capital's control on the material terrain or a state socialism seeking the bureaucratic and moral regulation of capitalism. The end of socialism, surely, rests upon the collapse of the latter notion and the advance of the former.

There is a need to innovate forms of organisation and action which would unify all emancipatory anti-capitalist forces. With the collapse of state socialism, the socialism of the parties and parliaments, the challenge before socialists today is to ensure that the socialism which capitalism's crises and contradictions will continue to put on the political agenda resists any political short-cuts and instead comes to contest capital on its own material terrain through the material counter-organisations of proletarian power. Marxism's tragedy, as Clarke puts it, is to have separated the movement for socialism from the collective organisations of the proletariat (Clarke 1991:328). Of course, other anti-capitalist movements or potentially anti-capitalist forces are non-proletarian and have a valid role to play (Callaghan 1990:240).

Democratisation Versus Institutionalised Separation
The justification for reexamining Marx is to outline the contours of a non-authoritarian alternative to the capital system, an alternative which avoids the bureaucratic conception of politics which instrumentalises the revolutionary subjects under a descending conception of government. This will be done through presenting Marx's work as a critique of alien control, a critique of the abstracting and institutionalising tendencies that remove material life processes from human control.

Democratisation as Marx presented it will be understood as being diametrically opposed to what may be called a 'double democratisation’ based upon upholding the institutional separation of the state from civil society. Rather, I will show that the creation of the socialist society based on a thoroughgoing democratisation of all spheres of life, requires the abolition of the separation of the state and civil society. This is the conclusion of the first phase of Marx's critique. The abolition of political alienation represents the aspiration for the non-coercive, non-authoritarian alternative to the control exercised by the state. In pursuit of this end, the socialist movement is to be oriented by Marx's critique of the separation of the state and civil society. The resolution of this gap is to be achieved not by the state subjecting the whole of society to its political control but through society incorporating the state power within itself as a legitimate form of democratic (self-assumed) authority. I will show that it is in the early critique of Hegel's doctrine of the state that Marx offered a vision of socialism that came to be lost in the positivism and economism of the Second International.

Gramsci recovered this lost alternative within Marxism in writing of the 'regulated society' (Showstack Sassoon 1987:16; Boggs 1984:24/5), and in doing so went some way towards answering the liberal critics for whom the abolition of the dualism of the state and civil society could only mean subjecting society to bureaucratic control from above (Habermas 1990:70). For Gramsci this could only be evidence of a restricted hegemony, of the failure to create the ethical society (Showstack Sassoon 1987:224). This issue defines the division between Marx's communism, which overcomes the bourgeois dualisms on the one hand, and liberal democracy within the socialist movement, which retains the institutional separation on the other. Marx stands or falls by the project of creating an organic totality that integrates political and social relations and realises what may be called an active sovereignty or, as Marx calls it, an 'active suffrage'. This is contrasted with the vision of those who line up behind what David Held formulates as a 'double democratisation' (Held 1987:283), the view that a democratised state and a democratised civil society function alongside each other but as institutionally separated realms (Gorz 1982; Keane 1984; Schechter 1994:175).

One has to keep coming back to the question of emancipation. For neither socialism nor democracy are, first and foremost, institutional questions. McLennan may have good reasons for striking out emancipation from Marxist politics (McLennan 1989:137). This would force Marxists to pay more attention to the institutional aspects of democratisation. For similar reasons, Pierson urges the abandonment of the emancipatory perspective as utterly unrealistic and standing in the way of Marxism ever getting to grips with the problem of democracy (Pierson 1986:29/30).

But Marx's is first and foremost an emancipatory critique that looks for a way past the institutional conception of democracy to the actual democratic participation of human beings as citizens. Marx's is a conception of active citizenship and repoliticisation which is much broader than the question of institutions and structures (Thomas 1994:16/7). Giddens makes a good point that is worth developing in relation to the critique of political alienation in Marx:





Quite so. Marx is to be read not so much as opposing human emancipation to political emancipation, 'despising' bourgeois rights and freedoms as the likes of Merquior crudely put it, (ignoring the role that Marx played in the struggle for those very rights and freedoms against the propertied classes) (Merquior 1986:55), but as demanding that the promise contained within political emancipation be realised as universal human emancipation. It is emancipation which structures Marx's work as a whole. Jon Elster titles his book Making Sense of Marx (1985). But making sense of Marx requires not Elster's analytical approach, that destroys as it dissects, but employing emancipation as the central category that unifies the whole of Marx's work. To criticise Marx for failing to provide an adequate democratic theory, as Pierson does, makes sense only when one considers the institutional aspects of democratic government to be the most important theoretical task facing socialists. But this is to profoundly misunderstand the task that Marx set himself. Marx endeavoured to critique the existing fetishised social world and its system of alien control presided over by capital and the state. This critique would indicate, through the projection of emancipatory themes, a viable alternative to the modern dilemma in which, as Marx put it, all things seem pregnant with their opposite. Thus the abolition of alienation would emancipate human beings from the fetishistic, dehumanising forces of the modern world so as to constitute a better world.

Marx And Utopianism
Again, this may be considered as a very particular reading of Marx. So it is as well to be explicit that the intention here is to reorient the socialist movement - or unite disparate forces for socialism in a integrated project - by taking a fresh view of Marx that repossesses critical and emancipatory themes that official Marxism 'buried' (Smith 1996:18/9). In so doing, the idea of a non-coercive - theorised as non-alien - way of social existence is considered as an historical possibility and is not to be dismissed as Utopian. Pierson resorts to the well-worn device of scarcity in order to press home the charge of utopianism. Thus he argues that the conditions for Marx's communism appear utterly unattainable for the foreseeable future. Other thinkers point to scarcity and urge 'realism' (Pierson 1986:28; Nove 1983:15/20; Elster 1985:231).

But are we not back here to a predilection for an evolutionary socialism that is calculated to evade the need for revolutionary activity? If not now, when? Pierson gives the impression that the emergence of the material conditions for socialism is to be equated with socialism. Hence we are back to the Second International and the assumption that capital's unsocial socialisation would, in time, evolve into socialism. We are back to Kautsky who condemned revolution in Russia on account of its backward economic conditions whilst rejecting revolution in the west on account of its advanced economic conditions. 'Scarcity’ is built into capitalism and will exist for so long as capitalism exists. Keynes himself distinguished between real and artificial needs, arguing that it is now technologically feasible to satisfy real needs (Robinson 1970:117). The artificial needs are stimulated by the capitalist system. Gramsci challenged these rejections of socialist revolution. Objectively, the conditions for socialism exist. What is lacking was the subjective conditions (Boggs 1984:138/9).

This is a question of politics, consciousness, organisation, not of abstract speculation concerning whether material conditions are ripe for socialism or not. One can affirm, with Gramsci, that the material conditions for a socialist society exist. What is standing in the way is the repressive organisation of the forces of production under capitalist relations and the failure of the proletariat to constitute itself as the revolutionary and hence create appropriate emancipatory organs. The transition from capitalism to socialism is not to be conceived in terms of the public ownership of the means of production. Such a rational and state capitalism fails to get to the heart of the capital system and the hierarchical division of labour; we are still here at the preconditions stage. It is only if socialism is conceived in emancipatory terms that it can become a force within reality for its transformation.

With the collapse of state socialism, indeed with the existence of state socialism in the first place, it has to be recognised that Marx's emancipatory aims have not been realised, and that both reformist and revolutionary socialism have ended in disillusionment, decay and abandonment. One line of criticism would be that Marx's emancipatory aims are Utopian pure and simple and could only be realised through the artificial community of the state. This is the view offered by the likes of Popper, Talmon, Kolakowski and Femia.

What puts a question mark against such views is the fact that Marx's great achievement is to have, in a sense, historicised and democratised the idea of Utopia (Harrington 1993:37/8). Marx was a radical immanentist (Suchting 1983:170; Parekh 1982:177 205), and as such sought the ideal within the forces and potentialities of the real world. What Marx does do is uphold a view of the future that is different and better than the present. The future is not arrested and is more than the enlargement of the present. Anti-utopianism does not mean the end of history. Fundamental to Marx are the beliefs that human beings can come to collectively control the future, that a unity of theory and practice that is effective in transforming the world for the better is possible and that as a result we can realise the true nature of human beings.

It is on account of these beliefs that Marx's work is of enduring significance. His 'theories' have been subjected to constant attack, with large chunks, like the labour theory of value, supposedly repudiated. But once one begins to argue that Marx did not uphold a labour theory of value, or any of the other theories that have been falsified, that Marx did not uphold any theory at all, than one begins to understand Marx's enduring relevance. Of course, one can dismiss this is little more than a religious or millenarian impulse. But the truth remains that Marx's is an emancipatory critique and project which is oriented towards participating in the struggles and practices of the real world so as to create the defetishised, emancipated social world (Parekh 1982). And this, as Sartre argues, will be of continuing relevance until the realm of freedom is achieved (Sartre 1968:34).

Marx's relevance lies in demonstrating this emancipated world as historical possibility. For this reason, despite numerous set-backs, one can feel confident in asserting that Marx will continue to provoke interest. This much is clear. To study Marx is to gain a valuable perspective upon the dilemma of the modern world. Nietzsche wrote that human beings should only have such powers as they can live up to: 'Man ought not to know more of a thing than he can creatively live up to'. As Erich Heller comments:





What this point emphasises is the destructive nature of that power that has not been 'ethicalised' by human control. Such power cannot be used positively, creatively or humanely. Karl Mannheim argued that the problem of the modern world is that the development of the technical powers of human beings has outran the development of the moral powers with potentially disastrous consequences.

Let us suppose that the aviator who was just flying above us so peacefully and harmlessly suddenly drops a load of bombs. In a single moment everything below him is demolished, everything living killed. All of us must admit that in our present situation this development is by no means a fantastic hallucination, but is rather to be classed with those terrors which may at any time be realized. 
In face of this horrible sight our unlimited enthusiasm for human progress, which was the basic dogma of earlier generations, involuntarily decreases. To be sure, as regards technological scientific knowledge, men have accomplished great things since the invention of the barrow. But—we ask ourselves—is the human mind in other fields actually very different to-day from what it was in the days when the barrow was the chief means of transport? Do our motives and impulses really operate on another or indeed on a higher plane than those of our forefathers?




Aronson introduces the concept of overdevelopment by which to explain the catastrophic events of the twentieth century (Aronson 1983:168/9 172 132/3). Marx formulates this problematic much better with his critique of alienation. Alienation is not an unalterable condition but contains within itself, as human self-alienation, the premise of its abolition. Alienation is an active process in which human beings participate and which human beings may transform. Marx thus can conceive of an alternative given that estrangement is the result of the active alienation of labour from itself. Simon Clarke penetrates beneath the institution of private property to grasp the fundamental contradiction between labour, as the active agent of production, and its alienated (commodity) form 'which explains both its foundation and the possibility of its overcoming’ (Clarke 1991:69/70). Given that the power of capital is the power of labour in alienated form, i.e. given that capital's power is derivative from labour in the form of surplus value (Clarke 1991:113), labour is capable of reappropriating its alienated power for itself. In Marx's conception of alienated labour, alienation is not a passive experience but an active process, a process of labour's self-alienation in which it is labour which is the subject (Clarke 1991:317).

Basic Principles
Marx has been the subject of endless commentary and there is no sign that exegetical interest is slackening. This in itself may be taken as evidence for the continuing relevance of Marx, despite doubts being expressed (Times Higher Education Supplement April 29 1994). Exegetical interest, however, is perhaps what is not really required at this precise moment. Perhaps there is a legitimacy in the development of Marxism as theory in certain areas. Intellectual capital is worth preserving and expanding. But the position being presented here is that Marx's Marxism is not primarily, or, even, is not at all, a theoretical approach to the world. Moreover, there are other approaches which are not even concerned with development at all but simply remain on the level of textual exegesis. The focus of this kind of study is the clarification of what Marx actually wrote on particular things. Their horizon rarely extends beyond the texts. Interpreters feel free to concentrate upon their particular area of expertise, breaking Marx up into little pieces and presenting the theory that they have elaborated from their little piece as the Marx. Conscious of this tendency, the approach I will take here will nevertheless be selective and will place particular attention upon the critical and emancipatory themes that are most explicitly present in the Marx up to and including The German Ideology as well as the Marx of the Grundrisse. Politically, these themes are shown to be consistent with the idealisation of the Paris Commune. The category of 'separation’ will be explored as the key figure running through Marx's work; his emancipatory commitment to a defetishised society being will be treated in terms of the potentials for radical democracy, with the model of the Paris Commune being considered as one particular aspect of a broader process of democratisation which lies at the heart of Marx's project. Such democratisation will also be understood as a humanisation but also as a repoliticisation that transcends the state power and the political realm as a sphere abstracted from the real lives and relations of citizens as individuals (Jameson 1992:393/9; Gilbert 1981:231/2 263/9; Kitching 1988:228/30; Lukacs 1991:71/5; Thomas 1994:83/4).

More generally, Marx is presented as offering a new, active materialism which makes room for conscious, creative human agency in shaping the social world. For Marx, the human subject is no longer speculative and contemplative as in Hegel and is no longer passive in relation to circumstances as in the old materialism. Rather, the human subject is the practical agency in the transformation of what are self-made circumstances. Marx's most concise formulation of this active materialism came in the Theses on Feuerbach. Marx outlines an activist as opposed to a passive-contemplative conception of knowledge. This follows from the rejecting the view that the world is an objective datum external to human beings - that it appears as such is a consequence of alienation - and from arguing that the social world is self-made and shaped by human agency. Knowledge is thus not given passively to the senses but is actively produced and. appropriated through praxis (Kitching 1988:31; Avineri 1963:137 139).

By resolving philosophical into sociological-practical critique, Marx subverted the position of the philosophers as interpreters of an alien world in favour of the proletariat as the changers of this world (Perkins 1993:16/7 20 25/6). And the proletariat is central to this breakthrough from philosophy to reality. In the Theses on Feuerbach 'Marx adopts the position of intuitional materialism (social matter conceived as proletarian, emancipatory activity which will rupture rationalised, alienative relations) whose standpoint is identified with the standpoint of “humanity”’ (Bonefeld et al vol I 1992:38/9). With this breakthrough to social reality, Marx subverted the role of philosopher rulers in enlightening and leading the passive masses. Unfortunately, the theoretico-elitist model that Marx thought he had extinguished from revolutionary politics but which came back again in the 'scientific socialism' of the parties (Avineri 1968:147/9; Perkins 1993:25).


The Academicisation Of Marxism
It is not only the Marxism of the parties that is the target of this critical analysis. The 'academicisation' of Marxism has underlined the fact that the philosophers have had their revenge on Marx. Separated from the class praxis of the proletariat, and with the proletariat consequently abandoned as a revolutionary force, the academic Marxists - and admittedly this is a sweeping generalisation to make a point - have become the philosophers interpreting a world so complex in its institutions, relations and structures and their effects as to be beyond the epistemological capacity of the proletariat to comprehend, change and control. This problem becomes even worse when even the 'mere’ interpretation of the world is abandoned for the continuous interpretation and reinterpretation of Marxism itself.

One further problem with the ascendancy of this passive-contemplative Marxism is its tendency to reduce Marxism to being another school of bourgeois sociology or social theory, entangled within the fetishised social world rather than seeking to transcending it. Such a Marxism is open to being colonised by theoretical perspectives quite alien to Marx and Marxism. One can mention here analytical Marxism, a particularly influential current trend which is corrosive of the essentialist metaphysics crucial to Marx (Cohen 1978; Elster 1985; Roemer 1981 1982; Przeworski 1985). Politically, one can make reference to what can only be depicted as the liberal democratic turn which urges Marxism to make peace with the institutions of bourgeois society insofar as these are or can become democratised (Bobbio; Przeworski; Nove; Lindblom; Keane; Pierson; Aronowitz 1981:286).





For Callinicos, the analytical Marxism of Cohen, Elster and Roemer is a 'serious intellectual threat'. He notes how the analytical Marxists 'have received extraordinary, indeed extravagant, praise from the English speaking intellectual establishment'. Indeed. For 'their politics cuts with the grain. Even the relatively 'orthodox' Cohen defends a variant of market socialism. And market socialism .. has very much become the watchword of the social democratic right, who have drawn from the failure of Keynesianism the conclusion that the market is essentially omnipotent' (Callinicos ISJ 2:35 Summer 1987:142/3). Perry Anderson associates analytical Marxism with the 'post-marxism' of Laclau and Mouffe as attempts to theorise - rationalise? - the shift to the right exhibited by a social democracy increasingly impotent in the face of capital (Anderson 1987:28).

Beyond The Passive-Contemplative Approach
Given these theoretical and political tendencies it is worth reexamining Marx's argument for the unity of theory and practice. For Marx is clearly transcending the interpretative effort to understand the world, as though the world were remote and external, and as though one could obtain knowledge of the world from a position abstracted from it. For Marx, knowledge of the world is an integral part of getting to grips with the world in order to change it. Knowledge of reality is thus conditional upon and a factor in the transformation of social reality. 'Theory', as mere interpretation, is dissolved in this practical transformation or, if one prefers, becomes a factor in this transformatory process (which is what is meant here by dissolution). Praxis, that is, is not blind but incorporates the critical dimension drawn from philosophy. Knowledge is no longer obtained post-festum but is instead generated in the process of practical transformation. Thus, for Marx, knowledge, understanding, theory are all bound up with the practical activity which transforms social reality. As such, knowledge cannot be obtained and understanding cannot be gained in abstraction from the world and from the practical process of its transformation.

In social and political terms this means that the separation of theory from practice, which is one of the separations which characterise the bourgeois world, is to be abolished through the material struggles and practices of the working class as it becomes a class-for-itself. In his early writings Marx was still groping for a way past this dualism of theory and practice deriving from bourgeois society. Hence he portrays philosophy as the head and the proletariat as the heart of the coming revolution (Perkins 1993:25/6). He also argues that theory becomes a material power when it seizes the masses. These views suggest the proletariat as the passive vehicle of theory, incapable of creative activity in relation to circumstances. By the time of the Theses on Feuerbach Marx had completely eradicated all remaining traces of the theoretico-elitist approach to knowledge and politics (Therborn 1976:332). Marxism's power lies not in its theory, as sophisticated as some of this has undoubtedly been (Kitching 1988:29), but as a force within the movement of society able to facilitate the consciousness of the contradictory dynamics and class struggles driving social transformation. Marxism is not a theory of the world, but a force within it for its positive transformation.

I will present here, then, a re-examination of the emancipatory-revolutionary dynamic Marx produced in his critiques of the world and of other peoples’ theories. One central assumption will be that Marx firmly located his Marxism within society and its processes of change. Marxism as theory, it will be argued, reverts to the passive-contemplative approach in its abstraction from the social world. It lacks a practical relation to this fetishised world and cannot intervene in the emancipatory-practical struggles and practices of human agents, except from the outside, that is. The perspective taken here is that this cannot but reinstate the theoretico-elitist model in theory and practice. It is a short step from here to the vanguardist political party claiming scientific knowledge of social reality, and to the reduction of Marxism to a sociology in which sociologists lay claim to scientific knowledge (Bonefeld et al vol I 1992:ix xvii/xviii).

Which is why it is so important to reject the view that Marxism is ‘scientific’ theory, formulated by scientists and introduced into the revolutionary subject. And reformulated, no doubt, at the whim of the politicians of the movement. Once more the proletariat have been reduced to being the passive vehicle for the realisation of purposes which are external to them. The argument here is that a Marxism that has become abstracted from society and from the constitutive class praxis of the proletariat no longer interacts with that society or is informed by the praxis of the proletariat; it neither understands reality nor can change it.

Such a Marxism has ceased to be critical and emancipatory and has instead made Marx, his texts and, indeed, the proletarian class subject the playthings of the theoreticians and the politicians who are now in the position to manipulate the socialist movement should they choose to do so. Many academics prefer not to. Their career lies in interpreting the world or just Marxism itself. Hence their predilection for building models and concepts and formal definitions (Callinicos 1985:157/8; Kitching 1988:55). Entire careers are built upon methodological constructions extracted from the 1859 Preface. McCarney questions the value and the accuracy of all such models (1980:34).

Against them, it is time to recover dialectics as a scandal and abomination, as something that subverts and transcends the very world against which the academics verify their theory. The social validity of their theory rests upon the extent to which it corresponds to the very fetishistic world which Marx took as his main task to change. The ‘academics’, the interpreters, the theorists cannot get past this world. They can only test the validity of their theory by comparing it with the social world considered in typical empirical, external fashion, whereas the point is to subject the world to the most practical and critical of tests (Bonefeld et al vol I 1992:xiv).

The Crisis Of Marxism

The 'evident truths' of the past - the classical forms of analysis and political calculation, the nature of the forces in conflict, the very meaning of the Left's struggles and objectives - have been seriously challenged by an avalanche of historical mutations which have riven the ground on which those truths were constituted.

Laclau and Mouffe 1985:1

The various mechanisms on which Marxists, more or less loosely basing themselves on Marx's analysis, have relied for the replacement of capitalism by socialism are not working.. Capitalist society is at present in global crisis, but few can believe that its probable, or even in the short term, its possible outcome in any country will be socialism. On what, then, other than blind will or an act of faith in historical inevitability, are we to base our hopes? But Marxists have never been blind voluntarists, nor have they ever based themselves on historical inevitability or philosophical generalisation in the abstract. They have always sought to identify specific conjunctures and situations, which would dig capitalism's grave.

Hobsbawm, New Left Review 105 Sept/Oct 1977 15/6

It could be argued that this spells the end of Marxist socialism. It might be argued that Marx's projections were quite appropriate for the time but that the proletariat, seduced by Social Democracy and Communism rather than constituting itself as a political force, has missed its revolutionary opportunity (Harris 1991:122/3). Its failure to seize its transformatory opportunity will be costly. Times move on and the space for transformation diminishes, at least for the proletariat. Socialism may or may not survive, but it is time to wave goodbye to Marxist socialism:





For Alan Carter (1988) Marxism is and always has been an obstacle to a genuinely emancipatory politics and should be extinguished as such. It’s a strong claim, contradicts the thesis I am presenting here, but is well reasoned and merits consideration. In giving my reasons for continuing to value the work of Marx, I am very much alive to the positions set out by anarchist critics of Marxism.

In short, there is a claim that Marxist socialism, whether or not it was ever a good cause that has now become a lost cause, cannot, with the best will and most ideal revolutionary party in the world, be recovered. Once history has moved on, opportunities wasted can never be recovered. Rather than cling on to lost hopes, it may be better to allow Marxist socialism to die a natural death. The view is that the struggles for a better world occur now outside the domain of Marxism (Bookchin 1980; Bookchin 1995). The proletariat has had its chance to be the revolutionary class and instead opted for a bureaucratic 'rational socialism' which has in no way put an end to the capital system (Kearney 1986:207 215). The space has now to be cleared for the new social movements.

Such at least is the toughest case to be made against attempts to re-assert Marxist socialism. For those who take this position (e.g. Carter 1983; Bookchin 1980,1982; Bahro 1978:253, 1980:220; Gorz 1982:14/5), Marxism, far from being emancipatory, stands in the way of a true politics of emancipation as being tied irrevocably to the era of capitalist industrialisation and bureaucratisation.

The case against Marxism is a strong one. And I have sympathies with the views of all the authors above. But fine distinctions can be made. For the criticisms made are most appropriate to the party-state socialism presiding over a continuing capital system rather than to Marxism as libertarian socialism (Post 1996:10/1; Eagleton 1991:212). Thus Sherman distinguishes a critical Marxism from soviet Marxism (Sherman 1996:3/4). 

Of course, there are tensions within Marx himself and it serves no useful purpose to suppress the fact. Marx could be read in an ‘economistic' and instrumentalist fashion as the prophet of a rational socialism. This is how Weber, through the lens of Second International socialism, read Marx (Gerth and Mills 1970:209). But there is an important point here. The loss of the critique of alienation is the loss of the emancipatory commitment which makes sense of Marx's writings. Walton and Gamble were right. Without the critique of alienation, Marx's socialism does indeed become the administered, rational socialism that Weber and Schumpeter always thought that it would become (Walton and Gamble 1972:196). My argument is that party-state socialism not only lost but reinforced this alienation critiqued by Marx. I will argue, then, that there is still something left in Marx, the emancipatory commitment that has been buried (Smith 1996:ch2) by the Marxists for much of the twentieth century, and which Gregor McLennan advocates abandoning in order to develop a greater institutional realism. I am all in favour of Marxism getting to grips with the question of mediation. But to lose the emancipatory dimension would be disastrous, losing the whole point of Marxism and inviting that degeneration into an alien politics that has been the characteristic of the theoretico-elitist model as a party-state socialism. 

This is to recognise that throughout the century there has been a buried Marxism that has understood proletarian self-emancipation to mean just that, and which has resisted ‘the party’ as an alienated form of organisation mediating between the proletariat and their emancipation.

Meszaros’ view of the crisis is correspondingly more sanguine:





To this extent one may accept the validity of the nature of the enterprise upon which Laclau and Mouffe have embarked upon. The 'evident truths' of Marxism as a political movement have been 'seriously challenged by an avalanche of historical mutations which have riven the ground on which those truths were constituted' (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:1). It isn't really an option to ignore or deny these historical mutations any more than it is plausible to argue that they fit neatly into the old categories.

But, as Meszaros’ work shows, it is possible to face the challenge of socialist renewal using the resources of Marx's Marxism, accepting the demise of social democracy and communism, without having to oppose non-class forms of struggle to a supposedly 'old' politics (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:1). Laclau and Mouffe affirm 'the rise of the new feminism, the protest movements of ethnic, national and sexual minorities, the anti-institutional ecology struggles .. the anti-nuclear movement, the atypical forms of social struggle in countries on the capitalist periphery' (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:1). But Marx is not so easily outflanked. One has to ask, with Marx, where, in these groups, is the material or structural capacity to engage in transformative action?

Touraine offers the new social movements as the actors destined to resolve the modern crisis (Touraine 1992). His opposition of 'the public’ to 'the system' is indeed more postmodernist than Marxist. But, logically, one must ask here, does not postmodernism demand an end of social movements as such, old and new, an end of the very notion of collective agents? (Eder 1993:186). But we are no longer dealing with creative agency here, but passive bearers of processes. We are no longer dealing with conscious collective actors at all but a functional explanation in which groups are mere unconscious bearers of new social relations.

Coming back to Hobsbawm's argument, in appreciating the extent of this crisis of Marxism as the failure of the mechanisms leading from capitalism to socialism one can acknowledge the necessity for the conscious, creative activity of the human actor. Marx is not arguing for the inevitability of socialism. Capitalism may or may not collapse by its own internal mechanisms (Ramtin 1992). And Marx did argue for the necessity of this crisis as a result of capital’s contradictory dynamics. But socialism can only be achieved if the proletariat, as the revolutionary subject, comes to organise itself and act so as to challenge capital on its material terrain and hence proceed to transform society from the base up. 

The socialist revolution is, therefore, first and foremost an act of freedom on the part of the proletariat (Ferraro 1992). There is, therefore, something to be gained from considering HeId's notion of a crisis with transformative potential (Held 1987). This potential requires a revolutionary subject in order to be actualised. For Marx, the proletariat is an integral part of this potential, the revolutionary class which he identified as the most important of the productive forces (Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy n.d. 145).

The contemporary crisis of Marxism, then, is less a cause for regret than a challenge to the political organisation and action that always was necessary. If capitalism creates its own gravediggers in the form of the proletariat (Perkins 1993:53/4), then it is the case that capitalism's grave has still to be dug. That is, the proletariat may be the product of the capital system but they must still act against that system in order to abolish it.

My re-examination of Marx thus seeks to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the collapse of state socialism, the crisis of Marxism and the crisis of the capital system itself to suggest a reorientation of Marxism through the recovery of its central revolutionary-emancipatory dynamic (Clarke 1991:328; Schecter 1994:175). My purpose is not so much to ensure the continuing relevance of the doctrine called 'marxism'. If the argument presented here is correct, then the body of thought existing in Marx's work is secondary to the emancipatory struggles to change the world through practical-critical revolutionary action. Marxism may or may not survive into the next millennium. My argument is that it can only do so as a) in poor condition like all schools of social science b) as a compensatory socialist ideology embodied in a party or c) as a revolutionary-emancipatory project aiming at a libertarian socialism.

In other words, the crisis in the capital system itself, the contradictory dynamics of capital, will continue to generate problems and demands that will suggest a social control that is somewhere in the domain of socialism. Bankrupted traditions may well be re-invigorated as a result. The preference developed here, however, is to take socialism away from the political-bureaucratic definition constituted under the state power (Makdisi et al 1996:244/5; Lukacs 1971:136/7; Miliband 59/60 60; Jameson 1992:35/6 373/9; Bowles and Gintis 1986:13/4).

Thus the attempt is made to address the crisis of Marxism as opportunity as well as defeat (Clarke 1991:328). As Sherman argues, whilst some thought that the collapse of the old soviet Marxism would mean the end of Marxism as such 'the result has been the flourishing of a new Marxism, the foundations of which were laid by the painstaking work of hundreds of Marxian scholars over the last forty years' (Sherman 1995:12). The collapse of party-state socialism does not mean the victory of capitalism. On the contrary, this collapse of party-state socialism can be interpreted as a crisis in the possibility of the political regulation of a crisis that now penetrates deeply into the capital system itself and, as such, exists as the possibility for a socialism that goes much deeper to the roots of the social metabolic order than a politicised socialism ever did or could (Meszaros 1995:xiv 702).

 This being the case, the substitute socialism practised for most of the twentieth century will no longer suffice. The half measures that have secured the hegemony of the working class are less and less possible. Capitalism is no longer reformable (Mattick 1978:230; Meszaros 1995:713). The path is cleared for a genuine socialism.

The Distinction Between Critical-Emancipatory Marxism And Scientific-Deterministic Marxism
What Smith calls the 'burying' of Marx's Marxism (Smith 1996) was accompanied by the restoration of the theoretico-elitist model that Marx had sought to demolish. Once more society had to be divided into two, one part, an ideal part, raised upon the general determinism afflicting the other. Only an elite could know and act (Jay 1984:58). The restoration of the passive approach to knowledge and the restoration of the passive approach to politics went hand in hand. The human subject was once more restored to a passive role in relation to circumstances. 

The critical and emancipatory dimension of Marx's Marxism was lost in all of this. Dialectics, the scandal and abomination of the bourgeoisie and all passive approaches to knowledge and politics, came to be suppressed. Value was discarded, and with it class understanding and the commitment to the proletariat as the subject of revolutionary social transformation. For Hilferding 'the politics of Marxism is, like its theory, free from value judgements. It is therefore false to identify Marxism directly with socialism' (Hilferding 1980). For Kautsky the materialist conception of history is, 'as scientific doctrine, in no way connected with the proletariat', it is a 'purely scientific doctrine' which is proletarian only to the extent to which it is recognised by the proletariat and, one might add, by its political and intellectual representatives.

These statements of the priority of correct scientific knowledge are by no means isolated examples. Further, they come from two 'eminent' Marxists, giving a view of Marxism that distorts Marx’s argument entirely. Both of them completely fail to understand Marx's dialectic. Marxism ceases to be 'in its essence a critical and revolutionary method' and instead becomes a reflective science, separated from practice and designed not to change the world but to interpret it. Or govern it. This apparently ‘scientific’ ‘vulgar marxism’ also claims that socialism grows 'naturally', that it 'must’ come about quite independently of human will. This may soothe and convince the philistine spirit in many who like to belief that the course of history is moving in their side, but in actual fact it is as unscientific as it could possibly be. And it is a complete distortion of Marx's theory. The fundamental misunderstanding which underlies these notions is their separation of consciousness from its object (and consequently of theory from practice). This separation occurs because they fail to see through the reified appearance of capitalist relations of production, which seem to them to confront human beings as 'natural’ relations rather than as the human relations which they actually are.

Marx's concrete application of the dialectic in these questions can only be grasped if we recognise the humanist character of his theory. This means adopting the conception of social man as the subject-object of knowledge, the conception of being as human being and of consciousness as conscious being: this is the step which turns Marxism into a theory of revolution. When Vico wrote that man was capable of knowing the social world because man himself had created it, he was already seeking a way of associating knowledge with transformation. But by locating human consciousness in human reality, Marx showed that knowledge represents a transformation of reality from the very beginning. Theory has become practical; practice, conversely, has become conscious. The way is open towards real knowledge, and towards the accompanying transformation of social life: 'social life’, argued Marx, 'is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice' (Jakubowski 1990:64).

I will, therefore, distinguish critical-emancipatory Marxism from the scientistic-deterministic Marxism which has prevailed since the time of the Second International. This distinction draws upon Gouldner’s notion of the two marxisms (Gouldner 1980). The Marxism that is in crisis, it may be pointed out, is precisely this scientistic and deterministic Marxism that has privileged 'the economy' as an objective datum and has asserted objective structures and relations over creative human agency (Bonefeld et al vol I 1992:xii; Bonefeld et al vol II 1992:xii/xiii; Bonefeld et al 1995:161/2). Such a Marxism, it is clear, must reflect the crisis of these structures and relations and hence suffers as the crisis of capitalism penetrates to the capital system itself (Open Marxism 1992:xii).

This Marxism became increasingly remote from the practical struggles and material organisations of the proletarian class subject in coming to concentrate upon the interpretation of society rather than its transformation. Meszaros thus demands that socialist politics transcends the institutional forms of political action and asserts and diffuses its own transient power through an effective transfer of power to the sphere of mass self-activity. He thus demands a new mode of political action and a new structure of social/economic and political interchanges which ensure the fusion of the power of political decision making with the social base from which it has been alienated for so long (Meszaros 1995:951).

The Marxism which is in crisis is one that no longer interacted with society and which possessed no relation to the social actors in this society other than the false claim to represent such actors in an abstracted sense. As 'theory', this Marxism was entangled in existing reality and came to share the ideological projections of this alienated world. The scientist and determinism reproduced the 'objective' and external character of the alien world (Ferraro 1992:27/8 192/5 198).





And there is another aspect to this. In reacting against scientistic-deterministic Marxism, post-marxism has come nowhere near close to addressing the problem. Like all reactions it has gone from one extreme to the other, reproducing the same problem in inverted form. Where once economics determined all, now ideology and politics are all determining (Eagleton 1991:205, 206). Unfortunately, the old problem was less economic determinism than the passive-elitist politics which such determinism rationalised (Callinicos 1976:16, 1985:65). In other words, ideology and politics were in control all along after the relocation of the site and agency of socialism from society and the class subject to the political and the party-state.

Post-marxism takes the 'new times' at their surface level and hence comes to theorise social developments uncritically, taking each new phenomenon as further evidence for the demise of capitalism and, with it, the perspectives of Marxism (Bonefeld et al vol I 1992: xvii/xviii). The important point here is that such a post-marxism, in the name of rejecting economic determinism, actually suppresses revolutionary possibilities every bit as effectively as the old deterministic Marxism. For, it is clear, post-marxism remains at the level of a determinism. The point is not that we have 'new times', and that, therefore, Marxism is outmoded. It matters that these 'new times' have been delivered over above the heads of human actors by technological developments. This is as scientistic and deterministic a view as anything offered by the economic determinists (Bonefeld 1992:x/xi).

Something that is worth underlining is that the assertions of the post-marxists, that Marxism has been outmoded or that Marxism is an economism to be rejected, is associated with the determined offensive waged by the state and capital against the material organisations of the working class (Eagleton 1991:205; Bonefeld 1992:x/xi). Those who have failed to register the struggles of the working class, or who used the term 'economism' to conveniently distance themselves from the class struggle, must be guilty of wilful blindness. The case seems less to be that Marxism is outmoded and the working class unrevolutionary than another goal entirely is preferred. Laclau and Mouffe at least retain a commitment to some kind of socialism. The problem is that it is hard, on their own premises, to see how they can give reasons for this commitment (Eagleton 1991:215f).

This perhaps gives us an angle on Perry Anderson's own evaluation of the crisis of Marxism. He gives two aspects to this crisis. The first refers to the difficulty that Marxism has had in reconciling structure and agency (Anderson 1983). And it is true that Marxism in its scientistic-deterministic form has tended to privilege structure over human agency (Aronowitz 1983:xii). There is a need to recover the constitutive power of the human subject and its struggles. The second aspect refers to marxism's failure to deliver on its emancipatory promise. If successful practice is a test of 'truth' - though Marxists have seldom been so crude - then the political collapse of organised Marxism must indicate marxism's deficiencies in some way (Perkins 1993:4). Of course one could argue that the collapse of the Marxist parties indicate deficiencies in their own marxism’s rather than in Marxism in general.

One must continue to ask where the proletarian class subject is in all this failure of Marxism. Thomas refers to 'a hundred years or so of chercher le proletariat' (Thomas 1980:353). The greatest failure of Marxism is arguably the distance that it officially put between itself and the material organisations and practices of the proletariat (Clarke 1991:323). If one argues, like Aron, that 'the party' had to mediate as an 'ersatz proletariat' in the absence of a revolutionary proletariat (Merquior 1986:58), then one needs to explain, for instance, socialistic, if not exactly revolutionary, activity of the working class that has occurred independently of the socialist parties throughout the twentieth century. Indeed, the revolutionary syndicalism and industrial unionism of the early century can be understood, in part, as a reaction on the part of the working class against the political-parliamentary turn of a Marxism which expropriated socialism from the class at the close of the nineteenth century and invested it in what Bakunin called the 'red bureaucracy’. 

The relocation of socialism from the social to the political level, that is, an abstracted political level still separated from social relationships and struggles, merits further examination (Callaghan 1990; Kendall 1969).

'Proletarian’ Theory
Marx's Marxism is an emancipatory and critical project that must always critique not just the inverted social world but, also, the inversion through which 'theory' itself exists. Edgley argues for the connection between Marx's theory or Marxism and the working class movement. This is the same connection that has been argued for here by affirming the self-made social world, social matter, as proletarian, emancipatory activity which will rupture rationalised, alienative relations (Psychopedis in Bonefeld. et al I 1992:38/9). To state his case Edgley quotes from the Manifesto of the Communist Party:

Just as the economists are the scientific representatives of the bourgeois class, so the socialists and the Communists are the theoreticians of the proletarian class.. in the measure that history moves forward, and with it the struggle of the proletariat assumes clearer outlines, they no longer need to seek science in their minds; they have only to take note of what is happening before their eyes and to become its mouthpiece.

Edgley argues that Marx's science 'aligns itself with the working class by theoretically supporting the working class movement, as its theoretical mouthpiece actually calling for .. revolutionary change' (Edgley in .McLellan ed.1983:290/1). Similarly, Marx's claim that the 'theoretical conclusions of the Communists .. merely express in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle', is taken by Edgley to suggest a close relationship 'according to which social scientific theory may express or be the mouthpiece of a social movement .. not simply as speaking of it but as speaking for it' (Edgley in Mepham and Ruben ed.III 1979:27). This enables Edgley to criticise Marxists like Althusser for the 'continuing theoreticist tendency in his understanding of Marxist science'. This tendency is a relic of bourgeois science and is due to the failure to 'appreciate the full philosophical depth of Marx's theoretical revolution and thus the way in which Marxist science, without deserting its scientific standpoint, constitutes itself theoretically as the mouthpiece of the workers' movement and their political revolution' (Edgley in Mepham and Ruben ed.III 1979:26). 

The closeness of the relationship between Marxism and the working class subject is something to be affirmed. Marxism may be defined as the theory and practice not merely of proletarian revolution but of proletarian self-emancipation. However, it is advisable to qualify this position as it stands. Marx's argument in the Manifesto purported to show the closeness of the relationship between the communists and the workers. The proletarian movement is not to be moulded by 'sectarian principles' introduced from the outside. In this sense the communists are class conscious workers, and communism is the class consciousness of the working class. Meszaros is, therefore, quite right to oppose Marx's original idea of producing communist consciousness on a mass scale - 'with its necessary implication of an inherently open organisational structure' - to the self-defensively closed structure of the vanguard party (Meszaros 1995:675). 

At the same time, one may suspect something a little defensive in Marx's presentation of the relationship between communists and proletarians. He is denying that the former are in some way removed from the latter. But Marx is aware that communism and the communist consciousness are, in being ‘advanced’, in some way distinct from the existing state of consciousness in the existing proletariat. Marx's Marxism, in other words, cannot simply be the 'mouthpiece' of the workers movement. It constitutes itself theoretically not so much as the mouthpiece of the proletarian movement but rather from the proletarian standpoint. 

As Parekh explains: ‘Marx could not simply take over and theoretically justify the opinions of the proletariat, for these are all derived from the ideologically constituted social world, and necessarily “vulgar”. Marx could not simply accept and theorise their experiences either, because they, too, are by definition confined to the surface of society. Nor could he accept and articulate what are called the “instincts”, “yearnings” or “unconscious aspirations” of the proletariat. These are all vague metaphors, and could hardly be the basis of a scientific theory. Besides, as Marx himself says, many of the proletarian “yearnings” are really bourgeois in nature. One must therefore criticise them and decide which of them are socialist. This presupposes a standard which cannot itself be derived from them’ (Parekh 1982:174).

But if this standard is independent of the proletarian movement are we not back to 'sectarian principles', vanguardism and a communism detached from the proletarian movement? Marx in the Manifesto is clearly concerned to deny the charge and hence to propose precisely the organic link between communism and the proletarian movement which Edgley defends. But Marx cannot be committed to the view that communism and the communist consciousness is whatever the proletarian movement at any one time thinks. But does this not mean that Marx does, after all, prescribe for the proletarian movement? If so, what happens to Marxism as the theory and practice of proletarian self-emancipation? And of what status is the 'self’ in this definition?

It is indeed a virtue to be wise to the dangers of vanguardism and substitutionism, the dangers of the actual proletariat as revolutionary class subject being replaced by its political and intellectual representatives. However there is something amiss in identifying communism and the Marxist critique of bourgeois theory and the fetishistic world it expresses with the proletariat as such. This, arguably, detracts from Marx's point in advocating what Parekh calls the proletarian point of view - that is, in the first place, the critique of what specifically is alienative and exploitative about capitalism and, in the second place, the communist society as the truly human society which is historically immanent and hence realizable.

What is needed, in other words, is a way of upholding the principle of proletarian self-emancipation, respecting the proletariat as the revolutionary class subject, whilst affirming communism as the historically immanent alternative to the existing alienative and exploitative relations of capitalism. The proletariat may well be part of that immanence. Marx, after all, described the revolutionary class as the most important productive force.









One may quibble over the notion of Marx supplying the proletariat with its point of view. The accent ought to be upon the production of communist class consciousness from within the very process of self-development in which the proletariat converts itself from being a class-in-itself to being a class-for-itself.

For Marxism there is thus a requirement for self-criticism. Marxism must needs be critical of itself. This is another way of expressing scepticism as regards marxism’s adventures as 'scientific theory'. For, without the critical and emancipatory component, acting as a force for change within the world, Marxism becomes 'uncritical theory’ as it were, part of the fetishistic world and its ideological projections. And it suffers the crisis of this world too.

On account of his stance, Edgley must sacrifice critique to the thoughts, acts and interests of a particular class, the proletariat. Edgley's intentions are politically honourable and represent a valuable attempt to affirm the centrality of the proletarian class subject to Marxism. But there is a sense in which Marx's motivations in taking the proletarian standpoint have been missed.

One refers here to the proletariat as the universal class, the class whose emancipation enables human emancipation in general. Whether or not one accepts this 'universal' significance of the proletariat is not the issue here. What is to be noted is that Marx does not identify his communism or Marxist critique with the interests of the proletariat. The class interests of the proletariat are important to Marx in coinciding with the interests of humanity in general. Parekh concludes:





The Crisis Of The Political Agencies

The crisis of Marxism, then, is a crisis in the political agencies of socialism but also a crisis in the capital system and a corresponding crisis in theory. And the argument presented here holds that these crises all form a general crisis in which Marxism may come to trace its way back to the struggles of the proletariat and to revolutionary politics. The old arguments for the 'inevitability' of socialism - the evolutionary turn associated with the 'passive radicalism' (Bricianer 1978:129) of the party - have collapsed. Socialism as the realm of freedom will not be produced automatically through the evolution of the objective laws of capital's realm of necessity. The passive waiting upon the unsocial, objective socialisation of economic relations under capitalism has 'evolved' only the capital system. Such an evolutionary socialism devalued the revolutionary activity of the proletariat which, it is no pedantry to observe, was the very condition and content of the achievement of socialism as a realm of freedom. The transition to socialism is not subject to bureaucratic engineering but is a process of emancipation in which human beings actively and consciously participate (Ferraro 1992:41/2; Howard 1971:17).

The point, after all, is the recovery of the human world by and for human beings themselves. With the bureaucratic conception - and theory reproduces itself and the world it studies as 'things' subject only to bureaucratic control - the human subject remains external to its own alienated world and hence remains the object of processes which exist outside of itself - the condition of alienation (Clarke 1991:288). The problem with party-state socialism is that this alienation reduced human beings to the status of being objects of their processes was reproduced and in the name of socialism too (Lukacs 1991:144).

The crisis of the modern world, of the capital system, of political regulation and of theory, insofar as it affects Marxism, may be understood as marxism's failure to respect the unity of theory and practice and hence resist the dualism of theory and practice which the dualistic nature of bourgeois society presses upon it.

These manifestations of a crisis of theory are characterised by the failure to mediate their practical concerns with the social form through which these concerns exist and which this practice sets out to transform. In contrast to an unmediated conception which ascribes objectivity to historical development and against an equally unmediated notion of the subjectivity of historical practice. Marxism's continued self-reflection upon itself goes forward through the concept of mediation and the method of dialectics. Dialectical theory confronts existing social and theoretical forms with a comprehensive conception of content, materiality and humanity.

Bonefeld et al ed. 1995:4

4 WHICH MARX? WHICH MARXISM?

Re-examining Marx with a purpose to recovering the revolutionary-emancipatory dynamic within assumes the continuing relevance of Marx and Marxism. This is not a fashionable view. The Times Higher Educational Supplement published a provocative, but sympathetic, article which asked why we should still study Marx. Marx is being abandoned not only politically but also intellectually, rejected in favour, even, of the Utopian socialists he himself sought to consign to the past (McCann, Off Your Marx?, The Times Higher Education Supplement, April 29 1994).

It would seem, then, that the abandonment of Marxism as a practical political project may well entail the abandonment even of Marxism as an academic project. Thus, the very defensive reply that Marx will remain as important to study as any of the great political philosophers (Aristotle, Plato, Hegel etc.) (Graham McCann. The Times Higher Education Supplement April 29 1994) cannot even be counted on.

One can affirm Marx's intellectual merits and achievements. As a political philosopher, Marx does deserve a place alongside the Hobbes’ and the Rousseau's of this world. The point is that such a treatment of Marx affirms the redundancy of his thought. Marx joins the ‘dead philosophers society’ in the History of Political Philosophers. 

Does it matter? Is Marx to be left to the teachers and students of the History of Political Thought, to be read alongside Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes and Rousseau? To answer in the affirmative is to accept that since Marxism has failed as an articulation of the political struggle against an exploitative and alienative society, it is better to leave Marx and Marxism to the teachers of political theory. 

There are many grounds for arguing that Marx’s time is still to come, particularly since the globalisation of economic relations means that capitalism is finally becoming the universal mode of production that Marx was the first to outline. It is the argument of this thesis that Marxism remains the most powerful critique of society and social forms that exists, the most powerful practical-critical negation of capitalism that has been developed. But this refers to a Marxism that is inherently critical and practical in its relation to the world.

To demonstrate this clearly it is necessary but not sufficient to expose the failures of party political and state socialism. There is also a need to identify some deep-rooted conceptual problems in the Marxist tradition, highlighting those principles which remain pertinent in the process (Bonefeld et al 1995:157).

Of course, one can still read the philosophers, be inspired by them and have possibilities suggested by them. The likes of Kant and Spinoza and Mill are never 'dead' in this sense. But this approach to Marx turns critique back into theory so that Marx’s work ceases to be Marxism in any real sense and has instead becomes the subject of scholarly interpretation and reinterpretation in the field of political theory. Marx's Marxism made the move from theory to the practical struggles to transform the world from within its own material sphere. And that is where any real Marxism is always located. Marxism can, in this sense, reclaim its relevance as a viable emancipatory-revolutionary project capable of being a factor in the transformation of society. And it is as such that Marxism remains the best hope we have in the struggle against the rule of capital. As Meszaros argues, there is not another emancipatory project in sight (Meszaros 1995:702). That in itself does not make Marxism right. It is the critical relation to social reality that ensures continuing relevance.

But in making these bold claims there is a critical need to be clear as to which 'marxism’ is being referred to. There have been many marxisms which have been anything but emancipatory and critical and which, correspondingly, have not even challenged, let alone overcome, the capital system. Such marxisms have, at best, succeeded only in instituting a rational and bureaucratic socialism. It matters less whether one refers to state capitalism (Cliff), bureaucratic collectivism, the ‘new class’ (Djilas) or managerial socialism (Burnham) than to understand the general criticisms made of the kind of socialism developed by the parties in the early to mid-twentieth century. Max Weber's argument is relevant here, as is that of Michels and the revolutionary syndicalists (Levy ed.1987:92; Turner 1993:5 214; Sayer 1991:145/6, Weber 1970:209; Weber 1964:248). Such a socialism produces not a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ but a dictatorship of the officials over the proletariat.

There is a need, therefore, to distinguish between the different marxisms, employing the distinction between a scientistic-deterministic Marxism, on the one hand, and a critical-emancipatory Marxism, on the other. By differentiating in this way it becomes possible to demonstrate the narrow and impoverished conception of Marxism that has been established by adherents and criticised by critics. Critics, it may be argued, had a vested interest in accepting Stalin's authority to proclaim the truth about Marxism. Interestingly, Karl Popper's assault on Marx in The Open Society and its Enemies derived its view of Marx from a single Stalinist publication. Bryan Magee nevertheless finds it hard to understand how anyone could be a Marxist after Popper's critique (Magee 1973:92). Many Marxists have also denounced the Stalinist conception of Marxism. Rather than pursue this kind of defence, though, it is much more profitable to pursue Popper's meaningful distinction between 'Marx the prophet' and ‘Marx the maker', emphasising that it is human beings, as thinking, acting, moral beings, who make their own history and are capable of subverting or altering so called historical 'laws'. That was precisely Marx’s point concerning human freedom as a conscious self-determination as against the external determinism of capitalism as an alienated system of production.

Most importantly, and with respect to the criticisms made by the anarchists going back to Proudhon and Bakunin, and expressed later by the likes of Malatesta, Kropotkin, Berkman and Goldman, one has to consider the serious question of whether the statism of Marxism in practice has its roots in Marx's work itself (Carter 1988; Bookchin 1971:162 185 208/10 212; Bookchin 1980:195/6 222/3). Bookchin goes so far as to argue that 'Marx's work is not only the most sophisticated ideology of state capitalism but it impedes a truly revolutionary conception of freedom' (Bookchin 1980:209). This view given coherent intellectual form by Alan Carter. (Carter 1988).





Marx's Marxism, it could be argued, always invited the political-parliamentary turn. Marx himself had to respond to the criticisms coming from the anarchists that he had diverted the socialist movement into bourgeois political channels. Marx could defend himself by arguing for liberal democracy as a real achievement, as a 'political emancipation' presaging human emancipation in general (Marx EW OJQ 1975), by pointing to the material benefits of legislative activity (Marx FI 1974:89), by indicating that the working class themselves took this route and therefore needed no direction (Marx 1974:328/9), by arguing for the need for the proletariat to develop its political organisation (Marx 1974:269/70 324), and by never failing to insist that political activity, whatever its positive merits, could never substitute for emancipation achieved through social revolution (Marx 1974:270). The anarchists argued all along that the political route to socialism would be a dead end. Marx had a more nuanced view which recognised the tendencies of the workers movement to take this route.

In time, however, Marx himself became increasingly disillusioned as to the character of Social Democracy. The stricture that political activity is to be accompanied by class struggle in society was not respected. Perhaps Marx was mistaken to think that those removed from society in parliament would see a unity between political and social struggles whereas in truth they came to see proletarian class struggle and extra-parliamentary action as a threat to their own position (Miliband 1987; Coates 1975).

Thus, one does not need to make convenient scapegoats out of Kautsky and Lenin so as to pull Marx safely clear of the wreckage of state socialism. The critique of the political and intellectual foundations of state socialism do address the distortion of Marx's Marxism and reveal a reversion to the theoretico-elitist model that Marx had eliminated from revolutionary politics. But one has also to go to the roots themselves. It is too easy to condemn Lenin as distorting Marxism to suit his pursuit of power. If power is all that Lenin wanted, as Mattick claims (Mattick 1978:55), then there were other, easier, routes than that of embracing revolutionary Marxism in Tsarist Russia. The ambiguities in Lenin's thought were genuine and not a pose (Harrington 1993:63/4). They remain the ambiguities of the politics of socialism, as to what precisely political action entails in a movement focused on social movement. The question is an old one, the question of the transition from philosophy to politics that troubled Plato all those years ago.

And these tensions in Marxism as politics go back to Marx. Lenin invited a heap of criticism from Luxemburg when he portrayed the social democrat as a class conscious Jacobin (Thomas 1994:123/4; Howard ed.1971:290). Jacobinism is the expression of bourgeois political revolution. Marxism, the theory and practice of proletarian self-emancipation has nothing to do with Jacobinism (Meszaros 1989:336 337 356; Smith 1996:39; Frolich 1994:96/101 101/3 154/5 241/3; Howard ed.1971:11 22 41 131 273 280/2). Yet it could be argued that Lenin had seized upon an aspect of revolutionary politics which Marx, despite his best efforts, had never quite succeeded in eliminating from his own politics. As Guerin points out, Marx occasionally gives expression to Jacobinism (Guerin in Goodway ed.1989:120/1). It is this Jacobin residue that could be seized upon as the political revolution which proceeds over the heads of the proletariat, replacing the idea of social revolution through the agency of the proletariat. The anarchists, again, were alert to the danger, although they have mistaken this unconscious Jacobin residue which Marx thought he had eliminated for the real character of Marx's Marxism. One can recognise the tension without having to argue that the Kautsky-Lenin thesis was as valid as the Luxemburg-Pannekoek thesis. There are, in short, ways of critically evaluating the various marxisms and of determining the character of the authentic Marxism of Marx. Were this not so one may as well abandon the re-examination of Marx to utter confusion. To get somewhere close to this authentic Marxism as an emancipatory project of proletarian self-emancipation - and why the proletariat should be considered as the revolutionary subject - means going back to Marx's own critique. From here, one is in the position to criticise marxisms vicissitudes as Social (parliamentary) Democracy and as Communism and to show why the collapse of state socialism is less the final defeat and failure of Marxism than the opportunity for its recovery for the emancipatory struggles and practices which will take place as the capital system is paralysed by crisis.

Beyond Marx?
Recent literature is full of the theme of 'going beyond' or 'regaining' or 'reinventing' or 'reconstructing' Marx and Marxism (examples include Schechter 1994; Makdisi et al 1996 Marxism Beyond Marxism; Wright, Levine, Sober 1992; Post 1996; Sherman 1996). Insofar as this theoretical activity going beyond Marxism is related to the achievement of the emancipated social world one can agree - though in truth this aim in itself is quite within the Marxist tradition (Aronowitz 1981:viii). But the idea of going beyond Marx and Marxism begs the question of which Marx and which Marxism is being left behind.

As Negri asks: ‘beyond Marx? But beyond which Marx? The Marx taught by the schools of the Party? Or the Marx that we discover in the practico-theoretical moment of the working class and proletarian struggle?’ (Negri 1991:14).

In this sense, going beyond Marxism means going beyond Social Democracy and Communism - which Schechter urges - but back to Marx's Marxism as the theory and practice of proletarian self-emancipation leading to the emancipated social world. And, bearing the aim of the emancipated social world in mind, one recalls Sartre's statement that so many attempts to go beyond Marx end up in a position before him. Sartre thus pointed to the achievement of the realm of freedom as the condition of going beyond Marxism (Sartre 1968:34). Until the emancipated social world is achieved, then Marxism, in some form, will remain relevant. Sartre's point, it needs to be recognised, will not, however, be accepted by those who believe that Marx and Marxism are obstacles in the attainment of the free society (Carter 1988:269).

For Harrington, Marx provides solid authority for contradictory positions. He argues that Marx's Capital gives justification for both the state planning of the economy but also for 'grasping the positive potential of markets even as that book brilliantly denounces their functioning under laisser-faire' (Harrington 1993:220). Can there be a Marxism for the markets, a market marxism? Robert Meister thinks so (Meister 1990:311). N Scott Arnold thinks not, arguing that Marx’s writings neither work in practice nor theory. The Yugoslavs sought to assert a market socialism against socialism as state bureaucratic control (Bottomore 1990:76/9 89/90). Marx himself can give justification, seemingly, to all points.

The truth is that Marx was a very peculiar theoretician. He was a theoretician who held to the unity of theory and practice. Marx took theory to the world and overcame that separation of theory from the real world. Marx's theoretical work thus had a practical relation to the world and its struggles. Indeed, the content and categories of Capital, to take one instance of Marx’s writings, were influenced by the contemporary struggles of the proletariat (Dunayevskaya 1988). 
What this means is that Marx's concerns changed in time and, what is more, that Marx would shift the emphases within his body of ideas according to intellectual, political and proletarian struggles. It was Engels more than Marx who had to confront the attempts by followers to construct a consistent theory out of Marx's work. Marx himself had to deny that his work offered a philosophico-historical master key. And perhaps it would have been better for Engels to have refused to sanction the codification of 'marxism' as orthodoxy.

Engels was engaged in a futile project. The creation of 'orthodoxy’ assumes that there is such a thing as a distinct, coherent body of thought called 'marxism’. Indeed, I have continually referred to 'Marx's marxism', as though there exists an authentic Marxism of Marx that lacks tensions and inconsistencies. This is misleading. It all depends upon what one chooses to stress and why.

Thus, in Marx himself, one will found what could be called an economic determinism which privileges structure over agency (Capital I 26). But one will also find Marx arguing for the creative significance of human agency (MECW iv 1975:93; Marx 1974:82). If capitalism will collapse on account of its own internal mechanisms, Marx nevertheless affirms that the revolutionary class itself is the most important of the productive forces (Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy Moscow nd 146). One will find the assertion of the base over the superstructure and yet have Marx arguing in terms of an interactive relationship. There is Marx who theorises the broad sweep of history around material relations and Marx the critic of specific political conjunctures in which politics possesses significance as a shaping force. There is Marx writing of the structural power and logic of capital and of the way that the labour process, the political sphere and history in general are constituted by the systemic imperatives of the process of private accumulation (Capital I). There is Marx the humanist criticising capital's alienated system of production as a dehumanisation, asserting the rule of human beings over the rule of capital (Capital I). In the Manifesto of the Communist Party there is Marx the hard headed revolutionary politician alongside the Marx the Utopian arguing for the free association of individuals.

The problem with Marxism as 'orthodoxy' is that an awful lot of Marx’s own positions are, by comparison, unorthodox. And it is not just a case of the Second International deviating from Marx. Marx possibly did increasingly emphasise the 'objectivist' aspects of capitalism's crisis, the collapse of capitalism as a result of its own internal mechanisms. More important than this, however, is to recognise that Marx himself was inherently unorthodox, revisionist and downright heretical as regards his own thought. He was critical in relation to changing social circumstances and relations. He would adjust according to real developments and class struggles. 

One could go one forever citing different aspects of Marx's work. At each phase in his career Marx had different problems and targets to deal with, taking something from each phase. There is Marx and Feuerbachian humanism; Marx and Hegelian political philosophy; Marx the radical democrat at the time of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung; Marx the communist, even Marx the Blanquist (1850); Marx the scientific critic of political economy and capital; the Marx of the International; Marx and the Paris Commune; Marx and the rise of German Social Democracy; Marx the critic of German Social Democracy (1875).

There would appear to be a Marx for every occasion and for every political position. Marx, moreover, was a voluminous writer at each and every phase. Marx's thinking is not at all easy to get hold of. One can affirm the idea that this work was firmly based upon a unity and consistency of purpose. One can find a stress upon the importance of material factors in the early writings just as one can find Marx asserting the need for proletarian revolutionary activity in the later work. It is too simple to argue that Marx's stress on the revolutionary agency of the proletariat in the early work came to be displaced by the stress on the objective mechanisms of capital in the later work. Marx's emphases changed, but not the emancipatory purpose.

One can understand, however, how different marxisms could be created from the different Marx's that appear at different phases of his career. It is not clear that Marx can be held responsible for this 'confusion'. For Marx was actually trying to keep abreast of changes in material reality and trying to distil lessons from material developments and an ongoing class praxis.

One needs to address this question of 'which marxism?' and this means recognising that the Marxism of Marx is significantly different from the Marxism of the parties. From another angle it means considering that the parties were dealing with the problems of a material reality that had moved some way on from Marx. Revision or deviation, even, is a condition of a living Marxism. But there are limits to how far revision can go without becoming an outright distortion.

The Core Ideas
There are so many Marx's, not to mention so many marxisms, that it could seem to be an impossible task to establish coherence. There is even a question as to whether we need to establish coherence in any case. There is no question of treating Marxism as an homogeneous or generic phenomenon. However, having affirmed the complexity of the issue it is possible to bring some form to the material. For there is a unity of purpose in Marx's practical and theoretical endeavour. 

Heilbroner identifies four essential components of Marxism. (1980:20/2). Firstly, there is the view of capital. Secondly there is the dialectical approach to knowledge, comprehending the 'innermost nature of things to be dynamic and conflictual rather than inert and static'. Thirdly, there is the materialist conception of history, focusing upon the centrality of how human beings organise themselves socially to produce their material means of existence, how this shapes other spheres and involves class struggle. Fourthly, there is the view that it is important not merely to interpret the world but to change it. This involves a commitment to socialism.

Marx's Marxism will here be distinguished from the Marxism of the Marxists. For, when all concessions have been made to Marxists operating in different times, the criticism may still be made that a significant deviation from Marx's Marxism took place and was taking place even before Marx died. Marx himself saw the beginnings of this process in German Social Democracy and criticised it, without much hope it would seem (Circular Letter, Critique of the Gotha Programme).

Marx Between Libertarianism And Authoritarianism
But what is more interesting than contrasting Marx's Marxism with that of those schools and parties which came later is to consider the tension within Marx himself between libertarian and authoritarian conceptions of socialism. Marx's critique of alienation in both its political and economic forms, not only of capital as 'dead’ labour dominating living labour but also of the state as the institutional expression of alienation in civil society, can be described as libertarian to the core. Similarly, Marx’s revolutionary-critical praxis is the attempt to undercut the dualism between rulers and ruled, circumstances and people, educators and educated in knowledge and politics. Marx is attempting to subvert the epistemological and materialist determinism which leads some to claim power over others and postulates an ideal agency raised above the determined mass. Marx's is a project of restitution in which the human subject practically reappropriates the power alienated to the state and capital and self-organises itself and its power socially.

But there is still a criticism, coming from the anarchists, that Marx never quite exorcised the authoritarianism deriving from the French revolutionary tradition. Some anarchists, in truth, believe that Marx's thought is inherently authoritarian but this view is the easiest to dispose of. Those anarchists who give a more sophisticated presentation of Bakunin's nightmare state socialist scenario need to explain the fact that Bakunin in his own practice was guilty of all that he accused Marx of. Bakunin’s own attempts to take over the International tend to undermine the anarchist view of Marx's activities (as Draper has convincingly shown 1990:ch2).

More challenging is Guerin's view that Marx jumped backwards and forwards between libertarianism and authoritarianism and never quite succeeded in choosing between these two aspects (Guerin in Goodway ed. 1989:111). Guerin goes much further than most anarchists in recognising the libertarianism of Marx's thought (Guerin 1970:144), and in being prepared to recognise that Bakunin's accusations against Marx were a distortion of the truth (Guerin 1970:23/4). But in drawing attention to a possible authoritarianism or Jacobinism, Guerin is urging us to see Marx's emancipatory project through to its full realisation (Guerin in Goodway ed.1989:124/5). The libertarianism has to be made consistent and thoroughgoing, ruling out any further possibilities of authoritarian deviations under a politicising and rationalising Marxism. Depending upon how one reads it, this thesis could be portrayed as the exorcism of the Marxist in Marx insofar as 'the Marxist' refers to epistemological determinism and political authoritarianism; alternatively, it could be portrayed as the exorcism of the unmarxist in Marx insofar as Marx is identified with the libertarian thrust and logic of his thought over against the residues of Jacobinism.

Closed Marxism
The consistent recovery of the critical-emancipatory themes of Marx's Marxism must confront marxism’s vicissitudes as scientistic-determinist Marxism.

'Closed’ Marxism is Marxism which does either or both of two interrelated things: it accepts the horizons of a given world as its own theoretical horizons and/or it announces a determinism which is causalist or teleological as the case may be.. These two aspects of closure are interrelated because acceptance of horizons amounts to acceptance of their inevitability and because deterministic theory becomes complicit in the foreclosing of possibilities which a contradictory world entails.
This being so, a central target for Marxism with an open character is fetishism. Fetishism is the construal (in theory) and the constitution (in practice) of social relations as 'thinglike', perverting such relations into a commodified and sheerly structural form. Closed Marxism substitutes fetishised theory for the - critical - theory of fetishism which open Marxism undertakes. Hostile to the movement of contradiction, the former reinforces and reproduces the fetishism which, officially, it proclaims against. It follows that the crisis of structures is equally the crisis of the Marxism which takes structures as its reference point, and however allegedly 'flexible' the structures, the crisis of their theory runs no less deep.

Bonefeld et al ed. vol I 1992:xii

Accordingly, the category of fetishism is central to the project of asserting an open Marxism over the closed Marxism that has been the dominant tradition. The recovery of critical and emancipatory themes, however, should be distinguished from western Marxism as much as from orthodox Marxism, despite apparent similarities. For my contention is that neither orthodox nor western Marxism has held to the emancipatory commitment which sustained Marx's work. Marx was not criticising an inverted, fetishised world from a position outside of it which, arguably, characterised the position of western Marxists. He was not engaged in a project of 'consciousness raising', as Harry Cleaver makes clear (Cleaver 1979:40/3).

The problem with orthodox Marxism is that its theoretical 'objectivism' rationalised a political passivity. Ironically, its 'economistic' assertion of a productive forces determinism could be associated with a devaluation of working class self-activity and self-organisation as itself 'economistic'. This devaluation of the political capacity of the proletariat justified the mediation of the political party between the class struggle and the socialist objective (Bonefeld et al vol II 1992:127/8). That this 'passive radicalism' would reinforce the proletariat's status as mere objects in an alien world was not appreciated. The Kautsky-Lenin thesis that socialist consciousness can only be introduced into the proletariat ‘from the outside’ completely broke Marx's materialist premise and the connection he established between social being and consciousness. The party would function as the ideal agency, raised above a general societal determinism, assuming a position to 'educate' the masses, still passive in relation to circumstances and also in relation to political activity.

Alienation And Economic Determinism
Western Marxism exposed the political and theoretical foundations of the rule of 'the party’ and generated many critical insights into the rational socialism of Social Democracy and Communism. Western Marxism also recovered something of the original critical approach to the fetishistic world (Adorno and Horkheimer 1972). But it could also be argued that western Marxism came to uphold another, albeit more sophisticated, determinism (Clarke 1991:318/23 317). To appreciate this point, one needs to have a grasp of the concept of alienation and how the alienated world can appear to operate according to its own inexorable logic independently of the human subject (Perkins 1993:210). The world appears as beyond the comprehension and control of the human subject. What much of western Marxism did, arguably, was to generalise the fetishism inherent in capital's alienated system of production to embrace the social and cultural institutions of the wider world. The objective determinism of capital expresses the capital system as an alienated system of production. The economic determinism of orthodox Marxism can thus be translated into the sophisticated determinism of the western Marxist concern with alienation, reification and fetishism. The entire world has been colonised by capital. Western Marxism took as its task the theorisation of the many and sophisticated mechanisms of domination exercised over the human subject. Capitalist colonisation, the reification of the world, thus come to appear irrevocable as a result (Clarke 1991:317 318/23; Bonefeld et al 1995:173/4 175).





Of course, this could be considered as a continuation of Marx's own work in examining how the domination of exchange value commodifies and thingifies the world. But the difference is that Marx proposed a way out of this impasse. Alongside the mechanisms of domination, Marx proposed mechanisms of liberation (Cleaver 1979:13/4). For alienation is not a passive process. Alienation is self-alienation and is, therefore, an active process in which the human subject acts, loses power but may also reappropriate that power. Marx's critique thus contains the possibility of an alternative world constituted by the emancipation of the human subject.

The problem with orthodox and western Marxism, then, is that neither tradition could incorporate a shaping role for proletarian class praxis, self-emancipation and autonomy. For Marx's dialectic of labour and capital held the potential for the working class to act and reclaim its power, not by taking over capital as a 'thing' - which could abolish capital-ism only, but by abolishing capital as a social relationship - thus abolishing the capital system itself.

Instead, the position of the philosophers was once more restored. The alienated world was governed by a reification and a fetishism that was mystifying. The working class lost the epistemological capacity to see through capitalist relations, which it had with Marx (Parekh 1982:164/5 168; Colletti 1972:375f; Lukacs 1971:68f 163f). Instead of the proletarian transformation of social reality, such an alienated world must be subject to the critical-theoretical work of the intellectuals. With orthodoxy, Marxism became ‘scientific theory’ formulated independently of the 'economistic' working class struggle and movement and made available to the party. The theoretico-elitist model, demolished by Marx (Theses on Feuerbach) was thus restored in the domination of the intellectuals and the politicians over the proletariat. Proletarian self-development, in which the class develops its own political, organisational, and intellectual capacities, was replaced by the theoretico-elitist model in which these capacities were supplied for the proletarian movement from the outside.

In making these points I am not claiming that Marx was anti-intellectual or anti-political. I am arguing that what Marx did was to subvert the role of the intellectuals and the politicians as thinking and acting independently of the proletarian class subject. It is for the proletarian movement to generate its own intellectual and political significance. The key to effective praxis and successful social transformation, for Marx, was the emergence of the proletariat as a class-for-itself, possessing political, intellectual and organisational capabilities fitting it for the constitution of the socialist social order (Negri 1991).

What Antonio Negri calls proletarian self-valorisation refers to a process of proletarian autonomisation from capitalist valorisation - 'a self-defining, self-determining process which goes beyond the mere resistance to capitalist valorisation to a positive project of self-constitution' (Negri in Bonefeld et al vol II 1992:129). Negri argues that the concept of proletarian self-valorisation is 'implicit in Marx's development of the concept of the working class from labour power through living labour and collective labour to the wage as autonomous power, working class-for-itself and the proletariat as revolutionary subject’ (Negri in Bonefeld et al vol II 1992:129). I develop this idea throughout this thesis.

The Marxism Of The Working Class Subject

The tragedy of Marxism, as Clarke puts it, is that it abandoned this affirmation of working class self-emancipation and put a distance between the class subject and political organisation (Clarke 1991:328). In so doing, Marxism adjusted itself to the alienating dualisms of the bourgeois world - subject and object, theory and practice, the political and the economic - and succeeded only in introducing bourgeois modes of organisation, thought and action in the proletarian movement. This applies to both Social Democracy and Communism.

But there has been another Marxism throughout the century, a subterranean, marginalised and often suppressed tendency (Clarke 1991:51/2). Amongst the names that could be mentioned here include Luxemburg, Pannekoek and Gorter, the early Lukacs, Korsch, Mattick, Bloch, Rubin, Pashukanis, Rosdolsky, Agnoli, Tronti, Negri. Add to these the revolutionary syndicalists, the industrial unionists, the working class militants who combined theory and practice like Tom Mann and James Connolly, and one sees the existence of a very lively heterodox Marxism.

The starting point for considering the power of Marxism as a theory of struggle (and for overcoming the dualism of the orthodox tradition) has to be struggle itself, the subjective, experiential scream of refusal ..., the scream that is muffled by the objectivist 'scientific’ conception of Marxism. The emphasis on subjectivity has been a recurrent theme in anti-orthodox Marxism.

Bonefeld et al III 1995:161/2

This tendency never lost sight of the working class and its material practices and held to Marx's own commitment to the proletarian subject and its class praxis as constitutive of the socialist order. Rosa Luxemburg is probably a common influence in this tendency. Although continuing to work with Social Democratic orthodoxy until the war forced a parting of the ways, Luxemburg could always marshal sharp, critical arguments against Bernstein, Kautsky and Lenin as all departing from Marx’s concern with the actual politics and practices of the working class. In seeking to keep social democracy in touch with the activity of the working class, Luxemburg resisted the renascent Jacobin tendencies of party political socialism by appropriating perspectives drawn from anarchism and from revolutionary syndicalism. Hence, Luxemburg would refer to spontaneity rather than simply self-activity, to the 'mass strike' which the revolutionary syndicalists were advocating at the time. And this assimilation of perspectives outside of official Marxism is not mere opportunism, as Bookchin suggests (Bookchin in Ehrlich ed. 1996:23), but rather the expression of an authentic, emancipatory Marxism.

Of course, this subterranean tendency was unambiguously a workers socialism and could be kept alive, under the shadow of Social Democracy and Communism, by the activity of the workers themselves. Thus, in referring to the intellectual influences of council communists like Pannekoek, Gorter, Roland-Holst, Korsch, the early Lukacs, Gramsci, one has also to the workers councils movement of the late 1910's and early 1920's. Lukacs was correct. The working class, faced with the task of constituting a new social order, will spontaneously constitute themselves in councils as organs of self-government (Lukacs 1971). The council communists, then, could point to the working class struggle for soviet democracy in early twentieth century Russia, culminating in the 1917 Revolution itself.

This movement on the part of the workers for soviet democracy was defeated and the workers once more became objects of the political process (Lukacs 1991:144). The important thing, however, is to note the repeated and continuing tendency for the working class to express their subjectivity through conciliar forms of political organisation. These, it may be argued, are the political-material organs capable of overcoming the bourgeois separation of the political and the social in a way that the political party is not able to (Lukacs 1991:144). What this conciliar politics indicates is an attempt on the part of the working class to create new social relations. That is, they contest capital as a social relation on its own material terrain in a way that the political party, removed at the state level and reproducing the political-economic dualism, cannot.

It is significant that the upsurge of militancy, first in Eastern Europe in the 1950's, but then in the west too in the 1960's was associated with a conciliar politics, this time with a broader class base. Councils, that is, need not be restricted to the factories and the working class. They are popular organs of social self-government to the extent that they are rooted in the communities and relate to the practices that are the basis of a social order. This was Gramsci's view in conceiving of a genuinely 'new politics' (Germino 1990:100). There is, therefore, an appreciation of the pluralism of civil society with such organisational forms. They are forms controlled by people as subjects and are powered from the base up. The political party, in contrast, aggregates individuals as a passive mass and imposes a collective identity upon them from above.

Prefiguration is a key term. The old syndicalist idea of building the social republic within the shell of the political state, itself a reprise of early British workers socialism, once more seems relevant in light of the failure of the politicians to deliver on their promise of instituting socialism from above. The task is to identify those practices and activities which suggest working class autonomy vis-a-vis the state and capital and which, therefore, suggest working class autonomisation in process, the potential for breaking through the institutional and structural constraints of existing society (Bonefeld et al 1995:164 178). The great challenge to any Marxism is to be able to intervene in these transformatory struggles from within rather than from without, to be inside the movement from the start. This would be to see Marxism as the expression of proletarian autonomy and subjectivity.

My recovery of the emancipatory and critical themes that sustained Marx's work as a whole is intended to outline a creative, innovative Marxism that once more can be a force for transforming the world, from within its contradictory, liberatory dynamics. The central categories of this emancipatory project are critique, dialectics, fetishism, praxis and totality. These are interrelated in a critical-emancipatory project.

Subject And Object
Perhaps establishing the antithesis of scientific-deterministic Marxism and critical-emancipatory Marxism is misleading insofar as it suggests an antithesis between an 'objectivist' Marxism and a ‘subjectivist' Marxism. This itself reproduces a dualism that has affected Marxism from the start. Critical-emancipatory Marxism takes care to relate human agency to structure, labour to capital, creative activity and praxis to objective determinations, processes and immanent lines of development. The objective is understood to be in the subjective and the subjective is understood to be in the objective.

Emancipatory politics thus acquires a new dimension, going from negation, mere refusal, to become an affirmation of power. Instead of rejecting an alienating objectification, it becomes possible to embody power in a life affirming form. Where once the starting point was the subjective rejection of objectively alienated existing society, now alienation is dissolved and there is nothing left but the objective power of the subject. The protest of the disempowered, passive prisoner of external circumstances becomes the assertion of the all-powerful subject.

The key to this emancipatory transformation is the concept of labour. The concept of the creative power of human practice, of labour is the cornerstone of Marx's emancipatory project. Marx argues that ‘free conscious activity constitutes the species-character of man’ (Marx EW EPM 1975: 328). Humanity is therefore defined by conscious creative practice. The concept of creative labour is a concept of power. This emerges in Marx’s critique of religion as an expression of human powerlessness. Since human beings are practical, creative beings, then all relations between them must be conceived as practical relations, relations of work: 'all social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice’ (Thesis VIII on Feuerbach). The comprehension of practice is crucial to understanding society since society is itself constituted as the sum of human practice. This is why Marx at the beginning of Capital describes the 'two fold nature of the labour contained’ in commodities as the pivot on which a clear comprehension of Political Economy turns.

Labour, practice and creation are different ways of referring to the same thing. Under the capital system, work exists in the form of the two fold nature of labour, as concrete and abstract labour. The (contradictory and antagonistic) subordination of concrete to abstract labour (the production of value) means that work exists in a form which negates that 'free conscious activity’ which Marx defines as the 'species characteristic of man’. Marx's central criticism of the capital system is not, as is popularly thought, class division as a division between rich and poor. Class exploitation is a species of alienation. Marx criticises the capital system above all as a dehumanisation, a system which denies the human species essence, dehumanising individuals by depriving them of that which makes them human. ‘Yet the existence of work as value producing labour does nothing at all to change the all constitutive power of work: since work is the only creative force in society (any society), it could not be otherwise. The force of Marx's theory of value lies precisely in that: it is simultaneously a theory of the subordination of work and a theory of the exclusive power of work. Work, then, is the 'simplest determination' (to use the term of the 1857 'Introduction'). Work, so understood, is subjectivity - practical subjectivity, since there is no other; and work is negativity, since it involves the practical negation of that which exists. Work is all-constitutive. 'Objectivity' is nothing but objectified subjectivity: there is nothing but subjectivity and its objectification (its transformation into a mode of existence as objective)’ (Holloway in Bonefeld et al 1995:171/2).






Critical-emancipatory Marxism can, therefore, claim to be the real 'orthodoxy' in the sense that it is oriented to overcoming the old dualisms of bourgeois thought, organisation and action - philosophy and the world, theory and practice, subject and object, state and civil society, elite and mass, being and consciousness, rulers and ruled, base and superstructure, state and civil society. Marx’s revolutionary-critical praxis, therefore, represents a creative, constitutive synthesis which restores the human made but alienated social world to the conscious control of human beings who have attained conscious practical status as subjects of the historical process. Far from believing in some anonymous 'History' as executing its design over the heads of human beings, Marx asserted that history does nothing. It is human individuals who think, act, etc. (Holy Family MECW, iv, 1975:93). But alienation makes it appear that the historical process is really external to human beings (Jay 1984 58). As a result, human beings, the true subjects, become objects.

The Difference Between the Early Philosophical Marx and the Later Economist Marx.
In setting up the contrast between scientistic-deterministic Marxism and critical-emancipatory Marxism one has necessarily to take a perspective on the view that there is a distinction between the early and the later Marx (Perkins 1993:195; Cowling and Wilde 1989:14). Cowling argues the case for two Marxes, purporting to show that whilst the communist views of the early Marx derive from a theory of alienation taken from Feuerbach, so that all aspects of the social whole are explained as products of alienated man, the later Marx proceeds from the concept of the mode of production, of which man is merely the bearer. 'For the mature Marx there is no essence of man to become alienated, no generic man with which to contrast capitalist man. From the theory of the mode of production a whole series of different theories is developed; for these theories, the young Marx's account of alienation is at best an irrelevant psychological hindrance and at worst a logically contradictory theory' (Cowling in Cowling and Wilde ed.1989:15). Against Cowling, one may oppose the views of those who argue for continuity in the work of Marx: Avineri (1968), Cornu 1957), Garaudy (1967), Howard (1972), Hyppolite (1969), Kamenka (1972), Korsch (1970), McLellan (1973:290/310), Maguire (1972), Mandel (1971:154/186), Meszaros (1970), Plamenatz (1975), Ollman (1971), Tucker (1967), Kolakowski (1978), and Geras (1983).

The problem here is the same one of establishing the antithesis in terms of objectivism and subjectivism. Such a dualism is far too simple. Of course, Marx's early critique of Hegel's political philosophy and of political economy, up to and including the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, is quite different to the nature of the critique of political economy developed in Capital (Rattansi 1989:13 18 21; Arthur 1986; Cowling and Wilde 1989:14 15; Rattansi 1989:7). Callinicos argues that with the introduction of the concept of relations of production, Marx finally abandons the teleological philosophy of history derived from Hegel and Feuerbach. He meets the objection that Hegelian categories are present in his mature writings by arguing that whilst the concepts 'human nature' and 'alienation' are present in his later writings 'their role is very different from that in the Manuscripts'.





Callinicos may be right about the greater theoretical precision of the categories developed and used by the mature Marx. But this does not necessarily mean that Marx’s early perspectives were rendered redundant. A more plausible interpretation is that Marx showed intellectual development, obtained greater historical depth and conceptual precision whilst working at the same project he embarked upon in the early critique of Hegel (Callinicos 1985:44/5). It is well understood that what Marx wrote on the Paris Commune represents a return to themes first elaborated, with greater philosophical depth, in the critique of Hegel's doctrine of the state (Suchting 1983:213). The philosophical character of the terminology and the approach in those early works can be explained by the fact that Marx, simply, was at an early stage of his intellectual development. His way of expressing himself could only come through Hegelian and Feuerbachian terms. But the seeds of Marx's later development are all contained in that early work and the later perspectives are incomprehensible without an understanding of Marx's early perspective and orientation

understanding and interpreting Marx requires first of all a firm grasp of the premises which he worked out in his early writings through critiques of Hegel and Feuerbach, and which then led him to study political economy - an undertaking which was to occupy him for the rest of his life. Marx's breakthrough in the 1840’s was to arrive at materialist premises that allowed human history to be conceived as an object of scientific rather than philosophical study. Although there is clearly an important change between the early critiques of philosophy and the later critiques of political economy we reject any simplistic idea of a decisive ‘epistemological’ break occurring in the 1840's. The later writings are inconceivable without the former.

Walton and Gamble 1976:xi

From the first, Marx is looking to close the gap between philosophy and the world. His project is the abolition/realisation of philosophy in the world. He is clearly intent on breaking through from philosophical critique to history and society. Hence, however philosophically formulated, Marx is affirming the reality of the material world as against Hegel’s idealism and abstraction (Cowling and Wilde 1989:24). In the 1859 Preface, Marx argues that he sought the anatomy of civil society in political economy. There are those for whom this represents a degeneration from Hegel (e.g. Femia 1993). For where Hegel had a sense of the richness of the institutions of civil society, Marx effectively reduced the civil sphere to political economy. The important point, however, is that Marx was already focusing upon the material reality as the true reality of human beings as against the abstraction of the political sphere. That Marx began to displace the categories of his early works with sharper, more socially and historically precise categories is clear (Rattansi 1989:18/9). But this is less Marx breaking with his early project than Marx fulfilling his ambition to develop that emancipatory project (Perkins 1993:95/6; Lukacs (1971); Marcuse (1967); Korsch (1970); Meszaros (1970); Howard (1972).

Surveying Marx's work as a whole in terms of the central emancipatory commitment it is plain that a contrast between an early, subjectivist, philosophical Marx and an older, objectivist, scientific Marx is too schematic and simple and has little explanatory value. Either side of the antithesis are combined in both early and later works, though it could be argued that emphases certainly change (Cowling and Wilde ed.1989:20/1).

 'Making sense of Marx’ thus requires a firm grasp of the emancipatory critique upon which the whole body of thought is premised. These began with the critique of Hegelian idealism and Feuerbachian materialism and developed through the elaboration of the materialist conception of history with The German Ideology and the critique of political economy, which Marx developed for the rest of his life. The breakthrough that Marx made with The German Ideology was to have secured the firm foundation for his materialist premises in the history and society of human beings. Marx could now apprehend the social world scientifically rather than philosophically (Callinicos 1976:69). But the point is that the outcome cannot be separated from the process. The notion of an epistemological break is thus thoroughly rejected. The later work makes little sense when abstracted from the early work.

One important corollary of asserting the unity of Marx's work is to re-instate the emancipatory commitment which became less explicit as Marx developed his work scientifically. Which isn't to claim that this emancipatory commitment is lacking in Marx's mature work, that Marx's later work really is objectivist after all (Boggs 1984:124/5). Marx's Capital, frankly, is a profoundly ethical work, a consistent, sustained critique of the capital system as a dehumanisation. For Marx is dealing with the struggle between labour and capital, he is defining capital as the power of labour in alienated form which comes, vampire like, to live off labour. He is calling for labour to recover its power and put an end to this dehumanisation. And, when the analysis comes to a conclusion, Marx consistently calls for the free association of individuals consciously controlling the material life process of society. These conclusions of Capital represent the logical development of Marx's early plans to re-unify the state and civil society.

There is another point to address here. For even if one accepts that Marx's project constitutes a unity of purpose, it can still be argued that Marx shifted his own emphases away from the more 'philosophical’ themes of the early works to the objectivist and determinist character of capital's laws of motion. Even here, however, it would be quite false to set up an antithesis between the early subjectivist Marx and the later objectivist Marx. For the supposed ‘subjectivist’ themes of the early Marx are not actually subjectivist at all. From the earliest, Marx attempts to integrate his conception of emancipation with material reality. It should be remembered that Marx's critique of Hegel's political doctrine affirmed the reality of civil society as against the abstraction of the modern state as the true reality of human beings. It is from this critique of abstraction that Marx sought the anatomy of civil society in political economy. This is the origin of Marx's supposed reductionism. It should also be pointed out that the Paris Manuscripts were both economic and philosophical and that the economic element greatly outweighs the philosophical. This should not be surprising since Marx had determined to resolve philosophical into social critique.

But how sensitive to these points can Marxists be when Marx shifts his emphases so heavily to a capitalist model of development that concentrates upon the internal mechanisms of the capital system? The continuing affirmation of creative political agency of the proletariat as the revolutionary class is implicit rather than explicit, is declared in scattered political writings and letters and is not integrated into the analysis of future development. The ‘orthodoxy’ of the Second International, with its bastardised teleology in which socialism became inevitable as a result of the immanent processes of the capital system, did not need to work too hard in its distortion of Marx, merely lose the emancipatory-critical themes that Marx himself had come to understate though not repudiate.

Emancipation And The Critique Of Political Economy
The claim here, then, is that it is in the early works critiquing Hegelian and Feuerbachian thought that Marx came to conceive his emancipatory project as one pertaining to human emancipation in general. Marx is thus committed to rooting out all relations of domination. And it is entirely reasonable that Marx sought to be more specific on the question of emancipation by examining the precise material foundations of this domination in civil society. Marx thus came to the exploitative relationship between capital and labour and came to integrate revolutionary politics with the contradictory dynamics of the capital system.

The point is not that Marx replaced the emancipatory commitment with a concern with the political economy of capital. Rather, the latter critique of capital cannot be understood without the early foundation. Rather than write generally of human beings controlled by their own alienated powers, Marx was justified in being more precise in his critical project of seeking the dissolution of the state as an alienated social power into a society of societies and voluntary association. Anarchists, however, have always been sceptical at best and hostile at worst.

Because, as these Marxists say, socialism is still so to speak, the private property of the entrepreneurs, who produce wildly and senselessly, and since they are in possession of the socialist production powers,... that is, because this situation is like a magic broomstick in the hands of the sorcerer's apprentice, a deluge of goods, overproduction and confusion must be the result, i.e., crises must ensue, which, no matter what the details may be, always come about, at least in the opinion of the Marxists, because the regulative function of a statistically controlling and directing world state authority is necessary to go with the socialist mode of production, which, in their wickedly stupid view, already exists. As long as this control authority is missing, ‘socialism’ is still imperfect, and disorder must result. The forms of organisation of capitalism are good, but they lack order, discipline, and strict centralisation. Capitalism and government must come together, and where we would speak of state capitalism, those Marxists say that socialism is here. But just as their socialism contains all forms of capitalism and regimentation, and just as they allow the tendency to uniformity and levelling that exists today to progress to its ultimate perfection, the proletarian too is carried over into their socialism. The proletarian of the capitalist enterprise has become the state proletarian, and proletarianisation has, where this type of socialism begins, really and predictably reached gigantic proportions. Everyone without exception is an employee of the state.




Of course, one could reply that Marx's work was a critique of capital as an alienated system of production, but this would be to miss a more important point - that Marxism - and socialism generally - has come to privilege the objective processes and 'laws' of capitalism over the revolutionary activity of human beings, thus making socialism the product of economic evolution, of capital's own unsocial socialisation, rather than human agency (Hilferding 1980:367/8). This would indeed lead only to a capitalist socialism. Much the same point was made by Weber, Tonnies and Schumpeter, that Marx's socialism as planned economy would be a rational socialism under the control of the state (Sayer 1991:146). All these points can be accepted. One should also recognise the 'perfected capitalism' which was the ideal of the Fabian state socialists (Clarke 1991:204 238). Landauer's criticisms of late nineteenth century and early twentieth century socialism are pertinent. But not only are they criticisms that do not apply to Marx, they are criticisms that could have been made by Marx on his own premises.

As Walton and Gamble argued: ‘Without the theory of alienation socialism becomes what Schumpeter and Weber claimed it was - a form of industrial society, which only differs from capitalism by the degree to which property is collectively owned and bureaucratically administered’ (Walton and Gamble 1976:196). I agree with this, but would change the word ‘theory’ to ‘critique’ to more adequately capture Marx’s 

This is true. But it could still be argued that Marx’s later emphases made capital and its internal mechanisms more important than the political agency of the working class (Perkins 1993:2) and that this easily translated into the orthodoxy of the Social Democratic party (Perkins 1993:79/91), the political passivity that placed the responsibility for realising socialism upon the evolution of the 'objective' (i.e. still alien), world.

In large part, the debate centres on both the authority and the interpretation of Capital. Capital is Marx's most important work. But Marx made his purpose clear here, to grasp the law of motion of this capital system, something which would require treating human beings as the 'personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class relations and class interests (Capital I 1954:21). So any 'objectivist' bias on Marx’s part is presented for a specific, critical purpose and not as a general conception (Perkins 1993:72/3). What happened, of course, is that this objectivism came to be codified into orthodoxy, giving the impression that socialism would be the product of objective processes immanent in 'History', i.e. a historical process in some way external to human praxis.

 Was the interpretation valid? Gramsci celebrated the Bolshevik Revolution as the revolution against Marx's Capital (Gramsci 1977:34). It was a revolution against the way that Marx's emphasis upon the operation of the internal mechanisms of capital production had been turned into a naturalistic teleology by the Second International. Other interpretations of Capital are available. One could argue, with Negri that the Grundrisse has more revolutionary creative political significance than Capital and that Capital does overly stress the objective aspects of social development (Negri 1991). But it is also true that Capital can be read politically (Cleaver 1979, Dunayevskaya 1988) and that Capital can be read humanistically as a critique of alienation, criticising capital as a system of dehumanisation (Kolakowski vol I 1978).


The 'Scientific’ Marxists And Subjectivity

The view I present here runs into conflict with Althusserian modes of thought. If Althusser performed one service for Marxism then it lies in the attempt to hold onto the precise conceptual apparatus that Marx developed after 1845 in order to be able to apprehend the capital system and class relations (Rattansi 1989:7 9/10; Cowling and Wilde ed.1989:144/5). These were prone to dissolution in the socialist humanism that followed the rediscovery of the early works of Marx. The unfortunate thing about the debate is that it seemed to be stuck in a wholly false antithesis. It isn't a question of an either/or. One could understand the early and the later Marx as one and the same person at different stages of intellectual development, whose work at any one phase was laying the foundations for the work at the next. Unfortunately, Althusserian thought rejected the view that history had a subject. The teleology that existed in Marx's own work, in which the human subject comes to reappropriate alienated powers and hence achieve reconciliation of essence and existence under communism, was rejected wholesale (Callinicos 1976:69). Instead, we are presented with history as a process without subjects (Callinicos 1976:66; Post 1996:76). This is to turn Marx’s methodological purpose in Capital into a general theory, treating human beings as mere personifications of economic categories and relations. Ironically, Marxism comes to theorise the very dehumanisation of the capital system that Marx sought to criticise and overthrow.

Althusser may be commended for opposing Marx's more precise categories deriving from the mode of production to the vague alienation theories of the Marxist humanists of the 1950s and 1960s, but in doing so he certainly underestimated the extent to which the concept of alienation was not so much reproduced as refined in the later work - the way that dehumanisation is related to specific, historically formed needs and capacities as opposed to a timeless human essence, thus forming 'a crucial ethical and substantive foundation for his critique of capitalism’ (Rattansi in Rattansi ed.1989:13, but see Cowling in Cowling and Wilde ed.1989:14/28).

 There is a good reason for identifying social relationships, understanding the necessity and the rootedness of class struggle and avoiding Marxist class politics being dissolved into a classless, humanist appeal that will fail for the simple fact that it presupposes social identities that do not exist in class society. ‘Marx and Engels had from the 1840's onwards clearly underlined what they saw as demarcating their theory from any other socialist theory: its scientific character. Previously, socialists had put forward a moral critique of the unjust and the oppressive condition of the working class under capitalism and had juxtaposed to this an ideal form of society - the ideal to be realised either by some sort of gradual metabolic process of cooperation or persuasion, or by the violent action of the few. Breaking with this tradition, Marx and Engels developed an analysis of the real character of the capitalist model of production on the basis of a general theory of history as a process of struggle between classes. By means of this analysis they were able to outline the tendencies inherent in capitalism that drove it towards its overthrow by the conscious action of the proletariat it had created’ (Callinicos 1976:10).

There is nothing here with which to disagree. Except that Callinicos can be found elsewhere arguing that it is precisely because the proletariat is created by capitalism that it cannot engage in the conscious revolutionary action here affirmed. The suspicion is that Althusserian modes of thought, like Lukacs on reification, devalues the political and intellectual capacities of the proletariat and justifies the insertion of the ideal agency of ‘the party’ to mediate between the class and the socialist consciousness (Walton and Gamble 1976:123).

Marx's 'settling of accounts' with his erstwhile philosophical conscience was indeed, in large part, the repudiation of Hegel's teleological conception of history in which the Absolute Idea operated as the subject of history (Cowling and Wilde ed.1989:24; Callinicos 1985:42 44/5). Marx thus rejected the view that there was some anonymous process called 'History' which possessed its own end or goal. In Hegel, this end or goal referred to the Absolute Idea coming to attain a complete understanding of itself and the world. Come The German Ideology and The Holy Family, Marx is making his repudiation of this teleology explicit.

Just as, for the earlier teleological thinkers, plants existed only in order to be eaten by animals, and animals only in order to be eaten by man, so history exists only to satisfy the need for consuming theoretical nourishment, for demonstration. Man exists so that history shall exist, and history exists so that truth can be revealed. In this critically debased form there is repeated the old speculative wisdom, according to which man and history exist so that truth can become conscious of itself.

History thus becomes, like truth, a separate entity, a metaphysical subject of which the real human individuals are only mere representatives.





The real controversy concerns the reductionism implicit in scientistic Marxism. Callinicos is right to refer to, even prioritise, class relations and class struggle. This is, after all, what Marx himself determined to do, so much so that Marxism is identified by its class analysis. But there was a point to Marx's analysis of the capitalist mode of production that went beyond the triumph of the proletariat in the class struggle. Through its self-emancipation the proletariat abolishes the alien power of capital, putting an end to both sides of the wage labour-capital dialectic. The proletariat dissolve themselves into humanity, striking a blow for human freedom and recovering the subjectivity that the capital system as an alienated system of production has extinguished from the world (Parekh 1982:172 174 222; Gilbert 1981:98/9 103/11). Class struggle is a means to an end beyond classes and towards the realm of freedom that Marx writes of in Capital. The emancipatory commitment remains. History has subjects.


Class Analysis And The Libertarian Perspective

By putting the argument in these terms, I seek to retain Marx's class analysis and politics whilst orienting Marxism beyond class society. Anarchists have expressed a great deal of scepticism on this point. Marx's 'economism' would reproduce capitalism. As ‘economism’, no doubt, it would, for economism implies the continuation of the alienated system of production which defines the capital system. For 'economism’ is the expression of this alienated system of capital production, it is what Marx sought to criticise and transform rather than rationalise and naturalise (Meszaros 1995:65/6 491).

John Griffin puts the anarchist argument:

In my view, any form of class analysis . . inevitably distracts attention from the core concern of all anarchists, namely the authority and power which sustains those who rule. Once we start to use class we are back on bourgeois and Marxist territory. So, if we reject class as a core concept, how are we to flesh out a distinctively anarchist approach?
An anarchist sociology must surely focus on the one concept that the authoritarians can't/won't handle - freedom. It can be said that the degree of freedom present in any society will be directly related to the extent to which power, in whatever form, is also present. The presence of hierarchical power will bring about inequality and disrupt community, in the process of which there will be both alienation and conflict. We now have four interdependent core concepts and objectives:

Anarchy the absence of all rulers.
Freedom of the individual, limited only by the freedom of others.
Equality between all men and women.
Community in harmonious social relationships.

John Griffin A Structured Anarchism 1991:11

My contention against this anarchist view is that Marx's Marxism is not authoritarian and does affirm the centrality of human freedom in its emancipatory project of practical reappropriation. Marx can handle freedom, precisely because he does not establish autonomy and authority as antithetical. That is, Marx sees human beings as social beings and hence freedom as implying a supra-individual context. The institutional and systemic constraints of the alienated world are to be dissolved as human beings recover their alienated sovereignty and labour in a self-organising society. In the very least, the four core concepts and objectives of anarchism, as presented by Griffin, can all be shown to be compatible with Marx's Marxism. More than this, Marx offers a socio-relational context which is designed to bring about freedom in those terms.

For anyone seriously concerned with the project of human emancipation, Marx's critique of alien control under the institutional and systemic power of the state and capital remains an invaluable resource. That the depth of this critique has not been understood or translated into a practical movement for change, but has rather been misunderstood as state ownership of the means of production, is to be regretted and corrected. To this end this thesis will proceed.


5 SCIENTIFIC-OBJECTIVISING VERSUS CRITICAL-REVOLUTIONISING MARXISM

A consistent theme of this thesis concerns the split within Marxism between two quite distinct and opposed tendencies. The one pertains to a scientific Marxism which is concerned to identify objective structures and relations, laws and processes, generating knowledge which can be used as a guide to political practice. This has been the main tradition of Marxism, both reformist and revolutionary. The other tendency places greater stress upon human agency, especially the revolutionary activity of the working class. Here subjective factors - consciousness, politics, organisation - are prioritised over the level of objective development. Revolution by human actors is affirmed over evolution through material developments.

These two wings have continually challenged each other within the Marxist tradition. And both have been able to claim the authority of Marx. Marx upheld the unity of objective and subjective factors. As a result, the objectivists can find Marx referring to the importance of objective factors in the historical process whilst the subjectivists can find ample writings on the importance of human agency. What is required, of course, is that the unity of subjective and objective factors be recovered and the revolutionary project be steered clear of the twin reefs of objectivism and subjectivism. Unfortunately, the dualism between the two that has split Marxism has resulted in continuous reaction from one extreme to the other.

Scientific-objectivising Marxism stresses the primacy of the productive forces, the relation between base and superstructure, economic determinacy, the 'laws' of development. Against this, critical-subjectivising Marxism concentrates upon creative human agency, the reality shaping power of the human subject, the power of will and consciousness over objective facts (Gouldner 1980 esp chapter 2).

Both sides have an element of the truth. The case against them is that they are trapped in a false antithesis that generates a one-sidedness that renders their perspective incomplete and, ultimately, a distortion. With the critical-subjectivists, one can affirm that politics and human agency are creative but need also to point out that they are not creative ex nihilo. Politics have to be rooted in real developments, being active in realising potentialities immanent in the social structure. With the scientific-objectivists one can affirm that socialism does find its material basis in the socialisation of the capital system whilst also having to point out the necessity of the proletarian revolution. A line of development may be necessary but it is not inevitable – human agency needs to act to bring that line to fruition. Capital's objective socialisation will never evolve into socialism without revolutionary intervention by the proletarian class subject.


The Split Between 'Objectivist' And 'Subjectivist’ Marxism

The view I develop has clear affinities with the critical-subjectivising side of this dispute in stressing the primacy of constitutive praxis, human agency as the reality shaping force. I seek to recover the creative human subject from behind the alienated social world, the subject which is capable of transformatory intervention into this world. This approach does not deny the importance of locating revolutionary-emancipatory possibilities in material developments. It merely makes clear the fact that 'objective' developments and structures are objective in the sense, as Gramsci put it, of being 'humanly objective' (Gramsci 1971:445), i.e. are products of human conscious life activity and are thus in this sense subjective also.

Against the objectivists, the capitalist model of politics, revolution and development will be rejected. This model cannot break free of the capital system or the productivist paradigm (Corrigan, Ramsay, Sayer 1978:41). It places its faith in technology, industrialism and economic growth rather than creative human agency in relation to the powers it engenders. In politics, it aligns itself with the organisations appropriate to capitalist socialisation (Clarke 1991:204 256), and hence looks to large scale, bureaucratised, centralised organisations like political parties and trade unions, thus reproducing the dualism between the state and civil society, the political and the economic. This amounts to an abandonment of Marx's principle of proletarian self-emancipation, something which led Marxism to detach the liberating potential of Marx's critique of capitalism from its concrete foundations in the socialisation of the working class, locating socialism not in the collective organisation of the working class, but in the alienated forms in which the socialisation of labour developed under capitalism, as the outcome of the concentration and centralisation of capital (Clarke 1991:328). Given this connection with objective socialisation, Milbrath goes so far as to argue that capitalism and communism have more in common than differences setting them apart (Milbrath 1989).

Against the subjectivists, the idea that human will and consciousness can be effective against institutions and structures, that history is an open ended process, that politics is autonomous will be rejected. The subjective factor, to be successful in a transformatory way, needs to possess structural and social relevance. One can affirm the human over the material, which is precisely what the transition to the realm of freedom is about, but not against. Indeed, it may be pointed out here that Marx was a radical immanentist, an anti-utopian whose studies of the French Revolution and its failure to realise its ideals led him to criticise political subjectivism for its inherent tendency to lead revolutionary agents away from material possibilities.

Both objectivist and subjectivist positions possess fatal flaws which are the mirror image of each other. And each, in losing sight of their antithesis, can easily degenerate into an apocalyptic approach to socialist revolution. Thus scientific Marxism can proceed with utter calmness and detachment in theorising how the internal mechanisms of capitalism lead it inexorably to breakdown. This inevitability of capitalist collapse (most eloquently restated by Ramin Ramtin, who does have the merit of differentiating the ‘capitalist breakdown’, which is inevitable, from the socialist revolution, which requires subjective, political, activity, Ramtin 1991:193/4) is associated with political passivity or, at least, an all or nothing approach to politics. On the critical side, the voluntarist approach to politics is much in evidence, an activist stress that often inflates the capacities of will to overcome obstacles. That objectivism overestimates constraints is not to be doubted. But neither is it to be doubted that subjectivism inflates possibilities against constraint. Gramsci's celebration of the 'Revolution against Karl Marx's Capital' was a justified defence of the Bolsheviks’ recovery of creative political agency against the paralysing evolutionary perspectives of the Second International. But the Bolsheviks themselves soon discovered the real material constraints that existed upon politics (Gottlieb 1992:104/5; Wright, Levine, Sober 1992:15/6).

The scientific Marxists can be said to privilege objective factors over human agency, setting constraints upon human subjectivity to such an extent that it is difficult to understand how human beings could throw them off. As such, the scientific Marxists reinforce the alienated world as something external and hostile to the human subject (Meszaros 1995:112/3 175; Meszaros 1970:116 118/9; Meszaros 1989:182 184/5; Ferraro 1992:27/9 192/5 198; Bonefeld et al vol I 1992:xviii 56/7 57 59 61/3 66 67 68 76/7 93/5 127/8; Bonefeld et al vol II 1992:xvii 1 4 8/9 13 40 59 160/1; Bonefeld et al 1995:6 159/60 161 161/2). The critical Marxists can be said to risk a romanticism which also divides the human subject from the self-made world, thus also reinforcing the alien character of the world (Meszaros 1970). The human subject - will and consciousness - are affirmed not within the world but over against it, whereas the point is to appropriate this world as a human world.

In the orthodox interpretation, the productive forces at the base determine the relations of production and these determine the superstructure. For D’Arcy, arguments that productive forces themselves change according to the class struggle are 'quite contrary’ to Marx’s view. Heilbroner, however, points out that neither the productive forces nor the production relations are narrowly economic. This allows Heilbroner to argue that 'the crude "economism" that on occasions has marked Marxist historiography is not, therefore, inherent in its materialist emphasis' (Heilbroner 1980:66). The economic base sets 'limits' without imposing a rigid or deterministic relationship of 'economic’ cause and 'social’ effect (Heilbroner 1980:66/7).

All of which is to argue that to be critical is also to be scientific and vice versa, that a unity as against a dualism of objective and subjective factors is to be upheld. Marx's emancipatory commitment is a commitment that manages to keep subject and object together, upholding as it does the view that human freedom is the affirmation of human beings in this world through their objectifying activity and its product. Emancipation thus comes in and not over against the ‘objective’ (i.e. humanly objective) world.


The Repudiation Of The Theoretico-Elitist Model

One final aspect to this emancipatory Marxism that has to be mentioned is its inherently democratic aspect. Scientific Marxism is associated with an elitism not only in knowledge but also in power. Scientific Marxism thus comes to legitimate a bureaucratic-centralist system of rule. Scientific Marxism made a clear distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ consciousness and promoted Marxism as the ‘correct theory' or the 'correct ideology’. This introduced a hierarchical division of labour into the socialist movement and reproduced the classic bourgeois dualism of leaders and led, between active elites and passive masses (Showstack Sassoon 1987:xvi). One can appreciate, therefore, how such a scientific Marxism could serve as the ideology of the bureaucratised political party, rationalising its separation from and domination over the proletarian class subject. This scientific Marxism lacked the democratic dimension that existed in Marx's conceptions of an ‘active’ or direct suffrage and of praxis 'philosophy’. It lacked Marx's sense of revolution as a process based upon the actual participation and self-development of the revolutionary subject. That it therefore reproduced bureaucratic politics alongside asymmetrical social relations is to be expected. Hierarchical and elitist modes of thought, action and organisation were thus introduced into the socialist movement as a result of a) a political practice situated upon the terrain of bourgeois society and b) the rationalising ideology of scientific socialism.






Engels' reputation has suffered from the help he gave to Second International Marxists in their attempt to create a Marxism for the party, rationalising the political passivity of the party and justifying the centrality of the bureaucratic party (Levine 1975; Carver in Cowling and Wilde ed.1989:57/9). And there, indeed, is no doubt that Engels, in stressing the objectivist aspects of Marxism, helped to introduce the positivist strain into Marxism that resulted in the loss of critical-emancipatory themes. In Engels' defence it can be argued that his strengthening of the philosophical materialist basis of Marxism, even though it represented a reversion to the passive materialism superseded by Marx, was in large part motivated by a concern to demolish the influence of ethical socialism which professors, professionals and bureaucrats were all introducing into the socialist movement as it gained in power and influence (Callinicos 1985:61; Smith 1996:48/9). Engels, rightly, perceived a new class seeking to ride socialism into power whilst increasingly distancing socialism from revolutionary class politics. Both Marx and Engels had already had this conflict with the German True Socialists in the 1840's. The idealism, moralism and materialism deriving from Fichte and Feuerbach could not see the subversive-revolutionary capacity of the proletariat and devalued the proletarian agency. This ‘true socialism’ was again becoming increasingly influential and threatened to become the ideological basis of the German party, with all the passive politics that that entailed (Callinicos 1985:61).

Thus, if Engels is to be criticised for codifying Marxism as an orthodoxy that stressed the objectivist and evolutionist aspect over the critical-emancipatory aspect, then it is only fair to remember those ethical socialists who once more were attempting to replace a class analysis and politics with vague, humanist and socially irrelevant ideals and phrases. In the end, moralism won out as Social Democracy replaced revolutionary socialism. Bernstein’s emphasis on ethical socialism over class politics merely made explicit what had long been the practice of the German party (McLellan 1979:37/3; Callinicos 1976:16).

Nevertheless, even when the mitigating circumstances provided by the danger of ethical socialism are taken into account, the fact remains that Marxism as 'orthodoxy’ impoverished Marx's project and suppressed the critical-emancipatory dimension (Carver in Cowling and Wilde 1989:49). The socialisation immanent in capitalist evolution came to be privileged over socialist revolution (Gottlieb 1992:63; Callinicos 1976:13/4). Orthodoxy presented the human universe as a law governed process. The laws of this universe were objective, could be scientifically identified and could thus inform practice (Gottlieb 1992:62/3). The dialectic came to be reduced to a number of laws, generally applicable irrespective of their object as a scientific method (Smith 1996:49 Callinicos 1985:65). The whole view is quite contrary to Marx's dialectic (Kolakowski 1978; Smith 1996:36). Nevertheless, Marx's materialist conception of history was translated into what in time became known as dialectical materialism, claiming knowledge of the laws operating within the realms of nature and society. This dialectical materialism came to be the world view of Stalinism and thus extended well into the twentieth century (Clarke 1991:310/1; Perkins 1993:76; Smith 1996:37/40). Its origins, however, lie in the period of the Second International (1889-1914), functioning as the official ideology of the SPD (Callinicos 1985:62).

The world, therefore, came to be considered as an objective, external datum which is, indeed, how it appeared to be and was experienced as being in an alienated condition. Thus, in arguing that the knowledge of 'objective' laws is essential to the successful political practice of the political party, 'orthodoxy' induced Marxism to reproduce the alienation of the capital system in thought and practice. The socialist revolution itself came to be reduced to being the product of the objective processes of the alienated, fetishistic world - a contradiction in terms (Callinicos 1985:61 62; Clarke 1991:288).

Materialism And Dialectics
Marxism thus came to revert to the philosophical materialism, with its determinist epistemology and authoritarian politics, that Marx had overcome through the critical appropriation of idealism. Marxism became a general philosophy in the hands of the social democratic party. Engels, who had played his part in codifying this Marxism for the party, did not live to see the full political effects of this Marxism as orthodoxy. The criticisms that Engels restricted to letters to the party leaders would, no doubt, have become more explicit (Meszaros 1995:434/6; Smith 1996:52). Nevertheless, all the leaders of the Second International Marxism acknowledged Engels rather than Marx as their route into Marxism, especially through the Anti-Duhring (Carver in Cowling and. Wilde 1989:49). These leaders of the Second International wanted a Marxism that corresponded to the practices of the bureaucratic parties and hence developed orthodoxy into a determinist philosophy which managed to rationalise the passive reformist practice of the party whilst nevertheless affirming the inevitability of socialism. Thus Marxism was a guarantee of socialism allowing the party to concentrate on more immediate, practical matters. Marxism was the ideology of ‘the party’ (Callinicos 1976:13/4; Smith 1996:22/3). Marx's critical, emancipatory and dialectical conception became routinized and institutionalised as the legitimating world view of bureaucratised parties and unions increasingly integrated into the existing order (Michels 1962; Schorske 1955:ch 4 5 conclusion). It was, in a sense, through political practice that the degeneration of Marxism occurred. But for Korsch, on the contrary, it was the separation of Marxism from such political practice that ensured its degeneration into a formalised scientific system (Korsch 1970:64/71). Clearly, practice alone is not a solution. What is important is the kind of practice.

Thus, the problem of dialectic is not simply one of scientific import but possesses crucially important political implications. For scientific, status of Marxism lies not in the passive study of the world as an external, objective datum but in being able, practically, to grasp the internal dynamics of reality (Smith 1996:111; Jakubowski 1990:62/3 64/5). Marx's science is, therefore, bound up with changing the world. The identification of the interactions and interrelationships through which social reality exists is a dialectical process and it is this that reveals the nature of Marx's ‘science'.

Thus, a mode of analysis that can be called dialectical is at work in historical materialism, with visible and distinctive effects, and without involving any assumptions contrary to empirical, natural-scientific procedure. Dialectics in this sense is also clearly pertinent to Marxism as a guide to revolutionary politics. Men are determined by the circumstances in which they live, as the French 'mechanical materialists' of the 18th century held. On the other hand, they can also change their circumstances, because these are themselves changing and contradictory, a unity of opposites in motion. The essential meaning of the socialist strategy laid out by Marx and Engels after their break with the 'Utopian Socialists' in the 1840's was that the emancipation of the exploited and degraded proletariat could not be brought about by socially indeterminate educators but only by the proletariat's own practice of class struggle, itself determined by the development of the inner contradictions of the capitalist mode of production as a unity of opposites. Dialectics, then, is central to Marxism both as science and as revolution (Therborn 1976:398).

Marx's Theses outlined what could be designated as an active, affirmative and intuitional materialism quite distinct from the old mechanical materialism. Matter as such lost its ontological significance. Instead matter is conceived as self-made social matter, further, as proletarian, emancipatory activity which will rupture rationalised, alienative relations (Psychopedis in Bonefeld et al II 1992:38/39). What emerges from Marx's definition of a new conception is the notion of a self-made social universe of materialist immanence, a field comprising forces in perpetual motion, conflict and contradiction. That socially indeterminate educators may attempt to impose their conceptions upon people as determinate social agents, however, to assume that the wish of a group imposes itself on this universe of materialist immanence, that the self-made social universe is something that could be filled with arbitrary designs, is something that Marx denies.

Recognising that the world is in continuous movement and coming to participate consciously in the changing of the world is political. Thus, to take just one example, the problem of the relationship between the base and superstructure is not merely of analytical significance. According to standard historical materialist arguments, the base, which is reduced to the economic, determines the superstructure (the word ideological is often added as a prefix) in the final analysis. This, it is argued, reduces the superstructure to passivity. The state, politics, ideas, morals, etc. are all determined by 'the economy’, as though the economic really were the external datum that it appears under the capital system. The question arises with respect to political implications. For if the economic is an objective datum that determines the superstructure then there is nothing for it but to wait upon an historical evolution in which the productive forces are the active principle. The superstructure simply reflects this movement in the productive forces. Once one accepts a degree of autonomy for superstructural factors, however, then it becomes apparent that socialist revolution requires the organised and active intervention of the working class subject into the 'objective’ world, to appreciate and to change it as a human world. The understanding is that Marx's science is not passive, concerned with contemplative knowledge, but inherently political (Callinicos 1976:11).


Orthodoxy and the Bureau-Sclerosis of Social Democracy

Marxism codified as orthodoxy rationalised the political passivity of the bureaucratic social democratic party. This party political socialism was what Pannekoek called a 'passive radicalism’, organised for the capture of the state power for the class rather than the class acting to dissolve this power into their own organs in society. This passivity would lead to political crisis with the First World War and this crisis, in turn, would involve philosophical crisis (Callinicos 1976:16). 'Orthodoxy' was discredited. For it became apparent that the reduction of Marxism to a scientistic creed had served to parent responsibility for revolutionary class politics upon the autonomism of 'the economy'. This enabled the party to engage in a day to day reformist practice that more and more integrated it into the existing institutional apparatus (Callinicos 1976: 13/4 14 15). As a result the party was unable to take any political initiative when confronted with the greatest crises faced by the capital system.

Given the importance that social democracy placed upon the codification of Marxism as orthodoxy, this political crisis was also a philosophical crisis. A common feature of what was called - maybe misleadingly (Callinicos 1985:71) - the 'return to Hegel' was the attempt to recover the political but also to re-think the philosophical bases of Marxism so as to re-affirm the critical and creative character of Marx's project. Here there came to be a much greater stress upon subjective factors in dealing with the question as to whether crisis may become the occasion for revolution (Callinicos 1976:16).

The whole controversy could have been avoided had it been appreciated that Marx engaged in a critique of political economy, not in the formulation of a new proletarian political economy. ‘The economic’ and its 'laws' were never some 'objective' datum external to human consciousness and practice for Marx; rather the social totality as a whole was conceived by Marx as a self-made human universe and hence a field of materialist immanence available to human comprehension and control. 'The economy' as such is inherently social, political and human, the product of the interchange between human agents and their environment. Hence the fallacy of interpretations which view Marx as a technological determinist. Marx affirms the unity rather than the antithesis of the forces and the relations of production within the social totality (Callinicos 1976:15). Marx, indeed, was looking to overcome the apparent autonomy acquired by 'the economic' under capital's alienated system of production.

The main point is that the codification of Marxism as orthodoxy at the time of the Second International resulted in the distortion of Marxism into an evolutionist creed asserting the autonomy of 'the economic'. At the same time, the critical and emancipatory themes of the 'real' Marx - and it does make sense to use this term in a strong sense - were lost. It may have made political sense for social democracy to lose them as it adjusted itself to the institutional and structural terrain of bourgeois society. But the distorted Marxist theory and politics that resulted was quite different from Marx's revolutionary socialism. Socialist revolution was made dependent upon the autonomist evolution of the economic.


Economic Evolution and Political Revolution

The economic determinist interpretation of Marx upholds that socialism is the inevitable product of the technical mastery of nature through the expansion of the productive forces (Therborn 1976:361). Thus, as Marx put it, ‘industry is the open book of the human faculties’ (EPM). The question that has to be addressed is whether it is too easy to parent the responsibility for the degeneration of Marxism as orthodoxy upon the Second International. Is it not true that Marx himself made socialist revolution dependent upon the operation of the internal mechanisms of the capital system? One finds a model of proletarian revolution that prioritises the socialising and centralising tendencies of the capital system most explicitly in Capital (Perkins 1993). Moreover, Marx himself justified the parliamentary turn of the labour movement and criticised the 'political indifferentism' of the anarchists. The anarchists made a point of criticising the Marxists for seeking to realise socialism through representative political institutions. Marx was indeed against political voluntarism and subjectivism. Socialism could not be created ex nihilo but had to be rooted in social development (Avineri 1968). Thus Marx attempted to relate political activity to immanent or structural potentiality, human agency coming to actualise real lines of development inherent in the social structure.


Walker attempts to establish an antithesis between Marx the political revolutionist and Marx the economic evolutionist.





And Marx has been criticised for conceiving of socialism as merely a future society which is immanent in capitalism itself, as just another form of capitalism. This was Landauer's criticism. Except that Marx did not equate the autonomous evolution of 'the economic’ with the attainment of socialism, as though the objective, unsocial socialisation of the capital system would by itself evolve into socialism. Marx always emphasised the revolutionary transformation of social relations through the class praxis of the proletariat.

Walker, however, refers to the ambiguity of Marx's account of the transition between modes of production. ‘On the one hand, he writes as if history and social change proceeded by way of a series of revolutions and disruptive jumps marked by violence and bloodshed. On the other hand, both descriptively and analytically, he often makes explicit allowance for transitions which clearly imply that the passage from one mode to another can be made without any discontinuity’ (Walker 1978:191).

That there is something of a tension here is recognised in other works (Gilbert 1981:92 121/2; Harrison 1978:18 19/20). This antithesis is too simple and reproduces the dualism of subjective and objective factor from which much of Marxism has indeed suffer. Moreover, as Walker himself suggests, a genuine revolution is impossible to theorise in the sense that the factors that are available to be theorised are those already existing, which revolution changes. This availability of factors exhibits a bias in favour of continuity over discontinuity, which means, at the theoretical level, it is always possible to criticise Marx for considering socialism as merely the outcome of capitalist evolution. This, indeed, is how Marx's stress on the internal mechanisms of the capital system has been both theorised (by the Marxists of the Second International) and rejected (by critics of marxism). It cannot be stressed enough that those objective factors and internal mechanisms of change are the necessary but not sufficient condition of revolutionary transformation. Transformation is not objective, internal forces but objective, internal forces plus. It is the extra that counts.

There is a need to reject the antithesis between politics and economics, subject and object, revolution and evolution, voluntarism and fatalism. This dualism characterised the Marxism of the Second International. Politics is not to be identified with the subjective and whilst economics is not to be identified with the objective. Against this dualism, Marx affirmed the unity, hence the interpenetration, of subjective and objective factors, entailing that the one may be located in the other and vice versa.

The revolutionary activity of the proletariat, therefore, occurs within an overall historical process which presupposes that the forces of production have expanded sufficiently to make socialism possible. In part, the argument can seem tautological. For Marx describes the revolutionary class itself as the most important of the productive forces. The development of the productive forces, therefore, is the development of the revolutionary class (Poverty of Philosophy nd 146). Marx, therefore, is not opposing the subjectivism of revolutionary socialist politics to the objectivism of historically given circumstances. Rather, these form two aspects of the same process. Marx thus integrates subjective and objective in the social totality (Harrison 1978:18 19/20).

What is open to controversy, however, is the way that a noticeable shift in emphases occurred between the early and the late Marx. And it is this shift which may give support to the notion of an early subjectivist and a late objectivist Marx. But there are reasons to doubt this split between the early and later Marx. Indeed, a great stress upon objective factors can be seen most clearly in The German Ideology and The Poverty of Philosophy, before the Year of Revolution of 1848. Nevertheless, the defeat of those revolutions no doubt induced Marx to examine the weakness of a political strategy based upon voluntarism or subjectivism. Marx thus came more and more to emphasise the importance of material factors, their constraints and their possibilities, in socialist revolution. Marx, therefore, came increasingly to ground his politics in material realities (Meister 1990:123 150; Lichtheim 1961:128/9).

But this is not at all the same as arguing that Marx replaced an initial subjectivism with a later objectivism. On the contrary, the stress upon objective factors which Marx later developed is quite apparent in the early critique of Hegel's political philosophy. Here Marx affirms the society of human beings and their practical activity as the true reality against the abstraction and idealism of the state. Similarly, the subjective factor continues to appear in Marx's later analyses (Perkins 1993:49). The increasing emphasis upon material factors in no way commits Marx to an economic determinism that leads Marx to assert mechanisms of objective determinism over creative human agency.

It could nevertheless be argued that this is the development which occurred in Marx’s thought. Thus the constraints of material development came to be prioritised over the political activity of the revolutionary class to such an extent that the institution of 'the party’ was required. By making socialist revolution dependent upon the autonomist evolution of the economy, 'orthodoxy' and its reformist practice came to reproduce the objective determinism, i.e. the capital system as-an alienated system of production. This continued to eternalise and naturalise the social relations of production of bourgeois society, contrary to Marx's subversive and practical critique (Perkins 1993:54/5).

Referring back to Walker's antithesis between political revolutionism and economic evolutionism, one has to reject the dualisms between politics and economics, subjectivism and objectivism that have plagued Marxism (Negri 1991:137; Bonefeld et al 1995:2/3). If this antithesis between the subjective and the objective forms the true nature of Marxism, and, as the logical corollary of this, the political is identified with the subjective and the economic with the objective, then there would be little controversy. Marxism would exist as a project that rationalises the dualisms of bourgeois society, as a body of thought that has internalised these bourgeois dualisms and is therefore incapable of overcoming them. This dualism which has characterised Marxism in its dominant forms is not actually present in Marx himself. There are lost traditions of Marxism, both political as well as more philosophical, which have upheld the unity of subjective and objective factors (Clarke 1991:51/2; Bonefeld et al 1995:161/2). Even here, however, there is controversy. The theorists of the Frankfurt School, for instance, for all their assertion of the centrality of praxis, did not succeed in relating their theory to the practical movement for the transformation of reality. Similarly, it could be argued, Luxemburg herself did not succeed in integrating her thoughts on socialist revolution with her analysis of capitalism and its breakdown (Cleaver 1979:14/15). Much the same could be said of Lenin. The revolution against Marx's Capital was a revolution that recovered the creative agency of politics. But how far did Lenin follow through the philosophical implications of what he had done? How far did Bolshevism throw off orthodoxy? By replicating the objectivist interpretation of the productive forces and their development, not very far (Corrigan, Ramsay, Sayer 1978:41).

The starting point for the recovery of Marxism is the affirmation of the unity of the subjective and objective factor as against the dualism that has characterised Marxism and which has induced Marxism to replicate the essential characteristic of bourgeois society. Marxism as an emancipatory project is oriented towards the abolition of the dualism of bourgeois society which has also come to characterise the main traditions of Marxism (Holloway in Open Marxism 1995:161/2).

One needs, therefore, to address this question of the unity or dualism of the objectivist/economic and the subjectivist/political. One needs to reject the identification of the economic with objectivist and politics as subjectivist. The unity of the political and the economic means rejecting both subjectivism and objectivism as two sides of the same dualistic coin.


The Economic And The Political - Subject And Object
The Marxism of Marx depends upon the unity of the economic and the political, the subjective and the objective factor. This unity overcomes subjectivism on the one hand and objectivism on the other. By recovering the unity of the subjective and the objective as the Marxism of Marx, a position is taken that has moved beyond Marxism, insofar as the dominant traditions of Marxism have rested upon this dualism. There are theoretical problems which lead us to reject the split in Marxist thought between an objectivist (economic) position and a subjectivist (political) position and to denounce - thereafter - the lack of an adequate and sufficient political perspective. Marx is seen as objectivistic and economistic and interpreted as an alibi for the paralysis of revolutionary thought and action. It thus becomes necessary to demand 'the unity of Marxist thought beyond Marxism, beyond the orthodoxy of a suffocating tradition..’ (Negri 1991:137). In rejecting the objectivism - and political passivism - of orthodoxy one does not embrace its twin error subjectivism and the belief that socialist politics are a matter of will.

The question mark is not so much against the scientific character of Marxism as against how the scientific is to be understood within Marxism (Smith 1996:111 124/5 129/30). What is to be rejected is the identification of the scientific with the study of the world as an objective datum. This conceives of the world as a quasi-natural universe and hence imports the methods of the natural scientist into the relation of human beings to their social world (Gottlieb 1992:43). This is to introduce positivism into Marxism and hence to redefine Marxism as precisely the passive-contemplative study of the factual world from a position outside of that world that Marx had rejected in favour of his activist conception. This excludes values, the 'ought to be', and, as such, confirms the alienated condition of capital's social world as a world that has eliminated human subjectivity.

Orthodoxy is therefore to be criticised for identifying the scientific with the passive study of the factual world conceived as an external, objective datum. Perhaps the most fundamental problem of Marxism arises when its purportedly 'scientific’ analysis of society is detached from its basic insight that human beings create themselves in history. With this separation, it is forgotten that the social structures described by historical materialism are the products of human action. The mode of production can then be mistakenly thought of as something different from the actions of socially connected, living human beings. The mode of production seems to take on a life of its own, appearing to be a power or structure controlling human action 'from the outside’ (Gottlieb 1992:40/1). The responsibility for the realisation of socialism comes to be transferred to the productive forces and to the objective contradictions of the capital system. This is the confirmation of alienated social conditions reproduces the dualism of bourgeois society within Marxism in the form of objectivist, scientific conceptions (Holloway in Bonefeld et al 1995:161/2; Smith 1996:134).

Dualism
The orthodox conception of science is based upon a dualism of subject and object and it is this dualism that has run right through the dominant traditions of Marxism. This involves a dualism between the political and the economic, between human activity and the objective development of capital, between class praxis and the internal mechanisms and ‘laws' of the capital system, between agency and structure, between revolutionary activism and professorial passivism. 

This dualism introduced by orthodoxy even infected those Marxists who consciously attempted to break from orthodoxy and its reformist practice. Thus Lenin reacted against Second International passivism yet failed to follow through his recovery of political agency through to reassessing the philosophical foundations of Marxism. Similarly, whilst Luxemburg and Pannekoek, representatives of the German and Dutch left, did recover the importance of subjective factors in socialist revolution, they nevertheless persisted in that dualism which rested upon the definition of the economy as an objective datum governed by laws of its own, independent of human consciousness and action. Here, revolutionary socialist politics is something quite distinct from the scientific analysis and the objective contradictions of the capital system (Bonefeld et al 1995:6).

Thus, even the reaction against orthodoxy failed to close the gaps that orthodoxy had opened up. Even the leaders of the revolutionary left of Marxism - Luxemburg, Pannekoek and Lenin - attempted to reconcile their revolutionary politics with scientific materialism and thus could not but reproduce the dualism between subject and object (Cleaver 1979).

The Privileging of Structure over Agency
Where there is real controversy is in respect of Marx's own Marxism. For there is no doubt that the 'scientific’ aspect of Marx's thought, i.e. understood in terms of the economic analyses of the capital system and its law of motion, became more prevalent the older Marx got. This, it may be argued, may be no more than a shift of emphasis by Marx, a continuation of his emancipatory critique, and certainly not a repudiation of his early work. This view is prepared to give Marx the benefit of the doubt as against criticisms that Marx himself began the tendency to privilege structure over agency. Aronowitz makes this criticism: ‘I will argue that, despite the tendency of recent marxisms to fuse their traditions with others .. it remains tied to an outmoded conception of agency and has failed to follow the critical side of Marx himself, particularly his dialectical understanding of science. For Marxism has betrayed a tendency to privilege structural constraints over social movements; that is, to submit to a scientist for which objective, historical tendencies' allow it to predict and control human action...’ (Aronowitz 1981:xii).

Which Marxism one has to ask. Nevertheless, as a general point, Aronowitz's criticism will be accepted here. If even the figures on the radical left of Marxism, both Luxemburg and Lukacs whom Aronowitz cites as his main influences, can be said to have failed to overcome that subject-object dualism which has characterised Marxism (Cleaver 1979), then the problem is a deep one. But that is the point here, that Marx himself did overcome this dualism. Were this not the case then one could willingly abandon Marx for his impressive but ultimately flawed work on human emancipation.

Aronowitz himself points to the loss of the critical side of Marx. By implication, then, there is a critical side to be recovered. To go back into the roots of Marx's Marxism is no philosophical exercise, therefore, but stems from an attempt to understand not only Marx's emancipatory commitment but how Marx came to this commitment. To recover that unity between theory and practice, subject and object, human beings and the social world, indeed the political and the economic too, is to overcome the paralysis caused by bourgeois separation; it is to infuse Marxism with the dynamism that comes from attaching the real, immanent ideal to a conception of conscious, creative human agency. And this does indeed require the recovery of the critical side of Marxism, with its stress upon active human agency, transformatory praxis, class consciousness, political intervention (Bonefeld at al 1995:5; Oakley 1983:x).

The World as Objectified Subjectivity
One needs, therefore, to have a more nuanced view of the relationship between structure and agency. This has always been a knotty problem within Marxism, and within sociology in general. One can argue that the way that Marx affirms the unity of structure and agency actually establishes conscious, creative human agency within the historical process, not over or against a i.e. 'external', reality but with a reality that is a self-made social world that human beings may reclaim as their own world, thus affirming their powers and themselves as objectifying human beings.

Human knowledge for Marx was self-knowledge, the self-consciousness that human beings acquires from coming to appreciate, practically, the world as their own creation, subject to human control (Parekh 1982:211). Thus, the social world and the knowledge of it was simultaneously the product of structural factors and a creative transformatory force possessing the capacity to reshape those factors. And one should be careful to avoid referring here to objective factors on the one hand and subjective factors on the other, reproducing as it does the very dualism that one is attempting to overcome. Instead, it is more accurate to write of the subjective factor being present within the objective factor and vice versa. The human subject is thus an objectifying being whilst the objective world is a human product shot through with consciousness (Kitching 1988:19/21).

Immanence, Inevitability and Possibility
The recovery of the critical side of Marx's thought has a powerful political motive. It is to eliminate for good the idea that socialism is the 'inevitable’ product of objective economic socialisation (Boggs 1984:67). This evolutionary perspective has proven to be a rationalisation of the political passivity of parties adapting to the institutional and structural terrain of bourgeois society. One can retain the idea that socialism is the immanent society rooted in real developments (Parekh 1982:177). And one can still make the stronger claim that refers to lines of development leading to socialism (Meikle 1985). Socialism is thus the historically necessary society, a notion quite distinct from both 'inevitabilism’ and 'possibilism', to use Terence Ball's terms (Ball in Carver ed.1991:140/2). Socialism is not merely one possibility amongst many but is rooted in material developments to an extent that other possibilities are not. But lines of development are frustratable (Meikle 1985:57/8). Human beings have to act to actualise necessary lines of development. They may fail to do so. They may be blocked from doing so. The realisation of immanent potentialities requires human intervention and action. At this level, then, one recovers the importance of political organisation, intervention and action as a transformatory force.

Thus one can agree with Gramsci that the objective conditions for socialism now exist and that what has been lacking has been political organisation and revolutionary class consciousness, i.e. the appropriate development of the subjective conditions for socialism (Boggs 1984:138/9). In arguing for a counter-hegemonic project based upon new proletarian material organs and consciousness, Gramsci understood that the objective evolution of the economy would not in itself result in socialism, that the factors now blocking the creation of the socialist society were in large part subjective. Gramsci thus rediscovered the importance of political activity, revolutionary class struggle, and class consciousness as against the passive socialism of the social democratic parties of the Second International (Boggs 1984:15). Until the subjective factor is developed sufficiently to break through existing constraints, institutionalised in parliamentary socialism and trade unionism; then socialism would not be achieved.
One can note here the very great similarity between Pannekoek's conception of social democracy's 'passive radicalism’ and Gramsci's conception of the 'passive revolution'. Both involve the pacification of the proletarian revolutionary subject through the incorporation of the socialist leadership in the institutions and practices of bourgeois state politics. Such political passivity, one may argue, is perfectly fitted to the objectivist conception of socialism as something gradually realised through the historical process and hence forms part of the subjective underdevelopment and constraint afflicting the socialist movement. The only way to throw off this constraint is by the development of the subjective factor as a self-development, i.e. as the proletariat developing its organisational, political, mental capacities as the revolutionary class.

It is this dialectic of subject and object, affirming the unity of structure and agency which Gramsci understands well. Indeed, one could put it in terms of Marx's emancipatory project of restitution, the creative human subjects reappropriating their alienated social powers and hence reclaiming the social world as their own (Meszaros 1995:468 480). It is a dialectic of structure and struggle, of human beings struggling against their enslavement to their own powers and struggling to reappropriate their social humanity (Bonefeld et al vol I 1992:xvii/xviii 93; Bonefeld et al vol II 1992:xii/xiii). And it is in these terms that Gramsci understood the dialectic:












This emancipatory perspective entails the transition from the indirect supply of social labour through the alienated forms of the capital system to the direct supply through the self-governing producers freely associated in society. With objective or material conditions understood in Gramsci's terms of possibility for freedom, this transition is to be conceived in terms of the transition from the realm of capital's objective social necessity to the realm of freedom through society reclaiming its powers as social powers. But, importantly, this transition is not the gradual, evolutionary process of some autonomous history but is a conscious, self-actualising process in which the revolutionary-ascendant-exploited class comes to 'know' possibility or freedom, as Gramsci puts it, and comes therefore to struggle against their alienated, dehumanised condition within bourgeois relations and their hierarchical division of labour. This revolutionary-emancipatory activity on the part of the oppressed class thus subverts and breaks down the old boundaries or constraints of thought, organisation and action which had blocked the realisation of socialism (Lukacs 1971:257/9; Gramsci PW vol II 7 12; Boggs 1984:38/9 203; Collins 1982:46/9 53; Draper 24/5 26 27 27/8 55/6; Showstack Sassoon 1987:23 36; Bonefeld et al vol II 1992:133/5). The emancipatory class praxis of the proletariat ruptures rationalised alienative and exploitative relations.

And the contention here is that 'scientific-rationalising' Marxism, in stressing the objectivist and structural character of Marx's thought fails to present the achievement of socialism as a revolutionary process which requires the self-actualising activity of the proletarian class subject. Instead, thought is paralysed between bureaucratised organisation and spontaneous activity, between the active leaders and the passive led. This privileging of objective structural factors over the human subject was an error not only of Second International Marxism, of the positivist strain introduced into Marxism in the late nineteenth century, but could be seen quite clearly in the structuralist definition of history as a process without a subject.

Gramsci could be quite scathing of this privileging of structures over agency, criticising the crudity of materialists like Bukharin and their tendency to fetishize structures as though the state and the mode of production possessed an existential significance in themselves independently of living, creating human beings (Femia 1981;66/79). Marxist 'orthodoxy' stands condemned for its tendency to make fetishes out of concepts like 'class', 'state’, 'base’ and 'superstructure', 'mode of production’, investing these concepts with a transhistorical significance that ignores human agency in specific social contexts, thus abstracting them from the individual human agents whose practical activity create the institutional and structural context giving rise to these concepts. Thus Gramsci contrasts the critical approach to the world with the 'external attitude' which characterises the mechanistic materialism masquerading as Marxism (Showstack Sassoon 1987:26). Indeed, one sees again here how Second International orthodoxy adopted an evolutionary approach that made socialism dependent upon the autonomy of 'the economy'. The need for political initiative and intervention by self-conscious human agency within this historical process was lost as structural entities and economic processes came to be invested with an existentialist significance, inducing political passivity and immobility on the part of the human subject. Indeed, this point goes further. For this tendency to fetishize structures has been apparent too in the structuralism of the 1960's, reproducing within Marxism the elimination of the human subject and subjectivity which characterises the capital system as an alienated, dehumanised system of production.

Marx envisaged the transition from the self-created and self-imposed determinism of alienated social conditions to human self-determination in society as a conscious, self-realising process whereby the exploited, dehumanised but ascendant class reach awareness of their alienated condition and hence, through their class praxis, rupture the constraints of rationalised, naturalised alienative and exploitative relations. Scientific Marxism, with its 'latent positivism' (Wellmer 1974), could possess little insight into this emancipatory process given that it viewed the world through the static, ahistorical categories of a mechanical materialism. No wonder, then, that Gramsci would castigate the mechanical Marxists’ inclination to fetishize structures as though these possessed an existential significance and hence could exist independently of human subjects:





Against the Objectivism of Political Economy

Hence one points to the great danger that exists in reading Marx as having offered a new 'proletarian' political economy (Cleaver 1979:12; Clarke 1991:85 90/1 96/7). True, Marx did refer to the victory of the political economy of labour over the political economy of capital. But this was in reference to legislative intervention into the economy and the assertion, however limited, of conscious human control over the anarchic capital system and its 'coercive laws'. Marx was not, in other words, referring to a new political economy at all but, on the contrary, its overthrow, the denial that there is such a thing as 'the economy' as an objective datum external to human beings and operating according to its own laws.

Hence the notion of Marxism as 'proletarian political economy’ is an inherently contradictory notion. For it still presents 'the economy' as a self-regulating system independent of human beings and removed from their control. The categories of political economy suggest precisely this static, inhuman quality. But, far from presenting a capitalist model of politics, as Pierson argues, Marx keenly observed how working class activity and material power blocked the developmental processes of capital and hence always threatened to subvert capital's power (Cleaver 1979:77/9 83).

And this is precisely how even Capital is to be read (Cleaver 1979:29). For the objectivist interpretation of Capital, the Second International 'scientific' Marxism against which both the Bolsheviks and Gramsci, in support, justifiably rebelled, was a one sided and hence misleading interpretation. For the proletariat's real ability to subvert the mechanisms of accumulation, investment and valorisation exists also as a power capable of falsifying the categories of political economy through the rejection of the value form. The proletarian understanding, as workers come to 'know' objective conditions, is thus fundamentally an anti-political economy in the sense that the proletarian class subject can grasp and attack the material roots of the categories of political economy.

In contrast, political economists must naturalise bourgeois relations. They must see the categories of political economy in reified terms, in abstraction from class power and class struggle. Thus, where the political economist sees absolute surplus value as a reified abstract concept, Marx saw how the class struggle over surplus value itself altered the nature of capital, compelling the capitalists to develop productivity increasing innovations raising the organic composition of capital. In other words, the capitalist class was forced to extract relative surplus value as a strategic response to proletarian class activity. Marx saw this, but the political economists do not (Cleaver 1979:29).

This has profound political implications. For capitalist collapse can never be the product of its own internal mechanisms alone. Or, rather, these mechanisms can never be conceived as purely 'objective'. The working class, themselves produced by capitalist relations, are integral to the capital system, an active, 'variable' factor within capital's internal mechanisms. Marx, describing the revolutionary proletarian class as the most important of the productive forces, could thus conceive of workers’ wages struggles as coming to possess a political significance in precipitating capitalist crisis and subverting the power of capital. Marx as political economist, however, would see here only capital's abstract 'laws of motion’ (Cleaver 1979:29). The impression given is that the capitalist class is the only actor whereas, in truth, the activity of the capitalists is often reactive to the encroachment of the working class upon the power of capital. Worse still is the appearance that ‘capital’ as some impersonal power acts over and above all human subjects, which indeed is a condition of allegation.

Thus one can concur with Cleaver's judgement:





The perspective taken by Cleaver is one which affirms the power of the proletariat to emancipate itself, as an actor capable of taking the initiative in the class struggle. And Cleaver does not fail to follow through the political implications of this affirmation of proletarian self-emancipation. For the bureaucratic-elitist political party appears as the ideal agency for overcoming the passivity of the proletariat before the power of capital. Thus Cleaver writes in relation to Marxism as political economy:





In this scenario, the party constitutes itself as the state and comes to preside over the political extraction of surplus value from the proletariat. The working class remain as passive and as exploited as before.

Praxis - The Critique of Abstract Knowledge





One can thus develop the reorientation of Marxism around the critical-emancipatory core which, through the domination of scientistic and party political Marxism, came to be lost in the twentieth century. Class designation and the economic are thus to be considered as the other side of the same coin of human self-alienation. The fetish systems of alienated production and representative politics are to be criticised as articulating the dualisms and separations that characterise bourgeois society. In taking alienation and fetishism - or fetishisation as an active and ongoing process (Holloway in Bonefeld et al 1995:175 173) - as central categories one can agree with Sartre:





That is, the key figures of Marxist thought pertain to the individual and to individuality as possessing existential significance in the real world of human beings (Millar 1982:13/4).

In attaining communal control of their hitherto independent social relations, human beings recover the fetishised world as their own social world and do so in such a way as to enable individual freedom as self-realisation and self-determination (Miller 1982; Forbes 1990). Marx is looking for the human subject that is the root of the structures of the objective world, hence the pertinence of Sartre's reference to existential structures. Sartre introduces other elements of the critical-emancipatory Marxism I develop here.





If one adds here the centrality of the dialectic of capital and labour and the principle of proletarian self-emancipation, one has here the essential foundations of Marxism as emancipatory project of social restitution.

The Marxism which is produced from this recovery of emancipatory and critical themes can hardly be said to constitute a fixed or finished system. On the contrary, it repudiates such a position as a 'closed' Marxism. The Marxism presented here is a creative project that privileges the conscious human agency through the key categories of dialectic, praxis, process, totality (Bonefeld et al vol I 1992:ix xi xii; Bonefeld et al vol II 1992:xiii/xiv).

This creative Marxism is not to be confused with idealism. Rather, what it does is recognise that Marx transcended the antithesis between philosophical materialism and idealism through the critical appropriation of idealism's 'active side' (Meikle 1985:42/5; Clarke 1991:57/8; Kitching 1988:25). For what Marx's revolutionary-critical praxis historically represents, in truth, is the overcoming of the old dualisms between philosophy and the world, theory and practice, subject and object, rulers and ruled, the state and civil society which characterise bourgeois society in favour of an emancipatory synthesis which restores social powers and relations to the conscious control of individuals (Bonefeld et al 1995:2/3).

When Marx wrote that philosophers have merely interpreted the world in various ways whereas the point is to change it, one thing that he is making clear here is that his drive to understand the world is secondary to his fundamental emancipatory commitment. Marx is engaged in nothing less than the project of human emancipation in general. Human beings must be emancipated from all forms of social exploitation and domination.

 This emancipatory commitment comes with the belief that the political practice which attains this emancipation crucially involves the capacity of human beings to 'know' their world as their own. Praxis, therefore, incorporates knowledge (Jameson 334; Tucker 172/3 174 175 176; Jakubowski 1990:18/19 20 61/5). It is not anti-cognitive. Rather, it rejects the abstract and passive conception of knowledge as something which philosophers detached from the world obtain from conceiving the world, as external object (Furedi in Jakubowski 1990: xxi/xxiii).

One final point here concerning praxis and ‘knowing’ the world. What makes the recovery of critical and emancipatory themes so important is that, as Gramsci argued, it is the underdevelopment of the subjective factor - political organisation, class consciousness - which explains the failure to achieve socialism, even though the 'objective' material conditions making socialism feasible exist. As has been demonstrated clearly in the twentieth century, socialism cannot be made dependent upon the autonomy of the economy, either its evolution or its breakdown, but requires political organisation and initiative on the part of the human agents. Thus the twentieth century has shown the capacity of capitalist social relations of production to survive political and economic crises. The subaltern class has to be organised and possess the revolutionary consciousness which enables it to exploit the transformative potential of capital's crises. The proletarian class subject must, therefore, equip itself with appropriate modes of thought, action and organisation in order to be able to intervene creatively at decisive conjunctures in history. The failure to constitute such modes explains the ability of the capital system to survive its crises. Simply fighting for, sometimes even winning, political power, does nothing to attack capital on its own material terrain. The reproduction of capitalist relations of production must be seen in terms of proletarian organisational and hegemonic underdevelopment as well as in terms of capital's class struggle to prevent such development. Without the political initiative of the working class subject, capitalist relations may well survive a condition in which the process of accumulation is blocked and shows its crisis tendencies in terms of stagnation and breakdown.

The fact that there is a unity of subjective and objective factors, the fact that 'the economy' is not some autonomous, external realm with laws of its own, the fact that self-conscious human agency is central in determining the direction taken by the historical process, means that socialism is not an inevitability in the sense of something that is guaranteed by 'History' but that there is a political struggle to be engaged in. This struggle is not merely for 'power' in the institutional sense but possesses greater historical significance in the affirmation of the human species essence (Gilbert 1981:98/9 103/11 188/9; Miller 1982:75 169 170 173 206 173 206 207 219 28; Ferraro 1992:172; West 1991:41/2 43/5 152/3). Nor is it a struggle to control the means of production. Important as institutional and structural control is in the class struggle, Marx's goal is human emancipation and, as such, transcends the class division in favour of humanity in general. But this self-conscious humanity, coming to know the world as its own creation, is a recovery of subjectivity in the world and, as such, requires an active struggle on the part of human beings engaged in the practical reappropriation of its alienated powers. These powers are to be embodied in the self-organising society (Meszaros 1995:480; Schecter 1994; Thomas 1994:82/4). The alien logic or instrumental rationality of 'things' - and the abstract and intellectualist knowledge that goes with the fetishised world is to be replaced by human self-knowledge.

The Fetishisation of Structures and Categories
The crisis afflicting Marxism in large part applies to what may be called a 'closed' Marxism (Bonefeld et al vol I 1992:ix). That is, the Marxism in crisis exhibits the objectivism and determinism that is implicit in all sociological projects (Bonefeld et al vol I 1992:ix/x/xi/xii). The reduction of Marxism from an emancipatory commitment to changing the world to merely interpreting the world has thus induced this contemporary crisis. This degeneration is particularly apparent in what has been called Analytical Marxism. One wonders whether the work of Elster, Roemer and Cohen is best considered as the academic revival of Marxism as a tool for understanding the world or the academic burial of Marxism as a commitment to changing the world (Furedi in Jakubowski 1990:xii/xiv; Gilbert 1981:ix). This analytical Marxism has extinguished Marx's social and historical specificity, his emancipatory commitment, revolutionary socialist activity and his understanding that class praxis and political struggle have a creative and shaping significance in changing the world.

'Making sense' of Marx (Elster 1985) has actually made nonsense of Marx's thought. Abstracted from the emancipatory commitment, Marx's categories lose their meaning. The failure to relate Marx's concepts to the critique of other theories and the critique of the reality expressed in these theories means that terms like 'state', 'class’, 'base and superstructure', 'productive forces and relations' are subject to constant scholarly reinterpretation and redefinition. Marx's conceptual apparatus thus becomes the plaything of professors engaged in the ceaseless interpretation of the world (Furedi in Jakubowski 1990:viii/ix). The reduction of Marxism to a sociological or analytical model is understood as quite contrary to Marx's project. If Marx had any 'theories' about the nature of the world, i.e. the ideas and ideals contained in the critiques of the state and of political economy, then these are thoroughly secondary and subordinate to the emancipatory commitment to changing the world (Kitching 1983:229). Marx's critique, in other words, embraced not only the world but also the theories about the world and, therefore, the static, definitional approach of bourgeois philosophy and social science (Furedi in Jakubowski 1990:xix/xx).

For this reason, the critical-emancipatory Marxism presented here will reject model-building analytical Marxism as a closed Marxism that classifies phenomena at a distance whereas Marx's point was that human beings, not merely the scientists, as knowledgeable agents should reclaim the 'external' world as their own.

One sees again the fetishisation of structures and categories which Gramsci had criticised as typifying mechanical Marxism (Boggs 1984:140). For model building analytical Marxism necessarily comes to invest categories abstracted from their social context and structures conceived in 'objective', external terms with an existential significance independent of human beings which they do not possess. The failure to understand this point is also the confirmation of the 'objective' world as an alien world. It confirms the separation of the human subject from their self-made social world and hence is a party to the fetishised character of the social world.

This fetishisation of structures and categories is not particular to analytical Marxism, as Gramsci's criticism of Bukharin’s mechanical materialism makes plain. But analytical Marxism may be singled out for particular criticism owing to its explicit intention in introducing the static and definitional approach of formal logic into Marxism. (Furedi in Jakubowski 1990:xi/xii). As Clarke argues, 'the defence of "historical materialism" is reduced to a defence of the "mechanical materialism" of the Scottish Enlightenment, an interpretation developed by the "Analytical Marxists", who try to reconstruct Marxism on the basis of Smith's individualistic and rationalist materialism' (Clarke 1991:95).

For this very clearly departs from Marx's Marxism at the crucial point. For Marx - as for Hegel before him - empiricism could not claim to obtain adequate knowledge of reality since it merely confirms the separation of human beings from their social world, the known from the unknown. Empiricism expresses the world as alienated, as external to human beings. Marx determined to close this separation through a project of restitution in which human beings reclaim their alienated powers and hence come to comprehend and control the 'objective' world as their own human world. Getting to know the world is thus conditional upon changing it through praxis that removes the gap between transformative human agency and the transformed world (Kitching 1983:20/1 33). There is no question here of empiricism, of obtaining knowledge of the external world from a position outside of it. Marx is explicitly attacking the idea that social reality is a 'given' factual world presented to the senses and which is to be classified and interpreted as such. One can understood how schools of bourgeois social science could accept the world as a given, factual datum to be studied as a quasi-natural object.

As Clarke comments on post-Parsonian sociology:





That Marxists could adopt the definitional approach serves only to indicate the extent to which the fundamental critical and emancipatory aspect of Marx has been suppressed by 'closed' Marxism, involving a causal determinism. For Edgley Marx's science aligns itself 'with the working class by theoretically supporting the working class movement, as its theoretical mouthpiece actually calling for .. revolutionary change’ (Edgley in McLellan ed.1983:290/1). Marx's science, 'without deserting its scientific standpoint, constitutes itself theoretically as the mouthpiece of the workers movement and their political revolution' (Edgley in Mepham and Ruben ed.III 1979:26). The reduction of Marxism to a sociological project, what Edgley calls, in relation to Althusser, a 'theoreticist tendency’, entails also the complete severance of Marx's thought from both his revolutionary socialist politics and from the class praxis of the proletarian subject (Therborn 1976:14/5; Kitching 1988:35).

This possesses wider implications in terms of transcending the social scientific - passive and contemplative - approach to a still externally conceived and experienced world: 

Marx's social thought changed course decisively in 1845. This change was directly related to Marx's (and Engels’) experience of the working class and its concrete struggles. Simultaneously with their discovery and development of a new pattern of social determination, Marx and Engels began to work out a new strategy for socialism that acknowledged the proletariat as the bearer of tendencies indicated by the new theory of society. Similarly, the classical sociologists worked out their theory of the social determination of human behaviour from their own quite different experiences of capitalist society and its problems and contradictions. This too was largely a critical experience of capitalism, an experience of crisis - but one undergone by intellectuals who were not related to the working class. On the contrary, they looked at the working class and the problems posed by it from the point of view of bourgeois society (Therborn 1976:421).
Summarily, Marx's transformation of the object of economics may be said to have had two aspects. First, the market was related to a broader determining social context, the mode of production. His analyses showed not only how the rise and development of the market could be explained by the dynamics of the mode of production, but also - and this was the second aspect - how certain theoretical contradictions in classical economics, such as those in the analysis of the mode of operation of the labour theory of value, could be resolved. Marx at once posed and explained problems unseen by the classical economists, and solved the riddles of political economy.

The tasks of a Marxist critique of sociology are similar. It is necessary first to insert systems of values and norms into a historical totality, to articulate them, with the forces and relations of production, with the state and with the class struggle based on these structures, and to demonstrate how the ideological community is determined by this totality. The second duty is to demonstrate how the ideological communities incarnated in different groups, organisations, institutions and societies are structured by the class struggle, constituting different and mutable examples of the unity of opposites, contradictory unities of the values and norms of opposing classes.

What the present study indicates, then, is neither convergence nor synthesis, but a transcendence of sociology, similar to Marx's transcendence of classical economics, and the development of historical materialism as the science of society. To indicate a task, however, is not to accomplish it. The extent to which these possibilities prove capable of realisation will not depend on intra-scientific events alone. The rise and formation of the social sciences were determined by the class struggles of particular historical societies, and so, no doubt, will be their further development or arrested development. Thus the question of a future development of social sciences in the direction of historical materialism remains open - above all to those of us who are committed to working for it (Therborn 1976:429).

But there are other examples of a closed Marxism. The conventional conception has been of Marx as an economic or technological determinist. Thus, if the character of the productive forces is known then one also knows the character of superstructural forces. But, for reasons given, this is erroneous. The unity of subjective and objective factors in Marx, the very notion of a project of restitution in which human beings practically claim the world as their own, means that the political passivity induced by assigning autonomy to the economy has nothing to do with Marx himself but the way that, again, Marx's categories have been abstracted from Marx's critique and fetishised. The basis of this rationalisation exists in the fetishism of an alienated system of production. Marx himself upheld a central role for revolutionary political activity and transformatory class praxis in rupturing rationalised alienative and exploitative relations.

One can refer also to 1960's structuralism, Althusser's conception of history as a process without a subject (Callinicos 1976:86). Again one sees closure. Of course, Althusser's work was largely a reaction against the vague, classless appeal of the Marxist humanists who had recovered Marx's critique of alienation. With this humanist Marxism, centred on the early texts, especially the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, there was an evident danger of turning Marxism into that German True Socialism which Marx criticised for its failure to see alienation in the precise form of class power, relations and struggle (Therborn 1976:50/66).

Humanist Determinism
Marxist humanism comes to conceive the true Marx as the philosopher of human freedom who shows how human, beings come to alienate their powers in production and politics and now they may reappropriate these powers and subject them to their conscious, common control. And, indeed, Marxism is presented in the argument given here as an emancipatory project of restitution. There are those who would reject the argument as teleological, history moving toward the goal of human reconciliation with their alienated powers, and as idealist, human beings coming to know the world as their own creation (Callinicos 1976:69; 1985:115/6).

This criticism is rejected here. Rather, one is examining the different marxisms for evidence of closure, showing how it is indeed possible for the concern with alienation to slide into determinism (Gilbert 1981:3/4). The Marxist humanists thus risk writing of alienation in the same way that Marxist orthodoxy asserted economic ‘laws’ – as a determinism. Neither Marx's emancipatory commitment nor his revolutionary socialist politics are recovered, the old political passivity in relation to circumstances is reproduced.

Determinism, therefore, comes in a variety of forms. Second International orthodoxy, humanism, structuralism, analytical Marxism, are all characterised by 'closure’. What they share in common is the notion of the (alienated) world as objective in the sense of being 'given' and 'external’. A ‘closed’ Marxism accepts the social world as given and fixed. It theorises this world rather than critiques it; it thus comes to give theoretical expression to the determinism inherent in the alienated world. Thus, in a sense, the fetishisation of categories and structures is not simply an intellectual error but is the theoretical expression of the fact that the structures of the alienated world really are fetishistic, i.e. invested with existential significance possessing a logic of their own (Bonefeld at al vol I 1992:xii).

With closed Marxism and its determinism, therefore, Marx's categories are abstracted from his critique and from his political commitment and are turned into a general theory which interprets the world but lacks the practical relation to the transformatory praxis of the revolutionary subject (Gilbert 1981 3/4 13).

The Rupturing of Rationalised Determinism
In this thesis, therefore, I affirm an 'open' as against a 'closed' Marxism in recovering Marx's critical and emancipatory themes. What defines Marxism as 'open' is the affirmation of the dialectical unity of subject and object, theory and practice, form and content, of the constitution and reconstitution of categories in and through the crisis ridden development of the social world (Bonefeld et al ed. I 1992:xi). For Marx, this world is in continuous movement and phenomena are to be grasped only in their interactive relationships. Contradiction and contradictory dynamics are at the heart of the social world and exist as transformative potential and opportunity. This conception of the world as a field of materialist immanence available to creative human agency subverts the fetishisation of categories and structures characterising 'closed' Marxism.

An 'open' Marxism, therefore, expunges determinism in all its forms from the emancipatory project. An open Marxism asserts the mechanisms of emancipation over mechanisms of domination, the self-determination of human agency over the objective determinism of the capital system. Marxism ceases to be a theory of domination, with 'domination' referring to something inert, fixed and given, and instead focuses upon the contradictions inherent to domination itself (Bonefeld et al ed. I 1992:xi). Similarly, Marxism ceases to theorise the economic determinism of the capital system and instead concentrates upon the transformatory significance of the dialectic of capital and labour, with the accent on labour. 'Crisis, understood as a category of contradiction, entails not just danger but opportunity’ (Bonefeld at al ed. 1992:xi). Alienation is comprehended as an active process in which labour retains the power of subversion. The alienation of powers is never an irrevocable process.

The slide into determinism occurs when one remains with the way that alien powers govern the world with inexorable necessity. It appears that once human beings have alienated their powers these powers exert an objective determinism of such total significance that it is hard to see how human beings, reduced to passivity, can alter things (Negri 1991:xxi). Thus one notes how the critical theorists have stressed mechanisms of domination over mechanisms of emancipation (Cleaver 1979).
Of course, this concern with alienation and the alienated world comes to be expressed, at least in part, in terms of the old economic determinism. For capital, exerting its objective determinism, is the alienated power of human beings, more specifically the workers. Marx's critique of alienation, in short, obtained social precision in the critique of capital. And the point is that where this critique ceases to possess a practical relation to the emancipatory practices and struggles of the revolutionary class it proceeds to theorise the fetish structures of the alienated world rather than seek their abolition.

Something that is striking is the extent to which 'closed' Marxism has effected closure through being compromised by and implicated in the alienation of capital and the capital system. It is 'capital’ which appears to be the only actor, it is capital's laws which appear as governing reality, it is capital's unsocial socialisation which is seen to deliver socialism. Marx saw how workers struggles could precipitate capitalist crisis. The 'closed' Marxists, with their reading of Marxism as political economy, see only abstract laws of motion. 'These kinds of interpretations glorify the dynamic of capital .. and portray the working class as a hapless victim' (Cleaver 1979:29). Capital, all the time, sets the agenda and shapes the political practice, whether reformist or revolutionary. And 'new times' 'post-fordist' 'post-marxist' thinking does nothing to overcome this determinism. Indeed, the celebration of new technologies and flexible mode of accumulation is merely a new version of the old determinism which assigns autonomy to 'the economy', i.e. to capital (Bonefeld et al vol II 1992:xii/xiii). Capital, still, is determining the agenda, shaping political practice and fixing the structures and institutions to which human beings must conform. Where, one may ask, is the human being as actor and as subject?

In short, a critical and emancipatory Marxism is an open Marxism that critiques determinism in the objective world, in the schools of bourgeois science and within Marxism itself. This critical-emancipatory Marxism has nothing, therefore, in common with positivist and empiricist philosophy which accepts the world as a given and fixed entity. Marxism becomes entangled with positivism and empiricism as it comes to lose contact with the practical project of social transformation and hence proletarian class praxis and hence replaces the critique of the alienated world with the theorisation of its determinism.

An open Marxism, therefore, establishes the primacy of Marx's emancipatory commitment and hence incorporates the critical themes of alienation, agency, and consciousness into the material context of social struggles and practices transforming the world, with this proletarian self-emancipation and Marx's revolutionary socialist politics are recovered. An open Marxism forces one to address the emancipatory and revolutionary character of Marx's Marxism.

Class, Capital and Crisis
The statement that social reality is contradictory and in continuous movement is a means of introducing the question of class and capital (Bonefeld et al vol II 1992: xii/xiii). Crisis is opportunity. And it means seeing the interrelationship of economic crisis, social antagonism and class struggle as something endemic to capital's social formation. They are not accidents that may be eliminated by piecemeal reforms. Hence the importance of focusing upon the contradiction inherent in social reality, revealing the transitory and specific character of the existing social formation. Thus, contradiction is the dynamic principle of social reality. This social reality may be apprehended, intellectually, only to the extent that it is conceptualised in terms of the contradictory dynamics and antagonistic relations which are central to it (Callinicos 1985:55). Hence the importance of Marx's dialectic, since the dialectic:





The Elitism Of Scientific Marxism
That an epistemological determinism or scientific Marxism comes to be associated with an authoritarian and elitist politics should come as no surprise. For the claim that the world is so complex that only a select few are able to understand it is elitist to the core and asserts the epistemological incapacity of 'the masses'. If the world is indeed so complex, then only a select few can possess the capacity to govern it. Thus the 'scientific' understanding of the world comes to legitimate the bureaucratic-centralist system of rule. The argument made here is that Marxism as 'scientific socialism' reverted to the old materialist determinism and authoritarian politics that Marx looked to transcend with his conception of revolutionary-critical praxis.

The Democratisation of Politics, Philosophy and Knowledge Versus Socialism 'From the Outside'

That is, Marx opposed the democratisation of philosophy, politics and power to their bureaucratisation. The abstracting tendencies of the modern world of the capital system removed the world from human control and made social relations independent of human individuals (Sayer 1991:viii/ix 154/5). It is this process of abstraction which is the sufficient explanation of the 'complexity' of the world and hence of the bureaucratisation of politics, philosophy and power which results. And the bureaucrats of knowledge and politics will still be found asserting the 'complexity' of the world, the impossibility of socialism and revolution and active democracy (Bobbio 1987a 1987b). The thesis presented here will counter these assertions with the view that socialism and the revolution leading to the socialist society are quite meaningful, possible and rational.

This critique of scientific Marxism is thus developed through a presentation of Marx's praxis as the democratisation of philosophy, politics and power and necessarily involves not only an understanding of the enlightenment materialism that Marx repudiated for its conservative implications - the notion that the mass of human beings are passive in relation to circumstances - but also traces the failures of Social Democracy and Communism back to the elitist and authoritarian roots of Second International 'orthodoxy' (Gramsci 1971:3 9 45 135 144 146 172 321 -323 333 334 369 370/1 402/3 419 436; Parekh 1982:145).

The Kautsky-Lenin thesis that socialism is the product of intellectuals and is introduced into the (still passive) proletariat 'from the outside' is understood as wholly contrary to Marx's conception of a socialist consciousness emerging from the class subject on account of its being, its structural position, its struggle (Therborn 1976:326/7; Smith 1996:37/8). Socialism ceases to be the consciousness of the class struggle and instead becomes a specialised body of knowledge which intellectuals alone can obtain through studying the objective laws and processes of the (external) world, independent of the class position and praxis of the proletariat. This is socialist theory as 'science'. Rather than being the class consciousness of the revolutionary subject socialism now becomes the 'correct ideology' to be inculcated into the proletariat from outside the class and class struggle. The social world is conceived objectively, as something external to human beings and as something that is to be apprehended at a distance from it.

Such a science reverts to the passive-contemplative conception of knowledge that Marx rejected and confirms the fetishised character of the world. The world and its laws remain independent of human beings. Scientific socialism rationalises this alienation and firmly becomes a part of its abstracting, centralising and bureaucratising tendencies (Sayer 1991:144/6 147/8). Thus, in rejecting that 'orthodox’ Marxism that long ago degenerated into Social Democracy and Communism and which legitimated a bureaucratic system of politics, the attempt is made in this thesis to develop Marx on his critical and emancipatory side (Boggs 1984:143). Sayer, however, argues that the rationalisation and bureaucratisation theorised by Weber 'makes any notion of an emancipatory politics deeply problematic' (Sayer 1991:154). That is, he adds, 'in so far as the very forms in which modern politics are conducted - states, parties, ideologies - partake of the same nexus of estrangement' (Sayer 1991:154).

The Critique Of Alien Control

The critique of alien politics developed by Paul Thomas offers a means of addressing these points and of safely steering the emancipatory socialist project past these alien forms of modern, bureaucratised, institutionalised politics, resting, as they do, upon the separation of the state from civil society and upon concomitant bourgeois separations. Sayer goes on to criticise the extent to which socialists 'have proved all too willing to strike Faustian bargains with his [Weber's] modern devils, notably the machines of industry and the state' (Sayer 1991:154). But if one conceives these modern devils to be the alien powers of human beings, as the state and capital as alienated social power, then one restates the case for an emancipatory socialist politics as a project of restitution. These alien powers are not to be appropriated, monopolised and utilised as 'things'. Nor are they to be 'democratised', a strategy proposed by the likes of Held (1987:283) and Bobbio (1988). Rather, they are to be restored to the social body and exercised directly by the associated producers (Meszaros 1995:430 463).

The idea of millions of associated producers consciously controlling a modern, complex economy is dismissed by Sayer as a 'quaint pipe dream' and may betray a weakness on the left in underestimating the complexity of the modern economy (Sayer 1992). But Sayer may well be raising important questions which he cannot, under Weber's influence, answer. As Marx wrote:

Individuals always proceeded, and always proceed, from themselves. Their relations are the relations of their real life-process. How does it happen that their relations assume an independent existence over against them? and that the forces of their own life become superior to them?

Marx The German Ideology

The answer to this question requires an analysis of the capital system. The structural power of capital is the ground upon which the various modern forms of estrangement arose, furnishing the template for the ‘severance’ which, for Max Weber, gives modernity's machines and institutions their ‘irresistible’ force (Sayer 1991:155). For Sayer, it is this wider Weberian mechanisation of modern life itself which is now the problem, and this indicates a pervasive alienation which is no longer confined to those theatres within which capital rules (Sayer 1991:155). This amounts to affirming a general, irrevocable, determinism.

The world demonstrates power out of human control and, it seems, a power that is never likely to be brought under control. It is difficult to see how it could be comprehended and controlled on Sayer's premises. Sayer claims not to wholly share Weber's pessimism (Sayer 1991:155). But it is difficult to see now he can avoid Weber's conclusions. For Weber, the substantive irrationality of capitalism necessarily accompanies the generalisation of the formal rationality characterising the capitalist mode of production. Such substantive irrationality, however, is not for Weber the result of capitalism but of the wider process of rationalisation. This rationalisation, as theorised by Weber, effectively blocks the project of restitution defined by Marx. The rationalisation of society acquires a momentum of its own. 'The fragmentation of modern society, and the rationalisation of its separate spheres, constitutes an "iron cage" which imposes a formally rational orientation to action on its participants in each relatively autonomous sphere' (Clarke 1991:237).
But the 'iron cage' is the fate of modern individuals. There is no way out of it on Weber's premises. For Weber, unlike Marx, 'could not get to the roots of this contradiction [between the formal rationality and substantive rationality of modern society] in the alienated forms of 'social labour because he saw such forms of labour as rational. Thus he remained trapped within a dualistic theory of capitalist society in which the individual subject confronts an objective social world which is indifferent to meaning and impervious to action, whose objectivity is defined functionally, in relation to ends which have become detached from their individual foundations and embedded in the social structure' (Clarke 1991:283/9).

This criticism applies to Sayer. In ruling out a society of associated producers, and hence the direct supply of social labour as opposed to its indirect supply through the value form, Sayer cannot get to the roots of the problem - alienated labour and capitalism as an alienated system of production. The question remains: how do relations between individuals take the alienated form of relations between things? Sayer understands the importance of the question. But he has rejected the premises required to answer it, Marx's critique of alienated labour. 

Not surprisingly, Sayer is sceptical towards the socialist project. For Sayer, the possibility needs to be faced, even by those persuaded of the validity of Marx's indictment of capitalism, that something may be awry in the very idea of socialism itself.





The Bureaucratisation of Socialist Politics
Two claims are made in this thesis. That there is a lost Marx and a lost Marxist tradition. And that the scientistic interpretation of Marx, which very one-sidedly exploited some of Engels' formulations of Marxism as a philosophical materialism, played an important role in this loss of critical and emancipatory themes. That there were political and material reasons for this scientistic interpretation is plain. And that Engels demonstrated a clear, highly critical awareness of these tendencies in German Social Democracy, expressing himself in a series of letters (to Kautsky etc.), should ensure that one avoids the crude view that blames the degeneration of Marxism upon Engels' positivism.

For the contention is that in a politics that reproduces the bourgeois separation between rulers and ruled, Marxism as orthodox 'theory' becomes an ideological claim to knowledge, in part rationalising and in part concealing asymmetrical relations of power and control. Marx saw such a thing beginning to happen in the new German party and criticises the development explicitly in the Critique of the Gotha Programme and the Circular Letter. Engels, too, warned Kautsky that 'it is also necessary that people finally stop treating Party functionaries - their own servants - with the eternal kid gloves and standing most obediently instead of critically before them, as if they were infallible bureaucrats' (Engels to Kautsky 11 Feb 1891). Marx and Engels lived to see the beginnings of socialism ‘from below’ being reconstructed according to a bureaucratic mode of politics ‘from above’.

Theory - and the practice that goes with it - came to be separated, estranged from the proletariat and from creative, knowledgeable class praxis. One understands, then, how, as a result of the failure to grasp Marx's revolutionary-critical praxis the divorce of theory and practice from the proletarian class subject can occur. Moreover, the unity of theory and practice is replaced by a dualism. Theory becomes a social science produced by intellectuals detached both from their object and from the praxis transforming this object. The application of this theory, as a scientific guide, is the responsibility of the politicians. Socialist theory is thus subordinated to - indeed tailor made for - narrow party political practice. In a series of letters, Engels attempted to mount a challenge to this bureaucratic degeneration. To this end, he challenged bureaucratism in the party, the 'socialist bosses' controlling the party, the self-censorship, the tight, artificial party discipline, the 'propensity to coercive measures', the 'enforced sectarianism’ and the claim to 'infallibility' in the German party (to Sorge 11 Feb 1891, to Kautsky 3 Feb 1891, to Kautsky 15 Jan 1891, to Bebel 1-2 May 1891, to Kautsky 11 Feb 1891).

This is not to deny the responsibility that Engels does have in codifying Marxism as 'orthodoxy'. But it does suggest how such an 'orthodoxy' would have been invented with or without Engels’ authority. And this scientific socialism reverted back to the elitist-authoritarian politics and philosophy that Marx had subverted. With the loss of the conception of revolutionary-critical praxis, a centralised, bureaucratic politics which is quite distinct from Marx's principles of active democracy and proletarian self-emancipation comes to be established and justified (Harrington 1993:78).

In conceiving of history as the result of human praxis, Marx was able to locate historical change in concrete social and economic processes attaining political expression through the mediation of consciousness. With this dialectical conception, Marx was able to reject what Heilbroner calls a 'rigid or deterministic relationship of "economic" cause and "social" effect' (Heilbroner 1980:67). Raising the principle of proletarian self-emancipation, bringing in the Hegelian notion of the 'universal class’, Marx did not conceive history and the transition to socialism as a quasi-natural, inevitable process unfolding independently of human agency. For Marx, consciousness is not the direct, passive reflection of objective processes; rather, it is the mediation between human agency and the external environment. Human agency is thus central to the conception of history and social transformation developed by Marx, integral to the self-made social universe as opposed to being external to an 'objective' world.

In conceiving an active materialism to replace the old determinist materialism, Marx's debt to German idealist philosophy, in developing the active side of subjectivity, is evident. And it clearly distinguishes Marx from the 'scientific’ Marxists of the late nineteenth century. Such a view could be said to ignore the 'latent positivism' (Wellmer 1974) of the later Marx. This is the criticism that has been made by Gilbert concerning Avineri's stress on the continuing Hegelian character of Marx's work. Could it not be, though, that such a positivism has its sources in the crude scientific materialism of the late nineteenth century (Callinicos 1985:71) and in Engels' work as distinct from Marx's (Carver in Cowling and Wilde ed.1989).

Scientific Marxism claimed to apprehend the 'laws' of the historical process and to obtain the knowledge of 'objective' reality which would then exist as a guide for the revolutionary movement, 'theory' as an instrument in the struggle. To quite some extent such a Marxism could not but conceive of the future as predetermined, with the task of knowledge, applied in the practice of the political party, being to smooth the path of development. It seems, therefore, that the 'objective' world retains the autonomy that it possesses under alienated conditions, with human beings having to react to and fit in with the developmental tendencies and laws generated, independently of their control.

The point is that, with the future already in large part determined, with the socialisation, centralisation and bureaucratisation of the capital system being understood as the real material development leading inevitably to socialism, Marx's sense of the self-conscious, creative human subject whose praxis possesses genuine transformative significance was lost. With this went the loss of the conception of revolution as a process in which the proletariat develops its political, organisational, moral and intellectual capacities and, through such a development, forms the content of the socialist society as a self-governing society. 'Prefiguration' is the term that would now be used. It would be a term that Wobblies, industrial unionists and revolutionary syndicalists would all understand in terms of building the social republic within the shell of capitalism. Recognising Marx's cautions against 'dwarfish experiments' and orienting practical activity towards the necessity of socialist revolution, this notion of prefiguration as a process of social transformation in which the proletariat are active, creative subjects is surely closer to Marx's perspective on self-emancipation than is the idea of collectivising workers under the authority of the party as the 'ideal’ agency which alone knows the path of history.

Immanence and Transformatory Agency
Marx himself refused to present socialism as an ideal society. On his own historicist premises Marx could not present a vision of the future (Avineri 1968). Rather Marx was a radical immanentist whose 'ideal', as it were, is something contained with the social structure of the present. The socialist future, therefore, is something implicit in the present society and, indeed, in its lines of development (Meikle 1985). To the extent that there are lines of development, then, the future can be conceived as in some way predetermined. Marx is neither a possibilist nor an inevitabilist. Socialism is more than a possibility, it is a necessity if the contradictions of the capital system, with the degeneration these involve, are to be positively resolved in the direction of human freedom. But that lines of development make socialism the necessary society implies no inevitability. Human activity, a process of actualisation through the transformatory human agency is required (Meikle 1985).

It is in this sense of process and transformatory praxis and actualisation that one raises the notion of prefiguration. For the problem is that the belief that socialism represents an historical inevitability has come to be expressed in the reality of state socialism rather than Marx's 'free association’ of individuals (Schechter 1994). The socialisation of the means of production has occurred under the authority of the state rather than the self-governing producers. One may argue, therefore, that the ideal and the real have truly parted company and that socialism once more has become a Utopia (Aronowitz 1981).

Marx's locating the ideal within the real still requires that human beings act within the historical process to realise that 'ideal'. This view is therefore distinct from the notion that the ideal is something guaranteed by the autonomous, movement of the real. One can nevertheless embrace the point of those who urge Marxists to face the consequences of the separation of the ideal and the real that has occurred under the auspices of ‘scientific socialism’. Thus Aronowitz argues





And it is the 'concrete negation of scientific marxism’ which is pursued in this thesis, not by presenting Marx as a theorist of socialist inevitability but by developing the critical and emancipatory aspect of Marx. Hence, my intention is to emphasise revolutionary-critical praxis as a fundamental democratisation of philosophy, politics and power. For this transformative praxis is oriented towards human emancipation through a project of restitution. Thus the transition to the socialist society is understood as being situated on two interrelated terrains - the state and capital as alienated social powers emerging as part of the same process of modernity. Thus revolution itself is to be understood less as act or event than as a process of reempowerment as human beings, self-organising in society, practically reappropriate their social powers. Marx's democratisation of knowledge and politics, then, is presented as reempowerment by and of human beings as knowledgeable, active agents. Thus socialist revolution as a transformatory process is understood to possess a prefigurative dimension that shapes the character of both means and end, of the relations within the revolutionary movement and which would apply in the future socialist society.

Thus the practical reappropriation of the social power alienated to the state and to capital signifies something much more profound than winning control of the state and of the means of production. It means the general reempowerment of civil society through its investment with the capacity for exercising social control, i.e. precisely the capacity exercised institutionally and systemically in external form by the state and capital. Indeed, from this perspective, capturing the state power and possessing the means of production could actually be interpreted as reinforcing the alien control of the state and capital rather than as part of the process of restitution. The political implications of this innovative, creative Marxism are clear. For what may be called revolution is a process of restitution which means that the transformatory action which leads to socialism begins long before and, indeed, is largely completed before the physical seizure of power which is conventionally interpreted as the revolution. For socialism as process is not about the capture and hence reinforcement of institutional and structural power but about their dissolution with the social bodies and agencies of civil society. Marx's socialism requires the restitution/dissolution of institutional and structural power as social power, not its monopolisation as alien power (Meszaros 1995:468 430).

Such a Marxism, as the negation of scientific Marxism and its authoritarian politics via the ideal party, orients the revolutionary subject within a complex process founded upon and sustained by the active participation and consent of human beings. This is nothing less than the demos itself reclaiming its powers, overturning the relations of domination and exploitation that underpin the abstraction of the 'complex' world and its bureaucratised systems of control. The intention of this thesis is to define a Marxism which does have a role for creative human agency, which relates 'economistic' issues of class and capital to human emancipation in general, i.e. to a process of emancipation and restitution which overturns the economism and determinism of the capital system in favour of human freedom as social self-determination.

The assumption is that this is possible within the Marxist paradigm. That certain marxisms have become exhausted is not in doubt. That dominant marxisms have expressed themselves in state socialism is not in doubt. Marxism can be reclaimed because there is a lost Marx to reclaim. Such attempts at recovery in the past still had the dead weight of Social Democracy and Communism to contend with political movements possessing strong material and popular roots. These roots have now withered. It is now possible, to an extent as never before, to argue that the party political socialism of Social Democracy and Communism, which necessarily involve the politicisation and bureaucratisation of socialism under the state, had no capacity to fight capital on its own material terrain, could not and cannot abolish the capital system and thus offered and offers nothing to the project of realising socialism. The capital system is not a public domain and is not open to such a political abolition. The capital system has to be attacked on its own material level, not by parties and politicians, even ones armed with the power of the state, but by the proletarian movement itself. Marxism is salvageable, but only to the extent that it begins to take the transformatory class praxis of the proletariat seriously.

Thus the critical and emancipatory Marxism presented here is based upon the centrality of praxis as the democratisation of politics, philosophy and power. This Marxism stresses the active, collective and participatory side of changing the world whereas scientific Marxism came to develop a passive reliance upon the autonomy of 'the economy', conceived as an objective datum governed by laws of its own. This objective world and these laws were interpreted by those whose scientific insight into the complex world made then epistemologically privileged as distinct from the, once more, passive, uncomprehending mass subject to a general materialist determinism. Laclau criticises science as ‘a monolithic and unified understanding of the whole of the social process’ on account of the authoritarian implications of such a conception (Laclau 1990). That this scientific Marxism had elitist and authoritarian implications is now plain enough. For, clearly, one has returned to that idealism that Marx had detected in Enlightenment materialism. For the old mechanical materialism to be able to account for change, society had to be divided into two parts, the one subject to the materialist determinism, the other, somehow, removed above it. Only something ideal could be raised above in this way. To counter this, Marx insisted that human beings were the active producers of circumstances and that they, as agents, and not circumstances, through its determinism, were the active principle in history. The need for an ideal agency had thus been removed. Scientific Marxism, conceiving the world objectively, as something independent of human beings, not only confirmed the alienated character of the world but also restated the need for the ideal agency. This ideal agency was ‘the party’. Of course Marxists saw the political passivity of the ideal party before 'history’. From differing perspectives Lenin, Luxemburg, Korsch, Lukacs and Gramsci all saw that socialism would not be achieved gradually as the result of historical evolution nor would it be achieved mechanically as a reaction to capitalist breakdown. Rather, socialism would require conscious, constructive political organisation and intervention on the part of human agency. Thus the attainment of socialism could not be presented, as 'orthodoxy’ had presented it, as following a predetermined pattern.

The argument presented here has no problem in acknowledging debts to these earlier Marxists. For, as consummate Marxists, they looked to develop Marxism within an existing reality. This study, however, reaches back into the roots of Marxism itself, into the writings of Marx. To this extent it could be dismissed as another archaeological excavation (Aronowitz 1981), as another pouring over the sacred texts. In defence, one can argue that there is a side to Marx which has not been fully developed and which retains political significance. To recover this Marx does require a lot of digging and reconstruction. But the recovery of emancipatory and critical themes is justified in the attempt to place the democratic and subjective dimension at the heart of a transformatory politics and hence place human beings as knowledgeable agents at the centre of a new Marxism – Marx's old Marxism - as a project of restitution (Boggs 1984:15). 

Academic versus Revolutionary Marxism
The intention here is to argue that in addition to the politicisation of Marxism, the alienation of socialism from the working class to those claiming to represent the class, i.e. to those extraneous from the world of material life, there has also been the academicization of Marxism (Kitching 1988:35; Sayer 1987; Thomas 1980:114; Meikle 1985). The bureaucratisation of politics and of knowledge are part of the same process of abstraction. The 'complex' world which only a select few can understand and govern is precisely the fetishistic, alienated world which Marx sought to restore to human control.

If the intention is to reconstruct Marx's thought in order to present Marx as engaged in an emancipatory project then a number of propositions follow. That Marx does not theorise or interpret the world from a position abstracted from the world, as though the world were really external to human beings. Rather, understanding the world is conditional upon transformative praxis removing the gap that alienation has put between human beings and their self-made social world. Thus, the 'reconstructed' Marx that is here presented is one that proceeds from the critique of political and social alienation, of the state as the institutional expression of capital's alienated system of social production (Thomas 1980:64 71/2 115/6 120/1).

My claim is that as human beings have been separated from their means of exercising control over their material existence, as the state and capital have emerged as alienated social powers, the social world has been fetishised, become 'complex’ to use the term of the social scientists and theorists. The tendency has thus grown to merely interpret the world, i.e. to opt for that passive knowledge that develops post-festum, rather than to test truth by praxis. And Marxism has succumbed to this tendency to theorise retrospectively, to develop bodies of thought that interpret the world as a given, objective datum, independent of human transformative praxis. One need not look at Second International orthodoxy here. The same tendency is apparent in most of the academic Marxists, from the stamocap (state monopoly capitalism) theorists to the critical theorists to the structuralists to the capital logic school to the analytical Marxists to the post-fordists and post-marxists themselves. All, it may be noted, argue as though the world were a given factual world governed by its own inexorable laws. All develop their theories in abstraction from the class praxis of the proletarian revolutionary subject.

It may seem that there is an anti-intellectualist strand to this argument. If so, it derives from Marx's breakthrough from philosophy to reality, leaving merely interpreting the world to such as Hegel's philosopher, whose knowledge is obtained post-festum (Marx and Engels Holy Family MECW, vol 4 1975:85/6), and embracing the transformation of this world as a human world subject to the reshaping agency of the human subject. It is the intention of Marxism as an emancipatory project to recover this fetishised world as a thoroughly human world.
Thus, when Ken Post argues that ‘concentration on intellectual work, must face the very real and unavoidable question of whether Marxism retains any theoretical, analytical and practical (hence revolutionary) meaning' (Post 1996:7), one has to question just what these terms refer to. For it is profoundly misleading to conceive Marx as a theorist, as someone who produced theories. This may seem like semantics. Marx, after all, did critically analyse capital and hence could be said to have put forward a body of thought possessing theoretical merit. But neither the problems nor their solutions are academic. There seems to be an implication in much recent work concerning the regaining or reconstructing of Marxism that the refinement of Marx's conceptual apparatus and analytical tools would be sufficient to make Marxism meaningful (Wright, Levine, Sober 1992:5/7). This may be true from the perspective of social science, perhaps, interpreting the world as something empirically given to the scientist. But the view taken here is that Marxism has shown itself quite as sophisticated in analysing the world as any other of the schools of social science, that its ability to predict the trends and tendencies of the world has been at least as effective as other schools (Howard and King 1992:391/2) but that this whole conception of Marxism as a means of analysing and interpreting the world is removed from Marx's intention in any case.

 My point is that there is a need to go beyond the view that the world is external to human beings and that knowledge, therefore, is obtained independently of transformative praxis and hence is post-festum.

From this perspective, one notes how sophistication in analytical terms seems to be obtained through the increased distancing of theory from human agency. The critical-emancipatory Marxism presented here has the transformatory human subject at the very centre of the project of restitution and, defined in such terms, is critical of those Marxists for whom Marxism is merely a means of obtaining an adequate knowledge of a given, alienated world. The point is to go beyond existing reality and its fetishistic relations and structures, not to theorise them.

For the academicisation of Marxism has, even with the best of intentions of the academic Marxists, distanced self-professed Marxists from the revolutionary agency. Where this agency has been engaged in the struggles and practices pointing beyond existing reality, the academics, as theorists and analysts, have been interpreting this very same world. Putting the point more crudely, the class agency has looked upon the world in terms of possibility whilst the theorists have identified and rationalised constraints.

The Theorisation and Naturalisation of Complexity
 	What makes the point so important is that to theorise constraint at the expense of possibility effectively denies the validity of revolutionary politics (Cleaver 1979:29). According to this view, bureaucratisation and industrialisation, the state, the division of labour, are all necessary features of modern civilisation and completely irrevocable (Meszaros 1995:620/1 797 739). The idea of 'abundance’ is dismissed as Utopian (Nove 1983:15/20; Elster 1985:231; Pierson 1986:28/9) whilst the substantial material wealth that has been obtained is understood as requiring a complex social organisation which makes bureaucracy, the division of labour, the state, and a degrading realm of production all necessary. The notion of 'inevitability' is apparent here. One also notes the old empiricist trick of proceeding from the world as given and deducing the necessary or inevitable from this givenness.

Against this, I prefer Stuart Hampshire's notion of 'false fixities' (Hampshire 1989:57) to describe those things historical and alterable which conservatives nevertheless protect as natural and inevitable.

Of course advanced industrial societies are 'complex', bureaucratised, technological and bureaucratic. Of course, they require a sophisticated institutional and organisational framework to regulate them. For ecologists, however, this complexity is sufficient explanation for the increasing tendency to breakdown exhibited by these societies (Rifkin 1985:79 88). 

It is ironic that as technology has become more complex and has enlarged its domain in the world, we have come to see it as something independent of nature, as if it were generating its own energy... The fact is technology never creates energy; it only uses up existing available energy. The larger and more complex the technology, the more available energy it uses up..
Even though all of this is rather obvious, we still continue to live under the delusion that out technology is freeing us from dependence upon our environment, when nothing could be further from the truth. 
We also entertain the belief that technology is creating greater order in the world when, again, the opposite is the case. The Entropy Law tells us that every time available energy is used up, it creates greater disorder somewhere in the surrounding environment. The massive flow through of energy in modern industrial society is creating massive disorder in the world we live in...




In fine, the ‘complexity’ which is cited to expose the ‘utopian’ aspirations of socialism denotes an alien order which is socially and environmentally destructive. The more the ‘complex’ world evinces chaos and disorder, the more people cling to the familiar rather than addressing the structural and institutional origins of the problem. Instead, there is an even stronger assertion of modern technique and organisation, defending its alleged necessity against all criticism. An ecological perspective criticises the centralisation and complexity of the modern social order.





The increasing complexity of the modern social order is not an argument in favour of its necessity but points to an alien control designed to maximise outputs. Rifkin refers to energy, but behind the capital system is the accumulation of capital. ‘the more stages in the mental process, the greater complexity, abstraction and centralisation, and the greater the dissipation of energy and disorder. The history of human mental developments has been a history of removing the human mind farther and farther away from the reality of the world we live in’ (Rifkin 1985:183).

This is a world of abstraction, of the autonomisation of concepts and ideas from realities. Of alterable institutions defended by false mental and psychological fixities.









In face of social and ecological breakdown, complexity is not an argument. It merely begs the question. There is a need to identify and uproot the alien forms behind this ‘complexity’ of modern institutions.

In a high entropy culture, the overriding purpose of life becomes one of using high energy flow to create material abundance and satisfy every conceivable, human desire. Human liberation is thus equated with the accumulation of greater wealth. A primary value is placed upon transforming the environment to extract its riches.

This points to the process of private accumulation, the ‘economic growth’ that is supposed to liberate the world but which, in truth, extends dehumanisation.

Having banished God from society, the high entropy, materialist value system attempts to provide a heaven on earth.. In so doing we have placed man and woman at the centre of our universe, and defined the ultimate purpose of our existence as the satisfaction of. all possible material wants, however frivolous. We have reduced 'reality' to that which can be measured, quantified, and tested. We have denied the qualitative, the spiritual, the metaphysical. We have entered into a pervasive dualism - our minds separated from our bodies, our bodies divorced from the 'surrounding' world.




Rifkin makes the case for social and democratic control over against the alien systems of control which characterise the modern state and capital economy.





Capitalism and is central accumulative logic contradicts the ecological perspective on every point.

The new stewardship doctrine turns the modern world view upside down. The rules and relationships that are used to exploit nature are diametrically opposed to those that are necessary to conserve nature. For example, private ownership of resources, increased centralisation of power, the elimination of diversity, greater reliance on science and technology, the refusal to set limits on production and consumption, the fragmentation of human labour into separate and autonomous spheres of operation, the reductionist approach to understanding life and the interrelationships between phenomena, and the concept of progress as a process of continually transforming the natural world into a more valuable and more ordered human-made environment have long been considered as valid pursuits and goals in the modern world. Every single one of these items and scores of others that make up the operating assumptions of the age of growth are inimical to the principles of ecology, a low-entropy economic framework, and, most importantly, the newly defined stewardship doctrine.




The status quo is not an option. The point is that this framework is not fixed and is not the most rational way for human beings to organise their material existence. If Marxists are urged to 'be realistic' and acknowledge the complexity of the modern world - as a whole number of thinkers from Nove to Sayer to Bobbio to N Scott Arnold urge - then the bluff may be called. 'Complexity' in itself is neither an argument nor an option. We need to ask what social relations lie behind this complexity.

If we continue to base our hope on maintaining the existing order, then, truly, we will have only despair for our companion, for there is no hope that the modern age as we know it can long continue. On the other hand, what is so desirable about even entertaining such a hope? Why should we hope for more complex technology and more wasteful economic growth, when it only serves to rob us of our future as a species? Continuing to have faith in our high energy environment is not a hope but an illusion. We should not despair of relieving ourselves of this illusion. Rather, we should rejoice that our generation has the opportunity to begin a planetary transformation that will move our world from the brink of annihilation into a new order of the ages.

Rifkin 1985:273 (see also Rifkin 1985:93 172 183 264/5 275 280).

State And Society - System And Life World
Thus one feels entitled to reject the cautions coming from 'realists' on the left to the effect that the world is so complex as to make Marxism as an emancipatory project of restitution utterly Utopian. Habermas, for instance, argues for the protection of the life world as separate from the system world, but nevertheless maintains that this system world, steered by money and power, cannot be reclaimed by human beings in the life world (Anderson 1992:329). This effectively leaves the state and capital untouched, the very forces behind abstraction and the social and ecological destruction it entails. In Habermas’ defence, it could be argued that his distinction between system and life world corresponds to Marx's distinction between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom, which itself of Aristotelian origin (Arendt 1958:30f 79/135 254 n.4). It is nevertheless clear that restitution for Marx referred to social powers in general and not merely the sphere of communication, as with Habermas.

The ‘realist’ assertion is that to maintain the standard of living obtained, 'modern' civilisation, then modern technology, bureaucratic forms of organisation, the hierarchical division of labour are all necessary. Capital as a system of alienated labour is thus naturalised. This argument from complexity has formed the Weberian case against Marxism (Clawson 1980:12/18). What perhaps needs underlining is the fact that such Weberianism has been strongly represented within what may be called the socialist tradition and has become ever more strident, the more recalcitrant to change modern social institutions have become.

Relevant in this connection is the number of theorists on the left who have come to argue the impossibility of socialist revolution, for the desirability of the institutional separation of the state and civil society, and for the interpretation of socialism as the completion of liberal democracy (Keane 1984; Bobbio 1987; Pierson 1986). Socialism in Marx's understanding is firmly rejected. To be meaningful socialism must adapt itself to the contours of existing society and thus stand for little more than a more egalitarian, more fair, better organised version of contemporary society, with socialist politicians in office in a system of parliamentary democracy. One may call this a neo-Bernsteinism. Marx's socialism in the sense of a nonhierarchical division of labour, direct, self-representing systems of production and politics, as the realm of freedom over the realm of necessity, is declared manifestly impossible. Habermas' attempts to preserve the life world against the system world thus appears as the only way that Marxism can remain meaningful in the modern world.

The argument developed in this thesis is that this Marxism of the modern world is precisely the Marxism that is in crisis, along with the world it theorises. For it is a Marxism that has struck Faustian bargains with the alien powers/modern gods (Sayer 1991:154; Habermas 1990:110), the powers that Marx argued should be reappropriated as social powers. It will be argued here that the apparently unalterable structures and institutions of the 'complex' modern world are best grasped in terms of Marx's critique of political and social alienation, a critique which upholds the possibility of an alternative organisation of social life.

It is thus argued that it is meaningful to conceive of an alternative social order, that socialist revolution is possible, that abstraction can be overcome and that it is possible to organise our interaction with the environment in such a way as to realise human essence through labour, that social labour can be directly supplied by society itself as against beings supplied indirectly through the value form.

Socialism and Weberian Determinism
The repudiation of Marxism for another dose of Faustian socialism occurs in quite Weberian terms but nevertheless ignores Weber's own critique of rational, bureaucratic socialism (Sayer 1991:145). For Weber, this is the only socialism possible (Mommsen in Levy ed. 1987). One also notes the deterministic strains of these revisionist arguments. The dictates of bureaucratic organisation, of technology and of dehumanised production are asserted on the unstated premise of capitalist social relations. The assumption is that the technology and bureaucracy of the existing system of production are natural and neutral in origin and effect whereas it is at least as plausible to trace these developments in the need for capitalists to organise and control labour within an alienated system of production (Clarke 1991; Marglin in Nicholls ed. 1980:237ff; Clawson 1980; Friedman 1977; Edwards 1979:177/83; Hyman 1989:227/9) and how this system structures and is structured by state politics (Burawoy 1985:11 254). Yet again the determining power of the class struggle is neglected, failing to see technological innovation as a strategic response by the capitalists to workers power, the factory as a means of controlling labour, which is how Marx presented the case in the supposedly 'objectivist' Capital (Cleaver 1979; Dunayevskaya 1988).

And this point possesses profound implications. For if the development of bureaucracy and technology is not the product of some autonomous process of 'rationalisation’ but is in fact the result of alienated labour and hence of the need for capitalists to organise the control of labour so as to ensure the extraction of surplus value, than it is at least feasible to conceive of alternative forms of social organisation and systems of production and politics. And it is this alternative which I argue for here.

To come back to the question of academicisation, the tendency of theorists is to accept the horizons of the existing world and to reproduce these theoretical horizons within socialism. This is to opt for a socialism of piecemeal reformism. For such theorists are removed from the class praxis of the revolutionary agent. As Clarke concluded, the real tragedy of Marxism lies in its separation from the concrete material organisation and practices of the proletariat (Clarke 1991:328), a point that may refer to the academicisation of Marxism as much as to its politicisation within existing state structures. Distanced from the class struggle and from the proletarian movement, the world is once more conceived as an object to be analysed retrospectively. The tendency, then, is to accept the horizons of the existing world and to sea just what kind of socialism could be meaningful in terms of these horizons.

The Marxism of the Academy

As theory, Marxism undergoes sporadic revival. Such revivals are usually parasitic upon an upsurge in the class struggle whilst retaining their distance from that struggle. Thus there is no contradiction at all in the view that some express of analytical Marxism as being 'the most exciting, theoretical work now in progress in the name of Marxism’ (Merquior 1986:200) whilst also ‘making sense’ of Marx only by presenting a 'frozen economic version of Marx's historical theory' and omitting Marx's revolutionary socialist activity aimed at radical democracy (Gilbert 1981:ix). The most exciting theoretical Marxism, in other words, turns out to be the most unmarxist in political terms. Thus Gilbert writes:





One can refer in this context of Gerry Cohen's Marx's Theory of History: A Defence. This presents the old productive forces determinism in a sophisticated analytical form. Cohen's account rests upon generalising Marx's concise statements in the 1859 Preface. Given that the most striking thing about this Preface is its lack of reference to the class struggle - one has to assume it to be implicit in the contradiction between forces and relations of production - then the presentation of a whole theory of history upon its productive forces determinism is of dubious value (Sherman 1996:59/62; McLennan 1989:60; Rigby 1987:110; Rigby 1984:68). Richard Miller thinks it remarkable that Marx's theory of history should be 'reconstructed, in large part, by a close reading of a brief formulation embedded in an autobiographical sketch in a preface to a book that [Marx] gladly allowed to go out of print' (Miller 1984:62). Indeed.

By his analytical approach, Cohen presents a parody of Marxism. One is entangled in such banal issues as to just what is to be included in the forces of production, of what the relations of production consist, how forces and relations are to be distinguished. One can make the point that Cohen postulates too easy a distinction between the forces and the relations of production, that he exaggerates Marx's stress on the development of the productive forces, that he abstracts this historical materialism from class struggle and revolutionary praxis to an extent that does imply an historical determinism operating over the heads of human agents.

The rigid distinction postulated between forces and relations of production is a problem for Derek Sayer. For Sayer, Marx's categories exist in internal relation to each other and are 'empirically open-ended'. To all intents and purposes, Cohen is guilty of fetishising concepts and may be offered as an example of precisely that reification of human understanding for which Marx criticised the bourgeois epoch. In contrast, Sayer argues that concepts are to be considered as being of essentially historical provenance and definition (Sayer 1987:22). Sayer's 'empirically open’ historical materialism enables him to go beyond issues of whether and how forces and relations of production come into contradiction. Sayer is able to broaden the issue to the production and reproduction of real life (Sayer 1987:73).

That the analytical Marxists are remote from Marx's emancipatory and revolutionary commitment is easily enough appreciated. The tendency to an objectivist, evolutionary approach to social change, with the development of the productive forces prioritised over human agency, is obvious. Cohen does not, perhaps, intend to devalue the class struggle. His point is that the class struggle in itself does not suffice to produce change; it can only do so if it is located in a historical dynamic involving the forces of production (Cohen 1982:495).

Rigby has attempted to create a greater space for human agency in historical change by inverting Cohen's scheme to argue for the dominance of the relations of production over the forces of production. He goes on to argue, moreover, that it is an error to restrict the definition of the relations of production to purely economic criteria. There is an inherent subjective element in exploitation and both politics and ideology, superstructural forces, go to constitute the relations of production. Rigby frames his argument in these terms in order to support his view that there is no necessary technical or economic dynamic propelling historical change. Rather, the only dynamic as such is the class struggle (Rigby 1987:part 2).

Rigby's argument has the merit of reinstating the class struggle where Cohen risks its devaluation. Cohen, however, identifies such justifications of the class struggle, without being founded in the forces of production, as guises for indeterminacy (Cohen 1982:495). Alex Callinicos offers a way out of the impasse. He acknowledges that the forces of production generate a 'weak impulse’ to growth and this suffices to 'trigger' serious crises (Callinicos 1987:93). The process is not objectivist and is not independent of conscious human agency. Whether these crises are resolved positively or not depends upon the class struggle and, importantly, upon class capacities (Levine and Wright in Callinicos 1989).

interests in the development of productive forces cannot, on Cohen's view, be finally blocked. Thus at the level of generality at which historical materialism (in the sense of the 1859 Preface) is posed, social constraints on the implementation of interests can be overlooked. On this crucial point, we think Cohen is wrong. The transformation of interests into practices is the central problem for any adequate theory of history, as it is for the theory and practice of politics. It is worth noting that this problem is a central motif of the thought of those Marxists who have, in effect, distanced themselves from the positions of the 1859 Preface, we agree with them that the theory of history Marx sketches in that text is inadequate to the extent it ignores or effectively minimises the problem of class capacities.

Levine and Wright in Callinicos 1989:32/3

Marx may, or may not, have too easily assumed the automatic development of proletarian class capacities. The 'expropriators are expropriated' passage in Capital indicates that he did, his political activity and writing suggests a keen awareness of the need for the proletariat to develop its organisational, political and intellectual capacities. There are, as Marx indicated, objective processes at work to facilitate proletarian self-development. But there are, as Levine and Wright argue, processes at work to discourage such development. Either way, the development of the class capacities required to produce social change is never automatic.

Socialist political strategies must contend directly with the obstacles in the way of developing appropriately revolutionary class capacities: the institutional form of the capitalist state, divisions within the working class, and between the working class and its (potential) allies, and mechanisms of ideological domination and deflection. Such obstacles are irreducible to the forces of production, and thus the fettering of those forces in no way ensures the eventual erosion of these obstacles to working class capacities.

Levine and Wright in Callinicos 1989:46

Cohen, then, may be criticised for the inadequacy of his theory in explaining social transformation and, indeed, its inability to buttress a revolutionary socialist politics. For Marxism, as a revolutionary theory, must concern itself with the issue of class capacities. A theory of history which postulates the development of class capacities as the inevitable result of technological development has failed to adequately theorise the formation of class capacities and, as such, may be condemned as deficient from the perspective of informing revolutionary practice. The theory that Cohen constructs is theoretically, politically and morally inadequate, and fails to give good reasons to motivate action on the part of the working class, whatever its roots in some of Marx's writings (Levine and Wright in Callinicos 1989:46/7).
Cohen's defence of Marx is very partial in constructing a theory of history out of the 1859 Preface. An awful lot has been left out of this account. Cohen's view of Marx's theory - which entails the questionable, assumption that Marx indeed held a theory of history - neither recognises Marx's critique of political alienation, nor his affirmation of radical, commune democracy, his political activism and commitment to international proletarian revolution, nor his attempts to integrate Marx's revolutionary communism into the theoretical project (Gilbert 1981:263/4). And this is the real point in contention. Marx's Marxism has been transformed into a theoretical enterprise aimed at interpreting the world. And, as such, it must meet bourgeois social science on its own ground. Hence the reduction of Marxism to theory and its entanglement in such sterile controversies as having to determine just how bases determine superstructures, how bases and superstructures exercise a reciprocal influence upon each other. It is noticeable that Marx himself thought these questions to be of such little relevance as to restrict his opinion to a few sentences in a preface to a work which was considered disappointing at the time and largely ignored since.

The only thing that one can conclude is that analytical Marxism, for all its attempt at conceptual precision, has succeeded only in reducing Marx's Marxism to a bourgeois social science that, from the perspective of Marx's emancipatory commitment, has made a nonsense of Marx. As Gilbert concludes 'Cohen's account treats the theory more as a tool for historians than as a vehicle to change the world' (Gilbert 1981:263/4). One is thus back to Hegel's philosopher obtaining knowledge post-festum, to merely interpreting the world rather than changing it. Worse still is the impression that Marxists are not even engaged in interpreting the world, just Marxism itself, redefining concepts according to preference.

The Academicisation of Marxism
The academicisation of Marxism has been characterised by the reduction of Marxism to merely interpreting the world and endlessly reinterpreting Marxism as a 'theory'. In contrast, Marx's Marxism was firmly located in the emancipatory struggles and practices of human subjects seeking to change the world. And, indeed, socialist parties and movements have appropriated from Marx what they have required, either in informing or in justifying their political practice. But just as it is questionable as to how far this politicisation of Marxism through the substitute agency of the party-state represents the authentic Marxism of Marx, so it is questionable how far the Marxism of the academy has any relation to Marx (Callinicos 1985:157/8). What one is dealing with here is the abstraction of Marx's Marxism as a body of thought from the proletarian class agency and its concrete material organisation. Clarke noted this in its political aspect. There is an academic aspect to this also. The academics have poured over Marx in their tens of thousands but have nevertheless ignored Marx's emancipatory commitment to changing the world, have been detached from the workers' movement for this change and have not been prepared to address the political implications of treating Marxism as a theory for interpreting the world.

Sheldon Wolin .. hits the nail right on the head. Marx was not at all one more theorist among many. By formulating Marxism as a doctrine, method, and political movement, he fundamentally recast theory and what theory can do. But the very prepotency of this achievement in some ways widens the gap between the immediate circumstances in Marx's theorising and the ultimate effects of the theory he produced. Others have proved only too ready to widen it still further. Wolin himself may be one of them. His way of accounting for Marx's achievements, which, as he knows, were not all theoretical, is to inscribe Marx within a canon, the canon of theory. Marx’s place, to put the matter crudely, becomes not the gulag but the academy. Here his views can be arrayed against or alongside those of other theorists; here he can fit rather comfortably, threatening nobody with anything except the occasional flash of insight or frisson of understanding. So situated, Marx can indeed be found in the most unlikely places, domains distantly removed from his own that include .. town planning, art history, and comparative religion. The 'entire immense superstructure', to which Marx famously referred in another context, has turned out to be immense indeed.

Thomas in Carver ed.1991:27

The academics, by and large, on account of the theoretical, i.e. passive-contemplative nature of their enterprise, have not been sensitive to Marx’s point that 'real' knowledge is a condition of getting to grips with the world, changing it, corning to know it as a human world, closing the gap between philosophy and reality. Marx's call to change the world is no mere left piety, a call to arms, activism for the sake of activism. It relates precisely to this project of restitution, the idea that human beings reclaim the fetishised social world as their own, come to 'know' the world as their own and themselves as truly human beings.

What is one to make, then, of the academic Marxists who, so concerned with theoretical sophistication in interpreting the world, can make no sense of Marx's emancipatory commitment? Elster confesses his 'inability to make any interesting sense of Marx's article On the Jewish Question' (Elster 1985:504). This from someone who excels in the mind numbingly dull rational choice approach to Marxism and who pursues to great lengths the questions of just what goes into the forces and into the relations of production, the nature of the contradiction between them, and the distinction between development and use fettering. Similarly, Gregor McLennan, in a much more interesting and relevant work, urges that Marxists drop reference to emancipation as inviting dubious millenarian strains (McLennan 1989:137).

There is something profoundly amiss when Marx's emancipatory commitment, upon which his entire work as scholar and political activist rested (Kitching 1988:229), can be treated in such a fashion. The academics have been so engrossed in their theoretical projects as to not even notice the centrality of the emancipatory commitment in Marx (Perkins 1993:10/1). This commitment is not of importance to their own theoretical projects and so it can be discarded. The political implications of the reversion from changing the world to merely interpreting it are most evident here.

And the target for this criticism is not one of the particular schools of Marxist social science in particular. Whether orthodox, diamat or stamocap, structural or analytical, capital logic or post-fordist, the tendency of academic Marxism has been to theorise a priori principles of rationality that, based upon the fetishisation of concepts and structures, has constrained to the point of denying genuinely revolutionary activity on the part of the proletariat. The capitalist, it seems, is the only actor, and this only on account of a productive forces determinism. Those of a more revisionary persuasion choose to affirm the necessity of existing technology and bureaucracy in 'complex' industrial societies to underline the utopian nature of Marx's socialism. As with the post-marxists, we are confronted by an inverted historical materialism in which politics and ideology determine everything (Eagleton 1991:213/4). In the post-fordist analysis one returns to a productive forces determinism, with human beings having to adapt to the autonomous development of the new technologies (Bonefeld et al vol I 1992:xviii; Bonefeld et al vol II 1992:xii/xiii). Where, in all this, is the creative human subject capable of engaging in transformative praxis? This absence of the human subject is quite an omission since ‘praxis .. is the central category of the philosophy which is not merely an interpretation of the world, but also a guide to its transformation: that is, Marxism’ (Vazquez 1977:2).

One may conclude with Gilbert that





And this applies as much to revolutionary as to revisionist Marxism. Indeed, it could be argued that reformism has proved to be the fate of the 'orthodox' Marxists. Thus Gilbert notes how a 'predominant productive forces emphasis' 'can be misinterpreted to supply a priori strictures against genuine revolutionary movements' (Gilbert 1981:270). Such an 'orthodox' Marxism has long since ceased to possess any revolutionary significance and no longer makes any commitment to revolutionary social transformation. Effectively, 'orthodoxy' wagered all its political and intellectual capital upon the autonomous development of the historical process and the agency of 'the party', affirming socialism as historical inevitability. Socialism did not emerge and the various mechanisms of history which seemed to promise to deliver socialism are no longer operative. With this, the whole rationale of the party interpreting the laws of history has been eroded. Thus, in the absence of historical inevitability and the political party the socialist millennium has had to be postponed to an indefinite future. What remains of the orthodox tradition, relieved of its revolutionary impetus, has had to perpetuate its existence by becoming another school of social science indicating, at best, the reformist possibilities inherent in a still 'objective' reality.

Thus, with the loss of the revolutionary and the emancipatory commitment, Marxist theory becomes just a more sophisticated theory of capitalist reproduction (or 'regulation'). The only political perspective is then a 'leftist' refashioning of the real world of capitalism: the acceptance of existing realities in order to articulate viable hegemonic project and ensure its popular appeal so as to reform the institutions of social administration in a fair and just way. In sum, the political implications of orthodox Marxism, and its modern variants, are that Marxism has to refrain from the scholarly work of negation in favour of supplying sociological knowledge concerning the reformist opportunities already inscribed in objective development (Bonefeld et al ed. Ill 1995:2/3).

The Reversion to Interpretation and the Assimilation of Marxism
Murray Bookchin has written of capitalism's remarkable capacities for incorporation. Capitalism seems to possess the ability to assimilate all forces hitherto opposed to the system (Bookchin 1994:1/2). This inability to transcend the capital system on the material terrain has its counterpart on the intellectual terrain in 'the bourgeois academy' (Callinicos 1985:157). The bourgeois academy shows the ‘most remarkable ability to recuperate the most avant garde theories. ‘Power can turn the most radical thinker to its own ends' (Callinicos 1985:157). Thus 'Lukacs, Adorno and Althusser were all prisoners of their academic specialisms, divorced from the life and activity of the working class' (Callinicos 1985:157).

Vazquez makes the critical point here.





It is important here to grasp the significance of Marx's breakthrough from philosophy to reality, resolving philosophical questions demanding intellectual treatment into social questions requiring practical transformation. Hence Marx's call for the abolition/realisation of philosophy. Marx's revolutionary-critical praxis upholds an activist conception of knowledge against the passive-contemplative conception which obtains knowledge post-festum. Marx's break with philosophy here is a break with the view that the problems of the social world are philosophical in origin and that the resolution of problems is thus a philosophical process. Such a conception identifies the problems of the world with false ideas and looks therefore to substitute true ideas. Marx, however, came to argue that the problems presented to the philosophers are actually social in origin and hence require the practical transformation of the world. Marx thus subverted the position of the philosophers in favour of the proletariat.

Praxis, taking precise form in the shape of the proletariat, is the central category which distinguishes Marxist 'active' materialism, incorporating transformative and knowledgeable human agency, from all other philosophies. ‘To understand Marxism, therefore, we must, be aware of the nature and role of the concept of praxis, and this in turn will depend on whether Marxism is regarded as just one more philosophy, an interpretation of the world which inverted Idealism in order to set materialism upright, but preserving at the same time the concept of dialectic divested of the mystifications it had carried in Idealism; or whether it is acknowledged as a philosophy of revolutionary action whose objective is to transform the world, and in which the Idealist form of praxis was inverted in order that the practical, objective activity of men as concrete, socio-historical beings could come to occupy a central place. These two versions of Marxism lead to very different explanations of the radical change of direction in the history of philosophy which is represented by Marxism. In the first case, Marxism is merely a single step from one (Idealist) interpretation of the world to another (materialist) one; this would set Marxism itself within the frontiers of that philosophy which Marx had criticised in the first part of his Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach ("The philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways"). In the second case, there is movement from philosophy as interpretation to philosophy as a theory of the transformation of the real world, which justifies the second half of the Eleventh Thesis ("the point is to change it")’ (Vazquez 1977:30/1).

The criticism is that the Marxism of the modern world has reverted to merely interpreting the world. Hence one can argue that the Marxism of the academy represents a reversion to the view that the resolution of social problems is a philosophical process. Indeed, it is possible to argue that Gramsci has been used by those who still identify with Marxism to cover their steps back: to interpreting the world. For the reversion to interpretation is not in doubt (Meszaros 1995:xiv). The preoccupation with hegemony betrays a tendency to believe that the attainment of the socialist society is first and foremost a matter of getting people to think differently. Thus, the transition to socialism is understood to be an almost completely intellectual process, whereas with Gramsci it was associated with the creation of proletarian organs capable of rupturing bourgeois rule on the political and material terrain. Of course, this one sided interpretation of Gramsci has been popular since it fits in with the expansion of mass media, the universities, and cultural agencies generally (Jay 1984:84/5; Curran and Gurevitch 1991).

This has important implications as regards the character of Marxism. Perry Anderson has commented upon the ‘basic shift in the whole centre of gravity of European Marxism towards philosophy’ (Anderson 1976:49), noting a ‘marked predominance of epistemological work’ (Anderson 1976:93). Moreover, when western Marxism went 'beyond questions of method to matters of substance' it did so only to 'concentrate overwhelmingly on study of superstructures' (Anderson 1976:75). Anderson proceeds to the crucial point.






It comes as no surprise, then, that one observes ‘the studied silence of Western Marxism in those areas most central to the classical traditions of historical materialism: scrutiny of the economic laws of motion of capitalism as a mode of production, analysis of the political machinery of the bourgeois state, strategy of the class struggle necessary to overthrow it’ (Anderson 1976:44/5).

These developments have encouraged the view that popular perceptions are shaped by the ideas and ideology disseminated by these cultural institutions and that, before change is possible, the intellectual battle must have been won and people, therefore, must therefore have come to think differently (Larrain 1979:162/4 169/71). This is a complete misreading of Gramsci, a revolutionary socialist for whom any counter-hegemonic project would be firmly rooted in the material practices and struggles of the working class. Gramsci was the last western Marxist 'to broach central issues of class struggle directly in his writings' (Anderson 1976:20). Gramsci is clear that understanding the world differently is conditional upon actually changing the world, hence Gramsci's work with the factory councils and the revolutionary party. Further, this view greatly exaggerates the influence of ideas in ruling the world whilst devaluing the hard realities of politics and class power (Eagleton 1991; Abercrombie at al 1980).

More generally, western Marxism has itself exhibited a tendency to opt for the battle of ideas over the class struggle (Anderson 1976). Without wishing to indulge in class reductionism and 'economism', and recognising too that intellectual struggle is also a material practice that has an effect in changing the world (Aronowitz 1981:20), it nevertheless remains true that this predilection for the intellectual struggle, for 'consciousness raising', displays an independence from the class struggle that is ultimately sterile (Cleaver 1979). One ends upon theorising capital's mechanisms of domination as being of such all-consuming power as to be untranscendable. What has been lost, of course, is the class subject and its epistemological and structural capacity to see through and break through mystifying and enslaving bourgeois relations.

The crisis of Marxism goes further than the fairly obvious deficiencies of the old communist parties and 'orthodoxy'. For, it could be argued, much of western Marxism itself has long been the new orthodoxy. Harvey thus argues that western Marxism, in the form of the New Left, has placed too great an emphasis upon cultural practices and politics to the exclusion of supposedly 'economistic' concerns, has been too willing to embrace the new social movements against the proletariat, and has as a result facilitated the 'turn to aesthetics that postmodernism has been about’ (Harvey 1989:354). This is not to defend 'orthodoxy' in politics and theory - whatever that may mean. Western Marxism may be credited for having long recognised, 'however obscurely’, the inadequacies of the orthodox position (Levine and Wright in Callinicos 1989:47). But there is much truth in Harvey's point that the New Left has erred in abandoning ‘its faith both in the proletariat as an instrument of progressive change and in historical materialism as a mode of analysis’.





The western Marxists were quite correct to argue that Marx had been engaged in a project of critique, with Capital, for instance, as a critique of political economy rather than as the presentation of a new economic theory. The problem is that western Marxism sought the origins of Marx's critique in its philosophical idealist roots to the neglect of Marx's 'scientific' breakthrough and revolutionary political activism. What was a practical process of revolutionary social transformation for Marx once more became an intellectual process. Not the least of the reasons for this was the privileged role that the intellectuals could assume in penetrating the mysteries of the fetishised world. Only those possessing a certain degree of philosophical insight could claim the capacity to interpret the fetishised world and to explain the political implications of this esoteric philosophy to the masses, the masses still subject to the determinism of circumstances.

The reformist, not to say bureaucratic, implications of this, are clear. The masses remain passive in relation to circumstances. Only that elite able to interpret and govern this determined world are capable of ruling. With the return to the view that resolving the problems of the world is an intellectual process a subtle shift has taken place which reinstates the theoretico-elitist model which Marx consciously set out to subvert. The bureaucratic conception of politics, philosophy and power returns. One may refer here to the tradition of 'socialism from above' which has continued to dominate over the workers socialism which was the socialism of Marx. Whilst Marx was engaged in critique, whilst intellectual practice is a material practice and whilst it is necessary to form a counter-hegemonic strategy, one should be alert to political dangers. Marx's emancipatory project is oriented by its socialist objective: the abolition of the state and capital as a mode of alien control and the institution of a mode of social control constituted by workers' material organs.

The Reinstatement of the Theoretico-Elitist Model
The problem with the academicisation of Marxism is that it replaces the workers' emancipatory struggle against the state and capital by an intellectual struggle to dissolve the mystifications surrounding the world and hence reform the popular consciousness. This carries with it the corollary of making socialism a 'correct theory’ to be inculcated into the working class. But this privileges those able to develop the correct theory over those into whom it is introduced. The popular masses remain passive and subaltern in this intellectual process of consciousness raising. This is a view associated with the Leninist theory of the revolutionary party, though Geras argues that Lenin took the argument from Kautsky and used it as a polemical weapon against the Economists (Geras 1986:140). More typical of Lenin is the view that 'correct revolutionary theory .. assumes final shape only in close connection with the practical activity of a truly mass and truly revolutionary movement’ (Lenin Collected Works, Vol 31 p25).

The conception that the proletariat is to have its consciousness elaborated outside it is quite appropriate to a view which places far greater stress upon domination in its ideological as opposed to its material aspects. Such a conception, therefore, reinterprets Marxism from being the theory and practice of the proletarian revolution to being the theoretical consciousness of the intellectuals. This redefines the nature of socialist revolution. From a concern with the abolition of capital and the state through a process of proletarian self-emancipation, Marxism comes to reinstate the theoretico-elitist model in which only a minority is able to understand and govern circumstances. The reformism of this bureaucratic 'socialism from above' is clear. The capacity for action and insight has shifted from the workers' transforming society to the intellectuals and the politicians working within the objective determinism and institutional constraints of existing society in order to identify possibilities for incremental change.

One returns, then, to Marx's unity - as against dualism - of theory and practice. Thus Gramsci argued for that kind of party which is the result of a dialectical process, in which the spontaneous movement of the revolutionary masses ‘and the organising and directing will of the centre converge' (Gramsci SPW II 1978:198). What was novel in the formation of the Communist Parties was the new relation between spontaneous action and conscious, theoretical foresight, it was the permanent assault upon and the gradual disappearance of the purely post-festum structure of the merely 'contemplative', reified consciousness of the bourgeoisie. This altered relationship has its origins in the objective possibility, available to the class consciousness of the proletariat at this stage of its development, of an insight into its own class situation which is no longer post-festum in character and in which the correspondingly correct line of action is already contained (Lukacs 1971:317).
Socialism, then, is not scientific theory or a theoretical consciousness facilitating the correct understanding of the world. Rather, socialism is the implicit class consciousness of the proletariat and, as such, is something deriving from the material practices and struggles of the class (i.e. not merely objective relation or position, enabling representatives to assume an assigned class consciousness Meszaros 1995:324/5) as revolutionary subject (Lukacs 1971:75). The socialist consciousness is not to be obtained post-festum. Meszaros argues against Lukacs, who ultimately holds a conception of consciousness that does indeed have to be introduced into the working class from the outside (Meszaros 1995:28). If it is a question of forming a counter-hegemonic strategy, then, one must proceed, according to this perspective, from the material practices and struggles of the working class. It is from this class praxis that the socialist consciousness is distilled and the world comes to be known as it is transformed. Thus, as Callinicos concludes:





The Interaction Of Spontaneity And Control
One can refer to the dialectical relationship between the spontaneous movement of the class and the organising centre canalising that movement, as does Gramsci; one can refer, as does Lukacs, to 'the interaction of spontaneity and conscious control’ (Lukacs 1971:317). For 





With the declining influence of 'orthodoxy' and, in its political form, of Social Democracy and Communism, the old historical materialism, with its predominant productive forces determinism, has been replaced by a post-marxism which, far from overcoming determinism, merely inverts the old economic determinism to present an ideological determinism (Furedi in Jakubowski 1990:xvi). For the Marxists of the academy, 'the economic' determines nothing. There is 'no necessary relation’ between economic position and political and ideological positions. This constant assertion of there being no necessary relation has become the occasion for asserting that politics and ideology truly determine all that there is. The material world, it appears, does not exist until it is defined into existence; it is clay in the hands of the politicians and the intellectuals (Eagleton 1991).

Of course, what may be criticised from a revolutionary perspective as detachment from the transformative class praxis of the proletariat is conveniently rationalised by the post-marxists of the academy, by dismissing Marx's socialism for its economism, determinism and class reductionism. This is accompanied by assertions that Marx neglected politics, ideology and culture. They are to be compared with the ‘socialists of the chair' in the late nineteenth century, with the attempt to replace the class perspective with an ethical appeal in the SPD, with the position of Arnold Ruge. Marx subverted the position of the ideologists and the politicians, the bureaucrats of knowledge and politics, completely overthrew the theoretico-elitist model.

Marx's revolutionary call in Capital that the expropriators must be expropriated can be quoted in this context to demand that the working class revolutionary subject must take back Marxism and develop its .socialist consciousness itself and hence contest those intellectuals and politicians who have expropriated Marxism and socialism from the class subject and invested them in elitist, bureaucratic apparatuses, pacifying Marxism as a correct ideology, a bourgeois social science and a reformist politics.

Marxism And Ecology
That this enterprise is worth undertaking stems from the fact that Marxism, despite all that has happened, remains the only serious project of emancipation available in the modern world (Post 1996:20; Sherman 1995; Meszaros 1995:702). The vicissitudes of Marxism in its several manifestations should not hide the fact that no other project has the intellectual depth and social relevance of Marxism. Green and ecological writers and thinkers have made several valid criticisms of Marxism, especially that Marxism institutionalised by parties and states (Porritt and Winner 1988). But Martinez-Allier go too far in denying the possibility of an ecological Marxism given that Marx envisaged unlimited development of the productive forces under socialism (Martinez-Allier 1990). To identify Marx's Marxism with the mere expansion of the forces of production, considered technologically as the conquest of nature, is crass. Marx's project may be considered ecological in the sense that it attempts to recover conscious control over alienated human powers so as to ensure that these powers are exercised creatively and responsibly. As regards Marx's 'Prometheanism', Marx demonstrated that it is capitalism, resting upon the self-expansion of values and the imperative to accumulate, which is inherently and irresponsibly expansionary. Marx's 'mastery' is an attempt to overcome such irresponsible relation to nature.

As Parsons puts it





'Really existing socialism’ may have had a foul record on environmental despoliation but this does not, as Grundman argues, prove that Marxism is inherently defective on account of Marx's supposed technological optimism (Grundman 1991:140). There clearly were other forces at work in the Russian experience, unless one considers any expansion in the productive forces as such unecological - hardly an ecological position given the way that Marx developed his perspective in relation to the development of human powers. There is, in short, a Marxism available which may be considered as inherently ecological in its concern that human beings take responsibility for and control of their powers (Capra 1982:216/8; Grundmann 1991; Parsons 1977).

Marx's perspective implies a unity between society and nature through the practical activity of human beings, i.e. labour. But this practical activity is quite distinct from that of capitalism which, Parsons argues, 'bulldozes and creates a denatured world' founded upon the dominating and exploitative ethic of classical science. Parsons quotes Marx from the Paris Manuscripts to show that Marx had nothing but contempt for this despoliation (Parsons 1977:17). Parsons also emphasises Marx's view, expressed in Capital III, that the more that human beings come to know and control 'the more remote natural consequences of production, the more they not only feel, but also know, themselves to be one with nature'.

And the fact remains that Marxism and ecologism have a common enemy - the capital system. Marxism possesses a critical insight into the capital system from which ecologism could benefit (Parsons 1977; Vaillancourt 1992). One of the dangers of Green politics lies in its being 'fundamentally left liberal’ (Dobson 1990:84), for this involves essentially reformist strategies that make it easy for it to be assimilated and contained by capitalism, precisely the danger noted by Bookchin (1994:1).

Marxism's Historical Purpose
If the capital system is to be abolished then Marxism clearly has to be rejuvenated, in terms of a critical analysis that goes right to the heart of capital as an alienated system of production resting upon alienated labour and an hierarchical division of labour, but also in terms of actually proceeding from the emancipatory struggles and practices of the proletariat in their material organisations. Thus:





This view is confirmed by Ellen Meiksins Wood:









This whole argument presented here has been an attempt to criticise academic Marxism as a reversion to merely interpreting the world. Such a theoretical project must necessarily become entangled in the fetish character of the social world, given that passive-contemplative knowledge of the theorists in obtained post-festum.

More than this, this reversion to interpretation has entailed the reinterpretation of Marxism. Marxism has become the plaything of the intellectuals, with Marx's concepts redefined according to preference and even to academic fashion and professional ambition. This chapter has made the case for the working class, as the revolutionary agency, to reappropriate Marxism from the bourgeois academy and from the political parties within the state too. The attempt has been to recover Marxism as an emancipatory project that is both developed from and incorporated into the class praxis of the proletarian movement. This has involved criticising the several varieties of Marxism for their remoteness from proletarian class praxis, for their inability to understand that Marx's is first and foremost an emancipatory commitment to a free social world, and for their conversion of Marxism into a school of social science.







Post-Modernism/Marxism - The Autonomy of Theory and Politics

Although there are differences between post-modernism and post-marxism, both will be treated here as reactions against Marxism. Both write off Marxism for its determinism and classism, for its reduction of all aspects of social life to the economic; both reject Marxism for its authoritarian hegemony over the left, its claim to be the sole emancipatory project.

 Post-marxism, it may be argued, has reacted so violently against a particular, if dominant, conception of Marxism as to become almost indistinguishable from the anti-marxism of the Cold War (McLennan 1989:151). On the philosophical plane, Marxism's attempt to connect political and intellectual positions with the social and the structural is rejected. In terms suggesting Humean scepticism, it is asserted that there is no necessary relation between class position on the one hand and the political and ideological position on the other. It denies the existence of underlying structures from which politics and consciousness may be read off (Scott 1990:103). What the basis of political and intellectual controversy and struggle is on this analysis is not at all clear. 

Post-modernism denies marxism's distinction between appearance and reality. Reality is at it appears to be. How the world appears to human beings is how it really is. Human beings live at the level of appearances. The problem with this conception is that, remaining on the surface of reality, post-modernism comes to be complicit in the fetish character of the social world. Marx's distinction between how the world appears at the surface level and how it really is enables him to penetrate the fetishistic masks covering social relations. Post-modernism mistakes these masks for the only reality, fails to critique existing social relations and hence confirms the fetish character of the world (Harvey 1990:101). It is from this perspective that Marxism will be defended against criticisms from these two directions.

In their work, Paul Hirst and Barry Hindess have determined to repudiate that classical epistemology which upholds a correspondence between the concepts human beings develop to know the world and how the world actually is (Hindess and Hirst 1975 1977). If the world is at it is as a result of its conceptual definition, then the reasoning supporting the correspondence theory of truth is circular. The view that what enables human beings to know the world is the fact that human beings are able to conceptualise it is depicted by Hindess and Hirst as a rationalist fallacy. This criticism is much broader than an attack upon Marx and is directed against the entire tradition deriving from Kant's epistemological revolution. In this tradition the world is accessible to the human mind precisely because it is pre-structured to correspond to human cognitions of it. One may characterise the position as Nietzschean, to the extent that there is no given order to the world, only ineffable chaos, and no meaning to the world other than what human beings, arbitrarily, determine to construct (Eagleton 1991:203/5).

Important here the linguistic turn (Eagleton 1991:210/1). It is human beings who bring order to the world through their ability to signify the world through language. Language does not reflect reality but shapes it conceptually. No opinion can be given here as to what precisely is being shaped conceptually. Reality lacks any causal or structural significance in itself independently of the signifying activity of human beings. Reality is thus an unknown before human beings constitute it through their discursive activity (Eagleton 1991:204).

But, surely, this scepticism as regards reality and its causal processes and hierarchies leads to absurdity. The impression given - indeed the only position that is logical on the premises asserted - that discursive activity creates reality ex nihilo. For reality is not some unknown x before being signified into existence. Rather, human beings signify the world through being able to comprehend the distinctions that exist in reality. For 'it seems plausible to believe that there is a given distinction between wine and wallabies, and that to be unclear on this point might be the occasion of some frustration on the part of someone looking for a drink' (Eagleton 1991: 204). There is, therefore, a limit as to how far one can go in this scepticism as regards reality before life becomes impossible.





There are, of course, very important political implications to this anti-epistemological thesis. For the essential core of Marxism is subjected to direct assault. In Hirst and Hindess, the whole notion of 'social totality' disappears as just another example of the rationalist fallacy. The anti-epistemological thesis dissolves the Marxist argument that the given social formation exists at a number of different levels, each of which determine the others, to a greater or lesser extent, in a number of ways. Marxism thus engages in depth analysis, grasping the underlying structures sustaining the world and establishing the causal processes at work.

For Hindess and Hirst, this is the rationalist fallacy again in that it implies that social reality is already internally structured by the concepts with which human beings attempt to apprehend it. The political implications of this scepticism become clear when one comes to the conclusions drawn from these premises. There is no such thing as a social totality, no basis for considering one form of social activity as being more determinant than another, no necessary relation between the economic, the political or the cultural. Given that it is Marxism that has distinguished itself by making claims concerning underlying structures, necessary relations, material capacity and social futurity, with regard to socialism and the working class, the whole thesis is explicitly anti-marxist.

To be blunt, the claim that relations can have no significance other than what human beings fashion politically and discursively is equivalent to writing a blank cheque for the bureaucrats of knowledge and politics. To explain, if relations do not exist independently of discourse and if there are no necessary relations which connect the political and the intellectual with the social and the structural, then the world is full of open possibilities, political packages which politicians which can endlessly present and re-present at will. Eagleton points out that on these premises it is just as plausible to argue that the Bolshevik Revolution was caused by Radek's taste for pork pies as it is to argue for any other cause. Once one asserts that there are no causal hierarchies, no levels which determine each other in various ways, then Radek's penchant for pork pies cannot be ruled out as a likely cause of the Bolshevik Revolution. To bring in the war and the breakdown of political authority, to bring in the militancy of the working class, seizing the factories and of the peasants seizing the land, to bring in the ability of the Bolsheviks to find a discourse which related to popular heeds and demands, to actually be able to conceive why the Bolshevik discourse could make more sense than those offered by other parties, actually means bringing structural realities, causal processes and necessary relations back in.

'What is it that constrains our discursive constructions?' asks Eagleton; (1991:205). What is it in social relations and material reality that makes some discourses more socially and politically relevant than others? What is it that makes the working class tend to socialism in their politics and the ruling class defend the ideological perspectives of the capital system? On Hirst and Hindess' premises it cannot be reality given that this reality is simply the product of discursive activity. This being the case, 'it might appear that we are free, in some voluntarist fantasy, to weave any network of relations which strikes our fancy' (Eagleton 1991:205).

What is significant is the extent to which a critique of philosophical realism, with no logical defence against its reduction to absurd conclusions, soon becomes far more confidant and sure footed when attacking the revolutionary politics of Marxism. Hirst and Hindess thus come to reject marxism's notion of economic determinacy so as to revise the revolutionary. 'Pragmatism’ is the key term. As against marxism's 'global' approach, Hirst and Hindess assert pragmatic calculation as the basis of political action within the specific social conjuncture. Such a conception is indeed much more palatable to the pragmatic socialists, working for piecemeal improvement of society through the parliamentary system than the old socialism which actually referred to class, interests and labour. 'This theory, coincidentally enough, was sponsored just at the historical point where the radical currents of the 1960's and early 1970's were beginning to ebb under the influence of an aggressive set of assaults from the political right. In this sense, it was a 'conjunctural' position in more senses than it proclaimed' (Eagleton 1991:205).

Putting to one side, for now, the question of economic determinacy within Marxism, it is interesting to pursue this controversy in terms of essentialism. For the attack upon the idea that there are such things as necessary relations and levels of determinacy entails the view that reality is essentially something and that the stuff of politics concerns this essential, something. Reality is more than x the unknown and, as such, possesses essential natures which make politics about something. Scott Meikle has written of those who strike at Marx's essentialism from an atomistic perspective.





And it is not only understanding the world that is obstructed by the atomist method, but changing the world. These are points of political as well as epistemological significance. For if social science is the institutionalisation of the attack on Marx's essentialism, then so too is pragmatic party-state socialism. The bureaucrats of knowledge walk together with the bureaucrats of politics.

For if reality is not essentially something or something essentially then politics cannot sustain a 'global' project of fundamental, far reaching change. Instead, in the world of discreet entities and accident, politics becomes mere incrementalism from above. If one cannot distinguish between the accidental and the necessary within the social system, if one rejects the idea of necessary change through having rejected essentialism, then politics possesses a quite arbitrary relation to reality.





Meikle then introduces the bureaucrats of knowledge. Within Marxism, this refers to the schools of 'socialism from above’.





The position taken by those post-marxists and post-modernists who reject Marxism for its economic determinacy, underlying structures and necessary relations precludes the possibility of changing society as something essentially. Politics, then, is restricted to messing about on the surface of reality. For the adherents of ‘socialism from above', the Social Democrats and the Stalinists,





Which, again, is much more palatable to the bureaucrats of politics, whether in or against the socialist movement, than is the Marxist concern to change the whole structure of society as essentially something possessing necessary relations.

Meikle concludes that basically there are only the two choices, between those who uphold the idea that there are essential natures and necessary relations on the one hand, and those who opt for accidents and for a multi-factoralism on the other hand. The choice has political implications. As Marx wrote about Gustav Hugo

He is a sceptic as regards the necessary essence of things, so as to be a courtier as regards their accidental appearance.

Marx MECW 1, 204

Post-marxists and post-modernists are courtiers as regards the existing world, working within its fetish character and being unable to transform this reality in any fundamental sense.

Postmarxism
Marxism has upheld the view that political and intellectual positions derive from one’s class position within prevailing social relations. There is, therefore, a necessary relation between the social and economic, on the one hand, and the political and the intellectual, on the other; between, in short, social being and consciousness. This necessary relation has nothing to do with the idea that politics and ideas are passive in relation to being or automatically follow social position. If this were the case, then there would be no need to engage in political and intellectual struggle as material practices. The claim is, rather, that this struggle over politics and ideas possesses social relevance which makes some positions effective and plausible and others less so. Hence Marx's commitment to socialism is no arbitrary position. There are reasons, within prevailing social relations and the social identities they make available, for opting for socialism as against, say, fascism or any other political package (Eagleton 1991:211 214 217).

For the post-marxists, however, this whole notion about there being in reality the stuff of politics involves the unwarranted assumption that political discourses 'reflect' or 'correspond' to something in reality, precisely the rationalist fallacy that the likes of Hirst and Hindess wish to demolish. 

If language is not the passive reflection of a given reality but is active in constituting that reality, then the Marxist position is untenable. For if class location within social relations equips human beings with 'objective' interests then politics and ideology are entirely passive in reflecting these interests in discourse. Politics and ideology lose any creative, constitutive significance and are restricted to passively articulating or expressing objective interests given by class location. For Hindess and Hirst there can be no such things as objective interests 'given' by reality in this way. Interests can only be what human beings conceptually construct and, for this reason politics and political discourse possesses greater creative significance than economics (Eagleton 1991:217).

One sees here again the inversion of Marxist orthodoxy's traditional determinism. From a position in which 'the economic' determined everything one has reached, by reaction, a position in which politics and ideology determine everything. The orthodox Marxists and the post-marxists would thus appear to be trapped within a determinist narrative of their own making, within a false antithesis between the economic and the political. One has moved from making socialism dependent upon the autonomy of the economic to being dependent upon the autonomy of theory and politics. In both cases human beings remain a passive mass worked upon from the outside, propelled by economic development or manipulated by ideologists and politicians. It is tempting to plead not guilty right here and end the whole tiresome debate. For Marx ‘the economic’ is never 'objective' and 'given' in the sense used by the post-marxists. Marx's argument in no way commits anyone to assert that political and ideological positions are ‘given’, simply and automatically, in any passive sense on account of 'objective' interests. These interests, for one thing, are never objective in the sense of pertaining to some inanimate 'reality’, as the post-marxist criticism suggests. Orthodoxy may have given the impression that the economic, for Marx, is some objective datum external to human action and consciousness, but this too was a misreading. 

Such a view makes a complete nonsense of Marx's own political activism, his demand for revolutionary politics by the proletariat and, indeed, his concern to eliminate certain political and ideological strains from the socialist movement. Marx thought and acted as though nothing were 'given' by class position and material interest. Marx's socialism and activism was designed to appeal to real actors who could be identified according to their location within the social relations of class society (Eagleton 1991:218). Marx's socialism, in other words, presupposed the social identities existing in class society and hence possessed a social relevance that was 'given' in the social structure. In this sense Marx's socialist politics was rooted. Nevertheless, positions still had to be worked for, 'constructed' if one wishes, on this material basis and could not be assumed to develop automatically, although some have suggested that Marx did believe in spontaneity (Callinicos ISJ 2:11 Winter 1981:116; Femia 1981:136; Wright, Levine, Sober 1992:39). It is more true to argue that Marx, on account of his historicism and his principle of self-emancipation, refused the prescriptive mode when referring to proletarian revolution.

What a Marxist position commits one to is the idea that there is a necessary relation between 'objective' interests on the one hand and political and intellectual positions on the other. Neither is autonomous of the other. The distinction between class-in-itself and class-for-itself enables one to conceive class constitution as a process to be worked for rather than as something simply 'given' (Miliband 1977:22 22/3 31 33 34 35/6; Meister 1990:27/8 204/5; Meszaros 1995:791 924/5; Post 1996:288/9; Parekh 1982:174/5). There is a political and intellectual struggle and this struggle is a material practice with reality shaping significance. But what makes struggle effective is the fact that it is about something in social reality, it has relevance in terms of the social structure and the social identities existing under prevailing social relations. If political and intellectual discourses are arbitrarily constructed then there are no good reasons why anyone should participate in them, either for what they are in themselves or for what they are in relation to other available discourses (Eagleton 1991:214 215). They lack social relevance (see Poole on how social appeals presuppose the existence of an appropriate social identity. This is how Marx related the call for socialism to the proletariat).

The post-marxists may be criticised for offering a caricature of Marxism for criticism. Whilst there is a vulgar Marxism which may correspond in parts to this caricature, only third rate minds tilt at straw men. Precious little of what Hindess and Hirst characterise the Marxism that exists in Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg, Gramsci, Pannekoek, Korsch, Sartre or, indeed, in the sophisticated theories of intellectuals like Godelier, the Frankfurt School, Lukacs.

That social interests are not 'objective' in the sense of being 'given' and that the role of political and intellectual struggle is more than just passively expressing these given interests is a proposition that few Marxists, if any, would dispute. Whether one refers to Marx's thought or his political practice - and that of later Marxists - there are no grounds for arguing that Marxism commits anyone to believing that, on account of class location within social relations, certain political and intellectual positions will automatically follow and that the role of politics and ideology is merely the passive one of expressing 'given' interests. Hirst and Hindess are careful to define objective interests in a vulgar way, which is possibly the only way that they can understand such interests. But what should be noted is how convenient it is, politically, to denigrate Marxism in the way that Hirst and Hindess do (Eagleton 1991:212).

Post-marxism asserts that there is no necessary relation between social and economic position on the one hand and political and ideological position on the other. One can readily accept the argument that the political and ideological positions are not the passive reflection of objective interests. But this does not commit one to denying the notion of necessary relations. For political and intellectual positions do possess an internal relation to the material conditions of individuals under prevailing social relations. One has to keep adding, on account of the nervous sensibilities of post-marxists, that the idea of a necessary relation is quite distinct from the idea that the material position is the automatic cause of political and ideological position. Rather, the material conditions provide the reasons and supply the social relevance underlying political and intellectual positions.

Hindess and Hirst, however, prefer to knock down the straw Marxism that they have set up. Their argument is far from being ideologically and political innocent. Having dissolved the idea of social totality and having denied the existence of necessary relations, Hindess and Hirst proceed inexorably to the view that the whole of social reality is defined into existence by political and ideological discourse and possesses no existence beyond this discursive activity.

Ernesto Laclau has also declared the 'impossibility of the social’. Laclau thus argues that 'the social’ has disappeared. All that we have is discursive formations along which people occupy subject positions. Laclau and Mouffe thus assert the idea of the uncentred subject. The subject has lost its fixed position in history. Again one notes the abandonment of working class and the class struggle. Even if one could have once pointed to something called "the working class' on account of its location in something to which one could refer to as a social structure, this is no longer valid. For 'the social' as such has disappeared. All that remains are discursive formations (Aronowitz l981:xiv). 

But just how plausible is this view? Laclau and Mouffe will be criticised later. I will deal with Hirst and Hindess first.

Reality is whatever it is defined as being by politics and ideology. But this is not to overcome the determinism of vulgar Marxism, it is to invert it. For the determinism here is just as drastic as that contained in the most vulgar of marxisms. From a position where the economic determined everything one has ended up in a position where the political and the ideological determined everything. Hindess and Hirst, and Laclau and Mouffe after them, have reacted against the one sided economic determinism of vulgar Marxism - which is the only Marxism they criticise - to such an extent as to fall into an equally one sided perspective. The economic, the social, the social totality have all been dissolved and now determine nothing at all (Furedi in Jakubowski 1990:xvi).

But the post-marxists have not escaped the old determinism: they have simply inverted it. It is ideology and politics that determine everything, nothing exists until brought into existence by ideology and politics. Nothing exists except discursive formations (Post 1996:270).

 Post is concerned to challenge postmodernism since it denies us the ability to understand fully or even any reason to make the effort; it makes "discursive" word games out of real concrete history (Post 1996:41).





With such a perspective, Post is clearly embarked upon a project of renewal rather than of mere restatement. Geras is unimpressed. Laclau and Mouffe's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is not theoretically worthwhile in any substantive respect and is the 'product of the very advanced stage of an intellectual malady’ (Geras 1987:42/3). Geras could be dismissed by post-marxists as a fundamentalist – he is, it should be pointed out, a leading professor at the University of Manchester, with a strong publishing record - but the ill balanced and poorly reasoned response to his criticisms suggest that he has touched a raw nerve. The articles collected in Discourses of Extremity: Radical Ethics and Post-Marxist Extravagances (Geras 1990) make compelling reading. The concluding chapter, ‘ex-Marxism without Substance’ shows how, point by point, Laclau and Mouffe caricature Marxism and evade dealing with criticisms of their work. Geras, in the end, runs out of patience, feeling that he has already spent too much time with the subject: ‘Argument by caricature and simplification; by easy reduction and intellectual short-cut; by light-minded use of such hackneyed vulgarizations as have already been answered many times over (and as will be seen today for vulgarizations not only by Marxists but by a substantial number of fair-minded, non-Marxist students of Marxism) - this is a dual dereliction. It obstructs fruitful socialist debate. And it reinforces the currently difficult external environment of that debate. It is no fit style for the kind of socialist pluralism we need. In any case, enough is now more than enough’ (Geras 1990:165). Indeed.

Necessary Relations And Essences
What Hindess and Hirst are attempting to achieve is nothing less than the destruction of Marxism. Eagleton certainly has their measure on this point (Eagleton 1991). Hindess and Hirst are conducting a polemic against Marxism. Their intention is to repudiate the basic Marxist premise that there exists some necessary relation between social and economic conditions on the one hand and political and ideological positions on the other. Moreover, in denying that there is a necessary relation Hindess and Hirst go on to devalue the economic in favour of the political and the ideological. In effect, they opt for the autonomy of theory and politics, an autonomy which characterises bourgeois thought. So called 'objective' interests, then, are made the product of political and ideological discourse.

But, given the denial of necessary relations, it becomes hard to identify what politics is about or, from a slightly different angle, it frees politics from having to relate to socio-economic conditions. And it is this latter quality that is most attractive to those who wish to escape the revolutionary political implications of asserting that social reality is essentially something and something essentially, that class location leads to a certain kind of politics. This plays into the hands of politicians selling any old package.

‘A total nihilism, unqualified chaos of factors and types - discourses, yes, but also other things of an inexhaustible, ineffable diversity - presumably follows. One may hope, however, to be spared this last deconstructive step. No matter what theoretical form it might take, it would be, in practical, political terms, pointless. Laclau-Mouffian indeterminacy, though a little way short of such 'completion', already yields, the unfounded - arbitrary - choice of more or less whatever politics you want’ (Geras 1990:115).

Essentialism has been Laclau and Mouffe's main target and they have hunted it down everywhere within Marxism. There are good and bad forms of essentialism. It depends how it is formulated. Laclau and Mouffe rather load the case against essentialism, a rather obvious strategy which Geras cruelly – and easily - exposes (Geras 1990:143/50. 

More interesting is to obtain an historical angle on this: 

During most of the twentieth century the social and historical pressures at work have seen to it that the bureaucrat of knowledge has been in the ascendant, and that essentialism has accordingly been put at a discount. The bureaucrat of knowledge has a vested interest in things being complicated rather than simple; just as a pretentious but unaccomplished savant will have a vested interest in the truth being unsayable.




For good measure Meikle adds that 'the natural habitat of that repulsive creature, the bureaucrat of knowledge, is the thicket of accident' (Meikle 1985:12).

 Eagleton makes the same point when challenging Hindess and Hirst's wholesale rejection of necessary relations. Hindess and Hirst's 'anti-epistemological' thesis is intended among other things to undermine the Marxist doctrine that a social formation is composed of different 'levels', some of which exert more significant determinacy than others. For them, this is merely another instance of the rationalist illusion, which would view society as somehow already internally structured along the lines of the concepts by which we appropriate it in thought. There is, then, no such thing as a 'social totality', and no such thing as one sort of activity being in general or in principle more determinant or causally privileged than another. The relations between the political, cultural, economic and the rest are ones we fashion for specific political ends within given historical contexts; they are in no sense relations which subsist, independently of our discourse. Once again, it is not easy to see just how far this case should be extended. Does it mean, for instance, that we cannot in principle rule out the possibility that the Bolshevik revolution was triggered by Bogdanov's asthma or Radek's penchant for pork pies? If there are no causal hierarchies in reality, why should this not be so? What is it which constrains our discursive constructions? It cannot be 'reality', for that is simply a product of them; in which case it might appear that we are free, in some voluntarist fantasy, to weave any network of relations which strikes our fancy. It is clear in any case that what began as an argument about epistemology has now shifted to an opposition to revolutionary politics. For if the Marxist doctrine of 'last instance' economic determinacy is discarded, then much in traditional revolutionary discourse will need to be radically, revised. ‘In place of this 'global’ brand of analysis, Hindess and Hirst’ urge instead the pragmatic calculation of political effects within some particular social conjuncture, which is a good deal more palatable to Mr Neil Kinnock. This theory, coincidentally enough, was sponsored just at the historical point where the radical currents ...of the 1960’s and early 1970's were beginning to ebb under the influence of an aggressive set of assaults from the political right. In this sense, it was a 'conjunctural' position in more senses than it proclaimed’ (Eagleton 1991:204/5).

Hirst and Hindess proceed with haste to discard the necessity of socialist transformation and of the working class possessing a necessary interest in socialist politics. Saussurean linguistics may give Hirst and Hindess' thesis a little more intellectual credibility than it would otherwise merit as straightforward old fashioned reformist pragmatism, but behind the superficial gloss of 'discourse theory' is the same opportunistic and evasive politics. It is in this sense that one can conclude that assertions of the autonomy of theory and politics release politicians from the revolutionary implications of social relevance and hence rationalise the predominance of the bureaucrats of politics.

There is, then, truth in Bookchin's dismissal of the post-marxist radical democrats as offering no more than another version of social democracy. He asks the fundamental question.

we must redefine the very meaning of the word Left today. We must ask if radicalism should be reduced to a form of social democracy that patently operates within the established order with a view toward acquiring mindless mass constituencies, as Laclau, Mouffe, Walzer, and so many self-proclaimed socialists would have it do, or if it must create a far reaching revolutionary challenge to desocialisation, disempowerment and every aspect of domination, be it in everyday life or in the broader social arena of the coming historic epoch.

Bookchin in Ehrlich ed.1996:26

More positively, Hindess and Hirst's case against viewing 'objective' interests as 'given' at least forces Marxists to argue the case for political and intellectual struggles as material practices possessing a creative significance. Thus class location within the social relations of class society do not automatically lead to the appropriate political and ideological discourse. A necessary relation is not an automatic relation, there is still an active role for political and intellectual struggle. That Marxism in some of its variants has seemed to assume that socialism is inherent in the daily life of the proletariat rather than looking upon political and ideological struggle on the basis of 'objective' position as constitutive of this implicit socialism may be readily admitted. And the rise of new social movements from the late 1960’s underlines the growing importance of a radical 'civic' politics that cannot be reduced to class position (Aronowitz 1987/8). 'Post-liberal', ‘post-marxist', 'post-modernist’, 'post' just about anything too difficult to confront head on and get beyond positively one may suggest.

 Macpherson is pertinent here:

there is a good deal of loose writing these days about something called 'post-capitalism'. The same publicists and theorists who use this term are apt to talk also about post-Marxism. The idea in both case is the same: to suggest that the thing now hyphenated has in fact disappeared and has been replaced by something really quite different. If one cannot deny, in either case, that something superficially similar to the old thing is still around, one can perhaps exorcise its spirit by exiling it 'post-'. Thus, as capitalism, old style, has become increasingly difficult to justify in terms of any acceptable social ethic, it becomes highly advantageous to find that it has given way to something else.
And as Marxism, old style, continues to give trouble, it can perhaps more easily be dealt with by announcing its demise and replacement.

Macpherson in Blackburn ed.1972:18

One can certainly question the assertions that these non-class struggles and movements represent what has been called a post-materialist ethic (Eder 1993:73 74 174 186). Certainly, however, the forms of social conflict have extended beyond the old class politics to embrace ecology, sexuality, ethnicity, religion, national identity. The arguments of Hindess and Hirst, Laclau and Mouffe, are timely when directed against an orthodox Marxism choosing to stay within the old grooves no matter what the social and cultural dynamics. But doesn’t this apply to a Marxism that is long dead anyway? (Sherman 1995:5/7).

One could be generous and argue that Hindess and Hirst's intention is to open the space for a new politics that transcends the class reductionism of orthodox Marxism. The problem is that the autonomy of political and intellectual discourse is of precious little help to these new social movements. This innovative response is far too extreme in its denial of necessary relations between social interest and political position. It is odd in the extreme to persist in arguing that there is no necessary relation between social situation and political position when there are very good reasons to believe that, for instance, there is indeed a link between being a member of an oppressed ethnic group in society on the one hand and making a conscious commitment to anti-racist political movements on the other (Eagleton 1991?211). Referring back to class, it is even more bizarre to argue that there is no necessary relation between being a member of the working class, subject to capital's relations of exploitation, on the one hand, and a socialist politics aiming at the free association of the producers on the other. Necessary here does not mean that the relation between the one and the other is automatic, or mechanical, that once one knows the social situation one also knows the political position. The idea of a necessary relation in no way commits one to arguing that all those in a particular social situation spontaneously and inevitably proceed to the appropriate political and ideological position. But one can argue both that they could attain that position and, more strongly, ought to. Thus, it is in the interests of the working class to become socialists and to attain socialism. That indeed is what Marxist politics has been all about and what Hindess. and Hirst wish to get away from. It is noticeable how easily Hindess and Hirst move from arguing that political and ideological positions cannot be conceived as directly representing class interests - something which Marxists have always known and which, therefore, explains marxism's very activist conception of knowledge and politics - to denying that there is any relation between the two. As they put it 'political and ideological struggles cannot be conceived as the struggles of economic classes'.

On these premises political and ideological positions are arbitrary and subjectivist. In defence of the Marxist position one can argue that the Marxist, referring to social relations and identities, can supply good reasons for why a member of the working class may become or ought to become a socialist whereas for the post-marxist the decision to become a socialist is purely arbitrary once one accepts the autonomy of politics and ideology in determining how reality is. One should positively evaluate the rationalism inherent in Marx's conception, human beings as agents able to become conscious of identify and actively promote their interests (Walton and Gamble 1976). Marx thus conceives human beings as capable of becoming knowledgeable and transformative agents.

The Marxist position, then, is that there is a necessary relation between social situation and political and ideological position but that this relation is neither automatic or spontaneous but requires political and intellectual struggle as a material practice. Hindess and Hirst's argument forces Marxists to explicitly repudiate the idea of 'objective interests', already structured and given, which politics and ideology simply reflect in some passive sense. In defending themselves against this criticism Marxists at least have to sharpen and clarify their own perspective.
The problem with Hindess and Hirst is that they deny that any kind of relation holds between the economic on the one hand and the political on the other. This position is actually as crude and misleading as the use of the base-superstructure metaphor has been in vulgar Marxism. It is impossible to steer clear of the twin reefs of objectivism and subjectivism once one distinguishes between the economic and the political and ideological as Hindess and Hirst do. The economic, once more, has become the objective, inanimate datum that it was within orthodoxy. The political and ideological, meanwhile, have no relation at all to social situation. Political and ideological positions are arbitrary.

The upshot of this drastic swerve from economism - which would hold that the political/ideological passivity and directly represents class interests - is an overpoliticisation. It is now politics, not economics, which reigns supreme. And taken in any crassly literal sense, this case is simply absurd. Are we being asked to believe that the reason some people vote Conservative is not because they are afraid a Labour government might nationalise their property, but that their regard for their property is created by the act of voting Conservative? Does a proletarian have an interest in securing better living conditions only because she is already a socialist? On this argument, it becomes impossible to say what politics is actually about. There is no 'raw material' on which politics and ideology go to work, since social interests are the product of them, not what they take off from. Politics and ideology thus become purely self-constituting, tautological practices. It is impossible to say what they derive from; they simply drop from the skies, like any other transcendental signifier.




Why, then, on Hirst and Hindess' premises, should anyone become a socialist, an ecologist, an anti-racist or a feminist? These political positions, it is affirmed, are in no way related to the nature of society. Indeed, the reasons are just as good for people to become conservatives, capitalists, racists and male chauvinists. Or, to put the question more provocatively, why, on Hirst and Hindess’ premises should anyone not become a fascist, a racist, a sexist? What makes one position better, more ethical, or less ethical, than another if there is no support in reality?

What one notices is that when the likes of Hindess and Hirst - and Laclau and Mouffe do this as well - begin to justify their own politics of socialist reformism, they soon proceed to argue from the nature of society. Logically, however, this justification is unavailable to them, since their premises explicitly deny the connection between social situation and political position. They need a concept of reality which is precisely what they deny.

Effectively, the autonomy of theory and politics means that the commitment to the politics of social reform is actually a disembodied idealism, the moralism which characterises western Social Democracy (Berki 1975:91/104; Eagleton 1991:214/5), which lacks roots in material conditions. One should savour the irony of the situation. Many of these post-marxists had a former life as Althusserians, the scourge of Marxist humanism. And, as Althusserians, they were quite militant in their defence of Marx's scientific project as against that vague, wishy-washy, philosophical moralism that referred to alienation and species essence and self-realisation. And yet here we are, in these post-Althusserian times, with socialism reduced to the most disembodied of moralisms, an impotent ethic with no relation to the social world and whose capacity to change the world depends upon moral persuasion. From assertions of history as a subjectless process, we have moved on to assertions of history as structureless. Indeterminacy, arbitrariness and, the give away term, accident are in vogue. The post-marxists, on Hirst and Hindess’ premises, are condemned to having 'construct' human beings this way and that whilst having to confront the point that there is no sound reason as to why these human beings should allow themselves to be constructed in such a way. What reasons can Hirst and Hindess offer in support of their own politics? One thus rediscovers the importance social interests, identities and the social relevance underlying morality and politics.

Laclau And Mouffe
Possibly the most well known of the post-marxists are Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Laclau and Mouffe modify Hirst and Hindess' anti-epistemological thesis so as to make post-marxism more defensible. And this, they argue, is the only relevant form that Marxism could take in the modern world. Laclau has insisted that '"postmarxism" is not an "ex-marxism"' (Laclau 1988:78). If one is inclined to be charitable, it could be argued that Laclau and Mouffe are engaged in an attempt to theorise a Marxism appropriate to postmodern conditions. It is this aspect that has been taken up by Hebdige and his call for a 'marxism without guarantees' (Hebdige 1988:207) and is expressed in Soja's demand for a 'postmodern deconstruction and reconstitution' of Marxism (Soja 1989:64). Such a Marxism has been shorn of its teleological infrastructure and has lost its guaranteed philosophical and epistemological underpinnings (Hall 1988:73). Which begs the question of just what remains to distinguish Marxism from the plurality of worldviews and perspectives.

But if postmarxist politics is condemned as rudderless and as lacking in direction (Burawoy 1989), it is nevertheless also presented as a necessary and appropriate response to postmodern conditions (Laclau and Mouffe 1985 1987; Hall 1986 1988; Emmison et al 1987/8). What this means is that any 'reconstituted’ Marxism, reconstituted along the lines of 'postmodern preoccupations' (Sayer 1991:5), which Marx himself had already anticipated (Sayer 1991:57), could ensure marxism's survival into the next millennium. Such a Marxism will no longer be the emancipatory project but simply one amongst a broader critical project. And this is Laclau's justification:





This is intellectual blackmail - reform on our terms or die. The terms, arguably, are death to Marxism. When one considers just what has to be abandoned to make Marxism relevant to postmodern conditions, it should come as no surprise that postmarxism, notwithstanding Laclau's protestations, is dismissed as an anti-marxism (Frankel 1987; Geras 1990). The principal distinguishing features of Marxism are all removed. Out goes the notion of class as the central category constituting the primary determinant of social identity and as the basis for political and ideological expression; out goes the primacy assigned to economic factors, in comes the idea that politics and ideology are determining factors; out goes the base-superstructure metaphor and also with it the premises of Marx's materialism; out goes what is portrayed as assigning objective interests and a privileged role to the working class, a working class presented as merely an analytically constructed social constituency; out goes the commitment to socialism as the radical project; out goes the totalising explanatory historical framework which renders human life and activity intelligible. Marxism is gutted. And replaced by what? A politics and economics without philosophical and epistemological underpinnings. Which is what?

In defence of Laclau and Mouffe it could be argued that all these positions within Marxism needed qualifying. More harshly, they can be criticised for a gross reductionism in which all talk of class and class struggle becomes the most 'vulgar’ of economisms. As Terry Eagleton comments, Laclau and Mouffe criticise a Marxism that most intelligent socialists have long since left behind (Eagleton 1991:218/9). And even the ‘the boy-scouts of the small Trotskyist sects’ demonstrate a more critical awareness of the challenges facing socialism in age of neo-liberal ascendency and capitalist crisis.

The language employed by Laclau and Mouffe is redolent of caricature. Since Laclau and Mouffe see reductionist essences and essentialism everywhere (Geras 1990:153), and since said essences and essentialism are thoroughly bad things by definition, it can be shown that all Marxists, of any kind, are guilty of essentialism which, by definition, is reductionist (Geras 1990:143/4). 'We are afforded no demonstration by Laclau and Mouffe of how Marxist categories have been inflated into "essences'; thus no demonstration that these are actually 'essentialist'. Bare use of the categories is proof, ipso facto, of 'essentialism’. To be the latter's victim - or perpetrator - it suffices that you be a Marxist, irrespective of whether or not you reduce everything to class, or economic, or any other singular, significance. For, 'essentialism’ functions doubly in the discourse of Hegemony and Social Strategy: as concept and as stigma' (Geras 1990:143/4).

Nor does the intellectual blackmail work. Marxism has been in crisis since its inception. The 'crisis of marxism' is virtually a synonym for Marxism itself (Jay 1988). Laclau and Mouffe themselves acknowledge that the notion of a 'crisis in marxism' derives from 1898 and Thomas Masaryk (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). I would argue that Marxists should be more worried by the absence of a crisis in Marxism than by the existence of such a crisis. Marxism, that is, entails a historically and socially specific critique of existing conditions, related to and rooted in existing social and cultural dynamics, and hence is inherently revisionist. Marxism is a dialectical intellectual and political engagement with a continuously changing, contradictory, dynamic social universe and must change with the transformations in the social, political and cultural terrain. Such change may well render existing forms whereby Marxism has been institutionalised or theorised, hence the term 'crisis'. But such crises are fatal only to outmoded conceptions and movements, which is how it should be. In short, the postmarxists are not very sensitive to the way that Marxism has continuously rejuvenated itself, pay scant respect to the political importance and intellectual quality of the debates within Marxism at crucial turning points in history, and, if one is allowed to be frank, displays a loss of nerve at a time when another of these major debates within Marxism is called for. Laclau and Mouffe just abandon Marxism.

Thus, whilst aware of the deficiencies of Hirst and Hindess, Laclau and Mouffe retain much of the extreme formulation of the original thesis. Thus Laclau and Mouffe affirm the view that there is 'no logical connection whatsoever’ between the class position that one happens to occupy and one’s political and ideological position (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:84). The same criticisms directed against Hirst and Hindess on this point apply here. Such a position implies that 'it is wholly coincidental that all capitalists are not also revolutionary socialists' (Eagleton 1991:215). 

Laclau and Mouffe argue that 'hegemony supposes the construction of the very identity of [the] social agents [being hegemonised] (1985:58). Which begs the question of such what is being constructed. It doesn't exist before being hegemonised. Laclau and Mouffe's position commits them to having to argue that the social agents being hegemonised do not exist at all independently of the process of hegemonisation which constructs them, which is an argument as circular as the rationalist fallacy condemned by Hindess and Hirst. Or they must argue that these social agents actually do exist prior to the process of being hegemonised, which implies that their hegemony constructing the identity of these social agents is quite contrary to their initial social identity, in which case one needs to know why these agents should acquiesce as they are coopted into the hegemonic project.

One further point is worth making here. Marxism has been condemned in the post-marxist discourse for its epistemological and political authoritarianism. The intention of Laclau and Mouffe is to developed a radical democratic politics that is 'uncentred' in the sense of being multi-sided as opposed to being under the hegemony of the political party (Jowers 1989:89/95; Post 1996:10). Laclau and Mouffe reject not only Leninism in this connection but Marxism in general. It may be quite plausible to treat the Leninist party as authoritarian. And, as a result, Laclau and Mouffe may well have some justification in rejecting the socialist 'science' upon which Leninism was based as 'a monolithic and unified understanding of the whole of the social process’. Laclau and Mouffe therefore are sensitive to the authoritarian implications of the party associated with the 'ontologically privileged position of a single class’ which soon becomes 'the epistemologically privileged position of a single political leadership' (Laclau 1990:206).

As a critique of revolutionary vanguardism, of the substitutionist and representative tendency of politics and of the political practice of Communism, this criticism can be readily accepted. But the point surely is that this criticism can be made from within Marxism, that both Communism and Social Democracy can be rejected from a Marxist position and that the rejection of 'marxism' as such is unwarranted. Laclau and Mouffe are very quick to identify Marxist positions with monolithic control (Post 1996:10/16). And yet there is no reason at all why reference to 'the working class' or to unity should not be able to recognise the multi-sided nature of the revolutionary subject. The imposition of uniformity upon the revolutionary subject comes from the party as an ideal agency aiming to represent this subject from above.

Laclau and Mouffe, then, are very keen in condemning Marxism for its authoritarianism. And yet their own work is an explicit justification of an hegemonic project that is committed to the construction of the identity of social agents, thus denying those agents their own social identity independent of the hegemonic project and their own capacity to define their own identity. The dangers of this hegemonic project ought to be clear. Whoever leads the hegemonic project claim the right to determine the identities of social agents, moulding them and manipulating them according to principles of political rationality.

The basic paradox at the heart of post-marxism is quite apparent here. Rejecting Marxism for its epistemological and political authoritarianism, post-marxism nevertheless adopts a particularly assertive and arrogant relationship to social agents. Indeed it treats social agents as a passive piece of clay to be moulded any way whatsoever according to the predilections of the hegemonisers (Eagleton 1991:214 217). Thus, in relation to the working class and socialism, it seems perfectly elitist and authoritarian to argue that, for instance, once the workers are hegemonised, coopted into a wider political movement, their previous identities, already unrecognised, are now completely submerged within the hegemonic process. Whatever human beings were before being hegemonised bears absolutely no relation to what they have become by being hegemonised.





With Laclau and Mouffe, one notes precisely the same predilection for mistaking a caricature for the authentic Marxism so as to be better able to define ones position against Marxism. All of which makes criticism a tedious and probably unrewarding business. Thus Laclau and Mouffe are strident in their rejection of the whole notion of 'objective interests'. Yet one is left wondering what purpose their argument really serves. For their version of 'objective interests' is of such bone-headed crudity that even the most dull-witted of Stalinists might think twice before embracing it. Thus Laclau and Mouffe argue that to uphold the notion of 'objective interests' entails the idea that one’s interests are automatically given by one’s location in the relations of production. One need not repeat the criticism of this caricature of Marxism, suffice to state that the notion of objective interests and necessary relations is capable of a far more sophisticated formulation. There are no grounds whatsoever for arguing that the notion of objective interests commits Marxists to having to assert an automatic, inevitable or spontaneous development from material interest to political/intellectual position. That criticism ignores so much controversy concerning politics and party and proletarian activity and organisation in Marxist circles to be unworthy of further comment. That this argument features so prominently in the writings of post-marxists suggests less an attempt to criticise Marxism than to create a whole new political project. This is a legitimate enough enterprise in itself. But its defeat of a straw man Marxism has had the unfortunate effect of merely inverting the old determinism.

It is quite possible from a Marxist perspective to argue for the existence of objective interests whilst preserving a creative role for political and intellectual struggle as reality shaping material practice. The post-marxists are quite right to repudiate economic reductionism and determinism - Marxists do it as well. For there are much more plausible ways of formulating the question of 'objective' interests' from within the Marxist tradition.

What Marx himself argues, when referring to the unity of the economic and the political struggle, of the process of transition from being a class-in-itself to being a class-for-itself, on the relation between social being and consciousness, is that the existence of an objective interest suggests the development of a subjective identity by those possessing the interest which corresponds to that interest but which has yet to be developed. It is a process of self-development in which a political and intellectual position is actively attained rather than supplied from the outside by an hegemonic project. This is the case for revolutionary socialist politics, precisely the case that Marx made before the proletarian movement.

Marx’s position makes a complete nonsense of the post-Marxist argument. For if the relation between objective interest and political/ideological position was automatic - as the post-marxist caricature of objective interests suggests - then the working class would all and always in their entirety be socialists. If only it were that simple, many a Marxist activist throughout the century might have declared. For there would be nothing to do at all.

To whom, then, is the post-marxist hegemonic project addressed? To make an appeal to any group of social agents presupposes the existence of a social identity. Or is it that the hegemonic project itself creates this social identity? This itself begs the question as just who the social agents are. Does it make political sense to approach a merchant banker with a view to moulding him or her into becoming a revolutionary socialist? 

There is nothing on post-marxist premises to rule out the attempt to refashion existing social identities through an hegemonic project. To pick and choose between social agents in order to discern those most likely to find, for instance, a socialist hegemonic project appealing is the only sensible position to take. Yet this clearly involves having some notion of objective interests. For to pick and choose between available social agents requires that the social position of these agents be scrutinised to see which of these would find socialism most relevant to their interests. Socialism, that is, has to possess social relevance, but this whole idea makes sense only if one upholds the idea of objective interests.

If post-marxism is no more than a pseudo-intellectual gloss for the opportunistic and visionless reformism of the pragmatic, parliamentary socialists (Jameson 1988; Burawoy 1989; Harvey 1990), then one need waste no time in debating the finer points. One can understand how these pragmatic politicians - even more their young, value-free, university educated, ambitious advisers and researchers, script writers and court jesters - can appropriate fashionable 'discourse theory'. From the perspective of the pragmatists a body of theory that is concerned to dissolve the idea of objective interests, social totality, necessary relations and class struggle is highly attractive (Eagleton 1991:218/9). Realising the impossibility of the parliamentary road to socialism, socialist parliamentarians are left with the tricky task of working within the institutions and mechanisms of the capital system, accepting that the vast processes of production, employment and investment are under private control, and that the allocative power and global reach belongs to the capitalist class. Even to win office through election requires a vague, classless appeal to ‘the electorate’ as made up of individual voters. It is utterly Utopian, in other words, to expect such pragmatic socialism to wage the class war. They will, deny it, more like. (Mlllband 1972; Meszaros 1995:663/4).
To this extent, the prawn cocktail offensive that parliamentary socialists wage in the centres of finance, banking and industry has a political rationale. They are not seeking converts to socialism. However, it would be entirely logical for them to do so on post-marxist premises. This is probably the most revealing point of all. For if social agents possess no interests until they are politically hegemonised and expressed, then there is indeed no reason at all why socialists should not spend time, energy and resources campaigning in the centres of capitalist power in order to win the capitalist class over to the cause of socialism. The fact that post-marxists - unlike the parliamentary socialists - do not approach the capitalist class in such a way is precisely because, after all, they do recognise that objective interests do exist prior to the hegemonic project and that these interests make some groups more likely and other groups less likely to embrace the cause of socialism. The point is, however, that post-marxists can adopt such a position only out of common sense rather than on their own premises.

‘The question of what weight one allots to 'given' interests or whether they exist at all - is thus of vital relevance to practical politics. If there is no necessary relation between woman and feminism, or the working class and socialism, then the upshot would be a disastrously eclectic, opportunistic politics, which simply drew into its project whatever social groups seemed currently most amenable to it. There would be no good reason why the struggle against patriarchy should not be spearheaded by men, or the fight against capitalism led by students [or, more pertinently, by capitalists]. Marxists have no objection to students .. but however politically important the intelligentsia may sometimes be, it cannot provide the major troops for the fight against capitalism. It cannot do so because it happens not to be socially located within the process of production in such a way as to be feasibly capable of taking it over. It is in this sense that the relation between certain social locations, and certain political forces is, is a 'necessary' one which is not, to repeat, to assert that it is inevitable, spontaneous, guaranteed or God given. Such convenient travesties of the case can be left to the fantasies of post-Marxism’ (Eagleton 1991:218).
There is nothing more to be said, other than make clear the political context in which the ‘convenient travesties’ and ‘fantasies of post-Marxism' were propagated. ‘We have seen that a particular brand of semiotics or discourse theory was the vital relay by which a whole sector of the political left shifted its political ground from revolutionism to reformism. That this should have happened just at a time when the former strategy was confronting genuine problems is hardly a coincidence. For all its undoubted insights, discourse theory provided the ideology of this political retreat - an ideology especially alluring to left 'cultural' intellectuals. Hindess and Hirst now espouse a politics which could hardly be dubbed radical at all, while Laclau and Mouffe, if rather more explicitly anti-capitalist, are almost wholly silent in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy on the very concept of ideology. In this rarefied theoretical milieu, all talk of social class or class struggle became rapidly branded as 'vulgar’ or reductionist overnight, in panic-stricken reaction to an 'economism' which every intelligent socialist had in any case long left behind. And then, no sooner had this position become the fashionable orthodoxy of sections of the political left, than a sector of the British working class embarked upon the greatest, most protracted piece of industrial militancy in the annals of British labour history’ (Eagleton 1991:218/9).





Much the same criticisms directed against post-marxism apply against post-modernism. Post-marxism and post-modernism have much the same historical and political roots and are responses to the same circumstances in the late twentieth century. The traditional agencies of socialism have been seen to be outmoded, the working class is undergoing recomposition. Social Democracy and Communism make sense only through the inability of the capital system to meet human needs and aspirations. Marxism, along with socialism, has ceased to be fashionable in academic circles. There isn't much of a political movement to latch on to. The idea of campaigning amongst the working class, helping the class resist the onslaught upon their organisations and their reformist gains within the system is obviously unattractive to those with careers in the universities and the media to further. Professional self-interest is quite enough to explain the attractions of post-marxism and post-modernism. Marxist intellectuals have proven to be intellectuals first and Marxists second, if at all (Post 1996:4). Better to theorise 'new times' and celebrate the cult of the 'new'. That this is a technological determinism as crude as anything ever proposed within Marxism is hardly noticed: 'in the celebration of new technology (computers, the microchip revolution) and in the foretelling of a novel historical stage just-around-the-corner, the ancient themes of technological determinism and of a teleological conception of social change broke out’ (Bonefeld, Gunn, Psychopedis in Bonefeld, Gunn, Psychopedis I 1992:ix). A healthy degree of scepticism is advisable when dealing with assertions of 'new times'. Callinicos is much more sober: 'I do not believe that we live in 'New Times', in a ‘postindustrial and postmodern age’ fundamentally different from the capitalist mode of production globally dominant for the past two centuries' (Callinicos 1989:4). And, as regards the fundamentals, Callinicos is right. The advanced economies of the world may be defined as capitalist on account of the fact that the valorisation and accumulation of capital on the basis of the exploitation of wage labour remains the central organising principle (Bottomore 1979 1985 1990).

What is striking is that the Marxism that both post-marxism and post-modernism repudiate as Marxism as such is very much that kind of economist, determinist and objectivist Marxism which one may depict as 'closed' (.Bonefeld et al vol I 1992 :ix). It is significant that many of those who are most vocal in writing Marxism off come from an Althusserian background. Structuralist Marxism privileged structure over agency, could never satisfactorily explain the fact of social change, and offered merely a sophisticated materialist determinism. This Marxism was quite deliberately an attack upon the critical and emancipatory, Hegelian and humanist, core of Marx's Marxism. It fetishised science and referred to science in extraordinarily repetitive fashion. The abandonment of such a Marxism is to be welcomed. But what is somewhat galling is the spectacle of those who propagated such a scientistic Marxism in the first place now being so vociferous in abandoning Marxism in general. The only consistency in all this is a career in the bourgeois academy.

Not that structuralism's sophisticated determinism has entirely died. Rather, it survives in the Regulation Approach or the Capital Logic school. The deleterious consequences that follow marxism's reduction to being a social science ought now to be apparent. Marxists have embraced the sociological - i.e. passive, post-festum - conception of knowledge and have correspondingly succumbed to the scientistic tendency inherent in sociology. The social world is put under scrutiny as a quasi-natural object and analysed independently of transformative human agency. The social scientist is concerned to delineate the 'objective' laws, processes and structures of society. The 'new times' celebrated by the post-marxists and post-fordists is yet another episode in technological determinism. New technologies are simply accepted as the product of some anonymous history. The idea of new technologies promising a new age in the near future, to which we must all adapt, is the tedious old tune that technological determinists have played throughout the ages. It is as teleological as anything in Marx's Hegelianism and, what is more, it is the worst form of teleology, one that has no room for human agency and instead refers to 'history' as some anonymous process operating according to a will of its own (Bonefeld 1992:ix).

Ultimately, the objections that post-marxism and post-modernism have made against Marxism are all the latest in a long line of criticisms that have been directed against a determinist materialism, against an 'economism' that makes the economy an autonomous factor in history and has made all other aspects of 'social life passively dependent, against 'objectivism', as though the economy were an objective, inanimate, quasi-natural datum. It is ironic to note that Max Weber criticised the Marxist materialism of his day in terms which, in part, repeated Marx's own arguments against philosophical materialism. From within Marxism, Gramsci thoroughly criticised the mechanical materialism of 'orthodoxy' when taking on Bukharin.

If this is the Marxism against which objections are made, then the point has to be made that Marxists have been attempting to repudiate objectivism, economism and determinism since the days of Second International orthodoxy (Sherman 1995:3). That these strains have continued within Marxism is not in doubt. But this is far from being the whole of Marxism. On the contrary, I argue that Marx's emancipatory project makes sense only in terms of the recovery of human-subjectivity in the realm of freedom, i.e. in terms of human self-determination overcoming the objective determinism imposed by capital and its coercive laws. 

More critically, it can be argued that Marx himself did tend to concentrate heavily upon the economic factor in social change, to the extent of devaluing non-economic factors. There is a strain of determinism in Marx's argument which enabled Social Democratic orthodoxy to present its economic evolutionism as possessing Marx's authority. A few points need to be made clear, however. The danger of determinism is inherent in any project which roots social change in real, material developments. Further, what Marx concentrated upon was not so much economics, with the economy conceived as independent from other social factors, as political economy, involving issues of the state, policy, power and class struggle. Moreover, Marx himself argued that the most important of the productive forces, whose expansion leads to revolution, is the working class itself as the revolutionary class. Thus, the creative actor of human agency is inherent to Marx's own supposed ‘economism’.

Two more points are worth considering. Marx's stated intention in Capital is to analyse the laws of motion of the capital system, something which does require that 'the economy' be abstracted from all factors and forces extrinsic to the system. Marx was after the characteristics inherent and hence necessary to the system. Objective determinism, moreover, characterises less Marx's Marxism than the capital system which Marx is concerned to critique. In this respect Marx's alleged objectivism, determinism and economism possess historical and analytical roots concerning the capital system as an alienated system of production (Clarke 1991:6/7), Marx's critique of it and Marx's reaction to it. What should be considered is that if Second International orthodoxy elevated 'the economic' to the status of autonomous, history making power over all other factors in the social totality, then this was less a theoretical error as a theoretical, i.e. post-festum, passive, retrospective, expression of the independence and determinism exercised by the economic factor throughout the nineteenth century (Jay 1984:82/3). The overrating of the primacy and the autonomy of the economic factor would have been less noticeable then than now, given the radical and novel experience of the expansion off the productive forces. This expansion throughout the twentieth century did indeed generate the impression that the economic factor was autonomous, the prime mover behind social reality and operating according to an objective system of economic laws (Post 1996:24).

What requires explanation is the massive appeal of post-modernism, which is far beyond what could be justified on its intellectual merits alone (Meszaros 1995; Post 1996:4). In truth, it is fairly easy to understand why a doctrine such as post-modernism should arise now and should be so appealing to intellectuals with some sort of commitment to the left. What needs underlining is the fact that many of these leftist intellectuals came to Marxism as a sort of intellectual fashion rather than as a political commitment. This Marxism of the 1960's was already quite distinct from Leninism and from the Communism associated with the U.S.S.R. Such intellectuals invested everything in the radicalism of the late sixties and were thus quite unprepared for the hard slog of the 1970's and the need for defence against a vicious and concerted political onslaught in the 1980's. Which is to say that they are not the stuff of socialist revolutionaries and never were. Fair-weather Marxists, they abandoned Marxism easily with the change in the political climate. The events of the late 1960's and early 1970's thus created the despairing post-1968 leftist North Atlantic intelligentsia smarting and sulking when denied its allegedly rightful turn at the levers of history. This, in the words of G Morton Wenger, is ‘the class historical truth of postmodernism’ (G Morton Wenger 'Idealism Redux: The Class Historical Truth of Postmodernism', Critical Sociology, 20, (1). In an earlier article Wenger referred to postmodernism in terms of the despair of the intellectuals and the twilight of the future (Wenger 1991). One feature of this despair is the assertion of the impossibility of finding a single, overriding solution. The age of the grand narratives is over, an assertion that Tony Blair has had his name attached to - an assertion which has all the hall marks of a young, ambitious, value free political and academic careerist with no experience of the real world outside of the university. It is when politicians begin to pick up these themes that one begins to appreciate how these 'post-socialist' pronouncements may easily be used to rationalise the same old political passivity of the parliamentary reformists. Whatever name this may go by, it cannot be called a ‘new politics’ at all. When certain parliamentary 'ethical' 'socialists' assert that the age of the grand narratives is over, it is clear that they are not intent on a deep, philosophical discussion of the issue, they merely have the abandonment of Marxist socialism, and all that that entails in terms of socialisation, class struggle, abolition of capital, in mind. Whilst the intellectuals indulge in a paralysing, neurotic negativity and pessimism, the political practice that has been instrumental in the defeats suffered by the labour movement persists, not only uncriticised but actually equipped by postmodernism and its groundless, valueless pragmatism (Geras 1990:127/65).

I am reminded here of Karl Mannheim's fear that 'after a long, tortuous but heroic development, just as the highest stage of awareness, when history is ceasing to be a blind fate, and is becoming more and more man's creation, with the relinquishment of Utopia's, man would lose his will to shape history and therewith his ability to understand it’ (Mannheim Ideology and Utopia 263). Postmodernism gives up all pretence of understanding or changing the world, it denies that either is possible.

From a Marxist perspective, there is no problem at all in negotiating a path beyond this despair and pessimism. Human freedom and justice depend upon the appropriate social and economic structures and the possibility for moving beyond the present impasse depends upon being able to grasp the interrelationship between these spheres (Harrington 1993:3).

And to reject post-modernism and post-marxism is not to defend the objectivist, determinist, scientistic Marxism that these criticise. It is to criticise this very same Marxism, with its tendency to privilege structure over agency, capital's determinism over struggle, but to do so from a Marxist position. It is to show that such key emancipatory issues as consciousness, autonomy, individuality and subjectivity can be derived from within the resources of Marx's Marxism itself. The repetitious ministrations of the despairing postmodernists, far from being, a help, actually block the recovery of critical-emancipatory themes and, therefore, confirm the paralysing crisis of the modern world inducing despair. One is left wondering whether to convict the postmodernist of self-indulgence or self-interest.

This study, therefore, has no problem with affirming the basic Marxist premise that history is indeed a process with subjects (Post 1996:76). That this is indeed a Marxist premise would be questioned by Marxists of an Althusserian persuasion (Callinicos 1976; 1985). But that many of these Althusserians, vigorously combating Marxist Hegelianism and humanism, should have developed into assertive post-marxists and post-structuralists is surely no coincidence. Marx's Marxism contained an active and creative role for human agency. Moreover, Marx does embrace a teleology in the sense that his concern was with the movement of the human agents who create the social world to regaining control of this world as their own world. There is, for Marx, therefore, an historical process of human creation and self-creation and it does have a purpose. History, that is human individuals in their practical activity, moves towards the end in which existence and essence are reconciled, human beings recover their alienated powers and thus affirm their essential humanity in history. Thus history is, for Marx, a teleological process, not in the sense of some anonymous 'History' having a purpose but of human individuals possessing potentialities which they need to realise to become fully human. For the postmodernists this end of human emancipation is quite meaningless. Their 'end of historicity' is the end of history as possessing meaning (Post 1996:76).

Just as post-marxism is in many of its pronouncements indistinguishable from a simple anti-marxism, so post-modernism has come to possess some very negative views of modernism. Of course, that modernism is pretty unattractive in terms of its urbanisation, centralisation, bureaucratisation and industrialisation is hardly to be denied by socialists - at least those resisting Faustian bargains exchanging their soul for (alien) power. Postmodernism can, however, refer to being against rather than beyond modernism. Postmodernism, in this aspect, criticises the instrumentalist rationality of modernity as an anti-humanism. This postmodernism reveals world mastery in a technocratic sense to be the underlying ethic to modernisation (Bahro 1984:172). Modernity is thus considered to threaten the very survival of the planet. Hence Bauman’s criticism that the Holocaust is the logical development of modernity; the gas chamber symbolises the triumph of modernity's instrumental rationality (Bauman 1989).
This constitutes a very powerful, if very pessimistic, case against modernism. What, perhaps, is of greater significance is less the postmodernist reaction against modernism than that tendency within postmodernism that actually supplies late capitalism with a rationale. Thus, the celebration of post-fordism and, earlier, post-industrialism has entailed justifying the 'new' capitalism as a 'flexible’ mode of accumulation requiring globally decentralised and small scale units of production (Jameson 1992; Harvey 1990).

Similarly, the search for grand narratives and overarching theories, whether to explain, change or organise tile world, has become unfashionable in intellectual circles. Instead, the idea is propagated that the world of appearances is indeed the real world, the world is precisely as human beings see it. The distinctions between appearance and reality, between subject and object, have disappeared and not through realising the unity that Marx sought but merely by denial. And this denial is frankly ideological in Marxist terms. Ideology refers to the way that ideas work to conceal the asymmetrical power relations of a given society to the benefit of the dominant power (Thompson 1982). The surface world of appearances is ideologically constituted by the inversion inherent in social reality. Hence those who restrict their critical attention to this surface world are necessarily engaged in an ideological project, regardless of their intention (Parekh 1982).

 And postmodernism is plainly ideological in this sense. For postmodernism asserts that the world of surface appearances, whether experienced through sound, pictures or images, is actually the real world. For, to all intents and purposes, this surface world is the world where human beings live. And it is a world of consumer goods, advertisements and PR. In celebrating the superficial as the real, postmodernism has put the intellectual gloss upon the ephemeral, the shallow and the consumerist. This, at least, is the view from a Marxist perspective coming from Jameson and Harvey. Jameson's stance is uncompromising: 'we are within the culture of postmodernism to the point where its facile repudiation is as impossible as any equally facile celebration of it is complacent and corrupt’ (Jameson 1984: 63). What is required is a close analysis of postmodernism. For Jameson, postmodernism is a reaction to high modernism (Jameson 1985). The relevant point here, however, is that for Jameson postmodernism is identified with a 'new depthlessness', as exhibited in contemporary theory and culture. What concerns Jameson here is the overwhelming preoccupation with surfaces, image and interpretation; 'a consequent weakening in historicity'; the decentring of the subject; broad changes in space and time associated with 'a whole new technology, which is itself a figure for a whole new economic world system'. Postmodernism is ‘the cultural logic of late capitalism’. (Jameson 1991: 58).

Frankfurt theorists like Adorno and Marcuse once argued that the individual is almost completely entangled in a web spun by bureaucracy, technocracy, mass culture and consumerism. This ‘administered’ or 'one dimensional’ world is a world in which individuals are manipulated, in which personal freedom has died, and the capacity for critical thought has been suppressed. Human society and consciousness are now totally reified and have come to acquire the qualities of objects (Marcuse One Dimensional Man; Adorno Culture Industry Reconsidered 1984, Negative Dialectics 1966, Adorno and Horkheimer The Dialectic of Enlightenment 1947). But where the likes of Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse were critical of this manipulative world - and hoped that they were wrong about the capacity of human individuals to escape its manipulation - the complicity of a strand of postmodernism in this manipulative world of appearances is not in doubt. Certainly, postmodernism in this aspect - and there are others (Soja 1989; Hebdige 1988) - appears to be thoroughly consonant with late capitalism rather than reacting against it. Located within a broader process of economic rationalisation, the 'condition of postmodernity' is presented as the cultural corollary of a 'late’ capitalism developing towards more flexible forms of accumulation (Jameson 1984b; Harvey 1989). Thus the world is presented by postmodernism as lacking meaning and order, fragmented, without purpose or direction. Postmodernism denies that there are underlying structures or lines of development, as Marxists would hold, and that consciousness, culture and politics are utterly groundless. There exists nothing from which to read them off (Pepper 1993:56/7; Scott 1990:103). It is difficult to know what, on these assumptions, politics can be about. Indeed, politics is hardly important at all in the postmodernist perspective. But, one has to ask, who really benefits from rendering power invisible?

It is not merely that, as Terry Eagleton has argued, postmodernism has failed to adequately address or theorise the question of power (Times Higher Education Supplement, April 29 1994); it is that postmodernism has systematically neglected the question and the reality of power and has, in its perspectives, worked to conceal the fact of power, asymmetrical power relations and, of course, class and exploitation. And it is this that makes postmodernism not merely the intellectual gloss of late capitalism but an inherently ideological project regardless of the leftist leanings of some of its major propagandists. Thus Frederic Jameson, in a masterly analysis, reveals postmodernism to be the 'cultural logic of late capitalism' (Jameson 1991). 

Jameson is far from being alone. David Harvey indicates how postmodernism has associated itself with the worst excesses of consumerism, emphasising the mass consumption of ephemeral services and useless goods. The appearances which postmodernists celebrate reality is actually a manipulated mass consciousness submerged under manufactured images and inculcated with notions of instaneity, temporariness and disposability. These attitudes apply equally to persons and things, human relationships, communities and nature as much as to manufactured products. Since this is the case one has to seriously question the association of postmodernism with the 'new' politics of the new social movements. There is precious little that is liberatory or ecological about this intellectual gloss for capitalism's wasteful, manipulative and shallow system. Postmodernism has exaggerated its own novelty. Schnaiberg refers to the cycle of increased production and consumption in terms of a 'treadmill' (Schnaiberg 1980:228/9; Pepper 1993:92). Postmodernism, at least in one aspect, provides the intellectual gloss for this treadmill. That there are other aspects to postmodernism, many of them critical of consumerism and capitalism, is not to be denied. Even Harvey acknowledges that to the extent that postmodernism is concerned with difference, the complexity and specificity of interests, cultures and places, then 'it exercises a positive influence' (Harvey 1989:113). 

The point, however, is that it is hard to conceive how postmodernism could actually challenge the capital system without having to recover the 'global’ and 'grand' perspectives of Marxism. Harvey, suggests that there is ‘more continuity than difference' between modernism and postmodernism; Harvey goes on to argue that it is appropriate to consider 'the latter as a particular kind of crisis within the former' (Harvey 1989:116).

But it is difficult to conceive how postmodernism is equipped to deal with the crisis of modernism. Harvey notes the absence of a 'coherent politics' and even identifies the existence of traces of a 'reactionary neoconservatism’ in the embrace of the market, an entrepreneurial culture and the superficiality of consumer society. The 'new’ politics, in other words, can only be furthered by rediscovering the perspectives on class and power and material relations that were intrinsic to the 'old’ politics.





The ‘essential subjectivity’ lies in the ‘ability and need to act’, pointing growth, development, expression and fulfilment in terms of the realisation and exercise of human potentialities and powers. This is Marx’s essentialism, and it is quite distinct from the caricature of postmodernism and postmarxism, pointing to the realised human society of realised human beings. (Meikle 1985. And each person and community does indeed contribute to humanity's process of self-creation. The new social movements have plenty to learn from the old social movements, the trade unions and socialist politics (Purchase 1990:8/9 12/3). And from the old metaphysics and ‘grand narratives’. Many ecological thinkers, indeed, have insisted upon the need for an overarching or meta-theory deriving from the 'natural order' as much as the social - in order to combat 'the ecological contradiction of capitalism' (Quaini 1982; Schumacher 1973).

It is worth pursuing this argument that postmodernism is ideological in presenting the world of appearances as the only world. This, to all intents and purposes, is an affirmation of the fetishistic character of the social world. The point of Marx's critique is to penetrate the fetish character of the world to the social relations lying at the heart of this world. By grasping social relations in this way, Marx looks to remove the fetishistic cover that mystifies the world and the relations between human beings. Postmodernists, on the other hand, affirm the 'impenetrability of the other' and, as a consequence, deny the existence of such a fetishistic cover. The world is at it appears. There is no doubting, therefore, the complicity of postmodernism with fetishism (Harvey 1990). Postmodernists neglect of underlying social realities, structures and meanings is actually the concealment of the asymmetrical relations of power upon which society rests. And it is this that makes it ideological in Marxist terms (Thompson 1982; Parekh 1982; Larrain 1979).

One notices, moreover, the paralysis of the will to change the world. It is hard to conceive of social change, of how it would be possible to intervene politically in an existing reality in order to change it. For if it is impossible to comprehend how underlying social relations sustain an existing political, social and ethical situation then it is impossible for human beings to involve themselves in attempts to transform these social relations. Indeed, it is possible neither to argue that change is necessary nor even that it is desirable. No good reasons can be supplied to justify a commitment to social change. Of course Marxists cannot support this attitude - it is designed explicitly to abandon Marxist perspectives. Postmodernism's radical relativism leads to, not from, the conservatism, that conservatism sceptical of rationalism rather than the conservatism concerned with collective values, and the entrepreneurial culture of neo- (not post) Fordism. The aestheticisation of politics bases them in place (nationalism) and person (mythological figures) rather than community, and points towards a barbarous irrationalism, refusing argument and rationality and producing the death camps (Harvey 1990:210 273). 

Harvey's words may seem an exaggeration. One notes, however, from the late nineteenth century, the same irrational turn in thought that, at least, made Nazism comprehensible. Gorz has been alive to the danger of dismissing politics in the way that postmodernism has. The tendency to lump all politicians together as 'grey’ is inadequate: 'the revival of Nazism exposes the unreality of this position’ (Gorz 1992). Gorz thus urges the Greens to understand that their allies are on the left. Instead of indulging in myths about a ‘new politics’, and speaking generally of ‘industrialism’, as the likes of Porritt do (Dobson 1990), Greens need to concentrate their energies upon providing ‘a living alternative to the dominance of big business and the market, rather than pretending to be above the battle’. This position is at least available to the Greens. It is not available at all to the postmodernists, their sceptical premises deny the formulation of the issue in terms of the labour-capital struggle.








MARXISM AS REVOLUTIONARY-CRITICAL PRAXIS


6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRAXIS

The very notion of ‘the philosophy of praxis' might be considered to be something of a contradiction in terms, or an oxymoron, much as 'the practice of praxis' might be. For what distinguishes Marx's revolutionary-critical praxis is that it is both theory and practice at the same time. Marx overcame the passive, contemplative approach to knowledge which he associated with philosophy. Philosophy was separate from the world whereas true knowledge was a condition of being in the world, acting upon it as a force within it, changing it. Given separation, philosophy apprehends the world only retrospectively. For Marx, philosophy could only be realised by being abolished. Praxis incorporates philosophy but, in closing the gap between human agency and the social world, develops it into an activist conception of knowledge.

Praxis is the central category of the philosophy which is not merely an interpretation of the world, but is an integral part of its transformation. In transcending German Idealism, Marx’s revolutionary-critical praxis represents the most developed consciousness as well as the strongest link with actual practice. Marx’s conception of praxis does not imply replacing idealism with a return to metaphysical materialist philosophy, which was still tied to ordinary consciousness and which preceded the more developed expositions of Idealist philosophy (in Kant, Fichte and Hegel). Nor does praxis imply pragmatism or a prephilosophical attitude. Marx’s conception of praxis is not a reversion to a past materialism but is the negation and assimilation in a dialectical manner of classical materialism and idealism. This implies, of course, that Marx’s philosophy of praxis incorporates the essential features of both idealism and materialism, particularly idealism which affirmed human practical activity, albeit in an abstract and mystified form (Vazquez 1977:2). 

With this transcendence of the old materialism and idealism in mind, it may be acknowledged that the term the philosophy of praxis may be employed as a euphemism for Marxism (Kitching 1988). Perhaps 'revolutionary-critical praxis' is the most appropriate term. However, whichever term is preferred, the most important point to grasp is that praxis, in Marx's work, represents the closing of all the classic bourgeois dualisms and alienating separations. Theory and practice, subject and object, agency and structure, reality and the social world, philosophy/knowledge and reality, the 'is' and the 'ought', the state and civil society, the base and superstructure are all integrated in a dialectical synthesis (Meszaros 1995:337/8 737 951). This conception of revolutionary-critical praxis is thus the fundamental 'philosophical' foundation of Marx's emancipatory project and continued to influence his perspectives in Capital and beyond. Thus, the critique of political economy, which characterises Marx's later 'scientific' work, came to introduce a greater socio-economic precision into Marx's work but the emancipatory goal remained that which was contained in the original conception of revolutionary-critical praxis. Indeed, Capital may be read as a critique of alienation in its precise form under the capital system.

In short, the conception of revolutionary-critical praxis provides the 'philosophical' underpinning of Marx's as an emancipatory project and the argument presented here will look to make this emancipatory thread throughout Marx's work more explicit, using it to challenge the fetish systems of production and politics imposed by the capital economy and representative political institutions. From the critique of Hegel's philosophy of the state through to the Critique of the Gotha Programme, with Capital and the Paris Commune in between, Marx's emancipatory commitment runs parallel with his political commitment to establish the fundamental continuity in and unity of his career as a revolutionary socialist (Kitching 1988:7 8).

In terms of the antithesis between scientific-rationalising Marxism and critical-emancipatory Marxism presented in this thesis, perhaps 'the philosophy of praxis' has been most associated with the latter and most criticised by the former. Certainly, in affirming that whatever 'theory' - if any - may be extracted from Marx is entirely subordinate to Marx's commitment to the achievement of the defetishised social world, in switching the emphasis from interpretation to transformation, critical-emancipatory Marxists have reacted with hostility towards the reduction of Marxism to a sociological or social scientific project. The inherent determinism of such a project (Bonefeld at al ed. 1992:ix) is incompatible with the emancipatory commitment that is fundamental to Marx's project.

Thus critical-emancipatory Marxists - which would include the likes of Lukacs,' Gramsci, Korsch, the Frankfurt theorists - have been alert to the determinism and economism inherent in 'scientific socialism', in the idea that socialism emerges as a result of the 'laws' of history. Thus Habermas recognises that Marx's original project was of a critical-emancipatory character but that Marxism nevertheless came to reinforce positivist modes of thought by viewing history as the deterministic unfolding of ‘laws' based upon the expansion of the productive forces. Thus Marxism comes to conceive labour and production in purely instrumental terms (Kearney 1986:224).

But at least Habermas recognises that Marx's original project was not positivist in this sense. Habermas, correctly, argues that Marx's original, project had the intention of synthesizing theory or critical reflection, the world of ideas, with practice, with changing the material world, thus resolving the traditional antithesis between philosophical idealism and philosophical materialism (Habermas 1987; Kearney 1985). Thus Marx's conception of praxis is designed to obtain knowledge of the processes of history not so as to be able to interpret them passively and objectively but to be both critical and practical about existing society and the possible future society, to be able to act in a transformative way so as to realise that immanent society which may be evaluated to be morally better and hence desirable. The point, then, is to be able to transform the propitious conditions to realise the socialist future. One appreciates here that Marx's overcoming of the dualism between the 'is' and the 'ought' means that Marx cannot be a positivist, cannot conceive the world as an objective datum appropriate to passive-contemplative 'scientific' study and must mean that values are constitutive of the dialectic. This means an emphasis upon the transformative potential of human agency.

To understand Marxism, therefore, we must be aware of the nature and role of the concept of praxis, and this in turn will depend on, whether Marxism is regarded as just one more philosophy, an interpretation of the world which inverted idealism in order to set materialism upright, but preserving at the same time the concept of dialectic divested of the mystifications it had carried in Idealism; or whether it is acknowledged as a philosophy of revolutionary action whose objective is to transform the world, and in which the Idealist form of praxis was inverted in order that the practical, objective activity of men as concrete, socio-historical beings could come to occupy a central place. These two versions of Marxism lead to very different explanations of the radical change of direction in the history of philosophy which is represented by Marxism. In the first case, Marxism is merely a single step from one (Idealist) interpretation of the world to another (materialist) one; this would set Marxism itself within the frontiers of that philosophy which Marx had criticised in the first part of his Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach ("The philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways"). In the second case, there is movement from philosophy as interpretation to philosophy as a theory of the transformation of the real world, which justifies the second half of the Eleventh Thesis ("the point is to change it") (Vazquez 1977:31).

Reference is made here to the two versions of Marxism. The distinction between the reversion to interpreting the world and changing the world corresponds to Alvin Gouldner's notion of two marxisms, Scientific Marxism and Critical Marxism (Gouldner 1980). Gramsci’s opposition of Marxism as a 'philosophy of praxis' to the mechanical materialism of Marxist orthodoxy expresses this division within Marxism as well as showing how Marx's revolutionary-critical praxis entails a breakthrough from merely interpreting the world to changing it. Gramsci used the term the 'philosophy of praxis' not merely to avoid the prison censor but to make clear what the Marxism of Marx actually meant. This enabled Gramsci to distinguish Marxism both from mechanical materialism, on the one hand, and from idealist philosophy, which was divorced from actual history and from practical human activity, particularly politics, on the other. Further, the ‘philosophy of praxis’ was a means of emphasising the role of the subjective factor in the making of history, of the revolutionary consciousness and activity of the proletariat. In this respect, Gramsci was reacting against a prevalent 'passive radicalism’ within Marxism which was using objective factors and the development of productive forces to justify a rejection or postponement of revolutionary activity (Vazquez 1977:32/3).

However, Gramsci's reaction against mechanical materialism comes with the risk of failing to take adequate account of the objective factor, as constraint and possibility rather than fetishised as absolute and external as with the mechanical materialists.





The reinstatement of the centrality of praxis, than, does not imply asserting critical to scientific Marxism but, rather, encompasses both elements.

One has to be careful about opposing scientific-rationalising Marxism to emancipatory-critical Marxism, eastern to western, orthodox/positivist to Hegelian. It would be difficult, for instance, to place Lenin and the Bolsheviks in these oppositions. Arguably, at the level of theory, Lenin never really broke with the evolutionary perspectives of the Second International and its productive forces determinism (Corrigan, Ramsay and Sayer 1978). But he did, discovering Hegel, begin to appreciate the fallacies of Second International objectivism. And perhaps the greatest achievement of the Bolsheviks lies in their recovery of the specifically revolutionary dimension of Marx's politics against the fetishism of the economic under the Second International. The significance of Bolshevism lies in the recovery of the political dimension of marxism's commitment to change the world. This went some way towards emancipating Marxism from the economic determinism which became a fundamental part of orthodoxy in the late nineteenth century. One can quibble with how far Bolshevism really did manage to break with the economism of Second International productive forces determinism. Nevertheless, the political impact of tie Bolshevik Revolution was to overcome the fetishism of the economic that had passed, as Marxism. Certainly this, at least, was a powerful stimulus to the recovery of the centrality of praxis, however it was understood, within twentieth century Marxism (Jay 1984:83). Here it is intended to be a little clearer as to the importance of revolutionary-critical praxis in establishing Marx's project as emancipatory.

Theory and Practice
The importance of theory and practice within Marxism is well known. What is often overlooked is the importance of the relation between theory and practice. Theory is not one thing and practice another in Marx's marxism; Marxism is not a theory to be applied in practice, a theory created by intellectuals and then put into practice by the workers movement or the socialist party. Rather, Marx's Marxism affirms the unity as against the dualism of theory and practice. Marx's ‘humanist standpoint’ exhibits a dialectical relationship between theory and practice in what is a self-made, social world. Jakubowski thus argues in relation to consciousness and being.





Jakubowski spells out the implications as regards theory and practice, seeing ‘consciousness as a factor in changing social reality’ (Jakubowski 1990:61). Theory is reality's knowledge of itself. Whilst Hegel himself had appreciated this, for him 'reality' meant the Idea coming to know itself in the course of the historical process – the progress of reason to the consciousness of freedom. For Marx, however, reality is a self-made human reality, constituted practically and mentally; consciousness is a human consciousness. Therefore, the person who knows reality does not stand outside history like Hegel's 'Philosopher', but is an active factor in transforming social relations. In Marx’s conception, theory no longer exists post festum as with Hegel but becomes a lever in the revolutionary process. Marx’s active materialism is both the expression and the means of a theoretical critique, in its essence, a critical and revolutionary method.

Jakubowski underlines the central importance of critique to Marx's project.





What had once been considered to be purely theoretical questions concerning the nature of the knowledge of an external world, questions which only the theorists were competent to answer, are resolved by Marx at the level of practice.

The unity of theory and practice clearly occurs in the union between socialism and the workers' movement; Marxist socialism is the theoretical expression of the working class movement. The union of Marxist theoretical critique with the practical-critical activity of the proletariat has a dual form (Jakubowski 1990:61/2). ‘Theory becomes material power as soon as it seizes, the masses’, Marx wrote in the Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Law’. Marxist socialism is thus a theory which is distilled out of and incorporated back into the practical activity of the workers. There is an interactive process between theory and practice: ‘Theory .. is no mere textbook guide to practice; it is the expression of practice’ (Jakubowski 1990:62). Unity is achieved as an historical reality through the struggle of the human subject to see its humanity in the self-made social reality, to appreciate the world as objectified subjectivity (Holloway in Bonefeld et al 1995:172).

This is the direction that Marx's thought had taken since making the breakthrough from philosophy and philosophising about the world to social reality and its transformation: 'All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice' (Marx Thesis VIII on Feuerbach in Marx 1975:423). The notion that theoretical problems might be resolved in and through praxis show how Marx had critically appropriated the achievement of German idealism in developing the active side of subjectivity (Perkins 1993:27/3), coming to place this on a materialist foundation which prioritised the creative activity of the human subject.

Lukacs emphasised this point:





But German idealist philosophy could go no further than this, could not get beyond the limitations of the bourgeois standpoint.

The view that things as they appear can be accounted for by 'natural laws' of society is, according to Marx, both the highpoint and the 'insuperable barrier' of bourgeois thought. The notion of the laws of society undergoes changes in the course of history and this is due to the fact that it originally represented the principle of the overthrow of (feudal) reality. Later on, while preserving the same structure, it became the principle for conserving (bourgeois) reality..




It was Marx who made the decisive step to social reality and its transformation by identifying the proletariat as the subject and agency of this praxis. It was at this point that classical philosophy turned back.

But, here, we find once again, quite concretely this time, the decisive problem of this line of thought: the problem of the subject of the action, the subject of the genesis. For the unity of subject and object, of thought and existence which the 'action’ undertook to prove and to exhibit finds both its fulfilment and its substratum in the unity of the determinants of thought and of the history of the evolution of reality. But to comprehend this unity it is necessary both to discover the site from which to resolve all these problems and also to exhibit concretely the 'we' which is the subject of history, that 'we’ whose action is in fact history.




Classical philosophy took the crucial turn towards history, towards human society as the sphere in which human practice assumes its true significance, only to turn back at the vital moment. As a result, it was unable to appreciate the concrete character of the specific form of human praxis which alone could resolve the problems presented to philosophy. For it is the proletariat which is the subject of this historical praxis. Classical philosophy could not go beyond its own bourgeois standpoint to embrace the standpoint of the proletariat.





A Marxism based upon the conception of revolutionary-critical praxis is innovative, open and democratic in resolving problems at the level of practice. Such a Marxism possesses an inherent capacity for renewal through its becoming a force within the emancipatory struggles and practices of human agents as they attempt to make the world something more amenable to human purposes. Marx's Marxism is within these struggles and practices but is not reduced to them. Resolving issues at the level of practice nevertheless also means that this practice is mediated through the categories of a critical-emancipatory Marxism.

The Reversion to the Contemplative-Passive Approach

It is in this sense that the unity of theory and practice is affirmed. This view is quite distinct from that 'scientific socialism' which made socialism a 'correct theory’ to be developed by intellectuals who, alone, were capable of grasping the laws and processes of an objectively conceived world. Such a Marxism – Second International, orthodox, dialectical materialist, Leninist, structuralist - has indeed upheld the notion that theory is indeed something independent of practice and, most importantly of all, independent of the transformative praxis of specific human agents.
Thus 'scientific socialism' returns to a position akin to Hegel's philosopher standing outside of the world and reflecting, externally, upon the world (Marx and Engels HF 1975:85/6; Jakubowski 1990:18/21).

Contemplative philosophy, in its sociological, analytical and model building forms, one-sidedly conceives of humanity and human action as the product of objective forces. Marx, of course, recognised these objective forces when he affirmed that human beings made their own history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing. This begs the question of the nature of these circumstances in relation to social being and consciousness. Materialism before Marx, from Montesquieu to Feuerbach, acknowledged that human beings were the product of the natural and social environment. Marx transcended the Enlightenment materialism which made human beings the passive products of their circumstances by insisting that the distinctive feature of humanity is the capacity to transform itself through its active intervention in the natural and social world, changing the world and themselves in the process. For Marx, ‘human consciousness develops through human activity in the world; it is a factor in changing social reality' (Marx Gr 1973 109).

The knowledge obtained by this passive-contemplative approach is obtained post-festum and, as such, presumes the givenness of the factual world. Such knowledge is retrospective and hence makes no pretence at changing the world. Such a perspective is impotent when faced with the alien character of social reality. It is restricted to interpreting this fetishised social world and hence, as theory, gives expression to this fetishism.

The relationship between theory and practice here can only be one that is dualistic and which reproduces the dualisms of the fetishised reality. Whatever forms they may take, objectivism and subjectivism are the dualistic, though inextricably connected, results of this approach to theory and practice. For it is the separation introduced between object and subject, the reopening of the gap between philosophy and the world, which invites the tendencies to objectivism and subjectivism. One thus reduces human agency to pure subjectivity, which is expressed as a voluntarism in politics, with the stress on consciousness and will, and a romantic attitude generally which fails to appreciate how human beings express and affirm themselves by objectifying their powers in the self-made social world.

It is not, then, a case of asserting the subject over the object but of affirming the unity between them so that human beings recognise themselves in the objective world. On the other side, objectivism issues from the scientistic stress upon abstract laws, objective relations and processes, and underlying structures, insofar as they are considered in abstraction from the transformative praxis of human agency.

The Dialectical Conception
The Marxism based upon the conception of revolutionary-critical praxis consciously transcends this dualism and steers clear of the twin reefs of subjectivism and objectivism. This is achieved by a dynamic, dialectical conception in which theory is as practical as practice is theoretical. One may quote Adorno here: 





One affirms human agency as both transformative and knowledgeable at the same time. This may nod in the direction of Giddens' theory of structuration. It is nevertheless true that Giddens himself acknowledged Marx's praxis as a major influence in this theory. Keeping the argument within a more explicitly Marxist framework, theory is considered to be both distilled from and constitutive of practice whilst practice is considered to occur only through reflective human agency. Theory is thus as much a material practice as practice is capable of generating theoretical insight (Bonefeld et al I992:xii/xiv).

What can be argued is that the relationship Marx postulated between theory and practice is one that establishes unity at the level of the practical transformation of the social world of human agents (Perkins 1993:26). Theory, in this sense, no longer possesses the task of deducing the truth into the world according to a priori principles of political and philosophical rationality. Marx initially held such a rationalist position when depicting philosophy as the head and the proletariat as the heart of the coming revolution. After 1848 and especially after his experiences of the struggles of the proletariat, Marx came to emphasise that such truth is generated out of the world and its practical transformation. The principles of the Marxist political project, then, are not to be considered as a priori principles of political rationality established from a position outside of the world. Rather, these principles are to be considered as latent, immanent, in the world and as implicit in the existing practices and struggles of human agents.

One needs to stress, therefore, Marx's breakthrough from philosophy to reality through the notion of revolutionary-critical praxis as the transformation of the social world.

It was the political reality of the Prussian State whose concrete actions were finally to reveal how inoperable and ultimately how inactive was this theoretical activity. The contrasts between the presumed omnipotence of this activity and its actual ineffectiveness, posed as a matter of urgency the transition from theoretical activity (which never transcended its theoretical status and this could never become a genuine praxis) to practical activity. And it is against the background of the problems that presented themselves to the Young Hegelians for solution that the evolution of Marx's thought must be understood. Marx resolved the contradiction and elaborated a philosophy of praxis which was no longer theoretical praxis, but a real activity designed to transform the world. What was required was not a theory whose praxis was limited to a critique of a reality which would then transform itself, nor a philosophy of action which would restrict itself to elaborating the objectives of practical action, philosophies like those of Cieszkowski and Hess, which were little more than a new form of Utopianism.




In converting philosophical problems into social problems and hence resolving contradictions at the level of practice, Marx had subverted the status of philosophy and the role of the philosophers in favour of the working class, the social agency capable of engaging in the practical transformation of social reality.

 The Theoretical Consciousness
This position leads to some interesting debates within the Marxist tradition concerning the formulation of certain questions. The most interesting questions of all pertain to consciousness and being and where, if anywhere, theory fits in.

Take this passage from Henri Lefebvre:





Lefebvre thus writes of human beings as knowledgeable agents capable of becoming conscious through their practical expediencies. And he is no doubt faithful to Marx in arguing that the concept is not to be introduced into the 'lived' world from the outside, as in the rationalist model, but that the lived proof of exploitation and power, capital and the state, inform the consciousness. Yet Lefebvre distinguishes this from the notion of a theoretical consciousness. There is room for ambiguity here. Is Marx arguing that human beings, through their lived experience, gradually obtain the level of (theoretical) consciousness contained in the concept, in Marx's theoretical apparatus in Capital for instance? Or is he arguing that this, as a 'scientific' appreciation of the world, remains distinct from the practical consciousness of human beings?

Lenin's argument was that there could not have been a Social Democratic consciousness emerging from among the workers. It would have to be brought to them from without. ‘The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade union consciousness ... The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by intellectuals’ (31/2). All of which amounts to a fairly forthright assertion of the superiority of the theoretical consciousness elaborated by the intellectuals over the practical consciousness developed by the proletariat. For Lenin 'there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working masses themselves in the process of their movement' (1937:39). Workers may have a part in creating this ideology but only as socialist theoreticians, not as workers (1987:39/40).

The Social Democratic consciousness to which Lenin refers, then, is clearly the theoretical consciousness of Lefebvre's argument. If it may be accepted that the proletariat will not spontaneously begin to speak the language of necessary and surplus value and will not necessarily identify the mechanisms of valorisation and accumulation that govern the capital system, it may nevertheless be considered quite consistent with Marx's argument to uphold that the proletariat is indeed capable of rationalising the lived proof of exploitation and power, capital and the state to achieve a practical consciousness that is both socialist and class based. This would appear to be Lefebvre's point and is certainly Marx's point in having abandoned the rationalist model that introduces truth into the world from outside of the world. The Lenin-Kautsky model, however, separates theory and practice, turns socialism into scientific theory which intellectuals alone can develop, and makes the practical consciousness of the proletariat a mere trade union consciousness characterised as 'ideological enslavement of the workers by the bourgeoisie’ (1987:40).

What is especially interesting is to consider the political implications of repudiating the Lenin—Kautsky thesis and recovering Marx's original conception of praxis. For if the theorising of the epistemological and material incapacity of the proletariat was institutionalised in the traditional political party, reformist and revolutionary, then the recovery of the sense of the proletariat as transformative and knowledgeable agents and the resolution of the relation between theory and practice lies in their being unified in the struggles and practices of the social world. With this unification, socialism as theory and practice can no longer be equated with the theoretico-elitist model of ‘the party’. The socialist consciousness is then the class consciousness of the proletariat as its experience of the lived world educates it as to the realities of this world.

The conception of revolutionary-critical praxis, then, is to be presented as the democratisation of knowledge, politics and power as human agency comes to appreciate, consciously and practically, the social world, as its own creation. One of the most persistent themes uniting Marx's work is the attempt to unite the spheres of revolutionary intellectual activity and continuing political and social struggles. Thus Marx's Marxism, in overcoming the separation of philosophy from the object of knowledge, praxis represents the dissolution of the theoretical function through its democratisation, restoring the connection of human agency with the self-made social world. 

In the Lenin-Kautsky thesis, 'orthodoxy', was quite explicit in divorcing socialism as scientific theory from the proletariat and its practical existence, introducing it into the proletariat ‘from the outside’ through the vehicle of the political party. Such a conception clearly invites political alienation, with the political party as a form of organisation possessing an independent existence raised above the class subject.

For Marx, praxis, as the uniting of theory and practice, the philosophical idea and the real world, subject and object, is no mere methodological principle sustaining an activist conception of knowledge. More than this it is the driving force of his emancipatory commitment to a defetishised social world that has been recovered by human beings and restored to their common conscious control.

The Two Marxisms 
Historically, there have been two versions of Marxism, a split which has stemmed from the inability to sustain a genuine unity of theory and practice. To understand Marxism, therefore, there is a need to understand the nature and role of the concept of praxis. Marxism is not just another philosophy or theory, one more interpretation of the world alongside the others. Marxism is not an inverted idealism which sets materialism upright, preserving the concept of dialectic whilst divesting it of the mystifications it had carried in idealism. Instead, Marxism is a ‘philosophy of praxis’ which affirms the transformation of the social world as a self-transformation on the parts of creative human agents. This conception affirms the true practical, objective activity of humanity as concrete, socio-historical beings could come to occupy a central place. 

Marx’s ‘philosophy of praxis’ is not a materialist interpretation of world in opposition to an idealist interpretation. This view amounts to a reversion to a pre-marxist position, the view that Marx criticised in the Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: ‘The philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways’. This is a conception of an active materialism which represents a movement from philosophy as interpretation to philosophy as the transformation of the social world, which justifies the second half of the Eleventh Thesis (‘the point is to change it’) (Vazquez 1977:31).

Gouldner believes that Marx upheld two conceptions of praxis, the one pertaining to alienation and the ‘laws of motion’ of the capitalist economy, the latter to human emancipation.

Marx had two tacitly different conceptions of praxis.. Praxis (1) is the unreflective labor on which capitalist rests, the wage labor imposed by necessity which operates within its confining property institutions and its stunting divisions of labor. While this labor inflicts an alienation upon workers, it also constitutes the foundation of that society, reproducing the very limits crippling workers. Mere workers are constrained to contribute to the very system that alienates them. This conception of praxis is congenial to Scientific Marxism. In the second, more heroic concept of practice. Praxis (2), more congenial to Critical Marxism emphasis is on a practice that is more freely chosen, most especially on political struggle. If Praxis (1) is the constrained labor that reproduces the status quo, Praxis (2) is the free labor-contributing toward emancipation from it.
 In undertaking the first form of labor or practice, persons submit to necessity; in the second, however, they undertake a deliberate and Promethean struggle against it.




Marx claimed to offer a scientific conception of socialism, as distinct from utopian and moral and political conceptions. But did Marx really offer a political economy theorising the laws of motion of the capitalist economy? One insists, again, that Marx engaged in the critique of political economy, the critique of capitalism as a fetishistic system of production resting upon alienated labour. In which case, the challenge facing an emancipatory Marxist politics is to oppose Praxis (2) to Praxis (1) so that conscious emancipatory activity on the part of the human subject comes to subvert and transform the rationalised, alienative relations produced and reproduced by Praxis (1).


The Opposition of the Life World to the Alien World
Marx's Marxism was inherently democratic in embracing an activist conception of philosophy as regards materialism and knowledge and of politics in terms of the suffrage and sovereignty. Just as Marx refused to equate knowledge with the passive-contemplative approach of the intellectuals interpreting a given factual world from a position abstracted from that world, so he refused to equate politics with the prevailing institutions and processes of the state. In both philosophy and politics Marx asserted the power of the demos against the institutionalised power of the alienated world. Stauth and Turner have theorised such a project from a Nietzschean perspective.

Sociology is literally, the study or knowledge of friendship and consequently the study of exchange within the life-world is fundamental to the whole sociological project. This reciprocal reality leads us into a consideration of the fundamental importance of fellowship, sympathy and empathy as basic social attitudes. We treat the larger institutional reality of society as parasitic upon this dense world of exchange. 

Stauth and Turner 1988:13

The final level of the social world is the reality of regulating institutions which attempt to organise the inter-subjective world and the world of social embodiment. To treat these institutions as social bodies which, through an intellectual stratum the professional men of learning and taste seek legitimation over the world of communal reciprocity and individual embodiment ... This 'higher’ social world can be conceptualised as a form of institutionalised resentment which, requires intellectuals, professional men and priest to smooth put its operation; they exist to render the world, either acceptable or efficient. This culture of resentment stands in opposition to the human world of sensualism, practice and feeling.

Stauth and Turner 1988:14

With one or two qualifications, this could stand as definitive of Marx’s emancipatory project, opposing the life world of communal reciprocity to the alienated-institutionalised world staffed by intellectuals, professionals, 'priests' of all kinds claiming esoteric knowledge and monopolising power usurped from the social body. This is Marx's project of human emancipation as defined in On the Jewish Question. 


Democratisation Of Politics, Philosophy And Power
Marx's definition of the state as alienated social power opposing the social body as force is paralleled by his definition of capital as the alienated social power created by, but coming to dominate, labour. Marx thus departed from the elitism and authoritarianism associated with philosophical materialism and with the ‘Jacobin’ tradition of radical politics. If one had to choose a term by which to characterise Marx's emancipatory project then 'democratisation' perhaps is the most appropriate. The realisation/abolition of philosophy through its incorporation in revolutionary-critical praxis may thus be considered as the democratisation of theory in that it treats human agency as both transformative and knowledgeable. When Marx writes, in criticism of Hegel, that 'the state is an abstraction. Only the people is a concrete reality' (Marx CHDS 1975:85), he is making the point that in the social world there exist only human beings and the social forms they create (Meikle 1985:46). 
Everything that exists in the social world is the product of human beings and their practice. Any particular form, be it the state or capital, is merely the 'objective' expression of 'socialised man': 'Each is only a moment of the demos as a whole .. democracy is the essence of all political constitutions, socialised man as a particular constitution’ (Marx CHDS 1975:87/8). Marx not only traced social forms back to their human roots but, and here he avoids an atomistic conception, he concentrated upon the character of social relations and how, under particular social relations, social forms escape the control of the demos.

Marx's emancipatory project of restitution entails these social forms being put under conscious common control. But, more than this, Marx develops an innovative framework whereby human beings, as transformative and knowledgeable agents, could act to reappropriate these social forms. And this, arguably, is the distinctiveness of praxis as well as its centrality in an authentic Marxism. Marx, arguably, effected an original and novel synthesis of politics and philosophy, one that united homo sapiens and homo faber, the rational and practical human being.

Comprehended in this way, the conception of revolutionary-critical praxis possibly appears as more than just another attempt to resurrect Marxism. It is already a reconstituted Marxism in that the synthesis of politics and philosophy is situated on the level of practice. Marxism, in other words, is more than a theoretical consciousness or conceptual apparatus. Understood in terms of praxis, Marxism is distinguished from the rationalist model which identifies 'truth' with a Marxist theoretical consciousness imported into a lived reality from the outside. Rather, since the unity of theory and practice is established at the level of the social world, material practices and struggles, then any reconstituted Marxism must possess a social as well as an emancipatory relevance as regards existing struggles and practices rather than being a representation of an abstracted set of concepts. 

If theory is distilled from practice, and if human beings are transformative and knowledgeable agents, as Marx's praxis upholds, then any rejuvenation of Marxism must amount to more than a reinterpretation from within Marx's concepts but has to indicate a capacity to intervene in the emancipatory struggles and practices of human agents in the social world. Such a Marxism is necessarily beyond Marx but not for that reason beyond Marxism. It recognises that the emancipatory project is necessarily ongoing and developing through human beings as subjects of their own emancipation. But it is Marx's synthesis of politics, philosophy and power (democratic versus alien) which enables the emancipatory project of Marxism to be formulated thus.

Marx's notion of a democratisation of philosophy represented a decisive shift from the old materialism, with its determinist epistemology and revolutionary politics, with their elitist-authoritarian character. Marx's revolutionary-critical praxis overthrows the old theoretico-elitist model which practised a clear division of labour separating intellectuals and politicians from the people, itself expressing the separation of the demos from their social forms. The commitment to an emancipated world entails overcoming this separation and, hence, with it the theoretico-elitist model. Marx's revolutionary-critical praxis radically revised philosophy and politics and established a new definition of the modern enterprise of knowledge and power. How Marx came to achieve this synthesis of politics, philosophy and power can be understood only if one understands how Marx passed from philosophy to reality and the proletariat.

Philosophy and the Proletariat
Marx's demand that philosophy be abolished was simultaneously a demand for its realisation. Marx’s argument was that philosophy could only know the world post-festum and, given this retrospective nature, cannot change the world. Philosophy is always, therefore, abstracted from the world and in passive-contemplative relation to it. The philosophical idea, as such, is always in some sense cut off from and in contradiction with the reality which it studies. But despite being at odds with this reality, 'abstract’ philosophy is nevertheless powerless to change it. Thus philosophy is restricted to an impotent criticism of reality from a position outside of reality.

What spurred Marx to his conception of praxis was his understanding, drawn from Hegel’s criticism of Kant, that the ideal is to be located in the real. The philosophical idea could only be actualised by the practical transformation of the world. By making the world philosophical through this transformation, philosophy is abolished. Or, put slightly differently, philosophy is self-abolishing in the sense that as it translates its ideal into actuality, and hence realises itself, philosophy is reunified with the world, from which it had been severed (Perkins 1996:117; Callinicos 1985:3). Philosophy is transformed through its connection with the proletariat and the proletariat is transformed through its connection with philosophy. Philosophy ceases to be abstract through this material embodiment, and the proletariat ceases to be merely an empirical, objective fact on account of its association with philosophy. The proletariat is therefore the mediating concept between philosophy and the self-made social world, making true understanding and true freedom possible, through practical-critical activity, since its situation in this world is both actual and critical (Perkins 1993:26).

This unification is possible only by the world becoming a transformed, philosophical world. The realisation of philosophy thus constitutes its abolition (Callinicos 1985:30). The 'rational’ society, in this sense, is very much the end which Marx pursues, so long as one understands ‘the rational’ to be something embodied, sensuous and material as opposed to an abstracted rationalism existing in systems and institutions (Paul, Miller Paul 1991:30 32/3 34/6 39/41; Miller 1982:94; Gramsci 1971:161 167-252/3 257/9 263; Aronowitz 1981:4 6/7 14/5 32 132 134).

It needs to be understood, however, that the conception of revolutionary-critical praxis possesses a philosophical component which means that any practice undertaken in this project is constituted by values and is quite distinct from pragmatism. One can, therefore, affirm Gramsci's understanding of Marx's position as against Femia's interpretation of it. 

Femia writes that Gramsci's:





Femia’s idea that Marx sought the extirpation of philosophy fails to appreciate that the practical activity which Marx saw as transforming the world actually incorporates the philosophical dimension. This entails the notion that the philosophical idea is translated into actuality (Meszaros 1970:221 233; Tucker 1961:174/6; West 1991:35/7 39/42). Certainly Marx criticised the passive-contemplative approach to knowledge in which philosophy comes to the world after the fact. Marx is looking to overcome the theoretical and the contemplative approach to the world; the philosophical idea is to be located in the world and hence the idea ceases to be philosophical in the abstract sense. But it remains an idea. The practical activity upon which places emphasis remains principled. Thus Marx argues:

Nothing prevents us, therefore, from lining our criticism with a criticism of politics, from taking sides in politics, i.e. from entering into real struggles, and identifying ourselves with them. This does not mean that we shall confront the world with nay doctrinaire principles and proclaim: Here is the truth, on your knees before it. It means that we shall develop for the world new principles from the existing principles of the world. We shall not say: ‘Abandon your struggles, they are mere folly; let us provide you with the true campaign slogans.' Instead we shall simply show the world why it is struggling, and consciousness of this is a thing it must acquire whether it wishes or not.
The reform of consciousness consists entirely in making the world aware of its own consciousness, in arousing it from its dream of itself, in explaining its own actions to it.

Marx to Ruge, September 1843 in Marx 1975:208

Marx is thus removing the gap between philosophy and the world. Philosophy, therefore, loses its abstract character to the extent that the world is made philosophical. This is how philosophy is, in Femia's words, 'extirpated'. Philosophy retains an active role only in making explicit what is actually implicit in the struggles of the world (Easton in Mcquarrie 1978:61; Callinicos 1985:37; Jakubowski 1990:61 60). This is quite a different proposition to a philosophy that, in abstraction from the world, prescribes for the world according to a priori principles of an abstracted rationality. Marx broke firmly with this rationalist model without, however, needing to 'extirpate' philosophy. Thus 

Reason has always existed, but not always in a rational form. Hence the critic can take his cue from every existing form of theoretical and practical consciousness and from this ideal and final goal implicit in the actual forms of existing reality.

Marx to Ruge September 1843 in EW 1975:208

It is from this awareness of the need to breakthrough from philosophy to reality that Marx came to embrace the cause of the proletariat. This, perhaps, places too great a stress upon Marx's philosophical activity, introducing the struggles of the proletariat only after Marx had come to espouse the proletarian cause as a matter of philosophical deduction. This stress on the intellectual character of Marx's breakthrough to praxis needs to be corrected. As Callinicos writes, 'Marx's philosophical development arose as much from his experience of political and social struggles as it did from any intellectual evolution’ (Callinicos 1985:8). Similarly, Thomas argues against Avineri (Thomas 1994:212).

This accepted, it nevertheless remains the case that when Marx embraced the cause of the proletariat, he did so with fairly precise philosophical intentions. Marx, after all, was not the first person to discover the proletariat; or to commit himself to the cause of the proletariat. Marx was well aware of radicals and socialists who had already adopted the proletarian cause. They did indeed assert the emancipation of the proletariat. But Marx did more. 'He affirmed the self-emancipation of the proletariat’ (Miliband 1977:33/4; 119/20) and he did so for specific reasons. Those who had previously supported the proletariat had done so out of sympathy with the proletariat. They nevertheless continued to conceive the proletariat as the object of the required social transformation. Marx, however, conceived the proletariat to be the subject of this transformation. Thus both revolutionary and gradualist wings stemming from the French Revolutionary tradition had considered social transformation to be the work of an elite acting on behalf of a 'corrupt' mass incapable of emancipating itself. This elitist political conception, indeed, derived from the determinist epistemology of the old materialism which made human beings the passive products of circumstances. In the Theses on Feuerbach, Marx conceives human beings to be the active producers of their circumstances, denying the need, therefore, to split society into two parts, one part ideal, escaping the general determinism by breaking the materialist premise, the other part passive and determined.

Neither the violent conquest of political power nor the peaceful moral persuasion of the bourgeoisie would suffice to realise socialism. Reformist or revolutionary, such a politics is based upon what may be called the theoretico-elitist model and, as such, reproduces a condition in which human beings were treated as objects rather than subjects.

The early Marx did on occasion express himself in terms of the elitist or rationalist model. In the 1843 Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s, Philosophy of Right, Marx's concern to develop the relation between theory and practice in the actual world led him to the proletariat for the first time. Marx comes to draw this conclusion concerning the relationship between philosophy and the proletariat:





Neither Aufhebung (transcendence) nor Verwirklichung (realisation) mean anything like the ‘extirpation’ of philosophy suggested by Femia. Gramsci's meaning is far closer to Marx than Femia allows. The important point, however, is that at this early stage Marx refers to the proletariat as the ‘heart’ of the emancipatory project and philosophy as its 'head' (Marx 1975:257).

Marx possessed a left Hegelian perspective at this time, regarding the proletariat as the 'passive element’ and the 'material basis’ of the coming revolution. Only philosophy could supply the revolutionary spark (1975:252). In this sense, the emancipation of the human being is the work of an alliance between philosophy as the head and the proletariat as the heart. This dualism of 'head' and 'heart' derive from Feuerbach's ‘Provisional Theses' where they apply to German idealism and French materialism. The contrast between the two, as Marx puts it, is the Hegelian one between spirit, as active, transformative, and universal, on the one hand, and matter, as passive, atomistic and self-seeking, on the other (Callinicos 1985: 35/6). With this contrast, the relation between philosophy and the proletariat could only be elitist. Marx's left Hegelian colleagues like Bauer, came to denounce the masses as inert and reactionary and hence as the barrier to the progress of spirit. This merely confirmed political impotence. Ruge came to condemn the revolt of the Silesian workers in 1844 for its lack of political understanding. In criticising these positions Marx makes explicit the decisive shift that had taken place in his conception: now it is the proletariat that supplies the dynamic, transformative principle. ‘Only in socialism can a philosophical nation discover the praxis consonant with its nature and only in the proletariat can it discover the active agent of its emancipation’ (Marx Critical Notes 1975:416).

Marx had thus come to acknowledge the proletariat as the active subject of the revolutionary-emancipatory process as opposed to being the passive, object as in the theoretico-elitist model.





The conception of revolutionary-critical praxis, which Marx outlined in the Theses on Feuerbach and developed at length in The German Ideology, allowed Marx to thoroughly repudiate the theoretico-elitist model, subverting the position of the philosophers and the politicians in favour of the proletariat as the true subjects of social transformation and, indeed, of its own emancipation (Perkins 1993:20 27/8; Callinicos 1985:45/6).

Thus the experience of their material practices and struggles, deriving from their class location, leads the working class first to resist and then to take positive action against the exploitation and dehumanisation to which they are subject. 'Philosophy’, to retain any relevance, has to abandon its abstract nature and participate in the struggles to abolish a class society. Philosophy is thus incorporated into the class praxis of the proletariat. The experience of the reality of the class struggle, moreover, transforms the consciousness of the workers and makes clear the true nature of reality in a way that an abstract philosophy could not. It is this experience which leads to the formation of socialist ideas embodying the secularised philosophical idea. And this is a result of praxis.

The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.

Thesis III on Feuerbach

Thus, the Theses an Feuerbach make clear that neither emancipation nor ‘education’ can be achieved by an elite raised above society as a ‘superior’ force (Thesis III). Such an elitist notion rests upon a determinist philosophical materialism which can account for change only by introducing idealism and an ideal agency, ‘superior’ to the determined society. This theoretico-elitist model treats human beings as the passive products of circumstances, as objects moulded by circumstances and, by extension, managed and manipulated by politicians and theoreticians claiming insight into these circumstances.

Marx subverted this model by making human beings the active producers of circumstances, creating an active materialism in which education and emancipation were to be achieved by the ‘masses’ themselves as subjects of a social transformation which would also be a self-transformation. Hence the principle of proletarian self-emancipation represented more than a revolutionary piety through which Marx boasted his socialist credentials. Behind it lay the need to unify philosophy and the world, the ideal and the real, theory and practice, agency and the self-made social universe.

7 FETISHISM AS THE CENTRAL CATEGORY
That fetishism is the central category in Marx's emancipatory project requires some explanation. For if it is argued that Marx offered a critique of fetishism as central to the emancipatory commitment (Bonefeld et al 1992:xii), it may nevertheless also be noted that there is a tendency to employ fetishism as an explanation as to why the proletariat has not and could never emancipate itself. Thus Lukacs' theory of reification demonstrates how the revolutionary mission ascribed to the proletariat has been systematically - and systemically - thwarted or diverted by the ability of bourgeois society to shape and to distort the consciousness through which it is perceived (Perkins 1993:2).

Further, to present Marxism in terms of a theory of fetishism carries with it the danger of rationalising the inversion of subject and object which characterises the alienated social world. Marxism, therefore, comes to be complicit in the objective determinism of capitalism as an alienated system of production. Fetishism, in other words, becomes synonymous with objectivism, treating the social world and its relations as given, unalterable facts.

Fetishism implies a failure on the part of human agents to apprehend the social world as their own creation, to recognise social reality as, in Gramsci's words, 'humanly objective' and hence as subject to human alteration and control. Marx's 'active' materialism elaborated a conception of an 'objectivity' which is founded upon and transformed by praxis, of a humanised objectivity. The question of the nature of objectivity can only be posed in the context of human praxis as the practical relation of subject and object (Vazquez 1977:116). Fetishism, as objectivity coming to acquire an existential significance of its own, independent of human beings, is to be penetrated by Marx's stress on the central role of practical, transformative activity in every human relation.

Marx's emancipatory project is to be understood as aimed consciously at subverting the fetish systems of politics and production that prevail under the alien control of the state and capital (Dunayevskaya 1988). Marx's dynamic, dialectical comprehension of social relations show that the constitutive conditions for the reproduction of the social formation generate an inability for social reproduction as a systemic result of the alienating separations which estrange human subjects from their means of production and their means of government. This generates a crisis with transformative potential (Held 1987:229). It is here that the significance of fetishism is clear. For fetishism encourages the notion that given social relations are natural and eternal, that, in short, social relations are not subject to human intervention and alteration (Adams in Carver ed.1991:268). As a result, society may suffer crisis without human agents succeeding in developing a transformative project.

Here, the transformative and emancipatory character of praxis may be presented in opposition to fetishism (Parekh 1982:193/4 194 197). Praxis affirms the alterability of social relations whereas fetishism induces a passive adjustment to these 'natural' relations. Failing to penetrate the fetishism which cloaks the institutional and systemic world there is nothing for it but for human beings to acquiesce in their status as passive objects and conform to the 'logic' of the world of things, however irrational or inhuman this logic may be. To widen the debate, the critique of instrumental rationality in critical theory may be translated into the critique of the alien logic of the state and capital as alienated social powers, for this instrumental rationality expresses the 'logic' of fetishistic relations.





Much depends upon how the problem is formulated. Thus, an emphasis upon Marx's writing on alienation, the 'early' Marx, is thought to characterise Marxist 'humanism' in contradistinction to orthodoxy and its economic determinism. However, it can be argued that Marx's later stress on economic factors is quite consistent with his early work and that, more to the point, Capital may be read as a more socially and historically precise critique of alienation. Marx is thus criticising the capital system, with its law of motion, for its systemic or objective determinism. This determinism is the result of specific social relations in which things and their 'logic' come to dominate, expressing the condition of alienation. In failing to appreciate Capital in terms of Marx's general critique of alienation, Marxists stress the social scientific aspect of Marx's study so as to present capital's objective determinism in terms of historical laws. Such a Marxism thus rationalises rather than criticises alienation (Bonefeld et al 1995:175).

But it may also be argued that there is constant risk that a heavy stress upon alienation, one that fails to recognise the principles for its self-abolition, has the tendency to reinstate the objective determinism of the capital system. Whatever the intentions of the humanists, their stress upon alienation as creating a world beyond human comprehension and control, failing to connect a critique with the proletarian movement and hence divorcing humanism from a revolutionary politics, actually theorised a sophisticated determinism (Gilbert 1981:3/4; Jakubowski 1990:63/5). This may be slightly less crude and economistic than the determinism of orthodoxy, but the result is the same: we are presented with a fixed, unalterable world governed by its own laws and logic (Clarke 1991:317/8).

Thus, the whole notion of determinism is reintroduced through stressing the centrality of fetishism. The danger of fetishism lies not so much at the theoretical level as in the actual world which theory represents. The determinism of the 'orthodox' tradition thus possesses a very real justification in the fetishistic character of social reality. The inversion between subject and object, which comes to be expressed in political philosophy and political economy and, after Marx, in Marxist orthodoxy itself, is actually inherent in social reality itself. There is thus immanent in the actual world an alienating dualism between human beings as true subjects reduced to passive objects and objects invested with or acquiring an existential significance. Human beings who, by their species essence, are conscious, practical and creative beings, are reduced under capitalist social relations to a dehumanised status as objects of the ‘things’ that their practical activity creates.

The capital system, therefore, is a dehumanised world in which human subjectivity has been systemically eliminated. It is thus an alienated social world which does indeed operate according to systemic 'laws' rather than consciously determined human purpose. This alienated world, in other words, rests upon an objective determinism.

The positivist strain introduced into Marxism in the late nineteenth century had the effect of reintroducing the passive-contemplative approach to knowledge, politics and the world. The social world was conceived as an objective datum to be studied externally. As a result, the 'scientists' of Marxism came to insist that the knowledge of objective laws, processes and structures of a world considered to be independent of human praxis actually equated with Marx's as a scientific enterprise.

To bring the attention back upon fetishism, one can argue that alienation, fetishism and determinism, both humanist Marxism at its extreme and orthodox Marxism at its extreme theorised the world as external to human beings, laws of history/social relations as unalterable, human beings as powerless objects.
The objective determinism that has continued to appear in Marxism in various guises, from orthodoxy to the Capital Logic school, actually represents the logic of the capital system as an alienated, fetishised world. Thus, the problem lies not so much with objective (or economic) determinism as with a failure to criticise this determinism as the systemic logic of the capital system as an alienated system of production.

Similarly, one notes a tendency amongst the humanists to mask an economic determinism as rigid as anything proposed by orthodoxy behind a stress upon alienation or fetishism. For, in such theories of the fetishised world, theorists tend to lose sight of the fact that, for Marx, alienation is always human self-alienation, an active process in which human beings participate and in which they remain capable of acting to negate alienation. Instead, the fetishism of social relations conveys the impression of a social reality that is fixed and unchangeable. The fetishised social forms, which human beings have created, are presented as beyond human control and comprehension which, though it corresponds to the reality experienced by human beings in alienated conditions, are nevertheless only mistakenly considered as the only mode of existence of social relations possible. This is the rationalisation rather than the critique of fetishised social forms and relations.

One can therefore present this question of fetishism of the world and of the approaches to it as being absolutely crucial to Marxism. For the way that fetishism is approached determines the character of politics and praxis. Marxism as a scientific project comes to rationalise the fetishised social world whereas Marxism as an emancipatory project comes to criticise the fetishised social world. This distinction is, perhaps, too crude. There is no necessary reason why Marxism as 'science' cannot be emancipatory. The target of criticism is that positivistic science which reproduces the dualisms between human beings and the social world, philosophy and reality, theory and practice which Marx sought to overcome. But the general point is well made as regards to the experiences of Marxism since the death of Marx.
Marxism as an economic determinism has its roots in the objective determinism of the capital system. The capital system is an alienated system of production in which a 'second nature', possessing its own laws, is created and accepted as a fixed and unalterable fact (Jay 1984:58). If there are only human beings and the social forms that they create (Meikle 1985:45/6) then, under the capital system, these forms are fetishised and hence accepted as the only possible mode of existence between human beings. Human beings are reduced to the status of passive objects dependent upon an external determinism rather than as self-determining subjects.

The Political Implications Of The Approach To Fetishism
How fetishism is approached has political implications. For if one reinstates the old determinism under the cloak of fetishism then one is entangled again in what Femia has called ‘the paradox of emancipation’ (Femia 1993). And the nature of this paradox is that it is difficult to see a way to emancipation without embracing authoritarian forms, implementing changes without the consent of those being emancipated (Lindley 1986:169; Benton 1982:15). Marx, of course, is quite well aware of the ‘paradox of emancipation’, 'circumstances' being so corrupting as to force the pursuit of the emancipatory objective by authoritarian means. Marx deliberately sets out to reject the authoritarian implications of the old emancipatory politics by repudiating the environmental determinism of the old philosophical materialism (Geras 1986:134/5). For if human beings have been reduced to passive objects under the capital system, then there are only uncertain grounds for supposing that they could develop the subjectivity required for the revolutionary transformation of society. One thus returns to the old elitist, conspiratorial politics which dismisses the masses as 'corrupt' and instead concentrates upon the activities of small groups organising to seize state power.

It is this elitist solution to the paradox of emancipation that Marx's notion of praxis is designed to overcome (Thomas 1985:110/1; Geras 1986:134/6; Bonefeld et al 1995:173/4). Since human beings are the active producers of circumstances, there is a coincidence of social transformation and self-transformation. For Geras, 'the principle of self-emancipation is central, not incidental, to historical materialism' (Geras 1986:134). Thus, in Marx's conception, the paradox of emancipation is resolved: 'the proletariat transforms and educates itself in the process of its revolutionary struggle to overthrow capitalist society. The education of the proletariat is essentially a self-education' (Geras 1986:137/8).


This principle of proletarian self-emancipation is perfectly consistent with Marx's critique of fetishism which delineates how the proletariat, in becoming a class-for-itself, develops its capacity to penetrate, consciously and politically, the fetishistic relations of the capital system. Hence Marx's emancipatory project stands or falls with the proletarian movement. Either the proletariat will constitute itself as the revolutionary class and hence the fetish systems of production and politics will be abolished; or the proletariat will remain the objects of a political process and a process of accumulation which turns their power against them and hence sustains fetishism.

A stress on fetishism, then, does not necessarily suggest critique in Marx's sense. Rather, fetishism may entail a passive politics resting upon the intransigence of fetishistic social forms. There is no way out of the fetishised social world and no possibility for social transformation beyond existing social forms. A critical perspective may still be possible but it is criticism that remains at the level of theory and has no practical relation to the world. Restricted to merely interpreting the world, such critical theory turns to pessimism. It criticises a world whilst theorising its untranscendability. One thinks here of the Frankfurt School (Jay 1984:84/5). Reason alone, ‘consciousness raising’, is not the solution. The problem lies not with a deformation of reason, a split between instrumental and substantive rationality, instrumental and communicative reason. Rather, the problem lies in the alienated form of labour; it is this which produces the inversion of subject and object and the pathos of means and ends (Clarke 1991:323). The problem is not a contrast between two forms of reason but a ‘contrast between the inherently social character of human existence and the alienated forms in which human sociability is expressed’ (Clarke 1991:322/3).

Fetishism, The Party and Proletarian Agency
A commitment to revolutionary socialist politics may nevertheless be compatible with an interpretation of fetishism which makes the proletariat incapable of spearheading the emancipatory project. This, arguably, is the position of those committed to socialism through the agency of the revolutionary party. This may be called by the general term 'Leninism'. The merit of the position is that it does conceive of a possible future significantly different to that of the present. There is, in other words, a way through the fetishistic systems and institutions of capital's social world. The problem is that this revolutionary strategy is predicated upon the passive and object status of the 'mass' of human beings as determined by socio-economic processes. This view reverses Marx’s judgement in arguing that the proletariat, by their very condition as the most exploited and dehumanised class, cannot emancipate themselves from their condition. Reduced to objects human beings are exactly as the old elitist politics had claimed, too 'corrupt' to act to emancipate themselves.

As Callinicos presents the point:





And if exploitation is systematically concealed by the fetish character of the capitalist mode of production, then, contrary to Marx, it is precisely the fact that the proletariat is the exploited class which serves to disqualify them from being the revolutionary class. ‘It is in terms of the theory of fetishism that the celebrated distinction arises between the essence of the capitalist mode of production and the phenomenal form in which it appears to the agents of production’ (Callinicos 1976:48/9).

The agents of the production process, therefore, are the ones incapable of grasping the underlying essence of the capital system. They remain on the ideologically constituted surface level of appearances. It is this theorisation of the epistemological incapacity which lies behind Lenin's definition of trade unionism as the ideological enslavement of the workers to the bourgeoisie, or, put more accurately, to bourgeois relations.

Yet there is here a failure to understand the proletariat as subject and as process. The proletariat is written off as being subjected to the fetish system of production and as being unable to penetrate its fetish character. But Marx’s argument is that it is precisely on account of its class position that the proletariat could and would become conscious of the exploitation and the dehumanisation that it suffers and, on this account, act to transform society. Marx argued for the structural and epistemological capacity of the proletariat as it transformed itself into a class-for-itself. But the sense of process, subjectivity, the tendency to autonomy is lost as the proletariat are conceived as objects of the capitalist mode of production. Here fetishism receives the determinist interpretation that justifies the introduction of the party as the ideal agency.





Post thus concludes that the proletariat's ‘basic economic conditions of existence, wage labour and the extraction of surplus labour in the surplus value/commodity form certainly do not constitute criteria for selecting the liberatory future since they are modalities of exploitation’ (Post 1996:29).

In sophisticated form, such a conception reinstates the Weitling-Buonarroti view that the masses are too 'corrupt', too determined by circumstances, to emancipate themselves (Thomas 1985:110/1; Geras 1986:134/5 141). If the proletariat are, as the agents of production, subject to the systematic generation of fetishism and ideology, limited to the world of appearances, it is hard to know how one can account for social change without having to reinstate the theoretico-elitist model in which those possessing scientific insight into circumstances alone claim' the right to know and to control reality. Hence the stress that Marx, overcoming this model, placed upon considering the proletariat as the active force in the revolutionary process.

Though Lenin and the Leninist tradition (and also Kautsky and the Social Democrats) are not as crude as the likes of Buonarroti or Weitling in stating this thesis, it amounts to the same elitist-authoritarian politics in which 'the masses' remain passive objects. Only that political leadership and action through the agency of 'the party', that ideal form of organisation which has escaped - somehow, by its scientific insight - the fetishism to which the social world is subject suffices to achieve socialism. Here, as Marx noted of the old philosophical materialism, change is conceivable only by introducing an ideal agency 'superior' to society. This elitism, however, breaks the materialist premise. 'The party' is thus itself an ideal agency which can do nothing to remove the reduction of human beings to the status of objects. Instead, the proletariat are made the objects of the political process supposedly leading to socialism.

Proletarian self-emancipation, in other words, is replaced by emancipation from above via self-appointed educators who have, by some ideal process, escaped the societal determinism that embraces everybody else: 'the working class integrated, manipulated, indoctrinated, its revolutionary potential contained, submitting to exploitation and oppression willingly, and failing to perceive, because unable to perceive, where its real interests lie' (Geras 1986:141). And, traditionally, this emancipation from above has come through the ideal agency of the 'revolutionary party', ‘ideal’ in the sense of being raised above society and its general determinism:





The Social Democratic tradition lacked the revolutionary commitment and political activism of the Leninist tradition. Here the socialist transformation of society was not thought of in terms of conscious political action by human agents but in terms of the autonomous evolution and objective socialisation of capitalism (Hilferding 1980).

[This] organic interpretation of change, associated above all with the works of Kautsky, picked out those various and many strands running through Marx's writings which portrayed the demise of capitalism as following inexorably from the social and political ascendancy of the working class. In this view of things, the assumption of state power is not regarded as especially problematic; it is seen as the final act of a lengthy drama whose denouement has been clearly signalled by preceding events in the shape of social and economic victories notched up by the newly emergent class. Political power simply follows from and makes manifest, the power already contained in emergent socio-economic forces. The interpretation of Marxism as an organic theory of change thrived abundantly upon Marx's curious fondness for gynaecological imagery when discussing the process of transition. His frequent allusions to embryos, wombs and midwives did much to bolster the view that societies move through a sequence of phases - from infancy to maturity, and to eventual senility and decline - in which the notion of gradual evolution has far more place than that of sudden and violent alterations of condition.

Parkin in Gouldner 1980:123/4

Capitalism, effectively, would do the job for the socialists. The convenience of this position for the socialist bureaucrats and politicians is clear. The contradictions between the forces and the relations of production, between socialised production and private appropriation, would work themselves out without the need for much political activity. In Hilferding's view the state would simply take over an already socialised productive apparatus (1980).

There are, then, three quite distinct positions here. The one takes a critical attitude to fetishism and to traditional socialism, reformist and revolutionary, as having failed to escape this fetishism. The second retains a commitment to socialist revolution but, in asserting the fetishism of the world reducing the mass of people, irrevocably it seems, to the status of objects, has to introduce the party as an alienated form of organisation. The third abandons revolutionary politics and instead transfers the responsibility for change to 'history'.

All three positions are distinct and yet all fundamentally rest upon understanding the reduction of human beings to the status of passive objects unable to throw off the fetishism that envelops their existence as unalterable. Fetishism is thus accepted and theorised as an accomplished, an unalterable fact. One can opt for political pessimism, with the critical theorists, political passivity, with the Social Democrats, or political alienation, with the Communists. Politically and intellectually, however, the corollary of these positions is that the object status of human beings is reinforced and reproduced (Bonefeld et al 1995:173/4).

Resistance to Fetishism
Thus, though it may have been presented in terms of an economic determinism, fetishism has always been a contentious theme within Marxism. Indeed, the economic determinist interpretation of Marxism can itself be read as being based upon the acceptance of fetishism as an accomplished fact and fetishistic relations as fixed. Of course, the source of this mistaken reading of Marxism lies in the fetishism inherent in capital's social reality and marxism’s reversion to a conception of science that is based upon the passive-contemplative study of an objectively conceived social world.

This science thus expresses in theoretical form the fetishism that is immanent in the social world. Ironically, therefore, Marxism itself comes, intellectually and politically, to treat human beings as objects rather than as subjects, reinforcing the very inversion which Marx sought to criticise so as to demand the transformation of social relations. It is a debatable point as to whether this 'scientific’ Marxism led to or was the creation of the bureaucratic political socialism of the Social Democratic and Communist traditions. Probably the latter, itself rooted in material and historical processes. Thus the fetishism of the social world generates an authoritarian and elitist politics which, of course, colonises the Marxist emancipatory project the more ‘pragmatic’ it seeks to be.

Does this then mean that the more that Marxism seeks to be practical, the more subject to fetishism it becomes? Such a position entails the politics of permanent defeat. If every action leads to an entanglement in the fetishised social world, turning action against the agents, then revolutionary socialism is condemned to defeat and impotence (Meister 1990:142/3). Indeed, it amounts to arguing that emancipation is indeed impossible. If socialism cannot be institutionalized without the alienation of power – which is what the radical position implies – then it never gets further than the endless struggle for socialism, ‘a glorification of moments of popular protest within a democratic culture’ (Meister 1990:142/3).

However, there is a way of being practical and of destroying the fetish character of the world. Alienation, for Marx, was human self-alienation and, as such, an active process in which human agents participate. Alienation could not be experienced or criticised if it did not presuppose a principle of or force for antagonism intrinsic to it. For the whole point concerns the way that human powers and the human world come to be 'external and hostile' to human beings. Alienation deprives human beings of their freedom, turns their power against them, and eliminates subjectivity from the world. The whole notion of alienation involves a critical awareness of the estrangement, the separation, the severance that the alienation of human powers involves. The experience and understanding of this severance entails a demand for reconciliation on the part of human subjects. It thus comes with a vision of existence and essence reconciled which exists as a standard of evaluation against which to criticise the existing world.

Much can be made of Foucault's statement that wherever there is power there is resistance (Miller 1987). And maybe Foucault has a point in criticising Marxism for viewing power as a concentrated phenomenon (Foucault Power/Knowledge 1980:97/102). There are indeed merits in a view that criticises the conception of power as a 'thing’ to be captured and controlled, an approach which reinforces the ‘thingification’ of power instead of dissolving it. This conception of power as a ‘thing’ may have characterised Marxism in its dominant Social Democratic and Communist forms, looking to possess the state and the means of production as 'things', objects. But Marx's critique of alien power is a critique of the relations under which human powers are institutionalised, systematised, concentrated as 'things' possessing an existential significance over human beings. This is to affirm a relational conception of power.

 But with power such a diffuse, almost anonymous force in Foucault's argument, it is never that clear how resistance is possible. In Marx's formulation, the power to be resisted refers to human social powers to be reappropriated and reorganised. The notion of alien power enables the identification of the human power capable of resistance. Alienation as self-alienation may thus always be retraced to the human subject. Resistance, then, entails the practical project of restitution (Meszaros 1995:468/9). ‘Consequently, socialist politics either follows the path set to it by Marx —from substitution to restitution — or ceases to be socialist politics and, instead of 'abolishing itself in due course, turns into authoritarian self-perpetuation’.





Alienation as self-alienation can never be considered as a finished process; the alienated world can never be considered as an accomplished fact. For the existence of alien powers, of fetishistic social forms, presupposes the existence of a human subject capable of resistance and, indeed, motivated to resist to reclaim these powers as human. If there are only people and the social forms they create then, for human freedom as self-determination, these forms are to be subject to conscious human control. It is the lack of control and comprehension which characterises alienation.

Once alienation is understood as self-alienation, then the creation of fetishistic social forms is of more than historical or sociological importance. Thus the supply of social labour through the value form, the domination of the demos by the state-form, the rule of the capital form, are not at all accomplished facts insulated from human intervention and alteration. Rather, these social forms represent specific relations which are constantly subject to change, alteration, contestation, production and reproduction through struggle. Struggle by people over the social forms they engender is the key dynamic of history.

To take Post's claim that the proletariat's basic economic conditions of existence disqualify it as a revolutionary class since they are modalities of exploitation, it may be argued that, understanding alienation as a revocable self-alienation, it is precisely because the proletariat generates the surplus value for capital that it has the power to subvert capital and its mechanisms of exploitation. It is the exploited class that has the reason, the motivation and the capacity to end its own exploitation. And in abolishing capital, the proletariat would abolish itself and hence class society in general (Meszaros 1995:925 927). Which is precisely why Marx called the proletariat the ‘universal class’. Writing with respect to Germany, Marx asked as to where the ‘positive possibility’ of emancipation is.

This is our answer. In the formation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society, a class [Stand] which is the dissolution of all classes, a sphere which has a universal character because of its universal suffering and which lays claim to no particular right because the wrong it suffers is not a particular wrong but wrong in general, a sphere of society which can no longer lay claim to a historical title, but merely to a human one, which does not stand in one-sided opposition to the consequences but in all-sided opposition to the premises of the German political system; and finally a sphere which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from - and thereby emancipating - all the other spheres of society, which is, in a word, the total loss of humanity and which can therefore redeem itself only through the total redemption of humanity. This dis​solution of society as a particular class is the proletariat.

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 256

The kind of argument offered here indicates that the barriers that fetishism puts in front of revolutionary action and to the constitution of the proletariat as the revolutionary class are capable of being overcome. That the active force in destroying the fetishism which makes the world appear as an accomplished fact is the proletariat and precisely on account of its being the exploited and dehumanised class. For this exploited and dehumanised condition is not an accomplished fact but is subject to alteration through the activity of human beings as the subjects behind alienation. Alienation contains an intrinsic opposition to and subversion of itself, hence the importance of stressing that it is precisely because the proletariat are the agents of their own exploitation and dehumanisation that they are capable of overcoming this condition.

The Intransigence of Fetishism
The theory of fetishism, however, provides an explanation as to why the proletariat cannot emancipate itself and is structurally and epistemologically incapable of self-emancipation. Thus the capitalist mode of production, through its process of accumulation and modalities of exploitation, systematically generates structures of thought and action that reproduce the modes of the society from which they derive. Hence the criticism that bourgeois modes of thought, action and organisation have been reproduced within the socialist movement (Anne Showstack Sassoon 1987:51 86) has less to do with the betrayal of bureaucrats and leaders than with adapting to the contours of the normal mode and way of life of a bourgeois society resting upon alienating dualisms and separations. It is these which create the leaders and the bureaucrats in the first place, i.e. institutionalise and bureaucratise the labour movement within bourgeois society. It is this inability of organised socialist politics to transcend bourgeois society that Pannekoek characterised as 'passive radicalism’ and Gramsci as 'passive revolution' (Anne Showstack Sassoon 1987:157).

The theory of fetishism, moreover, suggests that human beings cannot see the capital system in its totality and are therefore subject to systematically generated mystification. But this contains the danger of a lazy functionalism which is conservative in devaluing human agency in favour of forces stabilising the social system, as though society were self-regulating independently of human agency (Giddens in McLellan 1989:215). It implies, indeed, the existence of the social world as an accomplished fact, impervious to human intervention and alteration.

Stauth and Turner praise Nietzsche's social philosophy for giving more space for agency, reciprocity, sensualism and affirmative philosophy which counteract the determinism of linguistic and social structuralism, naive functionalism and economistic Marxism (Stauth and Turner 1988:184). The argument here is that Marx himself furnishes the practical-critical tools for subverting the determinism inherent in the alienated social world.

This does indeed mean challenging that 'economistic', structuralist Marxism which, arguably, rationalises the alienation of the world and its 'laws of motion’. Gouldner's Praxis (2) is to subvert the alienated condition of the world and hence replace the Praxis (1) which produces it. Critical Marxism replaces Scientific Marxism.

What is worth exploring here is the connection between the theory of fetishism and the party form of organisation. The case made for 'the party’ rests upon the theory of fetishism insofar as this theory presupposes the incapacity of the proletariat. Hence the association between fetishism and the party needs to be contextualised in terms of the capitalist mode of production and its necessary mystification.

Fetishism and the Proletariat
One returns to the notion of alienation as self-alienation. Marx's concern was not to describe the exploited and dehumanised condition of the proletariat or to provide better knowledge of the capital system but to critique existing reality from a perspective of the essential humanity of human beings, indicating how opposition to these conditions would grow, supporting the proletariat in their process of self-emancipation. Marx did not argue that the resistance that the proletariat offered to the depredations it suffered would inevitably be successful and lead to socialism but he did feel sure that the proletariat would actually offer resistance and, more than this, come to struggle as an active rather than a reactive force to take control of the production process (Clawson 1980:266). The lived experience of the proletariat as the exploited and dehumanised class would privilege it as the class capable of leading human resistance to the alienated world.

Marx never theorised the appropriate form of organisation for proletarian self-emancipation. Respecting the principle of proletarian self-emancipation he could not. Marx recognised a wide range of forms of working-class organization with respect to political issues and struggles, including trade unionism and various 'conciliar' forms of organization — workers' councils, Soviets, councils of action, and the like. ‘What is particularly notable about these and many other such formulations is not only that they show the crucial importance which Marx attached to the trade unions as political organizations; but also that he consistently failed to relegate the unions to the somewhat secondary and limited role, as compared to the party, which was assigned to them in later Marxist thinking. However this may be judged, it follows from the fact that neither Marx nor Engels had a particularly exalted view of 'the party' as the privileged expression of the political purposes and demands of the working class; and they did not therefore find it difficult to ascribe to trade unions a politically expressive role only a little less significant than that of 'the party'. This is not to suggest any kind of 'syndicalist' streak in Marx, but only to note yet again that his emphasis on the working class itself and on the role which it must play in its own emancipation led him — whether rightly or wrongly — to be much less concerned than were later Marxists with the assignment of a towering role to the party as compared with that of the trade unions’ (Miliband 1977:133/9).

As the revolutionary subject, the proletariat would have to develop its own political and organisational capacities as part of the process of constituting itself as the revolutionary class.

Where the theory of fetishism enters, however, doubts begin to be cast on the capacity for the proletariat to be able to emancipate itself from exploitative and alienative relations. Here, theory concentrates upon the proletariat in its condition as a class-in-itself, its objective condition as the exploited and dehumanised class. It is not appreciated how, by the process of self-development, the proletariat could become the class-for-itself. The proletariat cannot be the active subject of the revolutionary process given its entanglement in the modalities of exploitation. Hence the need for the agency of the political party. If the theory of the party stands as Lenin's great contribution to Marxism (Molyneux 1986; Carew-Hunt 1963:171/2 185/92; Femia 1993) then it has to be recognised that it also presumes a Marxism that has been shorn of its revolutionary agency.

Marx's stress fell upon the proletariat as the active force of the emancipatory and revolutionary process transforming the social world. This perspective replaces the theory of fetishism, with its tendency to rationalise the determinism of the alienated world, with the critique of fetishism, recovering recovery of the conception of self-alienation as an active process which may be alterable by human subjects.

This stress upon the proletariat as the active force in the transformation of the fetishised social world repudiates the theoretico-elitist model which was reintroduced into revolutionary politics by theorising proletarian incapacity. The process of proletarian self-development is recovered as the content of Marx's emancipatory project and the socialist revolution. The proletariat is thus emancipated from the need to depend upon representatives, whether the intellectuals who alone are capable of developing the socialist consciousness or the politicians who alone are capable of instituting socialism.

At the centre of this affirmation of proletarian self-emancipation is the notion of revolutionary-critical praxis. For affirming the proletariat as the revolutionary-emancipatory class whilst recognising its entanglement in exploitative and dehumanising conditions upholds the view that in revolutionary activity the changing of circumstances is coincidental with the changing of oneself, social change and self-change as one and the same process (Perkins 1993:184/5). This coincidence is the resolution of the paradox of revolution. And at the heart of this resolution is the proletariat as the active principle in the alienation of the world.


8 THE DIALECTIC OF STRUCTURE AND STRUGGLE

The duality between structure and agency derives from the separation between human agency and their social world, from the alienation which makes it appear that structure is something apart from and privileged against human agency (Kitching 1988:21/2). This dualism has been reproduced within Marxism (Anderson 1983; Callinicos 1989). The failure to integrate the two represents the failure to assimilate Marx's intellectual achievement at the level of practice. This dualism Giddens has proposed a solution in his notion of the 'duality of structure'. This is defined in terms of the 'essentially recursive nature of social practices. Structure is both the medium and outcome of the practices which constitute social systems' (Giddens 1981:27).

Marx's critique of alienation makes it possible to envisage the abolition of the dualism between structure and agency. The political implications of this are radical to the extent that they involve a fundamental transformation in the way that human beings relate to the world. That is, the reconciliation of structure and agency implies that human beings consciously and freely control their practical existence and their social world and that structures no longer constrain human agency as an external power.

Certainly, this means the abolition of the capital system and the way that its structural constraints deny human agency. Thus, under the capital system, human beings live under the control and the logic of capital. The process of private accumulation is the central dynamic of the social world under the control and logic of capital. Thus, human beings have no choice but to knuckle under and align themselves with the determinism implied by these constraints. Whether one calls these constraints structural, systemic, economic or technological is less important than to understand that, given that there are only human beings and the social forms they create, under alienation it is these social forms, ‘things’, that are in control. This is a denial of human agency and represents a loss of human power and control.

Thus the objective determinism under an alienated system of production, whatever form it takes - industrialism to post-industrialism, fordism to post-fordism, heavy technology to information technology - is the fate of human beings.

If, however, it is understood that these social forms are not 'thing' like structures given for all time but form a mode of life created and sustained by human practice then one is in a position to recover the power of human agency to act within, through and against existing social forms (Giddens 1981:26). For Giddens, most forms of Marxism have come under the heading of functionalism, structuralism and positivism and, as such, have succumbed to the tendency to view social systems as operating 'behind the backs' of human agents. Human beings, in consequence, are treated as little more than 'dopes' (Giddens 1979:52).

Against this, and recognising his debts to Marx (Giddens 1981:2), Giddens argues that human beings are knowledgeable agents whose practices constitute social systems. There can be no question here of structures operating independently of human beings; these structures are constituted by practice and have no existential significance apart from practice (Giddens 1981:26). For, ultimately, these social forms are human products. Only under certain social relations does it appear that they are external, fixed and natural. It could be argued, then, that Marx's concern to criticise and overcome alienation may also be read as an attempt to affirm human agency in the 'objective’ world. On this basis Marx reconciles the classical dualism between structure and agency.

With respect to Marxism, it is not sufficient to refer generally to human agency. One can relate human agency to Marx's general conception of human freedom as a self-determining humanity in control of its practice in the historical process. However, Marx was more specific in referring to capitalist social relations, capital as an alienated system of production and the proletariat as the value producing, exploited class. The significance that Marx assigned to class and class struggle lay in the view that, within capitalist society, the working class or proletariat is the historical agency of human emancipation. For Marx, the proletariat is the 'universal class' because its emancipation from relations of exploitation and domination would simultaneously bring about the emancipation of all humankind.





This points to the ‘principle of the proletariat’. Critics who argue that the only proletarians that Marx knew came from books are being disingenuous, missing the point that Marx embraced the cause of the proletariat not because he had a taste for class war, but because there was a principle of human emancipation in general at stake. Within capitalism, it is the proletariat that is the class which represents human agency in its specific form, creating capital's social world but being the most oppressed by the social forms of this world - the money form, the commodity form, the capital form, the value form, the state form. Class struggle may thus be read as the specific way in which human agency recovers control of the social forms it engenders. Class struggle thus shapes and informs the production and reproduction of the social world and is the heart of the dialectic between structure and agency (Bonefeld et al vol I 1992:xvii/xviii; Bonefeld et al vol II 1992:xii).

The Real Dialectic
There are a number of political implications which follow this understanding of the real dialectic. Most of all, it undermines the theoretico-elitist model, whether, the socialism of this model is revolutionary or reformist.

There is a need to distinguish the ‘real’ dialectic from scientistic interpretations. For, if one reduces the dialectic to 'laws', then one quickly loses human agency again. For these 'laws' of history imply that the social world remains external to and independent of human beings and their praxis. The social world as an 'objective' world is governed by its own laws. Again, there is nothing for it but for human beings to knuckle down under these laws and reconcile themselves to the suppression of human agency. It is no distance from here to the theoretico-elitist model. Only an elite can interpret these laws and translate them into political practice. Only this elite can, claiming knowledge of these laws, be invested with the responsibility of the political application of these laws.

Failure to grasp the real dialectic leads to the privileging of structure over agency. The social world is conceived as a world independent of transformative human praxis and based upon objective structures and relations. There is nothing for it but to permit the scientists of the social world to study this world from the outside so as to interpret it in a leftist way, indicating the reformist possibilities inscribed in its objective determinations (Bonefeld et al 1995:2/3).

The dialectic between human agency and structure delineates the process in which human beings come to reappropriate their alienated social powers and hence come to replace structural constraints with freely and consciously self-determining human praxis. This non-alienated world does not mean that structures are dissolved, leaving only sovereign self-governing individuals. This is the atomistic, liberal model of freedom as individual liberty. Rather, human beings affirm themselves subjectively in the objective world without this objective world coming to be opposed to them as something external. In this sense, structures, under conscious control rather than being divorced from human agents, will come to be enabling rather than constraining.

The proletariat and class struggle enter the picture when one considers that the constraining structures of the alien, fetishised social world pertain to the capital system and its forms. One must comprehend this system not in terms of 'objective', i.e. unalterable, natural, laws and structures but in terms of reality as a field of materialist immanence and contradiction. Here, the perspective is shifted radically away from the theoretico-elitist model. The social world is no longer conceived as independent of human agency. Rather, the transformative significance of human praxis shaping the world is affirmed. The contradictory dynamics of the capital system thus generate crises that are opportunities to human agents. Far from being self-regulating, as in a lazy functionalism or alienation as determinism argument, reality as contradiction creates ruptures which demand conscious human action. For Marx, the crisis and contradiction of the capital system is accompanied by struggle on the part of human agents in the shape of the self-emancipation of the proletariat (Bonefeld et al 1992:xvii/xviii).

Understanding the dialectic between agency and structure in this way - in general terms of alienation and its abolition, in specific terms of the capital system and proletarian self-activity - one can proceed to overcome that dualistic separation that has continued to be present within the Marxist tradition.

Marx is to be understood as aiming at the unity of structure and agency, of subject and object. This unity overcomes the dualistic separation between the 'objective', as the determinations of capital, and the 'subjective', as the activities of human beings. In Marx, this dualism is overcome by comprehending the object as being produced by the subject and by arguing that the subject must be confirmed rather than denied in the object. Marx is not arguing for the dissolution of objectivity in favour of pure subjectivity. It is not a question of opposing object and subject to each other, freedom as agency over structure as against the structure over agency which characterises alienation. This is the point that Avineri makes in criticising Engels' assertion of subject over object (Avineri 1968:229). Opposing subject to object, agency to structure, reproduces dualism whereas the point is to dissolve it (Bonefeld 1995:6).

That tendency within Marxism to privilege structure over agency is thus repudiated. Determinist Marxism, reformist or revolutionary, is to be condemned for fetishizing structures. Moreover, this fetishizing of structures is to be located in the real fetishism inherent in the social world. Determinist Marxism is thus revealed as the theoretical expression of capital's objectivism.

Marx and Determinism
The question is what responsibility Marx himself bears for that deterministic Marxism which privileges structure over agency. One has here to scrutinize Capital, its character, intention and interpretation.

In Capital, Marx makes his intentions perfectly clear. His concern is to identify and delineate the law of motion of the capital system. He is attempting to grasp the necessary, systemic operation of the capital economy. Human beings, he points out, will be treated as personifications of economic relations and categories. If Marx thus fails to consider human beings as conscious, creative agents in Capital and instead gives the impression that they are passive, reactive instruments of external forces beyond their comprehension and control, two points need to be remembered. In the first place, Marx's stated intention is to criticise the capital system in its necessary operation. In the second place, the depersonalisation involved in treating the capital economy in systemic terms actually expresses the fundamental dehumanisation that the capital system represents. Thus, under the capital system, human beings have really become personifications of economic categories and relations. It is this denial of human agency that Marx, deals with when criticising the capital system as a dehumanised world of alienated production (Perkins 1993:7). And it follows that Marx, committed to the abolition of the capital system, is also as a result committed to the recovery of human agency.

In this sense, then, Marx is raising as a contradiction the bourgeois society, which exalts the individual as a morally free being, and its social mechanisms, which systemically undermine the individual by reducing all to an 'objective dependency' upon capital (Marx Grundrisse 1973:165). The individual as a true subject of the historical process is thus extinguished as capitalism eliminates human subjectivity from its processes and from the world it makes in its own image (Turner 1993:186/7).

The impression given, however, is that Marx thinks, as a social scientific principle, that history is indeed a subjectless process, that the fundamental reality is social relations, that individuals simply embody prevailing social relations and corresponding material interests. The view is easily enough corrected. As The German Ideology and the Grundrisse make explicit, this fixity of occupational and/or class designation as the result of social relations is a denial of the freedom of the individual and these social relations are to be contested and changed as such.

Nevertheless, whilst we may argue over the nature of Capital - Cleaver reads it politically against objectivism (Cleaver 1979), Negri contrasts its objectivism with the Grundrisse’s revolutionary perspective (Negri 1991) - then the way it was interpreted during the Second International was unmistakenly objectivist (Perkins 1993:8). The 'scientific' component of Marx's writing was accentuated, not in Marx's dialectical and critical sense but in terms of the passive-contemplative knowledge of an objectively conceived (i.e. still alienated) social world. There thus developed a pronounced tendency towards economism and positivism which deviated radically from Marx's critical and emancipatory themes.

Beginning with Engels, continuing through Kautsky and Plekhanov and onto Lenin and 'dialectical materialism’, the interpretation of Marx's materialism came to refer to an objective social reality governed by its own laws. Human beings could intervene in this reality only by appreciating its necessity, a purely technical act based upon the knowledge of its laws. Nevertheless, this reality as an objective datum remains forever external to human beings. In this way Marx's dialectical conception of a world constituted by transformative human praxis was replaced by a 'scientific' conception that rationalised the alienation and determinism of capital's 'objective' world.

Given this complicity in the alienated world, it is relatively easy to understand how this making of socialism as dependent upon the autonomous evolution of structures could be associated with a political organisation and practice that would be integrated in the existing institutional order and hence be passive. Gramsci's celebration of the revolution against Marx's Capital - i.e. its interpretation - and his condemnation of passive revolution is thus be part of the same consistent point.

The Duality of Structure and Agency

Martin Jay has argued that ‘a reconstructed Marxist holism would have to reflect on the complicated interplay between the systemic and action-oriented dimensions of society in the past, the present and the possible future' (Jay 1984:504). Recognising the tendency of Marxism to have privileged structure over agency - and recognising that privileging agency over structure is no solution given that it simply reproduces the dualism in inverted form - one can argue that the structuralist tendency in Marxism (objectivism, determinism, economism) stands condemned for having omitted human agency according to a scientistic conception of an objective world and laws of history.

For Anthony Giddens, the structuralists were ‘apparently content to equate structure, or the structural properties of social systems, with constraint’, with the result that 'the action of individuals can then only be conceptualised as occurring in whatever space is left over from the operation of such constraint’ (Giddens 1982: 535).

Giddens refers to the 'duality of structure', arguing that ‘structure is recursively implicated in conduct, the medium and the outcome of the mix of intended and unintended outcomes that human beings create in their intervention with one another. Structure is to be conceived not merely as an impediment to action but as involved in a complex way with what “action” is’ (Giddens 1982:535).

Giddens has acknowledged that Marx at his best, in the conception of praxis, reconciles structure and agency, and the influence of this aspect of Marx on Giddens is evident. The Marx which upheld the concept of praxis upheld the view that human beings can become conscious of their conditions and act to change them (Giddens 1981:2 1984:242). But Giddens' structuration is noticeably different from Marx's praxis and, as such, one is perhaps entitled to present the argument in Marxist terms. Structure, in Marx’s sense, involves capital, class and alienation, whilst agency involves praxis, the proletariat and struggle.

Thus, if structure is to be equated with the systemic properties of the social world then they are also to be identified as products of human practices. Thus human practice creates the structures of the social world. The material practices of human beings may thus be presented in terms of a nexus of interrelated actions so that structures may be traced back to human agency and human agency may be considered as affirming itself - or denying itself under alienation - in the structures of the objective world. If human agency is expressed in structure through practice, then structure originates in the action of human beings. Hence the misleading nature of structuralists like Poulantzas who refer to ‘objective structures and relations’ (Miliband in Blackburn ad 1972:259). These relations are never objective in any external sense, as systemic regularities in the social world as an objective datum. Rather, these relations and structures are, in Gramsci's words, 'humanly objective', and are thus the products of the practice of human agents. Thus Miliband argues that Poulantzas's argument risks a superdetermination (Miliband 1977:73).

Thus 'objective' structures and relations have to be created and sustained by the activity of real human beings as agents. The capital system as an alienated system of production makes it appear that the social world is indeed an objective datum governed by its own laws. But Marx offers not a scientistic rationalisation of this dehumanisation but a critique. And it is a critique related to the class praxis of the proletariat. For capital is alien labour, the product of the surplus value extracted from labour, the power of labour in alien form. The contradictions inherent in the capital system, in its production relations expressed in its 'objective’ structures, are thus expressed in the political and social struggle of the proletariat as the always antagonistic class. The recovery of the human agency behind the fetishised social world thus brings us to the proletariat, struggle and class praxis. 'Objective’ structures and relations cannot exist without human agency as an active force. The capital system cannot exist without the proletariat as the value creating force. (Post 1996:91/2).

Given the need to establish a unity of structure and agency, as part of the need to establish a unity of subject and object, theory and practice, there is a need to argue that the social world is shaped by human agency and that, therefore, human action expressed in material practice is the key to human development through history.

Thus the unity of structure and agency is achieved through affirming the centrality of human practice. It is the character of this practice, with the ensemble of social relations as related actions, which determines whether human action leads to structures which are privileged and fetishised and hence which constrain human beings as external, alien forces or whether human beings as subjects confirm their essential humanity in the objective world.

One thus comes to Marx's Marxism as an active materialism which unifies structure and agency and Marx's revolutionary politics as comprehending this unity in terms of the contradictory dynamics of the capital system and as expressed in the struggle of the proletariat to abolish the social forms which structure the class domination and exploitation to which the proletariat is subject.

This perspective derives from the Theses on Feuerbach, where Marx first outlined the position of active materialism, 'circumstances' as the product of human praxis. This view gained greater socio-economic and class precision with The German Ideology, where Marx located this creation of the social world and human self-creation in the mutual material relations of society. The material world, then, is understood as the social world of individuals engaged in their material practices. Marx's active materialism outlined in the Theses thus becomes, from The German Ideology onwards, social, inherently practical, proletarian. Based on the emancipatory commitment, this active materialism is oriented to subvert and abolish the abstracted, systematised, alienative structures and relations of capital's 'objective' world. Marx's general perspective from the standpoint of humanity thus becomes explicitly a perspective from the standpoint of the proletariat.

Perkins notes an apparent contradiction between Marx's ‘categorical assertion that history is a product of human agency and nothing more’ - the self-emancipation of the working class as an act of the working class, ‘history does nothing, it is individuals’ who act - and his later stress upon socio-economic conditions in which 'human agency proves to play a far less significant role, being constrained .. by a whole range of other factors' (Perkins 1993:5).

Marx's active materialism enables us to resolve this apparent contradiction. If Marx argued that history is 'nothing but the activity of men' in pursuit of their goals, then it is also true, as Marx argued, that this activity takes place within social relations. Thus action is not free and unconstrained but takes place within a structured context. Marx did indeed come to place greater stress upon the structural constraints which shape what the action of individuals, groups and classes can achieve at any time (Kitching 1988:45/6). But Marx is arguing this general point concerning structure and agency within a general critique of alienation and on the basis of a fundamental emancipatory commitment.

Thus, the argument is that it is the activity of human agents, and this alone, which engenders the social forms which may be defined as structural constraints. Generally, in the Theses, Marx argued that human beings are not the passive products of circumstances but the active producers of these circumstances. How is it, then, that human beings could appear to be passive products? How could a materialist determinism appear so plausible as to become the dominant interpretation of Marxism ?

Here one comes to the capital system as a dehumanisation whose alienative systemic regularities do dominate human life and do shape the activities of human beings (Meszaros 1995:491 621 837). Marx's emancipatory commitment is to abolish this scenario and hence recover human agency. If there are only human agents and the social forms that they engender, then it is true that these social forms, under an alienated system of production, do come to externally constrain and objectively determine human beings. Hence the proletariat, the surplus value creating class, is compelled to supply social labour through the value form. The proletariat, and society generally, is dominated by the capital form, the commodity form, the money form, the state form. These social forms, appropriate to capital's alienated system of production, are privileged over human agents. If the Marxist determinists fetishised structures - and Gramsci rightly condemned them for doing so - then it is nevertheless true that these structures in the real world are indeed fetishistic.

The Repudiation of Determinist Materialism
Marx's standpoint has at its core the notion of human beings as social beings whose practice shapes social reality. Thus, by tracing the social world and its forms back to human agency, Marx is concerned to discern the possibilities for social transformation and the human agents of this transformation. In this way, Marx's active materialism avoids the errors of that deterministic materialism which makes human beings the passive products and reproducers of 'circumstances'. This deterministic materialism cannot account for social change except by introducing an ideal agency.

 Hence one is entitled to challenge Femia's view that Marx embraced a determinism that made the individual the product of the ensemble of social relations. (Femia 1993). Human beings, as individuals are also the producers of these relations. Further, in producing these relations, they produce themselves. If it really was the case that individuals were no more than the passive products of social relations then, indeed, social change, revolution, would be possible only by breaking the materialist premise (Kitching 1988:45/6).

Marx's achievement lies in having recast the old deterministic materialism by incorporating the 'active side’, subjectivity, as developed by the idealist tradition. Marx critically assimilated this idealism and developed a new materialism that was based upon the material practices and relations of human beings in society (Wilde in Cowling and Wilde ed.1989:34).

The dialectic of agency and structure thus centres upon the material practices of human beings within specific, alterable social relations. And the whole conception is set within an emancipatory commitment to a defetishised and free social world. One has to recognise the basis of the conception in the critical concern with alienation and its abolition. Marx thus shows how the social forms structuring the social world - economic and political and, more generally, cultural, moral, scientific - are actually human products - the product of the action of individuals, groups, classes - but that, at the same time, these products can come to appear as alien 'things', separated from human beings and escaping human control and comprehension. As such, these social forms come to be experienced as externally constraining phenomena, as 'objective structures and relations'.

Active Materialism – Summary of the Key Points 
▫	the importance of idealism and philosophy to Marx;
▫	the rejection of determinist philosophical materialism - human beings as passive products of 'circumstances';
▫	Marx as affirming an active materialism - human beings as active producers of 'circumstances';
▫	creative activity as a mode of life/existence;
▫	orthodoxy's philosophical materialism a reversion to pre-Marxian position;
▫	direct connection between old materialism and political authoritarianism;

9 DIALECTICS AND VALUES
Something that very clearly distinguishes Marx's Marxism from that of the dominant Marxist tradition which followed him is the approach to facts and values (Perkins 1993:86; Bonefeld et al ed.1995:2). For the definition of Marxism as an economic determinism came to invite degeneration into scientism on the one hand and moralism on the other. Social science, in apprehending the laws of historical development, came to argue that socialism, was an historical inevitability. But, as an inevitability, it lacked an ethic. The neo-Kantians in the Marxist movement claimed to supply such an ethic. What would have undercut the entire debate - and prevented the degeneration into scientism and moralism - was an appreciation of how Marx had, via Hegel, reconciled the 'is’ and the 'ought to be'.

Marxism as a scientism and as an economic determinism came to reintroduce the separation between the 'is' and the 'ought'. With the separation of the 'is' and the 'ought', Marxism as scientific theory and socialism as an historical inevitability has to be supplemented by an ethical perspective that would motivate those committed to the political practice. Socialism as a scientific ideology necessitated the creation of a socialist morality - both to be introduced into the proletariat from the outside. The entire debate could have been undercut by pointing out, as Lukacs did, that in the action of the proletariat, freedom and necessity coincide in the historical process (Kolakowski vol II 1978:254; Kolakowski vol III 1978:269/73).

The assumption behind socialism as scientific ideology and as a moral position is that Marxism as science provided a positive description of the objective laws of history whilst a moral standpoint had to be introduced into this process from the outside. This separation of ‘is’ and ‘ought’, science and morality, characterised orthodoxy and led to the economism of Communism and the moralism of Social Democracy, neither of which proved able to put together what had been rent asunder.

Aronowitz's criticism of the dominant traditions of Marxism, deriving from orthodoxy's separation of the 'is' and the ‘ought’ it is pertinent. 

In its passion to oppose the idealism of those who, following Kant, were unable to find the historical basis for ethics, Marxism denied that its own theory presupposed a system of norms. These norms privilege the most general features of historical development over their specificity.




It should be pointed out that this Marxism completely broke with Marx's achievement in reconciling the cognitive and the normative, science and emancipation. Why is it worth making an issue of the point? Because the ethical status of Marxism as an emancipatory project is at stake (Aronowitz 1981:28 69; Smith 1996:94; Post 1996:306/7; West 1991:xxiii 41/2 43/5 152/3). Marx is not a socialist because socialism is an historical inevitability - a position which does indeed lack an ethical base. Marx does not extinguish values, he makes them implicit. Locating the ideal in the real involves the retention of an ideal. And it means that Marx's practical project of social transformation incorporates a normative dimension. This dimension presupposes value judgements which critically evaluate the fetishism and 'inversion’ of existing social forms and which motivate human beings to participate in an emancipatory, transformative project oriented towards the creation of a free social world embodying values of autonomy, cooperation and solidarity in social relationships.

Marxists have, perhaps, been too complacent on the issue of values, too ready to leave values implicit or, worse, have taken an explicitly anti-ethical stance as a reaction against the disembodied, impotent moralism of the Social Democrats and of the bourgeois age generally. Marxism has always understood that an ethical position must possess social relevance and that any ethical appeal presupposes the existence of a certain social identity.

To address moral values here is to recognise that Marxism has devalued morality and has done so for the very same reason that it devalued politics - it transferred the responsibility for thinking and acting to 'history' and to those abstracted agencies that claimed scientific insight into the laws of this history. This entailed a certain moral disarmament which could lead Marxism into the moral wasteland of Stalinism (Aronson 1983:40/1 91/2 99 128/9). What this failed to appreciate was that, in closing the gap between the 'is’ and the 'ought’, Marx's dialectic is constituted by values. Marxists, in other words, need not evade the question of values but can address it directly by raising the ideal implicit in the real. It is in this sense of projecting a vision of an immanent society that the values contained in the socialist ideal can be presented. This is to create a discourse that contains something more than economics and class and material interests, as important as these are from the perspective of social relevance (Bonefeld et al 1995:4).

What we are looking for is what E.P. Thompson called the moral economy, something which cannot be found within the reductionist assumptions that begin and end with material and class interests. This moral economy sets material and class interests within a critical and normative framework that is oriented beyond a class divided world, the classless society which is, after all, Marx's intention. The damage caused by the reduction of Marxism to political economy is apparent here in this moral impoverishment.

Recovering the emancipatory commitment may indeed risk introducing dubious millenarian strains when considered in abstraction from real and recognisable forms of oppression, which is McLennan's point (McLennan 1989:137; Perkins 1993:10/1). However, making this emancipatory commitment relevant in terms of existing relations of domination and exploitation is a condition for articulating the normative dimension in Marxism.

The degeneration of Marxism into a scientism on the one hand and a moralism on the other rested upon orthodoxy's separation of the ‘is’ and the 'ought'. As a result, the province of science was asserted to be the factual world whilst ethics came to refer to value judgements. This severed the descriptive and the normative from each other (Goldmann 1968; Draper 1963; Maclntyre 1963). It is, however, a dualism which is completely at variance with what Marx had explicitly set out to achieve - the abolition of the Kantian dualism between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’.

Because he reconciled the 'is’ and the 'ought', Marx can, as in Capital, embark upon a rigorously scientific enterprise whilst making value judgements (Perkins 1993:73). Marx is no positivist and does not, therefore, respect the division between fact and value. The 'is' contains an 'ought to be'. In analysing the 'is’, therefore, Marx can criticise from a normative perspective. Thus Capital can be both a scientific analysis of the law of motion of the capital system whilst also being a thorough moral critique of the capital system as a dehumanisation.

The Normative Dimension of Marx's Science
Marx's science, in other words, can contain a genuinely emancipatory dimension without being any less scientific. Analytical and descriptive statements on the nature of the factual world are combined with moral evaluations. Thus Marx in Capital delineates the necessary operation of the capital system but also makes an explicit commitment to the conscious and rational control of social relations by the associated producers.

For Marx, values are never independent of facts. To the extent that they are, they are disembodied, abstract and impotent and can, in consequence, be rejected. It is this rejection of moralism on Marx’s part which is sometimes mistaken as a rejection of morality itself. Marx's project is, however, fundamentally moral (West 1991), as one might expect given the emancipatory commitment. 'Scientific’ analysis and description of the 'is' can never be 'objective' in the sense of being independent of human beings, subjectivity, value judgements. Rather, the objective world is a human world shot through with consciousness, meaning, purpose and morality. Within a description of the 'is' there is, in Marx's conception, necessarily inherent the normative 'ought to be’. Social scientific productions, therefore, are never free from value judgements.

Marx's 'science' is inherently critical and normative and his real dialectic is constituted by values. Marx criticises the theories of the theorists and criticises the world which these theories express from the standpoint of an emancipated, defetishised, immanent social world. Critique supplies the moral basis to motivate an emancipatory commitment which is the only basis for socialism, i.e. in inspiring human agents to actualise the vision of the immanent society.

Marx's science, as critical and normative, is quite distinct from positivism and empiricism. It is quite distinct from the determinist and scientistic Marxism which, over impressed by the methods of the natural sciences, came to dominate in the late nineteenth century. For Marx could not acknowledge the social world as an objective, quasi-natural datum external to human beings and independent of transformative human praxis. In so far as ‘science’ conceived the world in such a way this would simply indicate to Marx, as it would have indicated to Hegel, the continuation of alienation. For human beings would still have failed to appreciate the social world as their own self-made world and would have failed to recognise and affirm themselves in their own creation.

By keeping in mind the reconciliation that Marx sought between human beings and their self-made social world, one can appreciate how Marx could conceive obtaining greater scientific knowledge of the world as compatible with the emancipatory commitment that reconciles human beings with their world. Scientific knowledge and human self-knowledge, science and emancipation, are part of the same process.

Marx locates human agency in the historical process as something that human beings, in their practical existence, create. Human agents possess the capacity to participate in this process and hence to transform the 'given’ social environment. The factual world, far from being the natural datum to be studied in abstraction by the scientists, is something which human beings produce, reproduce, and transform in their practical existence. Thus the transformative praxis of human agents is not autonomous of the historical process but actually is this process. Marx upholds human freedom to be the telos of the historical process, given that human beings, with their ethical potentialities, are the creative subjects of this process. The values to orient this process in a desirable direction are to be located in the real and are generated by the needs created by human beings in their material practice shaping the environment (Perkins 1993:73).

Dialectics
I propose to present the dialectical nature of Marx's Marxism in four stages. Firstly, dialectics will be located within the broader project of recovering the critical-emancipatory themes of Marx's original Marxism. Secondly, the principle of dialectics will be presented as entailing a view of reality as a field of human agency, movement, contradiction and immanence. This principle will be explored, thirdly, for its political implications. Finally, the relationship of the proletariat as the ascendant class to the 'revolutionary' dialectic will be delineated.

Sartre defines the character of Marxism as a critical-emancipatory project concisely.









At the centre of Marx's project lies an appreciation of reality as contradictory, alienative, emancipatory, as subjective and objective. The categories that Marx uses to apprehend this reality whilst affirming its continuous movement are best described as dialectical (Meikle 1985:3/4). They recognise that society, its forms, laws, and relations are human, transitory, alterable, and in a continuous process of development (Meikle 1985:4). The dialectical character of Marx's thought evades general definition and treatment. It has to be embedded and rooted in the critical analysis of the world and its processes. Marx, however, did summarise his whole approach in the Afterword to Capital. Marx insists that his 'science’ rests upon the dialectical method and Marxists have generally taken this insistence 'as a basic premise and guiding light’ (McCarney 1990:4).





This dialectical approach is indeed a scandal and an abomination to those who have determined, consciously or otherwise, to dehistoricise the present (Eagleton 1991), and who thereby continue to affirm present relations as natural and eternal. But dialectics clearly grasp a reality in movement and development pointing beyond existing society and its forms. And it is this that cannot be tolerated, neither politically nor intellectually. The tendency to dismiss or to ridicule dialectics grows from a need to deliberately misunderstand dialectics. Just as the atomist and empiricist mode of thought has consciously hunted essentialism out of political and intellectual fashion so it has sought to attack dialectics. And for the same reason.

With Marx, human self-understanding reached a point of attainment yet to be surpassed. Those whose interest was not to understand, or have others understand, sought to draw back from that high point, and they struck at its base: the categories of essentialist or dialectical method. Modern social science is the institutionalisation of that attack. 




Scott Meikle refers to the 'hatchet job done on dialectics, essentialism and organicism’ (Meikle 1985:13). It is hardly an exaggeration to argue that unless dialectics and essentialism are recovered within Marxism, the whole Marxist emancipatory project of human self-knowledge will be blocked. The loss of dialectics may have served the dominant Communist and Social Democrat traditions as socialism, becoming politicised and institutionalised, came to possess an interest in maintaining an existing reality and its power relations, but this entailed also the almost complete loss of Marx's comprehension of human social development within a meaningful historical process possessing an emancipatory end.

Marx's understanding of the historical process embodies categories of essence, law and necessity, and these are the categories which Marxists need to foreground as lying at the core of Marx's theoretical and practical enterprise. Marx explicitly endorsed the view that what he sought were 'the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development and death of a given social organism and its replacement by another, higher one’ (Capital I Pelican 102). If these categories cannot be grounded, then Marx’s emancipatory project is blocked. This explains why they have been subject to consistent criticism. ‘So the task of recovering dialectics is at the same time the task of recovering Marx's essentialism, his conception of law and necessity in the historical process, and thus his conception of the real nature of the historical process. This, in turn, connects with Marx's view of history as a process which will (barring accidents) lead to the full realisation of human society and therewith fully realise the social nature of mankind: a process which will produce for the first time true humanity’ (Meikle 1985:3/4).

The question of dialectics is at the heart of Marx's emancipatory project. The need to recover the political and conceptual relevance of dialectics is something that Marxists need to insist upon (Bonefeld et al 1992:xiv).

Marx's critique of the alienated condition of the world - which involved the critique of the theoretical representations of the world - differs methodologically from the atomism and empiricism of social science/classical political economy. This critique shows Marx's understanding of what may be called the real dialectic. 

In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing, state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.

Marx Afterword to, the second German edition of Capital 1983:29

Again, the whole argument has to be presented within the emancipatory commitment to a defetishised social world in which the separation between human agents and their world has been overcome. Dialectics and praxis are inextricably connected. Human beings are the transformative agents who are the active, determining forces behind reality in its movement. The conception of dialectics is integral to this perspective. Central to the idea of dialectics is the notion that the act of enquiring into the nature of reality doesn’t just obtain knowledge of this reality, it shapes it as well (McCarney 1980:121).

Marx follows up the insight of Kant and Hegel that the world is shaped by human agency by developing his notion of praxis as constitutive of the social world (Smith 1996:64/6; Tucker 1951:136 137 137/8 138 139/40; Walton and Gamble 1976:1/4 27/32). Thus, to really know reality is to know not merely what 'is’, as though the world were an external, objective datum but to know, through practical transformation, what human agency makes of the world. This knowledge is not obtained post-festum, as is the case where there is still a separation between human beings and the world. The passive-contemplative approach, postulated upon separation and alienation, is replaced by an activist conception in which human agents come to practically and consciously appreciate the social world as their own.

Dialectics entails a conception of reality as being in continuous movement, not static, so that to dehistoricize existing reality and relations as unchanging and unalterable is to be criticised as concealing the true essence and movement of this reality. Moreover, in arguing that reality is in continuous movement, one does not wish to convey the impression that history is merely an evolutionary process. Rather, there are two points to be made here which indicate the qualitative, truly revolutionary, character of change. In the first place one needs to reinstate the sense of contradiction as inherent in all things in the world. This implies the view that the essence of reality is contradictory and conflictual in which processes exist in antagonistic relation and constantly threaten to rupture existing reality. This dynamic drives historical development (Therborn 1976:390 392 397 397/8). Therborn thus argues that:





The idea of social reality as movement in contradiction suggests that the development of contradictions continually ruptures existing, alienative, relations and hence contains an emancipatory potential (Bonefeld et al 1992:xvii/xviii). It all depends upon the capacity of human agents to intervene in the contradictory dynamics of an existing reality on the emancipatory side of development. This is the second point. If the world is the product of transformative human praxis then an active role for human beings is contained within the nature of reality (Forbes 1990:103/4). One thus presents social reality as a field of materialist immanence which, as a self-made world, involves human agency as the conscious, creative force at its heart.

Under the capital system, movement in contradiction refers to 'the contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society' (Marx Afterword 1983:29) and reveals crisis as opportunity to human beings. Or, more precisely, human agency intervening in the contradictory dynamics of the capital system is to be grasped in terms of the process of proletarian self-emancipation.

What emerges from this is a dialectical conception of reality as a self-made social universe of a materialist immanence constituted by human forces and social forms in continuous but contradictory and conflictual movement. The ‘social matter’ of Marx's active materialism is matter in movement, a materialist field of human praxis. Matter, as Gramsci put it, cannot be considered in itself, but as socially and historically organised by production (Gramsci Historical Materialism). Marx's is a conception of an objectivity founded by human praxis and this praxis, based on an interactive, dynamic relation of subject and object, extends into all human relationships.

By bringing in capital, contradiction, class antagonism, and proletarian self-emancipation, one is beginning to point towards the relations that obtain between Marx's active materialism, his emancipatory commitment and his socialist revolutionary politics. The political implications of the recovery of dialectics in association with praxis are radical. For the social universe is made available to human intervention and alteration. The constraints of social forms are to be explored in terms of an emancipatory commitment to overturn alienative relations rather than be uncritically and passively received as 'given' material constraints. Any fixities standing in the way of self-determining human agency are to be subjected to the practical test of human beings.

By reinstating dialectics, one abandons the conception of society as comprising static structures and objective laws. Human agency is reappointed as being transformative and knowledgeable as against the institutionalisation of an elite which alone claims insight into mystified circumstances and the capacity to govern these circumstances. One, moreover, avoids the reduction of dialectics to a number of general laws which, independent of a subject and applicable arbitrarily to any object, may be appropriated and monopolised by scientists and politicians. Instead, there is every reason to believe that Marx expressed himself clearly and meant what he wrote. The human agency reclaiming the world as a human world, not appointing any elite possessing insight into circumstances, is not merely the condition of the emancipatory process this reclamation actually is the emancipatory process. And there is every reason to link this recovery of the human world by and for human agents with the struggle of the proletariat against the capital system.
Proletarian self-emancipation is no Marxist piety but is quite specific in affirming the agency leading beyond capital's alienated social forms to the emancipated social world. There can be no substitute for this agency. To the extent that the substitutionist tendency in politics takes over, the proletariat are reduced once more to the condition of passive objects of processes existing outside of them, something which did indeed happen under Communism (Meszaros 1995:463; Perkins 1993:178; Lukacs 1991:144).

The dialectic is the mode of thought of the proletariat as the ascendant class and, as such, as a real dialectic rooted in reality, its practices and struggles, its immanent possibilities worked upon by human agents, determines the nature of the mode of action and organisation of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject. Luxemburg was clear that this, indeed, was the character of the dialectic: ‘Isn't the dialectic the sword that has helped the proletariat pierce the darkness of its historical future, the intellectual weapon with which the proletariat, though materially still in the yoke, triumphs over the bourgeoisie, its transitory character showing it the inevitability of the proletarian victory?’ (Luxemburg Social Reform or Revolution in Howard ed.1971:127).





In presenting Marx's materialism as active and intuitional one hopes to establish the importance of idealism and the philosophical idea to Marx. If Marx resolved the problems of philosophy at the level of practice, he did not reduce them to this level. It is important, therefore, to stress Marx's relationship with idealist philosophy so as to be better able to repudiate the positivism and naturalism imported into Marxism as a deviation (Clarke 1991:57; Dunayevskaya 1988:42). The reversion to the old philosophical materialism that Marx had superseded came through Plekhanov and became the Marxist orthodoxy of the Second International. This 'orthodoxy’ in no way appreciated the nature of Marx's intellectual breakthrough.

Although Marx is a 'materialist', it is important to recognise that Marx did not simply oppose materialism to idealism. Rather, following Hegel, Marx believed such opposition to rest on a false antithesis, since 'matter’ is as much an idealist a concept as is the 'idea', so that 'abstract materialism is the abstract spiritualism of matter’. Marx is against the ‘abstract materialism’ of natural science, which later Marxists introduced in marxism:

The inadequacy of the abstract materialism of natural science, which leaves out of consideration the historical process, is at once evident from the abstract and ideological conceptions of its spokesmen, whenever they venture beyond the bounds of their own specialism.

Marx Capital I (1867) I, p. 389, footnote 89

However, just as Marx rejected Smith's attempt to absorb reason into nature, so he rejected Hegel's attempt to absorb nature into reason. The opposition could be overcome only by establishing society as the mediating term between the 'material’ and the 'ideal'. ‘Society’ however is not to be understood as another abstraction, but as the everyday practical activity of real human beings (Clarke 1991:57).
It is the separation of the individual from society which underlies the false antitheses of liberal social thought and which, indeed, creates the danger which obsesses liberal thought, that of imposing 'society' as an abstraction upon the individual. It is a danger of which Marx is aware and is at pains to avoid (Marx EW EPM 1975:350). Marx, instead, searches for the mediating term reconciling the bourgeois antitheses of individual and society, ideal and material, subject and object.

Praxis is the central category of the philosophy which is not merely an interpretation of the world, but is involved in its transformation. Having transcended German Idealism, Marx leaves the Idealist consciousness behind, and travels even further from the immediate or ingenuous standpoint of ordinary consciousness.

The Marxist conception of praxis in no sense implies a return to prephilosophical attitudes nor to the standpoint of vulgar or metaphysical materialist philosophy, which was still tied to ordinary consciousness and which preceded the more developed expositions of Idealist philosophy (in Kant, Fichte and Hegel). The Marxist conception of praxis, then, does not represent a return to the past, but an advance, an overcoming, the negation and assimilation in a dialectical sense of traditional materialism and Idealism. This implies, of course, that both had an essential contribution to make to the development of Marxism, particularly as far as praxis was concerned, though Idealism did present human practical activity in an abstract and mystified form.
The Idealist conception was a necessary stage in the development of a true philosophy of praxis understood not only as the activity of consciousness, whether human or superhuman, but as the material activity of social man. The fact of overcoming that conception, moreover, did not in any sense entail a return to pre-Idealist conceptions, nor the restoration of the immediate, ingenuous standpoint of ordinary consciousness. Philosophical Idealism could not be overcome by a dose of 'common sense’, but only by another philosophical theory whose materialist character would enable it to go even further than Idealism beyond ordinary consciousness. Such a philosophy must not only offer a theoretical explanation of a reality, the reality of praxis, but must also show under what circumstances the transition from theory to practice is possible in a way that leaves intact their intimate unity.




Thus Marx overcomes the old philosophical materialism and idealism by adopting the standpoint of 'sensuous human activity, practice. ... real, sensuous activity .. practical-critical activity' (Thesis I on Feuerbach in Marx EW 1975:421/2).

One comes back again to alienation and its critique as the attempt to subvert inert, alien objectification by self-conscious praxis.

When real, corporeal man, his feet firmly planted on the solid earth and breathing all the powers of nature, establishes his real, objective essential powers as alien objects by externalisation, it is not the establishing which is subject; it is the subjectivity of objective essential powers whose action must therefore be an objective one. An objective being acts objectively, and it would not act objectively if objectivity were not an inherent part of its essential nature. It creates and establishes only objects because it is established by objects, because it is fundamentally nature. In the act of establishing it therefore does not descend from its 'pure activity’ to the creation of objects; on the contrary, its objective product simply confirms its objective activity, its activity as the activity of an objective natural being.
Here we see how consistent naturalism or humanism differs both from idealism and materialism and is at the same time their unifying truth. We also see that only naturalism is capable of comprehending the process of world history.

Marx EW EPM 1975:389

And Marx's active materialism also resolves the false antithesis between humanity and nature:

The human essence of nature exists only for social man; for only here does nature exist for him as a bond with other men, as his existence for others and their existence for him, as the vital element of human reality; only here does it exist as the basis of his own human existence. Only here has his natural existence become his human existence and nature become man for him. Society is therefore the perfected unity in essence of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the realised naturalism of man and the realised humanism of nature.

Marx EW EPM 1975:349/50

Marxism's degeneration into ‘scientism’ in the late nineteenth century came with the conception of social reality as an objective world operating according to its own laws. Such a world was to be studied externally, independently of the world and the practice shaping the world.

This scientism, however, completely failed to assimilate the achievements of Kant and, as such, failed to understand Marx's own background in tackling the problem of knowledge and the world. Thus, the critique of scientism can be made through Marx's own critique of the passive-contemplative approach to knowledge but ultimately derives from Kant himself. The analysis of social reality - a reality of history, action, social regularities - must refer to the binding practical principles which, as Kant demonstrated, underlie every practical proposition (Kant Critique of Practical Reason).

Kant's critical argument is that the creation of a conceptual framework for the study of social reality, i.e. the reality of human beings, that employs concepts appropriate to the philosophy of the natural sciences, would actually come to conceptualise human society as a natural object which, as a totality of causal determination, would prevent any possibility of being founded on freedom (Bonefeld et al 1992:8).

Of course, by the later nineteenth century Kant's star, with that of Hegel, had long since waned. The lessons of Kant's critique could be lost and, to the extent that they were incorporated in Marx, not appreciated. The very scientism subjected to critique in Kant and repudiated by Marx came to dominate in the Marxist tradition and more generally in society. It is not enough to distinguish the crude scientism and naturalist materialism that came to prominence within and without the Marxist movement (Callinicos 1985). This is accomplished easily enough. More than this, it is necessary to be explicit as to just how much Marx owed to idealism and to Kant's achievement. Marx did not repudiate idealism but, rather, critically appropriated it and put it on the basis of a materialism which united human agency and the self-made social world through the material relations and practices creating a mode of life. 'Thoroughgoing Naturalism or Humanism distinguishes itself from idealism and from materialism and is at the same time the truth uniting both’, Marx wrote. Marx calls his standpoint 'consistent naturalism or humanism' and sees it as the unifying truth of both idealism and materialism. 

This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature, and between man and man, the true resolution of the conflict between existence and being, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be the solution.

Marx EW EPM 1975.

Marx builds upon Kant's achievement in showing how the mental apparatus of human beings shapes the world presented to the senses and upon Hegel's achievement in conceiving this active shaping of the world in terms of the philosophy of alienation. As a result Marx's Marxism is indeed the most idealistic of all materialism's (Dunayevskaya 1988:42).

In arguing that Marx critically assimilated the achievements of Kant and Hegel and that, therefore, the conception of revolutionary-critical praxis incorporates the philosophical dimension, one wishes to draw attention to 'the kernel of idealism' that Marx's materialism 'contained from the beginning' (Marcuse in Martineau 1986:53/4). Marcuse referred to this kernel of idealism as the presence of Utopia at the core of the revolutionary project, 'a Utopia without which Marxist theory cannot serve as a guide to socialist practice' (Marcuse Theory and Practice in Martineau 1986:53/4). For Marcuse, this Utopia appears today 'as a project' born in 'the emancipated conscience that will determine the social being after 'the qualitative leap', that is, when conditions enable 'an economy aimed at the elimination of poverty and exploitation’ (Marcuse in Martineau 1986:53/4).

The Immanent Ideal Of Philosophy
One has to be careful about the way that Marcuse formulated his argument. In overcoming Kantian dualism between 'is’ and 'ought', coming to locate the ideal in the real, Marx adopted a radical immanentist stance. Marx is explicitly anti-utopian to the extent that Utopia is an ideal society detached from the conditions and agency enabling its actualisation. At the same time, however, Marcuse does recognise the conditions for the realisation of Utopia whilst Marx does appropriate many of the themes and values of the Utopian thinkers. Marx brings Utopia down to earth, democratises it (Harrington 1993:37/8). In this sense, socialism is 'Utopian' in the qualified sense of being the vision of the immanent, realisable but repressed society. It is a project that requires an agency for its actualisation. Marcuse's Utopia addresses the reasons and values which are contained in Utopian thinking which serve to motivate human beings to act to create the better society.

 As such, Marcuse can be credited with raising the normative dimension of Marxism and encouraging Marxists themselves to be explicit as to the normative basis of socialism.

Marx did not extinguish the philosophical idea, the ideal, but instead connected it with the forces and conditions of its realisation. In taking up this real, i.e. immanent, ideal one can play up the ethical dimension of socialism as a moral necessity and not merely as a material necessity. Indeed, this whole idea is contained in the very conception of humanising the alienated world, a project that is material and moral at the same time. The idea of pushing beyond the alien control/objective determinism of the capital system pertains to human beings, as rational and moral as well as practical beings, coming to organise the world according to conscious purpose. History becomes a mastered as opposed to an unmastered practice (Thompson in Anderson 1982), the 'emancipated conscience' or consciousness does come to determine social being. ‘In fact, with the possibility of the revolution being a "qualitative leap’ comes the appropriate dialectic for historical materialism - the idealistic core that was always there. The determination of consciousness through social assistance undergoes a change. Based on an economy aimed at eliminating poverty and exploitation, it is the liberated consciousness that would determine the social being’ (Marcuse Theory and Practice in Martineau 1986:72/3).

What is interesting about Marcuse's readiness to embrace Utopian thought is the connection he establishes between Utopia and the philosophical idea. For there is a case for arguing that philosophy represents, in abstract form, the true and the good that is denied in the real world. It may, as such, rationalise the unphilosophical world and present a cloak for the inverted values of the world. There is, however, another view, that philosophy is necessarily Utopian in being critical and subversive of the world. Philosophy arises in the gap between the world as it is and the world as it ought to be. The philosophical idea as such is Utopian in being oriented towards the creation not only of a better world but of the perfect world. Philosophy expresses the will to transform the world and make it free, moral and rational (Heller 1984:8 9 10 18/9) ‘What ought to be is therefore the confrontation of what is most real with what is. Between Ought and Is there is a tension’ (Heller 1984:12/3).





Philosophy is, therefore, 'not merely any Utopia, but a rational Utopia' (Heller 1984:13). Marx's achievement is to have brought philosophy into the world. His argument would be that philosophy can realise its idea only when theory and practice coincide and make the world philosophical: ‘one of the functions of philosophy is to de-fetishise. The generalisation of a completely fetishised consciousness would undoubtedly mean the end of philosophy’ (Heller 1984:4). It is, therefore, with the realisation of its emancipatory goal that the purpose of philosophy is exhausted - and, as Sartre argued, the purpose of Marxism, too, is exhausted (Sartre 1968:34).


The Incorporation of the Active Side
Marx credited idealism with developing the 'active side’ of subjectivity as against the old philosophical materialism which made human beings the passive products of circumstances (Thesis I on Feuerbach). Idealism had developed and preserved the active, practical, shaping side of subjectivity and this, for Marx, made it superior to naturalistic, deterministic and non-dialectical forms of materialism. Yet idealism's achievement had occurred solely on the level of a transcendental or abstractly philosophical subjectivity. Marx, therefore, conceived his task as that of identifying the material historical embodiment of the active, practical subjectivity posited by idealism (Jay 1984:59).





It is important to recognise that Marx both broke with the idealist paradigm whilst nevertheless incorporating a kernel of idealism in his active materialism. Marx's materialism thus incorporates the 'active side’ of subjectivity which had been developed, even if only abstractly, by idealism. This active materialism assigns a central role to the. practical, transforming activity of human beings in their real relations.


The Accusation of Idealism
The criticism has been made that Marxism has come to reproduce the idealist conceptualisation of reality and subjectivity and that, for instance, Marx ascribed a revolutionary role to the proletariat on account of his idealist categories. Thus Laclau argues that Marx privileges the proletariat on account of an idealist theory (Laclau 1990) whereas one would wish to argue here that Marx's privileging of the proletariat derives from experience and the reality of class exploitation and of the struggles against it.

Nevertheless, at the same time, one recognises that Marx does possess a concept of the proletariat as a paradigm of the human condition (Avineri 1968:52; Perkins. 1993:1 11/3 24/6 28 37/8 49/51; Berki 1988:150; Lowith 1993:37) and that the definition of the proletariat as the universal class is a commitment to universal human values. Hence the cause of the proletariat is not to be reduced to class interests and struggles over material power and resources, as undoubtedly important as these are. One may be open to the charge of idealism here, but there is a principle behind Marx's class politics.

Marx critically assimilated Hegel's concepts of objectification and alienation and put them on the materialist basis of human relations and practical activities (Kitching 1988:25). These concepts, in other words, were translated into the conditions of human beings in their practical existence rather being of the philosophical ‘idea’. It was human agency which shaped the world as a human world, not the mental activity of 'the idea'.

Hence the meaning of Marx's thesis that philosophers have merely interpreted the world in various ways whereas the point is to change it. Marx is criticising the notion of philosophers obtaining knowledge of the world post-festum from a position outside of the world and independent of the praxis transforming the world. Marx is looking to close the gap between philosophy and the world through reconciling human agency and the social world as a self-made social universe. True knowledge is a condition of getting to grips with the world and changing it (Avineri 1968). Merely interpreting the world in various ways presupposes the continued existence of the gap between philosophy and the world, the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’. Only through the practical transformation of the world can human beings really know this world as their own.

Marx was criticising the passive-contemplative approach to knowledge as abstract and scholastic in presupposing a position outside of a world still conceived as something external. In criticising the philosophers for merely interpreting the world Marx was not denying intellectual activity as such, though he was almost certainly attempting to overcome the philosophical and theoretical approach as something retrospective and as being entangled in the fetishism of the existing world (i.e. the validity of theory derives from its correspondence to an existing world).

The Intellectual Appreciation of a Self-Made World
Marx’s point was that intellectual activities concerning the knowledge of the world are to be considered as integral to the practical activities transforming the world. In this sense, intellectual activity is indeed a material practice (Aronowitz 1981) but at the same time the practical activities shaping the world are themselves intellectual and, as a result, create a world shot through with consciousness, meaning and purpose. Hence the appropriateness of Gramsci's depiction of the world as ‘humanly objective’.

Marx is pursuing a knowledge of the world that is also human self-knowledge. Human beings as practical agents, not merely philosophers and scientists, come to know the world through their engagement with it. This knowledge is not of the world as an external world, as though the world were something apart from human beings and hence the subject of study based on natural science methods. This approach, characterising scientism, positivism, naturalism and empiricism, shows that the separation of human beings from their world still exists. For the social world is a human world and human beings are to consciously appreciate it as such (Ferraro 1992:7/10 10/1 11 38 40 41; Tucker 1961:46/52; Suchting 1983:6 8). In this sense, the intellectual appreciation of the world is no longer passive and no longer the monopoly of the philosophers/scientists but is consciously and inextricably connected and integral to the material practices changing the world, something in which all human beings may participate as human agents coming to recognise themselves in the world as their own creation.

Intellectual activity, therefore, exists on a couple of levels in Marx. In transcending the theoretical and the philosophical approach, Marx was attempting to point the way towards human beings coming to recognise the so called external world as their own world. It is this self-knowledge, which by definition can be achieved by human beings as agents themselves, which Marx pursues. 

But Marx himself continues his own activity as an intellectual. Is this a contradiction? Not at all. It is all part of the process of human beings achieving self-knowledge. This process is neither automatic nor spontaneous. Marx's achievement is to have made the breakthrough from merely philosophical or theoretical activity outside of the world to the critique of the world oriented towards its fundamental transformation. Marx's Capital, then, is not a theory of the capital economy but its critique. And it is based on the emancipatory commitment to human self-knowledge. As Meikle argues:





Materialism - Old And New
To put the point concisely, the basic difference between the old philosophical materialism and Marx's new active materialism is that whilst the former regards human beings as passive products, i.e. determined object's, of circumstances Marx's materialism conceives human beings active producers, i.e. conscious and free subjects.

Hence the irony of the 'dialectical materialism’ parented upon Marx by the likes of Plekhanov. For the kind of materialism presented as Marxism under the Second International was precisely the mechanistic kind, resting upon a deterministic epistemology, that Marx consciously repudiated.

As Reich argued: ‘we left the praxis of the subjective factor to the idealists; we acted like mechanistic economistic materialists’ (Reich in Baxandall ed. 1972:284). Unfortunately, the conventional understanding of Marxism has been based more upon the Second International tradition than upon Marx himself. In understanding Marx's materialism, therefore, one needs to understand that Marx transcended the old antithesis between materialism and idealism. The reversion of Marxism to philosophical materialism came under the influence of the crude naturalism and scientism of the late nineteenth century, when the achievements of Kant and Hegel had long since been forgotten. Marx himself noted critically the way that Hegel was being treated as a 'dead dog'. Unfortunately, this reversion to philosophical materialism came at a time when Marxism was being codified as 'orthodoxy’.

Marx believed that the antithesis between idealism and materialism was a false one. 'Matter' is social and human and hence as idealist as the philosophical idea. But it is not an abstract conception but is rooted in the material relations and practices of real individuals. Hegel, too, had regarded this antithesis as false. In this sense, Hegel's is the most material of idealism's (Dunayevskaya 1988:42; Gouldner 1980:180). Marx, however, rejected Hegel's attempt to subsume the material world under reason.

Marx overcame this antithesis between, materialism and idealism by elevating society as the mediating category between the material and the ideal. 

The human essence of nature exists only for social man; for only here does nature exist form him as a bond with other men, as his existence for others and their existence for him, as the vital element of human reality; only here does it exist as the basis of his own human existence. Only here has his natural existence become his human existence and nature become man for him. Society is therefore the perfected unity in essence of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the realised naturalism of man and the realised humanism of nature.

Marx EW EPM 1975:349/50

But 'society’ here is not an abstraction raised over the individual (EPM 350), as under bourgeois society and its instrumental, exchange relationships. Rather, society is the everyday practical activity of real individuals. Marx identified himself as a materialist, but this had nothing to do with the old philosophical materialism. Rather, Marx made it clear that his materialist premise meant proceeding from 'real individuals', their activity and the material conditions under which they live (Clarke 1991:57; Meikle 1985:46).

Marx is not putting society as the mediating category forward here as the solution to a philosophical problem but as resolving the problem of the antithesis between materialism and idealism, subjectivity and objectivity. Marx turns a philosophical problem into a social and historical one. He thus comes to conceive his project in terms of the relations between individuals and society, humanity and nature. Marx resolves the antithesis between the material and the ideal within the framework of the historical development of social relations (Perkins 1993:57/8).

Hence one can understand why Marx continued to assign central importance to material relations, what they are, how the escape human control and come to acquire an independent existence, how they may be brought under the conscious common control of individuals (Clarke 1991:92 96/7; Meszaros 1995:xxi 32/3 39 41/2 72 93 296 789 818 837/8; Smith 1996:1/2 7; Miller 1982:28/30 46/7 49). It is the separation of these relations from conscious common control which results in 'society' becoming an abstraction standing over and above the individuals constituting society. It is this separation of relations from individuals and hence society from individuals which extinguishes the essential category mediating between human beings and nature and between the material and the ideal.

Thus Marx sums up his breakthrough in the Theses on Feuerbach. Here philosophical materialism and philosophical idealism are criticised from the standpoint of 'sensuous human activity, practice', ‘practical-critical activity' (Thesis I), 'revolutionary practice’ (Thesis III), ‘theory and practice' (Thesis IV), 'practical, human-sensuous activity' (Thesis V), 'human essence' as 'no abstraction' but as 'the ensemble of social relations' (Thesis VI), 'human practice' and its 'comprehension' (Thesis VIII), 'sensuousness as practical activity’ (Thesis IX), 'human society or socialised humanity' (Thesis X).

Where the old philosophical materialists had argued that human beings were simply the products of material circumstances and that to change these circumstances was to change human beings, Marx argued that human beings themselves created these circumstances so that social transformation coincided with self-transformation (Thesis III).

The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.

Thesis III on Feuerbach

It is crucial to understand, therefore, that Marx's materialism neither excludes nor devalues subjectivity but, rather, incorporates its active character within the material processes behind historical development. The active side developed by idealism could be made concrete only by practical activity in the material world and possesses only an abstract character unless this is so.

Marx thus breaks completely with philosophical or Enlightenment materialism. Human beings are not the passive products of circumstances. Such a view cannot account for social change, let alone revolution. Indeed, the revolutionary principle, such as it is, has to be located in the circumstances themselves. For Marx, human beings formed themselves through their interaction with material reality. It is this reflexive aspect of Marx's materialism to which O Neill draws attention. Humanity and nature are 'involved in a cultural matrix in which the natural history of man is interwoven with the humanisation of natural history' (O Neill 1969:xviii).

Marx's position is thus only very misleadingly defined as ‘materialism’. The Theses are pointed criticisms of the old materialism in which human beings react automatically to external material stimuli (Post 1996:,45). Instead, as The German Ideology made plain, Marx was breaking through to the reality of real individuals in their material relations and activities.

Marx himself had characterised his own position as a humanistic naturalism and as a naturalistic humanism. There is a need to understand the reasoning behind these terms.

When real, corporeal man, his feet firmly planted on the solid earth and breathing all the powers of nature, establishes his real, objective essential powers as alien objects by externalisation, it is not the establishing which is subject; it is the subjectivity of objective essential powers whose action must therefore be an objective one. An objective being acts objectively, and it would not act objectively if objectivity were not an inherent part of its essential nature. It creates and establishes only objects because it is established by objects, because it is fundamentally nature. In the act of establishing it therefore does not descend from its ‘pure activity’ to the creation of objects; on the contrary, its objective product simply confirms its objective activity, its activity as the activity of an objective, natural being.
Here we see how consistent naturalism or humanism differs both from idealism and materialism and is at the same time their unifying truth. We also see that only naturalism is capable of comprehending the process of world history.

Marx EPM EW 1975:389

This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature..

Marx EPM EW 1975:348

Marx's Active Materialism
In the Theses on Feuerbach, Marx makes his repudiation of the old materialism as explicit as his rejection of German idealism. Marx adopts a position of what may be referred to as an active materialism. Marx's active materialism is the product of the critical appropriation of Hegel's idealism, the materialisation of the concepts of objectification and alienation, and the resolution of the antithesis between philosophical idealism and materialism at the level of social and historical reality created by human beings.

Idealism's development of the ‘active side’ of subjectivity is incorporated into an understanding of material reality as social and human and practical. The material is social and conceived in terms of the practical activity and relations of human beings in their relations to each other and to nature. Materialising Hegel's concepts of objectification and alienation (Kitching 1983:25), Marx took the standpoint of socialised humanity in arguing for the thoroughly human nature of 'matter' and hence for the emancipatory-revolutionary incursion of human beings as subjects into this fetishised and alienated 'matter' (Bonefeld et al vol I 1992:38/9).

Marx's Determinism
Historical development takes place within the framework of material relations. Within these relations human beings are engaged in creative, practical activity. Thus, the materialisation of Hegel's concepts of objectification and alienation enables Marx to conceive the material world as social and human and to pursue the emancipatory goal of socialised humanity. In terms of the capital-labour dialectic, the material is inherently proletarian, labouring praxis which is always antagonistic to and potentially subversive of capital's alienated, systematised, fetishised social world. It is this that gives us an angle upon materialist determinism.

Marx is not arguing that human beings are the products of material circumstances, which is a simple enough materialist determinism. Rather, the creative, practical activity of individuals, taking place within social relations, creates material reality but, under alienative relations, the 'social matter’ produced may indeed come to determine human life as an external, alien force. Hence determinism exists in Marx as a critique of an alienated system of production which turns the creative, transformative, indeed determining creative activity of human beings against them as alien forces (Meszaros 1995:491 606/7 619 619/20). Marx's fundamental premise is that there are only human beings and the social forms they create. It is human activity which is the determining force behind these forms but, as a result of alienation, these social forms come to determine human life externally.

Thus Marx establishes the general point that material reality, in its historical development, is created by human creative, practical activity and hence will, as a result of this activity, will be constituted by certain social forms which will establish it as a specific mode of production, existence or life. But this materialist premise, in which human beings are the ensemble of social relations, has to be presented within the framework of the materialisation of the concepts of objectification and alienation. This framework explains how the determining activity of human beings can result in them being subject to the external determinism of capital's alienated social forms - the value form, the commodity form, the money form, the state form. Marx's determinism, then, is to be interpreted as a critique of alienation and a demand for human self-determination.

Marx's later work came to concentrate upon the critique of political economy. Perhaps Marx can be criticised for seeking the anatomy of civil society in political economy. Are there not aspects of civil society other than and irreducible to the economic? This exclusive emphasis upon the economic factor alone is not entailed in Marx's active materialism. Human beings are the active producers of all that there is in their social existence, from language to art to science etc. And there is no necessary reason why praxis ought to have an economistic character.

It is, of course, understandable why Marx should have concentrated upon the critique of political economy given the objective determinism exercised over society by the capital system. It is also understandable that Marx, given the domination of capitalist relations and the need to rupture these alienative relations, should turn to the only force capable of challenging capital - the proletariat. There is something slightly misleading about arguing that Marx's reduction of praxis to economics was a result of the influence of political economy and his commitment to the proletarian movement (Kitching 1988:32; Perkins 1993:10/1). Marx's was a critique of political economy as the theoretical expression of an alienated system of production. Marx's class politics was the result of an awareness that the proletariat alone possessed the structural capacity to rupture capital's alienative relations.

The Repudiation of Environmentalism
In recovering the idealist 'kernel' of Marx's Marxism one can define this Marxism as an active materialism that incorporates the active side of subjectivity developed and preserved by idealism. It proposes a materialism which makes a radical break with the old philosophical and Enlightenment materialism. One is entitled, therefore, to challenge the arguments that Marx's materialism is liked inextricably with the concept of the vanguard party. This criticism comes not only from familiar sources (Laclau 1990; Femia 1993) but also from those who would still call themselves Marxists.

Thus Post's attempt to 'regain' Marxism demands a break from Marx's environmentalist and its associated vanguardism.

Consciousness, to the ultimate unease of materialists, is a matter of the mind, and earlier in this essay, in the context of the philosophical, epistemological opening given from Marxism's beginning to the 'vanguard' concept, it was pointed out that the sensationalist psychology inherited by Marx from the Enlightenment was a problem.




The argument presented here hopes to make clear that Marx's materialism is not environmentalist at all, crude or sophisticated. The argument that Marx made the subject a passive object of external material stimuli is the complete reverse of the truth. It was precisely this conception of materialism that Marx's active materialism was consciously designed to overcome. And Marx, conscious of the elitism and authoritarianism implicit in the old materialist determinism the raising of an elite over society as an ideal/superior agency able to 'educate' human beings passively dependent on circumstances - deliberately rooted out all possibilities for vanguardism (Meszaros 1995:675; Smith 1996:37/3). Marx is to be interpreted as a thoroughgoing democratisation of knowledge, politics and power.

The old materialism, which made human beings the passive products of circumstances, possessed conservative and authoritarian implications which Marx was concerned to root out. The old materialism could only account for change by dividing society into two, one part 'superior' to the other. This 'superior' part escapes the general determinism but only by breaking the materialist premise. It is ideal. But with human beings made passively dependent upon circumstances, change is only possible if this 'superior' agency revolutionises circumstances from above. This privileges circumstances as the revolutionary force over human beings. In arguing that the educator must also be educated, Marx identified human beings as the true, active forces determining the historical process. He made human agency itself the revolutionary principle. He rejected the conservatism implicit in the passive Enlightenment position. And he deliberately subverted the theoretico-elitist model.

The Unification of Politics and Philosophy
The conception of revolutionary-critical praxis represents the unification of philosophy and politics. Marx has resolved the problems with which the philosophers grappled into social problems. The resolution of these problems requires a practical process of social transformation; it is not an intellectual process. Marx's conception entails a dialectical synthesis of a series of intellectual, political and social dualisms and separations which characterise bourgeois society - subject and object, theory and practice, the ideal and the material, human agency and social forms, base and superstructure, social being and consciousness, the state and civil society. These pairs are no longer antithetical but are, on the contrary, are integrated within the framework of transformative human praxis (Clarke 1991:57/8).

In this sense, Marx's materialism cannot be interpreted as inverting Hegel's idealism. Marx's real or social dialectic integrated what may be called 'social matter' within the Hegelian concepts of objectification and alienation, creating a thoroughly social or material process leading to human freedom.

One needs to stress at this point the extent to which Marx's breakthrough from philosophy to social reality derived from the experience of the way that the reality of class division ruptured the idea that reason ruled the world and, especially, the experience of the social struggles of the proletariat. Marx observed these struggles, especially in his journalistic work, and determined to make contact with workers and socialists when moving to Paris. Reference to Marxism as a 'philosophy' of praxis or as the 'theory' of working class revolution still imply a detachment from the world of work and struggle.

Marx's breakthrough from philosophy to reality raised the question of mediation. Marx needed to elaborate an emancipatory social theory and needed to specify the social agency which could incorporate this critique into its own transformative praxis. It is in the working class that the revolutionary synthesis of politics and philosophy is affected.

‘The passage from philosophy to reality requires the mediation of men; yet up to this point Marx had spoken only of their consciousness. Clearly the acceptance by men of a given theory is an essential precondition for a transformation, but it is still not the activity that can carry it out. Two questions, then, demanded resolution. First, what type of theory should be accepted and pass then into reality itself. Secondly, it is necessary to say what kind of concrete men can 'make the critique their own and convert it into action, into revolutionary praxis. In the first place, the critique must be radical. In the second, it is the role of the working class to realise philosophy and mediate between it and reality in the light of a given historical situation’ (Vazquez 1977:99/100).

Marx's Marxism is actually in the world and is part of its practical transformation, is a praxis rooted in material developments and oriented towards transforming the existing social world (Kitching 1988:35; McCarney 1980:13; Gouldner 1980:194). For Edgley, Marx's science 'aligns itself with the working class by theoretically supporting the working class movement, as its theoretical mouthpiece actually calling for .. revolutionary “change”’ (Edgley in McLellan ed.1983:290/1). Edgley's language can be criticised. Marx did not and could not make himself nor his Marxism the 'mouthpiece' of the proletarian movement in any simple sense. The nature of the relationship between Marxism and the proletariat is a good deal more reflexive and interactive than this. 'Marx could not simply take over and theoretically justify the opinions of the proletariat, for these are all derived from the ideologically constituted social world and necessarily "vulgar"’ (Parekh 1982:174).

If theory is distilled from practice then the knowledge obtained is also refined and incorporated back into transformative class praxis so as to orient the proletarian movement in its ongoing practical activity. What Marx was most concerned to avoid was the accusation of attempting to mould the proletarian movement according to 'sectarian principles'. It was a problem for him since, whilst upholding the principle of proletarian self-emancipation, he appreciated that he could not make himself and his science merely a theoretical mouthpiece for whatever the proletarian movement of any one time claimed to be its true interest. He was concerned most of all that the proletariat appreciate itself, through its own process of development, what its true interest was.

Hence Marx's concern to emphasise the communists as class conscious workers and hence as internal rather than external to the class movement. It is this class element that makes Edgley worth quoting. Marx's Marxism as a praxis rooted in material conditions and struggles is not simply a theorising of this struggle from a position outside the world, which theory implies. The unity of theory and practice means that Marxism is both at the same time, not merely a theory of the proletariat's class practice.

The unification of philosophy and politics entails a thoroughgoing 'democratisation'. Knowledge of the world was to be achieved through an activist approach that directly connects human beings as agents with their human world. This is distinguished from the passive-contemplative approach in which knowledge is obtained retrospectively from a position outside of the externally conceived world. As such, the view that there are only human beings and the social forms that they create is also a demand, with this activist conception, for these forms to be subjected to the conscious control of the demos, what Marx calls ‘socialised humanity’. The demos is to come forward as the conscious determining force in the historical process and thus establish human beings as the true subjects exercising control over their social existence.

Marx's unification of politics and philosophy represents a decisive shift away from the theoretico-elitist model and towards a democratic conception of human beings as conscious subjects governing their self-made social world. As against the passive and contemplative bourgeois conceptions of politics and philosophy, entailing abstraction and representation that confirms the separation of human beings from the social world, Marx's revolutionary-critical praxis opens up a radical redefinition of philosophy and politics through their unification (McCarney 1980:114; Therborn 1976:65; Gilbert 1981:63; Jameson 1992:334).

It is not a question of Marx extinguishing philosophy, as Femia argues (Femia 1981), but of realising philosophy. Making the social world philosophical means conceiving philosophy practically. Marx is thus repudiating the conception of philosophy as something abstract and as apart from the world. He comes to examine the alienation inherent in social reality which leads to philosophy becoming abstracted from the world in the first place. In a sense, then, Marx does look upon philosophy as an ideal, rational and ethical realm that exists in abstraction as compensation for the alienation of the world as much as it exists as rationalisation of this alienation. The existence of philosophy is a demand for the unphilosophical world to be transformed to conform to reason and morality. But Marx is concerned to reject that philosophy which exists as an impotent 'ought to be' apart from the world (McCarney 1990:112; Norman and Sayers 1980:135 137/8). Such an ‘ought’ is unable to transform the world. Marx, via Hegel, transcends Kantian dualism and instead comes to seek the ideal in the real. But, and this is an important point, this still remains an ideal.
Philosophy is 'utopian' in the sense of conceiving a possible, perfect world beyond the present (Heller 1984). Philosophy could only realise itself by fundamentally transforming the real world. As such philosophy is subversive. Marx, it could be argued, reveals and rejects the rationalising, ideological aspect of philosophy concealing and preserving existing institutionalised relations of power. But he seizes the subversive 'ought to be’ inherent in philosophy and converts philosophy's will to make the world free, rational and ethical into a practical project of social transformation. To the extent that a kernel of idealism is contained in Marxism it lies not in some abstract, rationalising, ultimately totalitarian schema, as Laclau thinks (Laclau 1990) but in this critical and subversive side. Which is another way of arguing that Marx's praxis is principled and contains a normative dimension. Philosophy has yet to attain its goal of a free social world precisely because theory and practice, subject and object - human beings and the human world - have not been united. Thus praxis, as the unification of philosophy and politics, transcends abstract - ideological, rationalising - philosophy and proceeds to locate its values within social reality as ideal possibilities for human agency to actualise.

Philosophy is incorporated into praxis, therefore, in its 'critical' aspect and thus exists as a normative dimension which reveals the ideal in the real, the values, goals and moral objectives which human agents should strive to realise in their practical transformation of the world. Philosophy thus brings a distinctive flavour to this practical project transforming the world.

11 THE INDIVIDUAL AND INDIVIDUALITY

The conception of the individual in Marx's writings is much richer than that expressed by the dominant liberal understanding of the individual. Marx enables us to distinguish between individuality, on the one hand, as the full realisation of human powers and individualism, on the other, as egoistic, monadic and as making the individual 'the plaything of alien powers'.
Perhaps Marxism generally has historically neglected the individual as such. Even worse, the concentration upon attacking 'the individual' of bourgeois society and politics has given the impression that Marxism is anti-individual, a point which liberals have been quite happy to repeat. Marx, Femia argues, denies the moral and ontological ultimacy of the individual (Femia 1993). Marx does indeed deny that the individual is some sovereign, self-contained entity cut off from others. Marx's criticism derives from his argument that the individual is no abstraction outside of society but is the ensemble of social relations (Marx Theses on Feuerbach). Femia interprets this as a social determinism that denies the individual whereas, in truth, Marx was attempting to reach the real individual, in a social context, as opposed to some fictional being existing outside of history and society (Femia 1993). Femia's ‘ultimacy’, pressed to its logical conclusion, consumes the real individual in a pure egoism that not even Stirner - his provocative assertions to the contrary - argued.

What needs to be argued is that there is no opposition for Marx between the individual and society and the fact that 'society’ could indeed become an abstraction opposed to the individual (Marx EW EPM 1975:350) indicates how the instrumental relationships of bourgeois society, with individuals having to use each other as means to private ends, have cut human beings off from the society of others.

Nevertheless, the feeling that Marxism has neglected or, even, denigrated the individual has provoked some theorists working within the Marxist tradition to begin to install the individual as the basic unit of analysis. This is most evident in the methodological individualism of those who have imported into Marxism ideas drawn from 'rational choice' or games theory. Thus, Elster spends the opening section of his attempt to ‘make sense’ of Marx searching for evidence of Marx's methodological individualism and using this to criticise his methodological collectivism (Elster 1985:4). If for nothing else, analytical Marxism may be credited either in making it clear that behind the ‘social’ world and its forms there are individual human actors making choices or for forcing Marxists to more adequately present the individual human actor.

But there are better ways of recovering the individual within Marxism and that, indeed, the rational choice perspective introduces into Marxism that very monadic, abstract conception of the individual that Marx criticised in bourgeois society and thought as antagonistic to the real individual (Forbes 1990:xiii xv; McCarney 1980:90). Marx's analysis of the individual in society constitutes a powerful critique of individualism and maintains a conception of true individuality which contrasts markedly with the individual of bourgeois society (Forbes 1990:xiv). Marx





Individuals are at the centre of Marx's thought, in his historical work, in his critical analysis of capitalism and in his vision of the future. Whilst Marx ‘dispensed with the understanding of the individual that dominated the ideologies of his day, but he did not jettison his interest in an individual existence of a radical kind’. Marx affirmed a developmental view of human nature and therefore of individuality. ‘Far from individuals ceasing to exist with the withering away of the state, he saw a history unfolding where individuals could truly and freely exist.. Moreover, the flowering of human capacities and their individual expression was, for him, the unfolding of that history. Individuals, that is, are the subjects and agents of Marxian historical change’ (Forbes 1990:xix).

Marx thus looks to go beyond the individualism of bourgeois as a denial of individual freedom, of true individuality. The personal independence from feudal ties that bourgeois relations have achieved have been replaced by the objective dependence of all individuals upon capital. Marx looks further than this objective dependency towards a society of freedom based upon new, free individuals living in a true equality (Marx 1973:163/4; Forbes 1990:114).

Marx's Communist Individuality
The recovery of the individual from within the Marxist tradition is long overdue. For Marx upholds a conception of individuality which takes the individual much further than the individualism of bourgeois society and which rests upon the free and full development of each individual (Capital I). Marx's materialist premise, as stated in The German Ideology, pertained to the existence and activity and relations of 'real individuals'. In truth, for Marx there is no antithesis between the individual and society. It is bourgeois relationships and the individualism that these entail that creates this antithesis, separating the individual from other individuals, from society, from their own human powers (Forbes 1990:116 117 118 119 119/20).

What is noticeable in Marx's works, especially The German Ideology and Grundrisse, is the extent to which Marx does indeed refer to and proceed from 'real individuals'. Class, as such, enters the critical analysis as a designation imposed by social relations, a designation that constrains the development of individuality and which is to be abolished for that very reason (Marx and Engels 1999).

With the domination of a narrow conception of the individual in the 1980's and 1990's, both in. politics and society and also in intellectual fashion, it is perhaps worthwhile considering Marx's introductory comments in the Grundrisse.

Individuals producing in society .. is of course the point of departure. The individual and isolated hunter and fisherman, with whom Smith and Ricardo begin, belongs among the unimaginative conceits of the eighteenth century Robinsonades.. It is .. the anticipation of 'civil society’. In this society of free competition, the individual appears detached from the natural bonds etc. which in earlier historical periods make him the accessory of a definite and limited human conglomerate. Smith and Ricardo still stand with both feet on the shoulders of the eighteenth century prophets, in whose imaginations this eighteenth century individual - the product on one side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of society, on the other side of the new forces of production developed since the sixteenth century - appears as an ideal, whose existence they project into the past.. As the Natural Individual appropriate to their notion of human nature, not arising historically, but posited by nature. This illusion has been common to each new epoch to this day.




Marx succeeds in the Grundrisse in destroying that abstract individualism which the rational choice theorists are now attempting to import into Marxism (Forbes 1990:221).

Marx is arguing that the individual is a social being but he is also arguing more. The isolated individual capable only of a monadic freedom develops with, 'civil society’. It is this 'civil society', with its instrumental relationships and its individualism, that Marx is concerned to criticise as inimical to the freedom of individuals (EPM). In the Grundrisse, Marx argues at length that the individual has been emancipated from ties of personal dependence under the feudal system only to become subjected to the 'objective dependency' of all under the capital system (Marx 1973:163/5). This objective dependency is perfectly compatible with the individualism which bourgeois theorists equate with the freedom, of the individual. Marx is exposing the illusory nature of this freedom and hence demanding a real freedom of the individual.

The dominant conception of rationally choosing, self-centred, self-contained individuals prevalent in contemporary politics, society and social science - even entering within Marxism - is to be understood as the further life of the isolated individuals of 'civil society'. It is, in Marx's understanding, an impoverished conception of the individual and, not coincidentally, it has been associated with the impoverishment, materially and culturally, of the 'societies' which have cultivated such an individual (McLellan in Forbes 1990:xi).

Marx Radicalises the Bourgeois Individual
The recovery of the richer conception of the individual from within Marx's work is timely, as well as highly subversive. For Marx offers a way of challenging bourgeois society and its politics and ideas on its chosen ground, that of the individual and individual freedom. Marx does not denigrate the idea of the individual or the process of individual emancipation; instead, he radicalises it (Miller 1982:13/4). 

Far from subsuming the individual under some homogeneous species being or under class identity, Marx looks to dissolve external designations imposed by social relations and the division of labour so that the individual could indeed emerge as a free, autonomous being in a self-determining social context. Sartre is correct to note the existential character of Marx's core concepts of alienation and fetishism (Sartre 1968). The demand that human beings reappropriate and reorganise their powers is predicated upon the assumption that, ultimately, there are only real individuals and the social forms that they create (Meszaros 1995:18 835; Meikle 1985:45/6).

Meszaros rightly points out that Marx's critique of the state is not simply concerned with the determination of a specific form of class rule - the capitalist - but with something much more fundamental: 'the full emancipation of the social individual' (Meszaros 1995:908). Meszaros gives a quote from The German Ideology: ‘the proletarians, if they are to assert themselves as individuals, have to abolish the hitherto prevailing condition of their existence (which has, moreover, been that of all society up to then) ,namely, labour. Thus they find themselves directly opposed to the form in which, hitherto, the individuals, of which society consists, have given themselves collective expression, that is, the State. In order, therefore, to assert themselves as individuals, they must overthrow the state’.

Meszaros comments: ‘Try and remove the concept of “individuals” from this reasoning, and the whole enterprise becomes meaningless. For the need to abolish the State arises because the individuals cannot “assert themselves as individuals”, and not simply because one class is dominated by another’ (Meszaros 1995:908).

It is thus possible to challenge liberal social thought on its own principal value - the individual and individual autonomy. Just how autonomous is the individual in bourgeois society? Marx shows that human beings cannot affirm themselves as free individuals in this society. The central institutions of liberal society contradict the core liberal value. One or the other has to go. In the name of individual freedom, Marx therefore demands the destruction of social institutions which restrict and deny true individuality.

Marx effectively forces the liberal to choose between liberal institutions - private property and the constitutional state - and the main liberal value - autonomy. The realisation that autonomy is not fostered to the extent claimed by liberal social theory forces those who affirm this value to consider an alternative social order. How many liberals are inclined to consider that the asymmetrical relations of power and resources are class structured and are effective blocks to the development of the universal citizenship and to autonomy? This is the question that Marx is forcing upon the liberals. It may be a question that liberals prefer not to answer. Lindley considers that, ultimately, rather than abandon the liberal institutions which preserve class inequalities, liberals would come to question the value of autonomy itself.





What Marx does, then, is demonstrate the social conditions required for the realisation of the liberal value of autonomy. The problem that Marx poses for liberals is that he shows that the realisation of the central value of liberalism requires the destruction of liberal institutions in so far as these protect material class inequalities. With a contemporary neo-conservatism protecting these very inequalities in the name of individual freedom, it might be suggested that the development of Marx's critique of liberal society and thought in this aspect is long since overdue.

Human beings, individuals, are to consciously control the social forms. This, the realm of freedom, overthrows the 'objective dependency' of individuals upon capital and thus completes the process of individual emancipation begun under bourgeois civil society.

The libertarian and emancipatory character of Marx's argument, in short, puts the accent upon real individuals. And it needs to be set in the context of Marx's critique of alienation. One needs to be clear that alienation entails the loss of the humanity of each individual. The abolition of alienation is thus the recovery of one’s humanity.










In short, there are far richer and far more radical means of developing the individual within Marxism than the analytical Marxists have been prepared to entertain. Marx's entire project can be interpreted as an attempt to assert individuality against individualism (Thomas 1985:25/7) and a developmental conception of human potentiality and growth runs right through from the 'philosophical' Marx calling for self-realisation (Marx EPM), the scientific Marx proceeding from 'real individuals' in their material relations (Clarke 1991:57) to the political Marx calling for the association in which the freedom of each is a condition of the freedom of all (Manifesto) and to the mature Marx calling for the free and full development of each individual (Capital).

It is in this developmental theme that a far richer concept of individual freedom as individuality is available. Indeed, taking up Femia's challenge on the moral and ontological ultimacy of the individual, it is arguable that Marx is doing much more than affirm the social nature of the individual and of individuality. Rather, as Forbes makes clear, Marx's end is the 'free individual'. If there are only human beings and the social forms they engender, then the demand for human beings, as individuals, to subordinate these social forms to their conscious control certainly implies that human beings are capable enough to dissolve all social institutions blocking or constraining their freedom. The evidence is that, ultimately, under full blown communism, human beings would be self-governing and self-regulating in this way (Forbes 1990:167/8; 176; 185ff; 192; 213/6; 232/7).

Post asks why Marxism should assign importance to the individual. He argues:





Western Marxism has been attempting to develop a view of the individual and of individuality which, one may argue, is far richer than that of the rational choice Marxists. There are better ways, from within Marx's own work, of addressing the individual and individuality than that of the analytical Marxists, whose approach risks degenerating into emptiness (Howard and King vol II 1992:351).

It is important for Marxism to give prominence to the individual precisely because the freedom of real individuals is the end of Marx's emancipatory project. The whole point of the victory of the proletariat in the class struggle is to facilitate the dissolution of the proletariat as a class and of class division generally. A crucial consideration is that locating the individual within Marx's argument enables us to, hopefully, undercut that debate between socialism and liberalism which is showing clear signs of degenerating into sterility and stereotype.

It could be argued that the prominence of the individual in Marx's emancipatory project could come to displace some traditional nostrums concerning class, the priority of the social, the public realm and collective action. Certainly, locating Marx's communism within the process of individual emancipation redefines revolutionary politics in such a way as to leave the explicitly collectivist traditions of Social Democracy and Communism far behind. Marxism is developed on its libertarian side. One is certainly justified in scrutinising Marx's approach to emancipation of the individual within the modern political and civil realms so as to reveal that Marx did not denigrate individual emancipation but, instead, demanded the completion of the process.

Marx, therefore, engages in a positive critique of the bourgeois individual, as revealed through the rights instituted by the political state and through the activities within market society. One can explore Marx's relation to liberalism and stress how he conceived his project as that of transcending rather than rejecting political liberalism. Transcending something implies the retention or preservation of something contained in that being transcended.

One needs to present the argument in an historical context. The existence of individualism as an oppositional ideology under the feudal society shows the emergence of bourgeois market society and capitalist social relations. In this process the individual was emancipated from ties of personal dependence but, formally free in a market society, came to involve the individual in ties of impersonal dependence.

 Individualism was thus perfectly compatible with the objective dependency of all upon capital (Marx 1973:163/5). Human beings came to be entangled in instrumental relationships in which each treats others as mere means to private ends with the result that all become the playthings of alien powers (Marx EW EPM 1975:220).

Gould argues that for Marx the fundamental entities that compose society are individuals in these social relations and that ‘these individuals become fully social and fully able to realize human possibilities in the course of a historical development’ (Gould 1978:1). From Gould's work one extracts a schema that characterises Marx's view of this historical development. In the first stage, one has personal dependence in community; in the second stage, one has the personal dependence of individuals combined with the objective dependency of these individuals in a society of individualism and external sociality; thirdly and finally one has free social individuality under communism (Gould 1978:4/5). 

The reduction of the process of individual emancipation to the individualism of the second stage is precisely what Marx is concerned to criticise in favour of the richer conception of individuality in the third stage. One can develop Marx’s notion of individuals becoming playthings of alien powers further to show how individuals are subjected to an abstracted, institutional and systemic world which imposes identities upon individuals and exercises an alien control over these individuals. Marx can, therefore, be presented as conceptualising and critiquing the capital system as systematically denying and destroying the autonomy of the individual.

Such, indeed, is the logic of arguing that human beings, the true subjects creating the social world, come to alienate their powers and have them turned against them as alien powers. Alienation both furthers and blocks the process of individual emancipation and it is as such that it is central to Marxism as an emancipatory project. Apart from anything else, the origin of Weber's 'iron cage', Adorno's 'administered society' and Foucault's 'panopticon society' are to be sought in the capital system as an alienated system of production which denies individuality (Clarke 1991:288/9). As a result, the sovereign individual that emerges in the process of individual emancipation in its bourgeois phase is a paradoxical character (Abercrombie et al 1986 in Turner 1991:65).

The capital system, resting upon the alienation of the conscious life activity of human beings, is predicated upon both the development and the dehumanisation of the individual in society. The progress of the capital system increasingly exacerbates the conflict between the development of all sided individuality that the process of individual emancipation entails and the possibility of subjecting these developing faculties to control. As individuality becomes ever richer, so does the development of individuality come to promise the realisation of fundamental human nature. This realisation, however, could not occur under the capital system given its dependence upon alienated labour (Clarke 1991; Forbes 1990:119/20).

The individuality that Marx proposes in contradistinction to individualism is not merely a critical reaction to the inadequacies of bourgeois society. More than this it is a practical exploration of human potentialities. For Marx, human beings are in a constant process of becoming, as they create and re-create the wealth of, their society and create themselves in the process. Individuals thus become what their continuous transformation of society allows them the freedom to become.


The social and historical foundations of the process of individual emancipation mean that Marx's individuality can also be presented as a projection of possibilities inherent in modern society under capital rule. This may be expressed in a number of forms, depending upon the ways that individuals create themselves and articulate their existence. Critically, needs are experienced by individuals as human rather than as the wants of the individual conceived as a private, isolated being. Most important of all, Marx viewed individuality as pertaining to the free, not merely the social, individual (Forbes 1990:236). Simply restoring the links between individual and society, which bourgeois relations had torn asunder in making relationships external and abstract to the individual, does not grasp the radical and emancipatory nature of Marx's argument. Individuality, for Marx, refers to the free and full development of each individual. This all round development emerges as the major principle of his view of individuality, and the one criterion upon which society and its forms could be evaluated.

This theme of individuality represents a normative ideal and a political project in Marx's conception of praxis unifying human beings with the world.





Marx explores the material conditions for arguing for the transition to communism as an historical possibility. For individuality, the free individual, is already in the process of emerging through the material development of human history. Before it is objectively and fully realised under communism, free individuality must already exist as an immanent potentiality. It is this potentiality that Marx is concerned to root his communism in.

The Free Individual
A comment should be made on Marx's approach to wealth. Marx's communism is not defined by the social ownership of this wealth but is beyond the possessive approach that ownership entails. Wealth is a human concept for Marx. Thus the degree of individuality and the character of its expression is related to wealth. For Marx, wealth comprises individuality. Wealth is the affirmation and expression of essential human powers which Marx saw as the end of human social existence, and it was as the mode of production capable of realising free individuality that Marx presented communism (Avineri 1968:64 89; Forbes 1990:207/8; Mandel 1968:678/9).

The free individual, therefore, is a constantly changing human product. Human beings as free individuals are constantly transcending themselves in the process of realising and developing their individuality (Grundmann in Pepper 1992:128/9). They are no longer in a struggle against themselves. Thus communism is the genuine resolution of the conflict between individual and species (EW EPM 1975:348). 

It is because communism is a genuine resolution of the various dualisms that have characterised historical development - between essence and existence, man and man, man and nature, objectification and self-affirmation - that society is no longer established 'as an abstraction over against the individual. The individual is the social being' (Marx EW EPM 1975:350). Indeed, with the free individual there can be no society which is over against individuals as an abstraction, just as there can be no abstraction of self and human nature. Given this interpretation no individual can be regarded as a being completely determined by 'society', subsumed under a collectivised existence as Femia suggests as Marx's position (Femia 1993).

This position has implications in determining the nature of socialist politics as an emancipatory project. Thus it is not that collectivity created by capitalist relations, the proletariat, that contains the potential for free individuality under communism, but the development of a new individuality which comes to be articulated with equal confidence in both communalist and individualist aspects.

Moreover, the power to exercise free individuality comes to establish the grounds for the continuous development of this individuality, until eventually the future society no longer presents any obstacles in the way of the free and full expression of individuality.

Free individuality, therefore, can be properly presented as the central theme defining Marxism as an emancipatory project. Marx's fundamental premise pertains to the existence of real individuals in their material activities (Marx, The German Ideology), and the relevance of this premise to the critique of the condition of the individual under different modes of production, especially the capital system as an alienated system of production.

The Critique of the Liberal Conception
A popular view, and one surprisingly well represented amongst scholars too (Femia 1993; Merquior 1986:56), is that Marx had little to say about the individual and that what little he did say made the individual a mere product of social relations. Contrary to this view, there are constant references to the real, the free and the social individual throughout Marx's work. Marx constantly refers to individuals rather than generally to ‘people’ or ‘the people’ (Miller 1982; Meszaros 1995:908) and, more than this, he is concerned with completing the process of individual emancipation in the communist society. It is necessary to point out the many angles from which Marx approached the question of the individual and individual freedom: 'as a real, producing and reproducing individual; as ideological construct, i.e. role bearer; as historical subject; as part of a change process, i.e. revolutionary agent; as a member of a class; as an exemplar of a theoretical dispute between Marx and 'individualist’ thinkers; as an expression of human nature under given conditions; as an expression of human nature viewed from the long historical perspective' (Forbes 1990:236).

One should remember from where Marx developed his argument. Against the abstractions proposed in Hegel's political philosophy, which in turn represent abstractions in the social world, Marx sought to recover the human subject (Avineri 1963:27). It is a project of democratisation in the sense that Marx is seeking to trace social forms back to the demos and, moreover, is looking to make the demos an active force governing these social forms instead of being governed by them. Thus Marx describes democracy as 'the essence of all political constitutions', of socialised man (EW CUDS 1975:88). Marx seeks to found the political constitution on its true ground: 'the demos as a whole’, 'real human beings and the real people; not merely implicitly and in essence, but in existence and reality’ (Marx CHDS 1975:87). It is thus plain that the materialist premise that Marx defines in The German Ideology derives from Marx's own critique of political alienation. It is a critique that developed, in time, to a critique of the capital system and of alienated labour as the alienation of the conscious life activity of human beings. There are only the individuals constituting the demos and the social forms they create. Marx is arguing that these forms be subordinated to the conscious common control of individuals (Marx The German Ideology 1999).

Human individuality can be developed to such an extent that it becomes a consciously determining force able to abolish those social forms preventing the full realisation of human capacities and abilities.

There are, then, strong grounds for arguing that Marx's Marxism is inherently a libertarian project concerned with individual freedom. One needs not look outside of Marxism for the theoretical means to emphasise the importance of the individual; the resources are available within Marxism and, indeed, constitute the central theme of Marx's argument. Frankly, this libertarian concern with real individuals, social control exercised by real individuals, the realisation of free individuality, the reduction of social forms to individuals as self-conscious, self-determining actors, has not received the prominence that it merits. Marxists could even be accused of fetishizing their own concepts, failing to perceive the liberatory goal that lay behind the conceptual apparatus.

The view that Marx virtually extirpates the individual is to be decisively rejected. There is room for debate as to whether Marx denied the moral and ontological ultimacy or primacy of the individual (Femia 1993). Marx certainly did deny the idea of the individual as an abstraction outside of society and history. The ultimate and prime individual, if one follows the logic of Femia's assault on Marx's determinism, is utterly lacking in content. One is reminded of Royden Harrison's comment here on this abstract individual: sexless, raceless, classless, the great bourgeois nothing.

But it can be accepted that there has been a tradition within Marxism - perhaps even the dominant one - that has denigrated the individual as a bourgeois conception. Marxism has conceded possibly its greatest asset, the real individual, to its political and theoretical opponents.

The view I am developing here directly challenges the conventional view that Marx is antithetical to the individual and to individual freedom. He certainly formulates the question - and the process leading to individual freedom - differently to liberal-individualism. But Marx's criticism is that liberal-individualism rationalises the capital system which itself systemically denies individual freedom. Marx's repudiation of liberal-individualism contains a commitment to free individuality as a determining and creative force in history.

The argument that Marx looks to recover the human subject also challenges those interpretations of Marxism as a scientific enterprise which views history as a subjectless process. History has subjects and Marx is looking to recover them. And it is to call for a more nuanced presentation of Marx's class politics.

It challenges those interpretations of Marxism which proceed from the existence of classes over above individuals. Here class forms the real basis for Marxist politics. But can Marxism be a truly emancipatory process if it only relates to class existence? In The German Ideology Marx makes his argument quite explicit on this issue. Class is a designation imposed upon individuals by prevailing social relations and is to be abolished as a denial of individual freedom. There is no denial here about the centrality of the class struggle in what is a class divided society. No devaluation of the class struggle in favour of some classless 'true socialist’ humanism is implied. Rather, it is an attempt to underline that Marx's class politics are oriented towards the dissolution of class so as to enable individual freedom.

'Society' can come to appear and be experienced as a 'single subject', ‘an abstraction vis a vis the individual', as an entity which accomplishes the mystery of generating itself (General Introduction to the Grundrisse; EPM; The German Ideology). But this does not mean that individual freedom is to be defined against society, in some private and monadic sense.

This may be the view of liberal individualism. Marx, however, is concerned to relate the creation of society as an abstraction over against the individual to estrangement, to alienated labour, the instrumental relationships of bourgeois society, and to the separation of human beings from each other and hence from their communal essence (Marx OJQ). Thus, whilst human beings have been ‘emancipated from ties of personal dependence, the very material grounds of this emancipation - capitalist social relations and its hierarchical division of labour - is at the same time the root of a systemic objective dependency’ (Marx 1973:165) in which social relations which impose an identity and a 'fixity' (The German Ideology) of occupation upon individuals have escaped human control and obtained an independence in themselves.

This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now. The social power, i.e., the multiplied productive force, which arises through the co-operation of different individuals as it is determined by the division of labour, appears to these individuals, since their co-operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus cannot control, which on the contrary passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and the action of man, nay even being the prime governor of these. 

Marx GI 1999 ch 1.

For Marx, this makes the personal independence which the liberal bourgeois conception equates with freedom ‘merely imaginary’, 'merely an illusion' (Marx Grundrisse). This passage makes clear the distinction between bourgeois individualism, as the negation of the human ontology within an objective dependency, and Marx’s free social individuality through control of social relations:

In the money relation, in the developed system of exchange (and this semblance seduces the democrats), the ties of personal dependence, of distinctions of blood, education, etc. are in fact exploded, ripped up (at least, personal ties all appear as personal relations); and individuals seem independent (this is an independence which is at bottom merely an illusion, and it is more correctly called indifference), free to collide with one another and to engage in exchange within this freedom; but they appear thus only for someone who abstracts from the conditions, the conditions of existence within which these individuals enter into contact (and these conditions, in turn, are independent of the individuals and, although created by society, appear as if they were natural conditions, not controllable by individuals). The definedness of individuals, which in the former case appears as a personal restriction of the individual by another, appears in the latter case as developed into an objective restriction of the individual by relations independent of him and sufficient unto themselves. (Since the single individual cannot strip away his personal definition, but may very well overcome and master external relations, his freedom seems to be greater in case 2. A closer examination of these external relations, these conditions, shows, however, that it is impossible for the individuals of a class etc. to overcome them en masse without destroying them. A particular individual may by chance get on top of these relations, but the mass of those under their rule cannot, since their mere existence expresses subordination, the necessary subordination of the mass of individuals.) These external relations are very far from being an abolition of 'relations of dependence'; they are rather the dissolution of these relations into a general form; they are merely the elaboration and emergence of the general foundation of the relations of personal dependence. Here also individuals come into connection with one another only in determined ways. These objective dependency relations also appear, in antithesis to those of personal dependence (the objective dependency relation is nothing more than social relations which have become independent and now enter into opposition to the seemingly independent individuals; i.e. the reciprocal relations of production separated from and autonomous of individuals) in such a way that individuals are now ruled by abstractions, whereas earlier they depended on one another. The abstraction, or idea, however, is nothing more than the theoretical expression of those material relations which are their lord and master.

Marx Gr 1973: 165 

So consistent and thorough is Marx's critique of the liberal bourgeois conception and the individual under bourgeois society that it is understood how easily, though facilely, it can be argued that Marx denigrated individual freedom. In On the Jewish Question, however, Marx clearly affirms bourgeois emancipation as an advance presaging further advance. Marx did not denigrate individual freedom and political and civil rights, he criticised them. And this criticism was oriented towards taking the process of individual emancipation further. Only by acknowledging political and civil individualism as an emancipation could Marx make the criticisms of bourgeois society that he does (Turner 1991:65).

The task is to examine Marx's critique of political emancipation in such a way as to indicate how Marx sought to realise the universalistic character of citizenship through human emancipation. Communism is not anti-democratic but post-liberal democracy and assumes the fullest development of emancipation within the abstraction of the political state. Marx thus seeks the transcendence and not the repudiation of political emancipation. The point that his criticism is concerned to make is that the 'abstract individual' whose political and civil rights liberal-individualism celebrates as freedom is the representation of a subject who exists not in real society but in the abstract realm of the state (Turner 1991:66).

Marx is to be credited with having formulated a conception of the human being as a real individual developing and, indeed, self-developing in history through their practical transformation of their social world. Marx has overcome the old materialism which made human beings react to sensations. He has also overcome the old idealism which would, in Kantian manner, impose a categorical imperative as an impotent moral ought. Instead, Marx has developed an active materialism driven by the material mediations of labour and its forms.

The Realm of Freedom
Marx refers to the reduction of necessary labour and hence the corresponding increase in free time at the disposal of human beings as enabling human beings to develop freely and fully as individuals in the realm of freedom (Capital I Meszaros 1995:835). By the ‘realm of freedom’, Marx means a free society in which, as distinct from the realm of necessity, the greatest possible amount of time is brought under the control of each individual as control over their life. The freedom of individuals is thus defined in contradistinction to their enslavement as individuals under the realm of necessity. Freedom thus means the overcoming of the artificial, objective necessity of the capital system. The material condition for freedom is the ability to reduce the time expended upon necessary labour. This reduction creates free time for the individual. Human self-determination thus involves the possibility for individuals to control and use time for their self-development as individuals apart from necessary labour.
The emphasis upon free individuality represents a shift within the dominant perspectives of Marxism and, moreover, is a break with the collectivist modes of thought and organisation in socialism generally. These perspectives came to stress the collectivist aspects of life to the virtual exclusion of the individualist character of existence. Such a stress carried with it obvious tendencies to establish ‘society’ again as an abstraction over against the individual. From the perspective of contemporary political developments, it is significant that the reaction against socialism towards a privatising conservatism could be propagated in terms of the freedom of the individual. Theoretically and politically socialism somewhere lost the individual and lost Marx's premise of proceeding from ‘real individuals’. In the attempt to overcome bourgeois individualism and its deleterious social consequences, the stick could be bent too far back. The repositioning of Marxism within the historical process of individual emancipation offers a way past the impasse into which socialism has fallen. And central to this repositioning is Marx's idea of free individuality as the end of the historical process. Marx's argument is that this free individuality can only be attained under communism. 

It is no exaggeration to argue that some dominant positions within Marxism have viewed the individual as an obstacle to the creation of a socialist society. One may quote Stalin for the clearest instance of how far Marxism lost touch with the individual and with individuality.





For Marx, however, free individuality is the highest stage of communism, its very content and raison d'etre. It is important, therefore, to reinstate the individual and the process of individual emancipation as integral to Marx's emancipatory project and as part of the humanist, normative dimension of this project.

It is when faced with the moral wasteland of the totalitarian realisations of Marxism that one needs to recover the individual and insist that the universal cannot be realised without the individual (Kearney 1986:235). And it needs also to be demonstrated that Marx's communist ideal in no way implies the subordination of the individual to the collective or to some homogeneous species being. 

As Kolakowski points out:





Marx's communism resolves the dichotomy between individual and society. The freedom of the individual is possible only through social relations enabling the individual to relate fully and freely to other individuals constituting the social group (Marcovic 1990).

For the free and full development of the powers of the individual, in various directions, through the development of the productive powers (Cohen 1990) was the very purpose inscribed at the heart of Marx's emancipatory project. This free and full development of each and all actually is human emancipation in general. It is when one actually determines to present free individuality as the end of Marx’s project that one can understand why Marx does reject the liberal bourgeois conception of the individual. Beginning with the critique of liberal individualism can encourage the false impression that Marx is anti-individual, especially given the domination of liberal conceptions which equate individual freedom with bourgeois society.

Marx's emancipatory project patently is not exhausted by the development of the productive forces and their conscious socialisation. This development of the productive forces is thus the development of the productive potential of society for the displacement of time away from necessity and towards freedom. The development of the productive forces establishes, therefore, the material conditions for human enrichment, wealth.





As to the material conditions, one can refer to Marx's view that the more that human beings know and control 'the more remote natural consequences of production, the more will they not only feel, but also know themselves to be one with nature' (Capital III 812).

This entire argument requires the fullest elaboration. Of concern here are the implications of the centrality of individual emancipation and free individuality within Marxism as an emancipatory project. The points made here are intended to indicate why, given the history of Marxism, given the need to rejuvenate socialism, and given the ease with which the individual has been appropriated for reactionary political projects, there is a need to make good the loss of the individual. The call to rejuvenate Marxism is an old one. But, in so far as regaining or reinventing or reconstituting Marxism is thought important, one may suggest no better starting point than the strong theme of the emancipation of real individuals and the commitment to free individuality that runs right throughout Marx. This recovery of the individual and of the process of individual emancipation puts Marxism back on the right track.

A quote from Lukacs forms an apposite conclusion:

















My intention in this chapter is to develop the critical and emancipatory aspect of Marx's thought by going back to the Hegelian origins of Marx's project. True, Marx subjected Hegel to a vigorous and, in places, painstaking critique. But Marx did not so much repudiate Hegel as critically assimilate his perspectives (Meikle 1985:40/5). There has, therefore, been an Hegelian dimension to Marxism which Marxists have continually sought to recover. The 'return to Hegel' undertaken by the likes of Lukacs, Korsch, Gramsci and others was both a reaction to the naturalism and positivism of the Second International (Callinicos 1985:72/3) and an attempt to develop a creative Marxism with an active role for human agency.

Lukacs explicitly attacked the orthodox model of socialism as 'economist' and instead proposed an Hegelian-humanist version of the realisation of the socialist society. Socialism thus emerges in Lukacs as a process of self-education in which human beings come to know the world as their own world. Lukacs is clearly influenced in his view by Hegel and his Phenomenology of Mind. Here Hegel depicts the process whereby consciousness becomes self-consciousness and hence self-determination. It is the progress of reason to the consciousness of freedom. As reason comes to know the world and its own capacities, by reflecting upon its previous creative activity in shaping the world, it achieves freedom as self-determination.

Lukacs translates this philosophical project into a social one, which, it may be argued, is precisely what Marx did (Perkins 1993). For Lukacs, socialism is this end of the progress of consciousness to freedom. Human beings in society become self-determining by a process of self-education which reveals the world to be a human product. The productive life of society is put under the conscious control of society.

By approaching the questions in this way one comes to appreciate the Hegelian underpinnings of Marx's argument. Thus, the argument for the productive life of the community to be put under a rational plan, which Marx made in two places in Capital I, is not an economic programme for a command economy, as some economists have understood it, but is very much in line with this progress of consciousness, human beings in society, to self-determination. 

The Naturalism and Positivism of Orthodoxy
The Hegelian Marxism developed by Lukacs, Gramsci and Korsch represented the attempt to develop an innovative, creative Marxism that rediscovered the emancipatory goal of Marxism within an active political project for changing the world. As such its target was the orthodox Marxism codified during the Second International. This orthodoxy was criticised for introducing naturalism and positivism into Marxism, coming to treat History as an external process governed by its own laws.

This fatalism before the autonomy of history could clearly rationalise the refusal of the parties of the International to engage in revolutionary political activity. Long before the International fell as a result of the crisis of 1914, its passivity had been clear to working class militants. In the industrial struggles occurring from 1909 to the outbreak of the war, the Second International played no positive role. The industrial unionists and the revolutionary syndicalists, moreover, were explicit in their reaction against the political party as a bourgeois form characterised by a passive, bourgeois practice (Brown Introduction to The Industrial Syndicalist 1974; Jennings 1990).

'Orthodoxy’, with its positivism and naturalism, passed the responsibility for the attainment of socialism to the laws of history. This positivism and naturalism failed to affirm the active, constitutive power of human agency in creating the social world - the world of history, society and culture - and hence could not understand the positive role for transformative human praxis in shaping the world. Instead, the social world was conceived as something objective, external to human beings and operating according to laws of its own - which is precisely the condition of alienation. The social world was thus accepted as a finished reality, a 'second nature' whose 'objective’ laws and processes are to be studied in the manner of the natural scientist. That the positivism of orthodoxy fitted the passive, contemplative politics of the political parties of the Second International is sufficient explanation as to why this version of Marxism gained such a hold as opposed to other Marxisms which were available. In other words, the recovery of critical and emancipatory themes would still not be enough to recover Marxism unless accompanied by revolutionary politics on the part of the proletarian movement.

The Hegelian Marxists repudiated this positivism and naturalism within Marxism and sought to develop the critical and emancipatory character of Marxism by going back to Marx and Hegel. They thus came to assign primacy to Hegelian themes, to consciousness, subjectivity, critique. As Marxists, they naturally did not adopt the position of Hegel's philosopher, obtaining knowledge post-festum, from a position outside of the world. They did not refer to the absolute spirit progressing to self-consciousness but instead to the human subject, society and social practices transforming the world.

Basic to the conception of the Hegelian Marxists was the affirmation of the unity of subject and object. This unity would, as in Marx's initial breakthrough in 1843/4, remove the gap between philosophy/philosophers and the world, overcome the dualism of the state and civil society, the economic and the political, and establish the dialectical unity of theory and practice. This would resolve all previous dualisms which separated human beings from their world, the condition of alienation, in a revolutionary synthesis that achieved reconciliation. Hence Korsch could refer to 'the coincidence of consciousness and reality’ (Callinicos 1985:72/3). This 'coincidence’ is made possible by the affirmation of the unity of subject and object in a social reality shaped by human agency in interaction with the given environment.

In the Theses on Feuerbach, Marx had criticised the old philosophical materialism for its epistemological determinism. He had also noted the conservative and authoritarian consequences of this determinism, the reduction of human beings to a condition of dependence upon circumstances and upon those, an elite, who can somehow raise themselves above the general determinism at an ideal level.

Idealism, Marx argued, had developed the active and practical side of subjectivity, as against the old philosophical materialism. That it had done so only on the abstract plain of a transcendental subjectivity meant that the task before Marx was to determine the historical, material embodiment of this idea of active subjectivity posited by idealist philosophy.





Marx and the Proletariat

The question of Marx’s relation to idealism is a delicate one. For in acknowledging, and positively evaluating, the debt that Marx owed to idealism there is a risk of playing into the hands of the critics of Marxism. For it has been argued that Marx did not so much transcend idealism as appropriate its idea of active subjectivity and assign it to 'the proletariat'. The proletariat, then, as much as Hegel's spirit, comes forward as an idealist category imposed upon history. Marx, in other words, is not as materialist as Marxists would like to think. Such a view, presented by Laclau and Mouffe amongst others (Post 1996:14/5), fails to appreciate that Marx was critically appropriating the active side developed and preserved by idealism in order to affirm the creativity of human agency on a materialist base (Post 1996:15).















What needs to be argued is that Marx began to make contact with proletarians in 1843, keenly observed their practices, and incorporated the experiences of their struggles into his critical perspectives. As McLellan argues, Marx's conception of the proletariat developed through an historical understanding of the modern world and through the contacts he made in Paris in 1843, whatever the Young Hegelian language (McLellan 1970:202/3).





This is sufficient to dismiss Tucker's argument that the only proletarians that Marx knew existed in books (Tucker 1961:114) and that Marx's depiction of the proletariat derives from the conservative Lorenz von Stein's Der Sozialismus und Kommunismus (1961:114-6). But one should be careful of denying too much. Marx's conception of the proletariat is not empirical, although it does proceed from the experiences and practices of the working class in its material reality. Avineri too dismisses the idea that Marx's proletariat is one taken from a book (Avineri 1968:53/4). But Avineri also argues that 'the proletariat, for Marx, is not just an historical phenomenon: its suffering and dehumanisation are, according to Marx, a paradigm for the human condition at large. It is not the proletarians' concrete conditions of life but their relation to an anthropological determination of man which primarily interest Marx’ (Avineri 1968:52). This may be described as the 'principle of the proletariat’.

Marx's concern, first and foremost, therefore, remains that of human emancipation in general. It is from this emancipatory commitment that Marx evaluated the proletariat and the process of proletarian self-emancipation. There is a point or a principle to the triumph of the proletariat in the class struggle. Through its emancipation, the proletariat is dissolved into a self-determining humanity. Hence the importance of understanding Marx's designation of the proletariat as the universal class, the class of concrete labour whose emancipation would achieve human emancipation in general (Geras 1986:42/4; Smith 1996:94; Miller1982:73 169 170 173 206 219 228). 

Marx, then, proceeds from material reality and the social practices of the real proletariat but also possesses an overall emancipatory perspective which makes sense of this real movement. The class struggle is, therefore, no mere power struggle but is linked to human emancipation as the end of history. The task is to incorporate this principle of the proletariat into the real movement of the class in such a way as to avoid accusations of or slippage into idealism.

The Materialist Premises
Incorporating principle into practice means reinstating Marx's materialist premises, as spelled out in The German Ideology, outlined in the Theses on Feuerbach but already being set out in the Paris Manuscripts. Praxis is the key category of this active materialism that overcomes both philosophical materialism and idealism. ‘The Hegelian deformations of Marxism and the mechanistic, scientistic or neopositivist interpretations of Marx's work are equally guilty of misrepresenting the true sense of praxis as the actual, objective material activity of men who are practical, social, beings in and through praxis’ (Vazquez 1977:3). 

From the perspective of Hegelian Marxism, one should be careful not to repudiate a vulgar, objectivist materialism only to embrace the notion that it is ideas alone that change or shape the world. Ernest Bloch's Hegelian Marxism, for instance, came to reinstate the Utopian thought that Marx had been concerned to eject from the socialist movement. Perhaps there is a role for 'Utopian' thinking, in creating a basis for action, a reason to act, ideals to act for (Goldman in Coleman and O Sullivan ed. 1990:9/13). Bloch's theology of hope argued that there was an interaction between idealism and material activity in producing history. This is uncontroversial enough. Marx's Marxism can indeed be considered in terms of the dialectic between objective potentialities inherent in the social structure and subjective possibilities as appreciated by conscious human agency (Kearney 1986).

The problems begin when a concentration upon the subjective factor begins to neglect the objective reality in which human agency is active. Here the danger of idealism is apparent as socialism comes to be disembodied. The idealist thus comes to assert will and consciousness over material reality whereas Marx's intention was to locate human agency within this reality as structurally capable of transforming this reality. It is probably on account of this danger that the more 'scientifically’ inclined Marxists have been somewhat sceptical of the Hegelians (McQuarrie ed. 1978 5/6). McQuarrie debates the points eloquently. He notes the strength and the importance of the work of those who have sought to recover the Hegelian link (Fromm 1961; McLellan 1969, 1970; Schmidt 1971; O Neill 1972; Meszaros 1970; Petrovic 1967; Ollman 1971; Goldmann 1969; Avineri 1971).

The Marx of the Hegelians is the Marx of alienation and estrangement which, for McQuarrie, is the 'young Marx'. McQuarrie recognises that whilst these scholars are of great interest in understanding the philosophical humanism of the early Marx 'they are of less help in deciphering the sociological content of Marx's later, mature works' (1978:4). McQuarrie identifies ‘many theoretical weaknesses’ in the 'dialectical' readings of Marxism, emphasising against these ‘the contributions of a more sociologically oriented tradition of European Marxism which, although largely overlooked, has been much more perceptive in its appreciation of the scientific character of Marx's theoretical work’ (McQuarrie 1978:5).

Without denying the scientific character of Marx's work, McQuarrie’s argument runs directly contrary to the one developed in this thesis. For the intention here is to steer Marxism clear of the scientism inherent in the sociological project (Bonefeld I 1992:ix), to indicate that Marx's project was not, first and foremost, theoretical at all and that any ideas Marx developed about economic or history were subordinate to the emancipatory commitment, and that to the extent that Marxism has been reduced to a social science so it has departed from Marx's original goal of changing the world. The world that it interprets, however scientifically, is an alien world of systemic determinism and dehumanisation.

Scott Meikle writes of sociology as 'one of a number of toadstools that have grown upon the putrefaction of Marxism' (1985:108). Social scientists put this point the other way round, arguing that everything that is of value in Marx's thought has been extracted and embodied in modern social science (1985:108). Hence the inanity of Bottomore's question Karl Marx - Marxist or Sociologist? (1978:275). 

Betraying the prejudices of the social scientist, Bottomore welcomes the 'revival of interest in Marxism as a theoretical scheme' which contrasts with 'its declining intellectual appeal as a political creed' and attributes this seemingly healthy situation to 'the recent work of sociologists' (1973:281). Similarly, the most fruitful discussions of Marx's thought in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century are stated as stemming from sociological and philosophical concerns. Bottomore thus praises not Marxists but critics of Marxism - Weber, Croce and Pareto (1978:231). And where on earth is the working class subject in this positive sociological evaluation of Marx? This is no minor point. Many of Weber's criticisms of Marxism can actually be found in the writings of the industrial and revolutionary syndicalists directed against state socialism. Do the workers possess no theoretical capacity?


13 AGENCY AND CAPITALIST BREAKDOWN

Perry Anderson has identified the difficulty in reconciling the competing claims of structure and agency as one of the key problems explaining the 'crisis of marxism' (Anderson 1983). The relationship between structure and agency is crucial to Marxism. Indeed, Marx's intention could be claimed to have reconciled the dualism between structure and agency as arising from alienation. With the abolition of the capital system as an alienated system of production it becomes possible for human beings to 'make history’ as conscious agents for the first time (Callinicos 1989).

Relevant to this subject is the question of how one conceives the nature of the transition from capitalism to socialism. For if socialism is to be defined in terms of the realm of freedom, and if freedom refers to human self-determination over against the objective determinism of capital, then transition cannot be conceived in terms of inevitable capitalist breakdown, as a result of objective mechanisms, internal to the capital system. Rather, since the proletariat as the revolutionary class is integral to the capital system, conscious human agency is integral to the transition (Gilbert 1981:6; Luxemburg in Howard ed.1971:16/7 144 167 179/80 234 236; Meszaros 1995:145/6 314/5 447/8; Millar 1982:69 70/2).

My argument, then, is that Marx's conception of creative human agency 'making history' continued to be a central feature of his critical project even though his critique of political economy, developed fully in Capital, came increasingly to concentrate upon the objective contradictions within the capital system and how these generated the political struggle of the proletariat.

The critical question is whether, through this emphasis upon the economic factor, Marx came to devalue the proletarian class agency. For the impression may be given that the proletariat, passive before capital's objective determinism, are simply reactive in relation to economic stimuli. Such a view, indeed, would reproduce the privileging of structure over agency which has characterised orthodox Marxism and which, moreover, expresses the fetishistic, inverted reality of capital's social metabolic order.

That Marxism should have taken such a turn is to be explained by the adjustment of the socialist movement to the institutional and material terrain of bourgeois society. Thus, the rise, of bureaucratic social democratic parties within bourgeois society meant the simultaneous devaluation of the revolutionary agency of the proletariat. Social Democracy appropriated political action from the class subject and invested it in the bureaucratic parties of the Second International. The revolutionary-emancipatory character of Marx's proletariat was systematically eliminated as the responsibility for the attainment of socialism was transferred to the evolutionary socialising processes of capitalism (Levy ed. 1987:17 19).

That there is something of a difficult, ambiguous relationship between structure and agency ought not to be so surprising. That, indeed, there is a conflict between the two, and that one often has to argue the relative merits of one against the other, derives from the dualism between structure and agency which characterises bourgeois society (Gottlieb 1992:40/1). For, with the alienation of labour, of the conscious life activity of human beings, the world does indeed come to appear and be experienced as external, as something 'objective’ which is opposed to human beings. In other words, through alienation, structure comes to prevail over human agency. Althusserian structuralism thus comes to treat the individual 'only as a "bearer" .. of the objective historical facts of social relations' (Post 1978:9). The individual becomes a 'support' for relations of production, with human agency replaced by fetishised structures, themselves invested with existential significance. The Marxist structuralists asserted structure over action and agency. They were 'apparently content to equate structure, or the structural properties of social systems, with constraint', with the result that 'the action of individuals can then only be conceptualised as occurring in whatever space is left over from the operation of such constraint' (Giddens 1982:535). Giddens' argument is an attempt to address the dualism of structure and agency. He argues that





Marx's emancipatory project can be read as an attempt to resolve this dualism so that creative human agency attains self-consciousness by coming to know the objective world as its own world, thus attaining self-realisation, as opposed to alienation, through objectification. This argument is the consistent theme of Marx's early work, particularly in the Paris Manuscripts. Marx went on to make more direct statements concerning the role of human agency in making history. Thus, he declares, 'History does nothing ...; history is not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means to achieve its own aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims' (The Holy Family).

This is Marx's clearest assertion that history is the unambiguous product of human agency. It is an assertion that Marx had to qualify by bringing in circumstances.

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.

Marx EB SE 1973: 146-147

Human beings, therefore, are involved in an active, interactive relationship with circumstances. These circumstances, it should be pointed out, are increasingly self-made as human beings create a 'second nature’ over the natural environment. The point is that the objective world is never objective in the sense of being inanimate and external. It is always, in Gramsci's apposite phrase, 'humanly objective’, a self-made human world shot through with, human purpose and consciousness and available for that reason to human control. Reality can never be known in itself but only in relation to human beings, only as it is humanised through praxis and thus integrated into the human world. As Gramsci put it: 'Matter, then, cannot be considered in itself, but as socially and historically organised by production, and natural science, in the same way, as in essence a historical category, a human relation' (Gramsci Historical Materialism in Vazquez 1977:116).

The Revolution Against Marx's Capital
Gramsci's celebration of 1917 as the revolution against Karl Marx's Capital is actually a celebration of Bolshevism as having recovered the importance of creative political agency against the deadening passivity of Second International economic evolutionism. That Second International orthodoxy rationalised the political passivity of the bureaucratic political parties is plain enough. What is contentious is the notion, that this orthodoxy was a faithful interpretation of Marx's Capital. For if it was, then Marx stands condemned for privileging the internal economic mechanisms of the capital system over, the revolutionary political agency of the proletariat in the attainment of socialism. Here, Marx makes his purpose quite explicit - to analyse the laws of motion of the capital system. Marx is, therefore, concerned to grasp the necessary processes of the capital system as a system, i.e. as intrinsic to the development of the system. Hence he must treat human beings as passive personifications of economic relations. Passive here means not inert but as dependent upon and reactive to capital's economic categories, laws and relations.

But is this a devaluation of human agency? Two points may be made. Marx's concern is methodological. This is how he spells out his method:





Marx needs to grasp and analyse the internal mechanisms of the capital system so as to determine what is necessary and intrinsic in its development. Further, this reduction of human beings to being the mere personifications of economic relations actually characterises the capital system as a dehumanisation. The capital system therefore rests upon the systematic devaluation of human agency, precisely the situation that Marx was concerned to abolish (Kolakowski vol I). Meszaros points out that as a mode of social metabolic control the capital system is unique in history in being a 'subjectless system of control’. The objective determinations and imperatives of capital must necessarily prevail over subjective wishes (Meszaros 1995:65/6). To assert structure over agency, in other words, is perfectly rational in a capital system as a subjectless system of control. The problem is that the scientific approach of the Marxist structuralists actually serves to rationalise this dehumanisation rather than criticise and uproot it. Against this, Marx was concerned to recover human consciousness and subjectivity in the real world and hence identify freedom with self-conscious human agency in the self-made, emancipated social world (Miller 1982:86 204/5; Jameson 1992:326/7 329).

The increasing stress upon structure over agency, and finally the privileging of structure over agency by the Second International within Marxism, derives from a process of adaptation to the contours of alienated bourgeois society resting on the inversion of the subject and the object and upon a correspondingly distorted reading of Marx's Capital. The tendency to objectivism, evolutionism and positivism in late nineteenth century scientism found its way into Marxism and led, through one sided development, to the orthodoxy of the Second International. This can only be exorcised from Marxism by recovering the key components of Marx's thought which remained with Marx, though emphases may have altered, for the rest of his life. These key components all centre upon the democratisation of philosophy and power in the conception of revolutionary-critical praxis in an emancipatory project of restitution. Marx's stress upon conscious human agency coming to recover their alienated powers is quite central to Marx's conception, quite integral to the economic structures of the capital system.

Marx thus developed a unique perspective upon the relationship between structure and agency. Thus Marx prioritises the revolutionary agency of the proletariat in the transition to socialism. In moving from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom, human beings, as the conscious, transforming agency 'making history', come to reappropriate their powers now invested in the institutions and structures of the fetishised 'objective' world (Femia 1981:119/20; Smart in Cowling and Wilde 1989:118/20). Gramsci expresses this idea perfectly:





The objective, external, systemic determinism of this alienated world operates to constrain, indeed, to deny the creative significance of human agency. And it is the proletariat, the class of concrete labour, the class which creates the surplus value upon which capital rests, which strikes the blow for human freedom (Smith 1996:87). The objective determinism imposed by capital and its 'coercive laws' amounts to a dehumanisation that systematically denies human agency. It follows that socialism as the realm of human freedom can be achieved only through the revaluation of human agency. The proletariat, then, has not only a revolutionary mission in the labour-capital struggle but also a humanising mission that recovers human subjectivity in a world subject to capital's objective determinism.

Thus, Marx's emphasis upon the revolutionary role of the proletariat makes clear that his concern was not to analyse the capital system so as to increase scientific knowledge of it but so that the capital system could be abolished in the process of human beings coming to know the world as their own. The privileging of structure over agency, as characterising the capital system as an alienated system of production, would be abolished.

It is this concern with freedom as conscious self-determination on the part of transformative human agency that is understood here as the central concern of Marx's Marxism (Meszaros 1995:5 188/9 425/6 528 528/9 653 728/9 734 776/7 808/9 811 974/5; Smith 1996:90/2; Bonefeld et al vol II 1992:107/10; Bonefeld et al 1995:3 23 176 177 178 182/3 184/5). The scientific study of the capital system is itself an important enterprise that equips the proletarian movement but is nevertheless subordinate to the emancipatory end. For all of Marx's undoubted scientific merit, the scientific knowledge of the social world is not Marx's main concern and, for this reason, one can indeed refer to social science as a 'toadstool' that has grown upon Marx's scientific achievements (Meikle 1985). Indeed, insofar as Marxism is reduced to a school of social science then the danger is that Marxism will be transformed from a concern with changing the alien world to interpreting it – and rationalising it as unalterable in its ‘complexity’ - theoretically. This is particularly the case when this scientific work occurs in abstraction from the proletarian movement and when times are hardly conducive to revolutionary politics.

 The tendency is, therefore, for sociological passivity and political passivity to reinforce each other.

Crisis and Breakdown
In conclusion, in this attempt to resolve the relationship between structure and agency, the proletariat possess a decisive and creative role in reclaiming the social world as a human world made by and, hence, potentially for human beings. The proletariat possesses the relevant social identity and the structural capacity that gives human agency transformative power. The proletariat exists as the mediating force between structure and human agency within the capital system but oriented beyond the capital system. The development of its own political agency and consciousness becomes a determining force and is of absolutely critical importance as to whether the capital system is overthrown or not.

Crisis is to be distinguished from breakdown. For Benedikt, crisis concerns ‘a growing, inevitable dialectical process of disturbances, contradictions, and crises - not an absolute, purely economic impossibility of accumulation, but a constant alternation between the overcoming of crisis and its reproduction at a higher level until the destruction of this schema by the proletariat’ (Benedikt in Mattick 1981:119). There can be no automatic, purely economic breakdown: 'no economic system, no matter how weakened, collapses by itself in an automatic fashion. It must be "overthrown"... The so-called "historical necessity" does not operate automatically but requires the active participation of the working class in the historical process’ (Grossman in Mattick 1981:119). And this is a question of class struggle rather than political economy and 'laws of motion’, i.e. 'objective' processes internal to the capital economy.

Thus, it is possible to argue that the breakdown of the capital system is inevitable on account of its internal mechanisms - the mechanisms that Marx analysed in abstraction in Capital - but that this breakdown as a result of necessary developments intrinsic to the mechanisms of accumulation, valorisation and realisation provide the necessary conditions for socialism not the guarantees (Ramtin 1991:193/4). Breakdown results in crises possessing transformative potential (Held 1987).

Whether this potential is realised in the direction of socialism depends upon the emergence of the proletarian movement as the conscious, creative human agency capable of taking the appropriate constructive action (Meszaros 1995:145/6 314/5 447/8; Luxemburg in Howard ad 1971:16/7 144 167 179/81 234 236).

Where the necessary development of the internal mechanisms of the capital system come to be conflated with the actual revolutionary process leading to socialism, with the former eventually being substituted for the latter, degeneration into passivity before the evolution of history follows. The argument developed here is that proletarian political agency is part of the material conditions for revolution, that Marx's analysis of 'objective' breakdown, for all the assertions of inevitability, nevertheless requires the innovative political activity of the proletarian movement, and, to the extent that this revolutionary activity is lacking, socialism will never be achieved no matter how crisis ridden the capital system may be (Mattick 1981:120/1; Therborn 1980:108/12). There is, therefore, a need to recover the revolutionary dimension and the innovative politics that Marx had always made integral to his argument, precisely those characteristics that the Second International lost as it privileged the autonomous evolution of 'history'.

I propose to look at these questions in five parts. 
In the first part the focus will be upon the breakdown of the capital system as an immanent development. In the second part it will be argued that the ensuing crises possess transformative potential and hence create the opportunity for revolution. The third part establishes that Marx affirmed the unity of subject and object when delineating both the relationship between structure and agency and the transition from capitalism to socialism. In the fourth part the revolutionary political agency of the proletariat is argued to be central both to the attainment of socialism and to Marx's own conception. Finally, it will be argued that if socialism cannot be conceived as dependent upon the autonomous movement of 'history’ but indeed requires conscious transformative human agency then the creativity of politics and values in relation to circumstances needs to be established.

The Inevitability of Breakdown
The major controversies within Marxism have resulted from the failure to reconcile structure and agency, science and ethics, evolution and revolution. From the Second International, referring to Marx's stated purpose in Capital, came the assertion that Marxism was a scientific analysis of the laws of motion of capitalism. Marxism as science could produce an objective, positivist description of the factual world and the necessary dynamics of the capitalist economy. Marxism, therefore, existed as a value neutral science. Kautsky saw in Capital nothing more than a set of ‘economic doctrines' bearing no connection at all to the idea of communism (Smith 1996:34). The separation of fact and values, of science and ethics, which was characteristic of Marxist orthodoxy was given classic statement by Hilferding:






Given the separation of fact and value, science and ethics, the reasons to join in the political movement for socialism had to be derived from elsewhere. This separation of faces and values, the one the province of science the other of morality, characterised orthodoxy (Goldmann 1963; Draper 1963). The neo-Kantians and the Communists who followed were unable to avoid coming to grief on the twin reefs of scientism and moralism which resulted. Of course, this separation also characterised bourgeois society generally. The whole debate could have been undercut by establishing that Marx was not a positivist and had determined, via Hegel, to overcome the dualism of the 'is' and the 'ought'. Marx's science, therefore, was ethically constituted. 

The notion that science was one thing and ethics - and politics - another was stated most directly by Kautsky and Hilferding.

Nor can the social democratic organisation of the proletariat, in its class struggle, do without the moral ideal, without ethical indignation against exploitation and class oppression. But this ideal has nothing to do with scientific socialism, the scientific study of the laws of evolution of the social organism in order to know the trends and the necessary ends of the proletarian struggle.

It is true that in the case of a socialist, the thinker is also a militant, and no man can be artificially cut in two parts of which one has nothing to do with the other; so sometimes even in Marx's scientific research we perceive a moral ideal. But he always, correctly, tries to exclude it as far as possible. For in science, the moral ideal becomes a course of errors, if it attempts to prescribe the ends of science. (Kautsky).

As though 'scientific research', on the one hand, and 'moral ideal', on the other, exhausted the possibilities. That Kautsky can discern a moral ideal only 'sometimes' in Marx's scientific work indicates how little sense the positivists dominating the Second International could make of Marx as having overcome the Kantian dualism of the ‘is’ and the ‘ought to be’. Hence the prevalence of the neo-Kantians in the socialist movement.





The result of this positivism within the Marxist camp was that it introduced dualisms of fact and value, history and politics, evolution as an entirely objective process and revolution as a purely subjectivist process, history and politics, science and morality into Marxism directly contrary to Marx, who, in reconciling the 'is’ and the 'ought', affirmed the unity of the subjective and the objective.

'Orthodoxy', created on this positivist foundation, thus completely distorted Marx's own emancipatory project. It sustained the notion that the transition from capitalism to socialism was an evolutionary process governed by 'laws' deriving from the conquest of nature and, hence, the continuing expansion of the productive forces. This evolutionary process took the form of capital's objective or unsocial socialisation and this socialisation possesses the character of an objective law of necessity. Hilferding, for all his merits in locating socialism in real developments, gives the impression that capital's socialisation will itself soon become equivalent with socialism, without revolutionary action on the part of the proletariat being necessary; the main work will already have been carried out by capital:





There is nothing wrong with the idea that the socialist revolution is a process rather than a sudden expropriation. The problem with Hilferding's formulation, however, is that this process is heavily determined by the objective socialisation of the capital economy itself. 'History', it seems, will have carried out the socialist revolution for the working class. The reformist character of Hilferding's argument is quite explicit as political activity is restricted to identifying the socialist possibilities inscribed into the gradual process of objective socialisation.

Thus, Second International 'scientific' socialism entertained the belief that the expansion of the forces of production also entailed the increasing socialisation of these forces. Capitalism, identified with private ownership of the means of production, is less and less able to manage these forces and is incapable of developing the centralised institutional machinery which is appropriate to this socialisation. The need for such institutional machinery comes to ensure the expansion of the state and its bureaucratic intervention in civil society, for individual capitalists are incapable of such 'total’ intervention. The state power thus expands and becomes the site of the political struggle. The proletariat - or the parties representing it - must fight to obtain control of this expanded state in order to be in a position to control these socialised economic forces. Thus the state is the necessary instrument of economic management, capable of representing the public good, and must be established as integral to the attainment of socialism (Gottlieb 1992:225).

The transition from capitalism to the socialist society is thus argued as being determined by 'objective laws'. Of particular interest here is the idea that socialism depends upon the evolution of the material conditions for socialism, the inevitable breakdown of capitalism, its periodic crises as providing the opportunity for proletarian action, and the assumption that the evolution of material conditions and the maturation of capital's objective contradictions will finally compel the proletariat to act (Perkins 1993:88/9).

What is interesting about this reference to objective laws is that the proletariat enter the scenario only in the passive, reactive sense of being provoked into action by economic stimuli, i.e. as still dependent upon the determination of circumstances. Such a notion continues the devaluation of the human agency and, it is argued here, cannot strike that decisive blow for human freedom which characterises the transition to the socialist society for Marx.

What should be made clear here is that it is not the notion of 'inevitability' that is being questioned. More than a few would like to extinguish the notion of inevitability from within Marxism. The problem, however, is not so much with inevitability as with how it is delineated. As Henryk Grossmann argued capitalist breakdown is 'objectively necessary’ but is not on this account an automatic process which human agents may passively await. Thus the immiseration produced by crisis could prolong the existence of capitalism whilst organised working class resistance could accelerate its final collapse. To argue for the inevitability of breakdown, therefore, does not necessarily entail political passivity (Grossmann in Howard and King vol II 1989:329). Notions of inevitability, therefore, pertain to the necessary workings of the capital system. The capital system is prone to crisis and, ultimately, collapse on account of its own internal mechanisms, precisely those laws of motion which Marx analysed in Capital.

What makes this point so important is that it locates socialism in an objective necessity. As Luxemburg understood, without this grounding in necessary development, socialism once more becomes an ideal or ethic. Without the assumption of the inevitability of capitalist breakdown as a result of the necessary operation of the mechanisms of the system and with, therefore, the assumption that the process of private accumulation is limitless in itself:

socialism loses the granite bedrock of objective historical necessity. We are lost in the fog of the pre-marxist systems and schools that want to derive socialism from the pure injustice and wickedness of the modern world or from the pure revolutionary will of the working class.

Luxemburg Was die Epigonen aus der Marxschen Theorie gemacht haben 1921:37

The argument for the inevitability of the breakdown of capitalism has received its most recent restatement from Ramin Ramtin. His Capitalism and Automation: Revolution in Technology and Capitalist Breakdown presents a detailed analysis of the mechanisms of the capital system and how these now point to the inevitable demise of the system. He recognises the controversial nature of his argument for the Inevitability of capitalist breakdown. He meets the objections head on.





Thus Ramtin goes on to recognise, as Marx did, the existence of countervailing tendencies whilst arguing that not only are they not determinant but that they operate to heighten the immanent contradictions of capitalism. Ramtin's thesis is simple enough to state. He argues that the technological system of automation represents the final maturity of the development of the productive forces within capitalist relations. As such, its greater application and diffusion must inevitably produce the breakdown of the capitalist mode of production.

For automation, which is necessary for the growth of productivity, also means the systematic replacement of the living labour which produces the surplus value upon which the self-expansion of capital rests. 

The production of surplus value requires the extraction and appropriation of unpaid or surplus labour. 









For these reasons one has to be critical of the various 'new technologies' determinisms that prevail in the contemporary theoretical world, of which post-Fordism is an obvious example. There are those who wish to argue for the obsolescence of the labour theory of value on account of these technological developments, but their concern is clearly to show that capitalism no longer generates the contradictions justifying a revolutionary proletarian socialism (Callinicos on Habermas 1976). Thus Aronowitz is concerned to show that Marxism has become outmoded. 'Capital has moved a step beyond Taylorism and Fordism' he argues, with 'the elimination of labour as the principal source of accumulation' becoming the 'major strategy of capital' (1981:115). This may well be capital's major strategy. The third industrial revolution which is underway in the developed industrial countries implies not just a transformation of the nature of the labour process, but also of the character of labour. For Aronowitz this means that the measurement of value by definite quantities of labour time necessary for the production of commodities is no longer theoretically valid under conditions where the processes of production at every level of the social division of labour are marked by the application of advanced science to technology (Aronowitz 1981:116).

However, this application of technology entails a contradiction at the heart of the capital system – if Marx is right. That automation increases the potential for the relative expansion of individual capitals explains the seemingly inexorable compulsion to automate. Aronowitz rightly notes this as a significant change in the mode of production. But Ramtin draws the conclusion that it is not theoretical categories that need to be changed here. It is not the obsolescence of Marxism as a theory interpreting the world that is the problem here, as in Aronowitz's perspective. Rather, this 'third industrial revolution' does indeed eliminate living labour from the production process and, in so doing, alters the technical or organic composition of capital, thus undermining the production of surplus value. Again, one must add, on the condition that Marx’s reasoning is sound.

Ramtin's exhaustive and detailed analysis of this thesis and his ability to relate Marx's categories to modern developments in the forces of production is invaluable in securing the 'objective' foundations of the socialist case. An effective answer is provided to those for whom the application of new technologies to production has rendered Marx's perspective, especially the labour theory of value, obsolete. What have been rendered obsolete are the capitalist relations of production and Ramtin shows why breakdown is inevitable on account of the inability of the internal mechanisms of accumulation and valorisation to operate as they ought to.

The stampede to reformist positions renders socialism a disembodied ideal, with the social scientists associated with the left understanding their task as being that of indicating reformist possibilities inherent in capitalist development. Thus Habermas' concern to argue the obsolescence of the labour theory of value - which contentiously assumes that Marx even held such a theory - is part of his attempt to show that the modern process of production no longer generates the contradictions that would justify the rise of a revolutionary proletarian movement (Callinicos 1976:46/7; Walton and Gamble 1976:46/7). All that remains, then, is the task of ideological criticism, a notion which has the effect of boosting the importance of intellectuals. The revolution has, once more, become an intellectual process.

The thesis of the inevitability of capitalist breakdown as a result of its objective, internal, systemic tendencies is of only secondary importance here. Even accepting Ramtin's analysis of this breakdown, we are entitled to ask where conscious human agency fits in. It is the relation of human agency to 'objective’ development that is of concern. What is contentious is Ramtin's assertion that the inevitability of the breakdown of capitalism is the 'same' 'as the inevitability of socialist revolution’ (1991:x). This may be a careless statement. Yet, since Ramtin goes out of his way to associate 'the inevitability of the socialist revolution' with capitalist breakdown, it may well not be. The confusion here results from conflating two quite distinct processes, indicating the well-known dangers of all 'inevitability' arguments. Only in the very final section of his last chapter 'A Final Note on Capitalist Breakdown' does Ramtin actually correct the error in his preface. Here, the relationship between capitalist breakdown and socialist revolution is adequately formulated.





And it is this movement of the class subject which is central. Since the socialist revolution is not inevitable the old political passivity of the bureaucratic parties must be firmly repudiated. It may seem a somewhat puzzling statement, but the task for Marxists is actually to bring the working class back in, not class as an objective fact, the subject of sociological analysis, but the class as a conscious, acting subject. Ramtin gives the reason why. The socialist revolution is 'the process of the realisation of the global association of free individuality by means of self-emancipation through universal appropriation' (1991:193). As such, capitalist breakdown leads to socialism only through the positive turn into class war. 'It is during the process of breakdown, as a result of class war, that the proletariat is able to become universally class conscious' (1991:193). In the process of social transformation, class consciousness is progressively transformed into individual consciousness. Thus the process of social transformation entails the unfolding of the individuality of each and all through the appropriation of the totality of the productive force. Thus the individuals must appropriate the existing totality of productive forces, not only to achieve self-activity, but, also, merely to safeguard their very existence. (Marx The German Ideology). Marx's stress here is upon individuals as they dissolve the class designation imposed upon them by the capital system ought to be stressed. For, Marx cannot be arguing that the proletariat as a class are simply reacting to external, determining stimuli. Rather the proletariat are not only conscious and active as a class agency but are taking the process of social transformation beyond victory in the class struggle to the dissolution of class society so as to realise the individuality of each and all. Thus, individual proletarians go beyond the 'association' appropriate to the stage of capitalist breakdown, the association which is 'simply an agreement' in which individuals participate 'not as individuals but as members of a class'. But social transformation goes further, beyond capital and the breakdown of the system to that 'community of revolutionary proletarians' in which 'it is as individuals that individuals participate in' (The German Ideology). 

It follows from all we have been saying up till now that the communal relationship into which the individuals of a class entered, and which was determined by their common interests over against a third party, was always a community to which these individuals belonged only as average individuals, only insofar as they lived within the conditions of existence of their class — a relationship in which they participated not as individuals but as members of a class. With the community of revolutionary proletarians, on the other hand, who take their con​ditions of existence and those of all members of society under their control, it is just the reverse; it is as individuals that the individuals participate in it. It is just this combination of individuals (assuming the advanced stage of modern productive forces, of course) which puts the conditions of the free development and movement of individuals under their control — conditions which were previously abandoned to chance and had won an independent existence over against the separate individuals just because of their separation as individuals, and because of the necessity of their combination which had been determined by the division of labour, and through their separation had become a bond alien to them.

Marx GI 1999: 85

Thus, social transformation, leading to socialism as the realm of freedom, means the universal, ‘world historic’ assertion of free individuality.

Thus Ramtin concludes: ‘That is why, while the breakdown of capitalism is inevitable, social transformation to communism, though absolutely essential for the very existence and survival of the human race, is not inevitable. For to abolish and transform the old social form, the proletariat first needs to conquer political power so that its class interest can be represented as the general interest. Conquest of political power, is also essential because that is the only way the appropriation of the productive forces of the technological system of automated production, can take place’ (Ramtin 1991:194).





What is worthwhile exploring here is the extent to which 'conditions' and 'action' are actually inextricably linked through the unity of subjective and objective factors. What is to be avoided is the sense that the material conditions on the one hand and the revolutionary activity of the conscious subject on the other are quite distinct. Rather, Marx's conception of the proletariat as 'gravediggers' actually grasps the unity of subject and object. For the proletariat are the products of capitalism, i.e. the bourgeoisie producing its own gravediggers, but are also the revolutionary agents putting an end to capitalism, i.e. gravedigging as a conscious political action. One needs to underline, therefore, Marx's statement in The Poverty of Philosophy that of all the productive forces it is the revolutionary class, the proletariat, which is the most important. The emergence of the material conditions for socialism, therefore, is not a purely objective phenomenon but involves the emergence of the revolutionary class.

It is in this sense, therefore, that one can affirm the inevitable economic breakdown of the capital system only as an abstraction from the real movement of history. The point of such analysis is to show that the breakdown of the capital system occurs on account of its internal mechanisms and is, for that reason, necessary rather than accidental. Remedial activity cannot, ultimately, salvage the capital system. In reality, however, the repeated occurrence of crises possessing transformative potential will be accompanied by conscious political activity. Capitalist breakdown and socialist revolution, therefore, are inextricably interconnected, unless one assumes the absolute passivity and inertness of the class subject so that it cannot even react to economic stimuli of a system in terminal crisis.

Hence Grossmann, having demonstrated the inevitability of capitalist breakdown, argues that in reality there can be no such thing as an automatic breakdown, there will be human activity at all stages of the process. For no economic system, no matter how weakened, collapses by itself in an automatic fashion. It must be 'overthrown’. The so-called 'historical necessity' does not operate automatically but requires the active participation of the working class in the historical process (Grossmann 1943:520). And this active participation of the class subject in the historical process has in turn to be connected with the emancipatory goal of achieving the realm of freedom as a condition in which human beings are reconciled with their social world and conscious control their life activity. Human beings make history consciously and are in control for the first time.

In other words, the economic analysis of capital's laws of motion, its internal mechanisms, has to be accompanied by the proper concentration of the importance of the subjective factor - political organisation and intervention, class self-activity and consciousness, of the socialist revolution as an active process. For the critical analysis supporting the thesis of the inevitability of capitalist breakdown can only illuminate the objective conditions creating the opportunity for successful revolutionary activity.

The Existence of Crises with Transformative Potential
What needs to be underlined in the perspective taken on Marx here is that whilst the breakdown of the capital system as a result of its internal contradictory dynamics is inevitable, it is nevertheless the case that the socialist revolution is not inevitable. The argument that the socialist revolution is inevitable would assume the spontaneous development of the proletarian movement in reaction to economic stimuli. In which case there would be no need for working class activity and organisation, no need for organisation, for human agency to engage in transformative action.

Socialist revolution, therefore, is an active and conscious process which, connected with the emancipatory goal of a defetishised world, is defined by the process of positive appropriation on the part of human individuals. The importance of affirming the inevitability of the breakdown of the capital system lies not in transferring the responsibility for revolutionary socialist politics to the autonomous operation of history and its economic laws but, rather, in locating socialism in the real dialectic of social movement, as opposed to making it something dependent upon the force of moral persuasion or political action.

The Systemic Tendency to Crisis 
And Socialism as an Immanent Potentiality
For Marx, the contradictory dynamics of the capital system must eventually lead the system to suppress the conditions for its reproduction. The whole process is intrinsic to the system, is systemic. It is something which capital is compelled to do through its own coercive laws. Hence the term contradiction.

To refer back to Ramtin's argument concerning the displacement of workers by automation. The Marxist assumptions of the thesis are these. The continued accumulation of capital is the central dynamic upon which the capital system rests. Yet this process of accumulation is threatened and ultimately blocked by the contradictory movements of the rate of surplus value and the rate of profit. For whilst the rate of surplus value must increase to compensate for the fall in the rate of profit. Variable capital continues to decline in relation to constant capital and this means, therefore, that the number of producers of surplus value comes to decline. Thus a decreasing number of workers must produce a larger surplus value so as to create the profits necessary to sustain the capital in existence and hence to continue to facilitate the process of accumulation. Ultimately, the production of the greatest quantity of surplus value that may be extracted from the diminishing number of producers will no longer suffice to increase the value of the existing capital. The process of accumulation is, therefore, blocked by its own internal mechanisms (Mattick 1981:54).

Such, in outline, is the hypothesis of capitalist breakdown. The importance of retaining this grounding in the inevitability of the eventual collapse of the capital system lies in providing socialism with a secure objective basis in the real movement of history. Without this, as Luxemburg argued, socialism must come to rely for its force upon its political practice or its ethical vision, neither of which really requires an historical rooting in the contradictory dynamics of the capital system - socialism becomes a possibility everywhere and anywhere.

Of course, one could conceive of socialism as a possibility, the opportunity for which comes through the periodic crises of the capital system. This comes closer to Marx's argument, especially if one can integrate subjective and objective factors. And, indeed, it could be argued that the recognition that socialism is not inevitable does indeed entail making it a possibility. But if socialism is merely one possibility amongst many what good reasons can socialists have in recommending socialism to the non-socialist? The good reasons must be located, as indicated, in an objective foundation which makes socialism the vision of the immanent and necessary society, a potentiality contained within the existing social structure (Parekh 1982:177). As McBride comments: 'Marx's "critiquing" of political economy, then, had the purpose of showing .. that the actual system contained tendencies that were at once potentially destructive of the existing system itself and potentially generative of a new, non-primitive system' (McBride 1977:16). This potentiality must be actualised if human beings are to further the emancipatory goal.


Where there is every reason to question this idea of the inevitability of capitalist breakdown has in the potential devaluation of the political agency of the proletariat. Yet the whole thesis is quite compatible with the view that the organised activity of the working class can block the mechanisms of investment, accumulation and valorisation and hence can act to impose crisis upon the capital system. What it attempts to do, however, is to avoid politicism and subjectivism. For, if capitalist crisis were merely caused by the class activity of the workers, then it follows that crisis can be resolved by the state sponsored capitalist offensive against the working class, its living standards and its institutions. In other words, crisis ceases to be intrinsic to the capital system and becomes, instead, the result of a power struggle.


The idea of the inevitability of capitalist breakdown is quite distinct from the idea of automatism. The criticism is that Marx's own approach combines the objective and subjective conditions of socialist revolution in a dialectical synthesis and that it is, therefore, inadmissible to place the stress upon the inevitable breakdown of the capital system as a result of its economic mechanisms (Pannekoek in Mattick 1981:91). Thus socialist revolution depends upon the organisation, will and consciousness of the proletariat, though, certainly, these subjective factors are themselves inextricably related to the objective factors of socialisation, crisis and class structure.

The argument is, therefore, that long before the capital system meets its final end, the working class will have converted its economic struggles deriving from the wages system into a political movement directed against the capital system. This indeed would appear to be Marx's own expectation (letter to Bolt 1871). Thus the proletariat is not simply going to wait until the capital system is in terminal crisis and then act but will act and organise according to its experiences within the conflictual, crisis ridden system until, constituting itself as a class-for-itself, its revolutionary organisation and consciousness is sufficient to challenge and overthrow the capital system (Mattick 1981:90/1).

The Political Implications of Inevitability
But this is not at all incompatible with the idea of the inevitability of capitalist breakdown. Indeed, as Grossmann argued, inevitability is not at all the same as fatalism. On the contrary, the argument of the inevitability of capitalist breakdown is a fundamental denial of the reformist idea that the problems, crises and inequalities associated with capitalism are accidental and hence reformable. Marx's point is that these deficiencies are inherent in the capital system and can be abolished only with that system.

Thus inevitability supports a revolutionary as against a reformist politics, working class activism as against the passivism of the parties. It is no surprise, therefore, that Luxemburg's Accumulation of Capital was the target of so much hostile criticism from Social Democratic theoreticians (Mattick 1981:91/2). For, in this book, Luxemburg had supported the necessity of proletarian revolutionary class activism as against the reformist and passive attitude of social (parliamentary) democracy. By arguing for the inevitable demise of the capital system, Luxemburg had exposed the chimera of reformist politics. The capital system could not be reformed. Its crises and contradictions were immanent to it and were not removable by political action through the agency of the state. It was precisely this thesis of the inevitability of capitalist breakdown that underscored the need for a revolutionary class politics as against a reformist politics through parliament. Luxemburg's argument called for the fundamental reorientation of the socialist movement away from political passivity to revolutionary class activism. And it was as such that inevitability was fought.

Again, however, Luxemburg held socialist revolution quite distinct from the thesis of inevitability (Luxemburg 1963:325; Frolich 1994:310). It was precisely because socialist revolution is not inevitable, that socialism is just a possibility, that the need for an explicitly revolutionary consciousness and organisation could be thought to be so important. Moreover, the development of the proletarian movement is itself part of the objective development of the capital system. One cannot, in reality, hold capitalist development as an objective process independent of the socialist revolution through the class agency. As Mattick argues:





Thus, there is no contradiction between the argument for the inevitability of capitalist breakdown on the one hand and the need for an activist politics on the other. One needs to distinguish between the analytical and the historical here. Marx demonstrated the inevitability thesis by examining the mechanisms internal to the capital system. He did not go on to argue from this that revolution would follow this course of events, as though human agents simply wait for systemic breakdown to occur. Marx demonstrated the contradictory dynamics of the capital system. Historically, the breakdown, of the capital system on the one hand and revolutionary socialist politics on the other, analytically distinct, would be inextricably connected in the dialectical synthesis of subjective and objective factors, of past, present and future.

Ultimately, then, when one comes to history itself there is no such thing as an 'inevitable' breakdown on account of purely objective, economic factor. One has to explore the possibilities for creative, transformative activity on the part of human agency. Whilst capitalist breakdown is systemic, socialist revolution is not and, hence, has to be organised. This revolutionary organisation is based on the notion that capitalist crises are endemic to the capital system but, if well developed, becomes capable of revolutionary or transformative intervention long before the inevitable breakdown has occurred.

Hence the importance of political and social movements capable of taking advantage of crises possessing transformative potential. This potential can be actualised only by self-conscious and organised human agency and this actualisation itself is part of the process of socialist revolution. Thus, the class conscious and politicised working class will have constituted itself as the revolutionary class well before the end of the capitalist system as scientifically discerned (Grossman in Mattick 1981:119).

There are, therefore, sound political reasons for insisting upon securing the basis for socialist politics in the notion of the inevitability of the breakdown of the capital system. For without the sense that capitalist crises, characterised by unemployment, impoverishment, depression, inflation, the disparity between endless production and human need, are the inevitable outcomes of the capital system socialist politics become a purely ethical criticism of the real world. The continued occurrence of these crises in the modern world confirm the logic of Marx's economic analysis (Heilbroner 1980:132).

For Marx, these crises derive from the fundamental properties of the capital system and are not, therefore, accidents of circumstances removable by remedial action. Marx's dialectical conception of the capital system demonstrates its immanent contradictions - the characteristics necessary to the capital system yet also antagonistic to its survival, causing its demise - whilst also insisting upon the transformative potential of repeated crises so that the political agency of the working class is essential to the socialist revolution.

Labour and its Alienation
One has also to ensure that the socialist revolution is defined according to its emancipatory goal. Thus, if crises provide the opportunity for the working class to act to actualise transformative potential, then it is also the case that the abolition of capital enables the rehumanisation of the world. The problem is not merely economic.

Thus labour, the conscious life activity of human beings, is appropriated as capital in the accumulation process and becomes a force over against the labourer. Thus, labour is alienated and comes to be subjected to the further alienation of the coercive laws to which all human beings, capitalists and proletarians alike, must conform. Thus the capital system is a dehumanisation which has eliminated subjectivity from the world subject to systemic control. The project of rehumanisation, of the positive appropriation of human powers, has to be an active process. It is the recovery of subjectivity by the self-conscious, creative human agency. Socialism as the realm of freedom refers precisely to a defetishised social world in which human beings are in conscious control of their powers.

Such a social transformation as an emancipatory process of reappropriation must necessarily be an active process. This, therefore, takes the argument for the inevitability of capitalist breakdown much further. The systemic world, with its objective mechanisms, processes and laws, is not only to be conceived as a self-contradictory world subject to breakdown but as an alien world subject to practical, human appropriation.

Thus the capital system and its laws are to be conceived in terms of specific social relations of production whose persistence depends upon labour's acquiescence or otherwise before the exploitation and extraction of surplus value to which it is subjected. Under the capital system, labour is subject to its own power in the alien form of capital; its own power appears as an external and hostile power which controls them. Thus labour's own products are turned against and opposed to labour when converted into capital. This is a loss of control. It means that human beings are subject to the 'objective dependency' of capital and hence do not control their material existence (Marx 1973:163/5). Communities can be destroyed, masses impoverished, and employment lost all as a result of this loss of control.

In short, the human agency cannot wait for the inevitable breakdown of the capital system and then proceed to create a new mode of production. That objective, economic determinism which ignores the creativity of movements and politics through concentrating upon Marx's breakdown theory fails to understand the character and the intention of Marx's emancipatory politics. Rather, the crises of the capital system will be accompanied by activity on the part of human beings to replace this system. This activity, moreover, is necessary to actualise the transformative potential of objective crises and to realise the emancipatory goal of human appropriation.





For these reasons, the socialist revolution as an active process has to take centre stage in Marxist politics. Breakdown and crisis in the capital system provide the objective foundations for revolutionary socialist politics and in no way can be considered a substitute for political activity by the class subject.

Unity of Subject and Object
If the breakdown of the capitalist system is inevitable, the socialist revolution cannot be considered a foregone conclusion. Thus material conditions may make social transformation possible, necessary even, but the class whose structural position identifies it as the revolutionary agency has to organise itself and orient its movement towards the objective social transformation. The revolutionary class may fail to act and organise itself in the required manner. And Marx does indeed recognise this as a possibility. Thus, the growing contradiction between the forces and relations of production, in other words an objective breakdown, can end either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes (Manifesto of the Communist Party). There is always the possibility that the revolutionary class may fail to act (Meikle 1985:57). Thus the abolition of the old relations of production and the establishment of new relations in no way can be considered as the automatic product of the emergence of the appropriate material conditions and new social forces.

It is, therefore, inadmissible to present Marx's argument as either objective or subjective but rather as one that affirms the unity of both. The objective material conditions certainly establish the context of and the possibilities for human action but, more than this, also comprise the emergence of the revolutionary class. Human agency, by the same token, cannot be considered wholly subjectively but as a product and a part of the objective material conditions (Catephores 1989:14).

Nor is Marx's argument for the inevitability of capitalist breakdown to be conceived as a determinism. For the whole notion of social change in Marx's argument incorporates an active role for conscious, intentional human agency in actualising the possibilities inherent in capitalist crises and structures. Of course, this human agency is never free in a subjectivist or voluntaristic sense but is involved in a dynamic and interactive relationship with the structural world created by the objectification of human powers in material practice. Marx's argument, therefore, needs to be understood as dynamic and dialectical in setting the material practice of human agents within a self-made social context. One needs to grasp human beings as the producers of their circumstances in order to gain an understanding of social and historical development (Kitching1988:58/9).

Gilbert, therefore, is quite right to argue that those who interpret Marx's as an economic determinism wholly misunderstand the character and derivation of Marx's politics (Gilbert 1981:13). Marx completely rejected the notion of converting his materialist conception into a 'superhistorical' key that showed the path of future development. Any 'theory' of history that Marx could be said to have entertained was always subject to alteration through the experience of real life material practice. It is therefore quite wrong to parent upon Marx a universal stage theory of history (Kitching 1988:58).

Marx also ruled out a fatalism in relation to historical development. If Marx rejected a subjectivist politics of the will, he also rejected passively waiting upon the evolution of the objective forces of history. Socialism had to be actualized by conscious human agency able to intervene to 'make history' but this actualisation itself presupposes potentialities immanent in the social structure capable of realisation.

As Gilbert argues in emphasising the revolutionary commitments underlying Marx's critical analysis, Marx himself tended towards the side of politics in the making of history (Gilbert 1981:15), not so much politics as the demiurge of history, creating ex nihilo, but as the organisation and activity of the working class in a definite material context being able to make a difference and change the world in a certain way.

Hence the argument here is that Marx affirmed a real dialectic of subject and object, economic and politics, evolution and revolution in which the relationship between the categories was one of unity, hence interpenetration, as opposed to dualism. Thus, whilst Avineri is right to underline Marx's anti-subjectivism in politics (1968), Gilbert is nevertheless correct in exposing Avineri's tendency to devalue the active role that politics, especially workers revolutionary politics, retained in Marx's conception (1981). For Marx stresses the importance of the material context not to denigrate political action, which is the impression Avineri gives, but to underline that the innovative, transformative political activity, which he did indeed support, possessed, a materialist relevance. 'In the complex, three tiered interplay of general theory, analysis of specific historical configurations, and new forms of class struggle, political movements played a decisive part' (Aronowitz1981:267).
The socialist revolution can only succeed when the appropriate material conditions have emerged (Gilbert 1981:15). Yet one needs to be clear that this entails no objective economic evolution. For the proletariat, the revolutionary class forms part of the material conditions. The proletariat is the product of capitalism but also the gravedigger of the system. The proletariat is the revolutionary class whose organisation, action and will is essential to the socialist transformation of society. This is part of the process whereby the proletariat, from being a class-in-itself, possessing an objective existence in relation to the means of production, constitutes itself as a class-for-itself possessing a subjective reality. For Molyneux, Marx possessed 'an over-optimistic and foreshortened view of the process by which the class-in-itself transforms itself into a class-for-itself - the assumption that the objective economic unity of the working class would spontaneously lead to its ultimate political unity’ (Molyneux 1978:116). Thankfully, Molyneux continues, 'Lenin was able .. to correct the one-sidedness of his early formulations and so make good his decisive advance over Marx’ (Molyneux 1978:116). Leaving aside the morally, intellectually and politically compromised history of the Leninist party, the validity of such a view depends upon the extent to which one identifies a process of proletarian self-development, the way that the proletariat converts itself from being a class-in-itself to being a class-for-itself, with spontaneity. Parekh points out that for Marx the proletariat 'exists only as a class-in-itself, a relatively passive group united by the social conditions of its material existence and lacking the active self-consciousness and social unity of a class-for-itself' (Parekh1982:174). It is no exaggeration to claim that, for Marx, the process of proletarian self-development, whereby the proletariat as a class-in-itself achieves the status of a class-for-itself, is central to socialist politics. It is a process for which ‘the party' cannot compensate.

There is an argument that since the proletariat is a product of capitalist and hence is not its own producer, it cannot act as the subject of the revolutionary process. Callinicos’ arguments directed against Lukacs’ identification of the proletariat as the subject-object of the revolution and against Gramsci's epistemology applies here.

if the practice of the worker in the capitalist productive process is necessarily impregnated with bourgeois ideology, then the foundation for Gramsci's epistemology collapses. For how can Marxism perform the function of rendering explicit what is implicit in the practice of the proletariat if that practice is, spontaneously at least, necessarily mystified? Clearly, an alternative account of the status of historical materialism and its relation to the working class is required….




Post also comments on the inadequacy of the proletariat as the revolutionary class (Post 1996). Putting the views together, the proletariat is stripped of the epistemological and structural capacity for self-emancipation that it had for Marx (Parekh1982:165/6). There seems nothing for it but for the proletariat to defer to the better, 'scientific', judgement of the socialist intellectuals and politicians who are able to make good the proletariat's deficiencies. The agency of socialist revolution has thus become the party representing the proletariat rather than the proletariat itself.
Marx's argument, affirming the unity of subject and object, being and consciousness, did hold that socialism and the socialist consciousness is implicit in the material practice and position of the proletariat (Callinicos 1985:152). As the producer of surplus value, subject to capital's domination, experiencing the class struggle directly in its practical life, the proletariat is able to see through and break through the social relations of production (Parekh 1982:132). It is the proletariat which is the class which has first-hand experience of the contradictions and crises of the capital system and which therefore understands the need for the alternative organisation of the productive activity of society. To abstract from this class struggle at the political and ideological level is neither to see through nor break through capitalist relations. It fails to confront capital on its own material terrain. The socialist revolution is instead converted into a political and an intellectual process (Cleaver 1979:28/9). Only the intellectuals are capable of escaping the mystification which apparently envelopes the proletariat. But is it not the class praxis of the proletariat alone which penetrates the fetishism of capital's production process? Only the party is capable of abolishing the capital system. But is it not the structural capacity of the proletariat which marks them out as the revolutionary class able to challenge capital on its own material terrain?

One needs, therefore, a full revaluation of the proletariat as the revolutionary class subject. One needs to recognise here the dialectics of revolution, as does Rosa Luxemburg. With socialism:

action grows historically out of the elementary class struggle. It thus moves in the dialectical contradiction that here the proletarian army is first recruited in the struggle itself, and too, only in the struggle does it become aware of the objectives of the struggle. Here, organisation, enlightenment, and struggle are not separate mechanically, and also temporally, different moments, as is the case with a Blanquist movement.

Luxemburg Organisational Questions of Russian Social Democracy in Howard ed. 1971:289

The Revolutionary Class
Probably the greatest ambiguity as regards Marx's conception of the proletariat lies in the notion of the class as both a product of the capital system and as the social force overthrowing the system. How can the proletariat truly be considered as the revolutionary class when, in engaging in revolutionary activity, it merely reacts to objective economic stimuli? In so far as the proletariat is merely reactive in this sense then it has not thrown off the external determinism which characterises the capital system as an alienated system of production and has not, therefore, emerged as the revolutionary-emancipatory class at all. One needs, in other words, to conceive of proletarian revolution in terms of the transition to the realm of freedom.

This is, therefore, to correct the heavy emphasis that the orthodox tradition came to place upon the evolution, the socialisation, indeed what could be called the autonomy, of 'the economy' (Perkins 1993:2). This objective development thus comes to be substituted for the revolutionary agency of the proletariat, which is a parody of Marx's argument. And this is the danger of all arguments for the inevitable collapse of the capital system, it gives the impression that a revolutionary socialist politics is not required whereas it very certainly is.

One should be able to pick off the more familiar objections to Marx. Even assuming the guilt of Social Democracy as regards its economic evolutionism and political passivity, there still remains the question of Marx's culpability. Is there, in Marx, an ambiguity, at best, or a contradiction, at worst, between a stress upon material conditions on the one hand and the stress upon the socialist objective on the other? Angus Walker, for instance, identifies a dualism in Marx between an evolutionary economic perspective on the one hand and a revolutionary politics on the other (Walker). And there has indeed been a split or dualism within Marxism between objectivist and subjectivist positions, between an economics identified with the objective and a politics identified with the subjective (Negri 1991:137). But, surely, far from existing in Marx himself, this is the dualism characterising bourgeois society which Marx himself sought to overcome? This, at least, is how Marx will be understood in the thesis presented here, as attempting to overcome the alienative separations and dualisms characterising bourgeois society (Meszaros 1995:337/8 737 951). The transition to the socialist society was a process based upon the development of the proletariat from being a class in to being a class-for-itself; it is a process mediated by the class consciousness and organisation of the proletariat (Miliband 1977:22 22/3 31 33 34 34/5 35 35/6; Draper 66 348 349/50; Meszaros 1995:791 924/5).

Since the responsibility for the attainment of the socialist society cannot be transferred to the autonomy of the economy and since the autonomous evolution of the economy is no substitute at all for the revolutionary socialist politics of the proletarian movement there is an evident need to recover the centrality of the class praxis of the proletariat (Perkins 1993:56). There is also the need to emphasise the emancipatory goal underpinning Marx's project of restitution. Human beings are to recover their alienated powers and subject them to conscious social control in the realm of freedom. Putting the point this way, the assertion of freedom as human self-determination over capital's objective necessity, one can understand that Marx does not have the proletariat merely reacting passively to economic stimuli. The 'economic’ as such ceases to be alien, external and determining.

Does Marx assert a productive forces determinism that makes socialism dependent upon the further development of the economy, that privileges the economic over the human, structure over agency? Marx argues that the essential condition for social revolution is that 'the productive powers already acquired and the existing social relations should no longer be capable of existing side by side'. Thus, there is a contradiction between forces and relations of production. Yet, what is sometimes overlooked is that Marx himself considered the development of the working class as the revolutionary class as part of the development of the forces of production. A productive forces determinism that privileges the economic as an external, 'objective' factor cannot be Marx's.

Of all the instruments of production, the greatest productive force is the revolutionary class itself. The organisation of the revolutionary elements as a class presupposes the existence of all the productive forces that could be engendered in the womb of the old society.

Marx The Poverty of Philosophy

Thus the development of the productive forces as the material condition for socialist politics can hardly be considered as purely evolutionary, objectivist process creating the opportunity for revolutionary activity, since the emergence of the working class as the revolutionary class forms part of this development. Hence, Marx avoids the split between objective conditions on the one and the subjective conditions on the other. He is very far from arguing that the proletarian movement simply awaits the fullest development of the productive forces, for the activity and organisation of the proletarian movement is itself a part of this fullest development. And the emergence of the proletariat as the revolutionary class is itself the revolutionary process leading to socialism. From being a class-in-itself as an objective but passive fact given by social relations the working class comes to constitute itself as a class-for-itself, possessing a subjective existence. Indeed, this very process of self-development, in which the proletariat constitutes itself as the revolutionary class, is sufficient evidence that the productive forces have developed to such an extent to make socialist revolution possible (Perkins 1993:59; Therborn 1976:65/6 71; Meszaros 1995:27/3 204/5; Gilbert 1981:151/2).

Rather than privilege the autonomy of the economy and its processes In achieving the socialist objective, a Marxist politics has to align itself with the tendency to autonomous proletarian class activity and organisation which does exist. This proletarian autonomy is not derived from the final breakdown of the capital system but is itself an integral part of that development of the productive forces bursting the fetters of the relations of production. Thus, the emergence of the revolutionary class is the result of the continuous attempts of the proletariat to throw off the exploitation and domination it suffers at the hands of capital. Thus, one can understand how the working class has continually looked to innovate forms of thought, action and organisation to secure their rising aspirations as a revolutionary class, resolving any crisis of their political agencies which result from being either outmoded by development or absorbed within the institutional and structural framework of existing society.

The great organisations of the masses of the people and of workers in the past were not worked out by any theoretical elite or vanguard. They arose from the experience of millions of people and their need to overcome the intolerable pressures which society had imposed upon them for generations .. the new organisations will come as Lilburne's Leveller Party came, as the sections and popular societies of Paris in 1793, as the Commune in 1871 and the Soviets in 1905, with not a single soul having any concrete ideas about them until they appeared in all their power and glory.




The proletariat is today suffering one of these crises in its political agencies (Miliband 1989:223) and it is possible to argue that there will be no development of working class politics until new and autonomous forms are developed.

Given that the autonomous evolution of the economy cannot substitute for the revolutionary activity of the class subject, i.e. the proletariat as a true subject determining events, and that capital's socialisation cannot in itself lead to socialism, there is a need to recover the importance of politics and ethics to socialism. In Marx's conception, the development of productive forces and their conflict with the relations of production were expressed and articulated most explicitly in the class struggle. This struggle becomes increasingly politicised as the class becomes conscious and hence converts the economic or wages struggle into a struggle for fundamental change and democratic social control. ln these struggles subaltern classes acquire a revolutionary consciousness and become ascendant. These politicised struggles between descendant and ascendant forces (Parekh) are themselves the 'locomotives of history’ for Marx (Gilbert 1981:14).

Marx avoids political subjectivism. Socialist politics is not a politics of will and consciousness alone but in relation to potentialities immanent in the social structure. Without the appropriate material context, political activity will be insufficient to realise socialism. Yet political activity retains a certain importance. For what Held calls crises with transformative potential, understanding transformative as a euphemism for 'revolutionary’, occur only periodically. To realise, even recognise, this transformative potential requires fairly rapid political innovation on the part of the revolutionary subject. But, since these crises can be anticipated - and it is here that the importance of Marx's critical analysis of capital's contradictory dynamics proves its worth - it is necessary to argue that the character of revolutionary socialist organisation in the period leading up to these crises is actually of crucial significance in determining whether revolutionary potential is actualized or not (Gilbert 1981:15). Thus





The autonomous evolution of the economy cannot be expected to deliver socialism and, since this is so, there is every need to develop and sustain a political movement that is able to conceive of an alternative social order. Indeed, this may well be a condition of successful revolutionary activity (Kolakowski 1969:90/1).

Moreover, this revolutionary preparation entails more than the development of a revolutionary political strategy. If socialisation can no longer be conceived as automatically evolving into socialism, which was the orthodox position, then the importance of politics but also of ethics as decisive factors shaping determining outcomes is to be recovered in relation to immanent material potentialities.

Thus, beyond political strategy, the very conception of the nature of socialise and why people ought to embrace socialism needs to be addressed.

Beyond strategy, the very conception of socialism requires an emphasis on values, on the non-economic as well as on the economic. If socialisation is no longer thought of as the automatic consequence of the economic development of capitalist society, as a transition from capitalist monopoly to socialist monopoly; if, on the contrary, socialisation is understood as the conscious control of their destiny by the people; then it is clearly a goal that extends to all of society, not just to the economy. It involves a shift in culture, in psychology, in the very self-conception of the individuals who have previously accepted a subordinate condition (Aronowitz 1981:265).






The socialist society is to be achieved not as the automatic product or the autonomous evolution of history. Rather the attainment of the socialist society depends upon the activity of the proletariat. 'Only the working class, through its own activity, can make the word flesh' (Luxemburg in Howard ed. 1971:369). The view taken here is that, contrary to the Callinicos thesis, the proletariat is the subject-object of history. The proletariat may indeed be the product of capitalism, but this does not make it passive and inert within prevailing economic relations. The proletariat may be an objective fact as a 'class-in-itself’ but it may nevertheless attain a subjective existence by becoming conscious of itself as a class, organising itself and setting about the fundamental transformation of society. Thus, a Marxist politics is oriented towards facilitating the process in which the proletariat, through its class praxis, comes to develop the class consciousness and revolutionary will that is essential to abolish the capital system (Geras 1986:127/9; Engels in McCarney 1990:81).

Marx's early conception of the proletariat as the emancipatory-revolutionary class, i.e. as a class subject, continued to be Marx's conception, despite the increasing emphasis upon economic processes in his later studies. Marx's critical analysis came to focus upon the contradictory dynamics of the capital system and it is this stress that allowed the theorists of the Second International to dispense altogether with the class agency as crucial to the attainment of socialism (Perkins 1993:87/91; Colletti 1972; Timpanaro 1975). Indeed, the proletariat existed for the parties of the International only as a mass whose value to the party lay in its numbers promising electoral victory (Perkins 1993:2). That the proletariat was actually the revolutionary force whose activity was central to social transformation was a perspective lost as the theorists of orthodoxy shifted the responsibility for revolution to capitalism's economic contradictions and evolution.

This devaluation of the class praxis of the proletariat had its rationale in the bureaucratic political practice of the parties of the Second International. Such parties looked upon themselves as the revolutionary agency. Orthodoxy, moreover, held a view of historical materialism - Plekhanov coined the term dialectical materialism - which made socialism, politics and class struggle the automatic reactions to the autonomous, contradictory evolution of 'the economy’.

What is required, then, is an awareness of the centrality of the proletariat as the revolutionary agency, one that recovers the emancipatory, creative character of the class and its praxis (Perkins 1993:2). 

The Stress on the Internal Mechanisms of the Capital System
Marx's increasing emphasis upon the contradictory dynamics of the capital system shifted attention away from the proletariat as the revolutionary agency and it is this emphasis which the Second International converted into a full blown economic evolutionism. This development could be corrected by integrating Marx's economic analysis with the stress that he continued to place upon the necessary political agency of the proletariat. The point is that Marx's original conception of the proletariat as the emancipatory-revolutionary class fundamentally remained Marx's conception, though, certainly, it acquired greater social depth. That the proletariat possessed a revolutionary mission, a universal significance and an emancipatory function remained Marx's view.

It is arguable that Marx himself undermined these assumptions when seeming to privilege the law of motion of the capital economy. Thus the objective determinism of capital economy came to constrain the emancipatory-revolutionary activity of the proletariat. The economic factor, then, seemed determining, with human action merely reactive to economic stimuli and hence determinant. The creative, transformative agency of the proletariat was thus devalued in favour of the autonomous evolution of the economy.





Indeed, the failure of the proletarian movement to abolish the capital system as an objective determinism and a systemic dehumanisation represents a failure 'on the part of the proletariat to carry out its mission to rehumanise the social world. And only the proletariat, the class of 'concrete labour' from whom, surplus value is extracted, can engage in this transformative action. And it should be underlined that the economic analysis that Marx came to concentrate upon was not a political economy privileging the economic factor but a critique of political economy that 'looked' to expose the contradictory dynamics of the capital economy leading to the dissolution of this economy. It was meant to aid the proletariat as it put an end to the 'dehumanisation and determinism of the capital system.
As Vazquez put the point: 





This explains Marx's concentration upon the contradictory dynamics of the capital economy, laying bare the ‘law of motion’ of capitalism so as to facilitate the class praxis of the proletariat. The critical insights obtained by Marx would be incorporated into that praxis, orienting it. Here, once more, one appreciates the unity of theory and practise achieved by Marx (Vazquez 1977:95).





The emancipatory-revolutionary conception of the proletariat, therefore, is central to Marxist politics. The critical analysis which placed a heavy emphasis upon the economic factor is not meant to displace the class agency by stressing the determinism of the economy.

The main controversy concerns whether the proletariat can at all be considered as retaining its emancipatory-revolutionary character if the autonomy of the economy comes to be privileged. For Marx' s point was that the proletarian movement, in throwing off the domination of exchange value, strikes a blow for human freedom as self-determination. The economy is not to be conceived as an objective, external datum operation, according to laws of its own, which is precisely how the capital system as an alienated system of production is experienced (Meszaros 1995:314/5 315 539/540 544 812; Negri 1991:xxv xxvi/viii 8 10 33 38 54 56 67/9 70 72 73 79 91 93/4 94 96/8 102 118 125 152 155/60 162/3. 165; 'Clarke 1991:142/3 234 313 314 315 317/8 318/9 322/3). The point is to overcome this alien character through an active process of reappropriation.

The danger is that the revolutionary praxis of the proletariat comes to be displaced by the evolution and the breakdown of the capital system. This danger was fully expressed in the Second International. There is no doubt that Marx thought the attainment of socialism to be dependent upon the development of the appropriate material conditions, but the emergence of the proletariat in a subjective sense, in terms of politics, consciousness and organisation, forms an essential part of these material conditions for Marx. Indeed, this whole process in which the material preconditions for socialism issue in the socialist society are to be mediated by the revolutionary class consciousness and organisation of the proletariat. Thus, the emergence of socialism was never for Marx an inevitability resulting from the autonomous evolution of history as it was for orthodox theorists. The proletarian class agency is either absent in the orthodox conception or merely made reactive to economic stimuli external to it (Perkins 1993:56).

But it is no longer orthodoxy which is the target against which a Marxist politics centred upon the class subject is to be defined. The traditional Marxist view which conceived the proletariat as the principal revolutionary agency has been rejected by anarchists, Greens and by post-marxist and post-modernist critics of socialism. It is against these trends that the centrality of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject is to be restated in more defensible terms than that of the old revolutionary vanguardism (Pepper 1993:213/4). This means recognising the force of the arguments of those who have questioned the working class as the revolutionary agent.

Ken Post considers the concept of universality, with its implications that working class consciousness is the key to all political struggle, to be highly suppositious, even if we are going to give priority to class consciousness as such. He argues that ‘the peripheral working classes are only one part of capital's creation of a system of exploitation and often not the main one’ (Post 1996:328/9). Which begs the question that if such working classes are ‘peripheral’, then who or what are the main parts of capital’s exploitative system? And why they are not considered part of the proletariat. Post denies Marx’s central claim that the proletariat are the class in radical chains, the ‘universal class’ whose self-emancipation emancipates society in general. Post argues that ‘the claim that the 'proletariat' in affect represents the oppressed classes and groups as a whole and subsumes their interests and struggles into its own can only be true in a very limited sense. The others have their own bases for constitution as subjects in opposition to capital. The key point is that the working class's basic condition of existence, the extraction of surplus labour in the surplus value/commodity form through wage labour, is not that of the others and cannot be assumed for them in a representation which would thus be a metaphysical annulment of both the material and the concrete’ (Post 1996:328/9).

Post argument spectacularly misses Marx’s point concerning the proletariat. The capital system is an organised system of exploitation which is sustained by the extraction of surplus labour through the wage form. Without that exploitation, capital does not exist. The self-emancipation of the working class, therefore, puts an end to this organised exploitation and therefore emancipates all sections of society from capitalist exploitation. Remember Marx’s argument that in an exploitative society, all are subject to a general alienation. The difference between the bourgeois and the proletariat is that the bourgeois are comfortable in their alienation. In emancipating themselves, however, the proletariat put an end to the conditions generating alienation, and therefore emancipate all others, comfortable or not. In other words, in designating the proletariat as the ‘universal class’, Marx well knew that the proletariat’s ‘basic conditions of existence’ is different from that of others. It is the structural centrality of the proletariat to the system of exploitation that gives them the capacity to change the system of general exploitation and alienation and thereby represent all oppressed classes and groups as a whole. Post denies that claim. He is entitled to. He is not, however, entitled to call what remains a ‘regained marxism’. He denies this vociferously:





It is not clear what this lag in theoretical development behind the progress of capital refers to. Marx, after all, designated capitalism as the ‘universal mode of production’ back in the 1840s. There is debate to be had over the new social, international and spatial division of labour, but the existence and increase of a worldwide proletariat as a result of the globalisation of capitalist relations is not in doubt. In this sense, one can agree with Nigel Harris that with globalisation, ‘the world is catching up with Marx’s outline of the tendencies of capitalism rather than superseding it… In the long term, the hundred years since his death will be seen as a very short period; few will remember all the deviations and false starts along the way’ (Harris 1991:123).

The Questioning Of The Working Class
Adam Przeworski has placed a rather large question mark against the conception of the working class as the revolutionary agency. Przeworski does more than note the failure of the proletariat historically to constitute itself as the revolutionary class. Such arguments, for and against, can quickly degenerate into tautology: ultimately the only proof for the revolutionary character of the working class is the proletarian revolution itself, in which case there is nothing to argue about, only a politics to be engaged in (or not). To this extent the question of proletarian revolution has something of the character of a self-fulfilling prophecy – as indeed does much politics.

What Przeworski does is question the very notion of the proletariat as an objective a priori class. Does this mean denying that the working class exists as a class-in-itself, i.e. as an objective fact defined in terms of the relationship to the means of production? Przeworski would appear to be part of that trend which moves from denying a necessary relationship between economic structure on the one hand and politics and ideology on the other to dissolving structure out of existence. Is this fair criticism?
Przeworski explicitly challenges the whole notion of a class-in-itself on account of its objectivist character. The main problem with Marxism, Przeworski argues, is that it has uncritically assumed the proletariat as a class to be an unproblematical category. More, Marxism has been undialectical in its conception of history in assuming that there is a proletarian class. Przeworski's point is that Marxism assumes the existence of the proletariat as being among the constituents of capitalism whereas it is more adequate to argue that as capitalism develops classes form as the result of struggles. The Marxists put the point the other way round, struggles occur as a result of the development of classes.

Przeworski's argument is that the formation of classes results from struggles about class. But, if this is the case, it is hard to know what these struggles could be about. Without that foundation in material interests and relations, i.e. some objective conception of class and class structure, there is nothing for struggles to go to work upon. The things to struggle about emerge only in the struggle itself, in which case good reasons to engage in struggle in the first place cannot be offered. Marxism does at least have the capacity to avoid the tautological consequences of this argument through the distinction that Marx draws between class-in-itself and class-for-itself. This unites structural and processual conceptions. 

In a sense, then, the working class does indeed 'make' itself by constituting itself as a subjective reality possessing a self-consciousness social identity. But it can only do this and attain this consciousness on account of possessing an objective reality given by class location in the social relations of production.

There is indeed a struggle involved here as the proletariat, from being an objective a priori class-in-itself, constitutes itself into being a class-for-itself possessing a subjective significance as a self-conscious, self-acting class. In the sense of emerging as a subjective reality, the proletariat does indeed create itself as a result of struggle. But Przeworski argues a very different thesis. He would argue that the Marxist view, by basing itself on an a priori conception, already knows what will emerge from this process of struggle and hence cannot really entertain the constitutive conception of struggle which he holds. Thus the struggles which Przeworski argues leads to class formation

structured by the totality of economic, political and ideological relations, and they have an autonomous effect upon the process of class formation, then the places in the relations of production .. can no longer be viewed as objective in the sense of the problematic of class-in-itself that is in the sense of determining uniquely what classes will emerge as classes in struggle. What this implies is that classification of positions must be viewed as immanent to the practices that (may) result in class formation.

Przeworski 'Proletariat into Class: , The Process of Class Formation from Karl Kautsky's 'Class Struggle' to Recent Controversies', Politics and Society, vol 7, no 4.

Przeworski thus rejects any notion of historical inevitability and, indeed, the less strong term historical necessity. For if it is struggle that is decisive in class formation then classes can no longer be considered to be given within capitalist society. This view, which is bound to sound extremely to a Marxist, that capitalism is not an inherently class structured society, that the expropriation of the means of production from the producing class does not entail an objective class division - which even critics of Marx like Weber unambiguously accepted - derives from conceiving class formation as the result of struggle rather than vice versa. 

Przeworski, moreover, argues that class formation is the effect of relations which are far broader than economic in character. Thus the struggles which occur cannot be reduced to struggles over material interests. In struggle, particular groups - and they could be any group on Przeworski's premises - come to struggle on whatever terrain they situate themselves. Intellectuals thus struggle on the intellectual terrain.

Any point that this somewhat circular reasoning could have could only be to devalue the proletariat within the emancipatory project. The proletariat is just one group amongst many with no priority over other groups on account of its class location.

And Przeworski does make a point of arguing that the industrial working class can be assigned no privileged status in this class formation given that, as a product of the development of capitalism, it may itself cease to have any historical significance. Przeworski refers to the importance of technology and the state sector in late capitalism here. But one wonders what the controversy is really about. The constitution and reconstitution of classes through the restructuring of social relations is surely part of the ABC of Marxism. Marx's whole approach is historicist in this sense. Przeworski would appear to be attempting to argue that emancipatory struggles are of more than economic significance and that there are social actors other than the proletariat, whether this proletariat is industrial or not.

In response, one needs to define the proletariat in terms of process. The proletariat, in a very real sense, constitutes itself as a class by developing its organisational, moral, intellectual and political capacities. There is nothing inevitable about this self-development, though one can argue that it is necessary. Marx himself leaves the possibility that the proletariat may not so act. Re-affirmed here is the notion of a transition from-being a class-in-itself to being a class-for-itself. One can raise the question of class capacities, the importance of relations over (objectively defined) forces of production and prioritise the development of organisational and cultural resources in the struggles of the proletariat.

Przeworski, however, rejects any such notion of a class-in-itself on account of its objective a priori character. Classes are formed in struggle for Przeworski whereas for Marx struggles express class division rooted in social structure.

Przeworski recognises the historicity of Marx's conception. Thus he challenges Marxists to respect Marx's principle of historical specificity so as to abolish its a priori privileging of the industrial proletariat.

And, as with the post-marxists, one notes the Althusserian background. Thus Przeworski's argument is based upon Althusser's critique of classes considered as continuous subjects, whose existence is independent of change other than that between modes of production. For historical subjects are themselves the product of struggles concerning the formation of classes. For Przeworski, economic, political and ideological relations are relatively autonomous within the social totality. Thus he argues that whilst proletarianisation is a part of the development of capital, the proletariat do not necessarily become integral to the relations of the reproduction of capital, they do not necessarily become productive workers. Yet this process of proletarianisation, in which individuals are alienated from the means of production, leads to struggles on the economic terrain which may or may not have the effect of leading to class formations which are distinct from the old proletariat. Depending upon the character of specific capitalist development, these struggles may or may not lead to class formation.

It is thus clear that the old Marxist distinction between material base and superstructure is extinguished. Przeworski's aim is to repudiate the conception of the proletariat and of socialism dominant in the Marxist political tradition. Thus he argues that it is no longer plausible to argue for a socialist party and ideology defined in terms of expressing an already-formed proletariat into a class conscious historical agency. Przeworski's argument is that the question of whether classes are formed is contingent upon the social formation but that, in this class formation, a specific formation may become the revolutionary or historical agent depending upon the availability of appropriate political and ideological conditions. The proletariat will not become the revolutionary, socialist class without political and ideological struggle.

But, in shifting emphasis from the idea of socialism as implicit in objective class location, has not Przeworski restated the old justification for the socialist party and socialist consciousness - ideology - in new form? (Aronowitz 1981:106). For the whole notion seems to be predicated upon the political and epistemological incapacity of the proletariat. If a necessary relation between class position and political and ideological position is denied, then socialism is not implicit in the class location of the proletariat, and there is no necessary relation between the proletariat and socialism. But Przeworski asserts the purely conjunctural character of class formation, thus repudiating the a priori conception of class based upon structural criteria like class location within social relations. Przeworski then goes on to deny the notion of the proletariat as the class ‘in radical chains'. Finally, class consciousness is no longer conceived as being derived from the position occupied by social actors given the autonomy of ideological relations within the social totality.

On these premises, Marxism, the proletariat and revolutionary socialism frankly disintegrate. They are defined out of existence. Przeworski denies the existence of class as an objective fact, denies the reality of class location within social relations, denies relations of exploitation and domination, denies the relation between the proletariat and socialism, and finally dissolves the proletariat itself. Przeworski explicitly rejects Marxism on all the main points. His own argument combines historical specificity and conjuncture to explain the formation of classes. He does this to insist that social groups other than the proletariat may become revolutionary actors. Opposition to capitalism may arise from any of those who have been alienated from the ownership of the means of production, but that these are not necessarily those who are productive workers:





Many of the criticisms that may be made of Przeworski’s critique of Marxism are those which have been made of Hirst and Hindess, Laclau and Mouffe. More relevant here is to question Przeworski's repudiation of the centrality of the proletariat and the assertion that other social actors may be revolutionary or historical agents. The conclusion that follows from this is that any emancipatory, anti-capitalist project has to be able to incorporate a whole number of social actors, with no privileged position for the proletariat. Indeed, for many, the very reference to 'the proletariat' is problematic. For these critics, the notion of a united working class triumphing in the class struggle and proceeding to transform society from the roots up can no longer be sustained in the modern world where fragmentation characterises the class structure. Indeed, from assertions of the complexity of the modern class structure, these critics move on to deny that the working class, as some homogeneous entity, ever corresponded to reality. And if 'the’ working class never really existed - the point that even in the middle of the nineteenth century there were more workers in domestic service than in the factories - it certainly does not exist now in an international division of labour presided over by the transnational corporations (Harrington 1993:2).

The Complexity Of Class
 Marx himself had adopted a fairly simple two class model of society. He assumed that the proletariat would form the major part of the population and that socialism itself was implicit in this proletariat. Hence Marx could quite easily align his socialism with winning the battle for democracy. The proletariat, with their implicit socialist consciousness, would form the majority in society. But it is these assumptions of a proletarian majority and of a homogeneous proletariat united in their conscious purpose which are thought to be problematic. Marx himself recognised that the view presented in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, of a final and direct collision between a large and united proletariat on the one hand and a small bourgeoisie on the other, was simplistic. Marx came, to recognise both complexity and the expansion, rather than the diminution, of the middle class.

 In the modern world the assumption of a simple cohesive working class has been shown to be untenable. The working class, nationally and internationally, has been internally divided on the basis of skill, gender, religion and race. The reality of intra- as well as inter-class struggle needs to be recognised. Moreover, a powerful factor threatening to undermine the possibility of ever attaining unity amongst the working class lies in the way that these intra-class differences can become institutionalised as each group looks to further its particular interest. Such intra-class division effectively blocks the success of the class as a whole in the inter-class struggle, especially when particular groups asserts its particular interest or power to obtain concessions within the system and at the expense of other groups (Harrington 1993:21; Meister 1990).

Since the Second World War the shift towards a new professional class and an expanded service sector made it patently clear that the industrial working class could no longer be assigned the central importance it had traditionally possessed. The question that Marxists had to face, and still face, is whether or not its socialist revolution had been shorn of its revolutionary agency and hence whether or not socialism had become once more, merely an ideal detached from the means of its realisation. Marxists had always rejected the utopianism and idealism of those for whom socialism represented an ideal society. These ethical socialists would project the vision of the good or just society but were unable to specify the precise social and class forces which possessed the material capacity to realise the ideal. But, deprived of the centrality of its revolutionary agency, 'the' working class, have not Marxists ended upon effectively in the position of the Utopians and the idealists they once criticised? (Harrington 1993). No. 

The Process Of Class Formation
There is a tendency for these criticisms to slide off from changes in class composition into the completely unwarranted assertion that classes are either no longer important or that, even worse, no longer exist. One can accept that the notion of the existence of 'the' working class as something homogeneous, cohesive, and united is rather presumptuous. If such a class existed why would Marx feel it necessary to call upon the workers of the world to unite. This very call presumes the reality of division and disunity in the class. One can accept too that the idea of 'the' working class acting in some inevitable way as the revolutionary agent, executing the will of history, is incredible and corresponds less to anything that Marx ever wrote than to the self-serving political rationalisations of the Communists – whose emphasis upon the primacy and unity of ‘the party’ showed that they only half believed it anyway. If politics has to be about something - material interests, class struggle etc. - then it is also true that politics too is more than the passive reflex of objective relations. If socialism and class unity were the inevitable products of class location then there would be nothing for politics to do. Yet once one integrates Marx's own political activism on the proletarian side of the struggle one begins to appreciate that the idea of inevitable class triumph leading to socialism is caricature.

That the inability of the proletariat to constitute itself as a united revolutionary class agency has been the principal factor in the failure to attain the socialist society in the twentieth century should be apparent. But the question is really what significance one reads into this failure. For those who would write the proletariat off as a revolutionary agency on account of this failure must logically uphold the view of the inevitability of class unity and revolutionary socialism, without the need for political and ideological struggle as material practices. The proletariat did not emerge as revolutionary actors, the proletarian transformation of politics did not occur. Therefore the proletariat is to be written off.

For those who take more account of Marx's revolutionary political activism, the more pertinent questions are directed not, so much against the proletariat as against the organs and agencies of proletarian politics and struggle. How well have these served in orienting the proletarian movement towards the realisation of socialism? In answering this question, there is also a need to address the question as to why Marx was so keen upon proletarian political independence, why, ideologically, he was so insistent upon striking bourgeois and petty bourgeois principles out of the declarations of the workers movement?

Clearly, Marx did not assume the inevitability of the class emerging as a united, revolutionary agency as a matter of course and clearly perceived the importance of political strategy. The argument here is that Marx's political strategy for proletarian revolution did not win out and that, from the beginning, the SPD owed much more to Lassalleanism than to Marx's Marxism. Hence Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme, hence the Circular Letter, hence Engels' critical correspondence with the SPD leadership. The point is that neither Marx nor Engels assumed that 'the' working class existed, that it would become revolutionary in some automatic sense and that, therefore, there was little for politics to do in the realisation of socialism.

The Reversion to Idealism and Utopianism
There is no problem at all in rejecting the notion of a homogeneous, always united and inevitably revolutionary proletariat. The problem is with the denial that the proletariat exists, possesses a common interest and identity as a class, could and should unite, can act in such a way as to express socialist demands for a new social order. It is this real movement by the proletariat, and not the myth of the proletariat, that is the basis of a genuinely Marxist politics.

Without the revolutionary agency, socialism becomes once more an ethical ideal lacking in social relevance. All the moral persuasion in the world will not suffice to realise this ideal. For the appeal to the ideal presupposes a social identity which, by clear admission, does not exist. Socialism has thus been shorn of its means of realisation. As a result, it has returned to the utopianism of the early nineteenth century and to the impotent ethical and academic idealism of the True Socialists of the 1840's. A Marxist would demand to know where the agency capable of realising this ideal society exists? If none can be specified, then there are no grounds for social transformation, and no reason to assume that there is actually any historical tendency let alone a political movement leading towards this goal.


The Crisis of the Political Agencies of Labour
The approach to this problem fixes the view of the nature of the contemporary crisis of socialism. For if one believes that socialism has been shorn of its revolutionary content and purpose and that no social force can be specified as the agent of social transformation, then one really has returned, at best, to utopianism and idealism. One can embrace a theology of hope, with Bloch, on the off-chance that Utopia may inspire enough people to act. It never did to a sufficient extent in the past. Or one can redefine socialism as a moralism with no more than electoral significance. Here socialism is really subordinate, once more, to the parliamentary party aiming at the legislative redress of certain grievances and piecemeal social reformism.
Or one can argue that the problem lies not so much with the proletarian class agency as with the modes of thought, action and organisation that have prevailed within the proletarian movement. That this was the problem which concerned Marx is quite evident given the pains he took to ensure proletarian independence in political activity and to strike the ideological predilections of the bourgeois reformers and democrats from the proletarian declarations of principle.

My contention, then, is not so much that the proletarian agency failed - an inappropriate term, when one considers that working class radicalism and activism this century has easily been the most important force for social and democratic change (Miliband 1989) - but that the potential for the class to become a revolutionary subject has been constrained, even suffocated, by political and organisational forms more appropriate to the institutional and structural terrain of bourgeois society. This is not a new point. It is the point that the radical left wing of the Marxist movement, led by Luxemburg and Lenin, directed against the political passivity of the Second International. It is a point that Gramsci elaborated with great sophistication in the 1920s and 1930s. The Council Communists developed the criticism much further, condemning the party as such as a bourgeois institution.

It is in this context that one may refer to an interesting argument made by Miliband in connection with the crisis of socialism and the failure/absence of the working class as the revolutionary agency. Miliband is concerned here with the failures of the traditional parties of the left and how these are to be explained. His argument, however, has relevance in relation to revolutionary socialism too. The electoral parties have frankly failed in office and, understanding that real power lies with capital rather than the electorate, have come to adopt orthodox economic policies that divide and demoralise their own class constituency. The Communist parties, meanwhile, have vacillated between the rhetoric of their revolutionary mission and the reality of their social democratic practice.









Of course, Miliband can be criticised for upholding the notion of an inbuilt majority for socialism within the proletariat, and, indeed, has been so criticised by Hindess. But, to turn the criticism around, it is that tradition which has upheld the autonomy of politics and ideology, detaching socialism from the working class, which has been responsible for this crisis of the agencies. When we refer to the traditional political agencies of the left, the argument is not so much that we have lost the working class revolutionary subject but have never really had it. In what socialism that has prevailed, it has been very clear that ‘the party’, whether reformist or revolutionary, had usurped the role that had been assigned to the working class and, in consequence, had come to block the self-development which was so crucial to the class constitution of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject. In this sense the real tragedy of Marxism is indeed to be found in the abandonment of the working class, its material organisations and the principle of self-emancipation (Clarke 1991:328).

It is this that is the real explanation for the failure to attain socialism. To pursue Miliband's point, the crisis of socialism lies not so much in the proletarian class subject as in the agencies and organisations which have traditionally claimed to represent labour. There is no problem with recognising that the working class is subject to internal divisions around skill, gender, race and religion. And there is no problem with recognising that the character of the proletariat is subject to continuous change as capital restructures itself. Modes of thought, action and organisation need to change to correspond with such changes and complexities. Where on earth does Marx deny this? Indeed, the view is entirely consistent with Marx’s notion of historical and social specificity. It says something about political failure that such a trite observation can be considered such a critical point.

 The real problem lies with the denial of the proletariat as the revolutionary class. The view taken here re-affirms the revolutionary character of the proletariat on account of its being the class of labour from whom surplus value is extracted and without which capital could not exist. It is this that gives the proletariat material capacity and social futurity, the ability to subvert the power of capital and constitute a new social order.

 The Caricature Of Marxism's Class Understanding
It should be noted that none of this argument justifies the caricature that even sympathetic critics cannot resist when delineating Marxist class politics. 

Thus Harrington writes: 




Thus, even if the Marxist left were right in arguing that the revisionists had abandoned commitment to the future socialist society, the revisionists were nevertheless right to do so given the new realities. But the language is to the disadvantage of the radicals - 'vision', 'faith’, 'collective Messiah', ‘true believers'. And where is the evidence that the revisionists were more realistic than the radicals? The twentieth century has been plunged into crisis, depression and war. Some may think 'barbarism’ too strong a term, given material improvement, but the scale of genocide and destruction far exceeded anything that Marx could have imagined, or even Luxemburg when she posed it as an alternative to socialism. As for myopia, the perspectives of the German Social Democrats, not only before the 1914-18 war but after it, in relation to the new republic and the working class militancy, would not be believed were it not a matter of historical record.

Then there is Ken Post:





The Marxist goal is condemned by Post as 'blind faith'. There are, however, much better ways of formulating the nature of the proletariat as the revolutionary agency and the achievement of socialism, one that does not require assertions of the class being 'bound' to drive history to its necessary goal.

Post, for reasons he himself gives elsewhere in his book, ought to have been more cautious in citing the authority of Laclau and Mouffe in support of his criticism of the old Marxist 'faith'. How much more valid is their notion of the revolutionary agency?





Harrington is right to note these contemporary trends within the working class, but how right is the assumption that Marx made the proletariat's tendency to socialism a reaction to external economic stimuli? This applies to orthodoxy but not, it can be argued, to Marx himself. Of course, making revolutionary politics dependent upon external economic stimuli makes socialism a hostage to fortune. The changing character of 'the economic' changes the stimuli to which human beings passively react. And it is this changing character of 'the economic’, conceived externally and objectively, which lies behind the new revisionism. And here there is a very strong strain of the old technological determinism (Bonefeld et al I 1992 :ix).

The Fragmentation of the Working Class
This is not to deny that Marx himself accentuated the socialist potentialities of the objective socialisation of the capital system. These socialising processes would indeed bring the working class together and facilitate their identification of a common identity and class consciousness. The famous passage in Capital may be cited here, the one referring to the proletariat growing in number and increasing in unity. In this sense, the fragmentation of the working class in the complex modern class structure and division of labour is of obvious significance. If it were ever justifiable to rely upon economic mechanisms to bring the class subject together and compel it to act - and the argument here that is that it never was, regardless of the theorists of orthodoxy - then this is certainly a position lacking plausibility now. And it is in this sense that the proletariat, as a revolutionary subject, has to recover the political and intellectual responsibility for socialism that orthodoxy had transferred to the autonomous evolution of history.

For, as Meszaros argues (1989), the new working class is in a position similar to the old French peasants, as a 'sack of potatoes'. The working class are internally divided and there is no automatically operative economic mechanism that can he relied upon to unite the class, let alone, compel it to socialism.

In a certain sense this development can be welcomed. For it is arguable that Marx did come to emphasise the objective over the subjective factor in socialist revolution and class constitution (Perkins 1993). Thus centralisation, industrialisation and urbanisation came to be the crucial factors in working class constitution, as though unity, organisation and consciousness were mere reflexes of objective processes. Now, with fragmentation, it is clear that if there is ever to be such a thing as a working class subject, the core elements of this subjectivity - consciousness, activity, struggle, political organisation and principle, the very things which have been lacking in the socialist movement of the twentieth century - will have to prevail over reliance upon objective socialising processes. Thus the strategy that 'history' has forced upon the socialist movement is one that they should have embraced all along - that of making socialism dependent upon the self-emancipation and the self-development of the proletariat. Class constitution, which has something in common with Przeworski's notion of class formation, is something that the working class must achieve for themselves. 'History', if one restricts analysis to 'objective' processes, no longer guarantees socialism as an automatic reflex - not that Marx ever thought that it did, isolated statements notwithstanding.

One can, therefore, reject the idea that there is such a thing as an homogeneous working class whose activity would inevitably lead to socialism. Thus a political strategy that puts the emphasis upon subjective factors, which affirms the creativity of political and intellectual struggles as well as of values over objective processes, clearly shows the way forward. But, it should be noted, all of this is quite compatible with the retention of the working class as the revolutionary agency. 

There are those who appropriate Gramsci's name to justify a politics of alliances between classes. But this justification of alliances actually affirms that unity is possible. And if unity is possible between classes, it is certainly possible within classes. Whatever the internal differences within the working class, working class unity around a common interest and identity is possible, even though it would require an active political struggle. This idea of unity within a class is, to say the least, is as plausible as the idea of unity between classes.
The rejection of the classic Marxist formulation of the working class as the structurally decisive class comes with the implication that social class in general, and labour in particular, have become irrelevant. This is a staggering misreading of contemporary developments. As capitalism has become the universal mode of production, it has created an international proletariat of numbers far in excess of anything Marx could have imagined. Further, in the old industrialised countries, there remains a significant blue collar stratum alongside a growing white collar proletariat as well as the increasing participation of women in the labour force. These people are all workers and hence will be involved in labour struggles in one form or another; the new expanded global all point in the direction of a new socialism (Harrington 1993:262). Which begs the question as to why the proletariat and labour should be restricted to the blue collar stratum. There is nothing whatsoever in Marx to justify this equation of the working class with the industrial and the blue collar.

15 THE PROLETARIAT AS THE CLASS SUBJECT
From 1843 the proletariat has been the historical/revolutionary subject at the heart of Marxism. The criticism directed against this notion refers to marxism's tendency to privilege not so much the working class in general as the working class of a particular moment in history, the traditional working class, white, male and industrial. That this no longer corresponds, or corresponds only partially, to the modern world ought to be obvious enough. Is there any major Marxist study which actually denies this? Moreover, that emancipatory struggles occur on a number of terrains - race, gender as well as class - need not be denied but may readily be incorporated into the praxis of the emancipatory subjects. To relaunch the emancipatory project in such a way as to acknowledge the existence of a number of social groups means being critical of marxism's privileging of the proletariat as 'the' revolutionary subject.









The criticism that there is some kind of necessary relationship between Marx's privileging of the proletariat and the concept of the revolutionary vanguard party representing the proletariat can be directly challenged. The 'regaining' of Marxism, in this sense, would mean restoring the centrality of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject, taking pains to block any substitutionist tendencies which would insert 'the party' as an alienated form of organisation into the process of proletarian self-emancipation. Marx looked to extinguish the theoretico-elitist model from revolutionary politics through his action-oriented conception of knowledge.

The Privileging of the Proletariat?

Nevertheless, the criticism focuses not merely upon Marxism’s alleged vanguardism as upon its privileging of the working class. For Hartsock, 'class’ is an inadequate concept to cover all subjects in the emancipatory struggle. There are terrains other than class, and social groups may engage in struggle around issues of gender, ecology, race, nationality, religion and generation. Once this point is conceded - and there is no intrinsic reason why it shouldn't be - the task facing any attempt to 'regain’ Marxism as an emancipatory project is to accommodate all social actors within the movement for social transformation, insofar as these actors are indeed emancipatory in relation to the capital system.

What perhaps has made Marxists suspicious of the new social movements has not so much been the rejection of the 'old' class politics as the belief by certain strands of these emancipatory movements that their aims can be secured without the fundamental transformation of society. Sooner or later the question of class and of capital has to be brought back in. The question, then, relates to the status of the proletariat within the emancipatory project, its relation to other social actors, and the claims of the proletariat to these other actors. Marxism can incorporate other social actors so long as the proletariat retains a central place. The question is: how central?

Laclau and Mouffe have no doubt on this question. We should renounce any epistemological prerogative based upon the ontologically privileged position of a 'universal class' (1985:4). The very idea of a universal class conceals the crucial process by which individuals come to constitute themselves subjectively into a class. The notion of classes as possessing an objective a priori existence is rejected. Individuals come to constitute themselves into a class only by a process of uneven development. This process, moreover, cannot be reduced to the economic level, though it may indeed be related to it. Hence Laclau and Mouffe affirm the importance of ideological discourses in constituting the emancipatory subject. With the discovery of the plurality of social actors, the idea that the proletariat occupies a central, let alone an exclusive place in the emancipatory project is firmly rejected.

Thus the working class and its class struggle no longer possesses a privileged place in the emancipatory project. This project may still be centred upon class, but it is recognised, that with other social actors struggling on a number of terrains, this project may developed in directions other than the class struggle. The transition is thus made from an emancipatory struggle centred upon the proletariat as the epistemologically and structurally privileged class, the Marxist conception, to a struggle that incorporates a plurality of social actors and hence excludes the notion of a universal, privileged subject.

The Centrality of the Proletariat
But was Marx really denying the legitimacy of other forms of struggle when he characterised the proletariat as the universal class? Of course there are social actors other than the proletariat. The crucial question, though, is how many of these possess the material capacity and social futurity which enables them to embark upon the successful transformation of the capital system? Capital as 'dead' or alienated labour is the power dominating the fetishised world. As the power of labour in alien form, capital's power is derivative and hence always subject to the attempts of the working class to reappropriate its power. In fighting against relations of exploitation, the working class resists the extraction of surplus value from them which is the source of capital. It follows that the proletariat alone can act to obstruct and subvert capital’s mechanisms of valorisation and accumulation. It is this structural capacity that identifies the proletariat as the ‘universal class’. And it is this that marks the proletariat out as central to the emancipatory project. Without the proletariat the emancipatory project cannot proceed very far. Hence, even taking the point that there are social actors other than the proletariat, none of these can expect to carry the social and structural weight of the proletariat. Capital is the alien power that dominates all, capitalists, proletarians and all social actors. Capital subjects all to 'objective dependency' denying freedom. But, Marx argues, there are some, the possessing class, who are comfortable in their alienation. These will not act to abolish the capital system. The proletariat, however, not only resist their dehumanisation as they become conscious of it, they possess the material power to abolish capital's alienated system of production.

The power of capital is really the alienated power of labour. Labour can reclaim this power as their own. In abolishing capital, the proletariat actually emancipate the whole of society from capital's domination, dehumanisation and dependency. Hence Marx's designation of the proletariat as the universal class has nothing to do with an arbitrary preference for the proletariat. It has nothing to do with denying the validity of other emancipatory struggles and social actors.

The problems really amount to the way that Marx tends to privilege class to the exclusion of other social groups. Thus, when he writes that 'the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle' (Manifesto of the Communist Party) Marx would certainly appear to be arguing that classes are the only subjects of history. And if only classes can be considered as subjects, emancipatory or otherwise, then this does indeed amount to the denial of the significance of social groups struggling over issues of race, religion, nation, gender, ecology and generation.

What Marx was looking for in any social group was the structural capacity to transform society from the bottom up. And though Marx's conception was never narrowly economic, a Marxist is committed to prioritising material factors in historically significant change. And it is this that makes the proletariat and class struggle of greater relevance to Marxism than the struggles of the new social movements. Hence the centrality of the working class, class struggle and consciousness to Marxism. That this can lead to a tendency to devalue other social actors and their struggles can be accepted. The question really is does Marxism systematically devalue other social actors and can it incorporate emancipatory struggles other than those based upon class?
In attacking the privileging of the proletariat in Marxism, critics are really attacking Marxism itself. David Lovell has argued that 'to question Marx's concept of the proletariat is to question Marx's concept of class itself. Moreover the proletariat is more than just the agency of socialism in Marx's theory; it is the element of theoretical coherence' (Lovell 1988:221 222).





If the proletariat, Marx's agency for realising the socialist ideal, has become marxism’s biggest liability, one needs to know what kind of Marxism is in the process of being reinvented. For the abandonment of the proletariat occurred practically during the Second International to such an extent that the revolutionary syndicalists and the industrial unionists consciously defined their struggles in opposition to the socialist parties. This abandonment of the proletariat lies behind Marxism's tragedy in the twentieth century (Clarke 1991:328). Just how central was the proletariat and its class praxis to the Marxist parties? Lovell might be making a theoretical point, but it is noticeable how easily critics slide from the political record of socialism in the twentieth century to theoretical deficiencies in Marxism as such. Which political party, Communist or Social Democratic, really did embody and express the central Marxist notion of proletarian self-emancipation? Political failure does not justify abandoning the proletariat, it stems from this abandonment in the first place. This was precisely Luxemburg’s and Gramsci’s point at the start of the twentieth century.

A Marxism without the proletariat is inconceivable or, rather, presupposes that the capital system has finally been abolished and the proletariat has dissolved itself into humanity in general. Which means, as Sartre argued, that the realm of freedom has been attained and marxism’s relevance has been exhausted.

But this is not what the critics are proposing. One wonders how they are to transcend the capital system, whether they believe the capital system to be transcendable, whether capital even exists at all as the target of their emancipatory struggle. Or even if emancipation as such means anything to them. Gregor McLellan argues for all references to emancipation to be dropped. There is a grim irony in these developments. As ex-radicals retreat back to positions akin to the uncritical pluralism of the 1950s, many of the original pluralists like Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom have come to appreciate the force of Marxist criticisms and embraced a more critical perspective.

To repeat a few Marxist verities, capital only exists and can only continue existing through the extraction of surplus value from the proletariat. So long as capital exists the proletariat will exist. Capital is parasitic upon labour. To eliminate the proletariat from Marxism on account of its liability implies a fundamental redefinition of the emancipatory goal.

The Continuing Relevance of Class Struggle
The proletariat are far from being ready for being consigned to history. On a global scale, the proletariat have never been bigger. Further, its record as the historical agency is nowhere near as poor as the ‘revolutionaries’ of the bourgeois academy like to suggest. Whether their activity has been reformist or revolutionary or simply reactive, whether involved in the strike wave before the First World War, whether creating Soviets and councils, building and maintaining trade unions against the hostile power of employers, politicians and police, whether leading the struggles against mass unemployment, fighting in Spain, winning the streets of the East End against the Fascists - the list can be extended into a book - the working class has been clearly the main force for humanisation and democratisation in the modern world. And this without ever becoming self-consciously, politically and organisationally, the revolutionary subject it is capable of being. In the late twentieth century, with the globalisation of capital's economic relations, the proletariat remains by far the strongest candidate for the role of emancipatory historical subject. Why this should be so will be the subject of further analysis here.]
Those who criticise the class politics of Marxism persistently ignore the fact that, as Heilbroner (1980) and Miliband (1999) point out, that Marx's conception is one of latent class conflict. Classes need not form themselves into solid, single, homogeneous entities and engage in the most direct of class struggles. This conflict is one of subterranean tensions and semi-conscious struggles continually generated through the way that society is organised under the mode of production. In this sense history as the history of class struggle is, by and large, a secret history. The struggle between the protagonists is ongoing, whether these protagonists are consciously or politically aware of this, struggle or not.

Indeed, this concentration upon the proletariat - does it exist, is it revolutionary, is it fragmented? - has allowed the existence of the capitalist class to go unchallenged. The collection of essays edited by Bottomore makes it clear that whilst the left persists in an almost neurotic debate over the existence of the proletariat, the capitalist class is very much alive and in control of vast global processes of investment, production and employment. Miliband is surely correct to argue that, whatever the debate concerning the complexity of the class structure and the fragmentation of the working class, there remains a corporate capitalist class controlling the economic and communication systems of the world and buttressed by the state and its coercive apparatus (Miliband 1989 ch 5). And if this capitalist class exists one needs to know from whom it is extracting surplus value. Assuming that the new post-socialist theorists have not fallen for the old saw that makes capital itself the generator of wealth, one needs to know the origin of capital. Which, of course, comes back to the proletariat and the politics of the production process and the regime of private appropriation and accumulation. The working class still exist (Callinicos and Harman). That they do not exist as a united, revolutionary force for abolishing the capital system amounts to a political failure of the agencies representing the class rather than a failure of the class itself. If the working class is internally divided and fragmented this is no justification for writing the working class off. It is a challenge to political strategy - unless one simply wishes to restate the technological determinism in which we have to accept whatever division of labour the capital system 'evolves'. Unity has to be struggled for.

In abandoning the proletariat, radical theorists do neither themselves nor the new social movements whom they embrace as the new emancipatory actors any favours. For the end in view of all emancipatory struggles is a new social order. This order needs to be structured, it needs to be organised, it needs to produce. Labour, the generator of the social wealth appropriated by capital, is a creative power capable of constituting this new social order from the bottom upwards. 

As Purchase argues, with the abolition of the capital system:





One can state the case for the working class as the revolutionary agency negatively by pointing out that the alternative candidates for revolutionary agents suggested by left critics of Marxism, the marginalised groups, the unemployed, the new social movements, are a lot less plausible social revolutionaries than are the working class, the class upon whose labour the system depends. Meszaros simply states that the working class remains the revolutionary agency, for there is no other, and that is about the only conclusion that can be drawn clearly.


16 PROLETARIAN AUTONOMY AND SUBJECTIVITY

This approach assumes that Marx's Marxism proceeded from the standpoint of the proletariat. It is an approach that is highly critical of that dominant tradition within Marxism that has continued to theorise the power and logic of capital as seemingly irresistible and hence which has asserted capital's mechanisms of domination over the mechanisms of emancipation: capitalist growth and accumulation has been analysed independently of working class initiative (Cleaver 1979:15 42).

 In this dominant Marxism ‘economics’ has prevailed over politics, the unfolding of objective 'laws' over the activity of human beings. Politics has been interpreted as the mere reflex of the economic base and has consequently been shut away in the attic of the superstructure.

 It is as though the arrival of the socialist society is a law inscribed into historical evolution, with nothing for the 'ideological superstructure' to do except merely passively reflect changes happening in the economic base. This building metaphor thus continues to separate economics and politics, identifying economics with the objective evolution of history and reducing politics to passivity. Such a Marxism is paralysed by being reduced to a dependency upon a capitalist model of politics with a heavy determinist and/or evolutionary strain. Socialism, indeed, comes to be dependent upon the 'laws of motion' of the capital economy.





The only problem is that such a Marxism, with its heavy stress upon the determining power of the ‘economic’, succeeds only in making capital and the capitalist class the only actors in 'making history' (Cleaver 1979: 29).
 
With the theorisation of the ‘logic’ of capital and the accumulation process, it comes to appear that capital is indeed an existential power. Whether the stress is upon reproduction or regulation, it appears that the capital system operates according to its own laws, independently of human intervention. Worse, it appears that the capital system is impervious to such intervention.
The obsessiveness with which Marxists, whether orthodox or critical, have theorised capital's mechanisms of domination has been noted by Harry Cleaver (1979). There would appear to be no way for the working class, passive and mystified, to fight against let alone overthrow the economic and cultural power that 'capital' and the capitalist class exercise over them. Without denying the determining, dehumanising power of capital, it is a one-sided, misleading presentation of Marxism that focuses on the theorisation of the mechanisms of domination.

For, in the critique of the capital system as an alienated system of production, Marx nevertheless affirmed the power of the proletariat as the subversive, antagonistic subject. For alienation was a self-alienation, an active process which involved human beings and their power. No matter how irresistible the grip of the alien power and its determinism appears, the human subject always possesses the capacity to resist, act, reappropriate.

The impression is given by many Marxist theorists that only capital and the capitalist class act whilst the working class merely react. Here, the power and the development of the working class is seen as derivative of capital's own power and development. Correspondingly, the contradictions inherent in the capital system are considered as 'internal' to the objective mechanisms of the system considered in purely economic terms.

With Marx, however, it is the power of capital itself which is derivative of labour. It is the alienation of labour which makes it appear otherwise. The theorists have, inevitably, become entangled in the fetishistic world. And it is the working class which is heavily involved in the contradictory dynamics of the capital system as the antagonistic subject which is opposed to capital but which capital depends upon.

The perspective taken here, then, proceeds from working class autonomy and subjectivity to focus upon the emancipatory dimensions of struggle. At a time when capital is restructuring itself and globalising its economic relations, compelling governments to institute tight fiscal and monetary policies against the working class as well as to adopt a coercive approach to working class organisations (Cowling and Sugden 1994:5/6 23 52; Coates in Bottomore and Brym1989:31/4; Holland 1978; Brett 1985:161 91 92 95), the presentation of a Marxism in which the proletarian perspective is restored to its central place underlines the point that the crisis of the capital system is always an opportunity for the working class to engage in transformatory action. Of course, crisis is also a threat to those working class organisations operating on the institutional and structural terrain of the capital system (Brett 1985:102 263; Wachtel 1990:192/3; Anderson 1992). These 'reformist’ organisations, the parties and the trade unions, have secured material improvements for the class but are nevertheless parasitic upon the capital system. The crisis of the system is thus also their crisis.

A Marxism based upon proletarian autonomy and subjectivity would seek to facilitate workers’ attempts to understand the current crisis of capitalism and of their traditional organisational forms, encouraging and helping the workers to innovate new political-material organisations capable of transcending the existing institutional and structural terrain of the capital system. This means uniting the material struggles and practices of the proletariat in their international aspect, contesting the 'global reach' of the capitalist class with the international solidarity of the workers movement (Brett1985:270/1; Cowling and Sugden 1994:147/9; Gill1988:375/6; Meszaros 1995:920). The globalisation of economic relations thus indicates the further progress of capital's objective socialisation, the development creating an universal proletariat capable of taking command of the fully developed means of production. Thus Harris argues for the emergence of a new international of division of labour (Harris 1987 93ff, 124ff, 129-30, 142ff, 187). Thus the division of the global economy into a centre concentrating upon manufacturing and a periphery concentrating upon primary products is giving way to an economy integrated by circuits of production and widely distributed in space. This integrated global economy, with the full development of the means of production in all parts of the world, resurrects Marx's original concept of a global communism achieved by an international proletariat (Harris 1987:155ff, 196ff; Warren 1980:xi-xii, 5-6).

To accentuate the transformative power of the proletariat and to identify possibilities for future development must be integral to Marxism insofar as it justifies its claim to change and not merely interpret the world (Negri 1991: xxii).

The Tendency to 'Objectivism’ through Political Economy

There is a great danger in reading Marxism as political economy. For this comes with the presentation of ‘the economy’ as an objective datum governed by laws of its own independently of the working class subject. Thus, the capital economy is interpreted as a self-regulating, self-perpetuating force in a way that completely ignores the capacity of the working class both to drive but also to block the development of the capital system through its class self-activity. 

Marx's Capital has been interpreted in this objectivist sense. Capital's 'laws of motion' have been privileged in such a way that, makes socialism dependent upon the objective evolution and/or breakdown of the capital, economy, regardless of the activity of the working class. Thus, in Capital, Marx pays very little attention to agents in history as efficient causes; rather he sees them if not as passive, then as blind instruments of forces beyond their comprehension or control, forces which determine the social conditions under which they live. ‘History develops "behind the backs" of human beings .. This derogation of human agency is not confined to the actions of individuals but it also reflected by the absence of any systematic exposition of the collective subject of social classes' (Perkins 1993:7).

That such an interpretation rationalised the political passivity of the parties of the Second International is plain enough (Callinicos 1985:65). But in Capital Marx himself did show the significance of working class activity in changing the nature and direction of capitalist development. Of course, his main concern was indeed to delineate the law of motion of the capital economy. Nevertheless, he showed, for instance, how the working class, by its struggle, forced a shorter working day, imposed a crisis upon capital and compelled capital to develop new ways to obtain sufficient surplus value. Thus the trend to relative surplus value away from absolute surplus value took place as a result of the assertion of working class power and the strategic reaction of the capitalist class.









The Western Marxists, of course, have consistently argued that Marx had written a critique of political economy as opposed to a rival proletarian economic theory. Unfortunately, for all the insistence on the centrality of praxis, the Western Marxists seemed more concerned to bolster the role of radical intellectuals like themselves in reinstating the philosophical roots of Marx's critique (Jay 1984:83). The point is not to theorise the fetishistic social world but to connect an emancipatory social theory to an emancipatory social practice (Clarke 1991:328).





And the same applies to sociology, to bourgeois social science (Therborn 1976:429). Theory expresses the fetishism inherent in the capital economy. Thus the concept of absolute surplus value is fetishised into something abstract and independent of human action. The political economists fail to recognise how working class struggle compelled the capitalist class to introduce productivity increasing machinery so as to extract relative surplus value. The political economists argue, instead, that it is the competition between capitals and the extra value to be obtained from these productivity increasing innovations that encourages the capitalist to introduce such machinery. As a result of the displacement of living labour, the technical composition of capital is increased and, ultimately, insufficient surplus 'value' is extracted. Hence the fundamental contradiction leading to the breakdown of the capital system is understood as objective and internal.

Marx did argue such a thesis to show that capitalist crises were necessary rather than accidental (Clarke 1994:4/5; 10/1). But he also indicated how the working class subject was also an integral part of the contradictory dynamics of the capital economy (Clarke 1994:64/7). Marx clearly expected the working class to continually resist its exploitation and to attempt to throw off its domination by exchange value. And he showed how working class struggle itself could generate the crisis of the capital system through obstructing the mechanisms of investment, accumulation and valorisation.
The political economists', instead, focus upon the 'objective' mechanisms, laws and processes internal to the capital system. This level of abstraction is justified in showing that capitalist crisis and breakdown is necessary to the system rather than accidental. But it is misleading if analysis remains at this level. For it reinforces the impression gained from capital's alienated system of production that human beings, the true subjects, are merely passive objects depending upon a systemic dynamic which they neither control nor comprehend. Thus, interpretation ends up investing capital with an existential significance, expressing theoretically the alienation of the capital system. The working class appears only as a passive victim incapable of asserting itself against the systemic, not to mention the ideological, power of capital.

Marxism as Emancipatory Theory
What Clarke refers to as Marx's 'emancipatory social theory’ implies the end of economic theory/political economy since such 'economics' is constructed upon the supposition of constituted forms, forms of social relations which are seen as finished, closed entities. For similar reasons, political theory is rejected, for it too is constructed on the presupposed formation of social relations; its project is that of constructing political norms and political institutions on the basis of proprietorial and individualistic rights' (Bonefeld et al 1995:2/3).

A theory which seeks to emancipate necessarily rejects explanations that entertain themselves with a scientistic ordering of concepts in so far as the starting point of such explanations is the disqualification of the experience of resistance-to-dehumanisation.
Marxism is an emancipatory theory and, as such, must always criticise not only a perverted social existence but, and at the same time, the perversion through which it itself exists. For Marxism, there is a need to be critical about the preconditions of critical theory itself. Theory which is, or has become, uncritical of itself becomes necessarily part of the fetishistic world and of its crisis.

Bonefeld et al ad 1995:3

Theory expresses the fetishism inherent in the capital economy. Edgley argues that 'a science that takes objective social contradictions for its target must be socialist' (1979:29). Contradiction is the key category for Edgley; it is basic to and presupposed by all the other critical concepts that Marx's science generates (Edgley in Mepham and Ruben vol III 1979:25). And these other critical concepts show the emancipatory character of Marx's science or social theory - alienation, exploitation, commodity fetishism. These concepts instantiate and are integrated into Marx's science through their connection with the 'essential critical category’ of 'contradiction in its dialectical form’. The specific critical Categories possess 'two characteristics that mark them as special forms of this general dialectical category of contradiction':

On the one hand they are relational, and the general form of the relation they denote is that of practical contradiction within a unity. On the other they bear critically on both thought and practice, involving both illusion subjection.

Edgley in McLellan ed.1983:299/300

With the best will in the world, the orthodox Marxists and the western Marxists have succeeded only in theorising the mechanisms of domination at the heart of the capital system to such an extent as to portray the working class as utterly incapable and powerless in comparison. All power, whether economic or cultural, has been assigned to capital. Ultimately, since opposition to the capital system appears futile, such Marxism as theory must function in the interests of capital, rationalising its permanence. Capital's tremendous powers for absorption thus extend to its very opposition. Marxism becomes a rationalisation of capital's powers of regulation and reproduction.

The Theorisation of Proletarian Incapacity 
With the best will in the world, the orthodox Marxists and the western Marxists have succeeded only in theorising the mechanisms of domination at the heart of the capital system to such an extent as to portray the working class as utterly incapable and powerless in comparison. All power, whether economic or cultural, has been assigned to capital. Ultimately, since opposition to the capital system appears futile, such Marxism as theory must be in the very interest of capital. Capital's tremendous powers for absorption thus extend to its very opposition. Marxism becomes a celebration of capital's powers of regulation and reproduction.

It may well be that to theorise the economic and the cultural power of capital and the associated epistemological and structural incapacity of the proletariat serves the interests of the vanguard party, for only such a party is capable of escaping the determinism of the capital system, mediating between the proletariat's passive, determined, present and the socialist objective. The working class is thus culturally and economically powerless in relation to capital and hence must be aided by 'the party'.

But if the proletariat is so passive and inert one wonders by what magic the party can transform them into being able to challenge the state and capital. Of course, the party hierarchy will provide the necessary leadership and knowledge that enables the proletariat to reach the socialist future, but do the proletariat contribute anything to this revolution other than their numbers? This is a revolution without content, what Pannekoek called a ‘passive revolution’. Without any sense of the proletariat as the revolutionary class, the political party mediating between the class and the socialist objective must become an alienated organisational form. This party is predicated upon the passivity and powerlessness of the class and, indeed, institutionalises this condition of the proletariat. The party reconstitutes the state power through its own agency and comes to institute a 'rational', planned economy under its own control. 
The working class remain an exploited proletariat subject now to the political extraction of surplus value (Cleaver 1979:29).
The crisis of socialism is to be located, in large part, in the inadequacies of this conception of proletarian passivity and the party as the substitute agency. The fact is that socialist revolutionaries invested their political and intellectual capital in the alienated form of party organisation. Their socialism cannot survive the dissipation of this capital, hence the trend to post-socialism (Bonefeld at al 1995:2/3). 
But it is noticeable how the working class as the revolutionary subject is still written off. It is as though ‘the party' was an ersatz proletariat, to use Aron's words, a substitute for the proletariat that was necessary given proletarian incapacity. Even with the collapse of party political socialism, there is no attempt to rediscover the revolutionary class subject. It is simply assumed that the proletariat is passive. This was the assumption that lay behind ‘the party’ in the first place.

Marxism as Political Economy
The dangers of scientism and positivism within Marxism are perhaps most clear in this devaluation of the transformative agency of the proletariat. In this sense the centrality which Marx assigned to proletarian class praxis was undermined by Marxism’s economic evolutionism and determinism which derived from a positivist and scientistic reading of Capital. The 'objectivist' interpretation of Marx's Capital is certainly mistaken, as Cleaver's analysis makes clear (Cleaver 1979). But it is nevertheless true that this mistaken interpretation was the dominant one at the time that Marxist ‘orthodoxy’ was codified. Yet Marx does indeed make his objective in Capital clear, to investigate the law of motion of the capital economy, treating human beings as personifications of economic categories and relations. Marx, then, is explicit about the level of abstraction involved in his critical enterprise. The problem is that the working class and the class struggle, once removed in order to grasp the necessary operation of the capital economy, are never brought back in. It is this which gave scientist and positivism a Marxist authority.

The consequence of this one sided reading, which effectively reduced Marxism to an abstracted political economy, was to introduce the split between a scientific-rationalising Marxism on the one hand and a critical-emancipatory Marxism on the other (Gouldner 1980). Neither approach, it may be argued, appreciated that Marx had effectively integrated both perspectives in a revolutionary synthesis of politics, knowledge and power.

Marxism thus became constrained within a model of politics based upon objective capitalist development (Pierson 1986:17). As a result, socialism was conceived of as resulting from the autonomous, internal development of the capital system. Whether one grasps this in terms of evolution or breakdown, or both, the fact remains that the determinism of the 'objective’ economic base was privileged in the realisation of socialism. Politics was hidden away in the attic of the superstructure as no more than a passive reflex.

Within this model, Marxism becomes a political economy which encourages the devaluation of proletarian political agency. Codified as 'orthodoxy', Marxism is institutionalised in the bureaucratic and passive form of Social Democracy. Marxism's political practice thus derives from the political economy of the capital system and its law of motion and presumes the determination of superstructural forces like politics and ideology and consciousness by the objective economic base. The superstructure is indeed passive in this relation. There is nothing for politics to do. The class struggle, the working class as the antagonistic subject and the conflictual relations between capital and labour, are replaced by the more general contradiction between the forces and relations of production. This contradiction, presuming the autonomous development of the productive forces, has the merit of being open to an evolutionary interpretation. Thus the growing contradiction between social production and private appropriation may be interpreted in a reformist way insofar as socialism becomes the logical next step to the socialisation of production under capitalism. This was Hilferding’s generally accepted point (Hilferding 1980:367/8).

Capital, even Marx himself, came to be confined to the realm of ‘economics’ as separated from the political realm in this Second International interpretation. This sharp dichotomy of politics and economics, with politics monopolised by the Social Democrats and the revolutionary party builders, characterised Second International Marxism and involved an unmediated split between the economic and political (Cleaver 1979:13/4).

Perkins considers that Marx, in part at least, is responsible for this paralysing dichotomy between politics and economics. To make good his case, however, he has to postulate a split between a pre-1848 Marx more open to subjectivist and voluntarist factors and a post-1848 Marx engrossed in the analysis of the constraining factors in historical development. Of course, locating the tendency towards socialism within the historical process need not commit Marx to a rigid determinism. But Perkins entertains the idea that Marxism unintentionally replicated the economic determinism of bourgeois economics that made eternal the social relations of bourgeois society through replacing the early eschatological vision with an impassionate, scientifically rigorous account of the actual developments of capitalism (Perkins 1993:54/5 55). This savours more than a little of caricature. Perkins knows better, knows that Marx was not a positivist. He needs to be clearer - did the split between fact and value, subject and object, politics and economics derive from Marx or from the Second International interpretation of Marx?

Of course, Marxism as political economy can be revolutionary as well as reformist. Thus, a greater stress can be placed upon the antagonism between capital and labour whilst the breakdown of the capital system on account of its internal mechanisms - the rise in the technical composition of capital, the tendential fall in the rate of profit - establishes a more dramatic break with the capitalist past than reformist evolutionism would imply. The 'immiseration’ thesis holds that the more that the capital system is compelled to intensify its exploitation, the more, indeed, the system plunges into contradiction and crisis, the less it is able to extract and realise surplus value, the more conscious the working class will be of its subordinate class position and the more it will understand its historic mission as that of abolishing capital.

It is not that these arguments are not to be found in Marx, they are. The problem is that the active, transformative significance of the working class as the revolutionary subject is not integrated into this analysis. Marx abstracted front class praxis for a reason. He sought to explain crisis and contradiction as the product of the necessary operation of the capital system and not as imposed upon it by extraneous forces and factors. The problem, however, lies with that Marxism whose politics were modelled upon political economy. For if one accepts the thesis of capitalist breakdown proposed above, the political agency of the working class is secondary and reactive to economic stimuli and hence may be simply assumed. But this, arguably, fails to take the political agency of the proletariat seriously and in no way may be considered an adequate conception of the proletariat.

Of course, Marxism as political economy can be revolutionary as well as reformist. Thus, a greater stress can be placed upon the antagonism between capital and labour whilst the breakdown of the capital system on account of its internal mechanisms - the rise in the technical composition of capital, the tendential fall in the rate of profit - establishes a more dramatic break with the capitalist past than reformist evolutionism would imply. The 'immiseration' thesis holds that the more than the capital system is compelled to intensify its exploitation, the more, indeed, the system plunges into contradiction and crisis, the less it is able to extract and realise surplus value, the more conscious the working class will be of its subordinate class position and the more it will understand its historic mission as that of abolishing capital.

It is not that these arguments are not to be found in Marx. They are. The problem is that the active, transformative significance of the working class as the revolutionary subject is not integrated into this analysis. Marx abstracted from class praxis for a reason. He sought to explain crisis and contradiction as the product of the necessary operation of the capital system and not as imposed upon it by extraneous forces and factors. The problem, however, lies with that Marxism whose politics were modelled upon political economy. For if one accepts the thesis of capitalist breakdown proposed above, the political agency of the working class is secondary and reactive to economic stimuli and hence may be simply assumed. But this, arguably, fails to take the political agency of the proletariat seriously and in no way may be considered an adequate conception of the proletariat.

Class Activity
Workers do more than passively react; they do more than simply resist in order to preserve their existing position against the encroachments of capital. The view that the working class only passively react presents the capitalist class as the only class capable of strategic action. The working class itself actively struggles in a variety of ways and exhibits a creativity that cannot be reduced to a response to capital's economic crisis or class offensive. Indeed, the working class has persistently gone beyond the wages struggle to contest the control of the production process with capital.

Yet there is a dominant view within this Marxist tradition that tends to conceive 'capital' and the capitalist class as the only determining forces. Capital possesses a logic of its own to which human beings must conform. The capitalist class can act on account of being the personification of this alien power. The working class, however, is subject to a double determination here, to capital and to the capitalist class. The capitalist class, it follows, is the only active class. The workers merely passively react to the systemic control, of capital and the strategic actions of the capitalist class.

Yet, from a Marxist perspective, one has to reverse this approach, not so much from the point of view of explanation as from political strategy. For the power of capital is derivative from labour. Capital is 'dead’ labour. Moreover, capital's process of production and of accumulation is based upon no easy functionalism in which a self-regulating system operates according to its own logic independently of human action. Rather, the capitalist class and the working class are engaged in a struggle that affects the character and the operation of the capital system. The capitalist class has to act continuously to maintain control of the production process whilst working class action asserts the power of labour to an extent that may always threaten to block the mechanisms of investment, accumulation and valorisation. There is, in short, a class struggle, which the protagonists instinctively recognise, whether they bring a degree of political consciousness to it or not (Clawson 1980:266).

Thus the development of the capital system is shaped not simply by an objective dynamic of accumulation, the self-expansion of capital as central to the reproduction of the system, but also by the class struggle between capitalists and proletarians. Human consciousness, will and intentionality, in the shape of the protagonists in the class struggle, thus come to shape the process of production and, in so doing, the social world of human beings. To recover this subjective aspect is to begin to conceive of the transition from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom in which human beings will go from being subject to the objective determinism of the system to being self-determining as human beings. To reach this realm of freedom, however, means revaluing labour as the always antagonistic subject capable of abolishing the power of capital through ending the system of alienated labour.

The conceding of all the powers of initiative and strategy to the capitalist class stems from a Marxism reduced to being the theory of a fetishised social world. And it comes with the corollary of devaluing the agency of the working class. Regardless of the intentions, a theory which presents the capitalist class as the only historically active class and portrays the working class as passive and reactive must serve the interests of capital. For it fails to present the proletariat as the antagonistic subject capable of successfully challenging the power of capital.

The capitalist class, if it ever could have it all its own way in the process of production, would indeed like to have a passive working class with no will to act in such a way as to block the accumulation process or to contest control at the point of production. The capitalist class would indeed prefer to transfer responsibility for action to the self-activating 'creature' called capital. The passive, reactive working class of the determinist Marxists represents the ideal for the, capitalist class.

Yet the working class in the flesh has never accepted this doubly determined status and have consistently acted to reject whatever 'the system' or the capitalist class seeks to impose upon it. This may be interpreted as the working class actively seeking to overthrow the double determination to which they are subject. The working class is reduced to quiescence only after a long struggle in which the capitalist class perceives the need to defeat the workers and their organisations in order to protect the system.

Marx himself, though certainly recognising that class conflict may be latent (Miliband 1989; Heilbroner 1980), expected the workers to become conscious of the reality of this class struggle and to organise and politicise themselves in an offensive against the capital system itself. Even limited to reaction, working class action could threaten the collapse of a capital system having to reduce workers living standards and intensify exploitation in order to survive. More conscious, offensive action proceeding from this reactive struggle comes to place continuous obstacles in the way of the 'automatic' functioning of the 'natural' processes of capital accumulation. The proper position for any Marxist is to revalue the power of the working class as the antagonistic subject and to explore emancipatory possibilities and participate in emancipatory struggles from the standpoint of the proletariat. In the very least, the presentation of the proletariat as a passive and reactive class is to be rejected as inconsistent with Marxist premises. It conforms, rather, to the normative ideal of the capitalist class (Catephores1989:76). That Marxism which is more concerned with the mechanisms of domination available to capital than with the mechanisms of emancipation available to labour ‘overrates the forces' opposed to the workers, whilst making it appear that the workers have no capacities to resist (Cleaver 1979).

Exploitation and 'Economism' 
One-sided economistic, deterministic interpretations of the class struggle actually fail to appreciate the revolutionary power of the working class. And the question is which side is really served by this theorisation of working class incapacity? Catephores is right when he argues that the one most striking difference between Marxist and non-Marxist economics is in the insistence of the former on the importance of exploitation of labour by capital as a cornerstone of the capitalist mode of production. Two main consequences flow from this basic premise. First, that theoretical analysis must be focused on this crucial feature of capitalism. Second, that there is no other way for the working class to rescue itself from exploitation except by getting rid of the capitalist system altogether. These, two tasks, the theoretical and the practical, are interdependent...' (Catephores 1989:56).

The concentration upon exploitation, however, can fail to explore the questions of power, control and alienation that are also involved in the capital-labour relation. It gives the impression that the struggle is one over material interests and issues only, especially when one introduces the immiseration thesis. There has thus been a tendency to conceive the actions of the working class as purely economistic, centring upon the struggle over wages and employment. Hence the presumption that the working class, unaided, engages... only in trade union activities and obtains only a trade union consciousness to quote Lenin’s justification of socialist politics and ideology being imported into the working class ‘from the outside’. The assumption is that workers struggles and conceptions are grafted to the wages struggle and that these economistic struggles possess no political significance and can generate no political consciousness in themselves. This has the consequence of making any revolutionary action on the part of the proletariat determinant upon economic stimuli. And the question is how can such reactive behaviour be considered revolutionary? Remember that Marx is looking to push beyond the objective necessity and determinism of the capital system to that realm in which human beings may freely assert their conscious purpose over 'the economic'. This is not to be attained by merely, reactive behaviour, determinant upon the objective processes of the economic system.

The kind of Marxist economism which opts for a one sided emphasis upon exploitation fails to address the wider significance of the struggle between capital and labour, and it certainly fails to appreciate the revolutionary power both of Marx's conception of the proletariat but perhaps most importantly of all of the proletariat itself.






The Proletariat as Antagonistic Class Subject
The purpose here, then, is to undertake the devaluation of the working class as the antagonistic revolutionary subject. This, in turns, means repudiating Marxism as political economy and instead evaluating the class struggle from the standpoint of the working class. Such a Marxism thus proceeds from the self-activity of the working class based on the understanding that the class is a real subject and hence is not the passive victim of capital's power and objective mechanisms.

It also means asserting that the working class is more than the fragmented, atomised mass that theorists argue the modern division of labour makes it. Such a perspective remains firmly within an economic determinism that privileges capital and its restructuring of the production process. 'Capital', the alien power, remains the subject, the capitalist class remains the only actor. Such a Marxism fails to explore the potentialities within the working class to act differently.

Yet it may be argued that working class autonomy and subjectivity is basic to the Marxism of Marx and runs like a red thread right throughout his work, from his view of labour as conscious life activity, to his critique of alienated labour and of the capital system as a dehumanisation. Marx's political activities, from his participation in the revolutionary events of the late 1840's to the International in the 1860's to his commitment to the cause of the Commune would follow his concern to locate the working class subject and its tendency to autonomy in the historical development of the capital system. Again, we may refer to the workers struggle to shorten working hours as victory of the class subject vis the systemic imposition of capital (Cleaver 1979:44).

The Standpoint of the Working Class
This perspective opts for a political as opposed to a political economist reading of Marx. This is predicated upon the assumption that there is struggle and that this struggle concerns issues not merely of materialist significance but of power, control and freedom. These are political issues and are based upon real choices with significance with respect to prevailing social relations. 'Political' here means more than this. A Weberian, for instance, could accept the notion of a power infused social infrastructure as the scene of struggle between social groups. Weber presents a thoroughly politicised world of struggles and conflicts. As Giddens argues:





Thus, whilst the class struggle is a political struggle for Marx it is also a struggle which has been located within the contradictory dynamics of the mode of production. Marx's analysis of the internal mechanisms of the capitalist economy and the way that he makes crisis intrinsic to the operation of this economy under girds his conception of the class struggle and the proletarian revolution. Marx specifies definite structural limits upon the activity of the capitalist class within the class struggle. The class struggle, in other words, is not merely a political struggle in the sense of being determined by power alone. The class struggle, which justifies a 'political' reading, needs to be located within a broader historical dynamic in which the development of the productive forces and the conflict with existing relations is central. ‘The central tenet of the materialist conception of history is that the attack which finally overthrows the political institutions of a ruling class is engineered by a class whose interests lie in establishing a new and incompatible system of social and economic organisation. It is this fact which sharply separates revolutions from mere power struggles. But from its first, appearance as an organised entity, the revolutionary class of the future reflects the political weakening of the old order’ (Benson 1978:8/9).

A 'political' reading of Marx's work would not employ 'the political' as a cover for indeterminacy but would locate struggles of class power within the transition from one mode of production to another. The struggle, then, concerns existing and potential opposed systems of social and economic organisation. For Marx, the working class represents the ascendant force capable of creating a new social order.

Adam Schaff explains the rationale behind Marx's adoption of the proletarian standpoint. In a class divided society, class is the basic unit. It is not possible to study the workings of such a society without making reference to class. Modern capitalist society is subject to a division between a 'rising' revolutionary class and a 'falling' conservative class. And this is where Marx's materialist appraisal of conditions within the mode of production, making specific relations necessary and possible, shows its importance. For the objective development of society operates against the conservative class, whose power has already been institutionalised in the existing order, and operates in favour of the revolutionary class, whose power can only be asserted against the existing order and its power arrangements. This rising revolutionary class is epistemologically privileged in that it has no fear of seeing reality as it is. The falling conservative class, however, has every reason to conceal, deny or distort objective trends of development and outmoded institutions. The knowledge such a class offers is corrupted by 'conservative deformations'. The rising revolutionary class has every incentive to expose these deformations for what they are. They have nothing to fear from an objective analysis of society and its trends of development. Thus, Schaff reasons, the proletarian standpoint offers the 'fullest and richest' perspective on existing society; it is the 'cognitively optimum position': ‘If you wish to attain objective truth .. then consciously adopt class and party positions which are in accord with the interests of the proletariat’ (Schaff 1976:246).

Lucio Colletti argues a similar point. There are, in capitalist class society, 'two realities', one that lies on the surface and one that lies deeper. The capitalist class is capable only of perceiving the former. The capitalist buys labour power as a commodity and is unable to appreciate that there is any difference between this and any other commodity. The capitalist pays a wage for this labour power and is unable to appreciate the relations with the proletariat as anything other than fair and equitable. The capitalist class is unable to recognise the exploitative nature of the wage relation.

You will say that this is the bosses' point of view. But the important thing to understand is that more than a subjective point of view is involved: it is a point of view which corresponds in a certain sense to the actual course of things. The working class reproduces its own means of subsistence, and at the same time produces surplus value (that is, profit, rent, and interest); with its labour it provides the revenues of all the basic classes of society. And - as long as it is kept down - the working class is in fact only a cog in the mechanism of capitalism. Capital is produced by labour: labour is the cause, capital the effect: the one the origin, the other the outcome.

Colletti in Blackburn ed.1972:376

The working class is able to penetrate this appearance and grasp the deeper reality. The worker knows that the wage relation is exploitative and that the sale of labour power is not fair but forced by the private monopoly of the means of production. The exploitative, alienative and contradictory character of the capitalist mode of production is clearly visible from the proletarian standpoint, invisible from the capitalist. Marx's adoption of the cause of the proletariat and of the proletarian standpoint was not an arbitrary commitment but was rooted in a dynamic of historical development, grasping the immanent society in its emergence in objective trends and tendencies and in the class struggles waged by the ascendant class.

The point of view adopted by Marx is in fact the expression precisely of this other reality. Capital, of which wage labour is only the variable component, is in reality part of this its part (which is therefore the 'totality'): it is the product of 'living labour'. Without then repeating Bernstein's moralism or Marcuse's 'Utopias', Marx overthrows the arguments of the economist and points to the overthrow of capitalist itself, pivoting on an aspect of reality. Marxism is therefore science. It is an analytical reconstruction of the way in which the mechanism of capitalist production works.

Colletti in Blackburn ed.1972:377 .

On the other hand, as well as being a science, Marxism is revolutionary ideology. It is the analysis of reality from the viewpoint of the working class. This in its turn means that the working class cannot constitute itself as a class without taking possession of the scientific analysis of Capital. Without this, it disintegrates into a myriad of 'categories'. The working class .. is not a given factor, it is not a product of nature. It is a destination point: the production of historical action, that is, not only of material conditions but also of political consciousness. In short, the class becomes a class when going beyond economistic spontaneism, it develops the consciousness of being the antagonist of the whole system: the consciousness of being the protagonist of a revolution which emancipates not only the workers but the whole of society. This consciousness, through which the class constitutes itself in political organisation and takes place at the head of its allies, cannot be derived from anywhere but Capital.

Colletti in Blackburn ed.1972:377

Marxism, then, is the analysis of reality from the viewpoint of the working class. The science and ideology to which Colletti refers are to be united at the level of proletarian class praxis.





For a Marxist, a 'political' reading would unambiguously taka the side of the working class. As Cleaver argues:





Economics is thus seen as inherently political, with economic relations conceived as political relations in which class subjects contest questions of power and control. And it is in the notion of the working class as the always, antagonistic subject, rather than in the alienated party form of organisation, that the revolutionary agency and its drive to autonomy is to be located. 

The Proletariat without Guarantees
It is something of a truism to argue that the failure of Marxism to deliver on its emancipatory promise is really the result of the failure of the proletariat to emerge as a revolutionary class. The proletariat, after all, is Marx's revolutionary agency. Marxism, in its organised political sense, has been an attempt to deal with the consequences of the failure of the proletariat to constitute itself as the revolutionary class.

There is, in a real sense, therefore, an inherent substitutionism in the concept of the party. The party form is thus predicated upon the incapacity of the proletariat. Marx's original hopes that philosophy would be abolished by being realised through the transformative activity of the proletariat, the triumph of the proletariat as the universal class, are thus thwarted. Marx had been confident in bringing philosophy down from the idealist plane into the material reality made by human practice, affirming the unity of theory and practice. Yet, at this very level of practice, it proved more difficult to overcome the distinction between the 'is' and the 'ought’, something which subsequent Marxism has had to struggle with (Jay 1984:56/7).

There are two approaches to this problem. One can simply write off the proletariat as the revolutionary subject, even the very notion of a revolutionary subject, and with this Marxism itself. Or one can affirm the proletariat as still the best hope for any emancipatory project. Whatever its entanglement in the capital system, it is the very fact that the proletariat is the source of the surplus value upon which the capital system rests that gives it the material capacity to abolish this system. It is a power unavailable to other groups.

Those who would write off the proletariat as the revolutionary agency would appear to have assumed a certain spontaneity and inevitability in the process of proletarian revolution. The proletariat were expected to automatically come to be the revolutionary-universal class on account of its class, location. It has, historically, not come forward as this class, therefore the proletariat can no longer be considered the revolutionary class. But Marx's conception came with no such guarantees. Marx's expectations with respect to the proletariat took full measure of the process whereby the proletariat as a class-in-itself would transform itself into a class-for-itself, would convert its economic movement into political movement, and would, by developing its organisational and intellectual capacities, constitute itself into the revolutionary class. There is nothing automatic or spontaneous about this process of self-development. By definition this process requires the active and conscious participation of the proletariat itself. And it requires political commitment to and intervention in the material practices and struggles of the proletariat as it comes to develop itself into the revolutionary-emancipatory class. Looked at from this perspective, the working class has engaged in emancipatory struggles and practices and has challenged the capital system. It has not completed the process in becoming the revolutionary class, for this would be associated with the simultaneous achievement of the socialist society. But it has got further than other social groups.

The key point is that Marxists do not argue that the proletariat act always as the revolutionary class but they potentially are this class and can come to constitute themselves as this class through a process of self-development. To the extent that Marxists have argued otherwise, that the proletariat act inevitably to bring socialism about, this has been the result of an economic determinism which has privileged the autonomous evolution of the economy. This can be safely rejected in favour of the rediscovery of revolution as politics and process.
It is the position of the working class as the most exploited class within capitalist social relations and the capacity of the working class for self-organisation and self-activity which explains why Marx assigned them a revolutionary, historical mission. The systemic control exercised over society, the capital system as an alienated and fetishistic system of production, which prevents human beings from realising their aspirations and which denies human freedom, is subject to political intervention and alteration through the agency of the proletariat. That is, the proletarian movement is equipped to penetrate the mystification and the reification to grasp the specific social relations so as to alter them. The proletariat alone possesses the material and epistemological capacity to do this and it is this that makes them the revolutionary class.





The Marxist claim is that the proletariat makes history on account of its unique position under capitalism as the most exploited and oppressed class capable of self-organisation. For Aronowitz, this amounts to a vulgar historical materialism (Aronowitz 1981:104). I argue here, to the contrary, that vulgar Marxism concentrated on the economistic aspects of exploitation to the exclusion of emancipatory themes focused upon the critique of alienation, the idea that the proletariat becomes conscious of the dehumanisation and degradation inflicted by the capital system and positively act to overcome this alienated condition. This perspective was lost as the evolutionism of the economy was privileged. Aronowitz is therefore correct in underlining the economistic bias of vulgar Marxism. The exploited position of the working class





But this bias also entailed the loss of the revolutionary character and logic of Marx's conception of the proletariat, one that did indeed focus upon the class as dehumanisation conscious of its dehumanisation and capable of fighting to overcome it. Marx did not write of the working class as merely reactive to economic stimuli but as possessing a human or anthropological significance in striking a blow for human freedom against capital's alienated system.

But there are those who would argue that any identification of the proletariat as having a revolutionary mission is vulgar in itself. Thus, the new emancipatory politics advocated by Aronowitz does imply a break with the assigning of a privileged role to the proletariat.

 Post argues for





Against this, it is proposed here to examine the nature of the proletariat as the revolutionary class in terms of the notion of the working class as the antagonistic subject.

Class as Antagonistic Subject

Marx clearly understood how the development of the capital system had always involved the development of the working class itself, not merely in terms of its specific character as determined by the division of labour but more broadly and politically in terms of the working class as the antagonistic subject. Since the power of capital is derivative of the power of labour itself, the working class remains the antagonistic subject throughout. The development of the capital system, therefore, is also the development of the power of labour and the power of the working class to impose crisis upon the system and overthrow it.

It is this concentration upon working class as revolutionary subject with a tendency to assert its autonomy that forms the standpoint of Marx's work. From this concentration comes the assertion of mechanisms of emancipation over capital's mechanisms of domination, focused firmly upon the proletariat as the revolutionary subject.
This theme of how the proletariat changes the world through its class praxis, demonstrating future, social forms through their emancipatory activity and their self-organisation is a consistent one in Marx's political activity and writing and is one that is consistent with Marx's general critique of the alien control of the state and of capital. The abolition of alien control and the simultaneous assertion of social control is an emancipatory project of restitution.
Marx's work is essentially a 'praxis philosophy' concerned with the problem, derived from German idealism, of how subjects relate to objects in the existing social world and how they may relate to them in a possible future world. The social world, therefore, is a self-made world shaped by human agency. The question then is of how human beings relate to this 'objective’ world. Do human beings realise themselves in this world? Or does objectification involve alienation so that this world denies human purposes?

One very good reason why the positivist turn within Marxism was so inappropriate is that Marx, overcoming the separation between human beings and their self-made social world, following Hegel, would identify any merely empirical treatment of the 'objective' or 'external' world as the continuing failure of the human agency - or mind - to appreciate the 'given' world as their own world. Positivism, empiricism, scientism - however one wishes to interpret this phenomenon - could not deal with this relation of subject and object adequately and could only reproduce the separation characteristic of the alienated world.

With respect to the proletariat, what this argument means is that proletarian subjectivity, the drive to autonomy, has to be conceived in terms of affirming the active, transformative, constitutive power of human subjectivity in creating the 'objective’ world, the human world of production, society, culture, history and politics. And it means taking a critical position in opposition to that deterministic Marxism which, in theorising the 'laws' of historical evolution and capital production, actually reproduced within Marxism a scientist that expressed the determinism of the capital system. This deterministic Marxism accepted the factual world as 'given', an 'objective' world. This 'second nature’ appeared as a fixed and finished reality governed by laws of its own (Jay 19B4). The passive, contemplative approach to knowledge which Marx himself had transcended by the middle of the 1840's. (Avineri 1968) was accompanied by a passive radicalism in politics that emphasised the importance of winning the state.

Self-Valorisation
Antonio Negri employs the term the 'self-valorisation' of the proletariat (Negri 1991). It is a term with a precise meaning in Negri's work, but it could be misleading in that it could get caught up with Marx's understanding of capital as the self-expansion of values, valorisation as something that is part of capitalist development. Negri's idea, however, is the authentic Marxism of Marx in that it is indeed implied in the process of proletarian self-emancipation and in the struggle of labour against capital to dissolve the capital system.

By the prefix 'self’, Negri is making a clear statement as regards the proletariat as its own agency, its own emancipator. The proletariat, then, is the always antagonistic subject whose own process of valorisation is autonomous of opposed to and subversive of capital's valorisation. The process of self-valorisation affirms the proletariat as the self-determining subject which does much more than react to capital's valorisation and instead struggles to emancipate itself from capital's valorisation process in an emancipatory project of self-constitution. As Negri puts it:

The self-valorisation of the proletarian subject contrarily to capitalist valorisation, takes the form of auto-determination in its development.

Negri in Bonefeld et al ed. 1992:129

Though one can quibble with Negri's argument that the Marx of Capital is objectivist, there is clear merit in the way that he develops this concept of self-valorisation through a closely reasoned presentation of Marx's Grundrisse. Here Negri shows now this concept of self-valorisation is implicit in Marx's treatment of the proletariat as the class of labour power, as the living labour upon which the capital system depends. There is consistency in Marx's approach to the proletariat. The only grounds for arguing that there is a difference between the proletariat in the early writing - revolutionary, emancipatory - and in the later writings - reactive, economistic - lies in Marx's shift in emphases, his greater socio-economic precision. But the assertion of the power of labour as living labour over capital as dead labour affirms the autonomous, antagonistic power of the proletariat much more precisely than the presentation of the proletariat as 'class in radical chains' in the 1843 Introduction. It remains a conception of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject but it indicates more precisely the material, creative power possessed by labour. It is on account of this power that the working class is capable of becoming a class-for-itself.
What, then, does the word 'autonomy’ mean? In Negri's work it means the independence of the proletariat's process of valorisation from capital's valorisation. The development of the proletariat is independent of capital's development. By valorising itself, the proletariat undermines capital's own valorisation, given that this 'process depends upon the extraction of surplus value from the proletariat and hence the continued subordination of the proletariat in the production process.

The idea may be pressed further in terms of its evident connection with Marx. This means firmly basing the notion of proletarian autonomy upon the critique of alienated labour, establishing the centrality of labour and opposing the direct supply of social labour under the 'freely associated producers' to the value form and rooting the entire argument in the capital-labour dialectic as a dialectic of control and struggle.

Self-Emancipation and Organisational Form
One interesting point to pursue is the relation of the principle and the reality of proletarian autonomy to the organisational form innovated by labour. For the self-valorisation of labour makes it very clear that the agency of this emancipation and transformation is the proletarian class subject itself. The class as the revolutionary subject is to innovate and control its own organisational forms. Thus 'autonomy' possesses significant political implications in that it is firmly rooted in the material practices, struggles and organisations of the working class as a true subject. These are not only autonomous of capitalist development and hence the institutional framework and structural infrastructure of the capital system but also of those traditional agencies of labour, the political party and the trade unions. For these agencies, it may be argued, represent the material interests of labour within the capital system and hence are incapable of any independence of this system.

This, perhaps, is the most controversial point of all in that it suggests a development of Marx beyond Marx, but, it is argued here, it is no less Marxist for that. For proletarian self-emancipation and self-activity, the idea that the proletariat constitutes itself as a revolutionary class-for-itself, do involve going beyond capitalist relations and the institutional framework buttressing those relations. Marx himself supported the parliamentary and trade union activity of the proletarian movement as part of the process of proletarian self-development. But this never represented the end of that process for Marx. The proletariat as revolutionary class subject pushes beyond these organisational forms, appropriate as they are to bourgeois society and its classical dualism between the political and the economic.

One needs, then, to explore this notion of proletarian autonomy as excluding all alien or substitutionist or representative forms of organisation. The principle of proletarian autonomy reaffirms the centrality of struggle in Marx's emancipatory project. Moreover, this project refers to more than the taking of labour's side against capital. It frankly means the dissolution of this relationship through the emancipatory project of practical reappropriation of the objective world by and for human beings (Bonefeld et al ed. 1995:164).

The problem is that the traditional agencies of labour are so adapted to the dualistic terrain of bourgeois society as to block any progress of the proletarian movement beyond this society. In this sense, the further development of the proletarian movement is prevented by its own organisational forms which, representing labour within the institutional and structural constraints of the capital system, have become part of the fetishistic system of production and politics. The parliamentary parties and the trade unions thus operate to block any development of the workers' struggle, which means that the working class is limited always to contesting capital on the terrain on which it can be most certain of winning. Labour is denied any opportunity to challenge the capital system. This effectively prevents struggle from developing in such a way as to lead to the revolutionary transformation of social relations.

The proletariat is thus constrained not only by the capital system but by its own organs and agencies claiming to represent labour within the system. The proletariat has to innovate its own political-material organisations oriented towards overcoming the classic dualism between the economic and the political, the state and civil society, thus pressing beyond the traditional agencies which have become bureaucratised in institutionalising labour within the capital system. To be able to do this means proceeding from the material practices and struggles of the class subject and treating the organs it innovates in its real life as autonomous nuclei of the new social order. These nuclei are not necessarily rooted in production, though they may be. They refer to the organs that human beings in all aspects of their practical existence may develop.

Autonomy
One should remember that Marx is looking to dissolve the class designation and abolish the social relations imposing this designation so as to enable individual freedom. Autonomy, ultimately, must be pressed beyond the working class identity to the dissolution of the class into a humanity of realised individuals. This concept of proletarian autonomy pursues autonomy beyond the proletariat and beyond the class system. This requires much more than a change in the title deeds to property; it means the abolition of the property system itself, beyond private and public ownership/control. It means a qualitative transformation in human relationships in society.

The question is how far we can go with this concept of autonomy before leaving the Marxist tradition for a more general communist tradition. Marx, indeed, may well be part of this wider tradition.

The extra-parliamentary movement, of which the Autonomy Movement is a part, is situated within the larger communist tradition. The important concept for understanding that denial is the refusal of work, which is directed in part against Leninism .. and Third International socialism, which merely represents capitalist development in a different form. Autonomy, as a movement and as a theory, opposes the notion that capitalism is an irrational system which can be made rational through planning. Instead it assumes the workers' viewpoint, privileging their activity as the lever of revolutionary passage and as that which alone can construct a communist society. Economics is seen as being entirely political; economic relations are direct political relations of force between class subjects. And it is in the economic category of the social worker, not in an alienated political form like the party, that the initiative for political change resides. The word autonomy must be understood in light of this historical and theoretical context. It names a combination of rank-and-file radicalism with sphere-of-production activism.

Michael Ryan in Negri 1991:xxv

The greatest threat to the workers' movement is the loss of confidence on the part of the working class in their capacities to create a better world. In many ways, the contemporary situation is similar to that facing the old syndicalists. Pierre Monatte's response is worth considering. Of course, he noted, the French people seem to be more reactionary than he had believed. Did this mean, then, that revolutionary syndicalism was dead? Monatte, however, emphasised the schisms of 1921,1989 and 1947, the 'physical exhaustion' and 'impotence’ after decades of tyranny and war, the caricature of socialism under Communism as the main factors behind the present impasse.

There was, therefore, no justification in writing off the proletariat as lacking the revolutionary will, as having been reduced to the status of robots by industrialisation. Despite defeat, the workers continued to advance slowly towards its emancipation. No matter how often this advance is blocked and the working class is defeated, the class will continue to attempt to improve its condition. Thus, Monatte argued, the first task was to see clearly. The greatest danger lay in the working class losing confidence in itself, abandoning that faith in its capacity to lead civilisation. The role for syndicalism in this context lay in preparing the proletariat's moral, administrative and technical capacities so as to create the conditions for the society of the future. 'The defeat of the revolutionary workers' movement has been above all a defeat of intelligence and character’, argued Monatte (Jennings 1990:223.

The Proletariat as the Class Subject
From 1843 the proletariat has been the historical/revolutionary subject at the heart of Marxism. The criticism directed against this notion refers to marxism’s tendency to privilege not merely the working class in general but also the working class of a particular moment in history, the 'traditional' working class, white, male and industrial. That this corresponds only partially to the modern world ought to be obvious enough. Is there a major Marxist study which actually denies this? Moreover, that emancipatory struggles occur on a number of terrains - race, gender as well as class - may readily be incorporated into the praxis of the emancipatory subject/s (Kitching on praxis 1988:22). To relaunch the emancipatory project in such a way as to acknowledge the existence of a number of social groups means being critical of marxism’s privileging of the proletariat as 'the' revolutionary subject. The logical corollary of this, moreover, is to abandon as teleological the whole notion of labour coming to reclaim the social world as its own creation. Marxists can entertain the idea that history possesses a meaning or a purpose given the teleology of labour postulated by Marx. Those who wish to devalue the centrality of the working class in order to accommodate other emancipatory social actors reject this teleology. But just how satisfactory is this position?





With Marxism, the emancipation is a fairly clear and straightforward proposition. The defetishised, free social world which is the end of the emancipatory project is to be obtained through the self-emancipation of the proletariat, or the objective, alien world is the product of the alienation of labour. The capital system is an alienated system of production. It follows that the defetishised social world is to be achieved by an emancipatory project in which the proletariat are privileged as the revolutionary subject. The whole conception of alienation as an active process shows the path forward to the defetishised world and indicates the social force which is to be the subject of the emancipatory project. Thus, when Marx criticises capital as the power of labour in alien form, it is apparent that the proletariat must be privileged in the struggle to abolish the capital system. But criticism has been directed against this very idea. 

Thus Post writes: ‘In practice, of course, analysis was far more difficult, leading as perhaps the most serious consequence to the concept of the party as the vanguard of the proletariat, which stages the necessary events on its behalf. Particularly with the failure of state socialism, the issue of establishing what criteria we can use to assess the emancipatory significance of a particular event must come high on our agenda for a regaining of Marxism’ (Post 1996:250).

The criticism that there is some kind of necessary relationship between Marx's privileging of the proletariat and the concept of the revolutionary vanguard party representing the proletariat can be directly challenged. The 'regaining' of Marxism, in this sense, would mean restoring the centrality of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject, taking pains to block any substitutionist tendencies which would insert 'the party' as an alienated form of organisation into the process of proletarian self-emancipation. Marx looked to extinguish the theoretico-elitist model from revolutionary politics through his action-oriented conception of knowledge.

The Broader Conception of Materialism
Nevertheless, the criticism focuses not merely upon an alleged vanguardism as upon its privileging of the working class. For Hartsock 'class' is an inadequate concept to cover all subjects in the emancipatory struggle. Marxism has emulated capital itself in privileging a male, usually white, proletariat. This makes Marxism a 'falsely universalistic theory' (Hartsock 1987:84). There are terrains other than class and social groups may engage in struggle around issues of gender, ecology, race, nationality, religion and generation. Once this point is conceded - and there is no intrinsic reason why it shouldn't be - the task facing any attempt to 'regain' Marxism as an emancipatory project is to accommodate all social actors within the movement for social transformation, insofar as these actors are indeed emancipatory in relation to the capital system. Hartsock thus develops a 'feminist materialism' from Marx's original work so as ‘to include all human activity rather than focusing on activity more characteristic of males in capitalism’ (Hartsock 1987:158).

The development is to be welcomed. However, one cannot help but think that a certain point has been missed. If Marxism has tended to privilege a white male western proletariat, then the reason has everything to do with the fact that this has been the social agent most central to the exploitative capitalist relations to be abolished. If the abolition of the capital system and the creation of a socialist society based upon the direct supply of social labour by the associated producers is still the objective of an emancipatory politics, then one must accord centrality to the social agent subordinated to the exploitative relations definitive of the capital system. And this has meant the working class which has, indeed, been created by capitalism itself: 'it is a mere fancy to think that the social agent subordinated by this relation could be anything but central to the project of its abolition' (Geras 1990:119).

But Hartsock's attempts to extend materialism beyond class and 'economistic' issues does have merit. Historical materialism should be extended beyond the conflict over the production of material goods to material life itself. That is, historical materialism should be extended to cover the production and reproduction of the real life of individuals (Sayer 1987:78). And the fact is that Marx's materialism is capable of such extension. The restriction of historical materialism to issues of capital and class is to be explained on account of its historical and social specificity - for the questions of capital and class are central on account of existing 'social relations. But Marx's materialism possesses more general significance. Human beings are producers of their circumstances, their real life in all its aspects. Under alienated conditions it appears that these circumstances are external to them. But this is a self-made social world which human beings are capable of perceiving and experiencing as their own. Marx's concentration upon capital and class, then, may be considered as the specific form taken by a general critique of alienation. Kitching argues for the wider conception of 'production' in Marx. Such a conception supplies the basis for an historical materialism that encompasses the production and reproduction of real life.





Human beings are producers of all these aspects of real life in Marx's conception. What this suggests is that Marx's historical materialism necessarily encompasses all aspects of human life, that one need not attach a prefix to Marxism, in order to make it relevant to a particular social movement, i.e. a 'feminist' Marxism, an 'ecological' Marxism etc. Marxism is in itself equipped to deal with whatever form alienation takes in the self-made social world. As the Paris Manuscripts make clear, Marx considers conscious human activity as responsible for the material and ideal objectifications which constitute the world of human beings. Human beings are producers in the widest sense. What Marx comes specifically to concentrate upon, however, is the alienated form that this creative activity takes through private property (later he traces it to the division of labour). And it is here that the seeds of Marx's supposedly economistic definition of materialism lie - though Marx was concerned with greater social precision in critiquing the specific historical form taken by alienation.





This general conception of the alienation of the human essence indicates how Marx's historical materialism already encompasses the struggle over the production and reproduction of real life and need not be extended to cover it. The point is that whilst the struggle for communist society does involve the emancipation of human beings from all forms of exploitation and domination, in particular societies it requires particular struggles. As Geras points out, it is the exploitation of labour which is definitive of capitalism and, as such, Marx is entirely justified in considering the class praxis of the proletariat to be central to the struggle for emancipation. The demand for extension, in this context, is a demand to go further than class issues to embrace non-class forms of oppression which have been identified. There is nothing in Marx's conception of materialism to prevent such a move. Kitching makes this criticism of Marx, whilst suggesting precisely this same point.





Kitching is, perhaps, stretching a point here. Marx's critique of political economy and his involvement with the workers movement had everything to do with the emancipatory project of abolishing precisely the exploitative and alienative relations which perverted conscious creative human activity in the production of real life. Marx's identification with the proletariat was not arbitrarily determined. Marx did not make an arbitrary commitment to class politics and neither is this commitment the definitive characteristic of his critique. Marx has retained the original emancipatory concern with what is considered alienative about capitalist and he has retained the conception of the truly human society which is immanent and hence historically realisable. The proletariat is the social agent, the material force, capable of engaging in the necessary transformative activity, the class vital and central to this emancipatory project. What Marx has not done, and which Kitching implies he has done, is identify emancipation with the definitive role of the proletariat. The 'philosophy of praxis' remains intact.

The New Social Movements and New Politics
What perhaps has made Marxists suspicious of the new social movements has not so much been the nsm rejection of the 'old' class politics as the belief by certain strands of these emancipatory movements that their aims can be secured without the fundamental transformation of society. Sooner or later the question of class and of capital has to be brought back in. Gorz’s new 'non class of post-industrial neo-proletarians' (Frankel 1987:209/10) has simply never looked likely to replace the proletariat as the revolutionary agent. Scott (1990) is more optimistic. The new social movements constitute ‘a collective actor made up of individuals who understand themselves to have common interests. Unlike political parties or pressure groups they have mass mobilisation or the threat of it as their prime source of social sanction’ (Scott 1990).

And, in contrast with the labour movement, the new social movements resist being incorporated into the existing political order, are anti-authoritarian, and seek to abolish the power of the state by passing it. In other words, it is the anarchist strategy restated. The problem is that even someone like Murray Bookchin, who has opposed the new social movements to Marxist class politics (Bookchin in. Goodway ed.1989), has acknowledged that capitalism has easily accommodated the new social movements (Bookchin 1994:1). One thus returns to the proletariat as the revolutionary class. Meszaros thus re-affirms the working class as the agent of change, as still the revolutionary subject:





The question, then, relates to the status of the proletariat within the emancipatory project, its relation to other social actors, and the claims of the proletariat to these other actors, Marxism can incorporate other social actors so long as the proletariat retains a central place. The question is how central?

Laclau and Mouffe have no doubt on this question. We should 'renounce any epistemological prerogative based upon the ontologically privileged position of a ‘universal class’ (1985:4). The very idea of a universal class conceals the crucial process by which individuals come, to constitute themselves subjectively into a class. Again the notion of classes as possessing an objective a priori existence is rejected. Individuals come to constitute themselves into a class only by a process of uneven development. This process, moreover, cannot be reduced to the economic level, though it may indeed be related to it. Hence the importance of ideological discourses in constituting the emancipatory subject is affirmed. With the discovery of the plurality of social actors, the idea that the proletariat occupies a central, let alone an exclusive place in the emancipatory project is firmly rejected.

Thus the working class and its class struggle no longer possesses a privileged place in the emancipatory project. This project may still be centred upon class, but it is recognised, that with other social actors struggling on a number of terrains, this project may developed in directions other than the class struggle. The transition is thus made from an emancipatory struggle centred upon the proletariat as the epistemologically and structurally privileged class, the Marxist conception, to a struggle that incorporates a plurality of social actors and hence excludes the notion of a universal, privileged subject.

But was Marx really denying the legitimacy of other forms of struggle when he characterised the proletariat as the universal class? Of course there are social actors other than the proletariat. The crucial question, though, is how many of these possess the material capacity and social futurity which enables them to embark upon the successful transformation of the capital system? (Eagleton 1991:2l8).





Capital as 'dead' or alienated labour is the power dominating the fetishised world. As the power of labour in alien form, capital's power is derivative (Clarke 1991:67; 113) and hence always subject to the attempts of the working class to reappropriate its power (Marx 1973:257/9; Oakley 1984:63 66; Ball 1959:933/52; Schacht 1971:107). In fighting against relations of exploitation, the working class resists the extraction of surplus value from them which is the source of capital. And it is this that marks the proletariat out as central to the emancipatory project. Without the proletariat the emancipatory project can hardly proceed very far. Hence, even taking the point that there are social actors other than the proletariat, none of these can expect to carry the social and structural weight of the proletariat.

Capital is the alien power that dominates all, capitalists, proletarians and all social actors. Capital subjects all to 'objective dependency’ denying freedom (Marx 1973:163/5). But, Marx argues, there are some, the possessing class, who are comfortable in their alienation. These will not act to abolish the capital system. The proletariat, however, not only resent their dehumanisation as they become conscious of it, they possess the material power to abolish capital's alienated system of production. The power of capital is really the alienated power of labour. Labour can reclaim this power as their own. In abolishing capital, the proletariat actually emancipate the whole of society from capital's domination, dehumanisation and dependency. Hence Marx's designation of the proletariat as the universal class has nothing to do with an arbitrary preference for the proletariat. It has nothing to do with denying the validity of other emancipatory struggles and social actors (McCarney 1990:125/6).

The problems really amount to the way that Marx tends to privilege class to the exclusion of other social groups. Thus, when he writes that 'the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle' (Manifesto of the Communist Party), Marx would certainly appear to be arguing that classes are the only subjects of history. And if only classes can be considered as subjects, emancipatory or otherwise, then this does indeed amount to the denial of the significance of social groups struggling over issues of race, religion, nation, gender, ecology and generation.

What Marx was looking for in any social group was that structural capacity to transform society from the bottom up. And though Marx's conception was never narrowly economic, a Marxist is committed to prioritising material factors in historically significant change. And it is this that makes the proletariat and class struggle of greater relevance to Marxism than the struggles of the new social movements.

It could, however, be argued that the new social movements represent a new class politics prefiguring new social relations or, at least, are the bearers of new relations (Eder 1992; Scott 1990; Gorz 1982; Lash and Urry 1987; Meister 1990:25 note 26). Good reasons have been advanced to doubt this. For Boris Frankel the working class, as the class dependent upon wage labour, still forms the majority in the western world. The figures offered by Callinicos and Berman (1987) support this view. Frankel goes on to express scepticism as to how Gorz’s non class of post-industrial neo-proletarians, lacking in power and class consciousness, could overthrow a still existing and thriving capitalist class. And, there is every need for an 'outright struggle with the guardians of capitalism’, as Mumford put it (Mumford1984:163).





The evidence and articles assembled by Bottomore and Bryn (1989) show that, whatever the social scientists and political journalists assert about the demise of class, the capitalist class as the owners and controllers of the major productive resources and a working class who sell their labour power to these owners may still be identified as constituting the existing mode of production. The articles collected in The Capitalist Class (Bottomore and Brym 1989) show how, in the major economies of the world, the capitalist class is economically, politically and culturally dominant and how it secures its position through reproducing the subordination of labour in the interests of capital valorisation and accumulation. 

Bottomore and Brym make a point which is highly relevant to the discussion here:

The strength of the capitalist class during much of the post-war period rests in part .. upon the relative weakness of opposing, or potentially opposing classes, which has resulted not only from changes, in class structure, but also from a certain loss of confidence in, or disillusionment with the idea of a socialist alternative to capitalism.

Bottomore and Brym 1989:10

The Political Implications of Theory
We are entitled, then, to consider the political implications of theory and theorising. Thus, when Sayer considers that something may be awry in the very idea of socialism itself (Sayer 1991:147) and that ‘any notion of an emancipatory politics' is 'deeply problematic' (Sayer 1991:154), we are entitled to ask as to which 'socialism’ the criticism is directed. To generalise from the political practice of Communism and Social (parliamentary) Democracy to the very idea of socialism, as though the latter has been adequately translated into reality by the practice of what could be considered to be highly deficient political movements, does not take us much beyond Weber's identification of the rational, statist, bureaucratised socialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as the only possible form that socialism could take. Just which socialist parties and movements, one is entitled to ask, proved all too willing to attempt to realise socialism through striking bargains with Weber's modern devils? (Sayer 1991:154). Weber’s modern devils are not irresistible, unalterable forces of modernity; they are Marx's alien powers, human social powers capable of practical reappropriation.

The failure to differentiate between different socialism's, the failure to criticise a particular political practice from the perspective of another practice, reinforces precisely that disillusionment with the idea of a socialist alternative to capitalism which, in part, reinforces the dominance of the capitalist class. Disillusionment, one might argue, has political rather than philosophical causes. Miliband, firmly concentrating on the political aspects of the 'crisis of socialism’, makes a very good point.









And we can't say that we weren't warned either (Miliband 1987; Coates 1975).

The Continuing Search for New Social Agents

The search for the 'new social movements', for new social agents to replace the traditional revolutionary subject, the working class, begun by the New Left, remains an unfulfilled promise. It is all very well for the likes of Isaac Balbus (1982) to think that all the new social movements can come to constitute a new left politics of emancipation, but, as Habermas acknowledges, not all the social movements are emancipatory or possess, equal emancipatory potential (Roderick 1986:136). The differences between the new social movements are quite striking and, as such, the possibility of there ever becoming a 'class-for-itself' in the manner of Marx's proletariat must be judged remote. Frankel is right to argue that the new social movements do not have a ready formed identity (Frankel 1987:235).

This in itself is not fatal to the claims made for the new social movements. There is no need to form an identity for the social movements and, indeed, there is a great emancipatory significance in respecting their autonomy. What matters is that groups be identified and evaluated according to how the promotion of their interests and their emancipation changes the conditions of existing society for the better. Laclau and Mouffe argue that the key task is to establish and express the parallels between the specific, identifiable oppressions to which each group is subject so as to ensure unity as a popular front for the promotion of progressive issues (Laclau and Mouffe 1985).

Nevertheless, the attempts to replace the proletariat with the new social movements have a long way to go. Those who have offered new social agents - from women to blacks to gays to ecologists etc. - have justified their claim with 'universalistic' arguments paralleling the claims that Marx made for the proletariat. In each case a specific emancipation possesses a broader significance for humanity in general. The 'new' social agents are said to possess the same strength, capacity, and vision, destiny that Marx and Marxists assigned to the proletariat.

However, what is missing in these claims is precisely why Marx identified with the proletariat for reasons of their structural capacity and social futurity. It is in these terms that Cohen explains 'why Marx had the right to think he was right' (Cohen 1983:376/80). The parallel between marxism's proletariat and the new social movements is, as Meister argues, 'illuminating for what is left out’:





Miliband is entirely right in emphasising the differences within each of the new social movements. The new social movements may possess a 'revolutionary' potential in so far as the realisation of their aims, ultimately, implies changes in the distribution of power, property, privilege and position within society (Miliband 1989:100). But there are substantial - dominant? - elements within each of the social movements which are liberal, reformist and pursue only piecemeal change. They pursue, and may well achieve, limited advances and these may be valuable; but these do not amount to a decisive breach in the structures of oppression (Miliband 1989:103). Emancipation at the level of identity politics is perfectly compatible within the overall iniquitous, exploitative relations of capitalism.

The perspectives within the social movements are to be evaluated in political and in class terms. Some elements pursue change within existing arrangements and hence will in no way alter existing power relations; more radical elements appreciate the need for an anti-capitalist struggle. If the new social movements are to fulfil the claimed potential for radical social transformation then they 'are absolutely and inescapably dependent on the potential strength of labour movements and their political agencies' (Miliband1989:109).





Hence the centrality of the working class, class struggle and consciousness to Marxism. That this leads to a tendency to devalue other social actors and their struggles can be accepted. The question really is does Marxism systematically devalue other social actors and can it incorporate emancipatory struggles other than those based upon class?

The Reification of the Proletariat?
We have been this way before. In One Dimensional Man, Herbert Marcuse argued that 'the reality of the labouring classes in advanced industrial society makes the Marxian 'proletariat’ a mythological concept’. Shortly afterwards the class struggle in Europe reached an intensity not seen since well before the Second World War, showing the limits to the incorporation of the working class during capitalism's long boom.

And yet, shortly before he died, Marcuse repeated the pessimistic ‘one dimensional’ view which is based upon the concept of reification. Marcuse's point was that capitalism had succeeded in converting personal relationships between workers into objective relationships between things (Marcuse 1979:20/3). By making the reification of the world under capitalist relations so all pervasive it is hard to perceive how any emancipatory project could be possible. Marcuse's 'Great Refusal' appears as the politics of despair.

Marcuse himself was undoubtedly aware of the difficulties involved in abandoning the class politics of Marxism. For if there are problems with the proletariat as the revolutionary subject, there are even greater problems with the various groups proposed by Marcuse himself. Asked directly as to where the revolutionary subject is to be found Marcuse could give only a vague reply. 'I have been bothered about this for a long time and I'm afraid I cannot give you a satisfactory answer. The only thing I can say is that it seems to me wrong to go around looking for agents of historical change. They probably will rise and become identifiable only during the process of change itself’ (Marcuse 1968:14).

Marcuse's argument, at least, has the merit of respecting the subjectivity of the historical agent, as opposed to prescribing its politics on account of its objective class location. When pressed, Marcuse was quite prepared to recognise the centrality of the proletariat. If we continue to see the necessity of the Marxist concept of the 'revolutionary subject, we have to say that revolution without the industrial working class is still unimaginable' (Marcuse 1969:326). Thus Marcuse referred to Marx's distinction between the revolutionary subject in itself and the revolutionary subject for itself, arguing that the working class still existed as a class-in-itself but that it had not come to be a class-for-itself. Why? Because the working class was not only a class in the capital system but had actually become a class of this system (1969:327). The revolutionary potential of the working class can only be actualised if the proletariat comes to resist its incorporation in the capital system, becomes conscious of the dehumanised condition in which it lives (Martineau 1986:50/1).

The Reinstatement of Class
Without wishing to devalue the emancipatory struggles of other social actors, once one proceeds to argue that their emancipatory struggles are directed against the capital system, one necessarily reintroduces class into the central position it occupied in the classical Marxist analysis. For class in Marx's perspective is a clearly political concept concerning those social actors capable of engaging transformative action. Marx's concern was to discern those groups which possess real material capacity and social futurity in transforming society through their activity. What attracted Marx to the proletariat, therefore, was their society and history-making potential. And this was related to their structural capacity. 

Do the other social actors proposed by those who wish to redefine or abandon the Marxist project possess a similar capacity? Or can they, at best, only achieve limited emancipations at the surface of the reality of the capital system? For instance, to achieve equal status on grounds of race and gender is to achieve an equality of opportunity with capitalism’s fundamentally iniquitous, exploitative system. All may therefore claim the right to exist as isolated monads competing against each other for scarce resources on the market. One remembers that Marx characterised the transition from feudalism to capitalism in terms of exchanging ties of personal dependence for the objective dependency of all upon capital. This is a form of equality, an equality of enslavement. Individuals are formally free but objectively enslaved. To overcome this objective enslavement means going beyond the partial emancipations of racial and sexual equality to human emancipation in general through a substantive equality achieved only through the abolition of the capital system. Again, that points to a class understanding of politics as against the ‘new politics’ of social movements and identities.

Take the ecological movement. The logic of this movement is anti-capitalist in that to secure its demands it must abolish the capital system and its central dynamic of the accumulation process. This was Marx's ambition too. But where is the social agency within ecologism capable of achieving this transformation? Marxism can still propose one. Klaus Eder proposes the new middle class and their post-materialist ethic (Eder 1993), examining whether these are conscious actors or merely functional agents in bringing about new social relations. It is easy to argue that this post-materialist ethic as the product of an affluence parasitic upon the capital system. This new middle class, the warriors of the life world against the system world, are not to be relied upon in attempting to abolish the capital system. They replace a politics of class and exploitation with the politics of lifestyle and culture, exchanging a collective ethos for an individualist ethos, public good for private interest. They are, ultimately, comfortable in its alienation in that they owe their position to the capital system. In the very least, then, the proletariat may still be prioritised as the most important of the social actors, even if these other actors are to be incorporated within the emancipatory project.

But surely the Marxist conception of the proletariat is harder than this. The proletariat of Marxism is more than one of many social actors, even if its priority is respected. For Marx, the proletariat is Marx's universal, emancipatory and revolutionary class, it is the product of the capital system which nevertheless is the power behind capital and is hence capable of abolishing the rule of capital, emancipating itself and society in general in the process. This makes the proletariat the epistemologically and structurally privileged class, the only class that is able to see through and break through capitalist relations. Which other social actor or group is equipped in this way?

The Proletariat and the Crisis of Marxism





MODERNITY, ALIENATION AND RATIONALISATION

17 ALIENATION AND ITS ABOLITION

Marx developed a critical and emancipatory project that sought to comprehend and change society from the standpoint of real individuals and their material activities and relations. Marx's critique of alienation sought to recover, conceptually and practically, the constitutive role of human subjectivity from behind the positivity of objective and externally constraining structures and relations. This positivity is the positivity of a self-alienated world. Under this positivity human powers come to confront the human subjects as objective 'things' with an independent life of their own.
I propose to argue that Marx's conception of alienated labour, developed in terms of the domination of the value form and the fetishism of commodities, represents a powerful critique of the capital system as an alienated system of production which is responsible for the alienating dualisms and separations which estrange human beings, in theory and practice, from their social world and its forms. Marx's critique is thus oriented towards the creation of the emancipated social world. He offers a way past the forms of capitalist social relations in which human subjectivity comes to take the form of objective constraint.

The positivity of the self-alienated life confronts human beings with their own powers in alien form. Marx's critique of the estrangement that this entails develops a perspective on the self-organising society which removes the separation between public and private realms, destroying both the abstract, ideal status of the citizen, on the one hand, and the alienated existence of the real individual, on the other. This perspective entails a critique of that Marxism taking the form of state socialism as it does of ordinary bourgeois politics.

Unfortunately, Marxism after Marx, in its politicised, institutionalised form, came to adapt itself to the contours of bourgeois society and its dualisms and separations. To be practical meant making Faustian bargains with precisely the forces which Marx identified as the alien powers to be reappropriated and reorganised as human social powers. Thus the productive forces were interpreted in a wholly economistic fashion, and the state was theorised as a 'thing', an instrument to capture, control and monopolise (Corrigan, Ramsay and Sayer 1978:7/13).

Historically, then, Marx's critique of political economy became Marxism as political economy, thus neutralising the critical and emancipatory power of Marx's original approach (Cleaver 1979; Therborn 1976:428/9). Theoretically and practically, Marxism came to be assimilated to the bourgeois society to be transcended.

Marxism should always begin with labour, with labour as the teleology of the species, as conscious life activity, as human and as class praxis, and as class antagonism, redirective and transformative, constitutive power, creative practice, objectified subjectivity. The whole argument is to be set in the framework of human self-activity, its alienation and its recovery.





The centrality of labour, then, is to be established in both its essential human-teleological aspect and in its class aspect, in terms of both affirmation and antagonism. Labour both affirms and denies the human being. Labour is central to Marx's materialist premise that individuals form themselves by objectifying their powers within their social environment, transforming this environment and transforming themselves through their conscious labour. Labour as the conscious life activity of real individuals is the constitutive, generative power through which these individuals develop themselves as human beings. But labour may also be alienating, something dehumanising rather than as the affirmation of humanity, crushing the individual. Marx thus makes an important distinction between objectification and dehumanisation.

The real, active relation of man to himself as a species being, or the realisation of himself as a real species being, i.e. as a human being, is only possible if he really employs all his species-powers - which again is only possible through the cooperation of mankind and as a result of history - and treats them as objects, which is at first only possible in the form of estrangement.

Marx EPM EW 1975:386

A number of conclusions follow from this passage. Human beings only realise themselves as human to the extent that they objectify their essential, generic powers. However, this objectification (material praxis, human labour) is only possible as a result of entering into a relation with others 'through the collective activity of men’. ‘Man cannot be man as long as he remains entrenched in his subjectivity; he must give himself objective form. Yet he is present as a social being in that objectification, which is a necessary component of the process whereby man makes or produces himself as such, and retains his human status, he carries out that process through labour which is, in principle, an objectification of his own being, of his essential powers. Hegel had already shown, in the Phenomenology, how man humanises Nature and himself through his labour, raising himself as a conscious being above his own nature. In that sense, material objectification, that is production, is essential to man’ (Vazquez 1977:103/9).

In the Paris Manuscripts, Marx formulated production as his the category in his materialism. The human being is a practical being who, even though the alienation of essential powers, is formed through labour. Human beings create themselves in and through their productive activity. Cornu stresses the importance of the theory of alienation in the formation of the conception of human praxis:

The theory of alienation enabled Marx to develop a profound critique of the capitalist system from the point of view of alienated labour. Through it, Marx was able to move towards an increasingly clear and precise notion of the determinant role of labour in practical activity, and in the development of human life and history.

Cornu quoted in Vazquez 1977:144

The central argument of the Paris Manuscripts, that human beings transform themselves and their world through labour, is a cornerstone of Marx's praxis as an active materialism that stresses the sensuous, practical activity of individuals (Theses on Feuerbach) and proceeds from real individuals in their relations (The German Ideology) and the historical dynamic located in the development of the productive forces in the context of specific social relations.

Labour is significant in another respect. It is the structuring force of material practice which makes all other practices possible. Labour is central to human activity and constitutes the agency and subjectivity of human beings. Without labour, politics, culture, language, communication etc., which are also involved in forming human beings as agents and subjects, would not be possible (Post 1996:138).

Labour has two important aspects for Marx. In the first place, labour is 'redirective' (Hook in Callinicos 1985:33). The attainment of self-consciousness means that human beings can redirect their human activity into new forms so as to realise new goals. In the second place, labour is transformative (Callinicos 1985:33). Thus the relationship between human beings and their environment is an interactive one. The transformation of circumstances through labour is also a self-transformation. Integral to this interactive relation is constitutive human praxis.

The Teleology of Labour
Marx could be presented as offering a teleology of labour and, as such, his conception could be said to contain an idealist residue. For Marx, labour is constitutive of a world in alienated form that human beings need to reappropriate (Habermas 1990:xvi). Human beings need to recognise themselves in a world which they have created through labour.

Marx's conception of labour is teleological in its presentation of the human being developing human capacities through labouring activity. It is this conception that enables Marx to demand the emancipation of human beings from any objective, constraining organisations or forms which stand in the way of this development. Thus, Marx's conception of human emancipation does not entail any a priori moralistic humanism. Rather, Marx's attack upon the Utopians condemns the arbitrary and impotent character of a merely moral imperative.

Marx, in other words, always proceeds from the individual human being as such and not from 'Man' as some ideal notion of what human beings should be. Marx's position is ethical in that it does involve a conception of human beings can become and, stronger than this, should become if they are to be truly human. But this is not to oppose an ideal ‘ought to be’ to the real world. Rather, Marx proceeds from the real articulation of the essential powers of human beings, and it from the expression of these powers as the conscious life activity of human beings that Marx is able to discern human potentiality. Marx is therefore able to criticise the positivity of the self-alienated life from the perspective of ethical human potentialities. Marx condemns alienation as a condition in which the essential powers of human beings are constrained under specific, alienative, relations (Walton and Gamble 1976:1/2).

Man's special capacity lies in the unfolding of his productive powers in the teleology of labour.

Walton and Gamble 1976:2

Existing society is thus to be critically evaluated according to the extent to which it enables human beings to realise their essential powers and the extent to which it constrains, distorts or destroys these powers. 'Free, conscious activity is man's species character and, as a result, the exploitative, coercive and fundamentally alienative relations of the capital system must be regarded as the denial of the species character of human beings and criticised as such’ (Walton and Gamble 1976:6).

Marx views the human being as a teleological being whose powers are developed through labour and yet are constrained under the specific social relations that turn human powers into alien powers. Thus human self-alienation both presages and stands in the way of human self-realisation. It is only by presenting the argument in thus way that it is possible to understand Marx's conception of communism as the true resolution of the conflict between individual and species (Marx EPM).

For Marx history possesses subjects and these subjects are formed by objectification. Human history is the history of the actions of individuals as agents and subjects. But objectification does not necessarily realise the species character of human beings given that the productive activity of human beings has not been free, conscious activity. On the contrary, under alienative relations human beings only objectify themselves as unfree and unconscious beings.

The capital system, resting upon alienated labour and the hierarchical division of labour, cripples 'the capabilities of the species' and separates the individual from the community. Marx condemns the division of labour as 'the estranged positioning of human activity as a real activity of the species or as activity of man as a species being' (Marx in Walton and Gamble 1976:13/4).

Marx is arguing that what makes human beings human - what their species character or essence is - is their capacity for conscious practical creative activity. It is of the essence of human beings that as they transform their social circumstances they transform their own character.

The Theses on Feuerbach state Marx's position concisely. As against Feuerbach's anthropological conception of species essence, Marx argues that the essence of human beings is the ensemble of social relations. But these social relations are themselves the result of the human capacity to transform the world through labour. The 'essence' of the human species is thus a social creation which is recreated through history by means of conscious human labour. Circumstances are only to be truly known and changed through human agency.

Labour is generative power, creative practice, objectified subjectivity. It is in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts that Marx explicitly affirmed this argument. Thus conscious, creative human activity is the constitutive force behind the processes of social reality. The social universe is, therefore, self-made and is created out of human praxis. Marxism is, then, a 'praxis philosophy' (Habermas 1990:62).

It is interesting, however, to go beyond general statements and to explore the political dimension to these points. For Marx's politics are inextricably linked to this notion of the objectification, alienation and recovery of essential human powers. Indeed, Marx proceeded to the critique of capital as alienated social power after the critique of the political alienation of the state. The basic argument is that there are only human beings, the individuals comprising the demos, and the social forms they create. These forms, and the whole organisational and institutional framework that goes with them, are to be evaluated according to the extent to which they enhance or deny essential human powers. This applies to politics as to production and it leads to a conception of social self-organisation as against the positivism of the self-alienated world (Habermas 1990:62).

This conception of the social environment and of human nature as the product of redirective and transformative labour and hence of praxis as the active relationship of human beings to 'circumstances' is central to the thought behind Marxism as an emancipatory project. Indeed, emancipation is to be defined as the self-realisation of human beings through the free and full exercise of their essential powers. The free society, then, is that social world which makes this self-realisation possible and, indeed, is defined by it. The end that Marx has in view is the realised human society of realised human beings (Meikle 1985:58).

The alienation of labour, then, is to be criticised as the alienation of the species character of human beings in that active relationship to circumstances. This alienation is the alienation of the individual from his/her species essence and indeed the alienation of individuals from each other. Thus Marx presents communism as the positive resolution of the various dualisms which have characterised human history - man and man, man and nature, individual and species, freedom and necessity (Marx EPM). For communism means the abolition of system of alienated labour and the division of labour and, therefore, roots out the capital system, not merely private property. Only under these conditions will it be possible for human beings to live a realised life (Meszaros 1970; Ollman 1971).

The Active Element of Alienation
Marx therefore presents a conception of human self-activity, its alienation and its recovery. It is this recovery of essential human powers that defines human emancipation and defines communism as the emancipated social world. This emancipated social world is possible only if the human individual ‘really brings out all his species-powers .. and treats these powers as objects: and this, to begin with, is again only possible in the form of estrangement’ (CW 3:333).

Thus human self-alienation does not merely obstruct human self-realisation but also presages it. Alienation, therefore, shows the potential for human self-realisation and is, indeed, a necessary condition for this self-realisation. Marx's is a demand that the human subject comes to recognise itself in the object it has created, comprehending and controlling the human world as their own world. One can, indeed, recognise the objective world as the objectified subjectivity of human beings. The recovery of an alienated humanity is not to be conceived in terms of the dissolution of the objective world in favour of pure subjectivity, the Romantic notion.





Human beings can only affirm their humanity through objectification. Human beings are to realise themselves in the objective world, but they cannot do so if this world is still alienated.

The notion of alienation involves the view that human beings as creative subjects who become conscious of the object they create only after an initial estrangement in which the object appears as a power alien to the subject. Human powers are objectified only by becoming alien objects. This condition of alienation is transcended only when the human subject comes to recognise these alien objects as their own creations and hence recovers them. As subjects objectify themselves, so objects are subjectified through a process, of practical reappropriation. Thus Marx conceives a process of original unity, self-alienation and diremption, reconciliation in a richer unity.

The objectification of human powers entails the reestablishment of conscious human activity at a higher level of development. Reconciliation is not the restoration of the original unity but the achievement of a richer unity in which human beings have fully affirmed their powers. This is the teleological conception behind Marx's definition of communism as 'the genuine resolution' of the dualisms which have characterised history. It is, indeed, the solution to the riddle of history. The social forms that human beings bring about in their activity are to be evaluated according to their place in this teleology of history. History, for Marx, is a process whose telos is human freedom.

Alienation and Class
Marx initially argued in humanistic terms, with no specific reference to class. Indeed Marx originally referred to 'conscious life activity' rather than to 'labour' and called for the abolition of labour rather than its emancipation. But Marx's perspective became more socially and politically relevant the more he experienced the ability of the working class to struggle against its exploitation and dehumanisation. The working class was capable of striking a blow for 'the rule of man' over 'the rule of property'. Thus the alienation of labour could be connected with proletarian self-emancipation and a class politics in which the proletariat demonstrated the 'need for universality’, the need felt by individuals to be whole. In Capital I Marx argued for 'the free individuality of the labourer himself’ (Dunayevskaya 1988:60/1).

In concluding, then, one needs to introduce the class dimension to the alienation of labour and to argue, therefore, that the centrality of labour refers to more than the constitutive role of human praxis but also to class struggle and proletarian autonomy. The mode of life or existence constituted by praxis under alienative relations is a structured class antagonism. This antagonism between capital as dead or accumulated labour and labour as living labour, the creative force, indicates the deep structural roots of the class struggle. The mastery of the capitalist over the proletarian is, fundamentally, ‘the mastery of things over man, of dead labour over living labour’ (Marx in Dunayevskaya 1988:114).

There is a need to establish the connection between the structural antagonism between capital and labour and the class antagonism between the capitalist class and the proletariat. By bringing in structures, I do not wish to argue that the class struggle is merely a reaction to deeper structural forces, that classes are merely the personifications of these objectively conceived structures. But there is also a danger of voluntarism in making these structures themselves something constituted by the class actors. This indicates a danger of asserting the primacy of class antagonism, though this argument does qualify itself by affirming structures as 'modes of existence of class antagonism’, (Bonefeld in Bonefeld et al ed.I 1992:114). This structural antagonism of capital and labour is thus to be grasped as an antagonistic relationship between two necessarily opposed classes, capitalist and proletarian. When Marx characterised the proletariat as the class of 'concrete labour', the class which is ‘of but not of civil society', as the class with 'radical chains', as 'degradation conscious of degradation', he was sowing the seeds of what would later be conceptualised as a conflict between accumulated labour and living labour, capital and labour, with labour possessing the capacity to subvert capital's power. The proletariat, as the living labour exploited by dead labour, is to be understood as the always antagonistic class, not the only protagonist but also as the revolutionary, subversive, emancipatory side in this antagonism.

The proletariat, then, is that subversive, revolutionary power which is in and against the relations of domination and exploitation. The proletariat actually creates but is also antagonistic to these relations. What this means is that these relations are alienative and work to ensure that labour's creative power is transformed into the alien power of capital. Labour's own power is thus turned against labour. And labour is integral to and constitutive of this process of alienation. Capital could not exist without labour. Labour, as Marx puts it, creates the conditions of its own enslavement - capital (Meszaros 1995:718/9 720 725 728/9 734; Meszaros 1970:21/2). 

But this comes with a corollary full of revolutionary and emancipatory implications. Labour always retains the potential for its own freedom. For the power of capital is really the power of labour in alien form. The power of capital is secondary and derivative; it is labour that is the determining power. Capital could not exist without labour but labour certainly could and, to realise itself as this determining power, must do so. It is to call for the autonomisation of labour, something which capital is completely incapable (Bonefeld et al I 1992:103. And it is to call for the direct supply of social labour through the freely associated producers as against its indirect supply through the subordination of the workers to the value form.

It is necessary, then, to develop the notion of alienated labour in class and political terms so as to establish the conditions for achieving the emancipated social world. For human self-alienation is not to be abolished by some generalised human revolt against alienation. As Marx proceeded to a class understanding he came to realise that those classes whose positions within asymmetrical, alienative relations gave them social dominance would be quite comfortable with alienation. The project for transcending human self-alienation, therefore, has to resolve itself into a class politics so as to identify the particular social agency with the power but also the motivation to rupture alienative relations. This may be understood in terms of the proletariat as both an exploited, dehumanised class but also as the constitutive power under the capital system.

The argument has progressed, therefore, from establishing the centrality of labour as conscious life activity shaping history to the alienation of labour and the critique of the capital-labour relation and, finally, to the class struggle between the capitalist class and the working class. One of the main points to be argued is that the class struggle is indeed a struggle and, as such, involves more than agents personifying or reacting to deeper structural forces. Though the class struggle may indeed be latent (Miliband 1989; Heilbroner 1980) and may proceed unconsciously in terms of classes behaving as one would expect them to given their structural location, when we proceed to conceive the stage beyond self-alienation as reconciliation, there is a need to address questions of human subjectivity and its recovery. If alienation is an active process, its condition is not, its 'objective' structures and relations reducing human beings to passivity as personifications. Resistance to this condition, which comes from the proletariat acting against its domination and exploitation, throws off this passivity. And it is in this recovery of the active aspect of alienation and the struggle against it that one comes to recover the centrality of class struggle (Bonefeld 1992:xii/iii).

18 THE VALUE FORM AND SOCIAL LABOUR
For Marx, the capital system creates the material potentiality for emancipating human beings from natural necessity. At the same time, however, the systemic processes behind this emancipation - the process of accumulation - comes to enslave human beings to an artificial, socially created necessity which is imposed through the alienated value form. The struggle for human emancipation, then, may be expressed in terms of the struggle on the part of the working class - the value creating class - to directly supply social labour through their free association as against the indirect supply of labour through the value form (Meikle 1985:100; Clarke 1991:66).

It is worth exploring this opposition over how social labour is to be supplied - socialism versus capitalism - from the standpoint of labour as the value creating and hence potentially determining force. Capital shows the power of labour expressed in alienated form. But the power of alienated labour cannot be inherent in the thing which is alienated. It is not a struggle over power as a thing but over social relationships. As Marx argued, ‘only man himself can be this alien power over man’ (Marx EW EPM 1975:331). The power of capital over labour, therefore, expresses a specific social relationship. Thus capital, as the power of labour in alienated form, its objective, thing-like character, stems from it being the expression of a particular social relationship. And it is as such that struggle between capital and labour is to be defined (Clarke 1991:66).

The problem, therefore, is the one of overcoming fetishistic relations. This is connected with Marx's critique of the rationalised, abstracted world which appears beyond human control. But rather than take the direction of Weber, Lukacs and the Frankfurt School, theorising the problem in terms of the rationalising tendencies inherent in modernism - something which does indeed leads us irrevocably into the 'iron cage' (Clarke 1991; Miller 1987) - one needs to develop Marx's critique of alienated labour, developed systematically in his mature work as the fetishism of commodities and the 'trinity formula' and then relate this critique to the working class struggle and revolutionary socialist politics.

Marx demonstrated that social identities are constituted under a mode of production in which social labour is supplied through the alienated form of the exchange of the products of labour as values. The form of exchange which appears as the exchange of things between capitalists is thus the fetishistic form of appearance taken by social relationships between individuals. It is from here, the alienation of labour and its consequences, that the abstracting tendencies of the capital system arise. The exchange relation, therefore, can be grasped only as an expression of a particular social relationship and as concealing this relationship by assigning social powers to things, investing things with existential significance.

The 'objectivist' conception of production, through which the productive forces appear as thing like and as expanding according to their immanent laws, is merely the fetishistic form in which capitalist relations appear. The central dynamic of the capital system, resting upon alienated labour, is the production, extraction and accumulation of surplus value as the power of labour taking the alienated form of surplus labour (Clarke 1991:208).

The only form that the socialist society can take is through the direct supply of social labour under the free association of the producers and this means overcoming the alienated value form prevailing under capitalist relations of production. Under socialism 'the law of value’ would cease to operate. Socialism means the overthrow of the domination of exchange value and the value form exercised over society.

The intention, therefore, is to understand what the concepts of political economy - necessary and surplus labour and the forms appropriate to the capital system - as relations between classes and hence as being power-infused and political, economics as a site of struggle (Bonefeld et al 1992 101/2). The concept of the political is to be extended beyond the state and its institutions to embrace all relationships of structured power. Thus Burawoy refers to the 'political apparatuses of production' (Burawoy 1985:11), sustained by the state and controlling labour. Whether or not the capital system is reproduced depends upon the ability of the capitalist class to control the working class.

The value form, then, is not some scientific, abstract, apolitical concept which simply corresponds to a set of objectively conceived relations of a mode of production. The ability of the capitalist class to control the working class and prevent its autonomy and hence the power of capital to impose the value form is the essential condition of maintaining the capital system. This makes explicit the struggle that is continually waged by the capitalist class and the struggle which the working class needs to wage, the one to maintain a system in which life for the workers is the converting of their surplus labour 'into capital, the very force which dominates them.

Hence the importance of the point that the working class is both in and against the capital system (Bonefeld et al 1992 vol I 114; Bonefeld et al 1992 vol II xii/xiii). As part of the capital system, the proletariat is a class-in-itself which functions to create the surplus value which capital appropriates and accumulates as capital. And this is how capital creates, defines and controls the working class. But, as the value producing power upon which capital depends, the proletariat is capable of going beyond capital as a class-for-itself. For, in autonomising itself, the proletariat breaks the control that capital seeks to impose upon it.

The working class-in-itself is defined by its objective relationship to the means of production and comprises all those who have to sell their labour power in order to obtain an income. It is as a class-in-itself, as an exploited class with only a passive, objective existence, that the proletariat exists for capital. But the working class-for-itself comes to obtain a subjective self-identity which goes over against capital and develops only when the working class comes to autonomise itself. This process necessarily subverts capital and blocks the process of accumulation.

And this is precisely what Marx had in mind when he argued that 'the working class is revolutionary or it is nothing’ (Marx OG FI 1974:147/8). By becoming a class-for-itself, as a subjective reality possessing political and organisational significance, the proletariat is necessarily revolutionary (Bonefeld in Bonefeld et al 1992 vol I 103). For proletarian autonomy implies the disempowerment of capital and hence implies class struggle between the working class and the capitalist class. It indicates the conscious, political struggle of the working class against its identity as the class producing the surplus value upon which capital rests.

The working class is revolutionary or it is nothing means that the working class, paradoxically, only constitutes itself as a class, subjectively, when it becomes conscious of the need to struggle against its objective status as an exploited class. By constituting itself as a class, the proletariat begins the process leading to its dissolution as a class.

The dialectic of the working class as a class in and against capital thus ends with the abolition of both capital and the proletariat. The working class becomes revolutionary to put an end to its own identity as a class (Cleaver 1979:73/4). Arguably, Marxism, in its orthodox and western forms, neglected Marx's analysis of proletarian autonomization. 'Neither tendency has ever proved capable of developing a theory of working class autonomy as an effective force against capitalism and both have always privileged the role of intellectuals (i.e. their own role) as the key to successful social transformation' (Cleaver in Bonefeld et al ed.II 1992:127/8).

Under the capital system, social relations of production are expressed in terms of commodity production and exchange value. Labour is a commodity which is bought and sold but which, unlike other commodities, generates value. The labour invested in a product is the origin of the value of that product as realised in exchange. The working class receives some of this value so as to maintain and reproduce itself as a working class. The remainder, the surplus, is appropriated and accumulated as capital and hence used to continue capital production. The capitalist class is the class which, monopolising the means of production, is able to preside over this extraction of surplus value from the working class (Martinelli and Chiesi in Bottomore and Brym 1989:127). And this capital valorisation and accumulation on the basis of wage labour still constitutes the principle structuring modern society (Giddens 1973; Bottomore 1979 1985 1990).

Necessary Vs Surplus Labour

It is worth developing this idea of labour as the power which is both in and against capital. Labour is the force which creates capital and hence retains, as it were, capacity to disempower capital. The power of capital is secondary or derivative. For capital is:





Having established the peculiar character of labour as the only commodity which creates value, it is important, from the perspective developed here, to explore the revolutionary potential of the working class. The autonomisation of capital is an impossibility, since its social power is derivative. Capital can disempower labour by compelling it to alienate its power, but it cannot abolish labour without abolishing itself. Labour can also disempower capital but the difference is that this disempowerment would entail the abolition of capital. Labour is the source of capital's power and, as such, can abolish capital.

What characterises capitalist relations as fetishistic is the conversion of the power of labour into capital. But no matter how effective capital is in controlling the working class and in reducing it to abstract, surplus value producing labour, capital's power is always derivative and as such always subject to the capacity of labour to disempower it. The capital system is based upon the exploitation of labour but, however complete this exploitation may seem, it remains true that the surplus value appropriated is produced by labour and hence is labour's own power.

No matter how complete the exploitation and domination of labour by capital may appear to be, it remains true that capital can never make itself autonomous of labour whereas labour can make itself autonomous of capital (Clarke 1991:118; Meszaros 1995:733 606/7). Capital's power is derivative. Labour and labour alone is the creative power capable of autonomisation. Labour creates its own enslavement.









It is this dependence of capital upon labour that defines the working class as the class that is in and against the capital system, and which indicates the contradiction immanent in this system. This is to demonstrate the need for a dynamic, dialectical approach to the working class and its revolutionary character. It is quite correct to argue that the working class as the exploited class-in-itself is established within modalities of exploitation (Post 1996:29; Callinicos 1976:27).

One of the themes running through Lukacs' History and Class Consciousness is that: 'As the product of capitalism the proletariat must necessarily be subject to the modes of existence of its creator. This mode of existence is inhumanity and reification' (Lukacs 1971:76). Until the proletariat has achieved true class consciousness, it cannot go beyond this reification. The socialist revolution depend crucially upon the proletariat coming to throw off this reification and attain class consciousness. For 'the proletariat has been entrusted by history with the task of transforming society consciously' (Lukacs 1971:71). The revolution of the proletariat is uniquely ‘the revolution of consciousness’ - the attainment of true class consciousness is the condition for the proletariat to fulfil its revolutionary mission in the historical process.

The fact that the proletariat is located within modalities of exploitation does not disqualify the class as a revolutionary force. If the class were to remain within the definition imposed upon it by capital - as a class forced to sell its labour power - then certainly the working class will not be revolutionary. But as the value creating force it is always potentially revolutionary. As the class comes to constitute itself as a class-for-itself, as it autonomises itself, the proletariat does indeed become the revolutionary class. The proletariat thus comes to act against the modalities of exploitation. The point is that the working class always possesses this capacity to autonomise itself and to disempower capital and that the revolutionary process is the transition of the class from a class-in-itself to a class-for-itself (Bonefeld et al vol I 1992:103). Failure to grasp this as process, hence the failure to appreciate the working class as a class which is both in and against capital at the same time, can lead to the error of identifying the working class with its objective identity as an exploited class, thus encouraging the dismissal of the workers as a revolutionary agency.

Such an approach has been taken within Marxism. It is an approach which fails to appreciate Marx's achievement in conceiving human beings as the active producers of circumstances rather than as the passive products of circumstances. Marx is thus able to overcome the environmental determinism which makes it impossible for those subject to this determinism to emancipate themselves. The view that the proletariat is a product of capitalism, is established within modalities of exploitation, and for this reason cannot be the emancipatory-revolutionary class reverts to this environmental and epistemological determinism and is associated with an authoritarian and elitist politics.





Marx's approach is very different to those who theorise the incapacity of the proletariat as the exploited and dehumanised class. Marx's dialectical view allows him to grasp the future immanent in the present, going beyond the present.

Marx's own work, from an early stage, emphasised that the germs of the future are to be located within the present. 'Within the old society', he wrote in the Manifesto, 'the elements of a new one have been created'. Those elements, of course, are first and foremost to be found in the working class, who are subordinate to capital, but whose autonomous self-activity would lead to the overthrow of the old society and the constitution of a new one. Repudiating utopian and elitist projects formulated for the working class by outsiders, ‘would-be universal reformers’, Marx insisted on the need to work within 'the gradual, spontaneous class-organisation of the proletariat’ which alone could give rise both to the power to overthrow capitalism and to the power to construct a new social order. The search for the future in the present must, therefore, focus on the struggles themselves.

His own contributions to the identification of such autonomous elements were primarily theoretical. His efforts to locate and understand the forces emerging in opposition to capital and with the potential power to found an alternative to it led him to a focus on the labour process - capital's fundamental vehicle of social control. There, at the heart of capitalist power, Marx isolated and emphasised the autonomous creative moment within it: 'living labour'. Indeed, Marx followed Hegel in seeing in the creativity of living labour an essential aspect of what made humans different from the rest of nature.

Cleaver in Bonefeld et al 1992 vol II 125

The political implications are indeed revolutionary. This basic idea needs to be explored for its implications for political practice. And it is worth reexamining the crisis of capitalism in terms of the active, conscious struggle between classes. For the working class is to be understood as the subversive, antagonistic force both in and against capital, the power creating the surplus value upon which the existence and the power of capital depends. Capital is both a dominant and a dependent power; its power derives from labour itself. Which is another way of arguing that labour can autonomise itself whereas capital cannot. The struggle of labour, that is, the working class, demonstrates this capacity for autonomous power by blocking and undermining the process of accumulation, thus imposing crisis upon capital and threatening to abolish capital.

Crisis and Class Struggle
The crisis of capitalism, then, may thus be developed in terms of the contradiction between the working class as necessary labour and the capitalist class as surplus labour. Hence, there is a contradiction inherent in the very dynamic of the capital system. The rising technical composition of capital, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, crisis itself all loss the purely objective, abstract treatment they receive in that Marxism read as political economy. The systemic tendency to crisis is thus read in terms of the way that the working class struggles to block capital and its process of accumulation (Clarke 1994:70/2).

Of course, this position risks voluntarism, as though capitalist crisis is not inherent in the necessary operation of the system but is imposed upon the system by the working class. At the same time, this revaluation of the working class power has the merit of restating the need for revolutionary agency and insisting upon the activity required to abolish the capital system. There is, in other words, a need to integrate the perspectives of working class autonomy and capitalist breakdown so that capitalist crisis remains something inherent in the capital system but is no blind or inevitable collapse generated by objective laws operating independently of human initiative.

Capitalist crisis, then, is to be presented as systemic, i.e. inherent in the capital system, as structural, in terms of the relation between capital and labour, surplus versus necessary labour, and as the struggle between the capitalist and the working classes as human actors capable of taking the initiative against each other. Only the working class, however, possesses the capacity to autonomise itself in such a way as to transcend the capital system. Capitalist crisis, therefore, is always an opportunity to the proletariat and is always a challenge to the capitalist class to recover its control over the working class so as to secure the extraction of surplus value (Cleaver 1979:62).

The systemic imperative of the capital system, its central dynamic, is accumulation. Without accumulation the capital system cannot survive. Accumulation is thus the essential requirement characterising surplus value production. And competition on the basis of this production compels every capital to expend its values as a condition of its self-preservation. Capital must expand its values and accumulate or it fails to survive. As a result there is a systemic tendency to expand total capital and to change value relations. With the rise in the technical composition of capital there is a fall in the rate of surplus value, hence the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. With the inability to extract sufficient surplus value the process of accumulation can no longer be continued profitably (Mattick 1981:115/6). This schema is neat but implies a purely objective process. Where, one needs to ask, are the human actors?

Thus, there is a need to present the structurally rooted contradiction between capital as surplus value and labour as necessary labour has also to be presented in its subjective, political and conscious sense. That is, the class struggle is to be understood as something more than a reaction to material stimuli, with capitalists and proletarians merely personifying their objective class identity and acting according to systemic imperatives. The class struggle is based upon the fundamental antagonism between capital as accumulated labour and labour as living labour is, in a sense, personified in the class struggle between capitalists and proletarians (Dunayevskaya 1988:114) but the obvious danger of such an argument is the implication that in the class struggle capitalists and proletarians actually do not act but merely react as personifications of their economic categories. The intention of the discussion here is to argue for the recovery of human agency and hence to argue that the objectification leading to the 'objective structures and relations' of the capital system actually leads to a world of objectified subjectivity. This is to locate the subjective in the objective and hence to explore the active side to the contradictions, crises and struggles of the capital system (Bonefeld et al 1995:6 171/2).

And it is to argue that the fundamental contradiction is indeed between capital and labour as 'dead' and 'living' forces. For the capitalist class is capable of initiative only within the parameters of the objective imperatives of the capital system. The capitalist class can never act to block or undermine the process of accumulation without putting an end to its own existence. In this sense, the capitalist class must remain within the world of the 'dead', within the positivism of the self-alienated world. The working class, however, asserts the power of the forces of the 'living' against this positivism and, as such, is capable of recovering human agency and subjectivity. The working class can transcend the capital system and hence strike the decisive blow for human freedom.

There is a need to keep this idea of the working class as a class in and against itself in mind. Too great a concentration upon the character of the class as a class 'in' capital fails to appreciate the process whereby the class-in-itself develops itself into a class-for-itself. This process of self-development may be call class constitution, the working class giving itself a subjective identity. By developing its organisational, political and intellectual capacities the working class/necessarily comes into conflict with capital. It is the struggle of living labour against dead labour. The working class is revolutionary or it is, if not exactly nothing, then merely an objective fact, passive and part of the capital system.

The idea of classes as objective facts, objectively given locations, is something familiar in the sociological treatment of the subject. It is an idea which fetishizes structure and abstracts it from agency and struggle. The objective conception of class is static and presumes that political and intellectual positions can be read off from objective class location. Those who argue that there are 'no necessary relations' between the two (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Hindess 1983 1987; Hirst and Hindess 1975; Hirst 1986) target this static, sociological conception but mistakenly identify it with Marxism as a whole. They do not overcome the determinism, merely invert it by presenting a world in which politics and ideology determine everything.

Marx himself unites the objective and the subjective, emphasising the self-development and struggle on the part of the class as it comes to create a subjective identity out of its objective position. From being a class-in-itself, created by, and within, capitalist social relations, the working class comes to repudiate its exploited and dehumanised condition to become a revolutionary class (Miliband 1977:22 22/3 31 33 34 34/5 35/6; Levine and Wright in Callinicos 1989:32/40 46). This conversion cannot be reduced to indoctrination (Thomas 1985:258), politicians and ideologists cannot prescribe for the class as subject.

Marx is, however, well aware of the importance of the political and intellectual expression of the workers movement. The collective social actor is more or less effective in promoting its material interests on account of what it understands to be its ideals. Marx argues, further, that the collective actor's ability to promote its ideals depends upon how well it comes to conceptualise its interest - 'claiming that the working class .. would be more effective in promoting the ideal of socialism if it had a clear understanding of its material interests' (Meister 1990:27/8).

There is a need to stress social relations as contradictory and antagonistic so as to indicate not merely the subjective character of social reality but to indicate how this reality is infused by class power, relations and struggle. Capital, indeed, is not a thing but a relation. Moreover, it is a relationship of a particular kind, contradictory and antagonistic. Capital must always secure its control of the working class in order to extract the surplus value upon which accumulation rests. Capital wants the working class to remain within its position 'in' capitalist relations and has to struggle to secure this character. Capital, therefore, has always to secure its expansion by securing the incorporation of the working class within capitalist relations. The working class, however, possesses the power to act against capital and to obstruct and undermine the process of accumulation.

The Dependence of Capital upon Labour
The basis of this argument is the asymmetrical relationship of class power between capital and labour. This asymmetry, moreover, can be argued in two, contradictory, ways. In the first place, capital is the dominant social power that exists by exploiting and dehumanising labour. In any struggle capital would appear to be all powerful whereas the working class struggles as the subaltern class. Separated from their means of production the working class is forced to sell its labour power to capital in order to obtain an income. In the second place, however, the working class has the potential to subvert capital. For the power of capital is labour's own power in alienated form. Capital depends upon the production of surplus value by labour whilst labour may resist this private appropriation. Capital cannot do without labour but labour can do without capital. Labour, in this sense, is the determining power which must struggle against the relations which turns its power against it as the alien power of capital.

There are, than, two asymmetries which guarantee conflict. In the first place, within capitalist relations, capital is the dominant social power. In the second place, as the value producing force, labour is the dominant structural power. Class struggle, then, occurs over the way that social labour is supplied and is a struggle over surplus labour. Struggle is inherent in the fetishistic capital system and is to be presented as such.

My intention, therefore, is to reject the notion of class struggle, the political, organisational and intellectual positions that the class develops in struggle, as passively attendant upon the evolution of objective contradictions. The class struggle between capital and labour does possess structural roots but human agency is embedded in these structures. There is a struggle to be fought out by human agents (Bonefeld et al vol I 1992:xvii/xviii 93 114; Bonefeld vol II 1992:xii/xiii). The reality shaping significance of class praxis may, therefore, be affirmed.

Thus, one proceeds from the structurally rooted antagonist between capital and labour to understanding the primacy of class praxis. It is to understand that only human beings act in a transformative way and that any transformation of social reality is less the operation of historical 'laws' than the activities of human agents involved in the class struggle (Bonefeld et al vol II 1992:xii/xiii).

Marx's work is packed with organic metaphors. Marx is a radical immanentist: ‘immanentist’ in the sense that social change always proceeds from within existing forms and forces; ‘radical’ in the sense that reality and its forms are always necessarily moving beyond existing society. Thus socialism is the vision of the immanent society (Parekh 1982:177), the ideal that may be located in the real. ‘Within the old society the elements of a new one have been created’ (Marx MCP in REV 1973). 

One can underline that Marx's categories - form, law, necessity - are all essentialist and organic and all assume that things possess natures, potentials which inhere within them and which are to be developed (Meikle 1985:3/4 10). But this is not to embrace an evolutionary perspective which gives the impression of a gradual, peaceful process of change. For the forms of the future are to be discerned, first and foremost, in the working class, the most important of the productive forces as the revolutionary class. The ability of the working class to autonomise themselves through their self-activity would be exercised to rupture capitalist relations and hence to constitute the new social order. Rejecting the social systems and sectarian principles of would-be universal reformers, principles which are introduced into the class from the outside (Manifesto of the Communist Party in REV 1973:80), Marx insisted upon 'the gradual, spontaneous class organisation of the proletariat' as central to abolishing the capital system and the constitution of the new social order. Thus, discerning the forms of the future social order within the present means focussing upon struggle from the standpoint of working class self-activity.

Marxism is thus the theory and practice (praxis) of proletarian self-emancipation which is firmly based upon the tendency to autonomy in the working class subject. Marxism means discerning and working with the emancipatory forces emerging in the autonomous working class movement to oppose and rupture alienative, exploitative capitalist relations. At the heart of the power of capital is the power of labour. Marx is thus opposing 'living' labour as the creating, determining force to 'dead' Labour, the working class movement to capital.


19 MARXISM AND MODERNITY

With the discovery of what may be called the intransigence of social institutions, and with the destruction of hopes in socialist revolution, many on the left have become theorists of modernity as an untranscendable condition. Weber has thus taken a place alongside Marx. Indeed, Weber's diagnosis has come to be more influential than Marx's prognosis. The notion of modernity is complex and, in Weber, a highly ambiguous condition (Turner 1993:vii/viii 5 115/6 118; Schroeder 1992:112). Sayer argues that Weber's critique of modern socialism is ‘rooted in a much deeper disenchantment with rationalisation itself’ (Sayer 1991:148). Defenders of modern society against Marx’s attempts to go beyond modernity will find little comfort in Weber’s conception of modernity as a thoroughly rationalised, demoralised and bureaucratised order.

Marx himself is aware of the ambiguity contained within modernity, an ambiguity most eloquently articulated in his speech on the anniversary of the People's Paper (Marx 1973:299/300). But Marx is an optimist. He is a theorist of the modern, modernity and modernisation but, more than this, he sees the historical process as going somewhere. Weber, however, offers merely 'mechanised petrification' and the 'iron cage' (Weber 1985:181/2). The aspects of modernity of which Marx was critical - the growing imposition of artificiality and abstraction over the genuine material experience of the everyday world of reciprocity – are perceived in Weberian terms as untranscendable. In Politics as a Vocation, Weber gives a pessimistic prognosis: 'Not summer's bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness, no matter which group may triumph externally now. Where there is nothing, not only the Kaiser but the proletarian has lost his rights' (Weber 1970: 128).

For Weber, we live in a morally divided world and lack the overarching moral framework within which moral argument could claim authority. The world thus expresses a plurality of values, no one of which can claim priority over the others (Lassman and Velody1989:22). 

Weber poses the question, 'Which of the warring gods shall we serve?' (Weber 1970:155). The question does not go away with disenchantment but, on the contrary, assumes a new urgency. 'Our civilization destines us to realize more clearly these struggles again, after our eyes have been blinded for a thousand years' by 'the grandiose moral fervour of Christian ethics'. And today 'many old gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence take the form of impersonal forces. They strive to gain power over our lives and again they resume their eternal struggle with one another'. What is so 'hard for modern man' is 'how to measure up to workaday existence' in this disenchanted world (Weber 1970: 149). Weber puts his faith in the ethic of responsibility. Its essence is that 'one has to give an account of the foreseeable results of one's action' (1970: 120). 

Weber's argument has political implications. For this pluralism of world views makes a liberal framework, based upon a principle of procedural justice the only relevant political form (Hampshire 1992:54/62). Secularisation through differentiation has, therefore, not only undermined the traditional moral framework; the fragmentation of the social structure also entails that general world views like that presented by Marx and Marxism will lack a widespread social appeal.

That which has given human life meaning and purpose has become, in a thoroughly rationalised world, merely contingent and transitory, and irremediably so. The disenchantment of the world destroys the possibility of the traditional moral framework which bestowed transcendental meaning on human action (Lassman and Velody 1989:30; Schroeder 1992:113/4). Moreover, this rationalisation is incapable of generating any kind of substitute for this moral framework. Hence the loss that Weber assigns to the process of rationalisation is irretrievable. The clock cannot be turned back (Schroeder 1992:112/5). Something such as Marxism could only appear as a kind of traditionalism in a world that lacks the overarching religious framework.

For Alasdair Maclntyre, the process of rationalisation issuing in the modernity described by Weber has been nothing less than a disaster. For him, the moral tradition which may be traced back to Aristotle, has been undermined, something which makes it impossible to identify the nature of the crisis in which the modern world finds itself, let alone overcome it (Poole 1991:60/2 146/50; Maclntyre 1981). The disorder in the moral order, the profound moral malaise in which human beings find themselves, is thus treated as a direct reflection of the crisis of modern society. Maclntyre is critical of most of the schools of modern social and moral theory to the extent that he considers them to be the expressions of, rather than solutions to, the crisis of modernity (Stauth and Turner 1988:45; Maclntyre 1981). The essence of this crisis lies in the gap between the 'is' and the 'ought'.

Ross Poole develops the Aristotelianism of Maclntyre in such a way as to avoid reactionary snares. Poole locates the loss of moral meaning in the destruction of community and in the fact that modern bourgeois relations mean that the social identity for which moral appeals have relevance are lacking (Poole 1991:155/6; Stauth and Turner 1988:45/6). There is, in fine, a division between the individual and the general good. Appeals to the general good, affirming that the good of all is the good of each, lack social relevance. It is a question, then, not so much of re-establishing the overarching moral framework as of recovering the community and communal identity which makes that framework meaningful (Poole 1991:136).

Marx's critical assessment of the process of modernity, involving the rise of the state and capital as abstracted social powers, the separation between the political and the economic, and the existence of a dichotomy within the human being as egoistic and communal being, all look timely indeed. The forms of modern sociality comprise the differentiation of the economic as the counterpart of the abstraction of the modern state. The emergence of the political and the economic as realms abstracted from society rest upon a profound transformation of social relationships and a consequent relocation of social power. The relations of personal dependence under the feudal order are replaced by the objective dependence of all upon the impersonal. Human life is mediated by 'things' - capital, state, law, money, commodities.

The class identity epitomises the modern social relationship and it is the centrality assigned to class that indicates that Marx is as aware as anyone that moral appeals to the general human good lack social relevance. Marx does not, on this basis, retreat upon an assertion of plurality. He looks into the plurality of class society for the positive force able to reconstitute community on the basis of the emancipatory achievements of modernity. Marx's community may be expressed as a unity with differentiation. Weber, on the other hand, sees this differentiation as entailing an irreversible disunity. The alienation of social power delineated by Marx becomes part of Weber's rationalisation ending in the iron cage and mechanised petrification of the modern World.

Marx's account of modernity is distinguished from Weber's in that he locates the crisis of the modern world not so much in a process of rationalisation as in the alienation of labour and the capital system as an alienated system of production. It is the capital system and alienated labour which makes modernity modern. The loss, for Marx, is not of the traditional framework of moral meaning as of human social power. And this loss is recoverable at a higher level of development.

Marx himself may be described as both a modernist and a critic of modernity. Therborn thus describes Marxism as 'Her Modern Majesty's Opposition to modernity' (Therborn 1996:59).





Marx looks to preserve the achievements of modernity whilst nevertheless going beyond modernity. Marx took the high road out of modernity rather than looking back to a lost past. 'Marxism defended modernity with a view to another, more fully developed modernity' (Therborn 1996:60). All the grand themes of modernity are developed by Marx - industrialisation, centralisation, abstraction, differentiation, rationalisation, individualisation, secularisation. Marx, it may be argued, was concerned that the emancipatory promise of modernity should be redeemed.

The truth is that Marx was a modernist who refused the backwards looking visions of critics of modernity. Marx distanced himself from the 'prophets facing backwards' who looked for the salvation of 'civilisation with all its evils' through 'digging up again from the rubbish' of the pre-modern, pre-capitalist society (The Association for Administrative Reform - People's Charter 1855). Contrary to Joseph Femia (1993), then, Marx displays none of that yearning for lost harmony, simplicity and community. Marx's communism is very much post-modernity (Turner 1993:186/7).

The question, then, is to discover how Marx could be a modernist who could critique modernity with a view to its transcendence. How could Marx see a path through modernity whereas Weber could not?

Rationalisation and Separation
Max Weber defined the essential features of modernisation in terms of a process of rationalisation which embraces all aspects of society, an increasing secularisation which brings about the disenchantment of the world, an irreversible bureaucratisation, and a growing plurality of values. Weber may be taken to be the theorist of modernity, not merely in delineating its processes but in developing the tensions between rationalisation in its technical and its human aspects as well as anyone. Weber's work pertains to religion and the ethical confusion of the modern world, the bureaucratisation of life and the standardisation of society, the disappearance of the autonomous individual of liberal theory and politics in the iron cage of modernity, the emergence of science, the decay of charismatic authority and the extension of the administrative machine, the destruction of face to face personal, relations and their replacement by large scale bureaucratically organised structures.

The process of rationalisation described by Weber contains a number of key components. Firstly, there is the differentiation of social spheres into specialised spheres each possessing a degree of autonomy. Secondly, there is the growth of abstract conceptualisations of sovereignty and power. This ties in which the rise of the abstraction of the modern state and the development of the abstract citizen. Thirdly, there is the extension of formal, abstract rationality in law, theology as science, the conversion of medicine into a science of disease from being a manual art. Fourthly, there is the extension of bureaucratic procedures in the organisation of all major public institutions. Fifthly, there is the separation of the private-emotional world from the public-rationalised world. Sixthly, there is the disenchantment of the world leading to a polytheistic world of competing values. Science has destroyed the overarching moral framework of pre-modern society but is incapable of replacing it. The world of competing values lacks a unifying moral framework.

The most salient characteristic of modernity is the rationalisation of all aspects of human life - of religion and morality, tradition and culture, of politics and law, of production and money, of individual relationships and the human body. For Max Weber, the modern world is a world of increasing rationalisation. This rationalisation, however, relates to the technical and not the moral component of rationality. It pertains to the means of realising social ends. However, the values involved in this rationalisation are left uncertain. That which gives human life its meaning and purpose are thus rendered, in a rationalised world, merely contingent. Disenchantment destroys the moral framework which gives meaning to human action and replaces this with a formal rationality that is agnostic as regards ends.

Rationalisation and Alienation
Weber's process of rationalisation leads directly to the iron cage of modernity. Rationalisation appears to be an inexorable and irrevocable process. There is, however, another way of presenting this rationalisation, one which permits of a way out of the iron cage. This is to relate rationalisation to the alienation of labour. Rationalisation is the product of alienation in this perspective. The rationalisation that Weber describes is the result of the subordination of reason to the alien power of capital rather than being the product of a formal rationality as such. This would be Marx's interpretation. Marx locates the source of Weber's rationalisation in alienated labour and the fetishism of commodities.

And here we notice a difference between Marx and many western Marxists who, under the influence of Weber, have underlined the centrality of formal or 'instrumental' rationality. The western Marxists, unimpressed by the working class and the category of labour, succumb to Weber's diagnosis and, for that reason, are condemned to a perspective quite contrary to Marx's. They are led, inexorably, into the iron cage and know that there is no way out.

For if rationalisation has been the essential characteristic of modernity and if 'reification' - Marx's alienation - is a necessary consequence of the extension of formal or instrumental rationality, then human beings are condemned to an alienated social existence, expressed in the metaphor of the iron cage. The progress of the modern and of modernity has its end in this 'nullity' (as Weber quotes Goethe in The Protestant Ethic). Where Marx's critique of alienation was based upon the possibility of a social transformation, the Weberian perspective precludes the possibility of such a transformation. There is nothing left but a contemplative moral approach with more than a hint of pessimism.

For Marx, the source of the deformation of 'reification' or fetishism lies not in a general process of rationalisation and the extension of formal or instrumental rationality. This rationality is the alien logic of abstracted 'things', the 'impersonal' entities mediating human life. More precisely, the source of the reification to which the human world is subjected is to be located in the alienated form of labour under the capital system. The deformation expressed by the extension and domination of instrumental rationality is to be explained by reference to alienated labour. Weber did possess a great sense of how means displaced ends in the process of modernisation. But this inversion of means and ends is basic to the inversion of subject and object in the alienated social world of capital.

Against Alienating Separations and Dualisms
'Separation' is a key figure in grasping the process of modernisation. Marx himself concentrated upon the separation of the workers from their means of production as the fundamental factor behind the abstraction of the modern world, the creation of an instrumental-system world possessing a rationality of its own over the everyday reality of individuals. Weber himself argued that this separation of the worker from their means of production was merely a particular, if still highly important, part of a general process of separation. Thus Weber makes a comparison between the separation of the worker from the means of production with the separation of the soldier from 'the paraphernalia of war'. In Capital, Marx argued that this ‘severance of the conditions of production, on the one hand, from the producers, on the other, forms the conception of capital' (Marx Capital III). For Weber, this 'severance' or separation characterises modern social organisation as such and extends across all areas of social life.





The rise of what Marx calls the 'abstraction of the modern state’ (Marx CHDS 1975:90 145) is located by Weber in 'the expropriation of the autonomous and "private" bearers of executive power . . who in their own right possess the means of administration, warfare and financial organisation'. Weber argues that the whole process of state making 'is a complete parallel to the development of the capitalist enterprise through gradual expropriation of the independent producers' (Weber 1970:82).

By making 'separation’ the basic characteristic of the modern world Weber has effectively argued for a generalisation of Marx's alienation beyond the economic sphere. This can be done on Marx's premises, so long as the origin of this general alienation is located in the alienation of labour. Weber's 'alienation', however, is of a significantly different character. For Weber, capitalism is merely a specific form of a more general 'separation' which is the basis of the discipline which moulds individual subjectivity and plunges the individual into the iron cage, the mechanised petrification of modern society (Turner 1993:207; Lassman and Speirs 1994:314: Schroeder 1992:114/6). Weber focused upon the social consequences of expropriation, arguing that the subordination of the worker to the capitalist through expropriation forms the necessary condition for rational calculation and discipline.

Weber therefore saw the effects of what Marx called the 'dull compulsion of economic relations' (Marx 1974: 688-9) in a way similar to Marx, in that the formal freedom of labour in the market resulted in factory discipline, managerial surveillance and social regulation. For Weber, however, this expropriation as the basis of discipline and calculation went beyond simple economic expropriation but embraced all aspects of life (Turner 1993:201/2).





Separation of the material means of human action from the human agents forms the generic foundation for all institutional rationalisation and differentiation for Weber. It is precisely this characteristic which lies behind that irreversible process of bureaucratisation which comes to embrace most areas of social life. In this bureaucracy we have discipline's 'most rational offspring' (1968:29).

For Weber, 'a developed money economy' forms the 'normal precondition for the unchanged and continued existence of pure bureaucratic administrations' (1970:204/5). The rational bureaucratic state is, for Weber, the sine qua non for the rational capitalist economy. Weber argues, in terms reminiscent of Marx in the early critique of Hegel's political philosophy, that it is only in 'the complete depersonalisation of administrative management by bureaucracy' that 'the separation of public and private' spheres fundamental to the capitalist economy is realised 'fully and in principle' (Marx 1970:239).

Weber's argument on the tension between democracy and bureaucracy also returns to one of the central themes of Marx's critique of Hegel's political philosophy. For Weber, however, 'democratisation' refers not to what Marx called ‘true democracy’, dissolving the state and civil society but to the abstracted political realm. 'Bureaucracy inevitably accompanies modern mass democracy in contrast to the democratic self-government of small homogeneous units'. For Weber, ‘democratisation’ in the sphere of politics, with the mass parties, and in society in general, creates a favourable terrain for bureaucratisation. Weber cautions that democratisation does not necessarily involve the governed taking an increasing and active share in governing. Rather, authority remains detached from the governed. The crucial fact is the levelling of the governed in opposition to the ruling and bureaucratically articulated group, which in turn may occupy a quits autocratic position, both in fact and in form (Marx 1970:224/6, 231). As with Marx, the political subjectivity of the governed is merely illusory. The fact is that the governed exist as objects of public policy and administration rather than as subjects of the political process. Weber writes of bureaucracy in terms very similar to Marx: 'the official secret’ is 'the specific invention of bureaucracy' and 'nothing is so fanatically defended' (Marx 1970:233).

It can be argued, then, that there are important similarities between Marx and Weber. Karl Lowith therefore draws the parallel between Marx's alienation and Weber's rationalisation (Lowith 1993; Turner 1993:212; Mommsen in Levy ed.1987:91/2). Both views rest upon a philosophical anthropology, upon a conception of what it is to be a human being. The views of Marx and Weber converge around the notion of estrangement and disenchantment. At the heart of this process is human self-alienation, the commodification of human life and individual relationships the rationalisation of human life through the refinement of discipline, surveillance and regulation through the extension of bureaucratic principles of organisation. The philosophical anthropology to which Lowith draws attention gives a fundamentally moral dimension to the process of estrangement and disenchantment. Indeed, with Weber, this dimension possesses a tragic dimension for Weber, one which we may be entitled to call existential.

The similarities of Weber's view with that of Marx are worth underlining. For Weber, the process of rationalisation involves the separation the workers, both mental and manual, from their means of production. Weber is clear that it is this separation or expropriation inflicted upon the workers that lay behind the possibility of rational calculation in economic affairs, managerial rationality, offering 'the most favourable conditions for discipline' (Weber 1978:1 133). In fine, there is a case for arguing that Weber's rationalisation has alienation at its core forming the basis of rational calculation and discipline.

The process of rationalisation entails an increasing intellectualisation of social life, that is, the subordination of all areas of human activity to systematic scientific inquiry and management. This subverts the position of the traditional authorities in favour of the expert in the sphere of morality, in social relationships and in personal behaviour. Frankly, this is nothing less than the progress of the standardisation and uniformisation which had so worried liberals like Mill in the nineteenth century. The process of rationalisation comes to be articulated in the extension of bureaucratic methods of social organisation, the domination of administrative personnel and the increasing surveillance of the individual in all aspects of life (Sayer 1991:144; Stauth and Turner 1983; Schroeder 1992:114/5). Rationalisation condemns the individual to the iron cage, a cage which imprisons the individual not merely physically but also subjectively. The individual is instrumentalised, reduced to the status of an object, standardised and quantified, to be manipulated and managed according to rational administrative methods. The individuality of the individual is thus submerged under the increasingly formalised character of social life.

Marx explains this rationalisation destroying individuality in terms of the transition from ties of personal dependence to the objective dependency of all upon the mediation of 'things', the 'impersonal’ (Marx 1973:165). The 'dull compulsion’ of economic relations is the most direct form that this mediation takes. And this has its origins in the separation of the workers from their means of production. This expropriation forces the worker to sell her/his labour power on the market in order to obtain the necessary resources to survive. Weber generalises this argument so as to demonstrate that the distinguishing feature of the modern world is the separation of human agents from all the principal means, of human activity. Weber thus argues for a general social and political alienation through the separation of human agents from their means of production, administration and knowledge.

In fine, the ‘rational calculation’ of the capitalist economy is set within a complex of other social and political separations. Weber refers to the separation of the officials from the means of administration, of the intellectual worker from the means of mental production, of the soldier from the means of violence in the modern army (Turner 1993:177; Sayer 1991:135; Lassman and Speirs 1994:279 281 314 315/6). The purpose in drawing parallels between Marx and Weber around this theme of expropriation and separation is to support the argument that Marx's Marxism contains within itself the potential to sustain a critique of a general alienation in political, social and economic terms. It is this, arguably, which Mouzelis attempts when proposing the concept of ‘mode of domination’ to run alongside the 'mode of production' (Mouzelis 1988).

The discipline of the worker in the capitalist enterprise and the obedience of the citizen under the state are secured by their separation from the means of social, economic and political activity. The individual is subjected to a developed and organised apparatus of social regulation and is treated as an object of this apparatus. The workers are separated from their means of mental and manual production, subjected to legal commands backed up by the coercive force of the state and is entangled in the full panoply of regulatory agencies and practices which control, classify and quantify the population for the benefit of the social regulation of the state (Miller 1987).

‘Separation’ is thus a key figure in the general alienation of modern society. The process of differentiation defining modernity thus expresses itself in a series of dualisms which separate the human agents from the means of human activity. When applied to Marx's own thinking, we come to recognise a number of dualisms which need to be overcome if human beings are to realise their human nature in their activity. Marx, therefore, argues for a dialectical unity by which this series of alienating dualisms and separations are integrated within the framework of transformative activity. Marx's active materialism (i.e. praxis) is thus oriented towards overcoming the tyranny of abstraction, recovering the 'impersonal' for the everyday world of reciprocity of individuals. There is thus a unity established between subject and object, social being and consciousness, base and superstructure.

The attempt to realise this integrative framework through collective transformative action may be defined in terms of dereification — material praxis as the struggle for authentic being. Revolutionary-critical praxis is an attempt to assert the reality and rootedness of the material, sensuous world of human sociality and reciprocity over the systematised, intellectualised and abstracted world. It is the process in which the social relations between individuals are revealed as a human product and, as such, may be understood as alterable.

Marx, in other words, avoids the reduction of western Marxism to a moralising contemplative critique by taking the process of dereification to the level of practice. At the level of class and class struggle dereification becomes revolutionary praxis.

The process of dereification, therefore, depends upon the practical transformation of the social relations of production by the proletarian class subject. Marx's emancipatory project is to be presented in terms of the abolition of alienating separations and dualisms.

One can therefore be sceptical of Habermas' attempts to delimit the proper sphere of instrumental rationality. Habermas' demarcation of the system world and the life world has the merit of attempting to accommodate the radical project to the permanence of modernity. The system world is governed by the steering media of money and administrative power. What Habermas hopes to protect against is the encroachment of the system world upon the life world, something which could only have pathological consequences. Habermas' objective is to preserve and strengthen the sphere of substantive rationality. The substantively rational society is created by strengthening 'culture' and 'civil society' through the undistorted interaction of free and equal individuals. The substantively rational civil society would thus rest upon a communicative ethic.

Habermas' theoretical work is an attempt to reconcile the instrumental rationality of the system world with the substantive rationality of the life world and shows the extent to which western Marxists have become theorists of modernity. The result is that Habermas falls between two stools. For Habermas, it is no longer meaningful to seek the transformation of the social relations of production. Instead, the objective is merely the delimitation of the system world so as to reconcile the claims of instrumental rationality and substantive rationality. Marx's emancipatory project of restitution is off the agenda. There is no question of the lifeworld of human reciprocity and sociality reappropriating the powers of the system world. The result is a reproduction of the alienating separations and dualisms characterising the modern world.

For Habermas’ perspective is founded upon the radical demarcation of instrumental rationality and substantive rationality, the system world of money (economics) and power (politics) and the life world of reciprocity, of labour and communicative interaction, object and subject, structure and agency. Habermas’ neo-marxism thus reproduces the classical dualisms of modern social thought and assumes the separations characterising modern society. And, as such, his view, however concealed behind the neutrality of money and power, assumes the productive efficiency of the capitalist economy and the legitimacy of the state. More pertinently, Habermas is committed to the view that it is possible to distinguish the instrumental rationality of the capitalist economy from its substantive irrationality as a form of domination.

Nevertheless, the dualism of instrumental and substantive rationality remains and the attempt to strictly demarcate system and life worlds is an attempt to reconcile the instrumental rationality of the one with the substantive rationality of the other, it is a reconciliation that succeeds only on the basis of dualism. Habermas has restated the dualism which necessarily reproduces the tension between instrumental rationality and substantive irrationality. The demarcation of the system world from the life world involves the reproduction of the classic bourgeois dualisms of structure and agency, the economy and society, instrumental rationality and substantive rationality (Clarke 1991:305 306).

Against this, there is a need to emphasise that Marx's emancipatory project represents the abolition of the alienating separations and dualisms that characterise the modern world. The collective transformative project that is the form that Marx's critical work takes at the practical level is an innovative project which is based upon creative, constitutive agency. What Marx's revolutionary-critical praxis represents is the abolition of the classical dualisms - between philosophy and the world, structure and agency, theory and practice, state and civil society - which have characterised modern bourgeois society and thought in favour of a revolutionary synthesis based upon an integrative framework at the level of praxis.

The old dualisms of social being and consciousness, elite and masses, state and society, base and superstructure have been attributed to Marx himself. The truth is that Marx sought to dissolve these alienating dualisms into a broad ensemble of social relationships rooted in the materiality of the life world of individuals. This means completely rethinking the organisational methods, the political strategies and the goals of the socialist transformation. Integral to this need to innovate new forms of action, thought and organisation is the need to redefine the scope for democratisation itself, to conceive how the separation of human agents from the means of human activity can be overcome and replaced with conscious, active, direct participation.


20 THE CAPITAL SYSTEM AND CLASS RATIONALITY

There is a need to look more closely at the origins of rationalisation in capitalist expropriation, private ownership of the means of production and 'free' wage labour.
There is a contradictory relationship between formal or instrumental rationality and substantive rationality. The questions of substantive value are subordinated to the questions of formal or instrumental value. The result of this domination is the substantive irrationality which afflicts the modern world. This contradiction is manifest in the process by which the rationalisation of the world actually robs the world of meaning. The disenchanted world of modernity is a meaningless world, lacking a moral framework and dominated by bureaucratic structures. Weber himself expressed the evident contradiction in the metaphor of the iron cage. Here the fundamental tension of the modern world, the contradictory relationship between instrumental rationality and substantive rationality, appears as irremediable. Weber, locating the problem in a general process of rationalisation, has no way out of this dilemma. It is a dilemma faces all of those who, like Habermas, fail to locate the contradiction in the alienation of labour and hence fail to demand the transformation of the social relations of production.

Weber himself gives evidence of the class rationality that lies behind the formal rationality governing the world. And, given the Weberian influence of the western and the neo-marxists, it is worthwhile recognising the 'marxist’ in Weber himself. For Weber, just as for Marx, modern capitalism is defined by the generalised production of commodities through a system of wage labour. Modern capitalism, Weber argues, ‘involves .. the appropriation of all physical means of production - land, apparatus, machinery, tools, etc. – as disposable property of autonomous private industrial enterprises'. This is a social and historical phenomenon 'known only to our time' and which rests upon formally free labour. Weber defines this formally free labour in terms which recall Marx.

Persons must be present who are not only legally in the position, but are also economically compelled, to sell their labour on the market without restriction. It is in contradiction to the essence of capitalism, and the development of capitalism is impossible, if such a propertyless stratum is absent, a class compelled to sell its labour services to live; and it is likewise impossible if only unfree labour is at hand. Rational capitalistic calculation is possible only on the basis of free labour; only where in consequence of the existence of workers who in the formal sense voluntarily but actually under the compulsion of the whip of hunger, offer themselves, the costs of products may be unambiguously determined by agreement in advance.

Weber General Economic History

Weber's conception of the social control exercised over the worker is similar to Marx's in being based upon expropriation. Both Weber and Marx agree that the basis of this control is at root economic, specifically, it lies in the social division of labour (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 1980:155/169). Weber thus assumed that the expropriation of the workers from their means of production formed the core component of the capitalist economy and which, as a result, compelled the formally free labourer to sell his/her labour power upon the market.

Expropriation thus entailed the subjection of the worker to the capitalist and this subjection is the basic condition of the rational calculation which characterised the capitalist economy. Moreover





Weber perceived the pressure of the ‘dull compulsion of economic relations’ in much the same way as Marx did. Factory discipline and the power of managers and employers lay in the formal freedom of labour based upon expropriation. Where Weber went further, arguably, was in arguing that expropriation forming the basis of rational calculation and discipline was generalised beyond the economic sphere. The soldier does not control the means of destruction and so, is forced into the trench. Thus





Expropriation, the general separation of human agents from the means of human activity, is thus a key figure for Weber as for Marx. The bureaucratic organisation upon which the modern state apparatus and the capitalist enterprise rest require the separation of the human agents from their means of production, administration and knowledge. Without the expropriation of the workers discipline would be extremely difficult to impose given that the worker, in Weber's view, prefers 'leisureliness' (Weber 1930:67).

One should recognise the differences between the way that Weber and Marx present the centrality of formally free labour. For there is a clear difference between the two on this subject. For Marx, the wage labourer alienates his/her labour power as the commodity which is creative of value. Capital is the power of labour in alien form. The concept of alienated labour enabled Marx to conceive of a path beyond modernity. Weber, however, did not uphold Marx's theory of surplus labour. For Weber, the significance of formally free labour lay not in the fact that its exploitation is the source of surplus value but in the fact that it can be hired and fired on the market and that its wages rise and fall according to efficiency. Moreover, the expropriation of the workers from the means of production enables the capitalists to exercise a 'unified control' over the production process. Only with this expropriation comes 'the possibility of subjecting labour to a stringent discipline, controlling both the speed of work and the standardisation and quality of products'. It is in this purely instrumental sense that Weber is interested in expropriation. Expropriation enables rational calculation, discipline. And, for Weber, 'free labour and the complete appropriation of the means of production create the most favourable conditions for discipline' (Weber 1964:246/8).

Weber draws the parallel between the discipline exercised in the capitalist enterprise and the discipline imposed in the army. Military discipline, for Weber, 'is the ideal model for the modern capitalist factory' and such discipline is manifested in scientific management (Weber 1968:38). Where Marx was concerned with the alienation of labour and the production of surplus value, Weber concentrated upon the fact of expropriation as forming the core component of rationalisation. Hence Weber can write of expropriation as a general category, as though separation of the worker from the means of production is comparable to the separation of the soldier from the means of destruction. Weber concentrates upon the organisational aspects of the question. Thus the 'maximum of formal rationality in capital accounting is possible only where the workers are subjected to the authority of business management'. Weber has no trouble with recognising this management as 'autocratic'.

Weber is quite explicit that it is the ownership or non-ownership of property which determines the centrality of class in modern society. He argues, moreover, that private property in the means of production and the existence of a 'propertyless stratum' of formally free labour are essential conditions for the capitalist economy. Weber has no trouble in recognising that the infrastructure of modern society is infused with class power. He acknowledges that the market economy has a systematic bias in favour of capital. Weber entertains no illusions as regards the 'equality' of the parties contracting with each other on the market. The 'possession of property', he argues, concedes 'bargaining superiority' to management, 'both on the labour market in relation to the worker, and in the commodity market’ in relation to 'any competitor ... less well situated with respect to capital and credit resources' (Weber 1964:248).

The Substantive Irrationality of Capital's Fetish Relations 
The Unnatural Spirit of Capitalism
Weber identifies two moral imperatives in the 'spirit' of capitalism which are specific to capitalism. In the first place there is ‘the duty of the individual toward the increase of his capital, which is assumed - as an end in itself’ and, in the second place, there is ‘the conception of labour as an end in itself, as a calling’ (Weber 1974:51, 63). Neither of these imperatives are natural, Weber argues. Weber stresses their peculiar character.





Marx also noted the 'ascetic' spirit of capitalism as a reversal of natural categories. This character was peculiar to capitalism. Marx thus criticises the mean, life denying morality of capitalism.

Its true ideal is the ascetic but usurious miser and the ascetic but productive slave. Its moral ideal is the worker who takes part of his wages to the savings bank... Its principal thesis is the renunciation of life and of human needs. The less you eat, drink, buy books, go to the theatre or to balls, or to the public house, and the less you think, love, theorise, sing, paint, fence, etc. the more you will be able to save and the greater will become your treasure which neither moth nor rust will corrupt - your capital. The less you are, the less you express your life, the greater is your alienated life and the greater is the saving of your alienated being. Everything which the capitalist takes from you in the way of life and humanity, he restores to you in the form of money and wealth.

Marx EW EPM 1975:361/2.

The unnatural spirit of capitalism needs to be related to the fundamental tension between formal or instrumental rationality and substantive rationality. The formal rationality of capitalism contrasts with its substantive irrationality. The basic argument is that the formal rationality of capitalism is substantively irrational. For this formal rationality expresses the rationality of the fetishised social forms of capitalist social, relations of production. Thus, capitalism's formal rationality cannot be separated from the substantive irrationality deriving from the fetish character of the social relations of capitalist production. Habermas' attempt to reconcile formal and substantive rationality through the demarcation of system world and life world fails to locate the contradiction in capital's alienated system of production. Consequently, he cannot but reproduce the contradictory relationship intrinsic to capitalism.

Rationality and Class
There is a need to relate the question of rationality to the relations of class power. For the substantive irrationality of capitalism is accompanied not merely by its formal rationality but by its substantive class rationality. Thus, the economic compulsion to which the working class is subject, the need to sell its labour power on the market, does express, a certain rationality. But this is not the formal rationality of a system of production providing for human needs. Rather, it expresses the substantive class rationality of exploitative and alienative relations based on the initial separation of workers from their means of production and culminating in a system of economic compulsion and ‘objective dependency’ (Marx Gr 1973:163/5).

The form of wage labour and the objective determinism of the capital system ensures that economic compulsion and dependence takes the form of scarcity. It ensures that the relation of the working class to the material world is one of scarcity. The capitalist rationality, expressed in economics as the bourgeois science, has nothing to do with natural scarcity nor with the abuse of power but expresses the alienated social form to which the worker is forced to submit through the process of expropriation. Capitalism has abolished natural necessity only to impose a socially constructed necessity, imposed by the systemic dynamic of capital (Meszaros 1995:103/9; Smith 1984:46; Perkins 1993:138/9; Lukacs 1971; Marx 1973:299/300). This is the artificial nature of the scarcity behind the economic compulsion and dependence to which the working class is subject. And it is this artificial scarcity which compels the capitalist class to assume a 'rational' approach to production and the working class to have a 'rational’ approach to work.

The capitalist system as an alienated system of production does not, then, represent the most rational approach to satisfying human needs. It abolishes one (natural) scarcity only to replace it by another (socially constructed) scarcity. The capitalist system thus reproduces scarcity through its class relations of social production and it is this scarcity which lies behind the rationality of the modern world.

One thus seeks the roots of rationality in the asymmetrical relations of class power. The need of the capitalist to accumulate capital, to extract surplus value from the working class, the need of the working class to sell their labour power on the market are not determined by technical imperatives. The working class has no option but to sell its labour power. The capitalist will buy this labour power only to the extent it can be efficiently utilised to produce surplus value. In the idiom of bourgeois economics this may be expressed in terms of the marginal productivity of labour.

This, however, is not a technical question, as conventional economics presents it, but a relation of class power. The capitalist is interested in the value that may be extracted from the working class. This is less a question of 'rationality' but of a particular rationality, a value magnitude concerning the way in which the capitalist class compels the working class to work beyond necessary labour time. The working class thus produces a value which exceeds the wage paid by the capitalist to purchase the workers' labour power. Thus, the demand for labour power is determined by the extent to which, this labour power creates a value exceeding the wage returned for necessary labour time. It expresses the extent to which the working class consents/is compelled to place themselves under the domination of capital, selling their labour power and subjecting themselves to alienative employment relations that suppress their creativity. The working class thus are compelled to subject themselves to the capitalist imperative to maximise the intensity and the duration of the labour power purchased so as to accumulate capital.

The exploitation and domination to which the working class is subject is the product not of 'rationality' but of the alienated social form that the productive activity of human beings has taken under capital's alienated system of production. It is not a question of individuals being free to make choices between work and leisure subject to the technical considerations of the market and the marginal productivity of labour. Rather, the rationality of the labour market expresses the extent to which the subordination of labour to capital is reproduced.

The exploitation and the dehumanisation of labour is not the result of the capitalist class abusing its power. Such a view would call for the humanisation of labour though legislative reform. Marx, however, demanded the abolition of labour as an inherently dehumanising form imposed upon the working class.

Dehumanisation is inherent in the fetishistic forms of the capitalist mode of production.

'Rationality', then, is a specifically capitalist rationality which ensures that the conquest of natural necessity, far from enabling the freedom of human beings, subjects them to a new social necessity. The development of the forces of production, far from being accompanied by the realisation of the creative human essence, subjects living labour to the domination of capital, dead labour, crushing creativity in the process. Hence the contradictory nature of the objective dynamics of capital. The development of the productive forces enables the abolition of the burden of labour. Instead, capitalists are subject to the systemic compulsion to intensify the exploitation of labour. The development of the productive power, far from being the means of realising the human faculties, is associated with their suppression.

The contradictory relationship between formal rationality and substantive rationality is to be traced to the contradictory dynamics of the capital system (Clarke 1991:283/9). The formal rationality of the capitalist system conceals behind technical considerations the class rationality of capitalist production (Clarke 1991:230/1 232 234).





The inherent tendencies of capitalism generates the class struggle in which the capitalist class attempts to impose its irrational rationality upon the workers and the workers, in turn, resist. The substantive irrationality of capitalist production appears, from the perspective of capital, as a substantive class rationality.

The questions of rationalisation and modernity need to be conceived in terms of this capitalist rationality. Weber himself traces the formal rationality of capitalism, in large part at least, to the increasing subordination of human activity to the narrow pursuit of economic ends. This is rational behaviour only under capitalism. It is peculiar to capitalism. It is profoundly irrational in non-capitalist societies.

Weber, Rationality and Socialism
Weber acknowledges that the formal rationality of the capitalist economy is inevitably associated with a substantive irrationality. Of course, Weber actually makes capitalism itself, with its substantive irrationality, part of a general process whereby formal rationality is progressively extended. Hence, the rationality of the capitalist economy forms one, important, aspect of modernity. This rationalisation is based upon the forcible separable of the workers from their means of production but also, more generally, of human agents from their means of activity. Weber also refers to the differentiation of the various spheres of social life, each subject to the rational adaptation of means to ends in their particular spheres.

By making rationalisation a general process which embraces the capitalist economy as one of its aspects, Weber cannot but look critically upon socialism, especially the dominant socialism of the turn of the century. Socialism, far from overcoming the contradictory relationship between formal and substantive rationality which characterises modern society actually represents the apotheosis of this contradiction (Turner 1993:180 214; Clarke 1991:288). Socialism, following the line of Weber's criticism, comes to replace the economic rationality of capitalism with the bureaucratic rationality of the state. For Weber, private capitalism and political freedom was the preferable alternative to the bureaucratic totalitarianism of socialism.

And Weber had a point, given the development of socialism in the twentieth century. As Clarke argues:





The highly critical attitude that Weber exhibited towards socialism is to be explained by his awareness that 'the great state and the mass party are the classical soil for bureaucratisation' (Weber 1970:209) and that socialism elevates both, 'just as, in the economic realm, the socialization of the means of production would, he believed, merely increase the power of bureaucratised management' (Sayer 1991:145).

Weber and the Dualism of Formal and Substantive Rationality
Weber's diagnosis of the dilemma at the heart of modern society between formal and substantive rationality brings a critical, even pessimistic, dimension to the process of rationalisation. Weber clearly shows that the substantive irrationality of modernity is inherent in the process of rationalisation and hence cannot be dismissed as a psychological deviation from a rational normality. Weber thus underlines the contradictory relationship between the formal rationality of modern society and its substantive irrationality. This relationship is an inherent characteristic of modern society.

However, in the final analysis, Weber's diagnosis contains an intrinsic flaw which prevents this contradictory relationship being traced to its source. Weber refers to a general process of rationalisation and hence is condemned to reproduce this relationship as the dualism at the heart of this process.

Hence, despite the similarities noted by Lowith, one must distinguish Weber's rationalisation from Marx's alienation. Weber cannot supersede the contradictory relationship at the heart of modernity. He cannot but see the individual autonomy he values highly disappear through a progression that leads inexorably to the iron cage. With Weber there is no way of avoiding the situation in which the individual subject comes to be confronted by an objective world which is meaningless, indifferent to human beings and their purposes, impervious to human action, and whose objectivity is defined functionally according to a formal, means-ends rationality. These ends have become divorced from their foundations in human activity and have come to be embedded in a structure conceived as external to human agents.

Weber's ‘existential’ perspective of an individual subject confronting a meaningless objective world fails to grasp why the social structure should come to be experienced as external to human agency. The origin of the contradictory relationship between formal rationality and substantive rationality lies in the fetishistic social forms through which social labour is supplied under the capital system. Weber could not do this precisely because he accepted these forms of labour as rational, subject to the methods of formal rationality. This means that Weber, however critical his diagnosis appears, comes to conceal the substantive class rationality of capital under the designation of formal rationality. And it means that Weber has no way of overcoming the substantive irrationality characterising the modern world.

For Marx, the alienated social forms which mediate the supply of social labour results in a fetishism which is not to be treated merely as an ideological mystification. The problem is not intellectual but social, inherent in social reality. The inversion of subject and object, which the contradiction between formal and substantive rationality expresses in the sense of means displacing ends, is immanent in social reality. Marx draws attention to an inverted reality to be transformed. Thus the fetishism of commodities is the product of a process inherent in social reality, of a reality constituted by the social relations of alienated labour.

It is not merely that social labour appears in the form of things but that social labour really does take the form of things. That the products of human labour come to confront the labourer as objective, external things is not an appearance but actually is the alienated reality of modern capitalist society. This alienation is not the product of an ideological mystification subjecting human beings to a fetishism which extinguishes subjectivity. Rather, alienation proceeds from the fact of labour as the subjective factor that can never be extinguished, however much it appears to have been extinguished. The argument is not that human powers come to be embodied in things but that human attributes appear in the form of the properties of things.

The question is one of mediation. Fetishism means not that social relations appear as relations between things but that these social relations come to appear in the form of relations between things. It is not that relations between things replace the relations between human beings but that the relations between human beings are mediated in the form of relation between things.


21 ABSTRACTION AND IMPERSONALITY

The question to be addressed is one of the mediation of modern 'rational’ society and the way that this suppresses the individuality of human beings in their material practices and relations to impersonal forms. The abstracting tendencies of the modern world mean that human relations are mediated by things. One is dealing with an abstract-systemic-institutional world raised over the heads of human beings in their material life. This amounts to the dissolution of the community of human beings and the creation of an objectively defined and imposed communality. The forms of modern communality involve what may, for the first time in history, be distinguished as 'the economy'.

This autonomy of 'the economy' is based upon the emancipation of private property from political and communal control and upon the expropriation of the immediate producers and has its political counterpart in the emergence- of what Marx calls the abstraction of the modern state. Both represent the abstraction of the political and the economic from the everyday social life of human beings and their corresponding autonomisation. Both political and economic spheres come to be subject to their own 'rational' logics, functionally determined in abstraction from the human subjects which they confront as external objective powers. The emergence of the modern state and the capitalist economy rests upon a profound transformation in the nature of social relationships and in the location of social power.

Marx characterises this transformation in terms of a transition from relations of personal dependence to an 'objective dependency' (Marx Gr 1973:163/5) in which human relations are mediated by things. The abstracting tendencies at the heart of this process of transformation result in the personal coming to be replaced by the 'impersonal', that is, by the money form, the capital form, by the supply of social labour through the value form. Reference may also be made here to the modern state, to the class designation imposed upon all individuals regardless of their subjective preferences, to the law and to bureaucracy.

Max Weber, too, concentrated upon the rise of the abstract and the impersonal.

Money is the most abstract and 'impersonal' element that exists in human life. The more the world of the modern capitalist economy follows its own immanent laws, the less accessible it is to any imaginable religion with a religious ethic of brotherliness. The more rational, and the more impersonal, capitalism becomes, the more is this the case. In the past it was possible to regulate ethically the personal relations between master and slave because they were personal relations. But it is not possible to regulate ... the relations between the shifting holders of mortgages and the shifting debtors of the banks that issue the mortgages; for in this case, no personal bonds of any sort exist.

Weber in Gerth and Wright Mills 1948:331





The Marxists who, under Weber's influence, have become modernists are condemned to reproduce the contradiction at the heart of modernity between formal and substantive rationality. Thus Habermas’ demarcation of the system world and the life world attempts to reconcile the contradictory relationship by confining instrumental and substantive rationality to their proper spheres. This is an attempt at reconciliation that avoids the need to transform the social relations of production which generate the contradiction in the first place. In other words, Habermas has failed to locate the contradiction in the fetishistic system of production resting upon alienated labour (Clarke 1991:209). In fact, Habermas has explicitly ruled out such a resolution of the contradiction, seeking to maintain the distinction between system world and life world. He is thus faced with the need to reconcile the instrumental rationality/alien logic of the capitalist economy with the substantive rationality of a civil society/life world resting upon a communicative ethic. This ethic embodies substantive rationality. Evidently, the dualism at the heart of modernity is reproduced.

The central tension in Habermas’ conception is that it attempts an optimistic reading of Weber. For Weber, all that is virtuous - reason, imagination, moral altruism - comes to be confronted by an objective world which stands in opposition to human autonomy, spontaneity and creativity. The extension of formal, means-ends rationality has resulted in the means displacing the ends. As with Marx, Weber's view of social and historical development was concerned with the pathos of means coming to be asserted over ends. The penetration of abstract and impersonal money relations into all aspects of human life expresses the ‘reification’ of social relationships in the capitalist economy.

The instrumental rationality associated with a substantive irrationality is explained by Marx in terms of the capitalist system as an alienated system of production. Weber, however, does not do this. His rationalisation is a general process whereby formal rationality comes to penetrate all spheres of society. It is no surprise, then, that Weber, on his own premises, comes to conceive socialism not as the abolition of reification but as its logical outcome. Socialism represents the culmination of the process of rationalisation which is inextricably connected with the penetration of abstract and impersonal relations into all spheres of society. Socialism succeeds in replacing capitalist rationality only with bureaucratic rationality.

Weber's hostility to socialism would therefore seem to be so unambiguous as to put a question mark against attempts to explore the common ground with Marx. What is interesting to explore, however, are the reasons offered in the criticism of socialism. For, translating the argument back into Marx's terms, the socialism criticised by Weber is that socialism which, far from abolishing the state and capital as alienated social powers actually seeks to merge the two by stressing the nationalisation of the means of production over the transformation of social relations. This would indeed produce the bureaucratic totalitarianism of a general alienation, the overcoming of the state-civil society dualism at the level of the state.

When one determines to trace the extension of formal rationality into all spheres of society to the capitalist economy as an alienated system of production then Weber's rationalisation, the pathos of his means over ends rationality, can be presented in such a way as to admit of a positive resolution. The domination of the impersonal and the abstract is to be traced to the 'objective dependency' upon capital to which all are subjected.

The Dialectic of Enlightenment
This, of course, is an optimistic assessment only to the extent that one accepts labour as the always antagonistic subject capable of subverting the power of capital. In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno reached conclusions even more pessimistic than those reached by Weber. Whereas for Marx the capitalist system generates its own emancipatory potential, for Horkheimer and Adorno there are forces intrinsic to modern society which operate to irrevocably suppress this potential. The pernicious character of rationality suppresses the possibility for emancipation (Adorno and Horkheimer 1972). Enlightenment, promising emancipation, has unintentionally produced the reverse. Horkheimer and Adorno explain this development by pointing to the relation between instrumental rationality and the exchange principle. Under the tyranny of exchange value everything comes to be reduced to an abstract equivalent of all other things in the service of universal exchange. The qualitatively different and non-identical is reduced to quantitative identity in the process. A significant feature of this reductionism of the modern world is the demise of the individual personal autonomy which played such a prominent part in bourgeois thought, society and politics.

The critical theory of Horkheimer and Adorno thus castigates capitalism as the final expression of instrumental rationality and as the basis of exploitation and domination in the modern world. Capitalism undermines the autonomous individual and makes it impossible for individuals to pursue their ends and satisfy their needs as conscious, choosing, autonomous beings. To the exploitation of capitalism, Horkheimer and Adorno add the degeneration of the world into the superficial and trivial through mass culture and consumerism.

What makes the perspective of critical theory so pessimistic is the scepticism towards and the distance from the working class. The working class had been integrated in and absorbed by this society. In many ways, the perspectives of Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse represent the pessimistic evaluation of the end of ideology/affluent society theses. As such, it suffers from the same deficiencies of these theses, the underestimation of the continuation of class antagonism and the centrality of class power.

Over time, the critical theorists became increasingly sceptical in regard of the emancipatory possibilities of socialism, indeed of emancipation itself. Ultimately, their critique of contemporary society bordered on the reactionary as the critical theorists became disillusioned with the working class as the revolutionary subject and all but abandoned hope in the potential for emancipation. The possibility for a genuine social transformation, as opposed to mere 'change', appeared to have been extinguished with the increasing control of society and of populations-by capitalist administrative structures. The rise of the administered society seemed to have blocked the possibility for an internal subversion. Rather than renew the commitment to the working class, all that seemed justifiable was to raise tentative hopes for some limited change through the opposition of various marginalised and oppressed groups to their opposition - blacks, women, students, etc.

But such groups are clearly no substitute for the working class. When pressed, Marcuse realised this and was led to reaffirm his commitment to the politics of the working class. Marginalised groups and movements can certainly raise issues challenging existing relations of domination and can, for that reason, radicalise the agenda. But do they possess the structural leverage for a genuine and far reaching social transformation? Doubts on this score lead us to re-evaluate the claims made for the working class.

The antinomies of modern society, politics and thought - most particularly the contradictory relationship between instrumental rationality and substantive rationality - can only be conceived as an expression of the alienated forms of capitalist social relations. The problem of fetishism and reification, to repeat, is not the product of an intellectual process and hence to be solved by criticism and 'consciousness raising'. They cannot be overcome by critical theory but only by praxis overcoming alienated forms, and this could only refer to the transformative class praxis of the proletariat.

Praxis and the Proletariat
This was the meaning of Marx's Theses on Feuerbach. Marx had resolved philosophical problems into social problems, subverting the position of the intellectuals in favour of the workers as the agents of this practical transformation. Marx thus moved from interpreting the world to changing it. The fetishism of commodities and reification of social relations cannot be overcome at the level of consciousness, through the subjective recovery of the human meaning in existing social forms, but by the practical reappropriation of alienated human powers. Existing alienated social forms need to be replaced by new social forms in which the social power of human beings is expressed directly rather than through alien forms of mediation.

For Marx, the dialectic of capital and labour at the core of the modern world meant that only the working class could be the agent of this process of practical transformation. That the working class has yet to emerge as the revolutionary agency in this sense, that the politics of the working class has been limited, hesitant or subject to defeat, does not in itself constitute grounds for writing off the working class as the revolutionary subject, but underlines the difficulties in the process by which the proletariat as a class-in-itself constitutes itself into a class-for-itself.

The contradiction between instrumental and substantive rationality is not an immutable structural characteristic of human society but is the product of the alienated forms through which human activity is expressed. Marx himself set up the opposition between capitalism and socialism in terms of a contrast between the indirect supply of social labour through the alienated value form on the one hand and the direct supply of social labour through the associated producers on the other hand. Marx demands the abolition of all the alienated social forms of capitalist social relations - the capital form, money form, commodity form, state form - and their replacement by new social forms enabling the direct expression of human social power.

How one approaches the working class subject thus possesses important political implications. For the integration and the absorption of the working class into contemporary capitalist society is by no means as complete as some have thought. What we are dealing with here is the reproduction of the alienated social forms of human activity and of the mode of domination and exploitation exercised over the working class. There is nothing natural, spontaneous and automatic about this reproduction; it is secured only by a continuous and pervasive class struggle in which the capitalist class imposes its domination but in which the working class always retains the potential to resist or overthrow its subordination to alienated social forms.

In short, labour, as the always antagonistic subject which is the value creating power upon which capital depends, is the active element in human self-alienation. Since this is the case the working class cannot be considered as merely the passive object dependent upon and moulded by the alienated social forms of capitalist domination and exploitation, whose alien logic is expressed in 'instrumental rationality'.

This instrumental rationality may produce a substantive irrationality in terms of human meaning and activity but behind it is a substantive class rationality. The working class can challenge and subvert this rationality. It is not the general, all pervasive and irrevocable process that Weber thought it was. It is the fact of alienation which makes it appear that the world is objective and external, separated from human beings and operating according to its own autonomous rationality. But, however alienated the social forms through which human activity is expressed under capitalism, it is nevertheless the case that the creative social power of associated labour remains the vital source of social wealth, of the surplus value extracted by the capitalist class.





Weber conceptualised the increasing subordination of the individual to social bureaucratic relations and rationality in terms of the metaphor of the 'iron cage’. What is so impressive about this metaphor, in Weber's German rather than in the English translation, is that it conveys the extent to which the process of rationalisation imprisons human beings not merely physically but in terms of embracing their subjectivity.

Weber opened up a trail of thought here which was developed further by critical theory. The modern world came to be presented as an ‘administered world’ which has extinguished the old autonomous liberal individual. In this world, the fragmented individual comes to be subject to the inexorable, all pervasive logic of instrumental rationality. Adorno's notion of ‘the administered society' has clear affinities with Foucault's 'panopticon society’ (Turner 1993:127/8; Sayer 1991:122; Miller 1987). These terms denote a process of the growing surveillance of populations from the cradle to the grave, the subordination of individuals to an all-encompassing bureaucratic rationality that is nothing short of totalitarian (Stauth and Turner 1988:41).

Within bourgeois social thought and politics it is traditionally argued that capitalism produces individual freedom. In truth, the process of individual emancipation was always more complex than this. Marx thus delineates the transition from relations of personal dependence to relations of objective dependence as both enabling the emergence of the individual whilst subordinating the individual to a bureaucratic rationality that denies a genuine autonomy. Marx showed how individuals have come to be emancipated from ties of personal dependence only to be subjected to the objective dependency of all upon capital. Capitalism initiates but arrests the process of individual emancipation. The individualism of bourgeois society is thus associated with the destruction of the authentic individual under the social division of labour. To this has been added the subordination of the individual to discipline, the extension of bureaucracy, state regulation. One finds in twentieth century thought a growing awareness that the world is increasingly administered, regulated and dominated by bureaucratic structures which undermine the autonomy of the individual.

Weber's pessimism can be explained, in part, by a certain nostalgia. Weber is aware of how the process of rationalisation operates to suppress the distinctive values of western civilisation, authenticity, spontaneity, creativity and autonomy (Schroeder 1992; Turner 1993:228). What Weber has drawn attention to with his famous metaphor of the iron cage is the fact that the individual is increasingly subject to structures and practices which effectively deny individual autonomy. The individual is subject to bureaucratic rationality not merely in the sense of being administered but also in terms of the micro-moralities prescribing individual behaviour and blocking the autonomous expression of human being. One is dealing with the suppression of individual autonomy and the loss of genuine social relationships. With the loss of moral unity the individual is increasingly subjected and subordinated to macro-social processes and institutions which progressively eliminate the autonomy of the individual and enclose the individual within a world of bureaucratic domination (Stauth and Turner 1988:41; Schroeder 1992:115 117/8).

The domination of bureaucratic rationality generalises a process which Marx had noted in the politics of the state as alienated social power. Marx's presentation of bureaucracy anticipates Weber, Adorno and Foucault. Marx shows that he has grasped the character of bureaucratic rationality. ‘Whatever is real is treated bureaucratically, in accordance with its transcendental, spiritual, essence. The bureaucracy holds the state, the spiritual essence of society, in thrall, as its private property. The bureaucracy is a false universal society. ‘The universal spirit of bureaucracy is secrecy, it is mystery preserved within itself by means of the hierarchical structure and appearing to the outside world as a self-contained corporation.’ Bureaucracy, for Marx, is characterised by a systematic social division of labour and a hierarchy of authority. Marx draws the analogy between bureaucracy and the machine. The principles of bureaucracy are those of passive obedience, of faith in authority, of the mechanism of fixed and formalistic behaviour. ‘The principle of its knowledge is therefore authority, and its patriotism is the adulation of authority. Within itself, however, spiritualism degenerates into crass materialism, the materialism of passive obedience, the worship of authority, the mechanism of fixed, formal action, of rigid principles, views and traditions.’ (Marx CHDS EW 1975: 109). Bureaucratic hierarchy, Marx continues, 'is a hierarchy of knowledge’ in which the top entrusts the understanding of detail to the lower levels, whilst the lower levels credit the top with understanding of the general, and all are mutually deceived.

The bureaucracy is a magic circle from which no one can escape. Its hierarchy is a hierarchy of knowledge. The apex entrusts insight into particulars to the lower echelons while the lower echelons credit the apex with insight into the universal, and so each deceives the other.

Marx EW CHDS 1975: 109 

 Marx is concerned to criticise the authoritarian, elitist, hierarchical character of bureaucratic rationality: 'Authority is the basis of its knowledge'.

Marx questions the rationality of a knowledge that rests upon authority as such. Writing of the relationship of the spheres of private rights and private welfare, of the family and civil society to the state, Marx writes that ‘the attitude of the state towards their “laws and interests” is that of a higher authority. The attitude of their “interest” and “law” towards the state is that of a “subordinate”. They subsist in a condition of “dependence” on the state.’ (Marx CHDS EW 1975: 59/60). Weber had justified bureaucracy on account of its being the most efficient form of organisation. But, on Marx's premises, this is exposed as a managerial ideology which rationalises hierarchical relations of power. Marx bitterly criticises 'the contradiction between the real nature of the world and that ascribed to it in government offices'. He concludes that 'even the most patent reality appears illusory compared with the reality depicted in the dossiers, which is official' (Marx, Justification of the Correspondent from Mosel). There is in this criticism the grounds for a distinction between the ideological representations of an official-institutional world raised over individuals and the perspectives of these individuals in their real social world.

Symptomatic of the elitism of this bureaucratic dominance and rationality is the examination, the proof of technical accreditation. The examination is the means of entry into the service of the state. The 'link' between the 'office of state' and the 'individual', Marx argues, ‘is nothing but the bureaucratic baptism of knowledge, the official recognition of the transubstantiation of profane into sacred knowledge (in every examination it goes without saying, the examiner knows all)' (Marx CHDS EW 1975: 113).

This division between the official-institutional world and its authoritarian bureaucratic rationality and the real everyday world of individuals persists into and informs Marx's later writing. For Marx, ‘administration and political governing’ become





The state servants are salaried and, in the case of the individual bureaucrat, the state objective turns into his private objective, a chasing after higher posts, the making of a career. 

The principle of its knowledge is therefore authority, and its patriotism is the adulation of authority. Within itself, however, spiritualism degenerates into crass materialism, the materialism of passive obedience, the worship of authority, the mechanism of fixed, formal action, of rigid principles, views and traditions. As for the individual bureaucrat, the purpose of the state becomes his private purpose, a hunt for promotion, careerism.

Marx CHDS EW 1975: 109

Just as at the heart of Weber's writing is the metaphysical pathos of means usurping ends so in Marx the means take the place of the end: 'the bureaucracy appears to itself as the ultimate purpose of the state', ‘converts its 'formal' purposes into its content, [and] comes into conflict with 'real' purposes at every point. It is therefore compelled to pass off form as content and content as form. The purposes of the state are transformed into purposes of offices and vice-versa.’ (Marx CHDS EW 1975: 108-109). In the bureaucracy the reality of civil society is paralleled by the formal reality of official society. Marx refers to the 'illusion of the state', which ‘exists only as a series of fixed bureau​cratic minds held together by passive obedience and their subor​dinate position in a hierarchy’ (Marx CHDS EW 1975:109).





22 RATIONAL SOCIALISM - SOCIALISM AND RATIONALISATION

Weber is both a penetrating but also a prejudiced critic of socialism. That is, Weber offers an acute diagnosis of rational, bureaucratic state socialism with which left wing critics of social democracy could agree, whilst nevertheless also maintaining that this rationalised socialism is the only possible form that socialism could take.

The different forms that socialism could take did not concern Weber. For him, the only form of socialism which was compatible with modern society is the centrally planned economy under the authority of the state. But nationalisation, the state ownership of the means of production, would not alter the social position of the workers. Such a socialism would not institute the dictatorship of the proletariat but the dictatorship of the public officials. Far from elevating the working class, state ownership would make bureaucratic control even more expensive, oppressive and pervasive. Given that production relations would be unaltered, it makes no difference to the workers whether power is exercised by the private capitalists or by the public officials. Indeed, given the concentration of economic power in the hands of the state, there is more reason for believing that the capacity of the workers to resist the state is much less than their capacity to resist private capital in a competitive market economy with an independent government. For Weber, the centrally organised socialist society actually represents the culmination of the process of rationalisation and bureaucratisation and, as such, is to be considered the greatest threat to human freedom in the modern world.

The problem is that Weber himself could not provide an alternative to the iron cage. He thus retreats upon a private capitalism which, on his own analysis, is being systematically eroded. For Weber, socialism cannot but be the expression of the process of rationalisation, coming to replace the economic rationality of the capitalist economy with the bureaucratic rationality of the totalitarian state. Marx can offer an alternative. Marx refers not to rationalisation but to alienation and stresses capital's objective, unsocial socialisation of the world. This progressive socialisation can, without political intervention of the human subject, enclose the individual in the iron cage. But intervention is possible for Marx in a way that it was not for Weber. 'Socialisation’ is a contradictory development for Marx, suggesting the alternative ways in which the world is made more social. Under the capitalist economy, there is a systemic tendency towards centralisation which is global in scope. This objective socialisation proceeds from the top down. The socialist alternative proceeds from the bottom up through the intervention of the human subject into these objective processes so as to ensure conscious human control from below by the demos. This is the assertion of the human community over the totalising 'community' imposed by money.

Weber could not but view the Bolshevik Revolution with trepidation. His critique of modernity extended beyond the capitalist economy to embrace a 'rational socialism’ as the culmination of the process of rationalisation.

Of course, Russian Communism vindicated Weber's critical assessment of socialism. Under this Russian Communism socialism came to be defined as the centrally planned and bureaucratically controlled economy performing the function of 'primitive, accumulation' which the capitalist class has carried out in the west. The state thus became the agent of capitalist modernisation. The fact that the Russian regime rested upon the state ownership of the means of production encouraged the belief that it was socialist. But the party and the bureaucracy owned the state as a result of the monopolisation of political power. Such a confirmation of Weber's worst nightmares was a political and moral catastrophe for socialism and represented the corruption of the socialist ideal from within, a false socialism with a plausible, however superficial, claim to be authentic.

One can credit Weber with the insight to have argued that the abolition of private capitalism in itself offers no guarantee that human beings may escape the iron cage of modern rational bureaucratic society. Under Russian Communism, the attempt to overcome the state-civil society dualism took the form of a dissolution of civil society into the state power which resulted in a general bureaucratisation. The constraining economic rationality of the capitalist system came to be extended into an administrative control penetrating all spheres of social life.

One result of this development is to render the emancipatory claims of socialism problematic. This is no bad thing, to the extent that it forces socialists to present socialism as a genuinely emancipatory alternative to the modern society. The potential is there, within the abstracting, centralising and bureaucratising tendencies of capitalism itself, for a 'rational' socialism to be realised as the apotheosis of the darker side of the modern world.

Rather than proceed immediately to the defence of socialism, it may be much more profitable to accept Weber's criticisms as referring to a potential, form that socialism may well take if it makes Faustian bargains with the very modern forces/alien powers which Marx would have it abolish. From this perspective it matters less that Weber believed that any viable socialism in modern society would be forced to make such bargains. 'Rational socialism' is a real possibility contained in the abstracting, bureaucratising and centralising tendencies of the modern capital economy.

For Weber, this rational socialism was unique to modern western civilisation. The basis of this civilisation lay in 'the rational organisation of free labour under regular discipline’ (Weber 1974:23), 'bondage to the machine and regular work discipline' (Weber Selections in Translation W.G. Runciman ed. 1978:252). Weber's criticisms of socialism thus derive from premises which do not differ that much from Marx. Weber underlines the fact that the Bolshevik's could only sustain their power through thorough 'depersonalisation and routinisation', in sum, through a 'psychic proletarianisation, in the interests of discipline' (Weber 1970:125). Weber is drawing attention to the continued, indeed the increasing, more regulated, subordination of labour under the new regime. From this perspective, Weber's is a cautionary tale which shifts the burden of proof upon socialists in justifying their emancipatory claims.

Weber's critical approach to socialism can thus be set in a context which suggests the nature of the obstacles standing in the way of socialism in modern society. For Weber offers the grounds for rejecting the emancipatory claims of party-state socialism. For Weber 'the great state and the mass party are the classic soil for bureaucratisation' (Weber 1970:209). Weber condemns socialism for elevating the status of both in the political realm. At the same time, in the economic realm, the nationalisation of the means of production would serve to expand the power of a bureaucratised management. In Economy and Society, Weber argued that 'in any rationally organised socialistic economy the expropriation :of all the workers would be retained and merely brought to completion by the expropriation of private owners' (Weber 1964:248).

Weber's is a criticism of state socialism with which those committed to an authentic 'proletarian socialism' may agree (notwithstanding the fact that Weber argued that ‘rational socialism’ under the central authority of the state was the only viable socialism in the modern world).

Weber's comments are thought provoking in light of the collapse of state socialism. Indeed, one cannot but recall Morris' resigned criticism in 1895 that the world is going the way of Sydney Webb in Weber's argument that ‘it is the dictatorship of the official, not that of the worker, which .. is on the advance’ (Weber 1978b:260). Weber thus concludes that this 'rational socialism' would be a 'house of servitude'. Such a socialism would represent not the abolition of Marx's expropriation but its culmination.

The Russian Revolution gave Weber an historical example by which to demonstrate his point:

the Soviets have preserved, or rather reintroduced, the highly paid enterpriser, the group wage, the Taylor system, military and workshop discipline, and a search for foreign capital. Hence, in a word, the Soviets have had to accept again absolutely all the things that Bolshevism has been fighting as class institutions. They have had to do so in order to keep the state and the economy going at all.

Weber in Sayer 1991:145/6 

But rather than conclude from this that there may be something amiss in the emancipatory project of socialism, we are entitled to point out that Weber is emphasising that Bolshevism had to reintroduce precisely those elements or institutions characterising capitalism. If Bolshevism represents the bureaucratic deformation of the socialist ideal, then the source of the degeneration comes not so much from within socialism as from the inability of socialist politics to transcend the capitalist context. Weber, of course, asserted the 'objective indispensability' of these capitalistic institutions, in which case the charge against socialism is one of utopianism. It is a charge that socialists may challenge by exposing the roots of this objective indispensability in capital's alienated system of production.

Rationalisation, Alienation and Socialism
There is a case for arguing that Weber criticises not so much socialism but the process of rationalisation in which this socialism is rooted. We are stuck with this rationalisation as a fate. It is not a prospect that pleases Weber, it has to be said. Indeed, Weber is not merely pessimistic but nostalgic. The disenchantment of the world entails rationalisation, intellectualisation and the penetration of science into all areas of life. But this emancipation from superstition and magic also involves a fundamental loss that can never be retrieved and for which science can never compensate. For science is silent on questions of values, the things which, for Weber, give human life and action its meaning.

Weber may make the possibility of an emancipatory socialist project highly problematical but one cannot at the same time avoid the impression that his criticisms are precisely the reasons why an emancipatory project is required. Weber has exposed the nihilism at the heart of modernity and has nothing but an existential ethic with which to confront this nihilism.

In restating the case for the emancipatory character of socialism in recognising the need to trace the extension of formal rationality to the substantive class rationality of the capital system as an alienated system of production - Weber's critique allows us to entertain no illusions to the extent that the forms taken by modern politics - the mass states, parties and ideologies - are entangled in a nexus of alienation extending from the economic sphere to the political sphere. The experience of state socialism in the twentieth century has done more than confirm Weber's critical prognosis. It has demonstrated to socialists the futility of taking short cuts to the socialist society by seeking to make Faustian bargains with Weber's modern devils/gods which, for Marx, are precisely the alienated social powers to be reappropriated by and reorganised in society - the state and capital.

For Weber, socialism represented the further development of the process of rationalisation. More than this, it would culminate only in a new serfdom, a serfdom based upon the rational bureaucratic management of resources. Human beings would be subjected to rational calculation, bureaucratic control and formal rationality. This rationalism in the social system would ultimately put an end to the private capitalist and hence to that dynamism which characterises private capitalism (Mommsen 1974).

But there are grounds for arguing that when Weber argues that socialism would merely be the apotheosis of the process of rationalisation his hostility is primarily directed against rationalisation and only secondarily against socialism. The crux of the matter is thus Weber's own ambiguity as regards modern capitalism and rationality (Lukacs 1955). The process of rationalisation threatens to undermine the very values which have distinguished western civilisation.

One sees again here the contradictory relationship between formal and substantive rationality. For Weber this contradiction implied no historical necessity for its resolution. Rather, whilst the process of rationalisation might create an unprecedented material abundance, it inevitably generates a radical separation of the values of western civilisation - autonomy, spontaneity, creativity, authenticity - from hard realities of an iron cage ordered according to the methods and principles of formal rationality. The process of rationalisation thus subverted imagination and inspiration and subordinated human beings to the dictates of standardised routines and technical procedures. Rationalisation thus threatens to generate a new characterology of soulless automatons.

Nevertheless, whilst Weber's ambiguity certainly has its nostalgic side, Weber consistently repudiated communitarian solutions to the modern crisis. The loss, he made it clear, is irretrievable. As Marx wrote, 'individuals are now ruled by abstractions, whereas previously they were dependent on one another'. The attempts to recover the lost pneuma of the charismatics could not but be futile (Turner 1993:17/8; Sayer 1991:152). And the same goes for community, this necessarily taking abstract form in modern conditions: 'Ideas such as "state", "church", "community", "party" or "enterprise" are thought of as being realised in a community' whereas in truth 'they provide an ideological halo for the master'. They are ersatz (Weber 1970:199. Weber concludes that we live in a 'godless and prophetless time' (Weber 1970:153). Whether we could assume the responsibility of finding meaning in an objectively valueless world was something Weber doubted.

The Inversion of Means and Ends
There is a great similarity between Marx and Weber in that both focus upon the inversion of means and ends, the process whereby the means become the ends (Turner 1993:212; Sayer 1991:133).'Today material goods have gained an increasing and finally an inexorable power-over, the lives of men as at no period in history’ (Weber 1985:181). 'Things' have come to acquire an existential significance just as human beings have been reduced to the status of objects. The difference between Marx and Weber is that this inversion is inherent in alienation for Marx, an active process of human self-alienation in which the subjective element cannot be extinguished. Marx is able to conceive of a way out of the paradox whereby human agency is transformed into human enslavement.

With Weber this assertion of means over ends is built into the process of rationalisation and is therefore as ineradicable as that process itself. Weber thus leads us inexorably to the iron cage of modernity (Clarke 1991:288/9 323 324/5). The penetration of formal rationality, especially of the abstract and the impersonal entailed by money relations, into all spheres of human society showed the effects of human alienation and the consequent reification of social relationships under capitalism.

And here one appreciates that the clear distinction to be drawn between Marx and Weber as regards socialism relates to the differences between alienation and rationalisation. For Weber, socialism did not represent the abolition of reification but the culmination of that process of bureaucratic rationalisation which was inextricably connected with the extension of abstract relationships in human society. Against Weber, I would argue that this is less a critique of socialism than of Weber's own premises and the way that these prevented a positive resolution of the contradictions at the heart of the rationalisation process under capitalism, between, formal and substantive rationality, means and ends, human agency and human enslavement (Clarke 1991:288/9).

Rationalisation and Class Rationality
In criticising Weber, I am criticising his premises. These have become the premises of the dominant school of social science. My concern is to demonstrate that Weber’s formal rationality is not some general, irrevocable phenomenon but the rationality of a particular social system resting upon asymmetrical relations of class power. In revealing the substantive class rationality which lies behind the concept of formal rationality Marx's critique of alienation is crucial. Through his conception of alienation Marx could differentiate between the specific form of labour under capitalist relations and labour in general. It is this which enables Marx to conceive socialism as the truly human society. Without this critique of alienation, socialism does indeed become what Weber thought that it would become - a centrally planned industrial, economy in which property is owned by the state and society bureaucratically administered (Walton and Gamble 1976:196). On Weber's own premises, that is, all that socialism could become an extension from capitalism within the process of rationalisation.

Totalitarianism as a General Alienation 

One can, in restating Marx's socialism, acknowledge the potential for a general alienation through the merger of state and capital on the basis of unaltered social relations of production. It is this possibility that Weber had discerned within socialism. He did not, however, believe in any future possibility whereby socialism could have avoided this development. At this point one can introduce the anarchists. The anarchists had always been quick to alert socialists to the state communist potential within the parties and movements of Marxist persuasion. 

In one of his four speeches at the Congress of the League for Peace and Freedom in Bern (1868), Bakunin argues:

I detest communism because it is the negation of liberty and I cannot conceive anything human without liberty. I am not a communist because communism concentrates all the powers of society and absorbs them into the State, because it leads inevitably to the centralization of property in the hands of the State, while I want to see the State abolished. I want the complete elimination of the authoritarian principle of state tutelage which has always subjected, oppressed, exploited, and depraved men while claiming to moralize and civilize them. I want society, and collective or social property, to be organized from the bottom up through free association and not from the top down by authority of any kind. ... In that sense I am a collectivist and not at all a communist.





The principle which would be appropriate to the non-alienated society could only be that of federalism, in which power is ascending from the bottom up and enables individuals to exercise their sovereign power consciously as active citizens. Self-management in the economy and self-organisation in society in general makes the state both as coercive and as ethical agency superfluous. Society becomes a self-governing sphere of free communities organising their affairs and their mutual relations according to need, associating with others in a nexus of inter-relations. In this federal system the freedom of the individual finds in the freedom of all other individuals not its limitation but its condition and confirmation. The greater the autonomy of the individuals composing society, the greater the vigour and dynamism of that society, the greater the individual freedom. The apparent tautology of the argument is explained by the fact that human beings are both individual and social beings requiring that both aspects of their nature be fulfilled. It is federalism which, offers the greatest scope for the development of both the individuality and the communality of the human being.

The totalitarian state, with the replacement of capitalism's economic rationality for socialism's bureaucratic rationality, represents an attempt to overcome the dualism between political and civil society at the level of the state. It is the dissolution of civil society into the state and consequently implies a top down organisation. Marx's characterisation of the state bureaucracy is generalised to society through the imposition of bureaucratic control from above. The totalitarian degeneration of socialism represents the triumph of the 'machine' in politics, the rationalisation of human thought and action, and the subordination of human beings to a condition of passive obedience to routinized procedures and to the established rules of the officials.

The combined force of the criticism of Weber and of the anarchists should force Marxists to be clear on the question of emancipation, reason and control. The failure to make the necessary distinctions means that Marxism certainly does run the risk of getting entangled within a, process of rationalisation in which human agency is transformed into human enslavement.

It should be argued, then, that the interest at the centre of Marx's 'science’ is indeed 'rational'. This reason, however, is not merely a question of the technique and organisation by which human beings manipulate the environment but possesses an all-important emancipatory component. It is not, then, a question of technical control, which would certainly fall within the province of the extension of formal rationality. Rather, the rational control which Marx pursues refers to reason with its ethical component. Marx is seeking to end the contradiction between formal and substantive rationality through the creation of a control which enables human beings to restore meaning to their thought and action. It is a recovery of ends and the restoration of means to their appropriate place. The rational control that Marx emphasises, then, is not the technical control in which means are asserted over ends, and 'things' over persons, but rests upon the notion of human emancipation and the realisation of the species essence of human beings. Marx's rational control is the conscious communal control of individuals, overcoming the inversion of subject and object which leads to the constraining social forms which prevent the full expression of the human being of each individual.

Marx's approach is to be distinguished from bourgeois social science, which lacks the core emancipatory commitment. This social science approaches society in the manner of the natural sciences, as a natural datum to be manipulated, classified, dissected. This has resulted in a machine language and a machine politics. Sociology has become entangled in the state project of classifying, standardising, and homogenising the population for the purposes of a totalitarian social control.
'Scientific' Marxism and Bureaucratic Politics
The question concerns the extent to which Marxism itself has found itself implicated in this bureaucratic politics of the machine age. Of greatest relevance here is the connection between a 'scientific' theory and a scientific politics in which 'science' has become an elitist and authoritarian privilege of the powerful. This is, as Marx wrote with regard to bureaucracy, authority as the principle of knowledge.

The connection between a 'scientific' Marxism, in which the world is accessible only to the intellectuals, and a political party based upon a strict, hierarchy of authority, seems fairly clear. The party is necessary to implement the knowledge that the intellectuals have obtained in abstraction from the class struggle. 

Marx's culpability in this degeneration of Marxism into a bureaucratic totalitarianism may be doubted. Marx did make a radical distinction between appearance and reality and did emphasise that science was necessary to obtain knowledge of the deep, underlying structures not always apparent on the ideologically constituted surface of reality (Parekh 1982:54/5 205; McLennan 1989:13/4; Smith 1996:125/6; Harvey 1990:101). Such a view of science implies a degree of inequality at the cognitive level. The knowledge of 'objective' reality and its law of motion requires the activity of an exclusive group of scientists. The knowledge that is obtained is in the hands of and is revealed by the politicians and theoreticians of the party. Such a view of science is thus linked again with the need for the political party guiding the practice of the proletariat. The emphasis is thus placed upon building the revolutionary party.

Given the subjection of the workers to ideological mystification, the inaccessibility of the world to the workers, it is the organisational form which comes to be invested with revolutionary significance. This party agency is highly disciplined and hierarchically ordered. The claim is that it is the existence of the revolutionary party which alone supplies the means for canalising the spontaneous activity of the workers into the longer term activity necessary to realise the socialist objective. The workers would never realise this objective by their own efforts.

What is awry in this version is the fact that absent from the account is Marx's overwhelming stress upon the constitutive role of human praxis (Parekh1982:190 194 195).





Marx takes the view that truth consists in conformity to reality. He argues that, in human affairs, reality is created and altered by human praxis. It consists of social relations, which are not given by nature but created by men. This means that, as men alter social reality, they make true what was once false, and vice versa. At one point in time a theory might be true, that is, conform to social reality. At another point in time, when the human praxis has changed social reality, the statement or the theory in question becomes false. It is not only falsified by reality, as happens when a hypothesis is refuted or proved false by a fact; rather it has been made false by men. In the same way, by changing social reality, human beings make true a theory that once was false. In short, in human affairs, human beings can create truth and falsehood (Parekh 1982:193/4).

The world is not an objective external datum but is the product of human agency and is subject to the transformatory praxis of this agency. To this extent, in producing the world, human beings produce their own truth. This stress upon praxis entails the democratisation of knowledge and, with it, the democratisation of power and politics (Lukacs 1991:197/8). The position of the philosophers and the politicians has been effectively subverted in favour of the demos as the transformative agency.









The Alienation of the Organic Labour State

Perhaps there will no longer be a privileged-class as such, but there will be a government and, let me emphasize, an extremely complex government, which will not be content with ruling and administering the masses politically, as all governments now do, but will also administer them economically, concentrating in its own hands production and the 'just' division of wealth, agriculture, the establishment and development of factories, the organisation and operation of commerce and, above all, the application of capital to production by the only banker, the state. All of this will call for an immense development of science, and for the presence in government of many 'heads overflowing with brains'. It will be the reign of scientific intelligence, the most aristocratic, despotic, arrogant, and scornful of all regimes. There will be a new class, a new hierarchy of real and pretended scholars, and the world will be divided into a majority that rules in the name of science, and a vast ignorant majority. Then let the mass of the ignorant look out.

Bakunin in Woodcock ed.1977:140/3

Weber's critique of socialism rests upon the notion that central planning and state ownership of the means of production would not overcome the 'severance' or separation to which Marx had, rightly, drawn attention. Rather, socialism would reinforce this 'severance’ and, indeed, institutionalise it at the level of the state. Socialism would thus reinforce alienation and make it general rather than abolish it. Socialist rationality would thus represent the further development of the process of rationalisation, with the economic rationality of capitalism being replaced by the bureaucratic rationality of the state.

Marx's early critique of political alienation had come to be 'economised' and neutralised by the passive radicalism of Social Democracy. The rationalisation of the Social Democrats, like Kautsky, was that the working class lacked the consciousness, the experience, and the organisational ability to generate the necessary political leadership required for the ‘proletarian socialism’ of the associated producers (Beetham in Levy ed.1987:117). Weber ruled out this proletarian socialism on the grounds that it simply did not correspond to modern rational forms of social organisation (Mommsen in Levy ed.1987:92), an early repudiation of socialism on grounds of ‘complexity'. Social Democracy retained much of the revolutionary language of Marx's critique. This revolutionary Marxism, however had long since been neutralised by the revisionism of the social democrats, whose position, indeed, was quite similar to Weber's (Clarke 1991:310).

The Emancipatory Component of Reason
At the core of the rational control offered by Marx is the emancipatory commitment to the free social world of realised individuals. The critique of alienation is crucial in that it is human self-alienation which explains the paradox of how human agency is transformed into human enslavement, which explains Weber's pathos of means coming to be asserted over ends (Turner 1993:179/80). Alienation demonstrates the inversion inherent in social reality, an inversion which cannot be removed by reforming consciousness via philosophy or science but only by practical transformation. Through alienation human beings are reduced to the status of things. Human beings under capitalism relate to each other not as persons but in the form of things. It is this inversion of subject and predicate and the reduction of human beings to the status of objects which makes it possible to quantify, standardise, classify and measure people and their social reality, i.e. to develop that social science which treats the world as a naturalistic datum and which supplies knowledge for the purpose of bureaucratic control.

Meszaros underlines the emancipatory commitment at the core of Marx's 'science’.





If the emancipatory commitment to the defetishised world and non-alienated human being is absent, then the science producing knowledge will be that naturalism or positivism which identifies the rational control pursued by Marx with the technical manipulation of the social environment and the persons in it. Thus ‘scientific’ Marxism, to this extent, is implicated in the bureaucratic management and manipulation of society sought by bourgeois social science and politics. It leads to the revolutionary party. hierarchically ordered, in possession of its ‘scientific’ socialism, which could only institutionalise its power as the culmination of the process of rationalisation.

Nationalisation and the Transformation of Social Relations
The logical corollary of this is that whilst it might well be possible to abolish capital-ism as a system of private property relations, the abolition of capital is more difficult in requiring the abolition of alienated labour. There is a need to penetrate beneath legal-property relations in a way that the socialist parties criticised by Weber did not. Social Democracy identified socialism with the nationalisation of the means of production whereas the task was to transform the social relations of productions.

The experiences of socialism in the twentieth century suffice to show that state ownership of the means of production is not the sufficient condition for the abolition of alienation (Meszaros 1995:24/5 26 29 107 133 368/9 403 416/8 422 617 621 663 679/80; Walton and Gamble 1976:196; Clarke 1991:231 233 243 244; Callinicos in Callinicos ed. 1989:143/6; Smith 1996:159/60). Alienated social conditions persist for so long as human activity is subject to an externally imposed need/imperative. It is the social relations of production which must be altered in that it is they that ensure that the productive activity of the workers is subordinated to a systemic imperative imposed in the interests of capital accumulation. As against this, result of the alienation of labour Marx argues for the subordination of production to human need enabling the realisation of the potentialities of the producers themselves.

The dehumanisation and exploitation to which labour is subject is immanent in the objective relations of the capitalist mode of production. It is the alien and class rationality of the capitalist economy which determines that the productive activity of the workers, far from enabling the realisation of the creative powers of labour, actually stifles these powers and constrains them within the need to produce surplus value. The class struggle is inherent in the contradictory dynamics of the capitalist development of the productive powers.

It should be clear, however, that the alienation of labour, which is the basis of capitalism's substantive irrationality, is not abolished by the rationalisation of the means of production but is actually reinforced. The Fabian/Social Democratic version of socialism - which Weber characterised in terms of the dictatorship of the officials - argued that the problem was one of the rational use of capital and the abuse of economic power by the capitalists. Thus capital was to be removed from the private hands of the capitalists and vested in the hands of the state. The Fabians' 'socialism’ could only conceive socialism as a perfected capitalism (Clarke 1991:204).

The Fabians made the classic mistake of identifying capital as a thing rather than as a relation and a process. Their target was the private capitalists’ supposed abuse of economic power. Thus Weber's contempt for the mediocrity of the Social Democrats is barely concealed - 'these gentlemen will frighten nobody anymore', he exclaimed (Weber to Michels, 8 Oct 1906 in Mommsen 1974:114). His repudiation of socialism was hardly a justification of revisionism. On the contrary, if revisionist socialism was the only practicable socialism, then Weber's criticism that socialism would issue only in the dictatorship of the officials was well founded (Lassman and Speirs 1994:292 295/6). The socialist plan for the bureaucratically ordered and controlled society constituted a development of modern capitalism not a genuine alternative to it. For Weber, central planning of the economy would merely accelerate the process of rationalising society. The socialist plan would merely accelerate the process whereby the central values of autonomy, creativity and spontaneity would be extinguished from the world.

Weber is clear that the modern state and political party represented the prime vehicles of bureaucratisation in the modern world. Moreover, the socialist state and party would, like all bureaucratic organisations, exhibit and succumb to Michels’ iron law of oligarchy. As a result, the socialist society, pursuing the Utopia of a controlled and ordered society, would be governed by an elite which has obtained power over the party bureaucracy. The alternative, the direct democracy of workers power, was no alternative at all but simply impossible on account of the sheer size and scale of the modern, world. Bureaucracy was an inevitability, with all that that entailed politically in terms of the administration of people and society.

To demonstrate the possibility of a proletarian socialism of the associated producers one needs to emphasise Marx's critique of alienation as critical in challenging Weber's premises whilst critically appropriating Weber's insights into the generalisation of alienation under state socialism. Whilst Utopian snares are to be avoided it needs to be recognised that the most Utopian socialism that there is lies in the notion of a world completely controlled by technique and organisation. And Weber has played an important part in showing why this is the case.

There is no doubt, however, that Weber’s critical comments on socialism need to be supplemented by Marx's critique of alienation so that an alternative to the technocratic Utopia of a world subject to bureaucratic control can be avoided. One cannot but prioritise the dialectic of capital and labour. Marx's critique of private property led him to the important conclusion that since the basis of property is alienated labour, the abolition of private property could only take' the form of the abolition of alienated labour. The way that Marx expresses himself is important. The problem is fundamentally with the alienation of labour and only secondarily with private property. The Fabians, concerned with efficiency, proposed that the state should assume the functions of capital: 'The Fabians state capitalism did not involve any fundamental transformation of social and political relations, but simply a transfer of given functions from capitalists to managers and administrators' (Clarke 1991:238).

State capitalism does not involve the alteration of social production relations. Instead, the state assumes the economic functions of capital, the public officials replacing the private capitalists. This state socialism/capitalism ruled out any fundamental transformation of social production relations and explicitly defined itself against notions of a socialisation constituted by workers control. Instead, on the basis of unaltered production relations, state socialism rested upon the transfer of functions from the private capitalists to the public officials. Quite clearly, nationalisation is not synonymous with socialisation or democratisation.

Nationalisation has not solved inequalities of power; it has merely substituted officials for owners. These officials are the realisation of Bakunin's fear of a 'red bureaucracy’, what one modern radical has called a 'red bourgeoisie'. Under the direction of this new elite, an enormous and highly centralised bureaucracy rigidly plans everything. The local unit is, in practice, reduced to Insignificance. This is bureaucracy, not democracy .. and Fabians are as guilty of it as Leninists, Trotskyists as much as Stalinists. For all, the workers are still treated like draftees into the industrial army. This is a socialism of five year plans, growth rates, and dams and factories, but it is not everyday democracy.

De Leon in Ehrlich ed.1996:206

From the perspective of socialist transformation the consequences of this redefinition of socialism, which represented the expropriation of socialism from the working class and its appropriation by the new class of managers and administrators, were nothing short of disastrous. It is, arguably, the most appalling case of arrested development recorded in history, a century of progressive, patient advance beached up in a bureaucratic party/state collectivism that dissipates the precious organisational, moral and intellectual resources, patiently accumulated by the working class over the century (Callaghan 1990:99; Kendall 1969:xii).





'Orthodoxy' and State Socialism
Marxism as 'orthodoxy' is itself implicated in this bureaucratic redefinition of socialist politics. Orthodoxy stressed the economistic aspects of Marx's later thought, presenting an objectivist reading of Capital as political economy. Marx was thus assimilated to the conceptual framework of political economy. The labour theory of value was interpreted as a theory of exploitation. The appropriation of the surplus value from the working class, which took the form of profit, was argued to rest upon the ownership of private property in the means of production. This conceptualisation of the problem plainly fitted the definition of socialism upheld by the social democratic parties. For it rests upon the notion that the class antagonism and the anarchy of production under capitalism are the result of the legal-property relations determining the form of distribution. Property is thus transferred from private hands to the state. ‘Orthodoxy’ stresses an 'economistic' Marxism that assimilates Marx to the framework of political economy (Cleaver 1979). This stresses exploitation and the ownership of the means of production, reduces socialism to a change in property relations rather production relations, and shifts ownership from the private to the public realm whilst failing to transform production relations.

This economism quickly became the dominant Marxist position and lent itself to the growing stress upon capitalism's anarchy as requiring a control which was to be exercised by the state. The problem with this stress is that it remains focused upon the level of property relations to the exclusion of the problem of transforming the social relations of problem. According to the objectivist reading, the development of the productive forces is the dynamic of history, with technology, the introduction of new machinery and the constant revolutionising of the instrument of production, transforming society. More than this, however, technology was viewed as a class neutral force for change, determinant of the relations of production. This changed the character of Marx's argument. The development of the productive powers creates the objective conditions for socialism and is thus to be given a central role in the socialist political movement. In fine, capitalism needs to be replaced when it has come to fetter the development of the productive powers.

Whilst the terminology is that of Marx, the meaning of the terms has shifted. The productive forces have been given a technological character, neutral in the class struggle, whilst the anarchy of production has come to be defined not in terms of the absence of conscious control exercised by the associated producers but in terms of the inefficiency and waste of the market economy. There is a failure to penetrate further to the relations of production. The control which is to take the place of the market is to be exercised by the state, with property shifting from private to public hands (Clarke 1991:307).

The problem with this reorientation of the socialist movement is that the social production relations are no longer considered problematic. The problem now concerns property relations. The productive powers are viewed technologically in as an objective datum rather than as the powers of human beings. The question concerns the effective management measured in technical economic terms. The state Is conceived as a technocratic tool for overcoming the ‘anarchy’ of the capitalist economy, an ‘anarchy’ identified with the market rather than the production relations constituting the market.

This is a socialism that has fixed its gaze upon the surface level of reality. And it is a conception which lends itself perfectly to the substitutionism inherent in the relocation of socialism from the social to the political realm and in the accompanying replacement of the proletarian agency by the new class agency organised in the political party. The party claims to represent the proletariat and constitutes itself as the state power owning the means of production. The workers are thus confronted by their own party in the form of their new employers and exploiters.

Socialism has thus been redefined so as to assume control over the productive forces developed under capitalism, a socialism which alters only the relations of property and hence concentrating its transformative project upon merely juridical property forms. Attention is thus taken away from the need to transform the social relations of production. Moreover, the class struggle is effectively constrained to the passive form of electoral or parliamentary activity at a safe distance from the fundamental production relations.

The refutation of the economistic theory of the productive forces and the conception of technocratic neutrality and bureaucratic necessity can only proceed from the concept of alienated labour. It is from this critique that Marx's analysis of the contradictory process of capitalist development can proceed. The intention is to show that attempts to render the existing world and its forms unalterable on account of some 'objective indispensability' are suspect on theoretical and political grounds; that the dominant forms of socialism have, by concentrating upon property relations to the exclusion of production relations, failed to seriously attempt to break from the process of rationalisation under modern capitalism; and that an alternative is available through establishing the centrality of the critique of alienated labour.

The Proletariat and the Substitutionism of Political Socialism
The abandonment of the proletariat by Marxism detaches socialism from its roots in the socialisation of the class subject through its self-organisation and instead locates it in the alienated forms of capital's objective socialisation (Clarke 1991:328). The view that socialism is necessarily generated from the contradictory dynamics of capitalist production and the spontaneous movement of the working class could be criticised as naive. Apart from anything else, it seems to make the subjective factor dependent upon the autonomous evolution of the objective sphere (Molyneux 1978:116).

Nevertheless, the stress upon political organisation in both Social Democracy and Communism was made in such a way as to distance socialism from the working class subject. Class struggle came to be waged in the abstraction of a political realm divorced from the social practices of the proletariat. To reject the 'spontaneist' position as naive does not warrant a substitutionist position in which the party political agency replaces the proletarian class subject. Rather, it makes it imperative to learn how to relocate the roots of socialism in the capacity of the working class to achieve its own emancipation.

The degeneration of socialism in the twentieth century can, in large part, be explained by the divorce of socialism from the emancipatory and transformatory capacity of the proletarian class subject (Clarke 1991:328; Gottlieb 1992:60). Socialism was wrenched from its material foundations in the self-socialisation of the working class, locating it not in material self-organisation of the working class, but in the alienated forms of objective, unsocial socialisation under the capital system. This substitutionism replaced the proletariat with the party, shifted the locus, of socialism from the social realm to the political, thereby altering the orientation completely by stressing the state ownership of property to the exclusion of the transformation of the social relations of production. As a result, state socialism reinforced alienation by merging the state and capital so that the social powers of individuals came to confront them in an alienated form all the more oppressive in seeming to be 'their' party and ‘their' class.

For Marx, property is the 'hidden secret' of all social structures. It is 'the power of disposing of the labour power of others'. In both The German Ideology and The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx emphasised the point that property cannot be defined in the abstract, only through specific social relations. Marx critiqued both the state and capital as the alienated social powers of human beings.

It is with this in mind that one is entitled to consider the political socialism of Social Democracy and Communism as the apotheosis of alienation, concentrating this alien power in the hands of 'the party’ constituting themselves as the state. Not surprisingly, the dominant form of socialism has involved production relations in which power has gone to that elite group in command of the bureaucratic 'machine'. Given the persistence of alienated labour under unaltered social production relations there is every reason to expect, on Marx's own premises, a totalitarian bureaucratic tyranny based upon the merging of political and economic alienation. Given this experience of a generalised alienation, complete with the rule of the new class in the state bureaucracy, the burden of proof lies with Marxist socialists to demonstrate that there is an alternative. This means investing Marx's emancipatory commitment with some institutional and organisational meaning at the level of political practice.

Marx himself repudiated blueprintism. In a famous phrase, he refused to write 'recipes for the kitchens of the future' (Marx Capital 1976:99). The character of the future society is not to be decided beforehand by theoreticians but by the human agents who would create and inhabit it. In so far as this respects the creative, constitutive role of human agency Marx is consistent with his own historicist and emancipatory premises.

However, neither Marx nor Marxists are justified by maintaining a silence on the nature of the future socialist society. In the first place, the projection of possibilities immanent in an existing social structure makes comment upon the character of future society legitimate. The truth is, in light of the experience of twentieth century socialism, Marxist socialists must reject the temptation to use historicism as an excuse for evasion and must, therefore, place ethical and intellectual considerations concerning socialism to the forefront. Failure to do so will merely serve to underline a bureaucratic, totalitarian and repressive past to stand as an example of socialism in practice.

In Finance Capital, Hilferding gave a classic presentation of the case for socialism as the logical outcome of capitalist socialisation (Hilferding 1980). Hilferding’s view represents the evolutionary conception of social democracy at its most sophisticated. Whilst Hilferding is correct in locating the attainment of socialism in real material developments, there is no doubt this way of presenting the evolution of socialism privileged the alienated forms of socialisation, especially the concentration and centralisation of capital, devalued the political agency of the proletarian class subject and hence worked in favour of the substitutionist tendencies at work in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Something fairly obvious was missed, and maybe it was a deliberate evasion. The nationalisation of the means of production is fairly easily accomplished by transferring property from private to state hands. But the socialisation of production so as to diffuse control to the associated producers is an altogether different proposition, requiring the transformation of social production relations. This is a fundamental truth which has been overlooked by those who have identified socialism with a nationalisation which is in the line of development of the alienated forms of capitalist socialisation.





The nationalisations undertaken by Bismarck, Engels argued, had given rise to a 'certain false socialism' in which the mere fact of government assuming economic functions, was interpreted as a step 'in the direction of socialism. In a letter of 1881 Engels wrote that it was a terrible error for socialists 'to accept what the capitalists themselves only pretended to believe, that state ownership is socialist'.

Nationalisation has meant the total exclusion of the working class from any kind of control over the means of production. This, combined with the nature of the production process under capitalist relations, means that the working class can only exercise some form of control only if ownership is genuinely socialised, diffused amongst the associated producers, rather than being vested in the hands of a public elite through nationalisation.

The ownership of property is merely the legal form of the relations of production and does not refer to these relations themselves. The question of ownership is not to be identified with the socialist transformation of production relations. These relations are not a matter of legal form but of the substantive control exercised in the production process and the organisation of work. For socialism, this must assume a cooperative character, not merely in the functional organisation of tasks but in the decision making processes.

The promise of Marxist socialism has been that of a self-governing society under the conscious control of the associated producers. The experience of socialism in the twentieth century has demonstrated conclusively that the abolition of private property is not in itself to be identified with socialism, that other conditions must be present for the development of an authentic socialism. Foremost among these conditions must be the abolition of alienated labour.


The identification of socialism with the nationalisation of the means of production and hence the concentration of property in the hands of the state is to be viewed as a phase in the development of socialism, part of its learning process as well as a response to the collectivism inherent in capitalist development. In terms of the argument presented here, this is a fairly meagre interpretation of socialism. Any authentic socialism must recover Marx's emancipatory commitment via the critique of alienation and, in so doing, emphasises the empowerment of individuals organised in civil society to assume control of a genuine socialisation, a self-socialisation to compare with capital's objective socialisation.

To dissociate socialism from the bureaucratic state power is intended to emphasise the distinction between socialisation and nationalisation so as to ensure that as the latter is abandoned, the former receives the attention it merits. The point is that if socialism is to have a future it must make a thorough critique of the identification of socialism with the nationalisation of the means of production so as to raise the demand for the transformation of social relations of production (Harrington 1993:16 198; Miliband 1994:16 42/3 54; Corrigan, Ramsay, Sayer 1978:55/6). This is a choice between top down and bottom up socialisation, now that the 'free market' has been revealed as thoroughly statist (Harrington 1993:144).

What emerges from the critique of alienation, in both its political and economic forms, is that socialisation has to be the restitution of social-human power to individuals organising themselves in their social reality. As such it is also a democratisation that dissolves the institutional-systemic world of abstraction that exerts its power over the real material world into that world of real individuals.

Socialists need, therefore, to pay more attention to the expropriation of the expropriators. Much depends upon what is expropriated, how it is expropriated and who or what does the expropriating. And much rests upon the transformation of the social relations of production. With merely the political abolition/expropriation of capitalism through the nationalisation of the means of production, the workers come to take their positions within what is merely a capitalist organisation of work subject to the same hierarchy of authority and the same logic of exploitation (Meszaros 1995:16 53 64/5 79 80/1 83 107 133 368/9 403 416/8 422 617 668 679/80 733 911 982). To institute the self-government of the producers on such a basis is doomed to failure, entailing no improvement in the position of the worker and subjecting the worker to much the same exploitation as before. The difference is that the worker is subject now to the political extraction of surplus value.

Self-Governing Socialism
If the social self-government of the producers is the end, then the only authentic self-governing activity which is relevant is that based upon self-government of the organs directing the class struggle. The task facing socialism is not that of imposing socialist forms on the structures already created by capitalism, which is how the technologist presentation of the development of the productive forces can make it appear. These productive forces cannot simply be used for socialist ends by being expropriated. It is, rather, a question of establishing new relationships between human beings in society and between human beings and their Social environment (Meszaros 1995:463 468 729). 





The transformation required in production and distribution involve the complete elimination of capital from the social metabolism as command over labour, which in turn implies the abolition of the alienated objectification of labour under all its aspects, particularly the political state and capital. The easiest part of this project is subjecting the material possessions of the private capitalists to social control.





The alternative - socialist - mode of reproductive control is unimaginable without successfully overcoming the existing diremption and alienation. For the necessary condition of carrying out the direct material reproductive functions of a socialist system is the restitution of the power of decision making - in all spheres of activity and at all levels of coordination, from the local productive enterprises to the most comprehensive international interchanges - to the associated producers. Thus the 'withering away of the state' refers to nothing mysterious or remote but to a perfectly tangible process which can be undertaken in the present reality. It means the practical reappropriation of the alienated social powers of political decision making and social production by individuals together in their transition towards a genuinely associative socialist society. Without the reappropriation of these social powers, neither the new mode of social control by individuals is conceivable, nor indeed the non-coercive and thereby cohesive/plannable everyday operation of the particular productive and distributive units by their self-managing associated producers.





This is not a question of destruction. The destruction of the state and capital and hence of the structures of the present society would merely result in the old society soon being reconstituted at a lower level of development. It is a question of abolition as transcendence, what Marx called Aufhebung, the supersession of existing society which is also the realisation of the positive, progressive potentials and tendencies in that society. The argument thus leads us to consider the interpenetration of means and ends so as to achieve a synthesis leading to a new social model.

In conclusion, one can argue that the complexity of alienated social power through the process of differentiation which has characterised modernity makes the attainment of the socialist society highly elusive. Behind the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is a complex nexus of alienated social power which is not abolished by the mere fact of expropriating the expropriators. It is not enough for the workers - or 'the party' - to expropriate the means of production so as to extinguish both the capitalist class and the power of capital. Nor does the mere destruction of the state power help this process of reappropriating social power if the workers' have not organised themselves to assume this power. The main support of the capitalist class in its economic and state forms lies in the production relations which restrict the working class to a subordinate position. Since this is the case, the proletariat can act to destroy the power of the capitalist class by putting an end to themselves as a proletariat through the transformation of social relations of production.

24 LIFE WORLD VS SYSTEM WORLD

In the modern world 'the economy', i.e. capital, is organised in a form so as to be functionally enmeshed with 'the political', i.e. the state, claiming the monopoly of power. The economic and the political become semi-autonomous spheres from society and existing as a value free communality imposed upon the everyday reality of individuals in society. This differentiation is associated with the extension of instrumental rationality and, as a result, an increasing substantive irrationality. The system world of the state and capital imposes its own functional imperatives over against the substantive rationality of the life world, the real society of individuals.

Habermas’ opposition between system world and life world may be presented as a conflict between instrumental rationality and substantive rationality which derives from the dialectic of labour and capital. The value free imperatives of the system world refer to an instrumental rationality which is the alien logic of capital. The systemic imperatives of capital are imposed over against the lifeworld, something which is accompanied by a substantive irrationality. It is a conflict between dead and living labour, between abstract and concrete labour. By conceptualising capitalism as an alienated system of production Marx is able to show the increasing regulation of the life world by the systemic imperatives of the capitalist mode of production.

The kind of instrumental rationality associated with these systemic imperatives is demonstrated in the way that the autonomous logic of the self-expansion capital increasingly dominates or determines every sphere of human action through the commodification of the world.

Habermas' decoupling of the system world from the life world is experienced in the modern world as the reification of social relationships in the life world. Hegel had conceived in terms of a ruptured ethical world, in terms of diremption. Marx translated this pursuit of the ethical totality into a critique of alienated labour and class antagonism. The value free imperatives of the system world, which led to the dirempted ethical world, were thus shown to derive from an alienated system of production.

For Marx, the capitalist mode of production was accompanied by a process of abstraction which removed the world and its imperatives from human comprehension and control but which, as self-made, remained subject to the (substantively) rational praxis of human agents. The subjective element may be alienated through objectification but it can never be eliminated. Marx is thus able to continue Hegel's pursuit of the ethical totality. The abstract and the impersonal may become independent of human rational control but they cannot autonomise themselves from human beings and human life. The systemic-institutional sphere has obtained an independence from human society and its imperatives are imposed over against human beings.

For Marx, the abolition (Aufhebung) of this systemic-institutional world takes the form of revolutionary-critical praxis subverting the systemic logic of capital's self-expansion, reappropriating alienated social powers for society, reabsorbing the independent processes of the economy back into the sphere of the life world, the state back into society. In attacking the alienation of labour by rational material praxis, the revolution subverts the institutional basis of the capital economy and the state. Society, as the everyday life world of human beings, has been rigidified under the law of value. The values of spontaneity, creativity and autonomy, which Weber saw as being systematically eliminated by the extension of formal rationality, are to be recovered by society as the alienated powers of human beings are dissolved into the life world.

Weber's tension between formal and substantive rationality, his pessimism concerning the progressive elimination of the central values of western civilisation, can thus be resolved through translating the conflict between system and life world into the dialectic of capital and labour. The norm free imperatives of capital and its self-realisation does produce a condition of substantive irrationality in the life world of individuals. Hegel had already understood modernity as producing a dirempted ethical totality.

Marx took up this diremption in terms of alienated labour and class division. Weber failed to locate this tension, indeed this nihilism of modernity, in the alienated system of production, its autonomy and its norm free imperatives. This is precisely what Marx did do. With his material praxis designed to restore the systemic-institutional world to the control of human beings in the life world, Marx embraced an affirmative materialism. That is, Marx's materialism is an affirmation of life against a system rationality that he has shown to derive from the alienation of human social powers. Marx opposes the concrete to the abstract, a substantive rationality to an instrumental rationality.

The increasing uncertainty concerning modernity and its nihilism, the increasingly apocalyptic tone of the many ‘end of’ books being published in the late twentieth century, all exhibit this same tension that exists in Weber and, arguably, the same inability to transcend this tension. On the Weberian premises of this debate, the problems are untranscendable. By locating these problems in the alienation of labour, Marx does offer a way forward.


The Violence and Tyranny of Abstraction

The separation of theory and practice resulted in transforming the latter into an empiricism without principles; the former into a pure, fixed knowledge. On the other hand, the economic planning imposed by a bureaucracy unwilling to recognise its mistake became thereby a violence done to reality. And since the future production of a nation was determined in offices often outside its own territory, this violence had as its counterpart an absolute idealism. Men and things had to yield to ideas - a priori ..




Sartre's conception of idealistic violence pertains to the bureaucratic control of political elites divorced from reality and from the people. This idealism and idealistic violence is to be related to the abstracting tendencies of modern capitalism culminating in the tyranny of the abstract and the impersonal exercised over the real, every day world of individuals.

To Sartre's idealistic violence, one can add the term 'tyranny of abstraction'.  It comes from George Woodcock.





The implication of this is that the question is not merely one of class power and class relation but of the rule of abstraction deriving from the alienation of social power. It is the abstraction and impersonality of bourgeois society which generates this conceptual thinking detached from reality, coming to trap the individual in the greatest abstraction of them all - the state. The tendency to idealistic violence, to a priori conceptualising and to a bureaucratic conception of control is inherent in bourgeois society. Those exercising this control in bourgeois society rely in the main upon conceptual thinking. The arguments that Marx directed against bureaucracy, criticising the extent to which official reports are remote from the real world, are pertinent here (Sayer 1991:78/9; Meister 1990:189/90; Avineri 1968:23/4). This conceptualising is instrumental in subjecting a chaotic, formless real world of individuals to an order that the bureaucrat can manage and manipulate. But this conceptualising imprisons individuals within particular schema, divorced from reality, inducing the bureaucrats to do violence to this reality and the people in it. Conceptualising makes the individual available as a target for bureaucratic control. Conceptual thought or rationality is typically bourgeois thought in being based upon abstraction and representation at a remove from the real world.

It is in this spirit that Edgley accuses Althusser of a ‘continuing theoreticist tendency in his understanding of Marxist science’. This bourgeois survival in his thought is 'due to his failure to appreciate the full philosophical depth of Marx's theoretical revolution and thus the way in which Marxist science, without deserting its scientific standpoint, constitutes itself theoretically as the mouthpiece of the workers' movement and their political revolution' (Edgley 1976:6).

What is of concern here is less the Marxist credentials of theorists than to establish that the idealistic violence/tyranny of abstraction through conceptual thought and bureaucratic control needs to be transcended and replaced by materially rooted thought and control.

The State as Abstraction
Marx's critique of the state underlines this argument. The state is depicted by Marx as an abstraction from social reality that is led to do violence to that reality. The principal achievement of the French Revolution lay in creating the abstraction of the modern state, centralising political power by destroying the particularisms of the feudal order. Marx does acknowledge this as a political emancipation in respect to the feudal order. However, there is another side to this abstraction of the political realm from society. The abstraction of the modern state had turned into a means of control. The state had become elevated into an ideal concept of community and could not tolerate any community of real individuals which existed independently of it, viewing with hostility all merely ‘particular’ or 'private' communities (Colletti Intro to Marx 1975). This argument against the totalitarianism of the state is later employed against capital as it attempts to make itself the only community (Marx 1973:223 224 225/6; 1975:259).

The Ambiguous Process of Modernity
Marshall Berman has argued that ‘to be modern is to find ourselves in an environment that promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of our soul and the world - and, at the same time threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are’ (Berman 1982:15). As a title for his argument, Berman adopted Marx's characterisation of the modern bourgeois society as a world in which 'all that is solid melts into air' (Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party).

The contradictory dynamic at the heart of modernity is discussed eloquently in the speech that Marx delivered on the anniversary of the People's Paper. The crisis of rationalisation, Weber's central theme which has become of contemporary relevance, had been anticipated by Marx in his critique of alienation. In the modern world, the destructive, indeed pathological consequences of the abstracting tendencies of modernity are evident in the turmoil of the global economy, in the threat of ecological catastrophe and in the internal decay of civilisation. The scale of the human dilemma is increasing as the world exhibits all the characteristics of being out of control (Stauth and Turner 1988:2). But this loss of control is not a new phenomenon at all but, as Marx had shown, is intrinsic to the alienation at the heart of modernity.

Nostalgia
Human beings live in a world which is increasingly torn by crisis and which increasingly exhibits a nihilism. This being so one can anticipate that human beings will experience a profound sense of loss, a certain yearning for a lost world of community, certainty, and an authentic, rooted experience of morality and culture. Nisbett has argued that sociology is itself a response to the profound sense of loss which accompanied modernisation and industrialisation, examining how the concept of community is central to the work of the greatest figures of modern social thought (Nisbett 1970). Certainly, the loss which accompanied capitalist industrialisation has led social thinkers to seek more secure foundations for individual identity than is available in outmoded cultures and institutions.

Marx's basic question in his critique of alienation is that of why human beings are not at home in the world and how they could be at home in the world (Kolakowski I 1978:135; Oskar Schatz and Ernst Florian Winter in Fromm ed. 1967:296/9). Given the profound sense of loss that accompanies modernisation one can expect that individuals would not be comfortable in their social roles. Nevertheless, in arguing that Marx is concerned with how human beings can be at home in the world one has to be careful to distinguish Marx from the nostalgic paradigm (Stauth and Turner 1988:31/2; Sayer 1991:13; Femia 1993).

The totalitarian drive of the modern state stems from its abstraction from and opposition to the real human society of individuals. Only by atomising and disorganising real individuals can the state justify its claim to represent the common good; it is a ‘public’ detached from the real individuals composing the public. The state seeks to encompass all associations, communities and individuals, thus becoming an instrument of collective servitude.

Marx made the connection between abstraction, conceptual thought and the totalitarianism of the modern state when criticising Hegel's doctrine of the state.

Another claim is that the ‘various powers of the state’ are ‘fixed by the nature of the concept’ and that therefore by means of them the universal ‘engenders itself in a necessary way'. Thus the various powers are not determined by ‘their own nature’ but by something alien to them. Similarly, their necessity is not to be found in their own essence, much less has it been critically established. Rather, their fate is predestined by the 'nature of the concept', it lies sealed in the holy archives of the Santa Casa [the prison of the Inquisition in Madrid] (of the Logic). The soul of an object, in this case of the state, is established and predestined prior to its body which is really just an illusion. The 'concept' is the Son within the 'Idea', God the Father; it is the agens, the driving force, the determining and differentiating principle. 'Idea' and 'concept' are here autonomous abstractions.

Marx CHDS in EW 1975:70

Marx is not merely attacking the abstract conceptual thinking of Hegel but the abstract existence of the state itself.

This point of view is certainly abstract, but the 'abstraction' is that of the political state as Hegel has presented it. It is also atomistic, but its atomism is that of society itself. The 'point of view' cannot be concrete when its object is 'abstract’. The atomism into which civil society is plunged by its political actions is a necessary consequence of the fact that the community, the communistic entity in which the individual exists, civil society, is separated from the state, or in other words: the political state is an abstraction from civil society.

Marx :CHDS in EW 1975:145

The separation of the state from civil society generates the opposition between the abstract and the concrete. It is this abstraction which lies behind the conceptual thought of bourgeois society, the idealism which is the corollary of bureaucratic control.

Like the conservative reaction against modernity, Marx went in search of community through a critique of modernity. The difference is that whereas conservatism expressed a nostalgia for past forms, Marx sought the reconstitution of community in the future through alternative forms immanent in the present. Weber subscribed to no such illusions and simply abandoned the search for community.

Marx himself was well aware of the pitfalls in the search for community. Indeed, in exposing the state as an ideological project, Marx was criticising the way that community had become abstract and ideal in the modern world. With the real civil society of individuals reduced to a sphere of universal egoism and antagonism human beings had to project community upwards to an ideal level raised above social reality - the state. In The German Ideology Marx characterises the state as the 'illusory community’. Such a criticism implies that Marx had an idea of what constituted the ‘real’ community.

Marx is thus concerned to negotiate his way through the snares of ideology, abstraction and inversion; he is aware of the temptation to project a yearning for community into an idealism that raises community over against real individuals. In the Paris Manuscripts Marx warns against the temptation to posit 'society' as an abstraction over against the individual (Marx 1975:350). Marx's demand for the recovery of human social powers is accompanied by a consistent critique of illusion, the metaphysics of the state and bureaucracy, inversion and distortion. His concern, precisely, is to dissolve the abstraction which has removed the world from the control of human beings.

Marx's approach to the problem of community was thus inherently critical and liberatory rather than nostalgic; moreover, it is radical in treating all forms of thought and organisation as serving certain class interests and imperatives (Marx 1973:496 223 224.225/6; Marx 1975:220 221 231). In criticising abstraction, Marx is aware of knowledge and the collective forms in which they are embodied as rationalising relations of power.

For Marx, genuine knowledge is the self-knowledge of the human agents whose praxis has shaped the social environment. Revolutionary-critical praxis is a way of restoring the self-made social world to human control. Marx's materialism, then, is life affirming in being premised upon the recovery by individuals of their social-human powers alienated to the state and capital and invested in an abstract institutional-systemic world, raised over against the real life world of these individuals. The real community would, on this account, rest upon individuals in the life world being empowered, and hence able to give expression to their individuality.

The progressive reappropriation of alienated social powers is thus to be considered as the empowerment and embodiment of the individual in the social context. The negative character of the modern world derives from a fetishistic social condition in which human beings turn their social power against themselves If Marx takes up the notion of homelessness, he nevertheless argues that the world has not so much been lost by human beings but that they have yet to claim it as their own. Marx does not look backwards and yearn for a lost moral unity and communal wholeness but forwards to human beings becoming at home in a world that they have created. Overcoming self-alienation means overcoming an existing separation rather than going back to a past society.

The theme of alienation in Marx's social theory is constitutive of Marx's entire project. The idea of human self-alienation which is central to the early writings of Marx is not a humanistic flourish which Marx later rejected but a crucial concern which integrates all the concepts and arguments within a philosophical anthropology. Marx’s work is unified and integrated, proceeding from the critique of bourgeois social reality as the alienation of human beings from themselves. Capital is more than a critique of political economy but applies more generally as a critique of the human condition in bourgeois society. This bourgeois society is characterised by the separation of the private world of atomised private property and egoism and the public realm of civic dignity and reason. Marx explored this problem of self-alienation and externalisation through religion, the capital economy and the state. In religious alienation, the natural powers of human beings are transferred to the divine powers of God; in economic alienation, the productive powers of human beings take the form of capital through commodification and, ideologically, as the fetishisation of commodities; political self-estrangement is constituted by the separation of the state and from civil society; the social expression of alienation in capitalism is the creation of an alienated proletariat. Marx's critique of political economy is therefore founded on the existential problem of the human condition (Lowith 1993:15/6).

A problem with much of the attacks focused upon modernity in the name of 'community' pertain to the ontological significance invested in this concept whilst remaining within the nostalgic paradigm. From this perspective, the use of 'community' as an overarching concept possessing a moral supremacy over all real entities, represents a real departure from Marx's own attempts to create a real community of individuals against the artificial, abstract communities imposed by the state and money.

The nostalgic paradigm, which laments what modernity has done to community, from this point of view, has failed to take up Marx's challenge. Sociology and social theory has ever been understood in terms of alienative relations. The abstract systemic-institutional world is thus asserted over against the concrete life world of individuals with alienated forms of mediation regulating human activity as quasi-autonomous forces. It is this which is the basis for dehumanisation, the destruction of human potentialities Marx saw this as the consequence of human beings being rendered passive objects of processes existing externally to them through being compelled to alienate their essential powers and have them turned against them as abstract force.

The Activist Conception of Knowledge
For Marx, knowledge is not separate from life but, on the contrary, is the expression of the real life activity of individuals, it follows from this that the intellectualisation described by Weber as accompanying the process of rationalisation represents the fundamental flaw at the heart of the abstraction of the modern world.

The question of authentic knowledge must seek to dissolve abstraction as the detachment of the power of control from the real world of individuals. No genuine knowledge is possible in abstraction. Authority is the principle of bureaucratic knowledge. And this results in a bureaucratic control which does idealistic violence to real society. To introduce the character of the individual as knowledgeable and transformative agent is to relate knowledge to revolutionary-critical praxis. Marx cannot be nostalgic concerning the loss of community with the emergence of atomistic bourgeois society given that he is committed to the idea of human agency as possessing a constitutive role in transforming existing society.

Given this centrality assigned to the transformative and knowledgeable human agent one can appreciate why Marx shunned blueprintism. Marx's position is fundamentally and inherently radical, a position that is concerned to avoid all intellectualisation as an abstraction from the praxis which actually creates and recreates society. Marx did not, as a result, present a systematic and detailed account of the socialist social structure. What is apparent is that Marx's vision of socialism as the self-governing society excluded the state as a regulatory institution over above society, precisely because he conceived such a reified conception of the state power as exhibiting an alienation from the real life power of individuals.

The reified concepts of 'state' and 'society', for Marx, express the abstraction of the modern world in which power has become externalised against human beings in their life world. These concepts do not express human-social power but its alienation. The concepts, indeed the realities of the state and society, have become abstractions.

In opposition to such abstract conceptual thought and the abstract reality this thought expresses, Marx attempted to emphasise material praxis as life-affirming, restoring power to the world of experience, reciprocity and sensuous activity. Marx is thus opposing the reality, the truth and, indeed, the community of the life world to the abstraction, untruthfulness and false collectivism of the official world. Praxis is opposed to abstraction (Stauth and Turner 1988:63/4).

Of course, the kind of praxis is important. Since abstraction has gone far beyond capitalism and cannot be overcome by simply changing the title deeds on property, it will not be overcome by the forms of modern politics - states, parties, ideologies - to the extent that these partake of the same nexus of estrangement (Sayer 1991:154). Whilst this makes emancipatory politics problematic, the truth is that Marx was always aware of the need to penetrate beyond the legal-juridical level of property relations to production relations, to challenge the state and capital as alienated social powers rather than assume (alien) control of them as 'things', to overcome the capital system rather than merely capitalism.

With the breakthrough from philosophy to reality through the conception of revolutionary-critical praxis, Marx criticised that the philosophers were necessarily passive and contemplative, merely interpreting a world which is not external, but which is the product of human practice and hence subject to human intervention and alteration, but interpreting as if it were an external objective datum. The philosophers rendered all reality 'positive’, externally objective and fixed, by dehistoricising it. They deny the real world of change and they deny that the world is subject to practical transformation through human agency. The problems of the world are treated as philosophical, with the result that the philosophers present a fixed and finished world of petrified forms. Such philosophy and philosophers suppress the world of change and sensuous activity and banish it from their consciousness.

In subverting the position of the philosophers by transforming philosophical problems requiring intellectual treatment into social problems requiring the practical transformation of the world, Marx struck a blow for life affirmation against the intellectualisation of modern society. Revolutionary-critical praxis is, from this standpoint, an affirmative materialism.

Marx's Critique of Abstraction
Marx's search for community is thus to be read as a systematic assault upon abstraction and upon the tyranny of abstraction. Indeed, Marx offers an acute and penetrating diagnosis of the violence to the life world done by abstraction. The collectivising, idealising and totalising representations of the modern world are related by Marx to the way that human beings are forced to externalise their social power by alienative relations, having it turned against them and their humanity in alienated form, the 'positive' form of political force and economic compulsion, institutional and systemic violence.

This abstraction over against the individual, involving a bureaucratic conception of political control, is inherent in modern society and threatens, to destroy the bases of human life in real society. It is a source of great regret that socialism itself, which ought to have been fighting the cause of the life world against official, society, actually became entangled in this abstraction, seeking to exercise this bureaucratic control in its own interest, little realising that this apparatus of alien power precluded socialism. Marx's alien powers denote a form of idolatry, false gods, Weber's modern devils, and they thrive only upon human sacrifice. There are no short cuts to socialism through making Faustian bargains with the very alien powers to be reappropriated, for these powers are not modern deities to be appeased but the very powers which have robbed human beings of their power.

Something that one can conclude from the all-pervasiveness of rationalisation is that Marx was a trifle optimistic in assuming that with the development of capitalism 'man is at last compelled to face, with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind' (Marx MCP REV 1973: 70/1). Marx was making the point that capitalism had revealed the world to be a human product, a fact which possessed quite radical implications concerning the governance of human affairs. If capitalism has ‘left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous cash payment', then it is also the case that this nexus has practical human activity as its source. Marx was examining the radical possibilities of this development.

At the same time, however, Marx gave good reasons for supposing that people would be most unable to apprehend their 'real conditions of life' and ‘relations with their kind’ in a society subject to ‘the magic of money’, the 'fetishism of commodities' and the ‘mystical veil’ of capital. Capitalism is an inverted reality in which the human subject has been reduced to the status of predicates of the things they create; objects have acquired an existential significance. Capitalism is an 'enchanted, topsy turvy world’. (Marx Capital III).

And, it could be pointed out, Marx has actually shown that beneath the asymmetrical relations of class power, there is the more fundamental alienation of social power. This entails an abstraction of the social over, against the individual and the loss of human subjectivity in a dehumanised mode of production. It is extremely hard for human beings to see themselves in this world, even though it is a world that they have created. 

Weber offers a perspective upon these totalising and collectivising representations which complement Marx's caution against false forms of community which come to exist over against individuals. One notes again the idealisation involved, the conceptualising which characterises abstract bourgeois society. Ideas such 'as "state", "church", "community", "party", or "enterprise" are thought of as being realised in a community’ whereas, in truth, 'they provide an ideological halo for the master’. Weber uses the word 'ersatz' to describe them (Weber 1970:199). His comments parallel those that Marx used to criticise bureaucracy.

One comes back to idealisation and idealistic violence, reified concepts and the abstraction of the modern state. Weber comments upon the sure interests of the bureaucracy for the conditions of maintaining its power through the canonization of the abstract and 'objective’ idea of ‘reasons of state'. Weber describes this as a 'specifically modern' idea (Weber 1970:220). As much as Marx, Weber is aware that since modern society has become utterly soulless the individuals in this society are tempted towards ersatz religion, to 'academic prophecies' of a kind which is capable of generating ‘fanatical sects but never a genuine community’ (Weber 1970:155).

The modern world, as Marx had argued, is governed by the abstract and the impersonal. And capitalism, founded upon the alienation of social power, is the basis of this abstraction and impersonality. Indeed, so far reaching is this abstraction that to simply refer to capitalism, and the necessity of class struggle fails to grasp the nature of the challenge facing human beings wishing to grasp their real conditions and relations of their life.

Certainly, the lessons are important ones for socialists to learn. Socialism must seek a social transformation which ensures that society can incorporate the power that has been alienated to the state and capital into itself. This is more than conquering state power and changing property relations. The monopolisation of the state and capital merely represents the generalisation of alienation and the concentration of alienated social power.

This is the lasting importance of Marx's criticism of abstraction, idealism and bureaucratism in power and knowledge. When alienated, our sociality and subjectivity is turned against us as systemic and institutional force that does violence to human life. In the official world there is no place for human values; the world in which the state and capital assert their imperatives independently of human beings is a norm free world, a world in which rationality is the alien logic of things.


25 THE EVERYDAY WORLD OF RECIPROCITY VERSUS ABSTRACTED RATIONALISM

The Colonisation of the Human World
Within Marxism, the notion of mediation between the base and the superstructure has taken the form of the party agency mediating between the immediacy or 'economism' of the class and a genuinely socialist consciousness and politics. The justification for ‘the party’ abstracted from the class subject draws upon Marx's distinction between base and superstructure, appearance and reality, the economic and the political. Lukacs rationalised this case for the revolutionary party by drawing upon Marx's work on the fetishism of commodities. This fetishism explained the ideological mystification to which the proletariat is subject and through which capital secures its domination over the proletariat. Ideology conceals relations of power and is a characteristic inherent in capitalist production.

Lukacs thus called into question the capacity of the working class to undertake the revolutionary transformation of society (Perkins 1993:134/5; Aronowitz 1981:40/1). Where Marx emphasised the structural and epistemological capacity of the working class to see through and break through capitalist relations and the fetishism concealing these relations, the notion of mediation between base and superstructure upheld by the dominant tradition of Marxism rests upon the devaluation of proletarian agency. The party, not the class subject, is invested with revolutionary significance. The party assumes the role of educator and demystifier (Lukacs 1971:41; Aronowitz 1981:34 164).

It is not that great a step from this position to writing off the proletariat completely as incapable of acting to transform society. The influence of Weber is evident in the writings of the Frankfurt School, especially in the idea that the modern world is increasingly subject to a rational calculation deriving from capitalism and the extension of monetary relations (Aronowitz 1981:56/7; Clarke 1991:318; Jay 1984:84/5). Such a world is largely impervious to radical challenge. The social transformation demanded by Marx and the Marxist parties is considered less and less likely. Indeed, the critical pessimism of the Frankfurt School went further than this. Weber had seen the mass states and parties as ideal soil for further bureaucratisation (Weber in Gerth and Mills 1970:209; Sayer 1991:145). The Frankfurt School followed this logic in arguing that this Weberian notion of bureaucratisation was sufficient to explain the role of ‘the party’ as the vehicle of a new unfreedom. From being the agency of emancipation, ‘the party’ became the agency of unfreedom (Aronowitz 1981:44). The party claims to represent the proletariat but can only do this by suppressing the emancipatory goal which, in effect, cannot be represented. The party is thus abstracted from its constituency and its social roots, developing as an institution separated from the immediate and the putative interests of the proletariat (Aronowitz 1981:165). The proletarian class subject was reduced to the status of an object of a political process, supposedly emancipatory, which had become external to it.

The increasing subjection of the social world to the rational calculation of capitalism demonstrates how capital's colonisation of social life is the central agency of modernisation. It is capitalism which lies at the heart of the process of rationalisation. This rational calculation penetrates the relationships between human beings and forms the nexus connecting individuals. Capitalism is constitutive of the forms of sociality and subjectivity in the modern world.

It follows from this that the claims for socialism as an emancipatory project have to be scrutinised closely. The historical evidence has suggested an inability to break free from modern deities, making socialism precisely what Weber said it would be, the most developed form of rationalisation (Sayer 1991:154). Indeed, ‘rational’ socialism 'emerges' from within capitalist society - to use Marx's organic, immanentist term - as the perverted apotheosis of what is most substantively irrational in capitalism itself. The values of spontaneity, creativity and autonomy which Weber saw rationalisation as wiping out are finally extinguished under the bureaucratic totalitarianism of the socialist state.

Marx's Affirmative Materialism
For Marx, the everyday life world of real individuals is the sensuous-material terrain for the embodied experience, which provides the basis for dissolving that abstracted rationalism divorced from human life. Marx's emancipatory project, based upon his life affirming materialism, is aimed at overcoming the way in which human-social power has become disembodied, invested in an institutional-systemic world raised above real society, disempowering human beings in the process.

Marx's affirmative materialism thus opposes the everyday life to the world of Institutionalised power, the artificial world of the state and capital, the everyday world of human interaction and reciprocity, the 'real' relations and conditions of 'real' individuals, is affirmed against institutionalisation and intellectualisation, the abstracted rationalism of knowledge and politics expressed, for Marx, in Hegel's doctrine of the state.

The argument presented here is an attempt to bring Marxism back to its origins, that is, from objectivism, rationalism and an alien politics back to the world of fellowship and relationships. Marx takes the side of reciprocity and sensualism against the alienation of an abstracted rationalism and institutionalisation.

Marx's materialism is premised upon real individuals in their real relationships. Marx is looking to recover social power so as to strengthen this real life world characterised by reciprocity and exchange. The life world is the terrain of concrete exchanges constituting the society of human beings itself. Marx's affirmative materialism seeks to embody power in real individuals so that they may affirm their individuality. Marx's socialism is literally the politics of fellowship based on the need for society. Marx expresses this socialism of other directedness, mutuality and friendship well in the Paris Manuscripts.

When communist workmen gather together, their immediate aim is instruction, propaganda, etc. But at the same time they acquire a new need - the need for society - and what appears as a means has become an end. This practical development can be most strikingly observed in the gatherings of French socialist workers. Smoking, eating and drinking, etc., are no longer means of creating links between people. Company, association, conversation, which in its turn, has society as its goal, is enough for them. The brotherhood of man is not a hollow phrase, it is a reality, and the nobility of man shines forth upon us from their work-worn figures.

Marx EPM in EW 1975:365

The exploration of the social bonds, of fellowship and reciprocity and exchange within the life world is fundamental to Marx's emancipatory socialism. It is this life world that Marx opposes to the official, abstracted world of institutionalisation and intellectualisation. The reciprocal society that Marx affirms leads us to emphasise the fundamental significance of friendship, sociability, sympathy and empathy - the material and symbolic exchange that Marx noted in the gatherings of the artisans - as fundamental social attitudes forming the basis of society itself. The abstracted institutional-systemic world is an artificial reality imposed but also parasitic upon this real life world of interaction and reciprocity.

The opposition may well be too sharply defined here. For the whole notion of alienation suggests that society itself has been disempowered, and that power, in consequence, has been disembodied. The ambiguity concerning this real life world of human beings, then, lies in the fact that its reciprocity and its sociality can be denied, redirected, reconstituted at another level by being alienated. Marx's argument is that there are processes at work at the level of social relationships which induce society to alienate its powers and to project its sociality upwards to the abstracted realm. This sociality and subjectivity can be redirected into an abstracted politics and hence politically reconstructed with the state as illusory community.

The Critique of the Parasitic Institutional-Systemic World
Marx's approach to modernity is expressed in terms of the critique of the way that power properly belonging to the real society of individuals is abstracted from that society and vested in an institutional and systemic world. Human beings have alienated their power of control to the state and capital and have, as a result, had their power opposed to them as political force and economic compulsion. Marx's critique of alienation involves the repudiation of the dictates of instrumentalist rationalist thought in the service of capital accumulation and state power. The instrumental rationality colonising the life world, a key theme of twentieth century social theory, is the alien logic of 'things'.

An overarching regulatory framework has been constructed over society, organising the affairs of human beings in an external sense. It is an artificial institutional-systemic world which has been invested with the power to regulate the social world. And it is a parasitic world, organising the disempowerment and disembodiment of the social world of reciprocity and solidarity.

This institutional and systemic world is a world of alien control. It has acquired the power of control which is properly exercised, in the cause of materialist embodiment, in the social world of individuals. The organisations and mechanisms of this institutional-systemic world are governed by an intellectualised and politicised stratum, the professionals of politics and economics, who have acquired their power from the world of communal reciprocity and have institutionalised this power as their own power.

Religiosity and Regulation
This abstracted world can be conceptualised as a form of institutionalised religiosity and regulation - the stem of the word religion deriving from rules - which requires what Marx calls 'state priests', professional elites and theologians of all kinds, to ensure its smooth operation. This culture of religiosity stands in complete contradiction to the human life world of sensuous activity, solidarity and feeling. The term religiosity is intended to convey the parallel that Marx drew between religion and politics in terms of their relation to the real life of individuals is an important one and in terms of their regulatory approach to individuals and society.

But this regulatory approach lacks meaning. Its religion is a norm free power, its binding rule being systemic rather than ethical. One returns to Weber's insights with respect to a disenchanted, meaningless world that has an abundance of means and a deficiency of ends. With the penetration of scientific rationality into all spheres of social life the everyday world of individuals is consumed by science. But since science is silent concerning ends, the social world regulated from above is rendered meaningless and becomes devoid of values. The implication of Weber's argument is that the more that human beings come to know the less they understand.

There is a bitter irony in the Weberian argument. The expansion of technical know-how is accompanied by a diminution in insight and understanding. Human beings possess vast means and uncertain ends. Einstein expressed the point well. 'Formerly’, he argued, 'one had perfect aims but imperfect means. Today we have perfect means and tremendous possibilities but confused goals' (Einstein quoted in Garaudy The Alternative Future 1975:39). On Weberian premises one can expect this confusion of ends. Science can never tell human beings what to do, even as it expands the human capacity to do what it believes it valid and appropriate to do. The world exhibits an unresolved struggle between a pluralism of value positions.

As Weber put it:

the fate of our times is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualisation and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world’. Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values, have retreated from public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations.

Weber SV in Gerth and Mills ed. 1961:155

There is a clear implication in Weber that the more that human beings come to know the less they actually understand, with the result that they become involved in an unresolvable struggle between different value positions. Rationalisation and intellectualisation mean that the everyday world of human beings comes to be filled up with scientific knowledge. But, since science has nothing to do with morality and must remain silent on what human beings ought to do, the world is rendered meaningless as a result (Sayer 1991:151/2).

Whilst Weber sought to discern the modern drive for salvation in an intellectualist quest for meaning, Marx was determined to underline the centrality of the everyday world and its needs, solidarity and embodiment. Against Weber's idealism we can oppose Marx's concern with a practical, sensuous and affirmative materialism in the everyday world and the social bonds which keep society together (Clarke 1991:294/300 319/20 323/4 326/7). This affirmation of the life world of individuals follows from Marx's subversion of the position of philosophy and philosophers in resolving the problems of the world. This conversion of social problems into philosophical problems, requiring contemplative-passive treatment detached from the social world considered as object is itself an intellectualisation and rationalisation.

Marx saw philosophy and politics, the university and the state, as expressions of that bureaucratic-regulatory approach which is a denial of reality. This abstracted rationalism is the construction of an imaginary world whose reified concepts express the reified character of social relationships. It is an artificial official world whose regulation is exercised over against the everyday life world in order to deny the sensuous reality of individuals organising their disempowerment and disembodiment. One can thus sum up the point as pertaining to the artificiality of modernity as an organised disempowerment and disembodiment through the imposition of an abstract unity under an alien control. But what needs to be remembered is that the social world, however much it seems to be beyond human comprehension and control, however 'complex’ and impervious to human alteration it seems, is always a human creation.





In fine, far from expressing an abstracted and objectivist rationalism, the Marxism of Marx is an inherently emancipatory project oriented towards the reempowerment of the everyday life world of human reciprocity, solidarity, and sensuous activity. Marx's critique of the artificiality and falsity of human experience led him to seek to replace the alien control organised around the abstract and the impersonal with a genuine social control. The institutional-systemic world, organised by the alienated social powers of the state and capital is to be dissolved by being disempowered. Marx's emancipatory materialism is a project of the progressive reappropriation of alienated human-social powers.

The Administration of Society 
Institutionalised Power
I argue that, for Marx, the everyday life world is the terrain for the embodied experience of individual human beings. Marx's affirmative materialism rests upon the critique of an abstracted rationalism in knowledge and politics. Such a rationalism is divorced from real life and is concerned with the regulation of real individuals in pursuit of external objectives in the official world. Intellectualisation and rationalisation is the assertion of the artificial and false world of alienated systems and institutions of politics and production over the reality of everyday exchange, reciprocity and fellowship. This argument, in sum, is motivated by a concern to bring Marxism back to its origins in Marx's affirmative materialism and to its roots in the life world of 'real individuals' and their relationships. It is to affirm reciprocity, solidarity and exchange in society over against the religiosity of institutionalisation and intellectualisation.

Marx's opposition to the state as an abstraction from civil society is developed through every page of the Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State. What should be emphasised in understanding the emancipatory core of this Critique is that the state is an institution which is parasitic upon the social life world and which possesses a totalitarian drive to control society which, unchecked, is destructive of the life world (Marx 1975:145; Marx 1973/1977:237/8; Marx 1974:247). There is the ever present tendency of the state to consume civil society under its control. The state, the new God, Nietzsche's 'new idol’, is a jealous God which acts to destroy rival centres of power in society or, in the least, to incorporate these centres under its own central control. As against this, Marx is committed to an emancipatory and affirmative conception of community and individuality through the practical reappropriation by society and individuals of their alienated social-human power (Thomas 1985:115/6 120/1). This entails an emancipatory commitment to a defetishised social world of social embodiment and sensuous practice.

Marx's emancipatory project is based on the critique of the alienation of social power and its subsequent institutionalisation in the ‘positive’ society. As a result of this institutionalisation, the social power of human beings comes to be converted into external force exercised over against them in society. One witnesses here the violence and tyranny of idealism and abstraction through the detachment from the life world. Marx himself noted the relationship between abstract knowledge and conceptual thought and totalitarian state politics. There is a need, therefore, to connect abstraction, intellectualisation, religiosity and regulation in a critical conception of the way that the society of human beings has been expropriated of its power.


One is confronted here by the paradox of how intellectualism has resulted not in an expansion of reason, which contains an ethical component, but the triumph of an abstracted rationality embodied in an artificial world over against the life world. This development has proceeded from the appropriation of social power and its institutionalisation as force in a system of religiosity, of external rules and regulations which organise a bureaucratic social control under the illusion of the common good and the general will. Human knowledge and power come to be institutionalised as tyranny and violence in the abstracted and ideal world detached from human society.

The process of abstraction in the development of the modern world forms the social and historical context of Marx's critique. Large spheres of human life formerly subject to political, religious and communal control were being removed from traditional and customary control and vested in quasi-autonomous spheres removed, from popular control.

Marx himself offers an acute diagnosis of the process whereby private property emancipates itself from political society as part of the process whereby the state becomes an abstraction from civil society. In this abstracting out of power, the society of individuals itself loses the capacity to exercise control over its social affairs. It is subject to the legal-institutional control of the state and the systemic control of an 'anarchic' capital economy.

The expansion of the state power over society is associated with the rise of a new class of professional bureaucrats, of whom Marx is particularly scathing. If Plato’s philosopher-king is something of a myth, then the professional bureaucrat is the perverted realisation of the ideal of combining knowledge and power. One can interpret Marx's critique as an emancipatory struggle against the expansion of an abstracted state politics and authoritarian knowledge as an ideological project looking to subsume the real world under official definitions.


Marx's critique is directed against abstraction, intellectualisation as idealistic violence, bureaucratic control, and the parasitism of these system world forms upon life world. It is not merely a critique of the colonisation of the life world by the system world but of the pathological character of the existence of the institutional-system world in the first place. This artificial world is to be dissolved back into society, reinvigorating the roots of social power and making possible a genuine social control.

Marx's Materialist Roots
This interpretation of Marx leads us back to his materialist roots and implicitly criticises that Marxism which sought to acquire some of the alienated social power for itself rather than proceed from the emancipatory critique of alienated social power. Marxism has, in its dominant forms, lost touch with these materialist roots and come to be entangled within the forms of abstracted politics and rationalism.

Marx is a critic of the alien control exercised by the state and capital as a collectivising form of social unity which is imposed from the outside of society. The notion of praxis as an active and as an affirmative materialism is intended to convey the sense of Marx's communism as a forward projecting critique which avoids the tendencies to conservatism and passivity in the deterministic materialist epistemology of the old Enlightenment materialism. Human beings, Marx argues in the Theses on Feuerbach, are not merely the passive products of circumstances but the active producers of circumstances. These circumstances are self-made and are for that reason accessible to human comprehension and control. It is human agency, not the circumstances, which is the revolutionary principle.

In attacking the determinist epistemology of the old materialism, however, we have one eye upon the deterministic tendency of the sociological project itself. The deterministic processes and relations which led Weber directly to the iron cage of modernity are indicative of a failure to incorporate the creative and constitutive role of human agency into the perspective.

By conceiving human beings as, potentially at least, transformative and knowledgeable agents, Marx is able to conceive of an alternative to the determinism of alienated society, though Marx is certainly aware of the paradox of how human agency is transformed into human enslavement. Alienation is always remediable. Human self-alienation is an active process which human beings retain the capacity to alter. It is this alternative which is denied to Weber.

Power, Mediation and Abstraction
Through human self-alienation, power comes to be externalised, to be invested in objective 'things'. These 'things', for Marx, refer to those things which may become capital, exchange values and money. In a society in which social relations between individuals take the form of relations between things, the command of persons is linked to the command of these things. As Marx puts it: 'The power that each individual exercises over the activity of others or over social wealth exists in him as the owner of exchange values, of money'. Marx continues: 'He carries his social power, as also his connection with society, in his pocket. Activity, regardless of its individual manifestation, and the product of activity, regardless of its particular make-up, are always exchange value, and exchange value is a generality, in which all individuality and peculiarity are negated and extinguished’ (Marx 1973:157/8). 

Social-human power has come to be alienated, coming to be vested in objective forms existing externally to human beings, opposed to their sociality and subjectivity. Power has been disembodied as human beings have been disempowered. And it is this alienation which means that power exercised through an alien form of control exercised over society.

Capitalism must reproduce the asymmetrical relations of power upon which it rests, and with this the concrete experience of domination and subordination. At the same time, it conceals this experience and makes it extremely hard to express this experience in anything more adequate than the merely immediate and contingent.

This is something that is inherent in the reified social relationships themselves and it is this that makes these relationships, with their abstraction from individuals, so modern. The ties of personal dependence made the facts of domination and subordination fairly clear. Modern social relationships between individuals, however, are mediated in the form of things and are not at all immediately given by subjective identity. The mediations of these forms - state, capital, commodity, money - establish the foundations for abstraction in the representations of sociality and subjectivity in the modern world. ‘The way of looking at things', Marx reasons, 'arises out of the relationship itself’ (Marx Theories of Surplus Value III 295/6).

As Godelier argues, for Marx concealment is not due to the inability of consciousness to perceive this structure, but to the structure itself. If capital is not a thing, but a social relationship, i.e. a non-sensible reality, it must inevitably disappear when presented in the sensible forms of raw materials, tools, money etc. It is not the subject who deceives himself, but reality which deceives him, and the appearances in which the structure of the capitalist production process conceals itself are the starting point for individuals’ conceptions' (Godelier Structure and Contradiction in Capital in Blackburn ed. Ideology in Social Science 1972:337). One learns from this that the capitalist system is accompanied not by self-deception on the part of the subject but by a reality which deceives individuals and generates deceiving representations of subjectivity and sociality.





it is decisive for the specific nature of modern loyalty to an office that .. it does not establish loyalty to a person.. Modern loyalty is devoted to impersonal and functional purposes.

Weber 1970:199 
This is the transition from ties of personal dependence to the dependence upon the impersonal that Marx had charted in terms of alienation. Weber characterises this transition extremely well - 'without regard for persons': The ‘objective’ discharge of business primarily means a discharge of business according to calculable rules and 'without regard for persons'.

'without regard for persons' is also the watchword of the market and, in general, of all pursuit of naked economic interests. A consistent execution of bureaucratic domination means the levelling of status, ‘honour'. Hence, if the principle of the free market is not at the same time restricted, it means the universal domination of the class situation.

Weber in Gerth and Mills 1970:215

Weber thus makes the argument that Marx himself made when exposing the contradiction between the formal equality of individuals offered by the abstract citizenship of the modern state, on the one hand, and the real inequality of individuals of society as a result of class division, on the other hand.

Marx's argument goes further than this substantive inequality and the class division to examine the reality of alienation and the creation of an abstract world above real individuals. For Marx, what characterises the modern world is that individuals are now ruled by abstractions, whereas previously they were dependent on one another (Sayer 1991:143). And it is this rule by abstractions which is examined here.

Weber, too, pursues this process of abstraction through the concept of rationalisation. Rationalised law, Weber argues, is characterised by ‘the rule of general and abstract norms’ (Weber 1970:219). But Weber - like Marx- notes the class character of this abstraction: 'the propertyless masses especially are not served by a formal "equality before the law" and a "calculable" adjudication. And administration as demanded by bourgeois interests. The proletariat's demand is for 'substantive justice oriented towards some concrete instance and person’ (Weber 1970:220/1). In short, the working class appreciates that abstract rationality serves the class interests of the bourgeoisie and seeks redress by asserting the claims of the concrete over the abstract.

Marx's critique of the state, as the institutionalisation of social power and its conversion into force is accompanied by the critique of bureaucracy, and the bureaucratic approach to reality which savours more than a little of Weber's concern for individual autonomy through the extension of bureaucracy. Weber's famous metaphor of the 'iron cage' of capitalist modernity and his characterisation of bureaucrats as 'mere cogs' within the modern economy makes him a critic of the modern world, even if he cannot provide an alternative on his own premises.

Weber notes that in the modern economic system, the lives of individuals come to be determined, 'with irresistible force' (Weber 1930:181). Weber's concern is with the problem of maintaining the autonomy of the individual when this individual is situated in 'an army camp such as our state is inevitably becoming' (Weber 1958:60). The routinisation of behaviour, the extension of bureaucracy, the specialisation of tasks and the administration of society were all required by modern capitalist society but are quite incompatible with human freedom and democracy. Weber points to the 'growing loss of freedom'.

It is quite ridiculous to attribute to today's high capitalism, as it exists in America and is being imported into Russia ... any 'elective affinity' with 'democracy' or indeed 'freedom' (in any sense of the word), when the only question one can ask is how all these things can ‘possibly’ survive at all in the long run under the rule of capitalism. They are in fact only possible if they are supported by the permanent, determined will of a nation not to be governed like a flock of sheep.

Weber On the Situation of Constitutional Democracy in Russia in Lassman and Spiers ed. Weber: Political Writings 1994:69

Weber consciously sets himself against inevitable development trend to affirm 'old fashioned' individualism, recognising this as the product of 'unique, never-to-be-repeated historical constellations' (Weber 1994:69). Given the developments of the modern economy and society which he himself has delineated, this amounts to bringing the curtain down on freedom.

Indeed, Weber's concern at this point is to demonstrate the futility of socialism from this perspective: 'It is not at all likely that taking the economy into social control as such will necessarily bring about either the development of "free" personalities or of "altruistic" ideals' (Weber 1994:70). It depends upon how this social control is constituted. Weber has that state socialism in mind which was not only the dominant form of socialism at the time, the socialism of the mass parties, but what he considered to be the only viable form of socialism in modern conditions.





Marx is able to take up this challenge. He notes how fragmentation and atomisation has destroyed the original unity of public and private life. The internal decay of society causes a projection of communality upwards to the state, which, in turn, provides an artificial existence for community. The centralised nation state, however, is an abstracted political sphere which offers individuals no genuine, i.e. active, citizenship. Instead, real individuals are regulated from above by the state and its bureaucratic regulation of real society. Nietzsche was quite right. With the death of God, the state, with its religion of nationalism, has become the new idol in which the demos exist as a 'mere herd of followers and worshippers.’


 Weber himself was not innocent of this worship. He was intensely concerned with the future of the German nation. But in expressing this concern he makes this interesting argument for a nation of 'masters' (Herrenvolk), not a master race but a nation of individuals in control of their lives and responsible for their political activity.

'Democratisation’ in the sense that the structure of social estates is being levelled by the state run by officials, is a fact. There are only two choices: either the mass of citizens is left without freedom or rights in a bureaucratic, 'authoritarian state' which has only the appearance of parliamentary rule, and in which the citizens are ‘administered’ like a herd of cattle; or the citizens are integrated into the state by making them its co-rulers. A nation of masters (Herrenvolk) - and only such a nation can and may engage in 'world politics' - has no choice in this matter. Democratisation can certainly, be obstructed - for the moment - because powerful interests, prejudices and cowardice are allied in opposing it. But it would soon emerge that the price to be paid for this would be the entire future of Germany. All the energies of the masses would then be engaged in a struggle against a state in which they are mere objects and in which they have no share. Certain circles may have an interest in the inevitable political consequences. The Fatherland certainly does not.

Weber Suffrage and Democracy in Germany in 1994:129





The problem with the faith or the hope that Weber placed in defending ‘old fashioned’ private individualistic capitalism is that Weber himself has given grounds for showing that the 'authoritarian state' is immanent in the development of this capitalism. His criticism of socialism is that it is a part of the process bringing the authoritarian state about, not a coherent response to it. The modern world brings, the tendency towards a state capitalism or a state socialism to fruition. 

The housing for the new serfdom is ready everywhere: in America's 'benevolent feudalism', in Germany's so called 'welfare provisions', in the factory system in Russia, and it is just waiting for certain conditions to make the masses 'compliant' enough to enter it once and for all - a slowdown in the tempo of technical and economic 'progress’, the victory of 'dividends' (Rente) over 'profits' (Gewinn), together with the exhaustion of the remaining 'free' land and markets. At the same time, the growing complexity of the economy, its partial takeover by the state or by municipalities, the territorial size of nations, all these things create ever more paperwork, further division and specialisation of labour and specialist training for administrators, in other words: a caste. Those American workers who were opposed to Civil Service Reform knew what they were doing. They preferred to be governed by upstarts of dubious morality rather than by a body of mandarins with a patent of office; but their protest was in vain.

Weber On the Situation of Constitutional Democracy in Russia in 1994:68/9 

This is the ‘false socialism’ criticised by Engels. The private capitalists, whom the workers could fight with some chance of success, are replaced by a bureaucratic caste possessing state power. Weber here is criticising that 'new class socialism' which aimed at a regulated state capitalism in which the officials replaced the private capitalists. Weber criticises precisely that state socialism of the professional, trained middle class which the revolutionary socialists and syndicalists also sought to contest in practice.

Weber, indeed, anticipates something of the argument of the Frankfurt School that capitalism is capable of integrating its own opposition, the opposition of the workers and other exploited strata. The likes of Marcuse and Horkheimer argued that the working class, through its parties and unions, are inextricably connected to the state, subjected to the mediation of bureaucracies which administer society in the interests of capital. The workers movement is dominated by this administration. For Horkheimer, this administration has become the crucial mediation that renders the notion of the revolutionary proletariat hugely problematic, putting a question mark against the idea of progress itself.

For Horkheimer, as for Weber, the mass party is a vehicle for bureaucratisation. Weber put the mass party and the mass state together in this process. For Horkheimer, the political party and the state are merely two aspects of the same thing, the administrative approach to society. The midwifery of 'the party’, Horkheimer argued, 'degraded the revolution to mere progress'. Horkheimer has in mind the centralisation at the heart of modern development.

Marx himself had treated this process of centralisation in terms of the modern state putting an end to the particularism of feudal society. But, in centralising the means of administration and communication, as well as the means of production, the bourgeoisie laid the basis for the general alienation of state socialism. Socialism, to be true to its name, must be defined by its objective - the dissolution of alienated power to enable the workers self-government of society.

Marcuse asks a pertinent question: 'How can the administered individuals .. liberate themselves from themselves as well as from their masters? How is it even thinkable that the vicious circle be broken? (Marcuse 1964:250/1). We are back to the paradox of emancipation and the need for revolutionary-critical praxis.

Standardisation and the Subordination of the Individual 
The Critique of Uniformity, Conformity and Regimentation
It is possible to argue that the standardisation of human behaviour has been achieved in the modern world through regularisation, the construction of uniformity in character, the bureaucratic imposition of rules. This standardisation of behaviour proceeds under the political framework of the abstract form of the centralised state power. There is, as a result, the universalisation of routinised and regularised behaviour. This iron cage of the administered society is incompatible with the ideal of individual autonomy, with democracy as an active process in which individuals, participate as citizens, with Marx's affirmative materialism based upon human self-realisation. The extension of administration possesses a certain inexorable quality which is strengthened by the ideological project of the state. This ideological project, identifying the bureaucratic control of society with the common good, renders the administration of society opaque, insulated from human criticism, intervention and alteration.

Conceiving Marx's praxis as an active and affirmative materialism, the emancipatory socialist project is a critique of the ideological character of a social science which rationalises the modern forms of regularisation and standardisation under the state power. This criticism applies also to those who argue that even within the life world there are specific uniform and standard processes within reciprocity. By proceeding from Marx’s socialism as an active and affirmative materialism, the intention is to provide the basis for an emancipatory critique of the state but also of bourgeois social science and the way that it is engaged in rationalising the regulatory state. The claim is that social science renders the specific character of existing social relations into abstract generalisations available for the state action. The population in its relations has been reduced to a condition that is objective, standardised. The reduction of people into an ideal type makes this population available for political control, a suitable target for organised political action. This applies as much to the socialism of ‘the party’ representing the proletarian class subject reduced to an ideal type and hence becoming an object available for political appropriation.

This notion of defining individuals in terms of ideal types gives, a prime example of the way that the standardisation of people and the regularisation of life proceeds through the state and the sociological project as it is part of the process of rationalisation and the increasing subordination of the life world to instrumental rationality. In the absence of a genuine community which has reappropriated social power alienated to the state and capital, social science, even that social science concerned with the life world, is entangled in a fetishistic world and hence comes to rationalise the institutions and the regularisation of the administered society. The institutions and the regularisation of human activity is preserved and legitimated.

Weber and Foucault
A comparison of Weber and Foucault is relevant here. Both Weber and Foucault underline the tendency to the regularisation of the life world and the surveillance of people. Both the military organisation and the monastic organisation exist as forms requiring the detailed surveillance and regulation of people. Weber located the roots of discipline in military organisation and in the extension of monastic practices to the wider society under the impact of the Reformation (Turner 1993:127).

The developments which concern Foucault are the culmination of that spirit of ascetic control which Weber had located in monastic and military discipline. For Foucault, this control is generalised to the wider society. In Discipline and Punish (1979), Foucault argues that these monastic practices have come to form the basis of a new system of social regulation (Simons 1995 ch 2; Turner 1993:127). Foucault is concerned with the forms of regulation and discipline which are developed in modern society so as to reduce human beings to mere objects of surveillance and control. Borrowing a term from Bentham, Foucault refers to 'panopticism’ as the principle of new forms of organisation which ensure the surveillance of people. The regulation of persons requires new forms of thought and new institutions so as to achieve useful and docile persons through surveillance and control. Foucault describes programmes of government such as Bentham's Panopticon as models for the rule of society. These programmes, apart from formulating intentions, also presuppose a knowledge of the field of reality upon which it is to intervene and render 'reality in the form of an object which is programmable' Gordon (1980: 248). This process culminates in a panopticism which functions as the model for regulation in all social areas, in schools, prisons, asylums (Foucault 1970) and represents the culmination of the search for the total control of the social environment through new forms of knowledge, making the individual an available target for disciplinary practices - penology, criminology, demography and social medicine (Foucault 1979).

This system for the surveillance of the population has enabled the administration of society to proceed to the extent of enclosing the everyday world of the individual citizen within its regulation. This regulation requires a self-regulation achieved through the individual being placed firmly within a set of disciplines then become habitual through being performed.

In sum, a direct comparison may be made between Weber's emphasis upon rationalisation and bureaucratisation and Foucault's view on disciplines. Weber's iron cage and Foucault's panopticon society have clear affinities in that both conceive rational practices regulating individual behaviour emerging from the military and the monastery, extending from there to the factory, the school, the hospital, the home.

Stressing this standardisation, with people subject to disciplinary practices and placed under bureaucratic control, one can emphasise the growing gap between the liberatory promises of bourgeois ideology and the regulatory reality of bourgeois reality. By defining Marx's as an affirmative materialism one is able to develop a critique of the totalising rule of modern capitalist society.

In this context, one can view Foucault's conception as concerned with the extension of forms of discipline as a result of which the population is regulated subjected to wider society. Social science and the institutions of the school, the factory, the prison and the asylum express a general panopticism encompassing the whole of society through which individuals are regulated, controlled and contained. Social science furnishes the state with official knowledge which fragments and atomises the population by breaking up their experiences and reconstructing it according to the official world view, reducing the population to objective, ideal type status, making it available for state control. The institutional framework of modern society rests upon a detailed management and surveillance that ensures that the individual is watched, policed and disciplined from the cradle to the grave. Influenced by Nietzsche, Foucault stressed the centrality of knowledge and power in the modern regulatory system (Foucault 1981 'Questions of Method: An. Interview', I and C No 8 quote Foucault in Smart I 220/1 and in Smart II 124).

Associated with this development is the loss of privacy and the erosion of individual autonomy, a theme that is historically associated with liberals like Tocqueville and Mill. The growing regulation of the individuals entails the loss of individual autonomy which had long been feared. Tocqueville's writings on the effects of democracy in America and Mill's analysis of the problems faced by liberty in the modern world have proved to be well founded as the space for individual autonomy and privacy have come to be progressively diminished.

The great fear of the liberals had been the expansion of state regulation. However, Spencer's fear of the 'coming slavery' and Belloc's 'servile state’ may be shown not to be the outcome of socialism but of the centralising, bureaucratising and unsocial socialising processes of capitalist modernity. The collectivist liberals made an attempt to preserve the values of individuality, autonomy and spontaneity in these changed conditions. Weber saw no alternative to the iron cage destroying these values. One thus locates the extension of bureaucratic regulation, state intervention, cultural uniformity, and the detailed surveillance and control of individuals by centralized agencies in work, health, education, police, local and national government. The autonomous individual is increasingly subjected to the regulatory and disciplinary processes of the iron cage, of the administered society in which the life of the individual is submerged under an all pervasive complex of disciplines and regulations which police the individual from the cradle to the grave (Donzelot 1979). Mill's warning in the close to Liberty has proved apt.





Foucault has, it could be argued, written the footnotes to Mill, Tocqueville, Spencer and Weber. He has explained the paradox of how the expansion of rights based upon abstract notions of equality necessarily requires the ever greater surveillance of individuals (Turner 1986c).

Marx and the Location of Power
In this thesis I have emphasised Marx's praxis as an active and an affirmative materialism that seeks the democratisation of power, reason and politics through the dissolution of the institutional-systemic world and its official knowledge. Marx's 'philosophy of praxis' seeks to reincorporate and reorganise alienated social-human power within the everyday life world of individuals. Marx thus asserts the social world of reciprocity, solidarity and exchange over the intellectualisation and institutionalisation of power and knowledge in the official world which standardises human behaviour and regulates, controls and contains the sensuous activity and social practices of individuals.

Marx's project is a critical and emancipatory one aimed against a repressive state apparatus and a systemically determining economy which externally regulated the life world, turning its social power into political and economic force in the process, denying individuality. Marx was consequently against the state and capital and against that philosophy and political economy which expressed and rationalised alienated power in the form of the state and capital.

Marx's critique of the state and of Hegel's doctrine of the state clearly possesses a wider relevance. Marx himself proceeded from the critique of the state to the critique of capital as the alienated power of human beings to be properly exercised within the self-organising society. In particular, Marx located the source of the contradictory relationship between formal and substantive rationality in the capital system as an alienated system of production. The historical process of rationalisation leading inexorably to the iron cage, the administered society, to panopticism, was rooted, for Marx, in the alienation of labour. Through the concept of alienated labour, Marx is able to grasp the foundations of the extension of instrumental rationality and the bureaucratic control of modern capitalism.

Marx's position presents a critical and emancipatory perspective concerning power, its origin and character its alienation and institutionalisation, its conversion into force, into idealistic violence and the tyranny of abstractions. Marx shows the relation between alienated power and official knowledge. He shows how alienation of human-social power entails a process of intellectualisation and institutionalisation which raises an abstracted world above the human life world, subjecting the life world, to a bureaucratic, an economic and an instrumental rationality that represents the immanent, functional imperatives of 'things', of alien powers.









26 THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT
The Domination of the Exchange Principle
The domination of the exchange principle in Marx's critique of the capital system and the fetishised social world can hardly be exaggerated. Marx contrasts the exchange value of commodities under capitalism to their 'use' value to the consumers and the value per se contributed by the labour of the producers of these commodities. Under the capitalist mode of production, commodities are exchanged through money as the abstract medium of equivalence. Through a process of alienation, the qualitative differences between commodities, whether expressed in terms of their use to consumers or in terms of the creative contribution of the specific producers, are extinguished through being reduced to the purely quantitative and abstract measurement of their worth in terms of exchange value in the market.

This development in the economic affairs of human beings has another consequence as regards social life. Formerly, the relations between individual in society and between society and nature had been socially mediated. Presently, however, these relations are mystified into the form of objective relations between things. This fetishism is all the more pernicious in that, concealed behind the apparent equivalence of the process of exchange is a substantive inequivalence which is systematically generated by the capitalist mode of production, a mode of production which survives, indeed, only by the extraction of surplus value from the working class. The principle of exchange value, on account of its inherent dynamics, comes to extent to the productive activity of human beings, taking the form of class division and asymmetrical relations of class power.
Marx explained the origins of the principle of exchange value and the process of exchange by the concept of alienated labour. This results in the creation of a fetishistic social world whose human origins have been rendered opaque. But, in addition to this stress upon alienated labour, it is important to grasp the process of abstraction at the heart of modernity and Marx’s argument that individuals are increasingly ruled by abstraction in the modern world. Marx, by his concept of alienated labour, is always able to conceive of a way of subverting the tyranny of abstraction. This is a possibility that Adorno would remove. Or, more accurately, Adorno locates the domination of the exchange principle in the division of mental from manual labour. Adorno relates this division to the subject's separation front and domination of the object.





Whereas the concept of alienated labour holds out the possibility for a defetishised social world, for Adorno, Marx's privileging of production reinforces the illusion associated within the predominance of the productive principle. This privileging of production reinforces the subject's domination of the object and hence of the tyranny of abstraction.

Against such a view, which effectively closes off the path out of Weber's iron cage by removing the subversive aspect of alienation, it is worth restating Marx's view on alienation, exchange and abstraction. Before coming back to abstraction, Marx's own view needs to be clarified. Engels had made private property the foundation of exchange, recognising the inseparability of the two. Marx, however, argued that the social relations of exchange form the basis of .private property. Hence, for Marx, it is the alienation of labour which creates private property, not private property which creates alienated labour. The importance of establishing the relationship is clear. Engels’ conception would identify socialism with the mere abolition of private property whereas Marx proceeds beyond property relations to the social relations of production so as to abolish the alienation of labour (Clarke 1991:63).

There is a need to argue that, for Marx, the forces of production ace not some objective, economic datum. And nor are the social relations of production to be interpreted in some narrow economistic sense. Whilst all the elements constituting the forces and relations of production are organised around productive activity, this does not entail that the 'economic' is set off as an objective and determining factor over all others. Rather, the productive forces are the productive powers of human beings and are thus inherently human, shot through with human consciousness.

The fundamental problem behind the tyranny of abstraction concerns how forms of human life comes to assume an independence of the human beings who have created them in their process of producing their social life. It concerns the reification of forms of social action. It is the paradox of how human agency is transformed into human enslavement. One comes back to money as the expression of the reified character of the forms of human life. The credit for recovering this basic theme of lies not with Lukacs but with Simmel (Turner 1993:171/2 as Against Maclntyre 1971 and Meszaros ed.1971). Simmel describes money as





This reification of relationships is to be set in the context of a wider process of abstraction in which the structure of society is alienated from human beings on the basis of monetary relations and the growing domination of monetary exchange.


The Frankfurt School and the Domination of Nature
By setting the problem in terms of the subject's domination of the object, Adorno leads us to question capitalist modernisation itself. Marx could focus upon the emancipatory potential of capitalist exploitation and alienation. But if it is the subject's separation from and domination of the object which is the source of reification then this liberatory promise can never be redeemed; it is an illusion that entangles in further reification.

Adorno expresses the increasing distance of the Frankfurt School from the proletariat, socialism and Marxist politics (McCarney 1990:166/7). The subject's domination of the object represents the human beings attempts to master nature as an object and, as such, cannot be considered as the specific property of a particular mode of production. The domination of nature would, on these assumptions, continue even should socialism replace capitalism (Jay 1984:66/8). Rather than critique the systemic dynamic of capital accumulation as generating the expansionary drive that led to .the human domination and destruction of nature, the Frankfurt School proceeded to the socially and historically imprecise term 'industrialism' (Bahro 1984:214/5 112). This repudiation of industrialism in general, failing to distinguish the social relations of production, has the consequence of facilitating the replacement of the centrality of class and class struggle by the general struggle between human beings and nature. Grundmann, however, is a Marxist influenced ecologist who argues that it is 'plainly wrong’ to argue that capitalism as such is the cause of ecological problems. These problems would continue even if class society were abolished (Grundmann 1991:51).

In The Dialectic of Enlightenment Horkheimer and Adorno argued that western society worked to undermine its emancipatory possibilities. They explored the repressive implications of rationality so as to break the connection between reason and freedom. Enlightenment, promising emancipation through reason, had turned into its opposite. In explaining this proposition, Horkheimer and Adorno noted how the extension of instrumental rationality was associated with the exchange principle under which everything came to be reduced to an abstract equivalence with all other things in the service of universal exchange. The qualitatively different was reduced to the same quantitative identity.

In conquering nature and natural necessity human beings have come to create a second social nature and necessity over them. In terms of the views of Horkheimer and Adorno we may argue that the domination of nature as an object is connected with the destructive consequences of instrumental rationality. The natural world is reduced to a field of objects, their qualitative differences extinguished in the demand for scientific control.

The separation of the subject from and the domination of the subject over nature as an object itself led to the domination of the subjects themselves through reification and the destruction of society by instrumental rationality. The domination of the natural world as an object led to the domination of the internal nature of human beings and to domination in the social world itself. The 'progress' of the Enlightenment thus turned into its opposite, a barbarism all the more barbaric for being equipped with modern technique. Far from being the force for human liberation, science contained the potential for a new form of dehumanisation (Adorno and Horkheimer 1972).

Science thus entails increasing technological domination over human beings and nature. One is dealing here still with Marx's alienation, the domination of human beings by their own forces alienated from them and hence which have come to act contrary to human purposes. Horkheimer and Adorno did what Marx could never do and abstract their critical perspective on science and rationality from historically specific social relations. This results in an ahistorical and increasingly apolitical and anti-revolutionary socialist perspective which offers no way out of the 'administered society' (Adorno and Horkheimer 1972).

The domination of nature and of society must be rooted in a critique of alienation within specific social relations. The approach to science and rationality, therefore, proceeds from the critique of reified forms of human action turning against human beings as the denial of life and individuality.

Marx's Ecological Perspective
The sharp difference between the way that Horkheimer and Adorno formulate the problem in terms of the subject's domination of nature as object and the way in which Marx focuses upon alienation within specific social relations conceals the extent to which Marx himself is appreciative of the fact that human beings have come to dominate nature and, in so doing, have subjected themselves to domination. The view of Horkheimer and Adorno would align Marx with the project of dominating nature as an object and hence deny the possibility of emancipation on Marxist premises. But there is reason to argue for a Marxist ecologism which mastery exists as the conscious control by human beings of their formerly alienated - and destructive - powers. There is certainly plenty of textual evidence to support an ecologist Marx. Thus what Quaini depicts as the 'ecological contradiction of capitalism' (Quaini 1982), the way in which the capitalist system continuously eats away at resource base which sustains it, is well known to Marx, who writes that.





By pointing to the ecological contradiction at the heart of capital - the fact that the expansionary dynamics of capital accumulation undermine the sources of wealth - Marx is questioning the rationality of capitalist agriculture as well as capitalist production in general. This systemic compulsion behind capital means that it leaves 'deserts' and a thoroughly degraded natural environment behind as it searches for exchange values.

all progress in capitalistic agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the labourer, but of robbing the soil… all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time, is a progress towards ruining the lasting sources of that fertility.

Marx Capital I 

The capitalist system exhibits an internalisation of gains and externalisation of costs. In the pollution of land, air and water, in the domination of private over public transport, in the waste of packaging and the throwaway consumer culture, and in the unemployment whose costs are made the responsibility of society as a whole. Human and natural resources are treated as a commons (Hardin 1968). Given the absence of common ownership there is no prospect of gains as well as costs being shared.

In other words, social relations make a difference. It will not do to simply refer to industrialism and to the domination of nature persisting under socialism. Socialism, based upon the recovery by human beings of their alienated powers, makes it conceivable that there will be a shared and common responsibility in productive affairs. Moreover, with production under the control of the associated producers, that systemic and expansionary drive of capital which lies behind the destruction of nature, has been removed. That is, with the abolition of alienation through the transformation of social relations it is at least, possible for human beings to assume responsibility for their powers, including science and technology, and affirm themselves as natural-human beings.





Thus, to refer to the subject struggling to control nature and to reduce it to its purposes fails to grasp the interaction between human beings and nature. Human beings manipulate nature by means of technique and organisation but, where this takes the form of exploitation and domination, these characteristics will be expressed in social relationships. Human beings can satisfy their needs and purposes, themselves natural, by cooperating with rather than warring against nature. As Grundmann puts the point: 'a society which does not take into account the repercussions of its transformations of nature can hardly be said to dominate nature at all' (Grundmann 1991:92). Turning everything to gold, as with Midas, leads to starvation amongst abundance, poverty amongst riches. This is the self-contradictory basis of capitalism. Marx's 'mastery' refers to the relations of human beings to nature being under the conscious, common control of individuals.

Marx's way of conceiving the contradictions - ecological as well as others - of capitalism in terms of specific exploitative and alienative relations enables us to formulate an ecological Marxism that actually seeks to retain the liberatory promise of the Enlightenment project. This is to directly challenge many of the green, anarchist and postmodernist perspectives which repudiate the Enlightenment tradition of science and rationality.

Such an ecological Marxism would look to secure the material wellbeing of humankind through the historical development of the productive powers of society. This would be possible not by the mere fact of expansion, given that the pursuit of exchange value has been the principal factor behind the expansionary drive, but by consciously managing these powers for the satisfaction of human needs. This means replacing capital's 'domination' of nature by human 'mastery'. The difference is that the 'domination' condemned by Horkheimer and Adorno is not domination by the subject but by capital as the alienated power of the subject which turns to dominate the subject itself as well as nature. Mastery refers to the subject coming to assume conscious responsibility for their alienated power. Such a Marxism repudiates the 'industrialism' of capitalism and state socialism which comes to dominate nature to the detriment of human beings in society.

The point is that Marx's socialism is not achieved by making Faustian bargains with alien powers - the pursuit of socialism through industry, science and technology under state control - but by human beings coming to recognise these powers as their own, organising them as social, human and, indeed, natural powers.
Marxism, in its political forms, has been guilty of seeking socialism by making such bargains. There has been a failure to appreciate that questions of class and exploitation need to be located within the broader problem of alienation and emancipation. Marx's 'mastery' as conscious communal control by human beings of their social powers is not the cause of ecological destruction but its solution. The mastery of nature entails the mastery of the social nature created by human beings. It is the absence of this domination which lies behind the domination and destruction of nature not by human subjects in any direct and conscious sense but by the social powers which have been alienated from human beings and their purposes. Here, mastery, for Marx, means conscious common control exercised by individuals over their relationship with nature.

Grundmann offers evidence from within Marx's texts to show that Marx himself employed ahistorical factors such as 'greed' rather than merely refer to the historically precise capitalist mode of production so that only under communism itself could human society come to control its form and its interaction with nature (Grundmann 1991:200/1). Marx, then, employs the ahistorical approach of the ecologists. The case for mastery or control remains but is defined in ecological terms. 'Domination' means coming to steer nature through cooperation, not breaking nature as an alien will (Grundmann 1991:57/61): Nature in Marx is not anthropomorphic. Nature has no end in itself, it is man who imposes his ends on it. In order to do so, however, he has to respect the laws of nature.

Thus one has to define Marxism in terms of the conscious common control of social relationships by the associated individuals constituting society. This involves stewardship as opposed to destruction and domination. It also implies the assertion of a substantive human rationality over the instrumental rationality of 'things'. But it looks to liberate human potentiality, within the new self-made social world rather than repudiating this world as involving the destruction and domination of nature translated into asocial relationships.





The case of the Frankfurt School rests upon the notion of capitalism as an institutionalised rationality, organising the domination of nature and translating into the domination of human beings. With the intellectual and political crisis of Marxism in the late twentieth century, the themes raised by the Frankfurt School appear more pertinent than Marx's concern with 'mastery' (Schmidt 1971). The whole notion of rational control appears dubious in the extreme, implicated in an ethic of technological and bureaucratic domination and in the extension of instrumental rationality.

Whilst recognising the importance of the themes of the Frankfurt School, acknowledging also the enduring importance of Weber. It is suggested here that the dilemma at the heart of modernity between formal or instrumental rationality on the one hand and substantive rationality on the other hand is resolvable only by locating the problem in the system of alienated labour. The challenge of Weber and of the Frankfurt School has been important in forcing a clarity of purpose upon Marxists so that an alternative political and intellectual framework to traditional, 'orthodox', objectivist-economistic Marxism is possible. This alternative recovers the critical and emancipatory themes lost in the dominant forms of Marxism and questioned by Weberian social thought.


First and Second Nature
In drawing attention to the distinction between first and second nature the intention Is to demonstrate the extent to which the social and natural environment confronting human beings is a self-made world. This notion is basic to Marx (Schmidt 1971; Redclift 1987; Stauth 1984). In many ways, the challenge is not so much to reject the domination of nature as to recognise that this domination has already been inflicted. The challenge now is to take responsibility for this domination and ensure that the control that human beings now exercise is rational in a human and ecological sense. Human beings, in short, must take ethical responsibility for their powers, putting an end to the destructive consequences of the extension of instrumental rationality, revealed as the external logic of alienated powers.

In putting the case for an ecological Marxism the claim is not that Marx himself was an ecologist in an explicit sense. Nor was he an ecologist in opposing nature to society. On the contrary, Marx proceeds from the socialisation and humanisation of nature, and this, to some ecologists, may well represent an anti-ecological perspective. Nevertheless, there is, inherent in Marx’s demands for conscious control over human powers and relationships, a concern for ethical mastery which is properly described as ecological. It is the case that Marx did write little on nature's value independently of human beings and, importantly, of human action.

It could be argued that Marx valued nature only to the extent that human beings had intervened in it to change it, to draw it into the social environment. This, indeed, is what the transition from first to second nature is all about. And, whilst recognising the critical, dialectical perspective in which progress and catastrophe are combined, Marx did display an optimism as regards the expansion of the productive powers and material progress (Oldroyd 1980). Like the technologically inclined Victorians, Marx repudiated the idea of limits to growth associated with Malthus.

But there is, above all, an important distinction to be made which distinguishes Marx from technological optimists and places him closer to the ecologists. For the second nature that human beings had created was not an unqualified good. On the contrary, it rested upon the subjugation of human beings to their own powers. This second nature entails a new artificial necessity determined by the tyranny of exchange value and the self-expansion of capital. And it Is this tyranny, under which human powers have become alienated from human beings and their purposes, which is to be 'mastered’. Mastery entails the end of domination. Mastery implies not domination but its converse, the exercise of skill and know how so that transformation proceeds wisely, with a sense of balance in fulfilling legitimate human purposes.

It is in this context that one finds Parsons arguing that





And Marx’s ecological position is not subject to the 'anarchy' of systemic control and determination. Marx's approach to the society-nature dialectic, fundamental to his perspective, may thus be argued to be inherently ecological. Indeed, Marx can be presented of something of a pioneer given that his development of this society-nature dialectic dates from before Haeckel and his ecology. As Parsons argues for Marx and Engels





Moreover, Marx and Engels ‘had a definite (though not fully detailed) ecological position. As both working people and nature are exploited by class rule, so they will be freed by liberation from class rule’ (Parsons 1977:xii). To which one must add that both nature and society are dominated, and exploited by an alienated system of production which rests upon alienated labour. The liberation from class rule, instituted under the form of private property, must rest upon the abolition of alienated labour at the more profound level of social relations of production.

Parsons' argument is that the ecological perspective of Marx and Engels is articulated through their writings on the interdependence between society and nature through the way that nature is transformed by labour as a mutual transformation. It is expressed also in the writing on the society-nature relationship before the rise of capitalism, on the expansion of technology, on the alienation of nature and human beings under capitalist domination, and in the relationship that is projected to exist under communism.

Marx as a Forerunner of Social Ecology 
Marx may thus be presented as the forerunner of the social ecology associated with Murray Bookchin. Bookchin, though critical of Marx and Marxism, has acknowledged his debt to Marx and has continued to recognise, against fashion, the 'rich legacy of ideas that should be brought to the service of libertarian thought’ (Bookchin 1993:54).

What lies behind the claim that Marx is the forerunner of social ecology is the argument that central to Marx was the interdependence of nature and human society. Marx's materialism stresses the importance of the natural environment as it is incorporated into society through the development of the productive forces. Marx may have acknowledged capital's powerful tendency to develop these productive forces and, in so doing, to potentially liberate human beings from necessity, i.e. from living subject to the vagaries of natural forces. This natural necessity has been conquered. The problem now is to conquer the new social necessity imposed upon human society by the capital system. 'Despite certain progressive aspects, capitalism .. both dehumanises man and perverts the natural world' (Vaillancourt 1992:34). Marx's conscious, control of the natural and social environment did entail intervention within nature. This intervention, however, is the contrary of capital's destructive domination.

Marx’s perspective on the nature-society dialectic acknowledges that ecological problems, are socially caused, through technological domination and economic exploitation associated with the process of capitalist industrialisation and commercialisation. And this irrational destruction of nature possesses a class aspect. Thus, for Marx and Engels the ‘primary places at which ecological damage was inflicted were the factory and dwellings of industrial workers, the large agricultural estates and rural slums’ (Parsons 1977:22). Marx describes how, in the factories





And human beings are, as the ecologists keep reminding us, a part of nature. The implication is clear. The concerns of human beings are natural. The life and liberty of human beings is an ecological question. From this perspective one can present the trade union movement as an ecological movement to the extent that it represented and represents a protest against the way that human labour is used under capitalist relations. Productive life activity, the very essence of human beings for Marx, is employed in such a way as to deny rather than realise life and liberty. The workers' struggles, far from being narrowly economic and sectional, are a struggle for the quality of the social ecology, from the production, process to the wider environment in which production is situated. The struggle of the labour movement thus represents an ecological struggle in that its fundamental orientation is towards improving the quality of the environment in which people work and live.

Marx may be credited with having identified the roots of the compulsion towards the rational domination of nature as object in the system of alienated labour. One can, with the Frankfurt School, condemn this as the ‘metaphysics’ of labour which reinforces the privileging of production, of the subject's domination of nature, which lies behind reification in the first place. What Horkheimer and Adorno argue is that the progress of enlightenment is characterised by rational domination over an objectified external nature associated with the repression of the internal nature of human beings. In sum, Horkheimer and Adorno deny the existence of the liberatory potential within capitalist modernity which Marx has sought to realise. This rational domination propels the human subject towards the endless expansion of the productive .forces for the sake of self-preservation whilst destroying the very forces for reconciliation which overcome this narrow aim of self-preservation.






One can, from this perspective, develop an alternative framework to the economism which has, perhaps, represented a dominant strain within Marxist thought and politics. This economism as Heilbroner has correctly stressed (Heilbroner 1980:66), is not inherent in Marx's own materialism. Heilbroner underlines the dialectical character of Marx's materialism. This has two important implications for Heilbroner. It repudiates the deterministic notion of a simply one way cause and effect relation. The dialectical conception does not separate an economic base from an ideological superstructure. Base and superstructure are inextricably connected to each other and cannot exist apart from each other. The forces of the base and the superstructure are constantly interacting and hence undergoing a continuous change. For Heilbroner, Marx's dialectical conception rejects the simple base-superstructure model in which base determines the superstructure. The second aspect upon which Heilbroner places emphasis is upon historical change as a dialectical process. He underlines the fact that, at any stage in history, the existing state of society will be subject to certain tensions owing to conflicts between groups and classes concerning social and economic arrangements.

This alternative framework proceeds from the nature-society dialectic. This recognises that as human beings change nature through their productive activity they also change their own human nature. Social reality is a field of materialist immanence which, as a self-made reality, enables the affirmation of human agency as the conscious creative principle. In creating/changing this self-made social reality, human beings are creating/changing themselves. This interaction is not merely economistic, it is dialectical. Through changing reality and creating the world around them, human beings have changed themselves. Human beings can appreciate the human character of what they create, developing their subjective senses as they make things buildings, technology etc. 'The dialectic is made clear, as the world is increasingly more humanised, so too are the senses humanly developed as a social process'. This comprises the development of the intellectual senses too.

The society-nature dialectic is developed by Marx into the idea of a transition from first to second nature.





With the transition from first to second nature under capitalist production every use value is given an exchange value as it becomes a commodity. Under the capitalist mode of production it is no longer meaningful to distinguish between first and second nature. First nature has been incorporated into second nature by being commodified. In conquering natural necessity human beings have come to be subject to capital's social necessity, the tyranny of exchange value in the second nature. This is a necessity that remains to be conquered. The practical reappropriation of alienated social powers enables the assertion of human self-determination in the (substantively) rational society over against the external determinism systemically imposed by capital and instituted by the state over human society. There is an emancipatory logic in Marx which exists over and above — some would even argue against - Marx's strategic and tactical political arguments concerning human freedom as the self-government of all aspects of life. This logic is to be developed into a praxis philosophy of an active and affirmative materialism so that Marx may outlive Marxism as an organised political movement.
My argument is that there is a fundamental philosophical anthropology in Marx's critique of alienation (Schmidt 1971; Markus 1978) and that this philosophical anthropology shares some significant features with that implicit in Weber's concept of rationalisation (Lowith). And it is here that the transition from first to second nature is relevant. The distinction to be made between use value in a natural economy and exchange value in the capitalist economy is a distinction appropriate to the development of human society. Both Marx and Weber see the development of capitalist production as wrenching human beings out of a natural communal society. In this society human beings are largely lacking in self-consciousness; their reflexive sense is undeveloped. There is here a distinction between the use values of the economy of the natural communal society and the domination of exchange values in the capitalist economy.

The Centrality of Praxis
Whilst the tyranny of exchange value in this second nature itself represents the blocking of consciousness and reflexivity, at the same time it is the development of self-consciousness. For it is human activity itself which lies behind the process of abstraction. In this process, human labour may be interpreted as production in a process of externalising, objectifying and appropriating essential human powers.

For Marx, praxis extends in historical time and social space within the sphere of a wider nature. Praxis mediates between the subjective nature of cooperating individuals and the objectified nature created by human intervention. 
The mediating activity of labour with relation to nature thus, shows itself in three aspects: 

1.	in the experienced needs and desires of the subjective nature of individuals;
2.	in the objective nature created by the objectification of essential powers;
3.	the nature which is the horizon in which-labour takes place. 

Labour is therefore the central category in Marx's view of production as a process in which human beings, externalise, objectify and appropriate their essential powers. Naturally enough, the process of self-mediation of nature incorporates into itself the self-actualisation of the subjects acting within it. The both of them are processes of a self-genesis, produced out of their own products. Accordingly, the society created by this social praxis is comprehended as the product of the forces and relations of production created within and by it.

Marx identified labour as the key category since, through it, he conceived, the structures of bourgeois society as increasingly characterised by abstract labour, i.e. the labour that is valorised in a capitalist manner, organised in capitalist commodity production. The alienation of labour is the crucial concept for Marx, for everything else, from class exploitation and private property to the process of abstraction and the tyranny of exchange value, derives from alienated labour. One thus looks to read Marx's critique as pertaining to the domination of the world by real abstractions generated and sustained by the alienation of labour. This domination has pathological consequences for human society. The abstracting-alienating tendencies inherent in capitalism as an alienated system of production have become universal, i.e. have encompassed more than the world of production.

An alternative intellectual and political framework for Marxism must proceed from an appreciation of the centrality of human and social embodiment to Marx's understanding of praxis as an active and affirmative materialism. This, of course, is relevant to the discovery of the humanism of the early Marx and a re-examination of the relation of Marx to Feuerbach. This attempt to recover the perspectives of a 'humanist' Marx was made with a fairly vigorous reaction in the shape of a structuralist Marxism, especially by that philosophical tradition associated with Louis Althusser. It is not at all certain whether either the humanists or the structuralists achieved more than polarise Marx between two perspectives whose inadequacies were revealed in time. Perry Anderson has some scathing words for the future development of the Marxist humanists. For Anderson, the degeneration of the Marxist humanists into rightist positions and politics was inherent in their vague, classless humanism (Anderson 1980:108/9). At the same time, post-structuralism led not so much to a post- as an anti-marxism. Either way, the structuralist Marxism was guilty of a super-determinism which not merely privileged structure over agency as eliminated agency. History was a subjectless process. In time, it became a structureless one too.

The development of an alternative framework avoids the ultimate sterility of this engagement by recovering human agency and social praxis within a perspective of an affirmative materialism. Certainly, there are debts to be acknowledged in developing this view of the centrality of the human essential nature, life affirming sensuous activity and social praxis in Marx's emancipatory project. In premising the argument upon the philosophical anthropology implicit in Marx the work of Alfred Schmidt (1971) and George Markus (1978) is to be recognised as being of key importance. This philosophical anthropology proceeds from the assumption that human beings are a part of nature and that human labour is directed towards the satisfaction of needs which intrinsic to human beings as natural beings. From here one proceeds to the nature-society dialectic which lies behind historical development. Human beings interact with their natural environment, transforming and appropriating nature through labour as their conscious life activity, transforming themselves in the process. This transformation of the natural environment by human labour, involving the development of technique and organisation, expresses the objectification of the human will.

Marx's implicit philosophical anthropology is thus demonstrated in his conception of how human beings, through their social praxis, intervene in, transform and appropriate their natural world through the social processes of labour. Within this conception, the natural world is both the object and the condition of existence for human beings. The transformation of the natural world is achieved through the practical, conscious activity of human beings in pursuit of their generically and historically determined needs.
It follows from Marx's philosophical anthropology that human nature is not fixed and unchanging. The specific nature of human beings is continuously transformed and developed by social activity itself. Moreover, Marx premised his argument upon the human being as a zoon politikon. Human beings can only individuate themselves within society. Marx's philosophical anthropology, therefore, refers not to the human being as an isolated agent in this social activity but locates the individual within social relationships which enhance and/or constrain individuality. These social relations are historically created and change throughout history. The character of these relations is explained by the particular mode of production within which they are set. Therefore the relationship between the nature of human beings and of their society is historical in character.

The historical development of human society rests upon the expansion of the productive powers of human beings, with each new stage of development containing the potential for further development. In the course of this development, the boundary of the natural world is pushed further and further backwards through the development of the social activity of human beings. In this process nature becomes 'the inorganic body' of man. The dialectical relationship between human beings, society and nature is expressed by Marx in terms of an associated process of humanisation and naturalisation.

Communism is the positive supersession of private property as human self-estrangement, and hence the true appropriation of the human essence through and for man; it is the complete restoration of man to himself as a social, i.e. human, being, a restoration which has become conscious and which takes place within the entire wealth of previous periods of development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature, and between man and man, the true resolution of the conflict between existence and being, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species.

Marx EPM in EW 348 

The human essence of nature exists only for social man; for only here does nature exist for him, as a bond with other men, as his existence for others and their existence for him, as the vital element of human reality; only here does it exist as the basis of his own human existence. Only here has his natural existence become his human existence and nature become man for him. Society is therefore the perfected unity in essence of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the realised naturalism of man and the realised humanism of nature. 

Marx EPM in EW 349/50

Marx thus conceives nature not as a thing in itself but as an extension of human labour progressively brought into society by this labour. However, under the alienative and exploitative relations of capital, this social reality is subject to reification in its relationships. The constitutive role of human agency comes to be lost in a fetishistic social world.

The concept of human, i.e. social praxis lies at the heart of Marx's conception of historical development.





Marx's concept of praxis shows the influence of ancient Greek philosophy, particularly of Aristotle. In Aristotle's philosophy, praxis was one of the three main human activities. Firstly, there is theoria, theoretical knowledge, and secondly there is poesis, cultural production. Thirdly, there is praxis. Aristotle argued that praxis described the activity of all animals but that, nevertheless, it ought, precisely, be applied only to human beings.

The concept of praxis allowed Marx to proceed from the notion of human beings as being engaged in practical and free conscious life activity. It allowed Marx to argue that human beings were not, as in the materialism of the Enlightenment, the passive products of circumstances, but the active producer of these circumstances. In producing these circumstances, moreover, human beings produced themselves. The concept of praxis, importantly, enabled Marx to deal with the paradox of how human agency turned into human enslavement. Praxis allowed Marx to deal with the problem of alienation in historical development.

Whilst the conscious, practical activity of human beings is productive and creative, expressing the reality shaping human agency, the social world becomes through alienative and exploitative relations, external to and oppressive of human agency. The products of human labour come to be alienated from the human agents. It is for this reason that a distinction between labour and praxis needs to be made (rather than make a distinction between Praxis (1) and Praxis (2) as Gouldner does 1980:33/4). The realisation of human beings through their conscious life activity entails the dissolution of labour, since labour under capitalism has become a commodity, an alienated activity which produces commodities for exchange, and which is life denying, and which dominates human life whilst denying human needs.

The intention of this argument is to underline the centrality of the notion of conscious, practical, creative and sensuous activity in Marx's affirmative and active materialism. And this notion entails a conception of human and social embodiment in which powers which have been alienated and institutionalised in an artificial world raised above society are reabsorbed into society.

Marx's critical and emancipatory project is developed in terms of a stress on social relations and how these shape the character of human social praxis. This interpretation involves three stages in a process of alienation and realisation. In the first place there is externalisation. This involves the praxis of transformative and knowledgeable human agents who, continuously and necessarily, create their social environment through their collective practices. In the second place, there is objectification which, under specific social relations, turns into alienation rather than realisation. As a result of this, human products achieve an apparently independent, external significance in relation to human beings. Objects are invested with an existential significance and come to confront the human subjects as an external and hostile reality. Thirdly, there is the practical process whereby human beings reappropriate their objectified or alienated powers, transforming the objective world into a world embodying the subjective consciousness. Through externalisation it is appreciated that the social environment is a product of human practice. Through objectification turning into alienation under specific social relations this human practice creates a social world which possesses an independence of human action and purpose. Finally, there is the process of practical reappropriation by which human beings come to appreciate and apprehend the social world as the product of their own labour.

Marx's scheme involves a critical and emancipatory perspective upon social and historical development. Marx affirms that it is human agency which creates and shapes the social world in which they live. Marx's view possesses revolutionary implications, stressing the capacity of human beings to transform their social environment. Marx presents a powerful argument for the capacity of human beings to subvert their fetishistic institutional and cultural environment. Marx's liberatory stress upon human agency makes it possible to conceive of a process of disalienation in which the institutional-systemic world is disempowered and the everyday social world of individuals is reempowered.

27 COMPLEXITY - THE DIVISION OF LABOUR

The complex division of labour presents enormous obstacles in front of the realisation of socialism. One can argue that in trades union activity, revolutionary syndicalism, council communism and guild socialism, socialism has taken practical steps to create its own division of labour. It is through such measures that labour practically confronts the power of capital, developing socialism in structural terms within the modern economy. And offers a form of mediation that is capable of subverting the abstract universality of the state.

There are, however, great difficulties. The problem of the complex division of labour is emphasised by Sayer and Walker (1992), underlining the extent to which this complexity has advanced in modern decades. For Sayer (1992) this means that Marx's political economy is too idealistic in its original form and needs to be fundamentally revised. The idea of millions of individuals as 'associated producers' collectively and consciously controlling the modern economy through planning without markets and the price mechanism is dismissed by Sayer as a 'quaint pipe dream'. The mere fact that such an idea continues to be offered on the left suggests an inherent tendency to underestimate the level of complexity in the modern economy.

This complexity is expressed in terms of an advanced specialisation - fragmentation, interdependence and globalisation. For many, these components of the modern economy have proceeded so far as to be irrevocable. There are too many economic agents in connection with each other in the market, too many producers and consumers, too many products and needs to reconcile through even the most advanced of planning (Nove 1983:32/4).

The increasing and ever more extensive division of labour which results from the development of the productive forces generates a structure of social relations that possess a systemically determining force and independence of its own, which Marx had characterised as alienation. What the likes of Sayer and Walker are effectively arguing is that the progressive aspects of alienation cannot, as Marx thought, be redeemed. Alienation, to a large extent, is an intractable problem. Thus Sayer argues that this structure of social relations, with its objective power and abilities of its own, survives the abolition of capitalist social relations of production.

It all depends upon how one defines these relations. If one defines them in terms of property-legal relations, in which all that is changed is the title on property, then one can agree. The transformation of social relations of production that Marx demands proceeds at a much deeper level than this, however, enabling human beings to envisage a greater degree of conscious control in the use of the productive forces. This distinction is pertinent to Sayer's point that the externalisation of costs would be a persistent problem under a socialist economy based upon the common ownership of the means of production. The lesson is clear. There is a need to secure control over the division of labour. And the scale of complexity puts a question mark against securing such a control. One cannot but return to Weber's conclusion of The Protestant Ethic.

The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order.. This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which today determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt. In Baxter's view the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the 'saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment'. But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage.
Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world and work out its ideals in the world, material goods have gained an increasing and finally an inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period in history. Today the spirit of religious asceticism - whether finally, who knows? - has escaped from the cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no longer. The rosy blush of its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems also to be irretrievably fading, and the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs. Where the fulfilment of the calling cannot directly be related to the highest spiritual and cultural values, or when, on the other hand, it need not be felt simply as economic compulsion, the individual generally abandons the attempt to justify it at all. In the field of its highest development, in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely mundane passions, which often actually give it the character of sport.




Weber's perspective is critical. The defences launched in favour of the modern division of labour and the assertion that 'complexity’ renders socialism Utopian have been inspired by Weber and may be portrayed as Weberian. It is important to acknowledge, however, that Weber was very far from being an apologist of the modern system of organisation. Weber quotes Goethe to depict the mechanised petrification of the modern world not as the highest level of civilisation but as a nullity.

Weber may not have felt able to offer a solution, but he was certainly aware of a problem in modernity which the apologists suppress. There are two things which follow from Weber's perspective. If socialists need to take the intractability of the modern division of labour more seriously, pushing beyond the level of property relations to develop a system that relies on more than common ownership, so must those rationalising the modern social organisation recognise the fundamental nullity at the heart of the modern world. 

Having taken Weber seriously, then what? Weber offers no positive solution. We need to take more seriously Marx's location of the problem in an alienated, system of production. Those who would abandon Marx for his alleged 'rational socialism' - the bureaucratic, state socialism which exists as a logical development of the centralising, rationalising and abstracting tendencies of capitalist modernity - not only misread Marx but abandon emancipatory politics for a pessimism as regards future possibilities. The irony is that it was precisely this abandonment of the 'utopian' in Marx, in favour of possibilities related to existing tendencies within Weber's process of rationalisation, which led to the bureaucratic state socialism in the first place. All things come back to complexity and the division of labour and the need to demonstrate the possibility for subverting the ‘mechanised petrification’ of the modern capital economy as an alienated system of production.

Bureaucratisation and Modernity
It is arguable that, of all the attacks upon socialism and the socialist revolution, the most important, certainly the most persistent, has rested upon the view that, given the complexity and indispensability of the modern division of labour, revolution is not a meaningful proposition and socialism is simply Utopian. Bottomore adequately states the objection to the Marxist ‘utopianism’ of communism as the stateless society:





This argument completely cuts the ground from under Marxism. Bottomore would possibly disagree. However, the abolition of the state is not an optional extra within Marx's politics but is absolutely central to his emancipatory project of restituting social power.

The case against Marxism rests upon the notion that modern complex society is subject to the dictates of modern technology and bureaucratic organisation (Nove 1983:35 46 49; Meszaros 1995:739/40 741 744 751). Nove argues that





N Scott Arnold, on the basis of such notions of complexity, judges Marx's attempt to abolish alienation as Utopian, as capable of being realised only through a state centralising regime that has put an end to the market and to commodity production (Arnold 1990).

This, it might be pointed out, is as rigid a societal or economic determinism as anything proposed by the Marxists. According to this view, it is impossible to have the material welfare of the modern world without a hierarchical division of labour, authority relations at work, bureaucratic organisation and a profit system. If people want material affluence, then work must be dull and repetitive, a 'disutility’ as the economists put it. The process of production, must respect the dictates of modern technology and bureaucratically organised forms. This means abandoning any demands for human fulfilment through labour or for the democratic self-management of production (Clawson 1980:12 13/4; Doray 1988:158/9).

Doray refers to the persecutory, reifying and desubjectivizing relationship which characterises Taylorized work: this 'is determined by a practical relationship of asymmetrical dependency which is at once social and technical' (Doray 1988:165/6). The point is that this situation is alterable. The development of the productive forces need to be set in a wider perspective, by looking at them in terms of the social relations they imply. Doray’s term 'Taylorist madness' enables us to see through economic and technical systems so as to perceive the contradiction between the objective socialisation of labour and the subjective expropriation of the agents of the labour process.





If a new system is 'emerging', it is not really a complex unalterable 'thing', but a new and dynamic expression of the contradiction in the form of industrial socialisation imposed by the dominant mode of production.









Weber argues that the 'objective indispensability' and 'impersonal’ character of bureaucracy means that 'the mechanism - in contrast to feudal orders based upon personal piety - is easily made to work for anybody who knows how to gain control over it'. Power has come to be separated from persons and objectified over against them. As human beings have been disempowered, power has simultaneously been disembodied. In elaborating this point Weber makes an argument which shares common features with Marx: ‘with all the changes in France since the time of the First Empire, the power machine has remained essentially the same [..] In classic fashion, France has demonstrated how this process [of bureaucratisation] has substituted coups d'état for “revolutions”’ (Weber 1970:229/30). As Marx wrote, in relation to the Paris Commune, 'all [previous] revolutions perfected the state machinery instead of throwing off this deadening incubus'. The Paris Commune was 'a revolution against the State itself’ (Marx The Civil War in France). Marx came to the conclusion that 'the working class cannot simply lay hold on the ready-made state machinery and wield it for their own purpose'. In the 1872 Preface to the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx repudiated the Manifesto's demands for centralisation.

Marx, then, was looking for a way of uprooting modern developments and setting them on another course. Weber entertained no such hope. As the 'objective indispensability' of modern bureaucratic forms of organisation becomes ever more entrenched, in the private economy too, the idea of abolishing these organisational forms 'becomes more and more Utopian': 'such a machine makes "revolution", in the sense of a forcible creation of entirely new formations of authority, technically more and more impossible, especially when the apparatus controls the modern means of communication .. and also by virtue of its internal rationalised structure’ (Weber 1970:230).

This, in a nutshell, has formed the most powerful case against socialism and the socialist revolution. It has operated as something of a trump card to be employed in debates against socialists. It is restated most eloquently in the works of Norberto Bobbio. One should, however, consider the paradoxical position, in which Weber found himself. He repudiated a workers' socialism as simply Utopian and criticised state socialism as the apotheosis of modernity's bureaucratising tendencies, he thus fell back upon private capitalism, with its political freedoms instituted by an independent government, as the best hope for humanity.

Yet Weber had already revealed this capitalism to be the most efficient vehicle of the rationalisation which was plunging humanity into the iron cage. Weber, clearly, is attempting to resist the seemingly inexorable development into a monocratic bureaucratised society, the general political and economic alienation which socialism would represent. Admittedly, he was gloomy about the future:





It is in light of the utter hopelessness of Weber's position that one is entitled to look more closely into the socialism repudiated as 'more and more Utopian’, the socialist revolution rejected as 'technically more and more impossible’. For this is the real battleground, not the critique of state socialism.

Weber, it may be argued, provided a rationalisation of bureaucracy and its indispensability.

Since Max Weber wrote the first, now classical, sociological defense of bureaucracy as the form of organisation most suited to capitalism, there have been few serious challenges to the belief in the necessity of bureaucratic forms. And the rationalisations for it seems never to end.
There are four essential components of a bureaucratic organisation that concern us here: 1) there is a hierarchy of positions; 2) there is a specialised division of labour; 3) salaries and other rewards are distributed according to rank in the hierarchy; and 4) there are formal rules and procedures regulating organisational behaviour.
It is my belief that bureaucracies are defended more because of the societal effects that social scientists do not talk about than because of their supposed efficiency as an organisational form. These four components may be necessary for a bureaucracy, but they are also necessary to maintain class stratification, to promote ideas of social mobility and competition, to preclude self-management and foster separatism and isolation. Bureaucratic forms - worst of all - deny people opportunities for growth and self-development ...

Ehrlich in Ehrlich ed.1995:63

The argument to be presented here upholds the view that the socialist revolution and the socialist society are possibilities and that it is meaningful to explore them as possibilities. It is to argue that it is meaningful to conceive of the abolition of the hierarchical division of labour and the system of wage labour, that human beings can realise themselves through creative labour without having to suffer a deterioration in material well-being.

The attack upon Marxist socialism asserts that there is no other way of producing the material affluence which modern society demands without degraded, dehumanised work subject to the dictates of modern technology and the hierarchical division of labour (Reuschemeyer 1986:112 117/8 194 17). This is to accept the 'objective indispensability' of modern technology and bureaucracy.

There is an assumption in modern versions of Weber's thesis that technology and bureaucracy are neutral forces of modernity which have developed outside of the class struggle, Weber himself rejected this assertion of neutrality. His argument rested upon the view of human action taking place within a power infused infrastructure which contained an inherent, systemic bias in favour of some groups against others (Reuschemeyer 1986:70).

One can, however, understand how, on the basis of the notion of objective indispensability, the dictates of technology and bureaucracy can come to be justified in terms of being the most efficient ways of organising production. Weber himself argued this to be the case. But there is another, class, aspect to this. Technology and bureaucracy cannot be treated in abstraction from the social relations of production. From this perspective one can argue that technology and bureaucracy have been developed within capitalist relations so as to give capitalists greater control over their workforce and so as to 'facilitate the process of extracting surplus value from the workforce.

Since this is the case it is conceivable that, under altered social relations, other forms of organisation are possible, that, in the least, modern technology and bureaucracy are not 'objective' in any fixed, neutral and unalterable sense.
The assertion that the ‘rationalisation’ of labour is necessary and inevitable in the efficient organisation of the production process can be considered as ideological. That is, it rationalises the dehumanisation of alienated labour and conceals the relations of class power behind assertions of objectivity and neutrality. It even conceals the aim of production by replacing capital accumulation beneficial to a specific class with the notion of a material affluence which is beneficial to all.

The arguments of the academics in the universities, the management specialists, concerning the objectivity and inevitability of bureaucratic organisation, rest upon the authority of Weber and his view that bureaucracy would increasingly come to pervade as the most efficient form of organisation (Clawson 1980:16). For Weber, bureaucracy is a form of organisation resting upon a fixed division of labour in which the regular activities of individuals are official duties, in which some have authority over others, in which there are rules governing these relations of authority, in which duties are performed only by those who can demonstrate their competence and qualifications for those duties (Turner 1993:205).

Democratisation Versus Bureaucratisation
The fact of the bureaucratisation of the world is not in doubt. The question concerns the possibility of uprooting this bureaucratisation and, with Marx, replacing it with a democratisation, The views of Marx and Weber are diametrically opposed on this issue. Weber's (nightmare) vision of a world bureaucratised, and Marx's vision of communist society are antithetical. One simply has to make a choice between the two; their views are irreconcilable.

Bureaucratic forms of organisation necessarily involve hierarchy, with some given the authority to issue commands to others, and with officials being appointed according to certified competence rather than being elected. In Marx's vision, however, democratisation replaces bureaucratisation. There is no hierarchical organisation whilst relations of authority rest upon the elective principle. There is no division between those with authority to give commands and those in subordinate positions to whom commands are given. Rather, the authority to issue commands is given by all within the new relations and this authority is constantly subject to the review of all. Furthermore, as opposed to a plethora of rules and regulations behind which the controlling class conceal their power behind a claim to bureaucratically conceived expertise, under Marx's communism these rules and regulations are simplified and reduced to a minimum as the social relations are altered so that all become technically competent (Clawson1980:16/7).

For Weber, the bureaucratisation of the world is inevitable on account of the technical superiority of bureaucratic forms of organisation.





As a result of this superiority bureaucracy is extended to more and more areas of social organisation. More than this, once bureaucracy has established itself it is well-nigh impossible to uproot it. For not only is bureaucracy the most effective form of organisation, it is an instrument of power. Those in control of the bureaucracy, Weber argues, have effective power 'the mechanism ... is easily made to work for anybody who knows how to gain control over it'. 'The ruled for their part cannot dispense with or replace the bureaucratic apparatus of authority once it exists' (Weber 1958:229).

Bureaucratisation, Power and Class Interests

A large part of the appeal of Weber's argument may be explained by the apparent neutrality and classlessness of bureaucracy as he presents it. The extension of bureaucracy to ever more areas of social life occurs not as a result of class struggle and interest. Rather, the extension of bureaucracy appears to be in the common interest in being concerned with the efficient organisation of social life. Since bureaucratic forms of organisation are technically superior and enables production to be undertaken in such a way as to use fewer resources to meet objectives.

On these Weberian lines, then, bureaucracy represents a technical advance in social organisation and is therefore not a class issue at all. There is a possibility, then, for depoliticisation, for reducing the questions of the appropriate form of organisation to technique, abstracting the whole issue from the class struggle.

The problem with this view is that it presents a very particular view of Weber's argument, one that concentrates upon the technical superiority of bureaucracy to the exclusion of the interests, relations and struggles of power which are just as important to Weber. Wright has accused Weber of conceiving capitalist development as a 'harmonious rationalisation process' (Wright 1978:217). This is the Weber of the academic sociologists justifying the authority relations of bureaucratically organised production. The formalism, technical superiority and objective indispensability of competent bureaucratic organisation appears to be class neutral on account of its inexorable and inevitable character.

Weber, however, sets this whole rationalisation process within an infrastructure that makes it anything but harmonious in its effects. On the contrary, this rationalisation reinforces existing asymmetries in power and resources and favours the powerful and the privileged. The formal rationality of the market, of autonomous law and of bureaucracy with the demands of substantive rationality coming from the various groups composing society. The formalist social order is thus infused with substantive conceptions of justice pursued by social groups and classes, all of which means that the process of rationalisation loses the harmonious character which it has for apologists. The infrastructure underpinning the process of rationalisation is power infused and subject to the conflict of social forces so that there is a clash between the rationality of the formalist order of market, law and bureaucracy and the substantive conceptions of justice.

Since the bureaucratisation of the world cannot be separated from questions of power and interest, then the apparent formalism of the rationalised social order loses its inexorable, automatic and harmonious character. There is something to struggle about. The academic sociologists have stripped Weber down to a justification of the formalist social order but there is another aspect to this question, one which Weber himself appreciated even as he theorised the technical superiority and objective indispensability of bureaucratic forms of organisation.

With Marx there is no ambiguity on this question. Bureaucracy is explained as part of the class struggle, inextricably a part of the social relations of production. Marx's view presents a clear challenge to those who would rationalise the formalist social order as the only one technically feasible. Marx is perfectly clear that it is the class antagonism of capitalist production which explains the bureaucratisation of production. The capitalist class must organise the extraction of surplus value from the working class.

the capitalist mode of production has brought matters to a point where the work of supervision, entirely divorced from the ownership of capital, is always readily available. It has therefore come to be superfluous for the capitalist to perform it himself. An orchestra conductor need not own the instruments of his orchestra ..

Marx Capital III 1960:379

The need for a directing and coordinating function is integral to any mode of production.





Marx is indicating that this function need not be monopolised and performed by the capitalist class. This functional requirement can be separated from the control of capital.

The labour of superintendence and management will naturally be required whenever the direct process of production assumes the form of a combined social process, and does not rest on the isolated labour of independent producers. It has, however, a twofold character.
On the one hand, all work in which many individuals cooperate necessarily requires for the coordination and unity of the process a directing will, and functions which are not concerned with fragmentary operations but with the total activity of the workshop, similar to those of the conductor of an orchestra. This is a kind of productive labour which must be performed in every mode of cooperative production.




Under the capitalist mode of production, it is necessary not merely to have the supervision and direction required in the production process but to ensure that supervision and direction necessary to ensure that the workers produce surplus value. Marx is thus underling the class antagonism behind the direction and supervision of the capitalist mode of production. Once the workers have sold their labour power they do not work for themselves but for the capitalist class. The capitalist class must organise the production of the workers so as to make the most efficient use of the labour power it has bought (Clawson 1980:20/1).

To ensure that these goals are achieved, supervision of a particular kind of supervision is required. The workers must be subject to discipline to ensure, that they produce the surplus value which is required for the accumulation of capital. The production process must be organised towards this goal of capital accumulation, attained through the extraction of the greatest possible amount of surplus value from the working class.

It is necessary to underline that this process is not an automatic one, which is how it translates in the Weberian interpretation, above the will, struggle and consciousness of the actors. For it is a process and not a structure with a fixed, objective character. It is a process that is shaped and shot through with class struggle, not some formalist technical necessity that imposes itself inexorably, above and beyond human agency.

The unity of subjective and objective factors is to be underlined. What Marx is challenging by this unity is that societal determinism in which structures have been invested with an objective, independent significance of their own. Marx is to be read against the Weberian attempts to present the bureaucratisation of the world as some technical necessity which unfolds with some automatic, objective inexorability.

Taylorism expresses perfectly the extent to which bureaucracy has been extended to secure the capitalist control of production and the workforce. Taylor came to argue that it was necessary to create the new category of management to appropriate the workers knowledge so as to be able to plan and direct the production process and be in a position to issue order to the workforce. So long as workers possessed this knowledge they could control the production process. The extension of bureaucracy was necessary so that workers had to submit to the dictates of the capitalists so as to expand their productive efforts. Given a free choice, capital would not have created this bureaucracy directing and supervising the work process. Class antagonism made this bureaucracy essential. This class antagonism made the capitalist class keen upon bureaucracy so as to ensure their control over the workplace. Either the capitalists or the workers must exercise this control. The Taylorite category of management made it possible for the capitalists to exercise this control through introducing bureaucracy into production (Clawson 1980).

The implication of Marx's argument is that both the bureaucratic organisation of work and the application of technology in production are shaped by specifically capitalist social relations. As a result, they are not class neutral, given their development within an alienated system of production, one can question their objective indispensability. As Marx's critical analysis in Capital makes abundantly clear, the development of technique and organisation under the capitalist mode of production possesses an exploitative rather than a neutral character. We are dealing with questions of power, authority and control, with both class exploitation and social alienation.

As noted, the creation of a management raised above the workforce is an example of how modern technique and organisation are shaped under the capitalist mode of production. This subjection of the workforce to industrial discipline so as to ensure the production of surplus value may be considered as essential to the technical development of capitalism. We are dealing with no merely technical necessity but the need of the capitalist class to secure the subordination of the workforce. The creation of management provided the capitalist class with a means for ensuring its control of the production and hence may be considered as the major technical and organisational necessity of the capitalist mode of production (Clawson 1980:253 260/1 266; Reuschemeyer 1988:84/5).

The Necessity of the Class Struggle

Those seeking a ‘feasible’ socialism adapted to the formalist social order, thus accepting the dictates of modern technology and organisation, are, on this, analysis, the real Utopians. They are seeking the impossible, the realisation of socialism through technical and organisational forms designed to ensure the subordination and exploitation of the workforce. They have accepted as a technical necessity what is in origin and function a class necessity. For so long as the capitalist mode of production exists the reformation of the position of the workers within that system will be limited, will never be allowed to obstruct the process of accumulation, and will be constantly subject to being withdrawn. If the workers secure real advances in their position the question of control will necessarily be raised. Certainly, once workers’ power blocks the mechanisms of investment, valorisation and accumulation, the issue is raised as to who shall exercise control in the process of production. The workers' movement either retreats to its former subordinate position, is destroyed, settles for some system of codetermination or takes control. There is a class struggle over control which either capital or labour wins. The labour movement which believes that it can win piecemeal changes that gradually but permanently improve its position, without abolishing capitalist relations, fails to appreciate the limits to this 'pragmatic' approach. Sooner or later the question of class struggle and the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism has to be faced. The pragmatic, piecemeal approach is not a gradual road to socialism but an evasion. Sooner or later, assuming the winning of reforms, the question of socialist revolution has to be faced. For the continuous improvement of the workers' position must, in time, reach that upper limit when the process of accumulation is blocked and the issue of control is raised.

To reject revolutionary socialism as 'Utopian’ and to embrace the technical, bureaucratic realities of the modern system of production is to become part of the process whereby capital has secured greater control of the production process at the expense of labour, whereas a genuine socialism requires a coherent response to this process. The direction and planning that is done by management and the bureaucracy was formerly done by the workers and has been expropriated from them. Again, this reflects no technical and organisational necessity but clearly derives from the need for the capitalist class to secure productive discipline over the workforce.

The bureaucratic organisation of the production process, then, has been developed not through technical necessity but as the result of an historically specific process of class struggle and was certainly understood as a class struggle by the parties in contention. The consciousness and activity of the capitalists and the workers have been central factors in shaping the technical and organisational development at the heart of the process of rationalisation.

Under the capitalist mode of production, workers are not induced to work for reasons of enjoyment but are compelled to work by 'economic compulsion'. The task facing the capitalist class is to keep the workers at their work. A productive discipline must be created to ensure the production of surplus value. For this reason management and bureaucracy are created. From a merely economic and technical point of view this could be conceived as wasteful and inefficient, hardly rational at all. But, of course, we cannot abstract from the class antagonism between capital and labour. This bureaucratic apparatus is needed by the capitalist class so that it may secure its capitalist objectives.

Against this there is Marx's vision of communism. Here, social labour is directly supplied by the freely associated producers cooperating with each other and exercising the coordinating functions themselves. Through the reorganisation of the production process workers come to enjoy their work in that it allows them to develop and exercise their human faculties, securing the all-round development of individuals as they realise themselves through labour as their conscious life activity. Human beings come to develop their essential human capacities with the process of production as it ceases to be a realm of degradation and dehumanisation, subject to an alienated necessity.

This result of the highest development of capitalist production is a necessary transition to the reconversion of capital into the property of the producers, no longer as the private property of individual producers but as the common property of associates, as directly social property. On the other hand it is a transition to the conversion of all the functions in the process of reproduction, hitherto bound up with capitalist private property, into simple functions of the associated producers, into social functions.

Marx Capital III 27

28 THE REDISCOVERY OF LIBERAL POLITICS

One can first of all, with a touch of cynicism, define the Social Democratic position as proceeding from an uncritical acceptance of the factual reality as the only reality possible in order to come to moralise against this factual reality. Without knowing how to alter the factual reality, and believing that such intervention and alteration is probably impossible anyway, the Social Democrat, no doubt reflecting hoary old liberal empiricism, asserts the permanence of an existing organisation of society only to regret the necessary consequences of this organisation, proceeding to moralise about what ought to be done. That strange combination of impotent moralism and uncritical positivism results from the Social Democrats ambiguous position between liberalism and socialism. But there is no doubt which tradition wins out in practice - it is socialism which is reduced to the impotent moralism. As Macpherson writes of Mill:

It is easy to see now that Mill, in spite of his ranking as an outstanding economist, did not grasp the essence of the capitalist market economy.. It was his failure to do so that enabled him to reject the market morality. The founding father of liberal democratic theory, we are compelled to say, was able to rise above the market morality only because he did not understand the market society.

Macpherson in Blackburn ed. 1972:22

The most crucial arguments against the kind of true democracy that Marx proposes all seem to rest upon 'complexity'. Modern society is 'complex'. Whether one refers to organisation, bureaucracy, the division of labour or the economy, one meets the objection that modern society is far too complex to make Marx's arguments in any way realistic. Marx, it seems, was not the first of the modern socialists, but the last of the Utopians.

But there is a reality principle in all this which, given its conservative implications, one would be wise to be conscious but critical of. The argument from 'complexity’ has the effect of turning the socialist objective into liberal democracy. Liberal democracy, through the givenness of this factual world, is the only realistic option available to the left. This is the position of writers like Keane and Bobbio among many others (Bobbio 1987a1987b; Keane 1984).

The argument presented here will have been seriously misunderstood if the possibility of penetrating this 'complexity' so as to reorganise society is excluded. The complex social world is not a given, impervious to human intervention and alteration, but has its roots in the capital system and the abstracting, centralising and bureaucratising tendencies which issue from an alienated system of production. This is to recover the generality of alienated labour so as to be able to entertain the possibility of a world without political and social alienation.

For what the liberal calls 'complexity' can be grasped as the fetishised social world which Marx sat out to abolish. The premise of this thesis is that central to Marxism is the emancipatory commitment to the defetishised, free social world (Bonefeld at al 1995:1). This, first and foremost, is Marx's concern (Kitching 1988:229). One can therefore argue that one of the deficiencies of the liberal/left theorists has been the persistent failure to take Marx's communism seriously by seeking the roots of 'complexity’ in the capital system of alienated production, relating the institutional and systemic world to its roots in human self-alienation. It is to fail to see how Marx could envisage the abolition of the state and capital and hence the restoration of the powers of the 'complex’ world to human beings. It is Marx who has conceived the possibility of the self-governing society, who has managed to discover the roots of centralisation and bureaucracy and who has managed to expose the authoritarian character of the state, liberal democratic or otherwise.

What is essential in making the case for overcoming complexity as the abstraction of a fetishised world is to ensure that Marxism is not equated with a retreat from modernity. Marx is not to be read as proposing an homogeneous society. Of course, the obvious criticism is that Marx, following Rousseau's identification of representation with alienation, is proposing a Rousseauan communitarian 'totalitarian' democracy (the criticism of Meister, Talmon and Femia). Apart from anything else, the accusation underestimates Rousseau's own attempts to discover a form of political organisation compatible with individual freedom in the modern world.

Nevertheless Sekelj argues that





Thus, the old socialist project for the abolition of the state has to be rejected and socialism in the modern world must become realistic. The left can never achieve the old ideal of a stateless communism given the complexity of modern society and would do itself a favour by abandoning Utopian hopes. Meister argues that Marxism only has a future if it succeeds, finally, once and for all, in exorcising the ghost of Rousseauan communitarian democracy (Meister 1990:107), as proposed by the likes of Levine (Levine 1987). If this is so, then liberal democracy/democratic socialism is not only marxism's best bet - it is the only show in town.

The Complexity of the Realists
The demand that socialism be realistic amounts to an assertion of the permanence of the modern division of labour. This division of labour does indeed pose enormous obstacles in the way of the realisation of the socialist society. The complexity that this involves is stressed by Sayer and Walker (1992). This complexity has intensified under modern capitalism. Sayer, indeed, argues for Marx's political economy to be modified since, in its original form, it is far too idealistic (Sayer 1992). Sayer describes as a 'quaint pipe dream' the idea that millions of workers, the associated producers, can collectively regulate the modern economy through planning without the need for markets. The prevalence of such views on the left, he suggests, indicates the extent to which the left has refused to acknowledge the complexity of the modern economy. Thus Sayer and Walker argue that the problem can only be resolved through combining markets and planning, a bland enough conclusion.

And a conclusion that can be challenged: the real issue at stake is not how to embrace the ‘market mechanism’ but how to turn into reality the socialist project of genuine self-management (Meszaros 1995:975 also 727/3).





Of what does the complexity of the realists consist? Specialisation, fragmentation, globalisation, bureaucratic organisation, digital communication and information systems, greater interdependence. Such complexity cannot be avoided given that there are now too many economic agents, producers and consumers, to reconcile even with the most advanced form of planning through computer technology.

Thus, the development of the forces of production creates not only the objective basis for socialism, but also a complex division of labour which puts a huge question mark against notions of the self-government of the producers. But Sayer gives some insight into the problem here. For he argues that the division of labour is part of a process in which modern social relations acquire an independent causal power of their own. This, Sayer is aware, is precisely Marx's concern (Sayer 1991:155). Where Sayer is heretical is in suggesting that this 'complexity' survives capitalist relations. What Sayer draws attention to is the need to go further than the property relation to the production relation. Common ownership is not enough to realise socialism; it is necessary to abolish the hierarchical division of labour and gain control at the very roots of the world of production.

Thus the socialist movement must abolish not only capitalism, defined in terms of the private ownership of the means of production, but the capital system, rooted in relations and the hierarchical division of labour. It needs to be shown that this was always Marx's argument (Meszaros 1995:729). And it requires a socialist movement equipped for the task.





What is absolutely crucial is to recognise that capital is a metabolic system, a social-economic metabolic system of control. You can overthrow the capitalist but the factory system remains, the division of labour remains, nothing has changed in the metabolic functions of society. Indeed, in time, there will be a need to reassign those forms of control to personalities, and this is the origin of increasing bureaucratisation. The bureaucracy is a function of the command structure exercising the equivalent control of the private capitalist in changed circumstances. This is worth stressing given the extent to which ‘bureaucracy’ is often simply stated as an explanation in its own right, when in fact the emergence of bureaucracy itself requires explanation. Bureaucracy is often employed as a deus ex machine, implying that bureaucracy explains everything, is the source of all problem, with the implication that the abolition of bureaucracy will make everything right. However, bureaucracy cannot be abolished without addressing its socio-economic foundation. There is a need to devise an alternative mode of regulating the social metabolic process so as to constrain and ultimately abolish the power of capital. 





Democratisation and Institutional Separation
Marx's plans to reunify the state and civil society are controversial and, indeed, always were. Marx is doing precisely what Hegel contemplated but ultimately rejected, working through the logic of Rousseau's arguments on sovereignty and the general will to see what form they could take. For Hegel, the state and civil society were to be kept distinct; they could never be re-unified (Smith 1989; Dallmyar 1993). What Marx is pursuing is the dissolution of the state and capital as systemically reified domains of action into the everyday world of human relations in society. In other words, Marx is looking to overcome the division between the state and civil society, between what Habermas calls the system world and the life world. Marx develops Hegel on the left, taking up again Rousseau's democratising logic. The Right Hegelians, however, asserted the differentiation of the state and civil society and criticised the left for arguing for de-differentiation (Habermas 1990:352/3).

The position of the Right Hegelians is worth noting given that arguments against the de-differentiation of the state and civil society are becoming increasingly common on the intellectual left (Schecter 1994; Keane1984; Held 1987; Pierson1985; Gorz 1982). There is a powerful case being built up against Marx and Marxism by writers on the left. Socialism is being drawn back to liberal democracy (Aronowitz 1981:258).

The premise of this case is that the state cannot be abolished and that it is desirable that it should not be abolished (Frankel 1983:131; Sekelj 1990:24; O Connor 1991a:27; O Connor 1991b 34/6). It is much better to attempt to democratise the state rather than abolish it. For the social, economic and ecological problems of the modern world ‘cannot be adequately addressed at the local level... Regional, national and international planning are necessary... Furthermore, if we broaden the concept of ecology to include urban environments, or what Marx called “general communal conditions of production”, problems of urban transport and congestion; high rents and housing; drugs and so on, what appear to be local issues amenable to local solutions turn out, in fact, to be global issues pertaining to, e.g., the way that money capital is allocated world-wide’ (O Connor 1991b:34/6).

The state is an integral part of any modern, complex society. Marx agreed, to the extent that he showed that the 'abstraction' of the modern state emerged as part of the modern world. It is the permanence of this modern, complex society that Marx was questioning. If the conditions of the state in an alienated system of labour could be overcome, then the state power could indeed be reabsorbed in civil society.

It is this argument which is being rejected in favour of a recognition of the 'complexity' of the modern world. Where the neo-Bernsteinians write of 'complexity' and assert its permanence, Marxists may refer to alienation and argue for its transcendence.

For the neo-Bernsteinians, any possible socialism can achieve liberty and equality only on the basis of an institutionalised separation of the state from civil society. Any attempt to overcome the division between the state and civil society and hence abolish representative institutions by direct, participatory forms of democracy will result in statist (Pierson 1986:150/1). Paradoxically, then, it turns out to be the anti-statists in theory who turn out to be the statists in practice.

The neo-Bernsteinians reject the view that it is the state-civil society separation that prevents democratisation. They do not accept the state as a form of political alienation and hence, deny that alienation could be overcome by the abolition of the state-civil society distinction. Indeed, more likely, the abolition of this division would encompass all in a general alienation.

For Nicos Poulantzas, both Social Democracy and Leninism were based upon political strategies which issued in forms of 'authoritarian statism'. Marxists of a libertarian persuasion would agree. Poulantzas, however, moves in a different direction. Poulantzas argues against the statist snares of Social Democracy and Leninism by arguing for the defence of existing liberties and democratic institutions. For Poulantzas, despite the differences between Social Democracy and Communism, the two share a fundamental complicity ‘marked by statism and profound distrust of mass initiatives'. Both Social Democracy and Communism issue. . in a 'techno-bureaucratic statism of the experts' (Poulantzas 1980:251). He seeks to extend democratic control in society whilst being sensitive to potential lapses into statism. Although the designation neo-Bernsteinian is a little loose, Poulantzas does present the common, unifying theme of a number of diverse writers on the left concerning democratic socialist theory.

The neo-Bernsteinians are solidly opposed to the Communist direct assault on the state power. Here they are aware that the Communists, reflecting ambiguities and omissions in Lenin's own thinking, reinforce the state power even while dispensing with representative forms and political liberties in the name of democracy. Against this, the neo-Bernsteinians make the liberal argument for the delimitation of the state power, for the state's power of intervention in civil society to be defined and codified. This return to the liberal instrumentalist conception of the state - the state as a form for protection - is alien to Marx's thought, but it does characterise an increasingly prevalent conception amongst democratic socialist/left theorists. In the line leading from Poulantzas, these theorists argue that the state is not a 'thing' that can be occupied or possessed, it is not an institution to be seized or smashed. Again, libertarian Marxists could agree and could condemn 'seize’ and 'smash' theories of the state for the way that, in fetishizing the state power, they actually prepare the way for reinforcing the state power (Corrigan, Ramsay and Sayer 1978:7/13). But this is not the direction taken by the neo-Bernsteinians. Indeed, more typical is Boris Frankel’s castigation of 'the abstract utopianism of stateless socialism' (Frankel 1983:181).

The neo-Bernsteinians thus come to argue that what defines statism is not the existence of the state, which is affirmed as necessary to modern society, but those political strategies which seek to abolish the state. This applies to the 'Utopians' but also to the Communists who continue to assert the withering away of the state as they reinforce the state power, who are therefore evasive on the nature of the state and how its power is to be delineated, and who argue that socialism is to emerge through the state and its institutions.

These criticisms repudiate the positions of both the libertarian and the authoritarian Marxists. There would appear to be no other direction to take than liberal democracy. This is an inadequate way of defining Poulantzas' position, which looks to combine representative and direct forms of democracy in such a way as to combine the arguments of those who argue for differentiation and de-differentiation. But by far the most common argument is that which focuses upon the relation between the state and civil society which asserts the necessary connection of the one to the other, which sees totalitarianism and utopianism as two sides of the same coin and which stresses the necessity of maintaining the state and civil society as autonomous spheres in their own right. The state thus exists to guarantee the independent activity of civil society.
For Gorz it is imperative to 'dissociate power from domination, keeping the first where necessary, doing away with the latter everywhere and upholding the specific autonomies of civil society, the political society and the state' (Gorz 1982:35). 

Habermas is quite clear and distinct on this point. Attempts to abolish relations of domination must concentrate on the life world and accept the necessity of a system world organised by the steering media of money and power. This comes directly to the critical issue - power, its alienation and the possibility or otherwise for its reappropriation. What Habermas refers to as steering media - money and power – pertain to the state and capital as alienated social powers. Habermas, it could be argued, has naturalised capitalist relations by affirming the inevitability of the state and capital as functional to the operation of the social system. Perhaps ‘functional power’ is necessary (Gorz 1982:65); but it is alienated power that is in Marx's critical sights. Habermas argues that restitution is impossible; the system world and the life world will remain distinct. But, from Marx's perspective, this entails human self-alienation and the continued subjection of human beings to their own powers; human beings will not be self-determining but systematically controlled from the outside.

As regards the state and civil society relation, their separation is also affirmed. Thus Held and Keane argue that:

without a secure and independent civil society of autonomous, public bodies, goals such as freedom and equality, participatory planning and community decision-making will be nothing but empty slogans. But without the protective, redistributive and conflicting mediating functions of the state, struggles to transform civil society will become ghettoised and divided, or will spawn their own, new forms of inequality.

D Held and J Keane, 'Socialism and the Limits of State Action', in J Curran ed. The Future of the Left 176.

What these arguments all mean is that the left has to acknowledge that the state cannot be abolished and that attempts to abolish the state will reproduce all the worst aspects of the state power whilst eliminating the various guarantees and protections preserving political and civil liberty. Thus, arguments for the continued existence of the state also argue that the power of the state must be strictly delimited and codified. This, it has to be stated, is not a new project at all. This is the classic liberal argument for delimiting the power of the state, whose existence is considered a necessary evil. Gorz restates this case when he argues for 'the existence of a state separate from civil society, able both to codify objective necessities in the form of law and to assure its implementation’. This is the essential prerequisite to the autonomy of civil society and the emergence of an area outside the spheres of heteronomy in which a variety of modes of production, modes of life and forms of cooperation can be experimented with according to individual desires (Gorz 1982:35). O Connor (1982a:27) argues for the democratisation of the state rather than its abolition. He argues for the necessity of the state given that economic and ecological problems cannot be resolved at local level (1991b:34/6). It follows from this that the only project available to the left is to democratise the state and civil society, a ‘double democratisation’ as Held aptly characterises it (Held 1987). 

Democratisation - Reformist and Marxist

It is this project of reforming or democratising the state and civil society as distinct, institutionally separated spheres that is so problematical from a Marxist perspective and which will be scrutinised here.

The case for the formalised differentiation between the state and civil society is now being made against Marx's case for de-differentiation. However, we have to question just how far democratisation can go under the constraints that the democratic socialist theorists have imposed upon themselves. For John Keane true democracy in Marx's terms is impossible. Marx's understanding of democracy has to be rejected. Keane here expresses the common view of the democratic theorists. The conditions which Marx establishes for true democracy abolition of class and private property, abolition of scarcity and production of abundance, elimination of conflict and recovery of true self - appear extremely unlikely (Pierson 1986:28/9). It is wiser, therefore, to abandon unrealistic hopes and strengthen the mechanisms and institutions for decision making and conflict resolution. Political institutions are necessary to restrain power, exercise constraint over individuals, protect liberties and establish democratic forms for resolving the conflicts that will still occur. The political problem cannot be wished away by the assertion that classlessness equals harmony equals statelessness.





Keane argues that the democratic procedures of political institutions are to be protected and extended (Keane in McLellan and Sayers 1991). This, in contrast to the concern to abolish this political realm in the pursuit of true democracy. The pluralism of civil society means that there is every reason to suggest that the need for decision making and conflict resolving mechanisms will be as important in a socialist society and maybe even more important. It is for this reason that one may insist upon defining Marx's project not as entailing the 'end of politics' but as the repoliticisation of society. There is every good reason to argue that, for Marx, the political will remain an integral part of true democracy, that there will be extensive public spaces for dealing with conflicts and for reaching decisions (McLennan 1989), that, in short, there is every reason to argue that political and civil liberties, having been stripped of their bourgeois character, will be realised in a genuine universality. The criticisms of the democratic socialist theorists can therefore be acknowledged as raising issues of genuine importance. The burden of proof is on the Marxist, pointing to the need to highlight Marx's relation to political liberalism (Wood ISJ 2:35 Summer 1987:136/7).

The perspective on the democratic socialist theorists remains critical. For the retention of the state-civil society separation amounts to the preservation of political and social alienation. Where Keane calls for the weakening of all public and private monopolies so as to achieve 'the establishment and strengthening of spheres of autonomous public life’ (Keane in Pierson 1986:181), someone following Marx's perspective would argue that such 'monopolies' are better formulated as alienated social power taking the form of the state and capital, the fetish systems of politics and production which are maintained, by alienative and exploitative relations. The autonomy that Keane pursues against monopoly will fall continuously against these relations.

There is some suggestion that the democratic theorists more than half suspect the odds against their project. Keane himself recognises the obstacles. Bobbio, too, has become fairly pessimistic (Anderson 1992:125/9).

What needs to be argued from Marx's perspective is that the neo-Bernsteinian model of ‘double democratisation’ not only underestimates the disabling impact of the systematic division between the economic and the political but actually makes this division the very premise of their project. This, perhaps, is the single most decisive point that reveals the contradictory nature of the project of democratisation that preserves the formalised differentiation of the state and civil society.

The model of a gradual reform of political structures and the institutions of civil society fails to grasp the extent to which the formalised division between the political and the economic under bourgeois society systematically blocks democracy and democratisation. The emphasis on the democratisation of the state ignores the fact that the power of the capitalist class is private and economic. The democratization of civil society must look to subordinate the mechanisms and processes of accumulation, investment and production - and the 'coercive laws' generated - to conscious democratic control.

To fail to attack private power and asymmetrical relations of class power is to be clearly evasive, something which the likes of Dahl and Lindblom accept as the failure of the old pluralism (Lindblom 1977:163/9 193; Dahl and Lindblom 1976 Preface xxxvi/xxxvii xxxvii). And, to be fair, Dahl does, however, point out that it is 'rather absurd' to argue that the conventional pluralists considered that groups are equally open, equally resourced groups with equal access to the political process (Dahl 1982:208/9).

To pursue democratisation in such a way as to make class power subject to political controversy, intervention and alteration moves beyond the reformist perspective of the neo-Bernsteinians. The very real barriers to democratisation presented by alienative relations could be overcome only by fundamental social transformation.

For Marx, no amount of 'double democratisation' could alter the alienated character of the state and civil society. The democratic socialist project amounts to an attempt to reform the alien powers which, for a truly democratic socialist society, need to be abolished by being reappropriated. True democracy entails a civil society invested with governmental power - i.e. legitimate as against coercive political power and this means overcoming the state-civil society dualism. There are those for whom this means also the 'end of politics' (Polan 1985; Schwartz 1996) but it would be more adequate to call this the ‘end of the state’. Marx, indeed, can be presented in terms of the realisation of politics so that all as individuals can participate in a public life as active citizens whereas formerly they were passive citizens of the state.

This presentation of true democracy has remained a central target for Marx's liberal critics, and has now been targeted by left/democratic socialist writers. But those who argue that the future for socialism now lies in completing the project of liberal democracy (e.g. Donald Sassoon) need to consider the implications of Macpherson's point that the liberal democratic state was liberal well before it was democratic (Macpherson 1966:9/10). As Perry Anderson argued, parliament is an institution formed by the propertied for the defence of property (Anderson 1980:204). This alone should raise a question mark against the attempts to democratise the state, about the nature of the state to be democratised and the character of the society that the state serves to protect. There is a strong suspicion that the democratic socialist theorists are failing to get to the roots of the matter, and are therefore unable to criticise the state as the institutional expression of social alienation and are thus condemned to pursue their project of democratisation within the sphere of alienation.

The Intransigence of Social Institutions

As the twentieth century progressed and as the perversion and degeneration of state socialism became apparent there was a growing appreciation of the complexity of the social totality and the extent to which society is resistant to revolutionary socialist transformation.

Amongst the first revolutionary socialists to appreciate what may be called the intransigence of social institutions was Antonio Gramsci. He was a supporter of the Bolshevik Revolution, but he came to question its relevance to the West as a model of revolution. For, in the West, the state is more complex and massive whilst the rule of the bourgeoisie is mediated through the hegemony it exercises through the institutions of civil society. To ensure the success of the socialist revolution, it would be necessary to subvert bourgeois hegemony within civil society. The development of a proletarian counter-hegemony is to be achieved through sustained class struggle, both material and intellectual, undermining bourgeois rule in all its forms.

Where the interests of the working class are articulated and organised within bourgeois society, the social democratic parties and the trade unions operating within the institutional and structural constraints of the bourgeois state politics and class relations of production, it is necessary to win workers to new, genuinely proletarian forms of material organisation before the question of the power of the state can be posed. Thus Gramsci justifies the creation of a revolutionary party capable of acting to organise the class so as to be able to pose the question of the state power.

Gramsci thus demonstrated an awareness of how bourgeois rule had been secured in social, cultural and institutional forms in the civil sphere. The implication is that the power of the capitalist class did not depend simply upon the state power and would not simply be broken by seizing or smashing the state power. The recognition of the resistance of bourgeois society to socialist transformation raised some difficult questions for the revolutionary-emancipatory project, certainly for the traditional politics of labour and the left.

This is to acknowledge the troublesome questions facing socialism in the modern world. The questions are not simply economic but are social and involve institutions, processes and practices which evade easy alteration or capture. Indeed, at the level of relationships, there is nothing to be captured. This evasiveness of class power deprives the socialist movement of a target, of an object to be captured.

More than this there is the intransigence of social institutions. 'The system’ itself, independent of classes, appears to be in control. The complexity of the social totality renders it increasingly immune to revolutionary transformation by means of the traditional political agencies of labour.

To Gramsci's 'hegemony' one may add Lukacs' 'reification’, Adorno's ‘administered society’, Marcuse's 'one dimensional man' and 'affirmative culture', Althusser's 'state ideological apparatuses', Lefebvre's 'everyday life’, so as to demonstrate the greater depth to which the revolutionary-emancipatory project of socialism must reach to. As the twentieth century progressed it became apparent that socialists had better prepare for what Gramsci had conceptualised as a long 'war of position' before the ‘war of manoeuvre’ could be fought with a real prospect of victory.

The Bureaucratic Conception of Politics 

And the Way that it Instrumentalises Individuals in Totalising Representations and Collectivising Politics 

The subject of this discussion is the instrumentalisation and collectivisation of the individual for the purposes of an alien form of control. Such control is necessarily bureaucratic. The perspective of Marxism is commonly associated with control in the economic sphere. Thus Stephen Marglin has argued that the character and the development of the factories was a result not of their technical efficiency but on account of the social control they allowed the capitalist to exercise over the workforce. Rather than concentrate upon this case.

Such control extended to the political sphere, as evidenced by the increasing subjection of the individual, atomised and isolated in civil society, to the bureaucratic unity imposed by the state. This has implications as regards the socialist project itself. For the socialist movement has, historically, been entangled in this bureaucratisation of control in politics and economics. 'The party’ is itself no less an agency of bureaucratisation as the state, as Weber had argued. The alienated party form of organisation suppressed the emancipatory character of socialism and degraded socialism into being merely part of the process of modern development.

A rational control in the sense of the bureaucratic, collectivist management of the productive forces and society is not the object of the socialist movement. The rational control pursued by Marx is not a technical or institutional one but emancipatory, the recovery by human beings of their alienated social powers to achieve social self-government.

One can draw the analogy here between the religiosity as the control of the individual, internal as well as external, and the bureaucratised control of the modern world. Alienation implies that not only are human beings governed by their own powers, subject to self-made constraints, but that they have rationalised this position as normal and natural. This internalisation of external constraints may be described as the religiosity that human beings must learn to overthrow, must want to overthrow, if human freedom is to be realised. My argument proceeds from a study of control in the form of religiosity and provides the opportunity for the critique of the religiosity of individuals as an expression of human self-estrangement.

Religiosity may be described as the institutionalised, bureaucratised form of alien control which has come to be internalised by human beings. It is not merely the rationalisation but the self-rationalisation of alienation, the participation by individuals in the ideological project of institutions imposing a collective unity.

The word 'religion' itself derives from 'religio', signifying both rule and regulation. This 'religion’ is intended to bind individuals to the social body. Religion may itself begin by expressing certain longings, certain emotional needs, as Marx argued in the 'opium of the people' passage. Nevertheless, religion becomes intellectualised and institutionalised through the work of theologians and priests. As a result, religion comes to be relocated away from the binding of the everyday world of individuals to the 'ideal' level of the state for means of bureaucratic control. Where once religion was a self-administered opium it now becomes part of an administrative control imposed upon the everyday life world for purposes of rule and regulation.





Alien Politics and the Religiosity of the Working Class
These comments need to be related to the reality of human self-estrangement. But there are also the implications as regards the socialist project of this religiosity. For the need to overcome the dualism of leaders and led so as to realise the principle of proletarian self-emancipation requires that this 'religiosity' as expressed by the proletariat is overcome. The proletariat must constitute itself as the revolutionary class subject. Its failure to do so implies a substitutionism in which the class comes to rely upon an agency not actually its own; the working class requires its own organic leaders. Socialism, which emerges as the self-consciousness of the class in their everyday social world, is intellectualised and institutionalised by the theologians and priests of 'the party' agency. As a result, rule and regulation, far from being overthrown, are reinforced.

The continuing 'religiosity’ of the working class is expressed in the supposed need for the 'revolutionary' party. It is, however, such a party which is the vehicle of religiosity, with its rules and regulations disciplining the class subject under a leadership and reducing the class to the status of a political process that has become external to it. Such a party vehicle wages the abstract class struggle, not for purposes of self-affirmation and self-actualisation, but for class revenge and resentment.

Such a politics of rule and regulation is no substitute to the alien politics of the modern world but part of such a politics. This explains the domination of authoritarian-elitist socialist parties, revolutionary and reformist, which have become vehicles of mere revenge, fighting the struggle of riches and poverty, as opposed to human freedom in social relationships, an affirmative politics. The working class ceases to be the revolutionary class subject capable of transforming its existence and becomes instead a mass of poor that needs to be fought for. In turn, this degraded and devalued 'mass' comes to sea in these parties a church which will lead to the socialist millennium.


For their part, the bureaucrats of politics and knowledge, entrenched in the parties and the unions, have every interest in reinforcing religiosity, for they are the agents of rule and regulation and owe their office, to the administrative control which follows. They can never, therefore, redeem their socialist promise. They exist by drawing socialism away from the everyday life world into the institutional world; they therefore act to block every act of emancipation on the part of the class; the class is now allowed to be autonomous of the rule and regulation instituted in the name of 'socialism'.

To the old religiosity intellectualised and institutionalised by the theologians and the priests has been added that political religiosity associated with the state. There is also a need to underline the extent to which socialism itself has been drawn into this state politics with the intellectualisation and institutionalisation of socialism under the theoreticians and the politicians.

An emancipatory socialist project may be outlined by the progressive abolition of alienation with the elimination of religiosity both in the working class and its acceptance of agents acting on its behalf and in the rule and regulation of the institutional world. Every attempt on the part of the proletariat to act for itself may be interpreted as an indication on the part of the class of that self-activity necessary to self-emancipation.

Marx himself writes of class consciousness when referring to the self-constitution of the proletariat as a class subject. Autonomy is a matter of human beings coming to assume responsibility for the world around them, being able to see themselves in the world that they have created. It may be apposite to refer to class consciousness in terms of class capacity. The capacity to act for themselves, the capacity to intervene as subject, the capacity to subvert the hold of religiosity, the capacity to overturn the rule and regulation imposed, from above: in sum the capacity to constitute ones autonomy and subjectivity.


Religiosity is the crucial accompaniment of human self-alienation and ensures that human beings fall under the bureaucratic control of an instrumentalising and collectivising agency established within the sphere of institutionalised alien power, denying human autonomy. This religiosity, however, exists within the working class itself as a dominated, exploited object feeling the need to be led and represented and ruled.

Thus, religiosity is not merely a component of the theologians and priests of the institutional world but also of the socialist parties and of the working class as passive mass. There is, therefore, religiosity in general, associated, with human self-estrangement and generating the need for and acceptance of the rule and regulation of administered control from above. It is this, also, which induces the working class to rely on an agency over and above its own self-activity, blocking its own autonomous development. Religiosity is the basis for and the expression of intellectualisation and institutionalisation, something which is expressed also within the socialist movement.

The struggle for proletarian autonomy and subjectivity rests upon the principle of proletarian self-emancipation as against the self-contradictory notion of emancipation from the outside/from above. That latter temptation within the socialist movement feeds off and reinforces religiosity, the religiosity of 'the masses' becoming the religiosity of the institutionalised agency.

Socialism began from within the efforts of the working class to emancipate itself. This autonomous movement, however, was intellectualised and institutionalised in the relocation of socialism from the social to the political realm. The working class was delivered - in part, on account of its own religiosity, delivered itself - into the hands of a collectivising, instrumentalising and bureaucratising elite.

The struggle for proletarian autonomy and subjectivity is an emancipatory-revolutionary struggle in which the proletariat overcomes its own religiosity and looks to destroy its institutional and intellectual expression in rule and regulation. With the collapse of party-state socialism, of socialism intellectualised and institutionalised under the bureaucratic control of theologians and priests, it is increasingly possible for the proletariat to recover that faith in itself as the revolutionary subject which subverts religiosity and hence the position of those who would instrumentalise the class - the alienated agencies of party and union.

29 SOCIAL SELF-DETERMINATION VERSUS CAPITAL'S NECESSITY

Communism, for Marx, is implicit in the development of the capitalist mode of production. It is 'the real movement’ immanent in existing society:

Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence. 

Marx GI 1999: 56-57

The task is to ‘free these wealth producing powers from the infamous shackles of monopoly, and subject them to the joint control of the producers, who, till now, allowed the very products of their hands to turn against them, and be transformed into as many instruments of their own subjugation'. 'The labouring classes have conquered nature; they have now to conquer man' (1954:58).

For Marx, capitalist development involved the profound transformation in the basic forms of social life, in relationships, community and individuality.

However, the emancipatory potentials of capitalist development are blocked within capitalist relations. The potential for self-determination cannot be liberated for so long as human life is subject to the external, objective determinism of the capital system and capitalist imperatives.

For Marx, the independence obtained by 'the economy' in relation to society rests upon increasing abstraction in the nexus of social relationships. The modern 'free' individual is the product of a social division of labour giving rise to the commodity form. The 'abstract individual' of liberal thought and politics arises out of that which constitutes individuals in the concrete, their social relationships mediated in the form of things. Marx argues that the 'sheer, blank individuality' of the modern individual expresses the fact that the 'content of the human being' has become 'the plaything of alien powers' (Marx OJQ EW 1975:220).

It may be argued that what characterises the capital system is less class and the class struggle and less the constant change in which all that is solid melts into air; more fundamental than both is the alienation which underpins the human experience in the modern world. And this is at the heart of capital’s social metabolic order of alien control.

Alien Control
Marx's emancipatory-critical project takes the standpoint of 'real' individuals over the constraining relations in which these individuals are placed. Marx's is a project of transcending liberalism by replacing the abstract, fictitious individual of the liberal with the real individual. Marx developed and sustained an emancipatory-critical project that was to achieve human comprehension and control through a social transformation which proceeds from the premise of real individuals in their real relationships.

Marx thus proceeds from the standpoint of the practices and aspirations of actual individuals. This attempt to grasp the creative, constitutive role of human subjects behind the immediacy of alienative relations represents an attempt to discern the human roots of the positive, objective constraints of a fetishistic social world. In looking to expose the condition of alienation in which social identity comes to confront the individual in the form of an external object, Marx also presents a critique of liberalism.

Marx's critique of political economy is also the critique of the alienated world theorised by political economy. Marx attacks liberal thought and politics at its roots. The 'abstract' individual is the product of modern, developed social relations which have atomised society. Marx, moreover, looks to establish an alternative foundation for a thought and politics which takes the standpoint of the real individual. There is, then, an emancipatory core to Marx's critique in the sense that it proceeds from the premise of the real individual and seeks to relate society and its forms to this real individual.

It is arguable that Marxism itself has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to ignore Marx's real achievement in this field. Almost immediately, with 'orthodoxy', Marxism succumbed to the siren voice of 'science’, presenting an economic determinism which, in the name of 'scientific socialism', actually rationalised the alienation of the capitalist system as a world which operated by its own immanent laws. Marxism became the science of historical laws. The result was a split within Marxism between Marxism as a new political economy on the one hand and Marxism as a moralistic repudiation of capitalism, a split between objectivism and subjectivism.

In its dominant forms Marxism has not developed Marx's own critique of liberal thought, society and politics so as to replace the abstract with the real individual whose concrete collectivity constitutes society. Instead, Marxism has been involved in creating abstract collectivities of its own, within which the individual has continued to be confronted by social-human power in alien form. The view taken of Marx here, then, is critical of the abstraction of the individual and of social relations in both liberal thought, society and politics and in the Marxist/socialist failure to transcend liberalism.

The Monopolisation of Power/Alienation of Control
The key figure for Marx is separation, in so far as this is expressed in terms of alienation within the mode of production. Political and economic power refers to the power of the state and of capital as alienated social powers, powers which have been expropriated from human society and invested in an institutional-systemic world raised above society and possessing laws of its own.

Political and economic power as something to be possessed by individuals, groups and classes, refers to the monopolisation of the means of law making, administration and production. Political power is monopoly over force, real and not merely legal and legitimate force. Economic power derives from separation from the means of production enabling control over the means of production, a monopolisation backed up by the state and its actual and legal force.

One comes to the frequently expressed feeling that the world is governed by external forces, that communities of human beings are subject to powers they neither understand nor control. This reality has its roots in the inversion of subject and object. With human beings reduced to the status of objects as these objects acquire an autonomous significance of their own. It is a paradox to which R.H. Tawney referred when arguing that economic activity is merely a means to higher ends whereas, in the modern world, it has become an end in itself. The economy has become everything and human beings have been reduced to mere means, involving a systematic economic determinism which is no less despotic than the power exercised by the most powerful of states. Whilst liberals equate the emancipation of private property from conscious communal or political control with individual freedom, Marx shows that this involves the subjection of all individuals to the economy as an autonomous sphere.

Power is monopolised. The free market rests upon the greatest monopoly of all, that of the means of production by the capitalist class. The separation of the workers from their means of production is crucial in creating the class of formal labour without which capital could not exist. This economic monopoly of the means of production forms the counterpart to the political monopoly of the means of administering society. As Marx showed, the abstraction of the modern state and the private property system emerged as part of the same process. And they can only be abolished together as a singular process.
It is the colonisation of human society by capitalism which is the crucial agency of 'modernisation’, its nexus of (abstract) relationships and, above all, its objective determinism. Capitalism lies at the very heart of the process of abstraction which removes control from human beings and confronts individuals with abstract collectivities.

Human Self-Determination Versus Objective Determinism
The question is one of opposing human self-determination through a genuine social control to the external determinism exercised by the alien control of the state and capital. Under this social control determinism would cease to operate. Engels himself addressed this question in a letter of 1894, arguing that, under socialism, the economic would diminish in its importance. Of course. For the independence attained by 'the economic’ characterises capitalism and its determinism. Socialism, subjecting human powers to social control, entails the ending of this autonomy of the economic. Economic determinism should be considered as a species of alienation. The alienated system of production under capital has eliminated human subjectivity from the world.

The abolition of capital is thus the recovery of subjectivity and, as such, brings conscious human purpose to bear over the objective determination of 'the economic' under the capital system. With the conscious control of the associated producers, human consciousness would be asserted over 'external' forces. Lukacs, in 'The Changing Function of Historical Materialism’, argues that the realisation of the Marxist project implies the domination of the superstructure over the base' (Lukacs 1971:223/256) though this may be better expressed as the integration of superstructure and base.

The abolition of capital is the abolition of the objective determinism of 'the economic' over the social (Lukacs 1991:98 125 126 144). Lukacs thus argues for the humanization of labour under socialism:

There it is the economic, the objective, that must bend and accommodate man, the subjective. Under socialism, the subjective rules the objective. Under socialism, the mode of human labor, must-correspond to the species being of man, and the being of man is made the criteria; and guiding principle for the organisation of the condition of labor.




Capital is alienated social power and is to be dissolved as such. The recovery of human subjectivity through the emancipation and humanization of labour is also the remoralisation of the world. It also means the abolition of the dualisms and separations which characterise bourgeois society and liberal thought and politics.

Scientific Socialism as the Rationalisation of Alienation
The view I develop entails the repudiation of that 'orthodox’ Marxism that succumbed to the determinism and reductionism inherent in the scientific and sociological project. My argument is that 'science’ and, 'theory' have to be related to Marx's emancipatory-critical commitment to a defetishised social world. If this relation is not attained then Marxism risks being wrecked on the twin reefs of objectivism and subjectivism, voluntarism and fatalism. As a result, society comes to be analysed and rationalised as a system governed by its own inexorable, 'laws'. Society is conceived as a quasi-natural datum.

 There is, in this 'scientific socialism', a split between freedom and necessity, which means that the socialist goal is conceived either as an historical inevitability or as a question of ethics. This is the dualism between scientism and moralism which characterised the Marxism of the Second International. It is against such a Marxism that Lukacs pointed out that Marx, in following Hegel, had overcome this split into fatalism and voluntarism. Rather, for Marx, there is a unity of theory and practice and of freedom and necessity in the practical-critical activity which changes the world.

The crucial fact of this activity for Marx is that the world is constituted through human agency. For this reason, social reality is not a natural, objective datum external to human consciousness and control and operating according to 'laws' of its own. Rather, the social world is created and shaped by human agency. The problem is that with alienation human beings do not experience the social world as the product of their own practical activity, but as a determining force that is external and hostile to them. The individual is confronted not by their own social relationships but by these relationships in abstract form and appearing external. The task of practical-critical activity is to overcome the fetishistic character of the social world so that human beings become conscious of this world as the 'product of their own social praxis.'

To summarize: under alienative relations social relationships become abstract to the real individual and are mediated in the form of 'things'. These 'things' are the creations of human practice which come to be invested with an existential significance of their own; they become alien powers which exert themselves, over and against the human subjects whose products they are. This indicates the alienated condition of the social world. 'Things' acquire an independent existence and become 'external' and 'objective’, with 'laws' of their own, over against the human, beings who produced them. Thus the economic determinism ascribed to Marx belongs to the capital system as an alienated social world. 

Determinism in Marx
Marx's own materialism is built on a socio-economic analysis but also entails an emancipatory critique of the capitalist mode of production and of the alienation/determinism inherent in this mode of production. Marx's criticism is not directed against greedy, exploitative capitalists but, rather, against the narrow aim of the self-expansion of values which is intrinsic to the capital system and which is a systemic imperative imposed upon the capitalists to accumulate capital. The determinism of the capital system as an alienated system of production is such that it is highly misleading to personalise the issue in terms of particular capitalists. The capital system creates capitalists, not vice versa.

In Capital Marx announced his intention to treat human beings as personifications of economic categories and relations (Preface to the first German edition of Capital I 1954:20/1). And this, indeed, expresses the determinism and dehumanisation characterising the capital system, the fact that objects are in the place of and in control of the human subjects. One needs be sceptical, therefore, of attempts like those of Parsons (Parsons 1977) to apportion 'blame' according to the distribution of power. Such a view assumes that human beings, of whatever class, are in power whereas Marx was demonstrating the systemic imperatives and coercive laws that capital, as power alienated from human beings, exercised over human society.

All power held by human beings within the capital system is derivative. To apportion 'blame' as such gives the impression that, with the right people in power, the character of production relations can be altered. This is the old Fabian fallacy which overlooks the fact that those who control the productive system are as alienated as the workers themselves, at least in the sense of being similarly subject to external imperatives. No capitalist can choose not to expand values. Of course, Marx did argue that they would be comfortable in this alienation, since it served their interests, but that is a different point.

There is a question here of ‘responsibility’. Sartre seeks to make each individual responsible for their compliance or otherwise with the system. This is radical in the sense of treating individuals as subjects. However, 'the system’ is greater than any individual and has obtained an independence from all individuals. Chiodi brings out the dangers of Sartre's position:





 In The German Ideology Marx focuses upon how relations escape human control and obtain an existential significance in themselves (1970:83 86/9). This situation cannot be altered by individual choice. As regards 'blame’, it needs to be underlined that the alienated social system is not under the conscious control of human beings. Only such a control, which is Marx's objective, would make notions of responsibility and blame meaningful. One can identify and attack the capitalist class. Rooting out the capital system so as to prevent the emergence of the capitalist class is more difficult.

Marx's Critique of Alienated Power
Marx's critique of alienated labour and of the way that political economy naturalises what should be historicised culminate in his critical analysis of the fetishism of commodities and the trinity formula (Parekh 1982:100 104/5 106 115 119). Marx argues that both property and the individual become the private individual and private property on the basis of a mode of production in which the supply of social labour is achieved indirectly through the alienated form of value. That is, the supply of social labour is coordinated through the form of the exchange of the products of labour as values. The apparent form of exchange as the exchange of things between the private owners of property is to be explained, therefore, as the fetishised form of appearance taken by the social relations between, individuals. The exchange relation cart only be understood in relation to the specific social relations it is an expression of the form of exchange can only be explained in terms of its social content.

This is something that political economy that cannot do given that it serves to conceal this social content by naturalising socially and historically specific and transitory relations and by assigning social powers to 'things' themselves. The definition of the mode of production in technologist rather than social terms, similarly, is the fetishised form of appearance taken by capitalist social relations of production in which the production of things is subordinated to the production, appropriation and accumulation of surplus value. This surplus value is the alienated form of surplus labour (Clarke 1991:208).

Thus, for Marx, 'the productive forces appear as a world for themselves, quite independent of and divorced from the individuals ... whose forces they are’ (Marx GI 1970:91/2). It is through this alienation that human beings' own controlling, collective capacities, their own powers, are alienated from them, and come to be manifested as the attributes of the 'things' themselves.

It is this alienation which is the foundation of the individualism of the modern world: 





Individuals come to appear to be independent of each other precisely because their mutual dependency in modern social relations has assumed the apparent form of relations between things. Human beings cannot, given this abstraction, recognise their relations between each other. These relations assume 'the fantastic form of relations between things' (Marx 1954:77 pt 1 ch 1 sect, 4). It is under these relations that 'the economic’ assumes an existence of its own, operating by its own immanent 'laws' and independently of human beings. The economic sphere now exists as an autonomous sphere and, as such, is capable of existing as an object for a political economy theorising its immanent 'laws'. 'The economy' has become independent of individual and communal control and thus exists and is experienced as an external sphere governed by laws of its own. Thus, what Marx writes of in terms of 'fetishism’ depicts not subjective illusion on the part of human beings but expresses the way that reality actually is. Fetishism is inherent in an inverted social reality and is not a category error.

‘Reification is the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something else than human products - such as facts of nature results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will. Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world and, further, that the dialectic between man, the producer and his products is lost to consciousness. The reified world is, by definition, a dehumanised world. It is experienced by man as a strange facticity, an opus alienum over which he has no control rather than as the opus proprium of his own productive activity’ (Berger and Luckman 1967:89).

What human beings cannot appreciate as their own products must come to be experienced as constraints upon their productive activity and, as such, prevents human autonomy and self-actualisation, alienating the human subject from the world and from themselves.

Translating the perspective presented by Berger and Luckman back into Marx's terms, one must relate the productive activity of human beings, and its alienation, to the concept of labour power. What the working class sell, and alienate, is their labour power. Through this, the capitalist class is able to appropriate surplus labour from the working class so as to accumulate capital. The 'reification' which refers to the way in which the objectified essential powers of human beings are removed from human control and come to oppose human beings as external powers, become class exploitation based upon the private appropriation of socially produced wealth through the private ownership of the means of production. 

Abstraction and Modernity 
These alien powers are the new gods to be appeased and propitiated, to be flattered and served in politics and economics. Human affairs are in the lap of the gods. For, like the gods, these alienated products govern the world and settle human destinies as mysterious forces. The great difference is that, unlike the fictitious gods of religion, these modern gods are far from being imaginary forces. Human beings, in an alienated social world, are everywhere prostrated before impersonal modern deities. Weber's renascent modern deities demand human sacrifice in a world subject to the tyranny of abstraction. The number of individuals who have been killed and maimed in the twentieth century indicates a catastrophe of such scale that it cannot be accidental, but must be in some way prepared, organised for (Aronson 1983:3 7/9).

In this context, Sayer's words are pertinent:





This testifies not only to the awesome power of modern forces but also to the idealistic violence entailed by the tyranny of abstraction. In one sense human society is, as Aronson has argued, overdeveloped (Aronson 1983). But human beings have not risen, ethically, to the level of their powers, or, more accurately, these powers have been abstracted from them, have become ethically, communally and humanly unfettered, and have come, in consequence, to do violence against reality.

One thinks here of Horkheimer and Adorno. These had Weber's disenchanted gods rising from their graves to take the form of impersonal forces engaged in irreconcilable struggles as devils (Adorno and Horkheimer 1972; Weber From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 1965:148; Habermas 1990:110).

But these modern deities or devils are the alien powers of humankind coming to act against human beings. The demand for human sacrifice need not be cloaked in religious terms. It is explained by alienation, that relation between human beings and the product of human activity in which the product comes to acquire an objective and independent existence over against human interests and purposes, threatening the life and liberty of the human agents.

The modern deities are the alienated social powers of human beings themselves. If human beings are the playthings of alien powers, they are the playthings of their own powers in alienated form and hence are capable of acting to alter their condition of impotence. This is the case for conscious control over 'anarchy’ that Marx makes.

30 SOLIDARY SELF-DETERMINATION
Through emancipation, human society will no longer be subject to the domination of coercive, external laws immanent in 'the system’ as an autonomous sphere abstracted from human beings. Instead, human powers will no longer be alienated but will be practically reappropriated and subject to a genuine social control. ‘Freedom in this field can only consist In socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with mature: bringing it under their common control instead of being ruled by it as the blind forces of nature’ (Marx Capital III 820).

From this we obtain:
 
1 freedom - a definition 
2 socialised man - the organising principle of the future society 
3 associated producers - the subject 
4 rational regulation - an ethical rather than technical conception 
5 the nature-society interchange as contrary to domination 
6 common control versus the external determinism of alienated powers.

The opposition of human self-determination to the external, objective determinism of the alienated social world amounts to an assertion of the everyday life world of individuals, as the real world of reciprocity and exchange, over the institutional-systemic world. One thus needs to define Marx's Marxism as an affirmative materialism in terms of a self-conscious social praxis in which the solidary self-determination of each and all, enabling individual self-actualisation, takes the place of external determinism. 

What is recovered by conceiving Marx's Marxism as revolutionary-critical praxis are the critical-emancipatory themes that a scientific-rationalising Marxism, caught up within the fetishistic social world and its 'laws', had extinguished. This distinction between an emancipatory-critical Marxism and a scientific-nationalising Marxism (which draws upon but does not strictly follow Gouldner's (1980) distinction critical and scientific Marxism) makes the distinction between what may be called the emancipatory-reconciling dimensions and the constraining-alienating dimensions of the process of capitalist rationalisation and modernisation.

The implication is that 'scientific' Marxism has, in approaching the social world as an object of study and theorising, has come to be entangled in the fetishism of this world. This entanglement is paradoxical in that Marxism itself comes to express and rationalise, in the name of 'scientific socialism’, the very determinism which is inherent in the alienated world.

The ever expanding power of the soulless political machine, which polices the life of the individual from birth to death, places, ever greater obstacles in the way of the solidaristic self-determination of human beings, of 'socialised man’. This extinguishes every possibility for self-actualisation as it proceeds. An institutional-systemic world in which the lives of individuals are sacrificed to functional imperatives divorced from the everyday life world must, of necessity, come to dissolve and destroy all the social bonds which sustain human reciprocity, solidarity and exchange.

The transformation of the specific social relations constraining-oppressive-alienative - must be the result of the conscious self-activity of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject. For it is the proletariat which possesses the structural capacity to act to transform society so that human beings come to recover their alienated social powers. This is to insist upon the capital-labour dialectic as the precise form of human self-alienation in the modern world. It is for the proletariat, as the active principle in this self-alienation, to act to abolish this alienated condition.

This process of emancipation is to be characterised in terms of opposing solidaristic self-determination to external, systemic determinism. Human society need not be governed by blind determinist forces since these forces are their own powers in alienated form. The 'objective’ and the 'economic' as an autonomous sphere operating beyond human control can be abolished by a process of practical reappropriation resulting in their subordination to conscious human control.

Active Materialism - The Democratisation of Philosophy, Politics and Power

One comes back to the principles of active materialism that Marx elaborated in the Theses on Feuerbach, rejecting the authoritarian-elitist approach to knowledge, power and politics in favour of a thoroughly democratic conception in which 'the educator must himself be educated'. Marx is justifying an activist orientation on the part of the human subject in relation to their self-made social world, to 'circumstances', and to their politics and representation.

The socialism that Marx conceives entails the conscious control of social existence and hence as a social self-determination over against the systemic external determinism to which the everyday life world is subject in conditions of alienation. Educating the educator implies that the principle of self-education is at the heart of the emancipatory process by which society is subject to conscious control (Lukacs 1991:97/8).

This democratisation of politics, philosophy and power has as its objective the self-governing society in which human beings have been reunited with their powers, their relations, with each other. It is a re-empowerment that is the recovery of solidarity.

Marx's revolutionary-critical praxis as a 'democratisation’ abolishes the old authoritarian-elitist relation between the educators, and the educated, between human beings and their circumstances/those claiming insight into circumstances. Marx's active materialism critically appropriates the achievement of idealist philosophy in developing the active side of subjectivity and, in so doing, takes its leave of Enlightenment or philosophical materialism and its conservative and authoritarian implication. Human beings are the active producers of their circumstances, not the passive products of circumstances. The revolutionary principle lies in human agency, not in circumstances. It is human agency which revolutionises circumstances, not the circumstances which revolutionise human beings.

Marx has no need, as did the old materialism, to divide society into two, an elite raised above the general determinism as an 'ideal’ on the one hand and a mass subject to the general determinism, and hence to the initiative of the ideal agency - state, party, educators of all kinds - on the other hand. The fact is that 'the educators', those claiming to monopolise insight into circumstances, must also be educated by the praxis which actually changes and shapes circumstances. The position of the bureaucrats of knowledge and power is subverted in favour of the revolutionary human agency which actually transforms the social world.

It is in dissolving these authoritarian relationships that the actively democratic aspect of Marx's emancipatory project is apparent. Marx's active materialism thus stands as a critique of every reversion to an 'ideal' or 'ideal' agency which claims to have escaped the general determinism and which alone claims to be in a position to educate a determinist reality. Marx is, then, rooting out the idealism implicit in the old determinist, philosophical materialism. Marx repudiates the deterministic epistemology and conservative-authoritarian implications of a materialism that could not account for social change and which retained its connection with revolutionary transformation only by a recourse to an idealism breaking the materialist premise.

Marx's praxis as an active materialism affirms that the world is not an objective datum but is shaped by human agency and shot through with human consciousness. Marx is not and cannot be an historical determinist, presenting everything that happens in history as the automatic and inevitable outcome of some autonomous objective evolution. For Marx, 'the economic' is never the sole basis of human development and, indeed, only appears to be the determining, autonomous power of the social world under alienated social conditions.

The whole point of Marx's emancipatory project is to subject this external, independent world of 'things' to the conscious control of the human agents. Marx is concerned with freedom as human self-determination and this requires not merely the development of human powers but the conscious control of these powers by human beings. Marx's praxis, clearly, is qualitatively distinct from the merely technological and economic conception of power.

The social world, its forms, relations, powers and laws which exist externally to and independently of human beings, appears as an 'objective' world. This 'objective’ social world possesses inherent systemic processes and laws which unfold and exert themselves as an external determinism that is inherent in an objective world that is beyond human comprehension and control. Human beings live in subordination to these objective processes and laws, within the immediacy of constraining social relations.

Marx's praxis as democratisation takes human beings to be active beings affirming their essential powers in their everyday world. Praxis transforms the objectified powers and objective products of human labour as conscious life activity into objects that are consciously created and controlled by human beings as their own products oriented towards fulfilling human purposes.

Marx's praxis establishes the political and intellectual framework which enables human beings to realise their subjectivity within the objectivity. The objective world is to be conceived in terms of the objectified subjectivity of human beings. Human beings affirm themselves in the world that they have created. This is the conquest of solidaristic self-determination over the external and alien objectivity which subjects human society to a systemic determinism.

Practical-Sensuous Experience vs. Capital's External-Abstract Determinism

Human emancipation means that society will no longer be subject to the determinism of 'external' powers and laws.

Freedom, in this sphere, can consist only in this, that socialized man, the associated producers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human nature. But this always remains a realm of necessity. The true realm of freedom, the development of human powers as an end in itself, begins beyond it, though it can only flourish with this realm of necessity as its basis. The reduction of the working day is the basic prerequisite. 

Marx C3 1981 ch 48

Marx thus defines freedom in terms of a self-determination exercised by 'socialized man’ over against the external economic determinism exercised over society. Hence the case is made for rational regulation and common control as against the control exercised by blind forces.

Marx's materialism is against idealism and utopianism and against doctrines of inevitability. Marx insisted upon underlining the creative, constitutive role of human agency in being able to act upon society and nature in order to transform them in order to make them meet human purpose. 

Marx's freedom is not freedom over and against the objective material world. This repeats the dualism of subject and object which denies freedom. Rather, since the objects of this world are the objectified essential powers of the human subject, then human beings realise themselves in this material world. Freedom is not freedom from the material world, in the sense of human beings asserting their purposes against it, apart from it. Freedom occurs in and through this objective material world, transforming this world from within.

Marx's materialism is distinct from the 'orthodox' Marxism codified in the late nineteenth century. What Marx argues is that the capitalist mode of production has developed the productive forces to an unprecedented extent, creating the potential to emancipate human beings from bondage to natural laws and making it possible to move from a, subjection to necessity, natural and social, to freedom as self-determination. The capitalist mode of production, however, rests upon certain contradictory dynamics which must necessarily prevent cooperative social labour from being realised.

Marx's Marxism envisages liberating the productive forces from capitalist relations and then using them in a way that capitalism could not. Thus, 'we should try to imagine and build technical regimes compatible with freedom, social justice and other key political ends' (Winner 1986). This would comprise production under 'socialized men’, the 'associated producers', which has become a material possibility.

The stress upon Marx's praxis as an affirmative, active materialism underlines the importance of sensuous-practical experience. It asserts the fundamental incompatibility of the nature of the individual and society with the sociological project, the inherent determinism of which expresses the objective determinism of the fetishistic social world.

However, at this stage, it should be emphasised that Marx's praxis as an affirmative materialism goes deeper than the proletariat and proletarian autonomy. The organisation of the productive activity of human beings to enable social self-determination needs to be located within a wider framework of individual and social embodiment.

The emphasis, then, is upon the centrality of sensuous-practical experience within Marx's concept of praxis as an affirmative and active materialism. One has considered Marx's critique of the fetishised social world against Weber's depiction of modern society as an 'iron cage', Adorno's view of an 'administered society' and Foucault's concept of the panopticon society. The human being has become the object of modern forms of rationalisation and regulation, standardisation and abstracted control. This may be considered as a disempowerment and disembodiment, the removal of powers from the human being and the deflation of the everyday life world of human beings. Marx's materialism looks to recover these powers from the institutional-systemic world raised above the heads and practices and values - solidaristic - of real individuals.

Marx's emancipatory project is thus one of restitution (Lukacs 1991:98 125). It may be argued that Marx's view of the material world of the individual and society is entirely incompatible with the projects of sociology and economics, with bourgeois social science, which have come to rationalise as an object the existing fetishistic social world.

My argument contains a number of themes concerning Marx’s emancipatory-critical project:

1.	the role of sensuous-practical experience; 
2.	the emphasis upon society as the everyday reality of reciprocity, need and interaction of and between individuals as opposed to the heavenly, abstract world of political society; 
3.	the stress upon true democracy as entailing the dissolution of existing state and civil society, with their abstracted, mediated form of control; 
4.	the critique of abstracted knowledge and consciousness as the intellectualisation of everyday reality, of abstracted control as the institutionalisation and systematisation of the reality of human beings, the external regulation of real individuals and their human relations. 

I argue that Marx's affirmative materialism is oriented towards recovering power from the institutional-systemic world and to embodying it in the world of real individuals and real society (Lukacs 1991:144).

By placing an emphasis upon Marx's concern with sensuous activity, social practices and material embodiment, a centrality is assigned to praxis as an active and affirmative project concerning the social self-determination and authenticity of real individuals, as social and individual embodiment. This is to argue for an interpretation which underlines praxis as the sensuous engagement of human beings with their environment, enabling individuals to affirm their existence as individual human beings.

Marx's emphasis is upon the primacy of the sensuous-practical experience of reality in the everyday social world over against the abstract world in an intellectualised and institutionalised power opposes human beings as external force. Marx is fundamentally a materialist thinker, not in the sense of apprehending the 'objective’ laws, processes and structures of the alienated social world - which is how 'scientific socialism' came to present itself - but in terms of defining an emancipatory-critical project in which alienated human-social powers are practically reappropriated and invested in the life world. This enables a materialist embodiment at the level of the real life world of individuals.

These arguments are full of relevance and meaning when one considers the attempts to reinvigorate Marxism by 'rational choice’ individualism. Marxism, however, has a much richer conception of the individual available to it, one which avoids the reductionism and abstraction of an analytical individualism.

 Frankly, Marx's affirmative and active materialism makes a clean break with the social determination of the individual; which is implicit in all projects of social scientific knowledge. Marx's is a critique of a fetishistic social world and the theories which give expression to the fetishism of this world. As such, Marx's position is to be distinguished from bourgeois social science.

Marx's appropriation is a human appropriation of the world and is thus to be distinguished from the possessive relationship between human beings and their objects which characterises bourgeois society Marx's authentic, embodied, empowered individual is clearly distinct from the egoistic being postulated in the possessive individualism of bourgeois society.
The intention is to develop Marx's materialism in such a way as to stand against alienated intellectualised and institutionalised power which renders human society and individuals objects of control, targets for the state power. This emphasis upon real individuals and society and upon empowerment and embodiment as proceeding at the level of the everyday life world sets Marx's stress upon the proletariat and upon class praxis within the wider framework of praxis as an active and affirmative materialism which restores the social world to human control. This is to locate the concept of praxis in a notion of empowerment and embodiment that is greater than the political and economic action of a class.

The idea of praxis as self-affirming and as affirmative activity on the part of human beings enables Marx to steer a course between the instrumentalism of the fetishistic institutional world and the subjectivism and romanticism of the anti-institutionalists. It is not a case of arguing for the freedom of the human subject against the objective world, the institutional-systemic world opposed to human purpose and will, but of enabling human beings to appreciate this world as their own and hence realise their freedom through this objective world.

Marx cautions against setting 'society’ up again as an abstraction over against the individual. With the dissolution of community, in the modern bourgeois world, Marx is aware of the search for a new community and of the tendency of human beings to project their communal essence upwards and outwards to create an ideal community. Marx thus condemns the state as the 'illusory community’ in The German Ideology. Marx's caution was that one should refuse to place a substitute in the space left by the dissolution of community as a form of compensation.

Both sociology and political movements, including socialism, have suffered from a predilection to reify concepts and hence have facilitated the institutionalisation of social practices at a remove from the practitioners. This has led to the instrumentalisation of the people. The purpose of Marx's materialism is to stress the world of sensuous-practical experience and to seek to reempower this world so as to realise a genuine community grounded in the solidarity and reciprocity of the affirming socialising individual.

This quest for the recovery of the sensuous-practical aspect of real life over the abstracted existence of human beings as passively determined objects of alien powers represents general approach towards what human beings are and what the good life for human beings is. Marx is seeking the genuine community as a habitus which would correspond to the needs not merely of the social individual but of the free individual. Marx's stress on individuality is so strong as to affirm the dissolution of all social and political forms which inhibit rather than enhance individual development (Forbes 1990).

Here again, Marx's emphasis upon self-realisation within a social context, i.e. of each and all, is important in not merely distancing Marx from state socialism but in developing a critique of the standardisation and regulation which is inherent in modernity itself and of which state socialism has been merely a development of in the world of real individuals and real society (Lukacs 1991:144).

By placing an emphasis upon Marx's concern with sensuous activity, social practices and material embodiment, a centrality is assigned to praxis as an active and affirmative project concerning the social self-determination and authenticity of real individuals, as social and individual embodiment. This is to argue for an interpretation which underlines praxis as the sensuous engagement of human beings with their environment, enabling individuals to affirm their existence as individual human beings.

Marx’s emphasis is upon the primacy of the sensuous-practical experience of reality in the everyday social world over against the abstract world in an intellectualised and institutionalised power opposes human beings as external force. Marx is fundamentally a materialist thinker, not in the sense of apprehending the 'objective’ laws, processes and structures of the alienated social world - which is how 'scientific socialism’ came to present itself - but in terms of defining an emancipatory-critical project in which alienated human-social powers are practically reappropriated and invested in the life world. This enables a materialist embodiment at the level of the real life world of individuals.

These arguments are full of relevance and meaning when one considers the attempts to reinvigorate Marxism by 'rational choice' individualism. Marxism, however, has a much richer conception of the individual available to it, one which avoids the reductionism and abstraction of an analytical individualism. Frankly, Marx's affirmative and active materialism makes a clean break with the social determination of the individual which is implicit in all projects of social scientific knowledge. Marx’s critique is directed against the fetishistic social world and the theories which give expression to the fetishism of this world. As such, Marx's position is to be distinguished from bourgeois social science.

Marx’s appropriation is a human appropriation of the world and is thus to be distinguished from the possessive relationship between human beings and their objects which characterises bourgeois society. Marx's authentic, embodied, empowered individual is clearly distinct from the egoistic being postulated in the possessive individualism of bourgeois society.

Marx's materialism is to be developed in such a way as to stand against alienated intellectualised and institutionalised power which renders human society and individuals objects of control, targets for the state power. This emphasis upon real individuals and society and upon empowerment and embodiment as proceeding at the level of the everyday life world is the anthropological basis of Marx's emphasis upon the proletariat. Marx's dialectical critique of abstraction and the tyranny of abstractions locating the abstracting process in the alienated powers of human beings, showing the original purposes for which these powers were exercised, and how, through alienative relations, they were redirected, recomposed and opposed to human beings.

Following this conception of a self-affirming and affirmative materialism one can proceed to analyse the social and political forms which human beings engender according to a view of 'social being'. This 'social being' needs to be interpreted widely. That is, it is far too narrow and restricted a notion to relate social being to class, labour and existing relations of production. Marx, after all, is seeking the dissolution of all three things so as to realise an authentic social being.

Social being is thus not to be reduced to being a narrowly economic category, which is how it has tended to be read in 'economist’ versions of Marxism. This interpretation may be understandable given Marx's stress upon class and social relations. However, the roots of Marx's 'scientific' materialism pertaining to the specific mode of production are to be located in this notion of praxis as an affirmative material emphasising the sensuous and the practical aspects of human society.

One has to relate social being to the notion of the practical agency of human beings. Social being is crucial to the notion of embodiment and empowerment; it is the practical, conscious, sensuous activity of the human agents determining the social and political forms rooted in the habitus of the everyday world. The emancipatory struggles and practices of human beings, then, are not simply grounded in the class relations of production, i.e. restricted to economic forms and issues, but pertain to the endeavours of human beings as social beings to obtain control of their practical existence.

Conscious, Collective Control of Social Relations
The most crucial and fundamental question that lies at the heart of Marx's emancipatory project concerns that of how relations between human beings come to assume the alienated form of relations between things.

How is it that personal interests always develop against the will of individuals into class interests, into common interests which acquire independent existence in relation to the individual persons, and in their independence assume the form of general interests? How is it that as such they come into contradiction with actual individuals and in this contradiction, by which they are defined as general interests, they can be conceived by consciousness as ideal and even as religious, holy interests? How is it that in this process of private interests acquiring independent existence as class interests the personal behaviour of the individual is bound to undergo substantiation, alienation and at the same time exists as a power independent of him and without him, created by intercourse, and becomes transformed into social relations, into a series of powers which determine and subordinate the individual and which therefore appear in the imagination as 'holy' powers?

Marx The German Ideology 1999:103/4

Marx answers these questions in terms of a critique of the capital system as an alienated system of production, as a system which rests upon the alienation of labour. Human self-alienation takes precise form within the capital system. It is the capitalist mode of production which establishes the foundation for the other forms of estrangement within the modern world and which forms the terrain for the general separation which expropriates the power of control from human society and which gives the forces of modernity, the modern deities, their remote, awesome force. 





These passages in The German Ideology, and there are others on this theme in the Grundrisse, should be underlined in terms of their significance in defining Marx's communism as a project oriented towards realising a genuine social control over human relations (Meszaros 1989:64; Miliband 1989:213/7; Miliband 1994:10/1). It is to overcome the independent existence of alienated powers and the systemic determinism it imposes upon human society that Marx's communist project is directed. Marx's communism concerns the need to develop a political and intellectual project in which the question of social relationships can be posed.

The question is of how the 'anarchic' relations of the capital system, i.e. the systemically regulated relations as opposed to socially self-regulating relations of anarchism, can be brought under control so as to create the genuinely self-governing society of active citizens (Meszaros 1995:xxi 32/3 39 41/2 72 93 296 789 818 837/8; Post 1996:224/5 226 227; Makdisi et al 1996:8 Surin in Makdisi et al 1996:195/6). This is to oppose human autonomy to the autonomy of their relations. Such a project becomes the centre for the emancipatory struggles and practices of the real world, through which these struggles and practices may be canalised towards the socialist objective.

The modern division of labour constitutes commodity producers as autonomous subjects but does so in a specific sense. The labour of these commodity producers is, both in appearance and in reality, private. They therefore come to act independently of each other on the basis of egoistic or rational calculation of returns.









What characterises capitalism, for Marx, is the form in which this social connectedness takes place. Sociality is not directly nor immediately personal, as in the pre-bourgeois world and nor does it take the form of 'the all-round development of the individuals and the subordination of their communal, social productivity' (Marx Gr 1973: 156), which is how Marx conceived social relatedness under communism. Under capitalism 'individuals now only produce for and within society'. As capitalism develops so production becomes increasingly socialised and exchange becomes globalised. But 'their production is not directly social, not the offspring of association distributing labour within itself. The individuals are subsumed under social production, which exists outside them as their fate; but social production is not subsumed under the individuals who manage it' (Marx Gr 1973: 159).





Relations of personal dependency come to be replaced by relations of impersonal dependency, the universal dependency of all upon external relations under capitalism. Marx is thus exploring the theme of human self-alienation, the estrangement of human products from human beings and their control.

Marx characterises modern society as a world in which 'relations of personal dependence’ have been replaced by 'personal independence founded on objective dependence’ (Marx Grundrisse 1973:158). This personal independence, then, is a universal human dependence mediated by things. Given the 'purely atomic’ character of commodity production, individuals are isolated from each other and their 'relations to each other assume a material character independent of their actions and conscious individual action' (Capital I 92/3). This is a topsy turvy enchanted world in which subject and object are inverted and social relations appear as a natural, unalterable facticity rather than as the product of human agency.

Marx's criticism, however, contains a positive aspect. Relations of personal dependence are the first social forms in which human productivity is developed.





Again, this free individuality transcends class. One appreciates how praxis as an affirmative materialism cannot be reduced to class and labour but, rather, seeks their dissolution into a community of free individuals. This is an important point. For Marx, class and the class designation come to be imposed upon individuals (Marx GI 1999: 82/6). David Selbourne makes this point, only against Marx and Marxism, by referring to the way that terms like the 'working class' actually imprison 'the individual’, 'confine him to it [his role within the division of labour] in a hated thraldom supervised both by capital and by the socialist intellectual’: 'the human-as-worker is trapped by socialist, and especially Marxist theory within categories and structures of argument which have always referred only to a part, and a shrinking part, of individual function' (Selbourne 1984:70/1).

But it is not Marx and Marxism which imposes the class designation. The imposition of class and the imprisonment of the individual within the class designation is not a conceptual or political process but derives from capitalist class relations. This is all part of the process in which social identity comes to confront individuals in alienated forms. Class is distinctively a modern social relationship. It is the product of the transition from relations of personal dependence to relations of personal independence mediated by things, to objective dependency. It is property in commodities, capital and labour, which define class and which, therefore, underlines class as a modern phenomenon, as part of Marx's second stage. Moving on to the third stage means the dissolution of class with the dissolution of objective dependency. Praxis cannot, therefore, be reduced to class and labour but must be conceived in terms of their dissolution in the realisation of the embodied and empowered community of free individuals.

Enselfment And Empowerment
Marx's quest for the embodied and empowered community of free individuals rests upon a conception of human nature, what human beings are and what the good life for human beings would be. Marx is searching for a habitus compatible with the fulfilment of the needs and the exercise of the powers not merely of the social individual but, further, of the free individual. Here, again, Marx's emancipatory project of the human-social reappropriation and reorganisation of alienated powers is important in developing a critique of an institutional-systemic world which has proceeded to incarcerate the autonomous individual within the rationalisation and regulation of the iron cage/administered society/panopticism, subjecting the individual to social bureaucratic relations and involving the individual in a network of disciplines which police them from the cradle to the grave (Donzelot 1979).

With the increasing awareness that the world is increasingly regulated and controlled by an overarching bureaucratic structure in which centralised agencies detail, document, register and discipline the individual, the stress upon free individuality, autonomy and authenticity is timely. The great irony is that the old liberal concern with the loss of autonomy and privacy, the increase of regulation, the spread of uniformity and conformity, as a result of the centralising and bureaucratising and, indeed, of democratising forces (in a 'mass') sense may well be best taken up by a movement inspired by the central themes of Marx's critique on an alienated institutional-systemic world.

With individual and social empowerment and embodiment one comes to enselfment and Marx's notion of human self-realisation. Again, the concept of praxis is crucial. The concept of enselfment rests upon the view of human beings as knowledgeable and transformative agents. Their practical activity changing the world demonstrates the capacity for consciousness and self-consciousness connected with the objective world and their individuality as agents. Human beings affirm their humanity through their agency.

The concept of praxis as practical-conscious activity involves the notion of human empowerment and enselfment. The relocation of power back into individual and society involves increasing the capacity of human beings as thinking and acting agents able to conceive and realise certain desirable conditions in the realisation of their human ends. The notion of empowerment and enselfment is thus integral to Marx's praxis as an active and affirmative materialism.

This presentation of Marx's materialism in activist and life-affirmative terms provides an alternative to the deterministic scientific or sociological materialism which has, politically and academically, passed for Marxism. This 'scientific' materialism rationalises the determinism of an alienated social world, its 'objective’ laws, structures and processes, by reinforcing the separation of this facticity from human agency.






The Critique of Alien Politics

31 MARX'S EMANCIPATORY POLITICS

Marx can he read as progressively moving towards the idea of a stateless society from a position in which he affirmed the idea of the ethical state. Thus, Marx proceeded to show that Hegel's ethical totality, the starts as ethical agency, could be realised only as the self-organising, stateless society. Thus, in the initial stages, Marx adopted the concept of the state as ethical agency synthesising the liberty of the individual and the universal will of the whole. Marx's examination of social reality led him to appreciate the extent to which the state could not function as Hegel's ethical agency and, instead, had become the surrogate of material interests. What may be described as Hegel's principle of the state was contradicted by the reality of the state.

As opposed to the ideal of ethical agency, reality showed that private interests had cloaked themselves in the general interest. Marx proceeded to develop this contradiction between the principle of the state and the reality of the state in terms of a distinction between political emancipation on the one hand and human emancipation in general on the other hand. In Marx's view political emancipation is an emancipation within the limitations of the abstract state. Human emancipation in general required social transformation. Thus Marx contrasted the formal equality and freedom of the abstract state with the reality of inequality and unfreedom in society. The communal and universal significance of the abstract citizenship of the state was denied by asocial and particularistic civil society.

In exposing the alienated social character of the state itself, Marx argued that human emancipation in general demanded the abolition of the state along with private property. Thus the state, as the institutional expression of social alienation, could not, as Hegel thought, overcome the diremption of civil society and create an ethical totality. This ethical principle could be realised only through removing the source of social alienation. Hence, the abolition of the state, capital and wage labour is part of the same process realising human emancipation in general.

One can develop these themes by arguing that what Marx had in mind was something akin to a modern polis democracy. The model of direct political participation, overcoming abstract representation and the division into rulers and ruled, is central to Marx's thought.

In effect, Marx took up again Rousseau's legacy, in light of the way in which Hegel had sought to develop it in relation to the modern state. Marx turned to the critique of the modern state, looking to embody its abstract citizenship in individual relationships in society. He interpreted universal suffrage as the attempt of civil society to make itself political society, which in turn implied the disappearance of the state. It is an intoxicating vision of a directly democratic politics which Hegel, following Rousseau, considered but ultimately rejected as Utopian. Marx took up this polis ideal again but did not seek to apply it to the modern state, which is where Hegel stalled, but to modern society and the possibilities for the stateless community (Turner 1993:79).

The State as Political Alienation 

The Critique of Representation

The intention here is to proceed from Marx's own writings on state, democracy and socialism, showing how Marx criticises the way that the state arrogates the common interest to itself, monopolising and corrupting political life in the process. Marx is shown to define a conception of commune democracy against the parasitic state structure. The recovery of Marx's Marxism thus proceeds by stressing its origins in the critique of political alienation, with the concern with economic exploitation coming later. This allows the recovery of the themes of citizenship, democracy, community and empowerment which have been apt to be lost under a class politics that has tended towards economism.

Marx's work on the state, democracy and socialism span his critique of Hegel's political philosophy and his critique of German Social Democracy. The argument here is that there is a consistency to this vast body of work, however, much there may be different emphases in different parts of the work at different stages of its development. Cowling puts the case for 'two Marxes', so significant is the difference exhibited by Marx at different stages of his intellectual development (Cowling in Cowling and Wilde ed.1989:14/28).

One may indeed find a Marx to suit ones political practice, from revolutionary syndicalist to statist social democracy, from spontaneism to vanguardism. But if one is really concerned with Marx's own position then it is essential to understand how his socialism emerged from an emancipatory commitment which Marx developed through his critique of Hegel's political philosophy and his examination of the relations between the political and the civil spheres in the modern world. This may well take the form of a 'what Marx really said' discussion. More interesting than this, however, may be the attempt to recover the importance of Marx’s early critique of Hegel's political philosophy and of the state-civil society relations which it expressed, something which Gramsci could be said to have done (Boggs 1984; Germino 1990; Showstack Sassoon 1987).

One thus comes to understand how Marx proceeded from the political alienation of the state to the social alienation of capital, grasping the roots of Marx's later class politics in the early attempts to measure the ideal of the ethico-rational community against reality. This therefore becomes part of an attempt to establish community, democracy and empowerment as the central themes of Marx's politics, themes which, arguably, are all to be relegated to a secondary position in a class politics that focuses upon economics, interests and exploitation. It is not to deny the latter but to root them in a deeper, principled framework.

One can thus agree that one of the weaknesses of orthodox Marxism has been 'to privilege the struggle against exploitation over the fight to overcome alienation' (Aronowitz 1981:300). Aronowitz goes too far when arguing that alienation 'is really the problematic of late capitalism just as exploitation was crucial for the intensive regime of industrialism' (Aronowitz 1981:300). For alienation, for Marx, is the problematic of capitalism by definition, early and late, just as exploitation too is as much a characteristic of late capitalism as of early capitalism. Alienation and exploitation are not alternatives hut two sides of the same coin (Adams in Carver ed.1991:268).

Nevertheless Aronowitz raises questions of loss of control and of empowerment and makes the normative case for direct democracy against representative democracy in terms of empowerment (Aronowitz 1981:300). This may, perhaps, remind us that the idea of an active, informed citizenry educating themselves through political participation represents an advanced strand of liberal/republican thought and can be found in Rousseau, Mill, Wollstonecraft, and Jefferson, an actively democratic politics as a mechanism of moral self-development (Held 1987:86; Macpherson 1977:ch 2; Dunn 1979:51/3; Padover ed.1989:19/30).

Going back and establishing the critique and abolition of political alienation as central to Marx's emancipatory project shows the possibility of developing class politics in terms that stress democratic and communal values rather than merely reducing Marxism to the clash of material and class interests.

The State as Alienated Social Power
One can certainly establish the continuity from the critique of Hegel's political philosophy with his writings on France up to and after the Empire. The state as an alienated social power thus gave rise to the notion of the parasite state (Hunt 1984:27/63). Marx is concerned to show the extent to which the parasite state arrogated to itself the common interests of society. Through both army and officialdom, the Imperial state came to monopolise political life. The centralisation of power and the monopolisation of politics showed an aspect of the general disempowerment and depoliticisation of society in the modern world (Thomas 1994:17). It is the implications for a proletarian revolutionary politics that are most interesting. Marx outlines the features of a radical democracy. The coercive and bureaucratic apparatus of the state is to be broken up and replaced by worker officials and a citizen militia. The workers thus take back for society the common interests that the state had severed from society in the first place.
Thus, in the Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx develops the notion of the state as an alienated social power into the state as parasitic upon the social body (Marx SS 1973:186 237/8; Marx 1974:250/1 247). Marx praised the Paris Commune as a solution to the problem of this parasitism.





With the critique of the parasite state Marx proceeds to outline that democratic society which was given living form by the Paris Commune, 'the political form at last discovered in which to work out the economic emancipation of labour' (Marx 1974:252/3). Thus, political and social struggles added to, refined and sharpened Marx's general conception of the state as an alienated social power and contributed to the way that Marx conceived the transition to and the character of the socialist society. The search for the ethico-rational political community, which Marx took up in 1843, thus took the form of commune democracy (Hunt 1984:134 146/7).

Marx's integration of the state as ethical agency, the state as alienated social power, the state as surrogate of material interests, the revolutions of 1848, the proletarian movement, the Imperial state, the Paris Commune and the attempt to form workers socialist parties show how Marx conceived the depoliticisation and disempowerment of society under the modern state and the possibility for the repoliticisation and empowerment of society (Levine in Lukacs 1991; Thomas 1994:18).

Far from being a statist, as liberals and anarchists constantly allege, Marx is able to explain the state power and suggest its abolition through being able to identify the historical process in which the state has emerged and by which the state may disappear (Marx 1974:212; Gilbert 1981:268/9). Liberals and anarchists may constantly criticise the state but, lacking this sense of process, are powerless to put an end to the state power. Marx can be found attacking taxation as vociferously as any liberal, but Marx is able to go further than the liberals in proposing the abolition of the state and being able to do so by arguing for the abolition of the material conditions which give rise to the state.

The bourgeois state is nothing but a mutual insurance pact of the bourgeois class both against its members taken individually and against the exploited class; this insurance becomes inevitably more and more costly and, in appearance, more and more independent vis-a-vis bourgeois society, for it is more and more difficult to bridle the exploited class. . . .
The abolition of the state only has a meaning for communists as a necessary result of the suppression of classes whose disappearance automatically entails the disappearance of the need for an organised power of one class for the suppression of another. 

Review of E. Girardin, Socialism and Taxes (Paris, 1850); MEW vii 288, in McLelIan 1971:192).

In The German Ideology, Marx shows how the bourgeoisie needs and creates the state and cannot dispense with the state without putting an end to their class power (Marx and Engels 1970:80; Marx 1974:248). Marx, in The Eighteenth Brumaire, describes the suffocation of society under the parasite state in terms as vociferous as any anarchist, referring to 'an immense bureaucratic and military organisation, an ingenious and broadly based state machinery, and an array of half a million officials alongside the actual army, which numbers a further half million’ (Marx 1977:237).





The French Revolution carried this process of centralisation further and Napoleon proceeded to perfect the state machinery. The corollary of this process is the disempowerment of society.





It follows from this that 'the self-activity of the individual members, of society’ is to cease as the subject for governmental activity and he reempowered in society. It also follows that Marx is looking to distinguish the socialist revolution from all previous revolutions which have reinforced the state power instead of smashing it and which saw the state power not as a parasite to be destroyed but as the spoils of political victory (Marx 1974:248/9). Marx thus argued that the proletarian revolution would put an end to the old parasite state. He conceives the transition to socialism in terms of a process of repoliticisation and empowerment in which the state power is reabsorbed into society. The Paris Commune gave living form to many of Marx's ideas here and showed Marx how professional politicians and officials - the 'state priests' - could be replaced by worker officials and citizen militia's (Gilbert 1981; Hunt 1984).

What needs to be done is to show how this democratization, for Marx, entails the abolition of the separation of the state from civil society, hence the abolition of the state and capital as alienated social powers. This is a quite different notion to that democratization of the state and of civil society as two institutionally distinct spheres which is proposed by some as the only feasible project available to the left (Keane and Held). This, in Marx's terms, would amount to an attempt to democratise the 'State parasite without attacking the root causes of this parasitism.'

What may be called the neo-Bernsteinian turn (Aronowitz 1981:206) amounts to an attempt to redefining socialism in terms of completing the project of liberal democracy actually preserves political and social alienation, the state and capital, the very forces behind the loss of control, disempowerment and depoliticisation. The idea of democratising these alienated structures is patently a self-contradictory one. If the re-examination of Marx's political writings served no other purpose than to expose the deficiencies of this attempt to democratise alien powers then it would be an eminently worthwhile enterprise. But, of course, there are more positive things to be gleaned from these writings, a still vibrant conception of democracy and community.

The Critique of Hegel
Marx's critique of Hegel's doctrine of the state proceeds from the argument that 'the political state is an abstraction from civil society’ (Marx 1975:145). Marx examines Hegel's idea of the state as an ethical agency that is able to overcome the diremption of civil society. For Marx, however, far from overcoming the self-alienated life, Hegel's state is its confirmation. Hegel's attempted reconciliation is achieved through the sublation of civil society in the state. But, Marx argues, this leaves the conditions of alienation intact. The state, far from being the ethical agency, is the institutional expression of social alienation and cannot, for this reason, act as the vehicle for overcoming the self-alienated life (Clarke 1991:53/4; Smith 1996:63; Suchting 1983:20; Meszaros 1995:157/8 158; Thomas 1994:31 155; Schecter 1994:5/6 121; Cleaver 1979:138; Bonefeld et al 1995:169/70 170).

Hence Marx's critique of Hegel's political philosophy sets out to show just how Hegel's idea of the state as the ethical agency could be realised in the form of the self-organising society (Habermas 1990:62). Thus Marx shows that if the state is to operate as Hegel's ethical agency, that is, as the authentic expression of the social morality that defines the human being, it must cease to exist as the abstraction separated from and opposed to real human beings. This means that the separation of the state from civil society is to be abolished.

What Marx soon appreciated, then, is that if human communal attributes are expressed in the abstracted and alienated sphere of the state, this implies that these attributes are denied in an atomistic and asocial civil society (Marx 1975:145, 146/7). The state thus exists as a form of compensation which in no way overcomes the antagonism and egoism of civil society but, rather, confirms it (Clarke 1991:55/6).

Hegel's merit, Marx argues, lies in conceiving 'the separation of the state from civil society as a contradiction. The mistake he makes is to rest content with the semblance of a resolution which he declares to be the real thing' (Marx 1975:141). Thus the separation of the state from civil society, which characterises the modern world, is understood by Hegel as a contradiction demanding resolution. Marx sees merit in Hegel here. What Marx does dispute is that Hegel can offer a genuine reconciliation of this contradiction. For Marx, the diremption of civil society cannot be resolved in the higher unity of the state. Hegel has inverted the real relation between the state and civil society. It is not the state which has created civil society but civil society which has created the state. Marx goes on to show that the whole institutional framework proposed by Hegel ends up by mediating the conflicting interests of civil society rather than resolving them in an ethical totality (Marx 1975:160). Far from transcending particular interests and resolving them in a higher synthesis, the modern state actually preserves the particular interests of private property against the common interest (Marx 1975:167/8). 

Hegel argued that the antagonistic, divisive and particularistic forces in civil society could be reconciled only in the political state as ethical community (Schechter 1994:5). Marx’s argument against this is that the state cannot transcend civil society as a sphere of universal antagonism and egoism. It is not the state which creates civil society; it is civil society which creates the state. Hegel's attempt to end diremption at the level of the state cannot achieve a genuine reconciliation. The state merely confirms the conflict and particularism of this society and is the institutional expression of its ruptured ethical life.

Whilst Marx criticises the liberal representative state, he certainly considers it an advance over the political arrangements of the Middle Ages, (Marx 1975:90). The political state, however, cannot furnish the institutional basis for the reconciled life. Thus Marx began to examine the form that Hegel's ethical totality had to take if the principle of the ethical state was to be realised. Thus Marx conceived the self-organising society in which political and civil society have been merged In a higher unity (Habermas 1990:62). The ‘abstract dualism’ characterising the modern world has been abolished, overcoming the division between state and society, public and private, citoyen and bourgeois.

Marx's critique of Hegel's political doctrine shows that the idea of the ethical totality could be realised only in the form of the self-organising society which has abolished the separation between the state and civil society, between the public and the private, the dichotomy that exists within each individual between the abstract representation of the citizen and the alienated existence of the homme privé (Marx 1975:143/4, 220). Thus Marx shows how Hegel's principle of the ethical state could be realised only in the stateless community.





This perspective shapes the emancipatory character of Marx's project and the approach that Marx takes to the state and capital. Recovering Marx's concern with political alienation is guided by the assumption that the attempt to realise the ethico-rational community is both rational and possible. The most familiar arguments against this attempt (Bobbio 1987), that society is too 'complex' and subject to institutional constraints and functional imperatives can be challenged by showing that political and social alienation lies behind this 'complexity'. ‘Complexity’ is synonymous with the loss of control which gives rise to the project of democratisation.

The argument developed by Marx is that the critique of the abstraction of the state involves also the struggle against capital. It is not that one attacks the alienation expressed by the state and the exploitation embodied in capitalist relations as two distinct processes. The state as the parasite state exploits society just as capital is the power of labour in alienated form. It is to attack both the state and capital for their alienative and exploitative relations separating human beings from their powers and imposing an alien form of control upon society. It is to understand why Marx could argue that 'the modern world is the age of abstract dualism' (Marx 1975:90) and to suggest a way beyond this modern condition.

These insights from Marx are to be developed in order to present socialism in terms of democratisation. It is to show that an alternative to the state centralising socialism which took Marx's name actually exists within Marx and is, indeed, the authentic articulation of his emancipatory politics.

Thus while Marx criticised Hegel for acknowledging the distinction between political and civil society as a contradiction to be overcome by an ethical totality, he nevertheless repudiated Hegel's solution to this contradiction. The antagonism and particularism of civil society could not be overcome by the state and its institutions. From this awareness Marx embarked upon the search for the self-organising society which would establish a genuine unity of political and social relationships. Marx is embarked upon an attempt to bring the public and the private person together, realising citizenship in the real practical lives of individuals.

Marx in time came to put the citizen and the producer together, combing a commitment to the self-government of the producers with a vision of a commune democracy. This development followed Marx's rejection of Hegel's argument that individual liberty and social unity could be established under the authority of the state. As the concentration of alienated social power, the political state could not act as the instrument for democratisation. For this democratisation both the state and capital had to be practically reappropriated by society as alienated social powers and brought under social control. This control, Marx came to understand, had to be constituted by democratic agencies modelled on the Commune (Schechter 1994:121).

The intention of recovering the centrality of political alienation in Marx's emancipatory project lies in establishing how the process of democratisation must be approached if it is to be effective and not ensconced in futile projects attempting to reform alienated political and economic powers, structures and institutions. It is to show what is required to create a socialist society. It is to define Marxism in terms of the repoliticisation of civil society. This is to locate Marx in the anti-centralist tradition which argues that power must be diffused and decentralised, with centralisation pursued from the bottom upwards on the basis of autonomy and self-government.

Marx, therefore, is to be placed on the side of those arguing that social control must be exercised through direct and participatory institutions in which people can actually act as citizens. Such a definition of Marx's socialism is to be sharply distinguished from the bureaucratising and centralising state socialism established in his name. One thus traces the emancipatory themes which distinguish Marx from the top down, statist, socialism from above tradition.

This does not necessarily mean portraying Marx as an anti-statist, for Marx criticised anarchist anti-statism as an inverted statism which makes a fetish of the state (Thomas 1985). Which state? 'The state’ as such is an abstraction. To portray Marx as an anti-statist risks failing to be sensitive to the way that Marx proceeded from the concept of the ethical and rational state. Even in criticising and rejecting the institution of Hegel’s state, Marx adopted its principle as ethical agency and totality. And he used this principle as a critical yardstick with which to evaluate the adequacy or otherwise of particular states: ‘A state which is not the realization of rational freedom is a bad state’ (Marx and Engels Historische Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt, Berlin and Moscow 1927, vol. I, i (i), p. 247). Marx is searching for the potentials for realising this ideal, a project that is inadequately defined as anti-statism.

The Social Reabsorption of State Power
Framing Marx's argument in terms of the reabsorption of the state power into society is of the greatest contemporary relevance given the reactions to the collapse of state socialism. The identification of socialism with the state, to the detriment of the former, is one that can be resisted from within Marx’s writings. Marx may be located in the tradition which identifies socialism not with the state but with the repoliticisation and democratisation of civil society. Marx shows how the power of the state and of capital is alienated social power which may be reappropriated through the transformation of social relations. 

This identifies Marx on the side of those who argue that power is social and, to be exercised by a self-organising society, must be decentralised. Marx is 'totalitarian' in the older sense of arguing for an organic totality based upon the self-movement of the parts. One should draw the parallels between Marx's communism and Gramsci's 'regulated society’ (Gramsci 1971:263). What has been written of Gramsci applies, with little qualification, to Marx.

Gramsci was able to rework the conceptual relation of the state and civil society and, therewith, rework the very concept of a (future) democratic society. In the best possible world, civil society (and not the state) would become the totalized expression of the social at every level: political, economic, militaristic, and so forth. Civil society, the immanent repository of the collective will, would thus 'become' and embody the state. In that sense, as Gramsci succinctly put it, ‘civil society and the State are one and the same'.








This view is quite the contrary of that totalitarianism in which the party develops into the state and encompasses civil society in the process. If there is central theme which distinguishes Marx from an authoritarian and elitist politics, it is the critique of political and economic alienation for the way that it separates human beings from their powers. To establish unity here, so that the objectification of essential powers does not degenerate into alienation is intrinsically a decentralising project (Lukacs 1991:125).

Marx may thus be read against that party-state socialism which, in separating form from agency, does not overcome the separation intrinsic to alienation but, rather, institutionalises it (Thomas 1994:194). Here, Marx may be used to criticise that process in which the political party comes to develop into the state, thus reconstituting and reinforcing the state power. This works entirely in the opposite direction to Marx's project. Where Marx sought to reabsorb the state power into society, the party as this alienated form of organisation comes to subsume civil society and subject civil society to political intervention and control (Habermas 1990:70).

One can reconstruct Marx's argument from his consistent definition of human emancipation/freedom as the complete subordination of the state power to society (On the Jewish Question/Critique of the Gotha Programme) so as to exclude from Marx's conception any identification of his socialism with the project of the state. One may also exclude from Marx's conception, similarly, any identification of the organisational forms he advocated, which did include the political party, with the state. Marx's thought runs in entirely the opposite direction of the state control of society.

One can, therefore, reject criticism of Marx as a state socialist and a totalitarian given that, intrinsic to both, is the reproduction of the abstraction of the state and the subordination of civil society to this abstracted political realm. The concentration of what Marx called the self-activity of society in the hands of the state achieves the merger of the state and civil society at the level of the state and does therefore identify socialism with a bureaucratically ordered society controlled from above (Habermas 1990:70). Marx's socialism does indeed involve the overcoming of the dualism of the state and civil society but this is a project which is to proceed from within civil society and is oriented towards the achievement of the self-organising, repoliticised civil society. This dualism, for Marx, is resolved on the level of civil society. Democratisation takes the place of bureaucratisation. It is a claim that has always been contested. Habermas notes how the Hegelian right as much as the Hegelian left concerned itself with the conflict potential of bourgeois society. But the communist path taken by Marx and his praxis philosophy is rejected decisively.





What is central to Marx's thought, then, is not only that the dualism between political and civil society is to be overcome as progress is made towards true democracy/communism. What also matters is the direction in which one attempts to abolish this project. The new relationship that Marx seeks to establish between the political and the social cannot be imposed institutionally and bureaucratically from above, which is part of Marx's argument against Hegel's attempt to achieve the ethical totality. Rather, Marx develops the implications of the suffrage as the attempt of civil society to make itself political society. A truly adequate representation, which is what political reform attempts to achieve, is possible only by the abolition of the state-civil society separation on the level of civil society.

Marx thus develops a new conception of politics based upon the notions of an active suffrage, citizenship as something embodied in individual relationships in society, principles of self-representation. Marx is looking to integrate social and political relationships so as to develop a repoliticised society possessing public spaces in which the citizenry as a whole are able to participate in political activity (Thomas 1994:17; McLennan 1989:124).

In 1871 Marx reaffirmed his view of 1843. The socialist revolution is not to be identified with transferring the state power from one set of rulers to another. Rather, the state power must be dismantled. Political power will be reabsorbed into society so that it could be organised and exercised from the bottom up. What Marx is calling for has similarities with the Guild Socialists but is quite distinct. Marx is not looking back to the corporate community of the Middle Ages for the model of the future society. Rather, he is seeking to develop his socialism out of the political emancipation/liberalism of the modern world, absorbing an abstract citizenship into social relations, thus looking for the development of social bodies which unite the identity of the individual as both a public and private being, citizen and worker.

It is to place Marx in that tradition which seeks political and economic decentralisation strengthening society. It is a tradition wider than Marx. For Martin Buber, 'the goal of Utopian Socialism [is] to substitute society for the State to the greatest degree possible, moreover a society that is genuine and not a state in another form (Harrington 1993:29). And as Proudhon wrote to Marx: 

I myself put the problem in this way: to bring about the return to society, by an economic combination, of the wealth which was withdrawn from society by another economic combination.

Proudhon to Marx, 17 May 1846

The future organisation of society should be carried out entirely from below upwards, by the free association and federation of the workers, in associations first of all, then in communes, in regions, in nations, and finally, in a great international and universal federation.

Bakunin Oeuvres vol IV 1910

What Marx's argument demonstrates is that the reappropriation of social power is the strengthening of society. It is the external control of the state and capital that undermines, dislocates and destroys society, the true reality of human beings. Marx is to be read as calling for the re- or self-socialisation of society through human beings coming to reappropriate their powers. It is to overcome that weakening and fragmentation of society that results from the ‘abstract dualism’ of the modern world. What will be weakened, of course, is the power of the state and capital over society, i.e. over the human beings who live in society.

Marx is looking to the empowerment of society so as to strengthen social bonds among the individuals comprising society. He argues that the political and economic alienation which occurs in the modern world and is expressed in the form of the state and capital is the cause of social disorder and breakdown. By the restitution of social-human power individuals are able to participate actively and consciously in the decisions and activities relating to their lives. The decentralisation that is implied by Marx, which could also be presented as a centralisation from the bottom up - federation - extinguishes the atomisation and rootlessness of the modern world. It overcomes the dependence of the individual upon relationships over which they have no control. It overcomes their subjection to the state and capital.

The state, like capital, is the domination of dead over the living, the mechanical over the organic. This domination presupposes the atomisation/fragmentation of society. Society recovering its organic, dynamic unity presupposes the dissolution of the state.

When, in the Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State, Marx argues that it is not the state which creates civil society, it is civil society which creates the state, he is making it clear that it is not the state which guarantees social order. On the contrary, the state presides over the breakdown of society, its fragmentation and atomisation under exchange, instrumental, abstract bourgeois relationships. The abolition of the state and capital as alien powers enables the strengthening of the bonds uniting society through asserting communal and cooperative relationships over competitive relationships.

Marx proposes no abstract community. He criticises the state as an ‘illusory community' and as ‘illusory communal life’ (Marx GI 1999:53/4 83/84 87/8) which exists both as compensation for the absence of the real community in society and as a surrogate for the bourgeoisie. As against power descending from the political 'heaven' of the state down to the 'earth' of society, bureaucratically mediated from the top down, Marx seeks to locate power and citizenship among the individuals constituting society.

Political and Human Emancipation
Marx distinguishes between political emancipation and human emancipation in general (Thomas 1994:82/5). He recognises political emancipation as an emancipation but nevertheless as an emancipation within the sphere of alienation. Human emancipation in general means the abolition of this alienation. Marx understands this to entail the resolution of the contradiction between the state and civil society at the level of society as the true reality of human beings. Marx rejected Hegel's attempted resolution through the mediation of the ethical state by arguing that Hegel's state preserves this contradiction. The state is based upon the separation of the political and the social; its very existence presupposes this contradiction. The state cannot remove this contradiction without removing its own basis.

The state-civil society dualism will be overcome only when political and social relationships are united, when civil society has made itself the political society, when, that is, the state power has been absorbed into civil society. Only through this merger of the public and the private can the dichotomy of the individual between citoyen and bourgeois be overcome and the individual become the 'real human being'. Thus Marx defines human emancipation in terms of human beings recognising and organising their forces propres as social powers, these powers no longer being separated from them and taking the form of political force (Marx On the Jewish Question 1975:234).

It follows from this that political emancipation is a limited emancipation that takes place within the realm of political force. Human emancipation in general, through the unity as opposed to the dualism of political and civil society, is the realisation of democracy.

Democracy is the solution to the riddle of every constitution. In it we find the constitution founded on its true ground: real human beings and real people; not merely implicitly and in essence, but in existence and reality. The constitution is thus posited as the people's own creation. The constitution is in appearance what it is in reality: the free creation of man.
Every other political formation is a definite, determinate, particular form of the state. In democracy, the formal principle is identical with the substantive principle. For this reason it is the first true unity of the particular and the universal.
In democracy the state as particular is only particular, and as universal it is really universal, i.e. it is not something determinate set off against other contents. In modern times the French have understood this to mean that the political state disappears in a true democracy.

Marx CHDS 1975:87/8 

Marx is thus pursuing the implications of his view that there are only human beings and the social and political forms they engender (Marx 1975:85/6). Everything in this social reality is human made. Human reality is a self-made social world. In locating the state in the demos, Marx is projecting the abolition of the state in a true democracy (Meikle 1985:45/6; Thomas 1994:20; Schecter 1994:121/4; Hunt 1984:84 85 124/5 139; Paul Miller Paul ed. 1989:vii).

Little argues for the inherently democratic nature of Marx's socialism. He offers the core idea that socialism requires democracy and argues that there are two contradictory lines of thought in Marx, one supporting democracy, the other undermining it. On the negative side he notes Marx's criticisms of bourgeois democracy. On the positive side he refers to Marx's arguments for human beings managing their own affairs. This, arguably, displays not contradiction but consistency. The criticism of 'bourgeois democracy’ rests upon the critical awareness that under such a democracy, democracy realised within the abstract form of the state, individuals are separated from the means of exercising control. Such a form is, therefore, not democratic at all. Hegel's defence of representative government made no claim to be democratic. Only later did the equation of representative forms with (bourgeois or liberal) democracy occur. So Marx's case for socialism as ‘true democracy’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 89), Little's positive side, can be stated as a consistent case for democracy. Thus Little refers to 'Marx's many discussions of the importance of free human beings managing their social, institutions consciously and autonomously’.

Thus Marx gives special prominence to some of the central values of democracy - the idea that a society ought to be self-regulating, that its fundamental political, and economic institutions ought to be subject to popular control, and that true human freedom requires that people have rational, deliberate control over their social arrangements. These idea provide the basis for the view, to which most western Marxists now subscribe, that socialism presupposes democracy - that true socialism is unavoidably democratic socialism.

Little in Paul, Miller, Paul. ed. 1989:5

And the point is that this commitment to self-determination on the part of the demos necessarily brings into conflict with 'bourgeois democracy’ and its separation of the political realm from the demos. In his critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right Marx writes of 'true democracy'. This true democracy and human emancipation in general are synonymous, the one presupposes the other. What it is interesting to do is to examine how Marx is offering a solution to the classical issues of political philosophy, the problems of political authority, obligation and representation.

Marx, in one school of thought, is simply evading these issues, assuming their resolution by playing the card of human emancipation (Pierson 1986:29). And, certainly, if human emancipation involves the practical reappropriation of the state power into society then the political problem as such would appear to be over. One is no longer concerned with the need to justify and legitimise the power and authority of the state, to establish limits on the state's power, or to ensure adequate representation. From this perspective, the crucial questions of political philosophy have been the expression of a dualistic world and a dichotomous self. With the overcoming of the state-civil society separation and of the internal split of the individual between the citoyen and homme privé these problems of rights, freedoms, limitations, representation, authority and obligation would seem to be at an end.

Marx, to this extent, offers no political philosophy and no theory on the exercise of the state power (Bonefeld ed. vol 3 1995:3). Marx's critique of the limitations of political emancipation, the concern to resolve the dualism of the state and civil society at the social level, thus entails going beyond politics. This makes Marxism, in the eyes of its critics, inadequate on ‘the political’ at the theoretical level and highly dangerous on the practical level. Marxism risks removing the political controls which make social life viable (Collins 1982:120/1).

Leaving aside Marx’s important argument that society holds together by its real bonds, not by the state and law, one can question whether Marx really is attempting to go beyond politics. For the likes of A.J. Polan there is no doubt that Marx is seeking an 'end of politics' (1984). And this makes Marx, in the eyes of some, a political naif (Huntington 1968:334/5). Marx, Huntington argues, lacks Lenin's sense of the importance of building political institutions, as indeed he would, given that his concern can be characterised as the deinstitutionalisation of alienated political power. It is significant that Huntington, a conservative political theorist, contrasts Marx unfavourably with Lenin. Lenin did not challenge political alienation in the way that Marx made it central to his emancipatory project (Thomas 1994:194). The conservative thus looks to argue for the permanence of institutionalised political power.

Pierson rejects the conditions, especially the assertion of abundance, which enables Marx to argue for the end of politics (Pierson 1986:28), Thus, socialist thinkers are themselves rediscovering the importance coordinating and conflict resolving institutions, thus subjecting Marx's notion of a stateless society to intense criticism (Offe 1984). Marx, in short, is found to be deficient on the political and institutional character of socialism and, arguably, assumed the political problem away through the assumption that freedom had been realised (Pierson 1986:28/9).

The Case for Representative Government
For McLennan, the notion of the withering away of the state is an expectation of Marx's politics which looks extremely vulnerable in the modern world. Moreover, the implicit proposal for a new nomenclature for public institutions, public bodies as something other than a state, combined with Lenin's call for the complete smashing of the state, 'indicates a serious lacuna in Marxist political theory' (McLennan 1989:124). 'At the very least, the conception of a global socialist community based on direct democracy rather than representative institutions is unrealistic by current standards' (McLennan 1989:124).

It is a view with which Ralph Miliband agrees (Miliband 1994:83/9). Miliband acknowledges the limitations of representative democracy, especially in respect of limiting popular participation, excluding the mass of people from the decision making process. But participatory democracy, which means something like direct democracy, 'is not a realistic view of what is possible' (Miliband 1994:89). In light of extensive opportunities for conflicts over loyalties, for group differentiation, and the persistence of systemic tendencies to inequality, the Marxist conception of the transparency of the political under communism 'amounts to a failure of theoretical and political nerve' (McLennan 1989:125).

Of course, Marx is not so silent on political structures and principles as one might suspect and seemed to assume a broadening of the public sphere and its accessibility to each and all as active citizens. This will be the view argued for here. And there is nothing in this fusion of the political and the social that precludes coordinating and conflict resolving mechanisms that establish a universal framework for society as a whole. Against this, Polan cautions against Marx's socialism:

It is .. a gigantic gamble; the gamble that it will be possible to set about constructing the state in the best of all possible 'worlds'. The odds against the gamble are astronomic.. It does not simply demand the absence of the peculiarly unhelpful conditions of post-1917 Russia although those conditions themselves have for a long time conspired to suggest the essential innocence of the model. It also demands a situation devoid of all political conflicts, of all economic problems, of all social contradictions, of all inadequate, selfish or simply human emotions and motivations of all singularity, of all negativity. It demands, in short, .. an absence of politics.

Polan 1984:12, 9/30 

The State and Politics
Given the history of Marxism as a political movement a growing number of left theorists have sought to recover the importance of liberal and democratic rights. Marx's distinction between political emancipation and human emancipation has been taken as Marx asserting the latter, over and against the former, as though Marx posed the two as alternatives rather than as on a continuum. Thus, Bowles and Gintis argue that 'the Marxist theoretical lexicon does not include such terms as freedom, personal rights, liberty, choice, or even democracy’ (Bowles and Gintis 1986:19). This is a statement that can certainly be challenged. Arguably, the realisation of freedom and democracy connected with the free and full development of each and all was precisely what Marx's project was all about. It is true, however, that Marx did not theorise liberal democracy but critiqued it. This, for Bowles and Gintis, means that even where the Marxist commitment to democracy is sincere, as with Luxemburg and Poulantzas, it lacks firm theoretical roots.

Classical Marxism is theoretically anti-democratic in the same sense that any political philosophy that fails to conceptualize the threat of state authoritarianism, and the centrality of privacy and individual liberty to human emancipation, provides a haven for despots and fanatics.

Bowles and Gintis 1986:20

The evidence, it seems, is against taking the gamble that Marx's socialism entails. A recent book by Joseph Schwartz asserts 'The Permanence of the Political' as against the attempts of Rousseau, Marx and Lenin to transcend politics. But one can challenge whether transcending politics is really what Marx - or Rousseau for that matter - is attempting. The argument here is that critics of Marx's 'end of politics' too easily conflate the political and the state. Mayo, in his book on democratic theory, points out that:





Thus, Marx may be argued to be challenging not so much 'the permanence of the political' as the permanence of the state as an institution that has come to claim the monopoly of the political in the modern world (Mayo 1960:3 Levine in Lukac's 1991:13/4 17 .18/9). It is this monopoly, arguably, which the critics of Marx and Marxism seek to defend. By identifying the state with the political the critics of Marx have closed off the possibility of conceiving of the repoliticisation of civil society.

Indeed, their criticism of Marx's attempts to transcend politics can be turned against them. By aligning themselves with the state's monopolisation of politics, the critics are actually implicated in the depoliticisation of modern society which Marx criticises. Marx, then, seeks not to transcend politics but that politics monopolised by and hence contained within the abstract sphere of the state. The reappropriation of the state power by civil society is, by definition, a project of repoliticisation (Thomas 1994:17).

Mayo's distinction between the state as an institution and the governing function can be considered alongside this passage in which Marx expresses his project to abolish the state with great clarity.





Hence, side by side with criticisms of 'state priests', the 'centralised state machinery' as a 'parasitical excrescence upon civil society', 'state mysteries' and 'state pretensions' and the demand for 'the reabsorption of the state power by society as its own living forces instead of as forces controlling and subduing it' (Marx 1974:248/52), Marx makes it plain that 'legitimate governmental functions' will continue by being invested in society.

It is in this sense that one defines Marx's project as one of repoliticisation. It is to challenge the state's monopoly of politics by attacking that process in which, the power of society is turned into the political force of the state. Putting the argument this way gives us an insight into Marx's claim in the Manifesto that 'public power will lose its political character' (Marx 1973:87). But one has to give Marx's definition here: 'political power, properly so called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another' (Marx 1973:87). Marx, therefore, is identifying political power with the class and coercive character of the state. This class coercive character of politics will be dissolved as political power becomes responsible in a self-governing society.

Two points should be made here. Marx argues that the 'state power forms in fact the creation of the middle class' to destroy feudalism and control the producers (Marx 1974:248/9) and to represent the common interests of the bourgeoisie (Marx 1970:30). And Marx argues against the way that social power is transformed into political force (Marx OJQ 1975:234). In other words, whilst one may challenge the way that Marx identifies political power as such with the class and coercive aspect of the state, it is clear that it is this class and coercive aspect which is to be abolished, not politics as such. Marx, in other words, ought to have referred to the state power in the Manifesto rather than conflate the state and the political.

To conclude, it can be argued that nothing short of human emancipation in general was the goal that Marx set himself in criticising the state-civil society dualism and the limitations of political emancipation. What can be challenged is whether this emancipation meant transcending politics. One can actually locate Marx in the tradition of political philosophy whilst coming out of it by showing that the claims made to legitimise the authority of the state entail the abolition of the state (Berki 1988:1/3). Marx is seeking the realisation of the just society. The normative claims made for the state have to be realised in civil society.

One, therefore, has to be clear of what kind of politics is being transcended. Marcuse gives a clue: ‘Political freedom would mean liberation of the individuals from politics over which they have no effective control’ (Marcuse 1964:4). The restoration of relations to social control may be read as repoliticisation, giving individuals effective control over their practical lives, no longer subjected to - and being playthings of - the alien powers of the state and capital.

The State-Civil Society Relation
The position that Marx takes in relation to the political may be clarified by pursuing the overcoming of the state-civil society dualism a little further. On the one hand, Marx presents 'the dissolution of civil society into independent individuals who are related by law’. Marx thus draws attention to the reduction of civil society into a sphere of universal antagonism and egoism in which individuals become isolated monads engaged in a war of all against all (Marx CHDS 1975:221). On the other hand, there is the constitution of the political state offering this atomistic society and the conflicting individuals in it, the protection of law. Hegel’s attempt to resolve the diremption of civil society through the ethical agency of the state actually preserves the institutional division of the state and civil society. Hegel, therefore, leaves the civil sphere of antagonism and egoism untouched.

Marx's argument is that Hegel has inverted the real relationship between the state and civil society. Marx criticises Hegel for ‘the illusion that it [the state] determines where it is in fact determined’ (Marx CHDS 1975:168). For Marx, the state cannot be the universal sphere since it is created by civil society. The state is the institutional expression of social alienation and, as such, does not represent a genuine universality. Instead, the state expresses the particularism of civil society. It is the reduction of civil society into a sphere of universal antagonism and egoism which gives rise to the state and the demand for a genuine universality. And it is the persistence of the dualism of the political and civil spheres which explains the existence of the state. The state, in other words, presupposes the continuation of the dualism between political and civil spheres and hence is incapable of acting as the vehicle of its removal. The state, then, does not transcend the diremption of civil society but, rather, confirms them (Marx 1975:145 220 221/2 227/231).

By establishing the centrality of the state-civil society relationship in Marx's project the intention is to develop Marxism in such a way as to separate the distinctively political themes and values of democracy, citizenship, power and freedom from the state and to argue for socialism as the repoliticisation of civil society. This is to suggest an alternative development of Marxism to the more economistic and class based Marxism of the reformist and revolutionary parties. Strangely enough, the politicism of the parties actually continued the depoliticisation of society and monopolisation of politics by the state which Marx sought to attack. It is the allegedly 'anti-political’ conception which enables us to invest society with political significance.

This project is grounded in Hegel's grasp of the state-civil society separation as a contradiction and his attempt to create an ethical totality. This is to show just what form this ethical totality would have to take if it were to be true to its premises. From here, it is possible to go on to revolutionary-critical 'praxis', 'dialectics', class and consciousness, social relations. The intention is to privilege the emancipatory commitment and hence be wary of the scientistic snares which have implicated Marxism as theory and politics with the fetishised social world and the objective determinism, of the capital system (Boggs 1984:23/4). 

This way of presenting Marx's argument establishes an orientation which not only aims at the abolition of the state power but pursues this abolition as a process for the repoliticisation of society. This is all implied in Marx's argument that true democracy, as opposed to political democracy within the abstract state form, i.e. the republic (Marx 1975:89) involves the dissolution of the state. In other words, the abolition of the state is the abolition of the monopoly of politics established by the state. Marx is looking to overcome the depoliticisation of the modern world, that reduction of civil society to a sphere of private conflict and particular interests which has robbed it of political significance, as it has been dissolved into isolated individuals. Marx argues for the restitution of the social powers of human beings (Meszaros 1995:468).

The process of democratisation that Marx pursues, then, requires the practical reappropriation by society of the powers that it has alienated to the state and capital. And this is a demand for the repoliticisation and empowerment of civil society. It is a demand for social control as against the abstracted, external, alien control of the state and capital (Thomas 1994:182; Meszaros 1995:xxi 32/3 39 41/2 72 93 296 789 818 837/8). Democratisation = reappropriation (from state and capital) = the repoliticisation (of civil society) = the empowerment of individuals in conscious communal control of their social relations. 

By putting the argument this way, the intention is to meet the criticisms of those for whom Marx's logic demands the 'end of politics'. The end of politics and the end of the state are to be distinguished from one another. The state and politics are not to be conflated. A stateless society can be a political society (Mayo 1960:3; Levine in Lukacs 1991).

Marx's Roots in Classical Political Philosophy
What Marx is demanding, it may be argued, is the realisation of the norms of political philosophy, i.e. of the claims made for the state as the ethical and rational agency. The language of socialism is inherently political. The values are those of classical politics and may be read in contrast with and against the economic reductionism of the modern capitalist world.

Appreciation of this point goes some way to underline the Marxist project as one of repoliticisation rather than as the end of politics. Marx is looking to realise the classical conception of politics, with, all that this entails from the perspective of democracy, freedom, citizenship and equality. It is the depoliticisation represented by capitalism that Marx repudiates. As Lomasky puts the point:

The theory of capitalism is very much contained within the science of economics. The positive theory of capitalistic institutions, but also its normative superstructure, rest moat easily within the language and methodology of the economist. What distinguishes the free–market? It is efficient; allocation of factors of production are optimised; individuals maximise their utility; and so on. These are the terms with which justifications of capitalistic production typically begin - begin, and often end.
Socialism is different. Its legitimation is overwhelmingly sought within a discourse proper to politics. Proper socialistic organisation of the means of production will, one is told, banish exploitation and thereby transcend class conflict. Socialist society is fundamentally more democratic than whatever bourgeois society holds forth because it is a more egalitarian order. (And the contemporary identification of the bourgeoisie, whatever its origins, has become an act of political classification). These entirely familiar locutions can hardly be misidentified: they advance political arguments. It is erroneous to view capitalism and socialism as theories in conflict. That cannot be so, because they occupy substantially different domains.

Lomasky in Paul, Miller, Paul 1989:112

Lomasky raises the questions posed by the historical failures of socialist societies and the extent to which these represent the failure of Marx's critical, analysis of capitalism. But this, he argues, is hardly the point. One can debate the success or otherwise of Marx's critique of capitalism. The point is, however, that behind this critique, sustaining it and providing it with its rationale, is a conception of politics that transcends merely economic questions. There is, Lomasky contends, a 'deep seated rationale' in Marx's socialism and that this rationale 'grows from roots planted deep in the Western tradition of political philosophy':

socialism incorporates motifs central to the study of politics that germinated in Greece and were preserved throughout the Middle Ages, but which were superseded by the modern revolution in political theory. That is, there is an important sense in which Marx is more truly the legitimate heir of Plato and Aristotle than are Machiavelli, Hobbes, Smith and Kant. Whatever the achievements of the modern political scientists .. the rock that they discarded served well the socialist builders of a restored classicism.

Lomasky in Paul Miller Paul 1989:115/6

These classical roots explain in part the remarkable resilience displayed by Marx's socialism. Marx's socialism is drawing upon the capital of the ancients: 'because that capital is fundamentally political, one is able to understand why socialism today survives, and even thrives, as a mode of political discourse’ (Lomasky in Paul Miller Paul 1989:130).

Democratisation and the Realisation of the Political
This realisation of the political, for Marx, goes beyond the state. What Marx is looking to do is locate the political in the social institutions of a self-organising demos, 'socialised man' (Marx CHDS 1975:37/3).

This idea of democratisation as the abolition of the state and capital/reappropriation of alienated social power enables one to conceive of a sphere of effective control in which human beings are able to act as citizens exercising their powers and shaping their lives according to purposes that are intrinsic rather than extrinsic to them. This is freedom as self-determination. And it is this empowerment which makes it meaningful to write of the repoliticisation of civil society. Civil society making itself political society is repoliticisation. This is the political investment of civil society; the investment of civil society with a responsible governmental significance.

Marx is to be compared favourably with those who would pursue a 'double democratisation' (Held 1987:283), looking to reform the political and civil spheres whilst maintaining their institutional distinction as well as their alien character. Marx is thus to be read against the contemporary tendency which may be called neo-Bernsteinism, that trend in the politics of the left which is identifying socialism with the completion of the project of liberal democracy (in McLellan and Sayers ed.1991). 

The emancipatory project that Marx develops concerns the location and character of power. Marx is concerned to ensure that social power no longer takes the form of political force and is instead located in the institutions of the self-organising society. The identification of the political with the state confirms the monopolisation of politics by the state which characterises the modern world (Thomas 1994:17). Remaining within these terms means reproducing the state-civil society dualism. Politics has to take place with the sphere of the abstract state form. Nothing beyond this sphere possesses political significance. It is to remain within the terms of liberal democracy. Marx's critique challenges this liberal democratic conception, which goes back to Hegel's liberal-representative state, by exposing it as a depoliticisation. This has contemporary implications.

The neo-Bernsteinians, pursuing the reform of the state, and the reform of civil society, whilst maintaining the institutional separation of the two, must confirm the monopolisation of politics by the state and society's loss of political significance. The neo—Bernsteinians, urging the left to take up the project of liberal democracy, are in no position to conceive the alternative of a democratisation that unites the political and the social, abolishes the state and capital as alienated power depriving human beings of effective control, i.e. of politics, and of the empowering of civil society.

The recovery of the centrality of the state-civil society relationship is thus highly important in allowing us to understand the vicissitudes of Marxism as state socialism, in criticising contemporary tendencies on the left and in being able to suggest alternatives to dominant conceptions. The question resolves itself into establishing the appropriate location of the social powers of human beings. Marx, in the Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State and On the Jewish Question, leaves no doubt that he considers that the state, as an abstraction from the true reality of human beings, can realise only an abstract form of democracy, representation and citizenship. Democracy entails the disappearance of the state (Marx 1975:83). Representation must be a functional or self-representation, rooted in the practical existence of individuals (Marx 1975:189). Citizenship must be incorporated in the individual relationships pertaining in society (Marx 1975:234).

Marx therefore argues in favour of locating power in civil society, the true reality of human beings. But he isn't just arguing for society to take the social powers appropriated by the state back from the state. The way he formulates the argument makes it clear that Marx is also demanding that these social powers retain their political significance in society. Thus, democracy, citizenship and representation, the formal principles of freedom and equality, be incorporated in social relationships (Thomas 1994:14). Marx is demanding the unity of political and social relationships. The political is apt to be overlooked in the socialist project. But this merely underlines the point of recovering the centrality of the state-civil society relationship in Marx's work.

The permanence of the political can be readily accepted. But even if we accept that politics is a permanent feature of human societies, even constitutive of human societies, Marx's question still remains. Where is power to be located and how is it to be exercised? Marx does not accept the state's claim to monopolise politics and it is here where misunderstandings arise. Marx's demand for the abolition of the state is read as a demand for the end of politics.

Without denying that there are certain formulations in Marx which suggest depoliticisation - 'the administration of things' for instance - it is much more adequate to conceive Marx as criticising the depoliticisation of the modern world and demanding the repoliticisation of society. Power is to be located in civil society as the true reality of individuals, the sphere, of their practical life. Civil society is the 'earth' of human beings in comparison to the 'heaven' of the political state. Marx is looking to overcome abstraction, the separation of power from human agents as producers-citizens, the ending of all institutions extraneous to the real life of individuals. Of course, in 1843 Marx has very little to say concerning the social organs, enabling this repoliticisation of civil society. It took greater experience of the political and social struggles of the working class to give Marx a greater understanding of how this state-civil society dualism could be overcome.

One final point. The intention of recovering the centrality of the state-civil society dualism is to accentuate the distinctively political themes and values in Marx’s socialism. By resolving this state-society dualism at the level of the social, Marx does not reduce the political to the economic. The temptation is to define Marxism in terms of class and material interests and ownership. All these 'economic' aspects are important in giving a social precision and relevance to Marx's project. But there is a wider framework which gives a point to Marxist class politics. One is thus able to develop Marxism as a project of democratisation in which human beings are to recover and exercise their powers as social and human powers.


32 THE RESTITUTION OF SOCIAL POWER

The absorption of the state power into society needs to be understood in terms of the reappropriation by society of its own social power and not as the generalisation of the coercive aspect characterising the state. Carter is quite right to reject this aspect of the state (1988). But there is a need to appreciate that Marx distinguishes the communal aspect of the state from its coercive aspect and seeks its social realisation. Marx is after realising the true community as against the illusory community.

This is to be understood too as empowerment, the strengthening and not the weakening of society. Civil society does not depend upon the state; rather the state depends and is parasitic upon civil society. It is this parasite state that Marx is looking to abolish (Hunt 1984:3 62/3 126/3 231/9).

the most radical thing about Marx and Engels does not concern means at all - certainly not their advocacy of revolution, since what they advocated was a popular revolution to establish democratic institutions where they did not exist, never a minority revolution to destroy them where they did. The most radical thing about Marx and Engels manifestly concerns ends: it was their desire to transcend the division of labor, to create a society of continuous occupational fluidity, a workforce with multiple skills, and in the political sphere - a democracy without, professionals.
The idea is profoundly rooted in Marx's conception of man as an indeterminate being who develops whatever powers lie within him by means of his interactions with the external world, in the first instance, by means of labor. To develop all one's powers to the fullest possible extent becomes thus the categorical imperative in Marx's implicit ethical philosophy - for individuals, and for mankind at large. Communism was for him the answer to the question: How can society be organised so as to insure the fullest development of each and every individual member? And communism would insure this primarily by overcoming the division of labor that confines each of us to a particular livelihood; it would rotate tasks so that individuals would develop multiple skills and talents; ideally all their gifts would mature to full blossom, benefiting society thereby no less than themselves. These ideas were the product of Marx's classical humanist education, in particular, his reinterpretation of the German ideal of Bildung (itself a reflection of Renaissance and Greek ideals), democratised and mixed together with some of the insights of the great Utopian socialists.
Marx's initial theory of the state may be set in the same perspective. Mankind cannot attain its destiny so long as one section of society, the enormous majority, is ruled over by another section, a small minority composed of professional administrators and professional soldiers. Such a division of labor inevitably gives the ruling stratum interests to defend that are separate from those of the people they administer. Marx's earliest political passion was a hatred of bureaucracy and it remained with him throughout his life, however ironical this may seem to those who identify him with a bureaucratically administered state socialism. The most hateful forms of state somehow were not the class despotisms but the parasite states - Oriental despotism, European absolutism, and above all Bonapartism. Marx's images for the Bonapartist state - a boa constrictor entoiling the social body, a deadening incubus, a ubiquitous parasite feeding on the vitals of Franca - betray the depth of his feeling; he wanted to eradicate not merely capitalist bureaucracy but the bureaucratic principle itself from all social institutions.... the opposite of the parasite state is democracy without professionals.




It is interesting to pursue here the notion of 'parasitism'.





Thus, Marxist socialism is to be presented in terms of a federal or organic centralism in which the autonomy of the parts strengthens the whole from the base upwards. As the practical reappropriation of social power alienated to the state and capital, the Marxist project breaks up every form of political and economic monopolisation and centralisation of power and aims to distribute this power by means of a commune and council system emancipated from the political control of the party or state. Against the abstracted state politics of the parties, Marxism looks to invest the economic organisations of labour with political significance or, put slightly differently, looks to convert the economic organisation of the class into political organisation. The self-organisation of the proletariat is thus also the self-socialisation of society as it reappropriates powers alienated to the state and capital. Consequently, Marxism has as its object not the conquest of state power nor the nationalisation of the means of production, both of which reinforce the centralisation and monopolisation of power - political and economic, alienation .on the basis of alienative and exploitative relations - but proceeds to the creation of a new social order based upon councils as organs of self-administration (Callinicos 1976:105).

This is an argument that has been made more in the syndicalist and councilist tradition than that of the political parties of socialism. Thus:

Revolutionary Syndicalism is the confirmed enemy of every form of economic and social monopoly, and aims at its abolition by means of economic communes and administrative or gains of field and factory workers on the basis of a free system of councils, entirely liberated from subordination to any government or political party. Against the politics of the state and of parties it erects the economic organisation of labour, against the government of men, it sets up the management of things. Consequently, it has for its object, not the conquest of political power, but the abolition of every state function in social life. It considers that, along with the monopoly of property, should disappear also the monopoly of domination, and that any form of the state, including the dictatorship of the proletariat, will always be the creator of new monopolies and new privileges; it could never be an instrument of liberation.

Declaration of Principles. International Working Men's Association in Rocker 1989:142/3

In conclusion, one can argue that an organisational conception of the proletarian revolution amounts to a denial of the principle of self-emancipation, a denial of the view that the proletariat is capable of developing the appropriate, autonomous modes of organisation, thought and action. It is to make the organisational form rather than the class subject the revolutionary force and is counter-productive in its effects. For the intervention of the organisational form as the ‘ideal’ agency capable of overcoming the material incapacity of the proletariat actually arrests the spontaneous process of self-development of the proletarian movement and places the proletariat once more under the control of alienated modes of organisation, thought and action.

In light of Social Democracy and Communism one has to argue that the channelling of socialism through the ideal agency of the political party cannot but lead to a state politics that devalues the constitutive class praxis of the workers. In opposition to this state politics, bourgeois modes in the socialist movement, one affirms the centrality of process to the Marxist conception of organisation, the class subject and revolution. It points to the actualisation of a latent, potential power rather than treating this power as read, 'objective’ and instituting a political party representing this power and substituting itself for this power, waging the abstract class struggle at the political level in the absence of the class.

The point is that, as a process, proletarian self-development cannot be fixed within forms and structures. The failure to appreciate the real movement and the creative significance of the class leads to a fetishism that once more creates an ideal state power above the human, subject and reduces the class to the status of objects of a political process that the party has removed from their control and participation and which has consequently become external to them. Lukacs’ point against Stalin is of much wider significance (Lukacs 1991:144). What matters, first and foremost, is the activity and consciousness of the working class as Marx's revolutionary subject. This is why Marx did scrutinise the spontaneous and autonomous developments of the working class as closely as he did (Dunayevskaya 1980). The organisational form is quite secondary to this self-development, thus one finds Marx offering a whole number of forms whilst theorising none as the form (Miliband 1977:119/120; Geras 1986:214/5).

Given the wide spectrum of views and attitudes on the question of class and party, it is as well to note first that Marx himself stands at one end of the spectrum, in so far as his own emphasis falls very heavily on the action of the class. His concern throughout his political life was not simply with the emancipation of the working class: this could be said to be the avowed purpose of all revolutionaries. His concern is with the emancipation of the working class by its own efforts. He expressed this most succinctly in the Preamble to the Provisional Rules of the First International in 1864. 'That the emancipation of the working classes must, be conquered by the working classes themselves'.
Neither this nor anything else Marx said on the subject precludes organisation in the form of a party of the working class: and there are in his work innumerable references to the need for the working class to organise itself. On the other hand, he was not particularly concerned with the form which the political organisation of the proletariat should assume, and was content to leave workers in different countries to determine this according to their own circumstances. The one definite prescription was that the party should not be a sect, isolated from the working class, and composed of the 'professional conspirators' whom he savagely denounced as the ‘alchemists of revolution’ in 1850.
Whatever the form of the party, it is the working class, its developing consciousness and its struggles for self-emancipation which really matter to Marx: the party is only the political expression and the instrument of the class. Even this formulation may go further than is warranted in Marx's case and it may be more accurate to interpret him, in this connection, as seeing the working class itself performing its political role, with the political party helping it to do so. The formulation is rather ambiguous but so are Marx's pronouncements on this issue.




To theorise a specific organisational form as the form, indeed, to imply that the form and not the class is the revolutionary agency, as in the 'revolutionary party’, is to fetishize, to imply that proletarian revolution can be fixed beforehand, and that the development of the class is a determined rather than a creative process. One needs, therefore, to reinstate the creative aspects of proletarian revolution and show how the autonomous action and consciousness of the proletariat, in whatever form it is materialised, generates new communist social relations.

The System of Councils
Something that continually impressed continental observers in the nineteenth century was the capacity of the British working class to create and maintain a complex social network of cooperatives, societies and unions generating their own leadership from within without requiring the assistance or intervention of the educated middle class. As the Webbs themselves pointed out 'the Trade Unions offer the century long experience of a thousand self-governing working class communities' (Webbs in Levy ed. 1987:18).

It is from this perspective that one may present the channelling of socialism through the 'bourgeois’ agencies of the party and the trade union as a case of arrested development. Bourgeois modes of thought, action and organisation represented the working class and constrained the class within bourgeois institutions and relations and, as such, stifled the process of self-development. In the arguments of William Morris, we are given some indication as to how development could have proceeded had the working class retained its autonomy instead of having its creativity canalised through bourgeois forms. For Morris retained the associational activity of the working class as the very basis of socialism. This associational activity was the politics of the workers as against the institutionalised politics of those more concerned with power as a thing to be controlled, monopolised, employed. In The Policy of Abstention Morris argues for the formation of a great ‘Labour Combination’ which would ensure that the working class would be powerful and organised enough to abstain from and act independently of the institutionalised centralised state politics.

Its aim would be to act directly, whatever was done in it would be done by the people themselves; there would consequently be no possibility of compromise, of the association becoming anything else than it was intended to be [i.e. from degenerating into an alienated form]; nothing could take its place; before all its members would be put but one alternative to complete success, complete failure.

Morris The Policy of Abstention in Levy ed. 1987:252

Thus, for Morris, the means employed in the attainment of communism form an integral part of the communist end itself, prefigurations of what form the communist society takes. Morris’ conception of the communist revolution in News From Nowhere shows this prefigurative socialism from below. Morris stresses the importance of 'a huge mass of people in sympathy with the movement bound together by a great number of links of small centres with simple instructions' (Morris 1973:305). The decentralised nature of the workers conciliar forms of organisation mean that the workers energies are tapped and channelled directly. The workers cannot be destroyed in one blow by centralised authorities. Nor can the workers, controlling their own decentralised associational forms, be brought under the centralised authority of a revolutionary leadership. There is no vanguard party of 'great revolutionary men' in Morris's conception. The working class educate themselves as they emancipate themselves; it is the practical experience of the class struggle which deepens and develops the workers communist consciousness.

the centre of gravity of the revolution progressively shifts to Morris's 'workmen's associations' and that a twentieth century author would probably have used the term 'workers' councils' to describe these organisations of working class self-administration. What is remarkable about Morris's account written in 1890, is that it easily recognizable in his description of grassroot bodies which are thrown up spontaneously in the heat of revolutionary struggle are the workers' council that emerged historically for the first time only fifteen years later in the Russian revolution of 1905. In Morris's revolution it is these workmen's associations/workers' councils which both guarantee that the revolutionary movement will be multifocal (and hence will not be dominated by a centralised leadership) and provide an environment in which workers' initiative can flourish.. Morris's vision of a process of working class self-liberation that is largely free from leadership stems from the strategy encapsulated in the maxim of the International Working Men's Association that the emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself.

Crump in Coleman and O Sullivan ed. 1990:64

Crump draws parallels between Morris's working men's associations and the Soviets that emerged in Russia in the early twentieth century. One could also refer to revolutionary syndicalism and the way that the syndicalists pointed to the economic organisations of the workers as organs of self-administration capable of creating the social republic within the framework of the political state. Thus Pelloutier offered the Bourses du Travail as a form of organisation which removed the separation of the state from civil society characterising bourgeois society and functioning as the organs of a democratised civil society based upon the association of the free and equal producers. The trade unions would coordinate and control the process of production and would send representatives to the Bourses du Travail. The Bourses would coordinate the relations between the different sectors of production and hence operated as democratic planning authorities (Schechter 1994:26; Jennings 1990).

The point is that this experience of socialism from below is much wider than the experience of Russia in the early twentieth century. The idea of the soviet was not merely of Russian origin. The idea needs to be located in the associational or conciliar activity of the emerging working class. It can, intellectually, be traced to Saint Simon and Robert Owen and their ideas of a decentralised society run from below by functional bodies. In a more consciously political sense one could refer to the revolutionary syndicalists, the industrial unionists and the I.W.W. in France, Britain, Italy, Spain and the U.S.A. These varied movements all shared a vision of a socialism constituted from below through the workers immediate organisations controlling the productive base of society.

They were in direct opposition to the Social Democratic version of socialism which nationalised rather than socialised the means of production. To this socialism from above they opposed the idea of a direct democracy of the working class as producers. They thus looked to the self-organisation of the class around interest in contradistinction to the political parties which organised the working class from the outside according to opinion/ideology. The direct rule of the workers was opposed to the indirect, rule of the political sphere, self-representation to representation, the social republic to the political republic. The common objective was a non-statist, non-bureaucratic form of socialism that would socialise, i.e. decentralise in society, or appropriately scale, rather than nationalise, i.e. centralise in the state, the means of production.

This idea of a socialism self-governed from the bottom up did not originate in the Russian Soviets and is not exclusive to the Russian experience but is a general tendency in the working class movement historically and internationally. And it remains a contemporary idea (Harrington 1993:64).

Sorel also pointed to the socialist character of the trade unions as the direct organs of the proletariat. Sorel thus wrote of 'The Socialist Future of the Unions' Sorel argued for a producer morality through a proletarian autonomy materialised through the trade unions, workers cooperatives and credit associations. These material forms would create the foundations for the socialist economy within the framework of capitalism. For Sorel, this social network of proletarian organs would secure proletarian autonomy from capitalism and the political state and it is this autonomy that Sorel made the condition of a socialist mode of production.





The system of councils is a state organisation, but without the bureaucracy that turns the state into a power external to the people it governs.

Pannekoek in Bricianar 1978:167

Pannekoek formulates the conflict between the two conceptions of socialism well.

Socialism, as inherited from the nineteenth century, was the creed of a social mission for the leaders and politicians: to transform capitalism into a system of a state directed economy without exploitation, producing abundance for all. It was the creed of class struggle for the workers, the belief that by transforming government into the hands of these socialists they would assure their freedom. Why did it not happen? Because the casting of a secret vote was too insignificant an effort to count as real class struggle. Because the socialist politicians alone in the entire capitalist fabric of society, stood against the immense power of the capitalist mastery of the production apparatus, with the working masses only looking on, expecting them, little-squad, to upset the world. What could they do other than run the affair in the usual way, and, by reforming the worst abuses, save their conscience? Now it is seen that socialism in the sense of state directed planned economy means state capitalism, and that socialism in the sense of workers' emancipation is only possible as a new orientation. The new orientation of socialism is self-direction of production, self-direction of the class struggle, by means of workers' councils.
What is called the failure of the working class and what alarms many socialists - i.e., the contradiction between the economic breakdown of capitalism and the inability of the workers to seize power and establish the new order - is no real contradiction.. New orientation needs time.




For Lukacs the soviet movement existed as a paradigmatic model of socialist democracy.





The Soviets are the institutional forms constituting the political framework of the socialist society.





Given that the soviet would be not merely a legislative body but also an organ of self-administration, the soviet system would work to prevent bureaucratisation and the emergence of an hierarchical division of labour. The working class could thus ensure that control is retained in their hands and exercised as their own power. This prevents the emergence of a bureaucratic class through the workers having to alienate their power. As Lenin came increasingly to appreciate, this bureaucratic class would institute and administer socialism in its own interest over against the workers (Aronowitz 1981:266). But, having engineered the revolution the way he did, Lenin had ensured that the working class lacked the autonomy required to resist bureaucratisation.

Proletarian Self-Emancipation
My argument here is that the political party represents a bourgeois form that enters the socialist movement to prevent the emergence of the proletarian public. Instead, one remains within the mediated, abstracted, intellectualised and indirect sphere of bourgeois politics. The political party is thus an alienated form of organisation which results in the paralysis of the proletarian movement. There are those who would present the political party as the institutional expression of a middle class possessing or aspiring to power. The party is the vehicle by which socialise is colonised by the educated middle class. The party is thus the site for bourgeoisification of socialism.

We need, then, to reassert the principle of self-emancipation as against the party and its representative approach to politics. And we need also to consider the extent to which Marxism itself has adopted the bourgeois, representative approach in relation to the proletarian class subject, with the class identified sociologically and deterministically in terms of objective interests and hence conceived as a passive object requiring representation and leadership. We need to show that, for Marx at least, the dictatorship of the proletariat is sustained by the self-representation of the proletariat and does not involve the political representation of the proletariat at the abstract state level.

Marx himself distinguishes between the revolutionary class and socialist consciousness of the proletariat from the theoretical consciousness of the professional revolutionary. This is why he is so insistent that his socialism has nothing to do with the social science or system of would be universal reformers (Marx MCP 1973:30). The consciousness of the communists has nothing to do with 'sectarian principles', by which to shape the proletarian movement but originate from within that movement (Marx MCP 1973:79). Communist principles are thus distilled from the social practices and struggles of the class rather than formulated in abstraction from class praxis.

This is Marx's consistent position in developing his conception of revolutionary-critical praxis. The problems of the world with which philosophers deal are not philosophical but social. As such the contradictions and inversions which philosophy criticises require practical, social solution through the transformation of a contradictory or inverted reality. Marx thus subverts the position of the philosophers in favour of those possessing the structural capacity to engage in transformatory activity resolving social contradictions and inversions - the proletariat (Perkins 1993:20 21).

No longer is philosophy the head and the proletariat the heart of the revolution, as in the rationalist model. Marx, then, affirms the class consciousness of the proletariat against the theoretical consciousness of the philosophers; it is the practical consciousness of the revolutionary subject as opposed to the post-festum knowledge of the philosopher which is the key to changing the world. One sees here, then, the direct opposition between the practical and sensuous proletarian mode as against the intellectualised and abstracted bourgeois mode in this opposition between the practical and the theoretical socialist consciousness.

The issue to be explored here is the party form of organisation as embodying the theoretical or intellectualised consciousness of socialism which is also a form of domination responsible for ossification of Marxism and the suppression of the practical consciousness of the proletariat. For the political party did interpret Marxism according to its own interests and hence reduced Marxism to a political ideology, the collective faith of the party membership. When Lenin referred to the 'correct ideology' he expressed perfectly this reduction of Marxism to a body of truth whose falseness is covered by collective reinforcement through the party.
Wherever Marxist parties succeeded in winning state power for themselves - they never got round to dissolving this power and themselves – we see clearly the tendency of the political party to institutionalise domination at the state level. And the whole experience has given support to those who have criticised the political party as an alienated form of organisation which rests upon the bourgeois separation of the political and the social and as being necessarily a bourgeois mediative and representative form (Negri in Makdisi et al 1996:173/4).

Marxism as Bourgeois Ideology
The causes of the degeneration of Marxism are to be sought in the codification of Marx's thought into a Marxist orthodoxy in the first place, given that Marx wrote critiques and not theories, in Marxism as the ideology of the political parties of the Second and the Third Internationals. Both these developments come with the devaluation and suffocation of workers' practical socialist consciousness as a corollary. The degeneration of Marxism is only another way of asserting the choking off of the autonomous movement of the revolutionary class subject itself.

The critique of state socialism thus focuses upon the role of the political party in defining and fixing 'marxism' as something abstractly formulated in abstraction from the transformative praxis of the revolutionary subject and hence lacking an ongoing, creative development through the workers movement. Ironically, the bourgeois mode of theoretical-intellectualised consciousness won out within Marxism over Marx's own stress on the practical class consciousness of the revolutionary subject (Mattick 1978:28 42/3). The revolutionary subject, indeed, was reduced to the status of object of a socialist politics that now proceeded through the alienated party form (Smith 1996:38; Geras 1986:140/1). Marxism was thus detached from the real world where the proletariat, in their social practices and struggles, sought to resolve the problems of the social world (Aronowitz 1981:21).

It is in the context of this party-state socialism that Marxism has been presented as the intellectual expression of a new class aspiring to institutionalise its social power, with Marxism as the ideology of the techno-bureaucratic class (Carter 1988). Thus Marxism is itself considered to be a part of the bourgeois epoch, with the Russian Revolution itself as the last of the bourgeois revolutions. I have given extensive textual evidence to show that Marx is quite consciously attempting to transcend bourgeois modes of organisation, thought and action and have argued that it is only from this perspective that one can make sense of Marx's criticisms of the state as an abstraction, of political emancipation, of the principle of representation and of Marx's support for a communal politics in which social power is reappropriated.

This is in itself not to deny that something codified as 'marxism' could not have functioned as the ideology of a new class aspiring to power. But this is a case of an ideology being generated by this aspiring class rather than of an ideology generating this new class. In Britain, the professional middle class did turn socialism into a vehicle for their own rise to state power. But this occurred in direct opposition to the Marxism expressed in the pages of Justice and Commonweal. There was nothing remotely Marxist about the state socialism developed by the Fabians.

We need to be sceptical, in other words, of claims that 'marxism’ itself is the ideology of the new class. Which Marxism? Marx's own Marxism is unambiguously a workers socialism that dissolves all relations of exploitation and domination and hence ideology itself as the systematic concealment of asymmetries of power in society. From this perspective it is the failure in the process of proletarian self-development which permits the colonisation of the socialist movement by the intermediate, 'new' class whose interests are detached from the working class as a whole and which lie in the preservation of an hierarchical division of labour.

It is for these reasons that the actions of those who would define themselves as Marxists do not demarcate them as a revolutionary vanguard whose scientific knowledge authorises them to represent the working class and in representing the class substituting themselves for the agency of the class. This is essentially Marx's argument in the Manifesto concerning the relations between communists and proletarians. The communists do not form an elite but are themselves members of the working class who have succeeded in obtaining a greater degree of class, not theoretico-intellectual, consciousness. The consciousness is something immanent in the class and its struggles and practices, not something that exists outside of the proletarian movement taking the form of 'sectarian principles'. The Marxist, in this sense, is the communist worker who solicits the proletarian movement from the inside. The very principle of proletarian self-emancipation assigns revolutionary responsibility to the exploited and oppressed class and hence does not make political activity the prerogative of a revolutionary vanguard.

'New Class' Colonisation of Socialism
Michels drew attention to the fact that in socialist organisations, possessing a large working class membership, there was a preponderance of the educated middle class the more one ascended the hierarchy (Michels Political Parties in Levy ed. 1-987:19). Michels was one of the first to understand the significance of the hierarchical structure of the political party. And the higher up the hierarchy one went, the more significant was the involvement of the middle class. Thus the centralisation with which party organisation was associated suited the purposes of the educated middle class and involved the systematic suppression of the spontaneous and local activities of the class subject below in favour of a centralized machinery within the nation.

Michels thus drew attention to what may be called the colonisation of the socialist movement by the professional, educated middle class and showed how their 'new class' interests entailed a hierarchical political division of labour that kept the working class in a subordinate position. The institutionalisation of the class struggle meant the devaluation and pacification of the class struggle and the creation of a bureaucratic apparatus which created career opportunities for politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals capable of appropriating socialism for collectivism (Levy ed. 1987:19).

In this argument, the contrast has continually been drawn between proletarian and bourgeois modes of thought, action and organisation. I have stressed that Marx offers a libertarian communism which proceeds from real individuals in society and the forms that they themselves create as appropriate to their struggle for social control. It is a project which repudiates collectivism and centralisation from above, though it certainly does entail federation from below, an organic or self-centralism. This approach contrasts markedly with the hierarchical structure of the political party as a bourgeois mode of-organisation (Walton and Gamble 1976:123).

It is for this reason that importance is assigned to the syndicalists as working class militants conscious of the political party as the vehicle of bourgeoisification. The party was thus the site of the colonisation of the workers movement, and the suppression of that delicate, complex fabric of local initiative and self-activity which sustained the workers movement. The workers had throughout the nineteenth century generated social, cultural and moral resources which middle class colonisation sought to destroy as a condition for the success of its own project. Hence the syndicalists, as a reaction, came aggressively to assert the sufficiency of the workers economic organisations in waging, the revolutionary struggle against the capitalist class and system.

Rather than go through the history of syndicalism, I wish here to concentrate on the conflict between the principle of self-emancipation and the party as an alienated form of organisation. Indeed, western Marxists came increasingly to portray the political party as an organ of domination (Aronowitz 1981:44). The principle is that the emancipation of the working class is the act of the workers themselves.

Whilst many have interpreted this to mean that the political party representing the class interests of the workers, there has always been a significant minority who have held firm to the principle of self-emancipation. It is not that the principle and the party are incompatible. It depends upon how the party is constituted. Crucially, it depends upon whether the working class forms itself into a political party as part of its process of self-development, or whether the political party is created for representing the proletariat, thus presuming that the class is incapable of representing, hence emancipating, itself.

The Party and Abstract Representation
The whole debate comes down to issues of representation, interests and agency. For there is an argument which makes Marxism necessarily authoritarian on account of its tendency to portray the proletariat as a 'thing' given by objective interests. Thus, Marxism invites that 'degeneration into authoritarian political forms’ owing to its treatment of the proletariat as an objective thing to be led and represented. The working class, therefore, is expected to surrender its initiative and responsibility to a political leadership. This leadership rests upon a political division of labour in which the class remains passive before the leadership. 

‘The party’ as the collective will of the proletariat presupposes the inability of the proletariat to represent this will or, indeed, presupposes the lack of this collective identity of the proletariat. 'The party' as an abstraction thus exists as the institutional expression of proletarian incapacity, confirming and reinforcing that incapacity whereas the point is to facilitate the process of self-development. The party, therefore, represents the class by suppressing autonomous class initiatives and hence blocking the emancipatory end. In a very real sense, the consciousness of the proletariat as the revolutionary class subject cannot be represented. Emancipation involves such a direct conscious relation between human agency and the social world as to exclude abstract forms of representation which presume separation. With regard to Lukacs’ theoretical attempts to mediate this separation only served to indicate the extent to which the party was introduced as the institutional form mediating between the actual and the ascribed class consciousness of the proletariat. It could be argued, with reference to this mediation, that the re-emergence of a hierarchical division of labour, involving leadership, bureaucracy and abstract representation, stems from a failure to underline the process of proletarian self-development which is integral to Marx's emancipatory goal. There are those who would go further and locate the deficiency in Marxism’s self-positing as a master discourse of historical change:





There is indeed a problem of representation. Aronowitz's criticism underlines the failure to treat proletarian autonomy and subjectivity seriously as a process of self-emancipation. Aronowitz's criticism applies more to the parties of Social Democracy and Communism, the parties which claimed to 'represent' the class whilst suppressing its local initiatives and spontaneous development. And it is upon this question that one may concentrate. The problem with this political representation of the class by the party is that, lacking roots in the process of self-development, it defines the class not as a subject, a class-for-itself, but as an object, a class-in-itself. The proletariat and its interests become a mere objective datum that only 'the party' can represent.

But the party, in institutionalising this passive-objective existence of the class as a sociological 'thing', reinforces the definition of the class as the class that 'is' of capitalist relations and, in so doing, prevents the emergence of the class as a class 'against' capitalist relations. In other words, the party and its hierarchical division of labour is a counter-revolutionary form that prevents the proletarian class subject from developing as the revolutionary subject, equipped with and controlling its own forms (Meszaros 1995:434/6).

Marx's conception of the state as an abstraction, as alienated social power and as the 'illusory community’ existing as compensation for the absence of real community, his critique of the way that the inversion inherent in social reality generates ideology, the way that he reveals the separation, abstraction and independence of relations, all show how the modern world is characterised by individuals being dominated by their own relations, powers and ideas. The atomisation of society, the disempowerment of individuals before the abstracted world of independent relations, the artificial and illusory attempts to reconstitute community at the political level, all give reasons for believing that the hierarchical political division of labour, in which individuals are represented at an abstracted collective level, is something generated by capital's alienated social world, an alienation in which Marxism, like anything else, can get entangled. The political party and Marxism as the political ideology of the state is based, in short, upon that abstraction of the social which Marx exposed as the characteristic of the modern world. It is this abstraction of the social which leads to the need for representation, specialisation, bureaucratisation and leadership.

Hence one can recognise Aronowitz's criticism of the party as the repository of scientific knowledge, which reflects the interest of the working class, even though class does not yet know it as its own interest. In this context the socialist consciousness does indeed have to be introduced into the class from the outside. But it is the abstraction of the social which Marx criticised, not something inherent in Marxism, which is responsible for this socialist party.

Thus Social Democracy and Communism represent a Marxism appropriate to the modern world. Here 'consciousness' had to be revealed to the population through the collective agency of the party, the party as the agency making transparent to the class its true class interest. Here socialism becomes not something inherent in and generated by the praxis of the proletariat but a political consciousness formulated by the bourgeois intelligentsia and introduced into the class from without. This is the Kautsky-Lenin thesis and, on the assumptions underpinning the thesis, socialism became something detached from the working class and imposed upon them by the parties and states claiming to represent their interests.

In distinguishing such a conception from that of Marx's, my intention is not to convict Kautsky and Lenin of deliberate distortion and hence explain one hundred years of Social Democracy and Communism by misinterpretation. What is suggested is that the Marxism of Social Democracy and Communism offered a form of socialism that made sense in the fetishised, abstracted world and presented itself as a means of representing the working class in this world. This, though, entailed the abandonment of the emancipatory goal (Sayer 1991:106).

There’s a need to establish, therefore, that that Marxism which is located in the sphere of proletarian autonomy does have its roots in the objective interests of the class but, as Marxism, is activated in the emancipatory struggles and practices in which the proletariat come to develop a subjective, conscious identity. Through the autonomous movement and development of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject, Marxism loses the theoretical and abstract character that it can seem to have independent of class praxis. Thus ‘marxism’ is not so much appropriated by the class as it becomes the revolutionary subject, for this would imply the independence of Marxism from the class, as the generation of Marxism from the class praxis and the reassimilation of Marxism into the class. One thus consciously excludes the snares generating leadership and representation in the workers movement, something which would mean retracing the steps of Social Democracy and Communism, leading to the hierarchical division of labour and making organised socialism the agency of the alienated power structure.

The Centrality of Proletarian Autonomy
As against this, I define the Marxism of Marx as an active presence in the workers movement as it autonomises itself from the state and capital, i.e. relates to the emancipatory goal of reappropriating for society the power alienated to political and economic realms that have become independent of human control. Marxism, therefore, entails action within the workers movement and its processes of development as against action within the alienated power structure, wherever it is constituted. It means an attempt to overcome the abstraction of the social and the need to represent the social through abstracted political agencies. It means attempting to innovate forms of self-representation that overcome mediation. It is, therefore, worth making conscious the commitment to proletarian autonomy as the basic theme running through Marx's class politics. It means connecting this class politics with the emancipatory goal of reappropriating alienated power so as to overcome abstraction, specialisation and representation. And it means restating the inherent libertarianism to Marx's project of putting the relations that have come to acquire an independent existence, denying human freedom, under the conscious common control of individuals. Libertarianism here refers to free individuality in community. This is to avoid lapsing into that class reduction which is part of the process of succumbing to the abstracting tendencies of modernity, which is also a passive, abstract class politics.

And it is to take steps to ensure that the dictatorship of the proletariat does not degenerate into the old politics of elite leadership and representation. It is to argue for the dissolution of the class through self-representation. For, in autotomizing themselves as a class the proletariat both affirm themselves, subjectively, as a class but also begin to annul their existence as a class. The process of self-constitution as a class is also a process of self-dissolution. For the proletariat come to affirm their humanity against capital's dehumanisation and, in so doing, act to abolish the capital system and class division. The proletariat, through its autonomous action, comes to dissolve itself into humanity. The limitations of political emancipation, which emancipated individuals within the sphere of an alienated world which denied individual freedom, are thus transcended by a social transformation which enables the achievement of human emancipation in general. In autotomizing itself the proletariat strikes a blow for living labour against dead labour, depriving capital of the very value creating force upon which its exploitative existence depends.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is thus that institutionalised aspect of proletarian self-emancipation which signals proletarian self-dissolution. The view taken on the dictatorship of the proletariat depends upon how the dictatorship is formulated. One can indeed reject as a new state in another form that notion of the dictatorship in which the working class has transferred its power, initiative and responsibility to leaders and representatives who claim to 'know’ the true collective interest of the class. In this instance, the class subject has again been disempowered and has been reduced to the status of object of a revolutionary process now conducted through the alienated political agency of ‘the party’. The party has come to claim the power to determine and define the true essence of the proletariat, even against the declared will of real proletarians.

This not to make a fetish of the proletariat. From the perspective of revolutionary socialism, real proletarians can obviously be wrong and express ‘bourgeois’ sentiments. But the point is that it is the development by the class subject of its own organisational, political and intellectual capacities which defines the revolutionary process and which is the very process leading to socialism.

The proletariat as subject thus comes to learn for itself what its interests are and how to define its own objectives. And it is this self-development which, demonstrably, constitutes the social network buttressing the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dictatorship, it needs to be pointed out, is not the state as something external from and presiding above civil society. Rather, this separation between the state and civil society has been closed by the organisational activity of the working class, re-socialising society and acquiring governmental functions for civil society. This is the process that Marx is clearly affirming, and not merely the capture of a state power still separated from civil society by an organised political minority claiming to represent the proletariat through the agency of 'the party'.

In short, the argument is that, for Marx, it is the autonomous action of the proletariat which subverts the old political and economic forms imposed upon society and which develops communist social relations. Thus, the process of proletarian self-emancipation possesses a democratic and a prefigurative dimension in which the proletariat are the active and conscious participants of a revolutionary process which, under their direction, leads to socialism. Thus, the autonomous movement and development of the proletariat is itself inherently 'marxist’, whether or not the workers have read Marx or not.

For the proletariat, in autotomizing itself, begins that emancipatory-revolutionary process which must necessarily dissolve the state and capital as parasitic and exploitative forces living off society and the proletariat. This autonomous action is implicitly communist and represents the self-constitution by the proletariat of communist social relations.

There is a need to look a little more closely as to the character and the status of Marx's Marxism given the relation to this process.

33 CLASS AGENCY - CLASS ‘IN' AND 'FOR' ITSELF
The argument in this chapter proceeds from the distinction between the revolutionary subject an sich and the revolutionary subject fur sich. This distinction is intended to prepare the ground for conceiving socialist revolution as a process in which the working class, as the revolutionary agent, comes to constitute itself as a class. Thus, in terms of the objective relationship to the means of production, one can identify the working class 'in itself’. But this identity does not necessarily mean that the working class has identified itself as forming a class. There is no automatic relation between class-in-itself and class-for-itself. Indeed, there are those who would question the status of the proletariat as the revolutionary class, i.e. its capacity for constitute itself as a class-for-itself. The working class did not make itself, it is not its own creator but is the creation of capitalism (Callinicos 1976:27).

Such a view renders the status of the proletariat as the revolutionary class highly problematic. The proletariat seems doomed to remain as a class-in-itself, an objective fact rather than a subjective reality. If one proposes a consciousness and politics, ‘from the outside’ one has to question what has happened to the materialist premise. In the argument presented here, this materialist premise will be retained by understanding the proletariat as the class which is both ‘of’ (actually) and 'against' (potentially) the capital system.

A Marxist politics, then, is a matter of developing the latent power of the proletariat. It is the revolutionary potential of the proletariat which forms the content of Marxism. The proletariat must determine to strike a blow against the degradation and exploitation to which it is subject. It is not simply immiseration to which the proletariat objects but the dehumanisation of its position and the way that this subordination to forces external to them is a denial of their freedom. The proletariat, therefore, is not merely struggling over material interests. If it was just about material interests, Marxism could easily be translated into a power struggle that remains within the sphere of objective relations to the means of production. Rather, it is a struggle over freedom and hence raises issues of power, democracy, control. And it is for this reason that one must underline the importance of proletarian subjectivity in the socialist revolution.

One can, therefore, devote some critical attention to the problem of the process in which the proletariat as a class-in-itself constitutes itself into a class-for-itself. This has implications for the politics of class interest. For the interests of the proletariat emerge from the objective relation to the means of production and corresponds to the identification of the proletariat as the class-in-itself. But just as there is no automatic development of class in to class-for-itself, so the politics of the class cannot be read off from the objective situation. For these class interests have to be identified by the proletariat themselves as their interests as such. In becoming a class-for-itself, the proletariat becomes capable of identifying its class interests and how they stand in opposition to capital.

In other words, there is a subjective dimension to the self-development of the proletariat. The autonomous movement and action of the proletariat indicates that the 'objective' class interests of the class are actualised only through that process of sensitization in which the class develops its subjective capacities - consciousness, organisation, politics.

The process of development from being a class-in-itself to being a class-for-itself is a process in which the proletariat becomes capable of identifying its 'objective' interests as a class and, hence, does not need to be told ‘from the outside’. This subjective development of an objective form is the very content of the socialist revolution as process. Without this development, one has recourse to some external agency which, in assuming that subjective development can occur 'from the outside', loses the content defining socialism. One ends up with an abstracted, idealistic politics – a party/state socialism.

The purpose of the argument is to distinguish between the objective and the subjective identity of the proletariat and to argue for the process that connects the two. There has been a tendency for Marxism to assume socialism as given by the objective situation of the proletariat and to engage in socialist politics on the basis of this assumption. This assumption, arguably, has left the proletariat on the terrain of immediacy and has failed to make that development from objective form to subjective identity which alone forms the content of socialism. The identification of the proletariat as socialist on account of its objective class position has justified the existence of a party form which treats the class as an object to be represented. This party has waged an abstract class struggle, independently of the real development of the proletariat. This politics has lacked content and takes an interest in the social struggles and practices of the proletariat only to the extent that they can serve the aggrandizement of the party. This kind of politics has failed to relate to the class agency, has substituted itself for the class and has done great damage in failing to strengthen the subjective identity of the proletariat. The council communists argued in the 1920's and 1930's that the Bolshevik form of organisation left the working class powerless before depression, fascism and war (McLellan 1980:173).

The distinction between class-in-itself and class-for-itself, therefore, is to be developed in the way that social relations determine the particular class to which the individual belongs - the class-in-itself - but to go further than this, as against that position which reads-off politics from objective situation, and to argue foe the constitution of the class subject class-for-itself - in terms of thought, organisation and action. The objective identification of the proletariat comprises all members of the class whether they see themselves as forming a class or not. The subjective identification of the class is a self-identification which, by definition, depends upon individuals in the class recognising themselves as forming a class. This will pertain only to certain individuals and sections in the class, not all. It is here that the intervention of alien forms of organisation can be anticipated. ‘The party’ as such a form claims to represent the class as a whole given the incapacity of the class to represent itself. This is an ideological claim that reduces the proletariat to the status of an object and hence arrests the whole process of self-development in which greater numbers come in time to identify themselves as members of a class. There is no artificial, institutional short cut through uneven development. Proletarian self-development will always be uneven and must be accepted as such.

In distinguishing the objective form of the class from the subjective identity of the class, my intention will be to show that the latter is developed out of the former as a process of self-development. To separate object and subject is to short circuit this process and to introduce an alienated form of organisation that justifies its intervention and domination by reference to the objective interests of the proletariat. The class subject, in short, is treated as the object.

Thus, whilst class identity is rooted in an objective fact - the relationship to the means of production - Marx can be shown to have argued that class can only be comprehended fully as possessing a subjective identity. This is precisely Marx's meaning when he argued that 'the working class is revolutionary or it is nothing ...' (Marx to Schweitzer 1865 1974:143). Marx's conception of class, in other words, comprises a subjective dimension in which the class thinks and acts as a class.

The danger of Marxist politics has always been that of treating classes as objects given by social relations. When Marx argued that he treats individuals as personifications of economic categories in Capital he made it clear that he did so for analytical purposes. There is, however, an argument for saying that Marxism has, in its politics, treated individuals and classes as personifications of economic categories. Naturally enough, the class subject has been reduced to the status of an object of a revolutionary process that has been made external to them through the ideal agency of the party. What has not been appreciated is that the objective form of the class out of which the subjective identity is created.

One can refer here to Thompson's processual definition of class. Thompson argues against treating class as an 'it’, which can be ‘marshalled, sent on manoeuvres, and marched up and down whole centuries' (Thompson 1978:85). Thompson argues that 'class itself is not a thing, it is a happening' (Thompson 1968:11). Cohen, rightly, exposes the vagueness of Thompson's formulation – ‘so many men who stand in relation to the means of production' implies the structural definition which Thompson rejects (Cohen 1978:77). And the truth is that there isn't an opposition between structure and process. Process proceeds on the basis of the structural reality of the class forming - or making - itself into a class. So long as one does not lose sight of either aspect there should not be a problem.

Revolution as Process
The point of defining the socialist revolution as a process is to underline the way that the self-constitution of the proletariat as the class subject forms the content of socialism. Without this process, socialism is all form and no content. One thus attempts to distinguish a Marxist politics from vanguardism. Vanguardism assumes that the proletariat is the class subject but actually acts as though the class were incapable of constituting itself as a subjective force. In other words, the vanguard relates to the class as an object incapable of acting for itself. The problem of identifying the process, in which the proletariat comes to develop its subjective identity, in the form, of consciousness and politics, is neglected. In short, one makes explicit the distinction between class as object and class as subject in order to underline the process between the two in which the proletariat comes to constitute itself as the revolutionary class. And it is this process which, for Marx, constitutes the socialist revolution itself.

It is necessary, therefore, to avoid treating class as a thing (Thompson 1968:9/10), as an entity which can be identified by its objective position and whose consciousness and politics is, as a consequence, pre-determined. From Marx's perspective one should root socialism in the internal movement of the class. The consciousness of forming a class is something intrinsic to the class itself. As against the Kautsky-Lenin thesis of consciousness from without, the emphasis here is upon the development of consciousness from within (Geras 1986:140 157/8). The 'consciousness from without' thesis actually reads off consciousness from objective position and, missing out the process of self-constitution, introduces this consciousness from without. This misses the whole point that the process of proletarian self-development is not the condition of revolution but actually is the revolution (Post 1996:293/4).

It is essential to be aware of the substitutionist tendency in politics (Meszaros 1995:463 469; Geras 1986 198/200). This means being sensitive to the dangers of an imputed or ascribed class consciousness, the idea that it is 'possible to infer the thoughts and feelings appropriate to their [the class] objective situation' (Lukacs 1971:51). To act on the basis of inference is to explicitly engage in substitutionism. It is no step at all from arguing that one knows how the class would act were it conscious of its real interests to acting in the place of the class. The point, surely, is to facilitate the process in which the working class itself makes itself the subject. The class-for-itself has to be constituted out of the class-in-itself from within the internal movement of the class.

Marx made a distinction between classes conceived as abstract types and classes conceived as collective actors. In the former, class existed as an objective fact as determined by the relationship to the means of production; in the latter, class possessed a subjective significance. Marx has been criticised for being naively optimistic in believing that the working class must come to develop the class capacity to fulfil its historical mission (Wright, Levine, Sober 1992:39).

But was Marx so naive, extreme statements notwithstanding? Such a criticism, it may be argued, cannot make sense of Marx's career as a political activist and his stress upon the political and organisational activity amongst the working class. The discrepancy between class position and class action did strike Marx as something that could only be overcome by a process of self-development in which the proletariat developed its political, organisational, moral and intellectual capacities. There is nothing in this of the argument that class capacities must follow class interests.

The value of the criticism made by Wright, Levine and Sober is that it does force Marxists to consider the problem of forming class capacities as a condition of effective social transformation. One might argue that this, for Marx, was a very practical problem in which he himself was active. Marx did not, then, assume that class action automatically or inevitably follows the mere existence of class interests. To assert the interests which derive from class position, it is essential that the class comes to develop a feeling of community, national links, or a political organisation.

Marx thus recognises that, objectively, the peasantry form a class but, through the failure to develop these subjective factors: 'they do not form a class’ (Marx 1973a:239). Marx explicitly states that the identity of their class interests fails to produce a 'feeling of community, national links, or a political organisation' and hence that the peasantry 'do not form a class’ (Marx 1973a:239). Class formation, and the development of class capacities, is very much a crucial issue for Marx. Certainly, he never ceased to insist upon the importance of political organisation to the proletarian movement, calling for the proletariat to organise itself into an independent political party (Marx 1974:376).

Marx's distinction between the proletariat as a class-in-itself and a class-for-itself upholds the notion of a process of class formation between the former and the latter. To become a class-for-itself, the proletariat must come to unite in a conscious, political class struggle so as to assert its class interests.

Where, perhaps, the criticism of Marx may be sustained is in the epistemological sense, Marx asserted a clear, necessary, link between class position and the political, intellectual and organisational articulation of the class as subject. The class-for-itself bears a necessary relation to the class-in-itself. But is not Marx dealing in ideal types which, given their abstract nature, cannot be translated directly into the real world of social interaction?

Wright, Levine and Sober raise doubts and, in doing so, emphasise the importance of and the difficulties in the way of the development of class capacities. Such an approach itself has its difficulties. There is merit in emphasising the process of self-development by which the proletariat convert itself from being a class-in-itself to being a class-for-itself. This, arguably, is what class formation is all about, as Marx's comments on the French peasantry would indicate.

But this emphasis upon politics, organisation and consciousness in the constitution of classes could lead to the assertion of subjective factors over objective class position. When pushed to its extreme this argument could come to mean that classes are to be defined by subjective criteria, even brought into existence by subjective factors, with no reference to objective factors dismissed as ‘economistic’. Clearly, the process that Marx envisaged in the making of class depends upon the existence of a class structure. It is upon this structure that the process takes place. In effect, the emphasis upon class as a process strikes class-in-itself out of existence. It becomes difficult to say what class is. Class appears to be brought into existence by political, ideological and cultural factors, something which risks degeneration into arbitrariness.

Przeworski shows the real danger of this degeneration. He actually argues that the objective 'economic' level is itself the product of political and ideological practices. 





Class, it seems, is the product of class formation and class formation is not objectively given or structured but is the product of political and ideological projects. By such an argument Przeworski dissolves the classical Marxist conception of class. Objectively, class does not exist. Questions of class and class struggle are not determined by Objective relations to the means of production but by politics and ideology: 'the ideological struggle is a struggle about class before it is a struggle among classes' (Przeworski 1985:70).

The problem with this view, as Eagleton has argued against Hindess and Hirst, and against Laclau and Mouffe (1991), it is difficult to know what these practices could be about. It seems that class struggle does not proceed on the basis of objective class positions but actually brings class about.

What Przeworski effectively does is remove the objective basis of a Marxist analysis of class and of a Marxist class politics. If the objective is brought into existence by political and ideological practices then why should the Marxist project obtain priority: 'several projects may be feasible’. But, on the same reasoning, why choose any of these projects against the others? One is in the world of the arbitrary and the accidental again, the world of 'multiple causality' or, as Przeworski puts it, of 'multiple determinations' - and the 'more multi-factoral the supposed reality, the wider the range of political goal packages you can entertain and sell' (Meikle 1985:12). Przeworski goes on to list the 'struggles between sexes, races, religious -groups, regions, ethnic groups, and so on', arguing the irrelevance of class to these struggles (Przeworski 1985:79/81). 

But it is apparent that in the end, Przeworski has tied himself into knots. For, unless one is happy with pure arbitrariness, there has to be a way of evaluating these struggles and of determining which are historically significant or otherwise. Przeworski points out that the 'theoretical function of class analysis is .. to identify the objective conditions and the objective consequences of concrete struggles': individuals, it seems, do indeed 'occupy places within the system of production' (Przeworski 1985:81). 

So how is one to understand the analysis offered by Przeworski?

For Levine and Wright class capacities may be defined as those organisational, ideological and material resources available to classes. The problem that concerns them is the tendency to subordinate the problem of the emergence of class capacity to the problem of class interests. Though their main target is Cohen, they argue that Marx himself saw the growth of class capacities (at least for the ascendant working class under capitalism) as a consequence of the emergence of revolutionary and 'transformative interests'.

As capitalism becomes increasingly untenable as an economic system, capitalism's gravediggers, the proletariat, become, Marx thought, increasingly capable of transforming capitalist relations of production. This coordination of interests and capacities is achieved, on Marx's account, by the mutual determination of interests and capacities by the development of productive forces. However, many Marxists have come with good reason, to question this account. Instead of seeing an inexorable growth in the capacity of the working class to struggle against the intensifying irrationality of capitalism, it has been argued that there are systematic processes at work in capitalist society that disorganise the working class, block its capacities and thwart its ability to destroy capitalist relations of production.

Levine and Wright in Callinicos ed.1989:33/4

Levine and Wright refer to labour market segmentation, the effect of racial and ethnic divisions on occupational cleavages within the working class, the effects of the bourgeois legal system and privatized consumerism in advertising. But we need to be careful as to how we articulate the relation between class interests and class capacities. Levine and Wright are correct to argue that 'there is no automatic development of working class capacities in consequence of the development of productive forces under capitalism’ (Levine and Wright in Callinicos 1989:34). But how right are they to argue that 'there is no necessary relation between the development of an interest in social change on the part of rational agents .. and an historical capacity for bringing such changes about. A sustained and powerful (rational) interest in the transformation of an economic structure is not a sufficient condition, even in the long run, for the revolutionary transformation of that structure’ (Levine and Wright in Callinicos ed.1989:34). This view means that class capacities do not derive from the development of the productive forces.

It is difficult to know how far to press this notion of 'no necessary relation’ between interests and capacities for transformation. It may certainly be argued that the view that class interests and class struggles shape the transformation of society is merely a necessary relation which Marxists, through their own political and ideological practices, have constructed. This is the direction that would be taken following Przeworski's analysis.

If there is 'no necessary relation' the question is posed as why the development of the political, intellectual and material resources of any one class, to build its class capacities, should be favoured over another class. The choice appears arbitrary without predicating this activity upon a necessary relation between class position and interest on the one hand and class capacity and activity on the other. If we push this conception of ‘no necessary relation’ to its extreme, with Przeworski, one obtains the view that the class, position within the mode of production does not furnish the class with objective interests which political and ideological practices articulate. For these 'political and ideological practices are actually constitutive' of this reality. There can be no class interests necessarily given by reality; interests are what come to be constructed by political and ideological practices.

This is not a criticism of Levine and Wright. Levine and Wright do not go so far as to argue that class interests are merely the product of political and ideological practices. What they are attempting to argue is that the question of the class capacities for action ought not be subordinated, as it has been, to the question of (rational) class interest in action as determined by the development of the productive forces. The problem comes when a denial of an automatic relation becomes a denial of a necessary - not inevitable or spontaneous - relation.

This risks the intellectual and political degeneration of post-marxism. A post-marxist analysis would deny that there is a necessary relation between class position on the one hand and political and ideological interests on the other hand. Marxists would agree that political and ideological positions are not some automatic reflection of class positions. But Marxists would go further than this to argue that political and intellectual positions do possess an internal relation to those interests - not in the sense that these interests are the automatic cause of those positions - which is how the post-marxists tend to set up Marxism for criticism - but in the sense that these interests furnish the reasons for political and intellectual positions.

Levine and Wright have focused upon a real and important problem in emphasising the capacity of the working class to forge effective organisations to be able to engage in that transformative action which is rational according to their class interest. The point is that there are systematic tendencies towards the organisation of the working class, such as Marx pointed to, but also to the disorganisation of the class. The development of class capacities cannot be assumed (Levine and Wright in Callinicos ed.1989:43/4).

But did Marx actually assume the development of class capacities as a result of some evolutionary process consequential upon the development of the productive forces? He certainly argued for a necessary relationship between the two, capitalist development would be accompanied by the development of the working class. There is, for Marx, an internal relationship between capitalism and its gravediggers (Manifesto), the revolutionary class as the most important productive force (Poverty of Philosophy). But none of this entails the view that Marx thought that the political and intellectual position of the working class would be a reflex of material conditions. Marx's stress not only upon the self-activity and self-organisation of the class but also upon intellectual clarity, in the workers movement, show how seriously he took political and intellectual practices as, in some way, indeed, constitutive of reality. Of course, for Marx, these political and intellectual struggles were about something inherent in social reality and hence possessed an internal or necessary relation to that reality.

Thus, if the criticism of Marx is to be pursued on this question of the discrepancy between class interest and position, on the one hand, and class activity, on the other hand, then we would have to accept that the distinction between class-in-itself and class-for-itself was a problem for Marx and that Marx envisaged a process of proletarian self-development, in which the organisational, political, intellectual and material resources building class capacities are developed between the two. To sustain the criticism, we would have to focus not upon the political aspect of the distinction but the epistemological. The distinction between class interest and class action was not an epistemological problem for Marx precisely because he did uphold a necessary relation between the former and the latter. And it is here, with their anti-epistemological argument of 'no necessary relation' that the post-marxists attack.

The point made by Levine and Wright is pressed further in Reconstructing Marxism (Wright, Levine, Sober 1992). Not only is the distinction between class interest and class action restated, it is difficult to see how any relation between the two exists or is possible on the analysis presented. A question mark is placed against the notion of the development of the productive forces increasing the class capacities of the working class. Reference is made to the global telecommunications revolution exacerbating national and regional divisions within the working class. Similar factors with similar effects are mentioned. The crucial point, however, is that 'there is no unequivocal and automatic connection, even of a tendential character, between technical change and development under capitalism and the growth of working class capacities for the revolutionary transformation of capitalism into socialism’ (Wright, Levine, Sober 1992:42/3). What Wright, Levine and Sober are hoping to do with this argument is to deny the productive forces the kind of primacy that orthodox historical materialism, as restated by Cohen, has ascribed to them. Their argument, however, has wider implications.

There is no necessary connection between the development of an objective interest in epochal social change on the part of a class and the development of class capacities for bringing about epochal transformations. An objective interest in moving from one mode of production to another is not sufficient, even in the long run, for revolutionizing modes of production.

Wright, Levine, Sober 1992:43

Thus class capacities do not, in the end, derive from the development of the productive forces. What, then, is their objective basis, if any? From what do class capacities derive, if anything? And what reason can be offered to develop class capacities, if any? If the argument is that the development of class capacities does not occur automatically, as some passive reflex of class interests, then any Marxist would agree. The problem comes when the word 'automatic' is substituted by the word 'necessary’. Wright, Levine and Sober deny even a tendential connection.

This is surely false. There is a clear relationship between class action and class interest, as any struggle of labour against the encroachment of the capitalist class would show. Of course, the wages struggle alone does not make the working class a politically conscious 'class against capital', still less a 'class-for-itself’. This is a subjective identity that is to be created through developing class capacities. And this may indeed be characterised as a process of class formation on the basis of an objective relation. But the inclusion of political and cultural factors in the process of class formation comes with dangers. And these dangers are exhibited in the analysis provided by Wright, Levine and Sober:

Subordinating class capacities for action to class interests in the outcomes of actions is a consequence of the individualist style of argument Marx sometimes lapsed into.. By abstracting human beings and their interests from the social and historical conditions in which these interests are formed and sustained, orthodox historical materialism (implicitly) maintains that structural conditions for the translation of interests into actions are derived from these interests themselves. However, this claim is almost certainly false. What the best Marxian social science of this century has shown repeatedly is that the major determinants of political action are irreducible, social determinations. Human beings may be generally interested in augmenting the level of development of productive forces, yet thwarted permanently from acting upon that interest.

Wright, Levine, Sober 1992:43

One can argue that Marx always entertained the possibility that the working class could fail to act and that, therefore, socialism was not an inevitability. This is in keeping with Marx's essentialist materialism in which necessary lines of development are frustratable anywhere along the line, not least by the working class failing to act or failing to develop the capacity to act effectively (Meikle 1985:57). To the extent that Wright, Levine and Sober are underlining the importance of the development of class capacities, their analysis is of the utmost value. The problems come with the denial of necessary relations, indeed, with the denial of even a tendential connection between the development of class capacities, on the one hand, and class interest, on the other. The point is that if no such relation exists then no reason can be supplied for why the proletariat - or any other class - should develop their class capacities for effective action or for why the proletariat should be singled out for development over and above any other class.

The position of this 'reconstructed' Marxism comes dangerously close to that position which affirms the primacy of the relations of production over the forces of production so that class struggle becomes the motor force of history. This is always the danger when the subjective factors of political and ideological practices and struggles enter into the definition of the process of class constitution. Marx related this necessary subjective element to class interest as defined by the objective relationship to the means of production. The class-for-itself was generated out of the class-in-itself. In this context, Cohen is surely right to argue that class struggle could only be a motor of historical change if it is rooted in an historical dynamic involving the forces of production. Any other position on the class struggle, as though political and ideological struggles can create ex nihilo, would be merely a guise for indeterminacy {Cohen 1982:495). Such indeterminacy might well please the post-marxists, but the position is indefensible.

What is most valuable in the analysis of Wright, Levine and Sober is the stress upon the development of organisational and material resources so that the proletariat possesses the class capacities enabling it to engage in effective transformative action. This question is worth looking at. The political defeat or failure of the working class - the 'crisis' or 'collapse' of socialism - can be related, in large part, to the failure to develop the political, organisational, material and intellectual resources to be able to act effectively in the prosecution of their class interest. Resource mobilisation theory has tended to stress the importance of material resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978).

For Tilly, what matters is control over labour power, goods, etc. (Tilly 1978:7). McCarthy and Zald place a greater emphasis upon formal bureaucratic resources enabling the effective organisation of a social movement. The view argued for here argues for a wider conception of the development of resources and includes a greater intellectual dimension. Class consciousness is an active factor in development as is the knowledge of organising and mobilising people in a political intervention in a given reality. The development of this political and organisational knowledge and awareness ensures that material resources are not only developed but utilised in the form of permanent organs of labour activity.

Organisational resources comprise more than the formal bureaucratic and professional forms presented by McCarthy and Zald. These resources constitute what Offe has aptly described as 'political paradigms' (Offe 1985:320) - the different ways in which individuals may be mobilised politically, the ways in which these are connected to different strategies and tactics.

The point is that these resources are unequally distributed throughout society but that the development of some of these resources. - e.g. intellectual and organisational – can compensate for the absence of others - e.g. material - and must be developed as a condition for effective transformative action. Moreover - and this is why the notion of an internal link is so important - the various kinds of resources and their development comes to give permanent, conscious form to the material Interests inherent in social reality.

The claim is that organisational and material resources constituting class capacities for transformative action exist not only in terms of the political and ideological practices and struggles of the organisation of individuals but most of all in terms of the class interests they are able to articulate. For it is there that the structural capacity to act exists - however much it remains an immanent potentiality to be realised through the development of political, organisational and intellectual resources. The general claim is that the political movement of the working class only occurs when the necessary organisational and intellectual resources have been developed so as to enable them to translate an existing material power/potential into effective transformative action. This view draws upon Giddens’ definition of resources as 'transformative capacities' in relation to material objects (allocative resources) or to people (authoritative resources) (Giddens 1984:258/62).

Without the necessary resources to act there can be no effective political movement of the working class. To this extent, the development of class capacities is the key to an emancipatory socialist politics. Thus, without the development of the political, material, intellectual and organisational resources constituting class capacities the proletariat will continue to lack the ability to engage in effective transformative action, however much its class interest gives it a reason to do so and however much its class position gives it the structural capacity to do so. The transformative capacities in relation to objects and to people have to be developed.





The attempt to define Marxism as the project for the repoliticisation of civil society has to be carefully delineated given Marx's critical and negative assessment of politics. Of course, what Marx is criticising is the abstraction which comes to characterise the modern political realm, the fact that such politics is extraneous to the real world of human beings. This is why Marx seeks to distinguish the social revolution leading to human emancipation from the political revolution restricted within the abstract form of the state.

Marx develops a whole number of points against Arnold Ruge's article on The King of Prussia and Social Reform. Ruge had deplored the lack of political understanding in the workers of the Silesian revolt. Marx struck back to show the limitations of the political understanding, how the political understanding is abstracted from social reality and how political understanding deceives the social instincts of the workers. The more developed the political understanding, the more the workers risk dissipating its social forces.

The whole of Marx's Critical Notes could be used to reject the basis of party political socialism in the Kautsky-Lenin thesis of socialism from without.









It can be argued that the party political socialists, abstracted from the class movement and seeking only to achieve power for itself in representing the 'true', i.e. imputed, consciousness of the class, have reverted to the limitations and illusions of political revolutionists like Ruge, and have done so because they have converted the revolutionary socialist consciousness into something 'spiritual’, i.e. intellectual, the socialist consciousness as something created by intellectuals and introduced into the class from without. The socialist revolution has been made the matter of the professionals, those possessing political understanding/consciousness, the people that Marx called the alchemists of revolution (Mattick 1978:42).

34 THE FUTURE FOR SOCIALISM
The collapse of state socialism refers to the socialism of the political parties, both Communist and Social Democratic. This collapse is the final and irrevocable proof of the failure of the class based politics of Marxism. One should, perhaps, be more careful in differentiating between two different forms of Marxism. What has collapsed is the party-state form of Marxism which has dominated the politics of the left in the twentieth century. There are those who would argue that this is the only form that Marxism could take and that, consequently, Marxism is to be repudiated in its entirety as an obstacle to emancipatory politics (Carter 1988).

Whilst recognising that there is plenty to do before Marxism can be reborn as an emancipatory project and that there is no good reason why anyone should be concerned with recovering the ‘authentic' Marxism of Marx, one can at least entertain the possibility of such a recovery. For one thing, Marx has been released from his Communist prison. With the collapse of state socialism, there is a greater opportunity to explore the possibilities of a rebirth of Marxism as a political movement (Clarke 1991:328). There is now greater freedom to explore different approaches to and angles on Marx without having to refer to the old orthodoxies or being trapped in the old narratives. For another, the capital system will continue, through its contradictory dynamics, to generate the problems which make Marx relevant, whether this relevance is perceived or not.

For all the celebration of the collapse of state socialism and the justification of liberal democracy/capitalism as the end of history, the fall of 'really existing socialism' and the degeneration of Social Democracy does nothing to overcome the contradictions at the heart of the capital system. Indeed, the collapse of state socialism, arguably, is part of the crisis of the globalised capitalist system (Meszaros 1995:49/50 705). The attempt to replace socialism with the ludicrously named ‘democratic capitalism’ is merely further evidence of the degeneration of Social Democracy (Meszaros 1995:728/9 975; see also Harrington 1993).

It is still possible to expose the self-contradictions of liberalism by turning its universal political ideals against the reality of asymmetrical relations of power and resources. The relationship between liberal democracy and capitalism can certainly be questioned. The ideology of 'democratic capitalism' is being urged on the left at precisely the time that political democracy is being put in a straight-jacket and political and civil liberties are being whittled away (Hodgson 1984:10 11/2 35/6; Poulantzas 1978:90 203/4; Millband; Mayer in Bowles and Gintis 1986:11/2).

The idea that the project of the left is now to be limited to the completion of the project of liberal democracy really does nothing to address the antinomies of liberalism, the abstractness of political democracy and the contradictory dynamics and class conflictual character of capitalism. It is to make the case for arrested development, halting socialism at precisely the point where Marx challenged Hegel.

Probably the most important thing to be learned from Marx concerns questions of power, control and freedom. Marx's central question is how human beings lose control of their relations, how these relations acquire an independence in relation to human beings and how they come to govern human society as external forces. The modern world is governed by what Sayer (1987) has called the 'tyranny of abstraction'. The institutional and systemic forms of control exercised over the world is removed from effective human control. This is the denial of democracy and freedom. And Marx shows how, through human self-alienation, this alien control comes to be established. It is this abstraction, commonly expressed as a world out of control, which is responsible for the various crises evident in the world.

In the words of Karl Marx we live in a world where 'all that is solid melts into air'. Of course, this crisis of knowledge and rationalism was quite familiar to writers like Tonnies, Weber and Simmel, but in the contemporary environment we have the added problems of ecological disaster, economic collapse and nuclear destruction. The scale of our dilemma is increasingly complex and increasingly out of control.

Stauth and Turner 1988:2

For Stauth and Turner, this makes Nietzsche the theorist of the hour. All the more so given the seeming collapse of socialism as a plausible alternative to capitalism. But whilst the escalating problems of modernity do seem ‘out of control’ this is not irrevocably so from a Marxist perspective. The restitution of alienated social power is the solution to the problems of the modern world. Simon Clarke, therefore, argues for the importance of Marx and the timeliness of the Marxist critique of capitalism. 





What this passage demonstrates is the need to create new social forms. It is this need and the ability to explain the roots of the crisis through the way that Marx addresses power, control and relations that makes it possible both to recover Marxism as an emancipatory project and for Marxism itself to recover its emancipatory character. It is to take up Marx's Marxism by connecting the critical-emancipatory themes of the original project with the emancipatory struggles and practices of the modern world.

What has collapsed is the dominant, organised, politicised, form of Marxism. There have been other forms, some more consciously Marxist than others. What these other strands of Marxist thought and politics show is that the channelling of Marxism into the ultimately sterile forms of Communism and Social Democracy does not necessarily justify the abandonment of Marx himself as a dead end. There are alternatives in the past and possibilities for the future to explore and develop. Which is to call for exploration and development. If there is no guarantee of a renewal or recovery of Marxism then, clearly, the responsibility falls upon those who believe that Marx still has something to offer to prove their case. There is little point in equivocation, which appeals to neither those attracted or repelled by Marxism. Instead, there is an imperative to go on the offensive (Meszaros 1995:673).

One thing can be argued from the start. The nature and the collapse of state socialism and the implications of this collapse can be grasped from a Marxist perspective which looks to recovery the revolutionary workers socialism which the party/state form suppressed. Only this authentic, emancipatory Marxism can critique the Russian experience and, with the collapse of stats socialism, no longer has to break the political, institutional and ideological obstacles to engaging in this critique. Marxism, politically, no longer has a vested interest in the false consciousness of the parties, the reality that this consciousness expressed no longer exists.

One can press on, then, to a new conception of the emancipatory project without having, to confront the old orthodoxies and parties as an immovable obstacle. So, mindful of Alan Carter’s critical points, it is possible to argue for a new emancipatory project that includes rather than excludes Marxism, though this must be a Marxism of a particular kind. What is excluded is the idea of 'the party' representing 'the class’. The view that the working class, by its own efforts, can achieve only a consciousness limited to trade union issues amounts to a denial of self-emancipation. Against this, the argument here asserts the self-emancipation of all subaltern groups and classes as the condition for the self-managed society with which socialism is to be identified.

What is to be rejected is Marxism as the master discourse of the emancipatory struggle in the sense of its scientistic claim to alone be capable of grasping the world as a whole, penetrating its reified exterior in a way that human beings, in their everyday life, could not. The claim to introduce the socialist consciousness into the working class from without shows the dangers of Marxism as the master discourse. It is a discourse put together in abstraction from those upon whom it comes to be imposed. The claim to possess a scientific grasp of the world is to be scrutinised as an ideological claim concealing or rationalising power.

The past failure and the continued relevance of Marxism has to be argued in terms of Marxism’s ability to give expression and orientation to new social antagonisms. It is not clear what developments like analytical Marxism can contribute to the emancipatory project. Indeed, the analytical attempts to bring rigor and precision to Marx's 'theories' of class, the productive forces and relations, of the state, of revolution actually robs Marxism of the negative, critical aspect which seems to transcend a given reality. Indeed, like sociological projects, this analytical approach is necessarily entangled in the fetishistic world as a result of its passive-contemplative approach. Marx did not engage in such a theoretical enterprise, merely trying to understand a fetishised social world. Rather he critiqued this world and indicated that knowing this world is conditional upon practical social transformation, i.e. an activist conception that brought the human agency and the self-made world together. 

With the reduction of Marxism to party-state socialism, on the one hand, and an analytical, sociological school of science, on the other, there can be no surprise that Marxism has been outflanked on the left. As Levine, arguing for the Marxian vision of a stateless social order under communism, writes: In the past decade and a half, along with a general decline in left wing politics, the Left, including that portion of the Left that continues to identify with Marxism, has become less visionary and less inclined than ever to take communism seriously. The widespread identification of communism with Communism, the political and economic system in force in existing socialist countries, is partly to blame. But it is appropriate here to note a particularly ironic reason for communism's decline: the influence of some of the most progressive social forces to have arisen in advanced capitalist countries in recent years. Specifically, the ecological movement and the women's movement have implicitly and (usually) inadvertently raised doubts about the vision I want to defend. These movements are likely components in any future struggle for communism. Yet each has abetted the decline of communism as an ideal (Levine 1987:3/4).

Marxism seems not to possess an emancipatory significance and hence to be of little or no interest to those involved in new areas of social conflict, apart from 'economistic' class struggle. The conflicts and struggles in the modern world over ecology, race, gender, age. These can be presented as having two forms, The most limited is that in which the new social movements concern attempts by marginalised groups to achieve the old liberal goal of equality of opportunity, the ability of the individual to compete on equal terms with other individuals for scarce resources on the market.

More interesting is the idea that the new social movements represent an attempt to resist the encroachment of the system world upon the life world, a kind of fight on the frontier. This second view is the more interesting one because, one the one hand, the system world is compelled by the dynamics of the capital system to intervene in the life world in order to facilitate the process of accumulation; and because, on the other hand, the resistance of the human subjects in the life world contain demands that the system world be subordinated to the life world. Despite Habermas' demand that the system world and the life world be kept distinct, despite his denial that the system world, steered by the media of money and power, could be reappropriated, and despite the pathological consequences that he predicts will follow the encroachment of the system world upon the life world, once one formulates this tension in terms of the capital system and alienated power it becomes clear that this is a conflict between alien control (state and capital) and social control (human subjects in society).

Thus, there is a need to resist the neo-Bernsteinism which is being offered as the only future for the left, to challenge the reduction of socialism to liberal democracy, and to align Marxism unambiguously with the emancipatory struggles on its left flank. It is in these terms that the continuing relevance of Marxism is to be demonstrated in light of the collapse of 'really existing socialism’. This is not to deny that Marxism can still generate insights concerning the contradictions of the capital economy (Howard and King vol II 1992:391/4) but it is to suggest that Marxism, to be relevant, has to be more than the critique of the capital economy. The critique has to be linked with an emancipatory social practice if it is to be considered a relevant Marxism (Clarke 1991:328).

Thus, the collapse of state socialism both liberates Marx from the Communist prison but offers no guarantee of rehabilitation. Obvious tasks facing Marxism include coming to finally settle accounts with the Marxists who 'buried’ Marx (Smith 1996), to show how and in what way the orthodoxies of Second and Third Internationals deviated from Marx, reverted to positions criticised and transcended by Marx, channelled an emancipatory project into 'bourgeois' forms. The intellectual baggage can now be more easily discarded. But, in doing this, it is imperative to present clearly a 'new' Marx. Failure to do so risks perpetuating the identification of the collapse of state socialism with the failure of Marxism. Far from demonstrating the relevance of Marxism one risks showing why Marxism is an irrelevance to those engaged in emancipatory struggles and practices. Against this, Marx offers a way of formulating the basic problem of the modern world that enables people to express and canalise their antagonism to the existing social world most adequately.

The presentation of Marxism as a master discourse is hardly likely to impress those engaged in the new social movements and will hardly encourage those on Marxism’s left flank to discern in Marx a perspective clarifying their own struggle. Indeed, Marxism as a master discourse is part of the intellectual baggage to be thrown out with the collapse of state socialism and the claims for the party. These claims place an obstacle between Marxism and democracy that need not be there. 'Scientific socialism' in which an elite alone claims insight into the workings of the system and the party which alone claims the capacity to represent the 'true' interests of the class subject are connected to each other in a theoretico-elitist model which, following Marx, is to be repudiated. A Marxism that operates within this model serves to support a political party that collectivise individuals so as to transform themselves from being an oppositional force excluded from political power to a governmental force exercising this power. The transition of socialist and communist parties from being forces for revolution to being forces for order has been frequently noted but there is no real mystery here when presented in these terms. From the start, 'the party' made the ideological claim to alone be able to identify and represent the 'true' interests of the class.

This neat equation of party and class with socialism can certainly be exploded (Post 1996:289/91). The party institutionalises its power on the basis of its separation from the class. Its claim to power is justified on the basis of its ability to escape the ideological enslavement to which the class is condemned. The party form thus works to suppress extra-political, social struggles in so far as they are incompatible with the interests of the party. The way that the parties act as forms of domination, of order, was demonstrated by the attitude of the Communists to the struggles of the later sixties. So long as parties as forms of domination and administration (Aronowitz 1981:44) continue to exist they will seek to marginalise and suppress all social movements in so far as they begin to resist or attempt to acquire power.

The argument is that ‘representation’ is inherently problematical from the perspective of self-emancipation. It is no exaggeration to argue that this problem lies behind the arguments concerning the relation of party to class throughout the twentieth century. It is also arguable that this relation did not trouble Marx so much precisely because he assumed that the class constituting itself as revolutionary subject would be able to represent itself through its own forms. Whilst this is a big assumption and whilst revolutionary socialists appreciating the need for socialism are likely to want to hasten the process a little by institutional means supplied by themselves, the direction of Marx's thought is plainly from the internal movement of the class. And it has to be, given his affirmation of the principle of proletarian self-emancipation.

For a century, those Marxists who have reacted as one Marxist party after another succumbed to the temptations of state power have sought to create the 'parti communiste ideal’ (Monatte in Jennings 1990:213/4) rather than come to question the party form itself. Similarly, Marxists have continued to present ‘the revolutionary party’ as the only alternative to the reformist party aiming at office within the parliamentary institutions of capital's world. Could it not be argued that the reformist party and the revolutionary party are members of the same species? For both are fighting with each other over the claim to represent the working class, as though the working class really were an 'it' or a 'thing' with no subjective identity or initiative of its own. Not only is the party form a form of domination and not only is the representative principle to be rejected, one has also to question the idea that there is such a thing as 'the working class'. Parties can continue to argue over the 'true' interest of the class.

The inferences we draw depend upon our premises. From the immediate position of the working class as the class of wage labour, we may infer that the real interest of the workers lies in a healthy capitalism and hence justify a reformist parliamentary socialism. If we proceed from the conflict between capital and labour we may infer that the real interest of the class lies in the abolition of the system. But what both sides miss is the very necessary process in which ‘the class’ comes forward to assert its interests for itself. For the old debates as to what constitutes a class, what the true interests of the class are and how they may be represented show are increasingly sterile. Whilst the sociological definitions of class offered by Poulantzas (1973 1975) and Wright (1978) possess analytical merit, one is left wondering just what the point is (Holloway in Bonefeld at al ed.1995:157). Why does it matter to which class individuals are to be assigned? It is as though classes really are little boxes into which individuals may be placed (Thompson 1968). Is the working class to be identified only with the manual working class, as Poulantzas argues? Is the working class diminishing or expanding? What sociological categories do we use to in answering these questions? Those who argue for the end of the working class can be challenged. But there is nevertheless reason to argue that attempts to refute those who write off the working class (Callinicos and Harman 1987) remain within a sociological framework that is highly deterministic and treats class in passive, objective terms. There are other approaches to class available from within Marx. The assumption that the main problem is to place individuals in their appropriate boxes is to be rejected. The problem of class is a practical one that cannot be solved in sociological or political terms.

How class is understood and approached has a number of implications. If, for instance, we understand class as a 'thing', then it is only one step away from once more justifying the alienated form of 'the party' which, inferring the 'true' imputed consciousness of the class, should be invested with the responsibility for representing the class. If, however, we are simply concerned with the identification of class as part of a sociological project then we reproduce the fetishisation of 'objective structures and relations' (Miliband in Blackburn ed.1972:259) which characterises the social world. Either way, the path to revolutionary socialism is blocked by sociologists, and politicians reducing class to the status of an object.

In short, the problem of representation is inherent in both the sociological project and the party form because neither can grasp the subjective aspect of class and class constitution. Both are 'bourgeois’ in being unable to transcend a fetishised social world in which the working class is treated as an object.

Socialisation vs. Nationalisation
In the aftermath of the collapse of state socialism, it is imperative to argue that the self-emancipation of the proletariat is the condition of the self-managed socialism which Marx, arguably, pursues against the fetish systems of politics and production. This emancipatory commitment to a defetishised, free social world is thus highly critical of 'the party' as an alienated organisational form which, on account of its 'scientific' knowledge claims to represent the working class. Such a party upholds a bureaucratic (descending) as opposed to a democratic (ascending) conception of politics and hence comes to dominate the working class rather than being constitutive of its self-emancipation.

Marx, it has to be remembered, argued that the working class should form itself into a political party, which is an altogether different notion to the idea that a political party is to be created for the class, embodying its true interests. Thus, Marx argues that ‘the proletariat can act as a class only by constituting itself a distinct political party’ (Marx Congress Resolutions FI. 1974:270) and that 'every movement in which the working class comes out as a class against the ruling classes and attempts to force them by pressure from without is a political movement' (Marx to Bolte 23 Nov. 1871).

The condition for the renewal of socialism is to distinguish socialism once and for all from nationalisation. What Marx is arguing for is the transformation of social relations and this means identifying socialism with socialisation. This is to be sharply distinguished from the nationalisation of the means of production, that state socialism in which the social powers of human beings continue to confront these human beings in alienated form.

This requires finally and for good transcending the Jacobin temptation to identify revolution with the control of the state power. The use of the state power to 'build socialism', to transform society from above is 'the most un-Marxian notion ever excogitated by professed Marxists' (Lichtheim 1961:370), and is typically Jacobin rather than Marxist. A Marxist politics must proceed from the principle of self-emancipation and pursue the notion of a 'proletarian public' in such a way as to enhance the possibilities for an active suffrage and citizenship rooted in practical relations.





Recognising this, we nevertheless have to avoid fetishizing the state power as a ‘thing’, as a concentrated entity, which is to be possessed and used as the prize of the revolutionary struggle. This is precisely what Marx warns against (Marx EBLB 1973:238). One can pursue this argument by defining power as a relation rather than a thing, changing the register so as to be able to dissolve concentrated 'thing’ like power. One can thus cite Landauer's view as a promising one from this perspective:

The state is not something which can be destroyed by a revolution, but is a condition, a certain relationship between human beings, a mode of human behaviour; we destroy it by contracting other relationships, by behaving differently.

Landauer in Ward Anarchy in Action

The task, therefore, has to be to identify socialism with the transformation of social relations rather than with the ownership of the means of production, and with socialisation as against nationalisation. But what kind of socialisation? Some time ago Pollock argued that the state intervention in the economy enabled it to contain the contradictions of capitalism. What Pollock did was to present before us the choice not between capitalism and socialism but a democratic state capitalism and an authoritarian state capitalism (Pollock in Jay 1984:36/7). A democratic state capitalism, one may argue, is a contradictory notion from a Marxist perspective. Neither the state nor capitalism can be democratic; the one realises democracy only on the abstract level, the other is defined as anti-democratic. The choice, it may be argued, is between a perspective that looks to align socialisation with a conscious process of democratisation and a perspective that is driven by the objective unconscious socialisation of the capital system. The collapse of state socialism has been greeted in triumphalist terms by free market liberals. But free market liberalism is itself utterly Utopian. Capitalism is taking increasingly authoritarian political forms. It is the objective socialisation of the capital system which is compelling increasing state intervention in civil society to facilitate the process of accumulation. It is this external determinism which is generating an authoritarian politics in which the state controls society from the top down. To fail to challenge this external determinism behind capital's unsocial socialisation of the world means being propelled into an increasingly authoritarian system (Poulantzas 1978:203/4). There is no anonymous 'History' whose purpose is gradually being unfolded in a liberal democratic capitalism.

The identification of socialism with nationalisation rather than with socialisation was natural to the descending conception of the party/state socialists. Socialism would be realised through the activity of a political elite reorganising society from above. This bureaucratic, descending conception of government created a socialism in its own image. This insisted upon the state ownership of the means of production. The obvious question, the one asked by Tawney, is who owns the state? We need to go much further than this given the tendency of the parliamentary socialists to argue for the democratic state and criticise, as Marx did, the limitations of democracy realised within the abstract form of the state. We have to pursue the logic of democratisation beyond the state. To argue for socialism as nationalisation, whether the state owning the means of production is a parliamentary or party regime representing the demos, is a clear mystification and continues to turn social powers into political force and confront individuals with an alienated form.

The fundamental problem of social relations and their transformation has to be addressed. State ownership is justified if the demos own the state, which is the logic of the arguments of the parliamentary socialists from Kautsky to Tawney. But one has to question, on Marx's premise, just how effective such ownership could be. This ownership, in other words, is realised within the abstract form of the state. True ownership, like true democracy, means the disappearance of the state. The state is not the vehicle of socialisation, just as it is not the vehicle of democratisation. Underpinning Marx's argument is humanisation, the practical reappropriation of social powers alienated to the state and capital. It is the transformation of social relations which enables effective, active and direct control from below which defines socialism as a conscious democratic socialisation as against the unsocial, authoritarian socialisation of the capital system.

Again, one has to take a critical approach to those who urge the project of 'democratic capitalism' upon the left. For this 'democratic’ alternative to a genuine socialism is not available given the nature of the capital system as a subjectless system of alien control. For Meszaros, 'the question of how to overcome the destructive structural presuppositions of the established mode of social metabolic control cannot be avoided much longer'.













A ‘democratic capitalism' is exactly what is not on the agenda and is a clear piece of rationalisation by the apologists of capitalism which some parts of the left - the typically evasive parliamentary socialists who aim at office in the system - have been stupid enough or calculating enough to embrace. 'Democratic capitalism' is not an option. Instead, socialists should proceed from the contradictory dynamics of the capital system so as to grasp the potentialities for the transformation of social relations. Failing this, we remain within the external determinism of the capital system and succumb to the authoritarian drift in politics. Indeed, much of contemporary politics lives in a fantasy world. The 'democratic capitalism' offered by the left parliamentary parties and the 'liberal market capitalism' offered by the right parties are both of them utterly Utopian in that capital's objective socialisation of the global economy is developing in quite illiberal and undemocratic directions. Democratic capitalism exists nowhere but in the self-interested self-delusion of the parliamentary socialists. Liberal market capitalism is plainly ideological and requires a straightjacketed democracy and political authoritarianism (Hodgson 1984). We either pursue the process of democratisation beyond the state and capital or we are driven along with the unsocial socialisation of the capital system. The choices are self-determination or external determinism.

The policies for introducing the liberal market economy have required the authoritarian state, massive intervention in civil society and a repressive approach to the population. The gradual build-up of the authoritarian state indicates that the 'liberal marketeers' have always been conscious of this need for political authoritarianism (Hodgson 1984:111; Bowles and Gintis 1986:11). The liberal marketers, then, have been the more or less self-conscious exponents of the anti-social, top down, statist socialisation which is the only form that the regime of private accumulation can take in the era of transnational monopoly capitalism.

It is for this reason that it is important to differentiate socialism unambiguously from nationalisation and hence to insist upon the transformation of social relations. One is to define Marxism in terms of the process of democratisation. Democratisation implies effective control and, as such, implies the dissolution of the state and capital as barriers to this real control. Socialism as democratic socialisation versus capital's totalitarian socialisation is a socialisation from below against a socialisation that is external to human beings in society. Socialism requires the democratisation of human powers, of the decision making and practical processes governing human affairs. This is to make the case for an active and direct control through participatory institutions allowing individuals to exercise some power over their common affairs.

Socialism, then, cannot be reduced to the nationalisation of the means of production, as though it is constituted or exhausted by a legal definition of property. Meszaros thus argues for a total transformation that takes account of the close interrelationship between the state and capital.





Rather, the principle of empowerment is to be prioritised as central to Marx's politics and, as such, it defines the task of socialism as that of recovering effective control for human beings as the true subjects of history. This notion of empowerment may be discussed alongside the principle of active citizenship and the conditions required to make this citizenship an effective possibility, not least of which is the common conscious control of relations (Harrington 1993; Aronowitz 1981; Hirst 1989:68/9), Meszaros refers to the true universality that might arise from the actual productive, self-mediation of the social individuals in their metabolic interchange with nature in a radically different kind of society: one regulated by socialist accountancy and a corresponding 'mode of social metabolic control' (Meszaros 1995:18). Any notion of an active citizenship, involving empowerment must overcome capital's subjectless system of control and end that alienation of control from individuals which characterises the capital system (Meszaros 1995:65/5).





There are only human beings as subjects and the forms they create; these forms are to be subjected to the conscious control of the subjects. This is the realisation of democracy, and it implies the abolition of the state and capital. Not nationalisation, which reinforces the alien power of the state and capital, but socialisation through the transformation of social relations is the true goal of socialism (Levy ed.1987:75 231/3 236/8 239/40 241/2 243/5; Clarke 1991:231 238 243 244; Thomas 1994:15 193/6; Meszaros 1995:16 53 64/5 79 80/1 83 124 26 29 107 133 368/9 403 416/8 422 617 621 668 679/80 733 911 905 982). The conflation of socialisation and nationalisation is the result of the historical relocation from the social to the political realm and served the purposes of those with a vested interest in running a bureaucratised, collectivized state capitalism (Levy ed. 1987:8 17/8 19/21 93 110/4 123 127 220 223/6 249/53 282 285/6; Gilbert 1981:161; Meszaros 1995:714; Aronowitz 1981:164/5). This conception has damaged socialism and has continued to do so. But distinguishing socialism from nationalisation does not in the least lend support to the revisionists’ attempts to identify socialism with a regulated capitalism. The case for nationalisation at least recognised, if it inadequately realised, the need for effective control. The revisionists’ attempt to manage capitalism is based upon the belief that the private process of accumulation is subject to the regulation of the public sphere. But this belief has also collapsed with Russian style Communism. Capitalism is not a public domain but a regime of private accumulation and, as such, is unavailable to public control (McLennan 1989). The possibility of managing capitalism through the public realm it Utopian in that it resists the need to transform social relations. The revisionists who have attacked Clause 4 style nationalisation have done so not to demand democratic socialisation based on the transformation of social relations but to opt for a publicly regulated capitalism. 'Democratic capitalism' is nothing new.

35 NEO-BERNSTEINISM - LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT
The starting point of this argument for a neo-Bernsteinian tendency in the political thought of the left is, of course, Bernstein himself. What Bernstein did was reject the roots of socialism in ‘immanent economic necessity’ and instead refer to the evolutionary, socialising processes of the capitalist economy. Bernstein rejected the basis of socialism in the class struggle and in the crisis of capitalism. The classes were not polarising as Marx predicted, capitalist crises were evening out and becoming manageable, the middle classes were expanding, living standards rising and the economy socialising itself. Put this way, the need for socialist revolution did not arise. The mechanisms propelling the workers to revolt had been removed. What socialism required, Bernstein argued, is an ethical component that gave good reasons why the socialist society ought to be achieved.

The inevitable breakdown of capitalism can no longer be asserted owing to capitalism's development of a capacity of adaptation, Bernstein argued. The development of this capacity through the credit system, employers' organisations, communications systems and informational services combine with the expansion of the middle class to make crisis increasingly a thing of the past and the continuous improvement of living standards all but guaranteed. Thus socialism will be achieved not through crisis and revolution but by the gradual extension of social control under the state and a socialised economy. Bernstein thus defends parliamentarism in politics and cooperation in economics.

In defence of Bernstein one could argue that he has in mind that gradualist strand in Marx's own thought, especially where Marx, in relation to the joint stock principle, refers to the abolition of capitalism within the capitalist mode of production. Thus Bernstein places his faith not in crisis and breakdown but in the very 'socialisation of production’ which he has just explained as the factor giving capitalism the capacity to adapt. The question is that if capitalism can adapt itself in such a way as to gradually increase living standards how on earth is the case for a socialist reorganisation to be made? Bernstein identifies the basis of socialism in the very factor which would appear to guarantee the permanence of capitalism. Capitalism's 'means of adaptation' cannot also be 'the preconditions and even in part the germs' of socialism (Luxemburg in Howard ed. 1971:59). The socialist implications of socialisation, in Marx's view, could only be appreciated through the transformation of capitalist social relations of production. Bernstein has grasped only the evolutionary side of Marx's thought, the idea that socialism is rooted in real developments. He has left out the revolutionary side concerning social transformation. The same can be said of the likes of Hilferding (Howard and King vol II 1992:363).

Rather than reprise the well-known Bernstein-Luxemburg controversy, we may simply note here that Luxemburg re-affirmed Marx's case that socialism rests upon three propositions: the growing anarchy or crisis of the capitalist economy, the growing socialisation of production, and the growing class organisation and consciousness of the proletariat. Luxemburg has no difficulty in exposing the wishful thinking in Bernstein's thought, as though capitalist evolution would do the job of the socialist revolutionaries. Bernstein's means of adaptation cannot operate to prevent crisis, the capitalist class will identify any attempt at their gradual elimination, the capitalist economy itself will systemically react against the gradual encroachment of socialism through cooperative production.

More relevant here, however, is to note how Luxemburg quickly identifies the moralism at the heart of Bernsteinian Social Democracy. For, if capitalist development no longer leads to crisis and breakdown, then socialism ceases to be an objective necessity. Let it first of all be pointed out that nothing in the argument that socialism is an objective necessity excludes political initiative, class consciousness, morality on the part of the proletarian agency. On the contrary, the classical Marxist case for the coincidence of subjective and objective factors, freedom and necessity, as Lukacs made clear (Lukacs 1971). So Luxemburg is not arguing for a fatalistic position. The point she is making against Bernstein is that socialism has its roots in objective necessity, motivating and obligating human agency and making it clear that politics, ideas and morals have a substance. Luxemburg is underlining the impotence of Bernsteinian socialism. Since the means of adaptation and the socialisation of production guarantee the continuation of the capitalist economy and since the amelioration of the workers' living standards produces an absence of conflict as well as crisis, thus removing all three factors in Marx's model of the transition to socialism, all that remains is socialism as an ideal. The realisation of socialism depends upon the force of persuasion. That the appeal to this ideal presupposes social identities which, on Bernstein's own premises, do not exist - i.e. a class consciousness working class - the socialists merely address people over their heads. The moral arguments of the socialists lack social relevance. The breaking of the links between socialism and social identity, class and necessity thus results in moralism.

And moralism has ever been the characteristic of Social Democracy (Berki 1976; Eagleton 1991:214/5). What Bernstein was attempting to achieve, arguably, was the remoralisation of the capitalist economy rather than its overthrow. And, indeed, we are now in a position to appreciate Marx's insight when criticising the increasing bourgeois elements in German Social Democracy. As Marx understood, it is the approach to class and class struggle which really separates the socialists from the well-meaning, moralistic, impotent liberals (Marx Circular Letter FI 1974:360). Luxemburg's castigation of the opportunist method is nothing less than an accurate assessment of the bourgeoisie and of bourgeois modes in the socialist movement. This was noticeable not only in Germany but also in Britain where the likes of Sydney Webb and R.H. Tawney, for instance, viewed the class struggle as expressing the inefficiency or immorality of capitalism rather than, as for Marxists, as indicating the positive agency for revolutionary socialist transformation (Levy ed. 1987:41).

Socialism, by the late nineteenth century, was beginning to attract not only the working class but precisely those 'well meaning' bourgeois and petty bourgeois who, for Marx, were distancing the socialist movement from the working class and the class struggle. Marx refers to the petty bourgeoisie who are making their presence felt, full of fear that the proletariat, under the pressure of its revolutionary position, may ‘go too far'.'

Instead of a determined political opposition - general mediation; instead of the struggle against government and bourgeoisie - the attempt to win them over and persuade them.





All historically necessary conflicts are reinterpreted as misunderstandings and all discussions are brought to an end with the protestation that ultimately we are all agreed on the main points. The people who appeared as bourgeois democrats in 1848 can now just as well call themselves Social Democrats. Just as for the former the democratic republic was unattainably remote so, too, is the overthrow of the capitalist order for the latter, and it has therefore absolutely no significance for the political practice of the present day; one can mediate, compromise and philanthropise to one's heart content. And it is just the same with the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. On paper it is acknowledged because its existence can no longer be denied; but in. practice it is hushed up. watered down, attenuated. The Social Democratic Party is not to be a workers' party; it is not to incur the hatred of the bourgeoisie or of anyone; above all it should conduct energetic propaganda among the bourgeoisie; instead of stressing far reaching goals which deter the bourgeoisie and are unattainable in our generation anyway, it should rather devote its whole strength and energy to those petty bourgeois patchwork reforms which could provide the old social order with new supports and hence perhaps transform the final catastrophe into a gradual, piecemeal and, as far as possible, peaceful process of dissolution. These are the same people who, under the guise of unflagging activity, not only do nothing but also try to prevent anything happening at all except chatter; the same people whose fear of every action in 1848 and 1849 obstructed the movement at every step and finally caused its downfall; the same people who never see reaction and are then quite amazed to find themselves in a blind alley, where neither resistance, nor flight is possible, the same people who want to banish history to the confines of their own narrow philistine horizon and over whose heads history always proceeds to the real business on the agenda.

Marx Circular Letter 1974:372/3

These ‘same people’ were around at the time of the Second International doing precisely the same things that they had done in 1843 and canalising progressive forces into the sane blind alleys. Bernstein defined their position, and continues to do so. Durkheim formulated it in terms of the opposition between state socialism and workers socialism (Gouldner ed.1962:61/2). Durkheim's sympathies were with the former, favouring the moral regulation of capitalism through the state (Turner in Lowith 1993:2; Durkheim 1958). And this is the common position amongst the bourgeois socialists. They





These points provide some kind of a context for the contemporary theoretical and political trends on the left which are critical and even hostile to Marx.

As Luxemburg makes clear, Marxists are not against reforms. The demand for social reforms is quite compatible with the revolutionary struggle for socialism. What Luxemburg is criticising with respect to the revisionists is the idea that the reforms have now become the end itself, thus exhausting the socialist position.

Marx himself argued for parliamentary activity and for the legislative reform of social ills, he was an opponent of 'political indifferentism’. A reformist position can he extracted from Marx, especially when connected with his analysis of the socialisation of production. Marx did support the view that parliamentary legislation could be of benefit to the working class. But there is no support at all for the view that Marx's politics ended here, that reformism exhausted political possibilities. Marx never ceased to insist upon the revolutionary transformation of social relations through the class struggle as the condition of socialism. One therefore needs to distinguish the support for legislative reform of social abuses from the socialist revolution, for Marx is not arguing that former evolves gradually into the latter. To this extent, Marx's position actually encompasses that of the reformists in going much further.

Thus, Marx does support a reformist politics but makes it clear that this politics is to be oriented by the socialist objective. Marx continued to adhere to the view that socialism requires the practical transformation of social relations, that is revolution realises the socialist potential immanent in evolution, as it were. Bernstein remained on the level of the latter. Whilst Marx consistently argued against the abstentionist position and whilst he consistently supported the extension of the franchise, he never made the claim that political action within parliamentary institutions would suffice to achieve socialism.

But, in underlining that Marx was not a Social Democrat, or one of the old bourgeois democrats of 1843, we open the controversy up further. For Marx is arguing for the revolutionary social transformation which the 'bourgeois democrats', upholding the state-civil society separation, are concerned to reject. Thus Marx, arguing for the necessity of a revolutionary politics that transcends existing political institutions, may be criticised for his evasion on the issues of the delimitation of the state power, the state's intervention in society, democratic rights and individual liberties, the decision making and conflict resolving mechanisms. Marx's 'end of politics' has nothing to say on these issues and instead evades what have been the central problems of government by the assertion of abundance (Pierson 1986:24/30). This evasiveness, this silence, on fundamental issues of government and liberties and democratic procedures invites a political wasteland. Such is the liberal criticism of Marx’s politics or anti-politics.

Of course, it should be pointed out that Marx was assuming the attainment of liberal democracy. It should be for liberal democrats to make the case for liberal democracy. Marx's business was to show the limitations of political emancipation as an emancipation within the sphere of alienation. The character of representative institutions, the delimitation of the state and the codification of rights and liberties was hardly on Marx's agenda. Indeed, he was concerned to demonstrate the asocial nature of bourgeois society as producing the universal antagonism and egoism which explains why the conflict resolving mechanisms of the ‘protective’ boom so large in liberal analysis in the first place. Perhaps Marx is deficient when it comes to an account of political authority and obligation. But such an account can be provided, since the overcoming of the dualism between state and civil society does not necessarily mean the ‘end of politics’.

Marx's evasiveness on the status of politics under socialism can hardly qualify him as a theorist of democratic practices and procedures. It is here that the neo-Bernsteinians strike. As they might, given the fact that they assert the permanence of the political institutions and the state-civil society dualism that Marx seeks to transcend.

Neo-Bernsteinism
The key principles of neo-Bernsteinism can be stated as the permanence of the state, the recognition of autonomous institutions within civil society, the formalised differentiation of the state from civil society, the importance of democratic institutions and procedures, and finally the emphasis upon pluralism (Pierson 1986:190),.

Perhaps, however, neo-Bernsteinism is an inappropriate term. For the old Social Democracy is also in the critical sights of the likes of Paul Hirst for its top down, bureaucratic approach to politics and society (Hirst 1989:13/4 55/6). Poulantzas for one condemns Social Democracy for its statism, tending, along with Leninism, to issue in 'the techno-bureaucratic statism of the experts' (Poulantzas 1978). Poulantzas has the merit of rethinking the transition to socialism. He is concerned to avoid all the old snares, looking to overcome the old antithesis between a top down politics based upon existing representative institutions and a bottom up politics based upon direct forms.





Poulantzas sought to overcome this dilemma by proposing a 'democratic road to socialism' which combines both representative and direct forms. What Poulantzas is after is 'combining the transformation of' representative democracy with the development of fords of direct, rank and file democracy' (Poulantzas 1978). He defines the task facing socialism by asking this question:





Poulantzas avoids fetishizing the state power by conceiving it not as a thing but as a relation. Thus the state is conceived as the expression of a relationship of forces, as 'through and through constituted divided by class contradictions'. Power is not a 'quantifiable substance' but a 'series of relations the various social classes'.

This has profound implications as regards the 'seize' or 'capture' or 'smash’ theories of the state. To be able to do any of these things, it follows from Poulantzas' analysis, that there has also been, a change in the balance of forces. This change, for Poulantzas, must have a popular dimension, it must be the result of 'mass struggle'. Thus, the 'democratic road to socialism' proposed by Poulantzas is a 'long process' involving the creation of 'diffuse centres of resistance which the masses always possess within the state networks' with a view to establishing 'real centres of power on the strategic terrain of the state' (Poulantzas 1978:258).

Poulantzas thus proposes a view of winning power which differs from the old strategies of Social Democracy and Communism. Poulantzas rejects the 'smash' theory of the state as being based upon an instrumentalist approach in which those 'smashing' the state look to replace the bourgeois state with their own form, removing democratic rights and representative institutions in the process.

Offe expresses the difficulties facing the socialist project: 'socialism in industrially advanced societies cannot be built without state power and it cannot be built upon state power'. It is this dilemma which Marx does not grasp, in Offe's opinion, and which cannot be addressed in terms of the 'withering away' of the 'capitalist state' (Offe 1984:246). Another way of expressing the dilemma is given by Przeworski: 'Participation in electoral politics is necessary if the movement for socialism is to find mass support among workers, yet this participation seems to obstruct the attainment of final goals' (Przeworski 1980:38). Poulantzas identifies the horns of the dilemma on which left/democratic theorists are likely to falter, sliding back into liberal democratic forms.

What these writers are calling for is a reassessment of Marx's approach to the state-civil society relation in order to provide a more adequate and more plausible account of democratic rights, political institutions and procedures, the pluralism of society. In so far as this call for a reassessment is directed most immediately against Social Democracy and Communism one can agree. But how many reassess Marx himself, directly, and not through the distorting lenses of the statist or 'techno-bureaucratic' expression of marxism?

Marx's attempts to overcome the state-civil society separation are obviously 'dangerous' from a liberal democratic perspective, for they go beyond liberal democratic forms. Liberal democratic critics, therefore, argue for the indispensability of political institutions based upon the principle of representation, formal liberties and democratic rights. Critics may go further and argue for ‘the permanence of the political’ (Schwartz). In all forms of society there will be a need for political institutions and mechanisms. On both counts Marx is criticised as deficient. Marx's anticipation of the 'end of politics' is thus condemned as Utopian and as inviting totalitarianism (Polan 1984).

But, against this, it can be questioned whether Marx really is asserting the end of politics and not, on the contrary, arguing for a repoliticisation. There has been a slippage, undoubtedly, but this has followed the identification of 'the state’ with the political. Both liberals and Communists and Social Democrats are guilty of this identification and therefore are not able to conceive of a polity without a state. Apart from the use of the Paris Commune as a paradigm, for the future socialist society, Marx is silent on an institutional framework that establishes the rights of citizens and the claims of government and the protection of liberties. Marx is not that explicit on the provision of public spaces in which citizens can come together to negotiate differences, resolve conflicts, argue for competing policies and be able to agree on a programme of action. Marx is not as clear as maybe he should have been concerning the necessity of a common framework which can only be described as political. One may infer that the creation of such a common framework is not at all incompatible with what Marx is arguing and that, indeed, Marx would seem to be demanding not the elimination but the extension of public spaces to enable mass participation on the part of an active citizenship (McLennan 1989:124). But Marx has really left it to the Marxists who followed him to bring a greater level of explicitness and clarity to his argument.

The underlying assumption of the neo-Bernsteinians is that Marxism must dissolve itself into liberal democratic pluralism. In other words it is a repudiation of Marxism and its attempt to create a stateless polity. On the institutional terrain, Marx is weak and critics, rejecting the possibility for true democracy, have little difficulty in exposing Marx's inadequacies (Pierson 1986:188/9). But theorising the liberal democratic state, supplying norms for this state, formed no part of Marx's brief. Marx is not a political theorist and transcends the tradition of political philosophy, with its concern to legitimise state power, law and authority (Bonefeld et al 1995:3). To criticise Marx for not being a political philosopher is either to misunderstand or consciously reject what Marx was attempting to do.

The collapse of state socialism has not only meant Marxism being outflanked on the left by the new social movements. On the right, there has been something of a renaissance in liberal/social democratic theory (Aronowitz 1981:257). Meister's political materialism and Marxism for the markets attempts to align Marxism with this renaissance (Meister 1990).

Similarly, one can refer to the way that McLennan explores the common ground between Marxism and pluralism (McLennan 1989). One can refer to those who argue for a connection between democracy and markets, like Alec Nove (1983), to those putting the case for the democratic economy, like Hodgson (1984), Dahl (1985) and Lindblom (1977), to those arguing for the institutionalised separation of the state from civil society, like Keane (1988). To the likes of Przeworski, who reject the old Marxist orthodoxies concerning class and revolution in favour of a. more democratic institutional approach (Przeworski 'Proletariat into Class: The Process of Class Formation from Karl Kautsky's "Class Struggle" to Recent Controversies, Politics and Society, vol 7, no 4). 'In short, we are in the midst of a new theoretical defence of Bernsteinism (Aronowitz 1981:236).

It is not that easy to differentiate between the liberal and the social given that one point that the democratic socialist theorists insist upon is that formal sphere of liberal freedoms. There is a basic insistence upon procedural justice, drawing upon the work of Rawls (Hampshire 1992:142ff). Norberto Bobbio's attempts to defend a liberal socialism indicates the extent to which liberal and social democracy are conflated. There is no doubt that Bobbio's principal target is the socialist left. Bobbio puts the case for representative institutions and the parliamentary system.

One can question this neo-Bernsteinism for all the reasons that Luxemburg offered against Bernstein. For a reformed capitalism presupposes a reformable capitalism. Yet the ending of the long boom has shown that such reforms as Social Democracy can make are always conditional upon the process of accumulation and hence revocable (Meszaros 1995). The weaknesses of Communism have been as much in evidence in Social Democracy and, this being the case, we cannot presume innocence on the part of the neo-Bernsteinians. Is it the rationalisation of reverses already suffered or ideological preparation for the reverses to be suffered by the workers movement? As Luxemburg argued in relation to Bernstein, to choose to make reforms, the end is not to suggest a different route to socialism but to choose another goal entirely. What we have with neo-Bernsteinism is, on its positive side, a strong defence of a formal system of democratic rights, political procedures and individual liberties as crucial to socialism. More negatively, however, we have a visionless, unenlightened pragmatism that has reduced the ends of socialism to what can be achieved through existing institutional and structural constraints. Such a pragmatism is parasitic upon the capital system and shares in the crisis of that system. It is significant that the neo-Bernsteinian turn has come at precisely the same time that the roots of and space for Social, not to mention Liberal Democracy are being rapidly eroded. 

Hence we have to conclude with a fair degree of pessimism. The bourgeois democrats of 1848 who Marx slammed for their intellectual paucity and political passivity, who took over Social Democracy in the late nineteenth century, who seemed to possess a congenital incapacity to think or act decisively, are still around and are still in the way, blind to possibilities and limiting horizons. The spread of capitalist economic relations, the crisis of the capital system and the commodification of all aspects of society is creating a social infrastructure which is immune from the old social democratic controls instituted at the political level and which make the old liberal freedoms as abstract as ever. More than this, the need for political intervention in civil society to facilitate the process of private accumulation on the one hand and to control a society subject to crisis on the other, makes the institution of liberal democracy extremely problematic. The liberal democrats are powerless to institute liberal democracy or to resist the gradual erosion of liberal democracy for they do not address the roots of the problem. Poulantzas was right when he said that we discover the importance of liberal democracy now that it is being whittled away. But unless we understand the processes behind this gradual erosion, then there is little prospect of defending, let alone deepening liberal democratic rights and freedoms.

There is, contrary to the neo-Bernsteinians, a substantial case against 'complexity'. The argument from complexity too easily - and too obviously - is designed to end debate and remove from controversy political forms which ought to be subject to controversy and alteration. Robert Dahl, who has concerned himself with political and economic democracy, explicitly states that there is no alternative to large, centralised political systems.

Let us put away our infantile fantasies, the yearning to return to an infancy of the species that never was, where mankind existed in small and totally autonomous units like tribes and villages and practised primary democracy and knew peace and harmony... No, because the species is interdependent, giant political systems are a necessity.

Leaving aside the historical inaccuracy of the first part, we can focus upon the way that the assertion of the final line removes any notion of human choice in the matter. Dahl repeats the assertion.

As for making all large political systems vanish into thin air, when the silk scarf is pulled away there in full sight are matters that cannot be handled by completely autonomous communes, neighbourhoods, or villages: matters of trade, tariffs, unemployment, health, pollution, nuclear energy, discrimination, civil liberties, freedom of movement, not to say the whole tragic range of historically given problems like the threat of war and aggression, the presence great military establishments around the world, the danger of annihilation. These problems inexorably impel us to larger and more inclusive units of government, not to small and totally autonomous units.

But, as Kirkpatrick Sale comments, we might be more inclined to give up our 'infantile fantasies' if Dahl did not put up against them so many adult ones of his own (Sale in Ehrlich ed.1996:38/9). For the problems that Dahl highlights as justifying the necessity of the state are problems which have everything to do with large, centralised forms of government, removing power from human control and, as a result, responsibility.

Aren't the problems of war and aggression and nuclear energy and tariff barriers caused rather than solved by big governments. (They, certainly haven't solved them, in any case, have they?). Surely, if there were no giant governments there would be no 'great military establishments' around the world and a good deal less 'danger of annihilation'. And if we have in fact been impelled to ‘larger and more inclusive units of government’ because in that way we would solve the problems of unemployment, pollution, and discrimination, it does not take any special genius to show that it seems to have been rather futile, or at the very best inadequate; if to provide us with high levels of health-care and a profitable balance of trade, it does seem to have failed, or at the best proven highly erratic.

Sale in Ehrlich ed.1996:39

And here we come to the crucial point, the liberal state and its permanence or otherwise. Democracy is identified with the processes and institutions of the 'liberal state'. What makes this ideological identification worse is that it comes when the liberal state has long since been in the process of becoming the authoritarian state.

'Complexity' in itself is not an argument. Indeed, it is as much a criticism of a world abstracted from real, individuals in which the power of control is vested in the hands of elites. And it is pointless to attempt to achieve democratisation, socialisation and humanisation within such alien forms of control.

For centuries, elites have used complex rules and regulations to dominate groups of lower status. Kropotkin (1970:251/2) makes this point in some very tailing illustrations... Basil Bernstein argues that the middle and upper classes have developed a more elaborate form of speech, one that requires learning in childhood if one is to master it. The effect is to perpetuate the domination of higher over lower classes who understandably find such speech awkward or inaccessible..




The solution is to break down these large centralised political systems and that 'complexity' which exists as a cover for concentrations of power exercised over people.





There is simply no doubt in the anarchist mind that individuals should be allowed to do for one another what they can. To institutionalise health or education, for instance, is to make the process of getting well or learning something a matter for professional guidance and control; to institutionalise learning, then, is to habituate individuals to being guided and justifies the prevailing level of complexity. The argument of modern writers like Jonathan Kozol or Ivan Illich has insisted on this point. Once individuals become used to going to schools for education or to doctors for getting well, they have already lost the battle for freedom.

Now, as the doctor and the teacher, the social worker and the various other professionals combine to make their authority coercive and their services, necessary for the citizen, they receive the protection of the state. As Kropotkin would have put it, where the priest, judge, soldier, and lord combine, there is the state, and the resulting concentration of power destroys all competitors within its territory. For Bakunin, the devil in history was not confined to the formal organisation of the state itself; it was the principle of command, a devil that can influence even socialist organisations when they succumb to the authoritarian tempter.

And here is the answer to the case made for the necessity of the state by the likes of Dahl and any number of other neo-Bernsteinians.

In rejecting the state, then, anarchists have refused to take into their own hands the powers that command consent and discourage competing forms of united action; therein lay the disagreement, of course, between Bakunin and Marx. The same disagreement caused Max Weber to argue that the anarchists project is anachronistic in view of the size, complexity, and technological advancement of modern societies, for which the state is the only conceivable form of political order. Here, however, I wish to revive the anarchists' argument against the state. The state only appears to be 'necessary’, I suggest, so long as work, education, health, and other essential activities become sufficiently complex that more communal or spontaneous forms of organisation will not suffice, and so long as individuals become habituated to being doctored or schooled or otherwise subordinated to professional frameworks. In the absence of adequate rituals for managing social conflict, a highly complex social system lacks the support of custom and appears arbitrary and unmanageable. To the extent that any complexity is supported by ritualized gestures and attitudes of consent, however, an elites domination will seers to provide simplicity, unity, and legitimate rule.

Still, it is not a gross oversimplification to argue that complexity in social life is imposed by elites to perpetuate their domination. Complexity is a characteristic of a code, and elites alone control the code embedded in the organisation of a social system. The more complicated industry becomes, the more difficult it will be for workers to control it. The more complicated becomes the machinery of the state, the less voters can influence it. 'Complexity' is as much a criticism of a world abstracted from real individuals, in which the power of control is vested in the hands of elites. And it is pointless to attempt to achieve democratisation, socialisation and humanisation within such alien forms of control.

In so complicated a social system, even the organ of government cannot draw people together in common action toward the public good. The problem is not simply the natural tendencies, so to speak, of the industrial age, in which work becomes increasingly specialised, offices more formal, rules more complex, and action attenuated along the length of a chain of command that seems to have no definable beginning or end. The problem is also that the state perpetuates and enforces such complexity. The state pre-empts constructive action without taking enough initiative itself. The power to achieve united action requires conditions of less complexity and more freedom than the state, in modern societies, will provide. On the contrary, the complexity of work and politics in modern societies appears to call for further extensions of the state's own apparatus (Fenn 1986:91/2).

A complex industrial order, in which conflict had to be managed according to the rites presided over by the state, made genuine solutions impossible and protracted certain problems until disaster finally occurred (Fenn 1986:92).


36 LIBERALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY

John Keane
John Keane defines democracy in formal and procedural terms, in which rules specify who is authorised to take decisions and what procedures apply in the decision making process. This proceduralist definition of democracy encompasses equal and universal suffrage; rule by majority decision with inbuilt protection of minority rights; rule of law; freedom of thought, opinion and assembly as constitutionally guaranteed.

Keane thus argues that democracy requires the strict and institutional separation of the state from civil society, in which the democratic state is accountable to a pluralist civil society comprising freely organising groups. Political parties, parliamentary institutions and corporatist procedures mediate the division between state and civil society (Keane Public Life and Late Capitalism 1984; The Media and Democracy).

For Keane, there is a connection between pluralism and the institutional division between civil society and the state. He affirms the need for formal political democracy and for institutional arrangements which ensure opportunities for protagonists to express their different points of view. Given the necessity of political, administrative and legal mechanisms for containing or resolving conflict





Keane's reference to overpoliticisation is important for indicating the danger of politicising aspects of life which lack political significance, something which could generate totalitarianism. There is a need to delimit the political. But the way that Keane argues for the institutional division of the state and civil society tends to reproduce the identification of the political with the state and for civil society as a self-organising society independent of this political power. Keane, in short, reproduces the dualism of the political and the social and cannot choose the option of repoliticising civil society.

In arguing this case, Keane detaches liberal democracy from capitalism and the class interest of the bourgeoisie. Liberal democracy is an end in itself as the most effective way of popularly controlling political actors and limiting the scope of state power in relation to society. Keane argues that a post-liberal democracy is possible. What he argues against is a non-liberal democracy, condemning the idea of dissolving political order and replacing organisation with spontaneity as Utopian.

Keane insists that those who wish for a democratic polity have to recognise that in complex, modern societies it is impossible to replace representative forms with direct and participatory forms of organisation. His main point, then, is that any polity that can be designated democratic has to establish procedural rules in collective decision making, preventing arbitrariness and misrule.

The idea that direct and participatory forms of democracy are appropriate only to small states and that, therefore, Marx is a Utopian in modern industrial society based upon the centralised nation state, misses the fact that Marx was aware of the complexity, the abstraction and the centralisation characterising the modern world. Marx envisages a process of decentralisation of power through the positive abolition of the state, entailing also the abolition of capital rule. It means challenging the centralised state removed from civil society as an established fact through exposing its roots in capital's social metabolic order. Failure to do this does indeed mean accepting representative forms as the only possible basis of a democratic polity.

The problem is that Keane is well aware of the problems vitiating representative democracy. Trends and forces working against democracy are legion: the rise of executive power and the fall of legislative power, the expansion of the state's coercive apparatus and unaccountable power, government advertisement, the concentration of social power in civil society constraining the democratic public power, citizens lack of an effective voice in the crucial decisions of investment, employment and production, the undemocratic nature of the major social institutions.

Keane, undeterred, argues for greater democratization in civil society (Keane DCS 1988). The question, however, is whether Keane has come to hobble his project of democratisation from the start by adopting a liberal view of the desirability and inevitability of the state-civil society separation, working in a piecemeal fashion in both public and private spheres without being able to confront the alien powers of the state and capital as inextricably related parts of capital's whole social metabolic order. The point is not to democratise alien powers but to abolish them in order to facilitate a thoroughgoing democratisation. It is as little clear how centralised states, with complex bureaucratic structures and coercive means, can be democratised as how the agencies and mechanisms of capital rule, 'private', institutional and systemic, can similarly be subject to democratic control. For, as Marx revealed, the capital system is a dehumanisation, a subjectless system of control which operates not according to conscious human will or decision but to the imperatives of investment, valorisation and accumulation. To democratise these processes requires human intervention in a systemic order. It means what Marx claimed that it meant, the assertion of the 'rule of men' over the ‘rule of property’. In sum, socialism as the challenge to the capital system and the question of class power and struggle is brought back into political controversy.

One problem with Keane's argument is his identification of socialism with the state.

From the time of its birth in the 1820's, the socialist project aimed to undo this development by abolishing the social power of the bourgeoisie and, hence, by destroying the division between civil society and the state. The problem .. is that state power tends to become dictatorial whenever it ceases to be subject to the countervailing powers of civil society. And that is not the only problem. If socialism means a society in which ownership of the means of production has been transferred from private hands into the laps of ‘society’ - in the twentieth century that has normally meant the state itself - than the abuses of state power are (and have been) much more likely than in a capitalist society. Under socialist conditions, citizens would be exposed constantly to the whims and calculations of a state which simultaneously performs the functions of policeman, administrator, social worker and employer.

Keane in McLellan and Sayers ed. 1991:15/7

This is Weber's criticism again. And it theorises the superiority of private capitalism over state socialism. The problem, as Weber well knew, is that private capitalism was less and less in evidence in the early twentieth century. The objective socialisation which Marx theorised in Capital has long since replaced the economy based around private property with corporate form. The likes of Keane are offering a free market utopia that is the plainest fantasy in the era of transnational monopoly capitalism and the corporate form (McDermott 1991). 

 Further, the lazy identification of socialisation with state ownership and control ignores the point that there are other ways of formulating the socialist project. Marx himself aimed to overcome the state-civil society separation at the level of society against the state. Marx's democratisation may thus be presented as the practical reappropriation of the state and capital as alienated social powers so that social control which alone could realise Keane's principle that citizens should control their projects (Keane 1987b). This identification of socialism with the state is a consistent theme of Keane's Democracy and Civil Society. Keane, unable to comprehend the democratising logic of Marx's socialism, is reduced to arguing that 'the demand for socialism in this sense is undemocratic' (Keane in McLellan and Sayers ed. 1991:17). Keane offers his views in order to reinvigorate the project of the Left. With views like this it is difficult to see in what way Keane is entitled to align with the Left at all. At best, he presents the most uncritical of uncritical pluralism, writing in complete innocence of two hundred years of change. To argue that Paine has more to offer than Marx, when Paine’s views on free trade and small government are clearly appropriate to late eighteenth century conditions, is a sign of an advanced political and intellectual malady. Keane seems to have gone back to the origins of Marx’s project in the early modern democratic revolution in order to claim democracy to be more subversive than socialism. 

The demand for democracy is much more subversive because it calls into question all heteronomous forms of power.

Keane in McLellan and Sayers ed. 1991:17

Marx was well aware of the extent to which democracy called into question heteronomous forms of power. The reappropriation of alienated social power from fetish systems of state politics and production follows this democratising logic to its conclusion. 

Keane has a point as regards the failure of socialism as an organised political movement to strengthen the power of the demos self-organised in society as against the state and capital. But this applies to the politics of socialism on the modern terrain, not Marx’s conception of socialism as a challenge to that terrain. The similarities of Keane to Bobbio are a cause for suspicion. 

For Bobbio also identifies socialism with the project of the state, going on to argue that democracy is more subversive than socialism (Bobbio WS 1987). 

Norberto Bobbio on Socialism and Democracy
The attempts to synthesise liberalism and socialism must make reference to Norberto Bobbio, especially his Which Socialism? and The Future of Democracy, originally published in 1976 and 1983 but published in English only in 1987. These books reveal Bobbio to be a critic of marxism's relation to democracy (Bobbio 1987). For Bobbio, the only possible form of democracy given the complexity of modern society is representative democracy. This being so, Marxism's devaluation of formal and representative institutions has to be judged harshly. At best, Marxism could view democracy as a mere means to an end. At worst, Marxism would dismantle parliamentary government which, however limited, is the only form of democratic government presently in existence. Marxism's only alternative is a Utopia.

Marxism's inability to treat democratic institutions seriously would appear to be congenital as far as Bobbio is concerned. Bobbio criticises Marx's tendency to define all states as mere instruments of class dictatorship. Within Marxism this led to a predilection for denigrating existing institutions of parliamentary democracy as part of the class struggle. Bobbio launches a fierce assault upon Marxian notions of direct democracy as utterly inappropriate in the modern world. Marxist socialism, it seems, could produce only chaos or bureaucratisation through the dismantling of parliamentary forms and the suppression of the market. Through bureaucratisation, decision making would be insulated from popular scrutiny and control whilst the dynamism of civil society would be lost. 

Other points in the case against Marxism are marxism's claims to scientific status leading it to claim to be a master discourse that has no need to recognise other discourses. The privileging of one class, the proletariat, is a claim to exclusivity that cuts off the avenue to a truly democratic politics. There is very little open to negotiation since issues have been predetermined. Bobbio himself locates this deficiency in the relation that Marx established between economic base and political superstructure. Bobbio, indeed, exposes the origins of Marx's economic reductionism as lying not in the 1859 Preface but in his understanding of the relationship between the state and civil society. And it is indeed true that Marx, against Hegel, argued that it is civil society that creates the state. It is from this critique of Hegel's political philosophy that Marx sought to locate the anatomy of civil society in political economy.

Marx's critique could be said to have produced some powerful insights, exposing the state's ideological claim to represent the general will, revealing the political nature of 'private’ relationships, and cautioning against the illusions of political subjectivism. Politics had to be related to economic relations in order to determine their material effectiveness.

For Bobbio, however, Marx has uncritically accepted a commercial market conception of civil society, taking it from Hegel who, in turn, took it from the Scottish political economists. It is the achievement of Gramsci, Bobbio writes, to have rediscovered civil society as a realm comprising a complex network of social institutions which are independent of the state and of capital. And it is the achievement of Gramsci to have appreciated the relative autonomy of the political superstructure, thus enabling a more sophisticated approach to democratic politics.

The claims that economic reductionism and class politics prevent Marxism from having an adequate approach to democracy (McLennan 1989:114) can be countered by indicating precisely why, with not only Hegel but also the French Revolution and its unfulfilled ideals in mind, Marx came to give a negative and critical assessment of the creative capacities of politics. Neither will nor force, Marx argued, are themselves the basis of a political order but only in so far as they relate to economic relations, a view which, it should be noted, does not deny creative political agency.

More importantly, the idea that Marx identified civil society with capital, control and that it was left to Gramsci to rediscover the significance that civil society has for socialist politics is misleading. Marx did indeed identify civil society as a 'private' realm structured by property emancipated from political control. And he did theorise socialism in terms of the dissolution of the state and civil society. But the end in view was social control, the control by a self-organising society of social powers hitherto alienated to the state and capital.

For Bobbio, Marxism's inability to positively evaluate democratic institutions invites the degeneration of socialism into dictatorship. And





Or, as Marx put it, political revolution, even one that democratises and not merely captures the state power, is an emancipation from one alienation within the sphere of another, political, alienation. Such a view led Marx to argue for the Aufhebung of the state and for genuine social self-government. And it is this concern with overcoming the state/civil society separation so as to enable social control that leads Marx to conceive political democracy as merely the precursor of human emancipation in general, pointing beyond representative institutions.

Marx, it could be argued, did discover the roots of socialism in the reality of civil society and wished, in consequence, to absorb politics into these social centres and relationships. Bobbio, however, launches a fierce critique of direct democracy as being utterly Utopian in the modern world of complex industrial societies administered by large centralised states.

The best that is achievable, for Bobbio, is what could be called a 'liberal socialism’ which, involving institutions of representative democracy and the state/civil society separation, is not too different to what Hegel proposed. And, as such, means that the criticisms that Marx made of Hegel are of contemporary relevance.

Bobbio's article 'Democracy and Dictatorship’ represents a critique of the Marxist understanding of these two terms. Bobbio's consistent theme is evident here. Marxism has failed to recognise the importance of the liberal separation and limitation of powers, though he offers the hopeful view that the PCI would come in time to accept the liberal view as essential for its cohabitation with the Western world (Politica e Cultura 149).

Galvano Della Volpe responded by arguing that Bobbio had returned to the moderate liberalism of Constant. To Constant's libertas minor, Della Volpe opposed Rousseau's libertas maior. In reply Bobbio cautioned the Communists against a 'too ardent progressivism’ which ran the danger of extinguishing the achievements of an existing liberal democracy in pursuing a perfect ulterior democracy (Politica e Cultura 194). Bobbio's brand of liberalism, then, values the legal and constitutional guarantees protecting individual freedom and civil rights. This is fine, in so far as it goes, but it fails to relate such a liberal politics to its withering socio-economic roots. What Marx called the objective socialisation of the capital economy is ‘erasing liberal society’ (McDermott 1991), not in favour of socialism as Marx thought but in favour of a society based on corporate form. Liberal politics will not survive long in these conditions; it will be a head without a body.

With the Historic Compromise between the Communists and the Christian Democrats, and with the PCI adopting the principles of Eurocommunism, Bobbio was presented with circumstances more favourable to his attempts to synthesise liberalism and socialism. In two articles written in 1975 he decried the absence of a political theory in Marxism and argued for there being no alternative to a representative form of democracy. Bobbio thus stated, again the necessity of representative as against direct democracy in the free society (Bobbio WS 1987:47/84). 

Bobbio may be described as possessing a realist conception of the state. All states, he argues, rest ultimately on force (La Ideologie e il Potere in Crisi 165 in Anderson 1992:108). This was also the view, he argues, of Marx and Lenin. But, he criticises, the deficiency of Marx and Lenin lies in combining a pessimistic view of the state with an optimistic conception of human nature. Thus Marx was able to propose the abolition of the state through the emancipation of humankind. Bobbio, instead, remains with the tradition of conservative realism. The incorrigible nature of human beings demanded the permanent existence of an organised power for purposes of restraint (Bobbio 1987:62/3, 187/90): 'political studies owe more to the sometimes ruthless insights of conservatives than to the rigorous but brittle constructions of reformers' (Saggi sulla Scienza Politica 217). The problem is that one cannot just pick and choose such ‘ruthless insights’ with respect to the state as force and the people as corrupt and competitive and stupid. It tends to be a package deal. With this philosophical anthropology there is as little reason to believe democracy to be possible and desirable, let alone socialism. Marx’s developmental conception concerning politics as creative self-realisation does offer a way out of this impasse.

One comes here to the absolutely crucial point of the controversy, a point which separates Marx from liberal/democratic socialists like Bobbio. For Marx relates this necessity for a restraining institutional framework not to the incorrigible nature of human beings but to social relationships which separate human beings from each other and atomise society as it becomes a sphere of universal antagonism and egoism. Whether one theorises this institutional framework in terms of protection, the atomist liberal view appropriate to bourgeois society, or in terms of the common good, connecting individuals with their true nature, the corporate liberal view, the fact is that Marx believed that the existence of such an institutional framework showed the absence of that communal ethic in individuals given the present arrangement of society. The 'good', clearly, had become something external, artificial and imposed from above by an overarching authority, whereas for Marx the good was something intrinsic to human nature. Human beings had to be institutionally constrained to the good given the egoistic and competitive social identity that instrumental bourgeois relationships imposed in real society.

Bobbio upholds a proceduralist rather than a substantivist conception of democracy. This sets him clearly against Marx's notion of democracy as the ‘truth’ of political constitutions/the state (Marx EW CHDS 1975). The essential components of democracy for Bobbio are equal and universal suffrage, civic rights ensuring the free expression of opinion and the free organisation of currents of opinion, decision-making by majority, the guarantees of minority rights against abuse by majorities. This proceduralist definition thus underlines Bobbio's basic argument that democracy concerns the form rather than the substance of the political community. Such a position, it may be noted, effectively closes off the process of democratisation proposed by Marx ending in the direct forms of an 'active' suffrage. Where Marx could propose the ultimate incorporation of political institutions into civil society as the realisation of democracy, the recovery by the demos of their sovereign power, Bobbio emphasises the permanent need for liberal institutions. He argues for parliamentary government and civil liberty whilst acknowledging present society as class divided and capitalist. His point is that the domination of the capitalist class is exercised under the regulative institutional framework made possible by liberal rights and freedoms, a framework that applies to all equally and universally, regardless of class. This liberal democracy, Bobbio argues, represents a bulwark against the abuse of power. Liberal democracy is 'the only possible form of an effective democracy’ (Politics a Cultura 150/2). And the basic function of this democracy is to guarantee the negative freedom of individuals from the state. Bobbio thus justifies the representative form of government and the existence of civil rights to the individual.

Bobbio's basic theme is that democracy is necessarily representative and indirect. He thus consistently states the case for liberal democracy against delegated or direct democracy. He thus criticises those who opposed a direct, conciliar form of democracy to representative institutions. Bobbio refers to the way that left wing socialists make a ‘fetish’ of direct democracy. He recognised the Athenian roots and the importance of Rousseau's contribution to Marx's notion of democracy. But he nevertheless was clear that such a conception was singularly inappropriate to advanced industrial societies. The sheer size and complexity of modern state and society ruled out popular participation in governmental debate and decision making. Bobbio, though, is concerned that he himself should avoid making a fetish of representative democracy. He thus acknowledges a continuum of representative and direct forms: 'there is no form which is good or bad in an absolute sense but each 'is good or bad according to the time, the place, the issues, the agents' (Bobbio WS 1987:112). 

To which one might reply that Marx is not attempting to govern a 'complex', large scale, centralised political and social order by direct democracy but to dissolve this 'complexity' as an alienated social world whose powers could be recovered by 'society', implying a rescaling of power that makes direct forms highly appropriate. Bobbio, however, does not entertain such a possibility. It is interesting to note that Bobbio cites the influence of Bernstein and Kautsky in his repudiation of direct democracy (FD 1987:47/52, WS 1987:109/110). One by one he rules out the particular forms of direct democracy, referenda (WS 1987:79), popular assemblies (WS 1987:80/2), revocable and binding mandates. 

Bobbio thus defends representative parliamentary forms against direct conciliar forms and upholds the permanence of liberal institutions. The status of his socialism, to say the least, seems questionable. The problem is that having made the case for representative forms and for liberal democracy, he proceeds to delineate the objective processes which patently contradict the claims previously made for liberal democracy. Thus Bobbio emphasises the way that large scale organisation has undermined the autonomy of the individual citizen. Advanced industrial societies are of such size and complexity as to effectively extinguish the classic liberal democratic notion of individual wills being able to form themselves into a collective will. Instead, Bobbio notes the competition of oligarchic groups, at the level of the state and society as a kind of corporate bargaining based upon consolidated power as opposed to the representation of individuals, Rather than counteracting this tendency, universal suffrage has merely resulted in creating a further tendency to bureaucratisation which removes even areas, like welfare and social security, from popular control.
Next, Bobbio comes to the technological barriers to representative democracy. The modern economy requires ever more complex and specialised coordination from government. And, given technological advance, the question is one of a competence available only to the few. The overwhelming majority of the citizens lack this technical competence. A technocratic form of government is inevitable. Further, given the exclusion of the citizens from such technocracy, growing apathy and ignorance, fed by political and commercial manipulation, is noticeable. The result is not an active and informed citizenship at all but precisely the opposite. Bobbio presents less a vigorous defence of representative democracy than a depressing picture of its tendency to degenerate. One is presented with a picture of an overloaded government paralysed under the weight of powerful corporate groups, multiple pressures and intersecting demands, bureaucratisation, technocracy, and massification (Bobbio FD 1987:28739).

But Bobbio's criticisms do not refer only to the reality of liberal democracy but to the ideal itself. Here the objection is less the familiar one that liberal democracy has failed to fulfil its promises than that there are certain promises that it never made in the first place. Thus Bobbio refers to the absence of democracy outside of the legislative institutions resting on the representative principle. It is, moreover, a misnomer to refer to the representative state. The state itself is composed of administrative and coercive apparatuses of an authoritarian character, which predate representative democracy and which are in large part insulated from representative democracy.





The ‘first has never been able to make the second wholly submit to it' (Bobbio WS 1987:83). It would appear to follow that Bobbio would be on the side of an ascending against a descending conception of power and government and that he affirms autonomy over hierarchy in politics. And he does indeed argue that democracy is more subversive than socialism. Bobbio, however, I will show, is not quite consistent with these principles and, ultimately, shows himself to be a prisoner of the descending conception as the only mode possible given the size, scale and complexity of modern society.

Next Bobbio comes to civil society, and notes an almost complete absence of democracy in its institutions. Even representative forms have very limited application in social life. Whether one writes of schools, churches, factories or families, autocracy is the mode of government. Noting that the 'institutions the citizen' succeeds in controlling are increasingly fictitious as 'centres of power’, Bobbio argues that 'the various centres of power of a modern state such as big business, or the major instruments of real power,' like the army and the bureaucracy, are subject to no democratic control (Bobbio WS 1987:43). And Bobbio is being critical rather than factual here; he is arguing for democratic control and, it may be noted, is doing so in a way that must bring us back to Marx's notion of commune democracy. For, Bobbio continues, 'the process of democratisation has not even begun to scratch the surface of the two great blocks of descending and hierarchical power in every complex society, large corporations, and public administration’ (Bobbio WS 1987:57), Bobbio's conclusion hardly constitutes a defence of representative democracy in the advanced industrial nations. 'Even in a democratic society, autocratic power is far more widespread than democratic power' (Bobbio WS 1987:113).

Bobbio is, therefore, led to propose the democratization of social life. But, whilst the logic of an ascending conception, with democracy linked to autonomy, may suggest direct and conciliar forms, Bobbio makes the case again for the representative principle. He thus looks to extend the right of free organisation and decision from the political ballot to the basic units of practical existence, work, leisure, home, education, wherever - a crucial rider - this extension is feasible. 'The present problem of democracy no longer concerns “who” votes, but “where” we vote' (Bobbio WS 1987:114). For Bobbio, this development is already in process, for 'we are witnessing the extension of the process of democratisation'. In this process 'quite traditional' forms of democracy, such as representative democracy, are infiltrating new spaces, occupied till now by hierarchical or bureaucratic organisations'. Bobbio believes that it is justified to talk of a genuine turning point in the evolution of society.

Bobbio is a critic of Marx's affirmation of direct and conciliar forms of government based upon the abolition of the state-civil society separation. The problem is that his own conception of democracy can point in two directions at once, defending representative institutions on the one hand only to raise the 'subversive' aspect of democracy as based upon an ascending conception of power. When Bobbio notes the deficiencies of representative forms yet nevertheless conceives democratisation in terms of the extension of these forms, we are justified in looking to Marx for other options.

Bobbio, moreover, contradicts himself, underlining the limitations of representative democracy only to demand the extension of the representative principle to social life as a solution as well as within the state itself. For the point is that Bobbio has already theorised at length the objective processes which, in modern societies, block the operation, let alone the extension, of representative democracy. Now, one can either retain the commitment to democracy as indeed 'subversive' and come to criticise the present organisation of society and politics; or one can simply accept that democracy, representative now as well as direct, is utopian. Bobbio does indicate that he is aware of the tension: 'we seek ever more democracy in conditions that are ever worse for obtaining it' (Bobbio WS 1987:69).

If Bobbio is ultimately pessimistic concerning the prospects for democracy, he has nothing more encouraging to write as regards socialism. History seems to have ended with liberal democracy and capitalism. Bobbio can find only two possible routes to socialism beyond this base, and can hardly be described as hopeful with respect to either. In the first place, there is the possibility of creating socialism as a result of structural reforms from above, what may be called the old reformist view, taken up also by the Eurocommunists. But Bobbio criticises such a notion in terms hardly distinguishable from revolutionary Marxists (see Mandel's critique of Eurocommunism 1978).





Which is to say that capital itself will systematically react when partial reforms begin to interfere with the mechanisms of investment, accumulation and reproduction and that the capitalist class will resist encroachment upon its power. The capital system is a system, it needs underlining, and it rests upon a process of private accumulation. That process is not subject to reforms which are designed to progressively eliminate it as the core of the capital system. Long before socialism is even half achieved, there will be a systemic reaction as a result of the mechanisms of accumulation and reproduction being blocked. Drawing upon a point which Martinelli and Chiesi make with reference to working class/trade union power one can establish the nature of the task facing the reformers from above: in the capital system resting upon the process of accumulation, reform/workers power cannot pass that critical level beyond which the mechanisms of accumulation and investment are obstructed without being prepared to proceed to another social order - in other words for socialist revolution (Martinelli and Chiesi in Bottomore and Brym ed. 1989:113).

Bobbio, it does not need saying, is not a socialist revolutionary and has never had much hope for structural reforms anyway. Of more interest to him is the possibility for democratising civil society. Nevertheless, Bobbio is just as pessimistic here.





And Bobbio has gone further than this. 'The extension of democratic instances to civil society now seems to me more an illusion than a solution’ (Bobbio 'Introduzione', 11 Sistema Politico Italiano tra Crisi e Inno'vaziorie 20). We are not, after all, at a turning point in the evolution of democratic institutions. Bobbio has repudiated his earlier claim (Bobbio FD 1987:54/6). The possibilities for democratic control from below are precluded by the character of the economic system which actually raises the demand for democratic control.

Bobbio, it could be argued, has presented here the case against reformist roads to socialism, from above and from below, as well as any Marxist could have. He would certainly appear to have undermined the case for the parliamentary road to socialism and the very liberal socialism to which he is committed. Bobbio's points certainly render the project of 'double democratization' preserving the institutional separation of the state and civil society problematical. Yet, even at this juncture, Bobbio will not countenance more radical forms.

Indeed, Bobbio gives reasons for believing that democracy will be threatened even more under socialism. Socialism, with socialisation taking the form of state ownership/control, will produce an all-powerful state controlling both political and economic life. It is a point well made by Weber - and, it might be added, by the syndicalists and industrial unionists before him - and it is important to note how consistent a theme it is in the writings of 'double democratisers' like Keane and Held. Bobbio argues 'that in a socialist society democracy will be even more difficult' (Bobbio WS 1987:99). Again, it is an argument that is frequently asserted amongst the new democratic theorists as they seek to distinguish the project of the left from Marxism (Pierson 1986).

There is, however, something somewhat awry about a conception of socialism which does not have democracy at its core. Bobbio, of course, is arguing that the barriers facing democracy in modern society, with its size and large scale, will be present under any feasible socialist society, that is, a socialism built upon this ‘complexity’. Pierson, for his part, is arguing for the necessity of a democratic legal and constitutional framework to guarantee social order, which raises another point about just what does constitute social order. Arguably, both Bobbio and Pierson, along with the other double democratisers, are led to repudiate socialism and to fall back upon liberalism.

Putting such a large question mark against the possibility of a democratic route to socialism and coming to argue that socialism is an even greater danger to democracy than capitalism, Bobbio effectively retreats to the liberal position. He may attempt to rationalise this position by arguing that democracy is ‘a much more subversive idea than socialism itself’ (Bobbio WS 1987:74), but it is all too clear that he has set up a statist definition of socialism in order to knock it down, whilst affirming an ascending conception of democratic power that, in turn, he comes to repudiate as Utopian.

To finish, we may discuss what may be considered the most substantial case against the politics that Marx pursues, Norberto Bobbio's case for a liberal socialism. 

Bobbio looks to underline the subversive character of democracy as against socialism: ‘wherever it spreads, it subverts the most traditional sense of power, one so traditional it has come to be considered natural, based on the assumption that power flows downward. By conceiving power as flowing upwards, democracy is in some ways more subversive than socialism' (Bobbio FD 1987). But Bobbio isn't being altogether fair here. There are very good reasons to argue that Marx upheld the ascending conception of power. Indeed, one could argue that Marx's critique of Hegel's doctrine of the state only makes sense when considered from the perspective of an ascending conception of democracy. Marx's entire project began here and is to be conceived in terms of following through the logic of this ascending conception to the conclusion of the disappearance of the state. Democracy is indeed 'subversive', it dissolves all political forms independent of the demos in Marx's argument.

Which is Marx's argument exactly.

Monarchy cannot be explained in its own terms; democracy can be so explained. In democracy no moment acquires a meaning other than what is proper to it. Each is really only a moment of the demos as a whole. In monarchy, a part determines the character of the whole. The whole constitution must adapt itself to the one fixed point. Democracy is the generic constitution. Monarchy is only a variant and a bad variant at that. Democracy is both form and content. Monarchy is supposed to be only a form, but it falsifies the content.
In monarchy the whole, the people, is subsumed under one of its forms of existence, the political constitution; in democracy the constitution itself appears only as one determining characteristic of the people, and indeed as its self-determination. In monarchy we have the people of the constitution, in democracy the constitution of the people. Democracy is the solution to the riddle of every constitution. In it we find the constitution founded on its true ground: real human beings and the real people; not merely implicitly and in essence, but in existence and in reality. The constitution is thus posited as the people's own creation. The constitution is in appearance what it is in reality: the free creation of man. It could be argued that in certain respects this might be said also of constitutional monarchy. But the distinguishing characteristic of democracy is that in it the constitution is only one facet of the people, that the political constitution does not form the state for itself. 

Marx EW CHDS 1975

Bobbio, in contrasting socialism - defined conservatively as the ‘transfer of ownership of the means of production from the hands of private individuals to the state' - unfavourably with democracy has certainly opened an exciting avenue to explore. Indeed, Bobbio himself soon recoils from the subversive implications of democracy. What may be called the ascending conception of power, Bobbio's idea of power flowing upwards, threatens to dissolve alien forms of power independent of and above the demos. This is precisely the radical conception of democracy that Bobbio is concerned to reject. Thus, Bobbio refers to this idea as an ideal type which corresponds very little with existing democratic regimes.

In short, Bobbio ties himself into something of a knot. In the first place, he affirms a 'subversive' conception of democracy as flowing from below as against a socialism that is statist, repudiates socialism as a result of the contrast, only finally to acknowledge that his conception of democracy bears very little relation to actual democratic societies. What Bobbio has done, and what he quickly recoils from, is to proceed from a conception of democracy flowing upwards to raise the possibility of a socialism based upon social rather than state ownership. Bobbio has set up a straw man socialism which he proceeds to knock down with an ascending conception of democracy which Marx had already developed into a conception of socialism from below.

The radicals will quite gladly accept Bobbio's repudiation of the socialism of state ownership. What Bobbio needs to recognise, then, is that not only state socialism but existing political regimes are in contradiction with the ascending conception of power. If power does rest at the base and flow upwards then political institutions are to be subject to the demos; the demos is to exercise rather than alienate its sovereignty and are to engage in political activities formerly reserved to the executive and administrative bodies of the state. Marx’s view can be presented in terms of a politicisation rather than as a depoliticisation. Though he does argue for the disappearance of the state as the logical conclusion of democracy, a 'state' still exists in some form in Marx to the extent that some political form of government, some unifying framework does still persist.

What Marx is arguing for is the rooting of power in an active, democratic society. This entails an active conception of sovereignty. Thus, Marx is not arguing for the dissolution of all political relations into a purely spontaneous, unmediated world, which is the atomistic interpretation of democracy. Self-government is still a form of government in which the prefix 'self’ applies not to the individual alone but to each and all together. Marx thus envisages a long process of Aufhebung in which ‘society’ reappropriates its power and learns how to exercise this power. Ultimately reason and not force will be in control and the normative dimension of political philosophy, in which authority and obligation is grounded in justice and freedom, is realised.

All that is suggested here is that, in the first place, to initiate this process, we have to entertain a radical restructuring of power so that it loses its alien character. Transformative social praxis thus abolishes the stats and capital in the cause of an ascending conception of power and democracy.

As regards Bobbio, there is a clear split between the normative case for a 'subversive' conception of sovereignty and the practical application of democracy in terms of representative institutions removed from the demos. Bobbio begins by affirming the former only to end up by acknowledging the reality of the latter. Bobbio quite willingly confronts (state) socialism with the subversive implications of democracy. Having repudiated socialism in its statist form, Bobbio has to confront these subversive implications. Rather than confront existing democratic regimes, resting on representative institutions, with the norms of radical ascending democracy, Bobbio draws back. Ought he have not done so with respect to state socialism too? His criticism of socialism is vitiated by the fact that he denies the possibility of any society conforming to the subversive conception of democracy he initially affirms. 

At this point we appreciate that Bobbio is not prepared to follow through the principle he affirms to its conclusion, as Marx himself did. Instead, he returns to arguments from complexity in defence of representative institutions, bureaucratic organisations and decision making by experts. He repudiates direct democracy as Utopian. The basic theme throughout, it is plain, is the permanence of the liberal democratic state. So why employ an ascending conception of democracy to repudiate a statist definition of socialism? Bobbio, it may be concluded, forms part of the neo-Bernsteinian trend in democratic socialist/social democratic thinking which, as its socialist aspirations are diminished, increasingly falls back upon liberal democracy. This trend of democratic theory is trapped in a descending conception of power as a result of accepting the permanence of complexity, the hierarchical division of labour, the state-civil society separation and the private power of capital. Obviously, the ascending conception of power is denied by such 'complexity' - which is precisely why democracy is 'subversive'. Marx, not Bobbio, followed through the principle to the practice.

Bobbio, all too obviously, is seeking to make a case against the socialist left. There is nothing particularly wrong about this. The problem comes with the contradictory values and principles that Bobbio upholds in making this case, affirming an ascending conception of power/democracy only to capitulate to contemporary descending modes, making the case for socialism against existing authoritarian forms in state and civil society only to identify socialism as statist and undemocratic, arguing for representative democracy only to note its deficiencies in the real and the ideal.

In truth, Bobbio's argument amounts to an assertion of the permanence of representative liberal democracy and capitalism. Though the case for socialism can be extracted from Bobbio's own principles of democracy and from his critique of representative democracy and the class and systemic power of the capitalist economy, making this case would mean confronting Bobbio's argument that large scale organisation and complexity make anything other than representative democracy impossible, even though this representation is entangled in descending rather than ascending conceptions of power.

Bobbio’s argument is full of contradictions. He argues that democracy is more subversive than socialism on account of resting upon an ascending conception of power. He goes on to make it clear that this ascending conception can be expressed only very inadequately in representative forms. He then proceeds to reject the subversive character of democracy as Utopian in advanced modern societies. He even gives good reasons to show that even the more moderate, representative form of democracy is Utopian given large scale bureaucratic organisation in the state and society. In truth, in making this point, Bobbio is less affirming a principle than attacking the socialist left. Elsewhere, he notes the 'moderate' character of democracy. 'The acceptance of a democratic regime presupposes the acceptance of a moderate ideology' (La filosofia politica 114), since 'majority decisions in a political order based on universal suffrage permit changes in the system, but they do not allow a change of the system' (Bobbio La ragola della maggiorianza e i suoi liraiti 20).

One sees here, then, an assertion of the permanence of capitalism as the basis for any democratic political order. History has ended, therefore, before socialism could be realised. But if the capitalist system is permanent, Bobbio's liberal democracy is not: 'one cannot change in a qualitative leap by democracy, but one can die by democracy' (Bobbio La regola della maggiorianza e i suoi limiti 21). As Miliband has argued, the parliamentary road to socialism may be a myth, the parliamentary road to fascism is not (Miliband). For Bobbio, this merely strengthens the case for legal and constitutional safeguards protecting liberal democracy - precisely the attitude, it may be argued, of the liberals and social democrats when the Nazis were contesting - and winning - the streets. One can only repeat that the continued concentration and centralisation of capital is associated with the growth of the big interventionist state and the erosion of the liberal roots of society. Bobbio has offered nothing with which to contest this process.





There is quite a consensus forming against Marx's notion of the abolition of the state and with it the state/civil society separation.









We cannot escape, therefore, the necessity of recognising the importance of a number of fundamental liberal tenets concerning the centrality, in principle, of an 'impersonal' structure of public power, of a constitution to help guarantee and protect rights, of a diversity of power centres within and outside the state, of mechanisms to promote competition and debate between alternative political platforms. What this amounts to, among other things, is confirmation of the fundamental liberal notion that the 'separation' of the state from civil society must be a central feature of any democratic political order. Models of democracy that depend on the assumption, that ‘state’ could ever replace ‘civil society’ or vice versa must be treated with the utmost caution.

Much, more feasible is a ‘double democratisation’:





In short, Keane, Bobbio, Schecter and Held make powerful arguments in favour of the desirability of maintaining the strict, institutional separation of the state from civil society. The problem is, however, that realisation of the aims that they set themselves must, on Marx's terms, mean challenging that separation. The alienated social powers of the state and capital, and all the forms that go with them, are immune from democratisation. Thus, Keane retains a critical awareness that his project of democratisation continues to be frustrated by powerful forces and tendencies in the state and civil society. Schecter is even more incoherent, demanding a socialist civil society that is, in some way, self-governing but failing to appreciate the force of Marx's point that the state/civil society separation is rooted in the existence of the state and of capital as alienated social powers. Held, similarly, rejects Marx's solution on the one hand only to re-open the door again to Marxism on the other. For it was precisely Marx's point against Hegel that the state - no matter how ethical or democratic it is - cannot be 'free of the inequalities and constraints imposed by the private appropriation of capital'. Held, to be consistent to his democratic project, must attack capital rule and, in so doing, must proceed to the transformation and dissolution of the state and of civil society. The strength of Marx's critique of Hegel is to have demonstrated the structural and systemic power of the 'private' control that capital exercises over government and society. It is upon the illusion that the capitalist economy is a public domain, subject to the control of popularly elected governments, that parliamentary socialism has crashed. To realise his ‘constraint free’ vision of democracy, Held has to be prepared to pursue his critical comments on capital and reformulate 'double democratisation' as one single process of democratisation overcoming the state/civil society separation through the practical reappropriation by society of powers alienated to the state and to capital. 'Double democratization’ can proceed only so far within constraints imposed by the process of accumulation. Held acknowledges the power of capital but believes that it can be publicly controlled (Held 1987:233ff).

It is a tribute to Bobbie's honesty - and probably his pessimism - that although a lifelong supporter of the parliamentary road to socialism he is now prepared to acknowledge the force of this point (without embracing the socialist democracy he attacked, it might be added). He thus refers to his former proposal of structural reforms from above and democratic reforms from below in harsh terms. 'Let us assume that a total transformation can result from a series of partial reforms: up to what point is the system prepared to accept them? Who can exclude the possibility that the tolerance of the system has a limit, beyond which it will shatter rather than bend? If those whose interests are threatened react with violence, what is there to do except respond with violence?' (Bobbio WS 1987).

Bobbio is thus raising precisely the point that Marxists have continued to make against reformist and parliamentary projects of democratisation, as though it is possible to peacefully move to socialism without a capitalist reaction. At a certain point, democratic reforms, if they successfully impose the 'rule of man' upon the ‘rule of property' will obstruct the mechanisms of valorisation, accumulation and reproduction. These mechanisms cannot be democratised and are not subject to constitutional reforms. Democratisation can proceed only so far within the constraints imposed by the process of accumulation, what Bobbio calls ‘the system’. Beyond these limits, where democracy interferes in and subverts mechanisms of investment and accumulation, capital will react. The question of socialist revolution has, therefore, to be faced. One suspects that more than a few 'democratisers' will recoil once socialism and the class struggle are on the agenda. Bobbio is pessimistic: 'There are good reasons to suspect that a progressive extension of the democratic basis of our society will encounter an insuperable barrier - I say insuperable within the system - at the factory gates' (Bobbio WS). The project of double democratisation, then, is denied by the very imperatives and constraints of the capital system. One could, therefore, turn the question around and argue it is the inherently anti-democratic nature of the capital system which makes democratisation necessary in the first place. 

I argue, unambiguously, therefore, for socialism as the abolition of the capital system and as a working class politics and class struggle against capital rule. What is continually being written off as outdated is thus of the greatest contemporary relevance. Rather than the left embarking upon a project of 'double democratisation' as something 'new' and post-socialist, it is as well to point out Bobbio's recognition that his lifelong attempt to pursue much the same thing has produced limited results and, what is more, even had it achieved more, it would necessarily have collided with the system itself. In a capitalist economy, now increasingly globalised, democratisation cannot proceed beyond the point at which it obstructs the mechanisms of valorisation, accumulation and reproduction. When the process of democratisation reaches this point, the democratisers either have to transform the political and economic order or have to curtail the democratic project. In putting the question in this forthright way a few classical Marxist themes are re-asserted. The modern, complex societies which, apparently, cannot be transcended are not class and politics neutral societies operating according to criteria of technique and efficiency. Further, these societies are capitalistically structured and controlled, given that valorisation and accumulation on the basis of the exploitation of wage labour still constitutes the central basis of social organisation. In this capitalist economy, there is a capitalist class that possesses an allocative and managerial power owing to its ownership/control of the means of production.

We can, therefore, insist on the systemic or external nature of capital control as a dehumanisation and as an alienated system of production where there is a temptation to write, neutrally, of an untranscendable complexity. The capitalist economy does, as an alien system, generate 'functional' needs and imperatives which constrain human action and government policy. The structural dependence of the state upon capital's environing system of socio-economic relations does constrain state policy to facilitate the process of accumulation. But to argue thus is not to slide into an easy functionalism but to raise the critical issue of capitalism as an alienated mode of production that does assert the 'logic’ of things over conscious human purpose. But it is also to bring class power, ownership and struggle into the centre of analysis in the hops of rendering public, controversial and subject to political intervention and alteration the capitalist class relations that ideologists would prefer to naturalise and dehistoricise conceal. The functional imperative of the capital system to accumulate capital can thus be viewed from the other angle of the politically and materially motivated desire of the capitalist class to reproduce capitalist class relations. And this is the response to Femia who argues for the 'liberal state' protecting capital as in the workers interests (Femia 1993). A fantastical claim when one considers that capital rests upon relations of exploitation and exists as the surplus value extracted from the working class. The liberal state is not protecting workers any more than the capitalist enterprise is creating work. The business of capitalism is the extraction and realisation of surplus value or, in the bourgeois idiom, profit; workers income and employment follow only if this process - of exploitation - can be secured -Femia's 'liberal state' is not a value free arbiter, still less does it exist for the working class. It does indeed protect capitalism, not as a 'rational' and efficient economy but as a specific system of processes and social relationships structured by private property and the class-material interests of the capitalist class. To defend this 'protection' as in the best interests of the workers is merely to relate the facts of the workers dependence upon those who own/control the means of production and are thus in a position to compel the working class to sell their labour power for a wage. Femia's defence of the 'liberal state' thus has the unintended consequence of exposing the reality of a capitalist economy in which the capitalist class has power over the working class owing to its control of the means of production, something which Femia had sought to deny. 

‘Double democratisation' might be possible. However, failure to confront and abolish the state and capital as interdependent alienated social powers means that the whole project operates within precisely the limitations and constraints which give rise to the demand for democratisation in the first place. As Pierson recognises, the single most decisive point of the Leninist critique - and one that was also forcefully made by Luxemburg - is that the Kautskyan model of a gradual transition to socialism ignores the systematic division under capitalism between the economic and the political, confining its recommendations for a strategy of democratisation exclusively to the latter. Against this, both Lenin and Luxemburg insisted that the decisive power of the bourgeoisie is economic rather than political and that this power is largely untouched by the democratisation of political 'life' (Pierson 1986:76/7). The project of democratisation must be oriented towards pushing beyond both the state and capital as interlocking forces in a total system of control. Alex Callinicos pulls no punches when he argues that the strategic focus upon democratisation 'could only reinforce the deep seated parliamentary cretinism of the British left, and encourage their resistance to the fundamental truth of classical Marxism ... that the path to socialism lies through the revolutionary destruction of the state, not its reform' (Callinicos 1988:102). 

Even someone as critical of parliamentary socialism, and who advocated an alternative to parliamentary socialism, as Ralph Miliband expresses a great degree of scepticism here. Such demands for the abolition of the state fail to suggest – ‘in terms that could carry conviction' - what would replace the 'smashed' state. Miliband may have a point as against 'smash’ theories of the state. But a dialectical process of transcendence - Aufhebung - has much more to commend it. We can conceive of a civil society that is socialist and which exercises governmental functions (a self-governing society that is also a political order). But this would have to be the Marxist 'organic totality' that has fused political and economic power and has put it under social democratic control. Either way, a democratisation pursued within the constraints imposed by the state and capital will do nothing to overcome the systemic, subjectless, alien character of control of contemporary society. Miliband himself recognises that this question of an alternative to capitalist democracy - a contradiction in terms? - will remain a crucial item on the agenda of the labour movement given that the concentration of power and the erosion of democratic forms makes it a problem which imperatively demands to be resolved (Miliband 1989:216). Callinicos' case against the parliamentary cretinism of the British left, moreover, has received powerful support from Panitch and Leys, who declare the end of parliamentary socialism and argue that in the last twenty five years a new Labour left has emerged to create a viable alternative to capitalism which has only been defeated through an over-dependency upon sterile parliamentary channels (Panitch and Leys 1997).

Miliband himself recognises the limited nature of the democratisation of the state system. The political system would remain a system of representative democracy, in which the people's participation in public affairs and the decision-making process would be fairly limited (Miliband 1994:08). This is not a problem for the theorists of liberal democracy, for whom popular passivity as opposed to activity is a condition of the normal and efficient functioning of liberal institutions. As Lipset writes, 'political apathy may reflect the health of a democracy' (Lipset 1963:32 n20). This passivity might not be a problem for theorists of liberal institutions. It is one of the virtues of Marxism that this political passivity is considered a problem. Apathy might denote consensus for Lipset, but evidence suggests dissensus, especially when related to class. Pateman shows that the working class keep their distance from and show distrust of existing liberal institutions (Pateman 1971 1980).

Another aspect to this issue is the connection between popular control and self-determination with human self-realisation. This is Marx's case, drawing upon classical politics, and it is the case for what Barber calls 'strong democracy’: ‘without participation in the common life that, defines them and in the decision making that shapes their social habitat, women and men cannot become individuals ' (Barber 1984 :xv).

Miliband, aware of the problem, is not however prepared to push democratisation the whole way to direct democracy:

The issue here is not participatory democracy, in the strong sense, or representative democracy. In its strongest sense, participatory democracy means something like direct democracy, virtually without mediation, or with representatives totally controlled by their constituents. This is not a realistic view of what is possible. Representation is inherent in organisations at all but the most immediate and local level, and even there it will be found to be needed; and representation does involve some distance between representatives and represented.




Miliband's position has clear affinities with that of Poulantzas and the question he poses for the transition to socialism:





Attention may be drawn to the attempts to explore the relation between liberalism and socialism. One may point out, historically, the way in which the collectivist liberalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century did merge into socialism, altering the character of that socialism, providing a socialism for the state as the representative of the common good. In recent times, however, the concern has been less to reconcile liberalism with the growing need for more collective forms of economic ownership and control. Rather, liberal democratic principles and values have been explored. The attempt to bring liberal democracy and socialism closer together could issue in demands for a post-liberal democracy (Macpherson 1977), which, as transcendence, could be argued to have been Marx's own idea.

One may also draw attention to the way that pluralists like Dahl and Lindblom have all but recognised the Marxist criticism that private capitalist class power and the systemic constraints of capitalism effectively deny pluralism and require some form of economic democracy. Dahl notes the tendency of capitalism to 'produce inequalities in social and economic resources so great as to bring about severe violations of political equality and hence of the democratic process' (Dahl 1985:60).

Marxists would go further than this and note the systemic constraints upon the capacity of any government to translate the democratic will into public policy. The most obvious constraint is the dependence of the state upon the private economy for its own power and resources and hence, its need to facilitate the process of private accumulation. The mechanisms of investment and accumulation thus generate systemic imperatives which the state must meet as a condition of its own stability and survival. Failure to meet these imperatives produces economic crisis, social instability and popular discontent. Thus, the liberal democratic state is dependent upon the process of private accumulation and must therefore act to secure the conditions for capital accumulation even if this means increasing state intervention in civil society and repudiation of the democratic will, that is, the denial of liberal democracy.

Lindblom explains why liberal democracy is so vulnerable:





Dahl and Lindblom are worth quoting at length because they show that pluralist democrats can recognise the scale of the obstacles blocking their project. Frankly, democratic theorists are confronted with precisely that socio-economic, class and systemic power rooted in capitalist social relations which Marx had insisted upon all along. What Dahl and Lindblom underline is the way that a liberal democratic state, far from being concerned to translate the democratic will into appropriate policy, actually has to assign priority to private business. What matters is the way in which liberal and democratic theorists address this obvious contradiction. One can, like Femia, assert that the liberal state, in protecting capitalism, serves the interests of the workers, which is another way of saying that since the workers, like the state, are dependent for their survival upon the private economy, all effort is legitimately concentrated upon securing the health of this economy. This position prioritises ‘the economy’ and its systemic imperatives over liberal democracy, neatly evades the contradiction to which Dahl and Lindblom expose, and is silent on the class nature of power. Dahl has the merit of objecting to the contradiction between the political principle and social practice of liberal democracy and argues that democracy is only possible if the power of the corporations is reduced and the right to self-government is recognised as superior to the right to private property (Dahl 1985:162). Thus, Dahl is led from the principles of liberal democracy to demand an extension of democracy to the economic sphere, demanding forms of cooperative ownership and control.

Dahl and Lindblom thus move to the ground on which Marxists are comfortable, for it brings capitalist class power into public controversy as a denial of democracy. Nevertheless, the implications of their arguments, which they do not address, are revolutionary. But the solutions proposed are piecemeal and reformist, advocating what could only be called a gradual encroachment upon the power of capital. And the fact is that the capital economy, systemically, has the capacity to resist such encroachment. If the state and the demos are dependent upon the process of private accumulation as Dahl and Lindblom show, then any obstruction of the mechanisms of investment, accumulation and valorisation will produce crisis. This forces the issue. The question is, will those forcing the crisis proceed to the revolutionary transformation of social relations? (Martinelli and Chiesi in Bottomore and Brym 1989:113).

Far more numerous are arguments for the recovery of the liberal and democratic tradition which either recoil from such revolutionary conclusions and opt instead for a gradual democratisation of public and private power. A whole number of theorists have rediscovered the importance of liberal democratic institutions providing the universal framework for a democratic society, of civil society as the sphere of the demos or both. One can refer here to Cohen and Rogers (1933), Laclau and Mouffe, Hindess and Hirst, Keane (I987a, 1987b), Held (1984, 1987), and Bobbio (1987a I987b), Pelczynski (195), Pierson (1986) Dunn (1984), Bowles and Gintis (1986), Offe (1984). The common theme uniting these works, whether the accent is upon the need to secure the democratic character of the political or the civil realm, is the need to redefine the project of the left in terms of liberal and democratic values. In this process, arguably, both the Marxist criticism of liberal democracy, class power and systemic constraints as well as the need for socialism is lost. In attempting to supply a democratic theory for socialism theorists have necessarily had to proceed from the basis of existing political institutions and social relations. Naturally enough, one ends up with a classical liberal defence of coordinating and conflict resolving institutions. What is not appreciated, arguably, is Marx's criticism as to why liberal society would require such institutions as a result of bourgeois social relations. Instead, such institutions are theorised as permanent, conflated with the political as such. Not surprisingly, Marx's argument for direct democracy is subjected to damaging criticism as Utopian. Given the existing institutional and structural constraints in terms of which contemporary democratic theory is developed, Marx's own version of democracy is inappropriate and does indeed make little sense. For, after all, Marx's case rested upon exposing the fundamentally anti-democratic nature of the contemporary social world not to produce a democracy for it.

Briefly stated, the liberal democrat argument holds that the formalised distinction of the state from civil society, which Marx sought to remove, is actually essential for democracy. The state provides the universal legal framework for civil society and, since it does so, plays a central role in constituting society. Civil society, meanwhile, comprises a whole range of activities from the economic to the cultural which are organised independently of the state, at least are not under the direct control of the state (Hall 1983). Once the need for this formalised division is understood as the condition for democracy then the case for a continuation of the centralised state apparatus is theorised as providing the essential framework for legislative activity, law enforcement, instituting rights, protecting liberties, containing conflicts and resolving disputes. With this centralised machinery in place the left project can proceed to democratise the state on the one hand and civil society on the other. From Marx's perspective, the democratic theorists have already theorised as permanent the very institutional and structural constraints which deny democracy. There is thus a fundamental question mark against attempts to democratise the state and civil society whilst deepening the formalised division between both spheres.

The new democratic theorists have tended to emphasise the importance of the procedures of democratic government and, by concentrating upon political institutions, have rather neglected the contradiction between formal equality and freedom and real freedom and equality, have not adequately treated the denial in reality of the principle of citizens as free and equal beings, and have minimised the significance of the way that democratic rights are violated in a social sphere dominated by class power. The asymmetrical relations of class power between capital and labour are ignored as the democratic theorists propose representative bodies, like political parties, to mediate between the state and civil society. 

The basic criticism is that none of the versions of a liberal democratic model of socialism can assimilate the revolutionary import of socialism, can understand why socialism, concentrating upon the socioeconomic realisation of freedom and equality sought to move beyond liberal democracy in the first place. One can accept that liberal democratic achievements and principles were apt to be lost in this process but also that they need to be recovered not as an end exhausting socialist possibilities but as potential to be realised and incorporated within socialism. The recovery of liberal democracy is made to restate the case for transcendence. Only through transcendence can socialism actually be realised possessing a liberal democratic character. The other attempts to synthesise liberalism and socialism on the level of existing bourgeois political institutions and social relations fail to grasp the way that socioeconomic realities structurally and systemically deny liberal democratic principles and ignore the way that the social dynamics of a corporate capitalism are ‘erasing liberal society’ (McDermott 1991:13). 

Simply, just as the old Keynesian reformism failed to understand that the capital system is not a public domain subject to public/democratic control/management but a regime of private accumulation (McLennan 1989:131/2), so the new democratic theorists are failing to appreciate that political arrangements are not freely available and to be selected according to preference. The roots of the 'double democratisation' being proposed are flimsy and all the more so given the tendency, under transnational monopoly capitalism (Haymer in Frieden and Lake 1987:31/46; Cox 1987), towards increasing state intervention in civil society to secure the conditions of private accumulation and given the move to an illiberal and undemocratic corporate society in which a dictatorship of the clever - the managerial, professional and technical class - is instituted under big capital (McDermott 1991:1-6 63 201). McDermott notes the corporate takeover of government business with the rhetoric of free market individualism as an ideology rationalising this process (McDermott 1991:116). Where Marx referred to legitimate governmental functions being assumed by society itself, McDermott draws attention to the conquest of traditional governmental tasks by the corporations (McDermott 1991:116).





What we are dealing with here is the emergence of a new property system based upon the corporate form, erasing liberal society and the roots of liberal democracy, raising the prospect of a 'post-society', the victory of property over society (McDermott 1991:13), and moving from a factory to a social Taylorism given the need to exercise rigid control over the workers, to organise, discipline and train workers on functional lines (McDermott 1991:14, 145).

The point is not that the new democratic theorists on the left are theorising the project of the corporate 'post-society' form but that their rediscovery of liberal democracy and their call to democratise the state and civil society almost completely fails to grasp the forms, relations and dynamics of what is becoming a highly illiberal and anti-democratic corporate capitalism. The rediscovery of civil society comes precisely at the time of movement to a 'post-society' governed by the corporate form. Those liberals who argue that only that form of socialism is possible that accepts the 'complexity' of modern society and its division of labour quite easily become part of this process. But surely, to merit the designation socialism, socialists have to have a coherent response to such a process, not become a part of it. Though the likes of Keane and Held are genuine enough in the proposals for democratisation they offer (Held 1987:290/1), one has to question any process of democratisation which maintains the state-civil society separation and fails to challenge prevailing social relations.

Questioning the Necessity of a Political-Legal Order
The argument here proceeds from the increasing stress upon the need for legal and constitutional guarantees in constituting the social order. The criticism is that Marx is deficient in terms of his political and democratic theory and, indeed, assumes 'the political' away. This repudiation of Marx's theory is concisely put by Pierson.





One should note, again, how the socialised economy is considered as un or even anti-democratic. It is that same identification of socialisation with the state that one finds in Keane and Bobbio. This in itself may be challenged by an emphasis upon cooperative and self-managed forms, what Marx referred to as the ‘associated producers’. In passing, one may note the paradoxical nature of a democratic socialism which presumes that socialism tends to be undemocratic in itself. More relevant here, however, is the affirmation of a political and legal order as constitutive of the social order. It is this position that, from a Marxist position, is open to challenge as a reversion to liberal conceptions.

38 THE DIALECTIC OF LIFE

The attempt will be made in this chapter to connect the question of the relationship between the state and civil society with the alienated condition of the social world and the abolition of this alienation. One can therefore make use of the way that Habermas conceives modernity. Habermas makes the distinction between a system world steered by the media of administrative power and money on the one hand and a life world of self-organised public spheres resting upon solidarity and communication.





Habermas's argument is that the uncoupling of the system world from the life world is the condition of the genuine pluralisation of the political and the economic whilst also drawing attention to the constant danger of colonisation to which the life world is subject through the expansionary logic of money and power.

The intention here is to pursue the state-civil society dualism in terms of this conflict between system and life world as an attempt to overcome an alienated social world. Habermas' separation of the system world and the life world is related to Marx's opposition of the 'realm of freedom' to the 'realm of necessity'. It can also be related to Kant's distinction between 'respublica noumenon' and 'respublica phenomenon’.

In the context of searching for the new polis as the ethico-rational community it is as well to acknowledge the Aristotelian basis. The realm of necessity may thus be interpreted as concerning the provision of the material conditions necessary to the existence of the polis via familial and economic arrangements. Marx's realm of freedom thus appears as a reworking of the Aristotelian polis, fully taking account of modern conditions. The polis, for Aristotle, was a substance comprising individuals who are themselves substances (Meikle in Carver ed. 1991: 303/9). One may anticipate, therefore, Marx's communism to exhibit the characteristics of an Aristotelian substance. Habermas' life world does so too, for that matter.

The controversy, however, relates to the neutralisation of power, the assertion of a conflict free/politically neutral system world comprising a technological approach to production and an administrative approach to politics.





Marx's breakthrough is his insistence that philosophy must become practical so that its rational and emancipatory content is mobilised and materialised. Marx's 'philosophy of praxis' assigns central significance to the subject-object relationship. The creation of the world is also a self-creation of the human species. The creative subject can thus relate to the world of objects as their own world. For Marx, labour is constitutive of a world in alienated form. Emancipation thus entails the practical reappropriation of the alienated power of labour. Marx is thus able to conceive how the objectification of essential human powers can also become their alienation. 

Through the alienation of labour the passage between externalisation and appropriation is obstructed; objectified essential powers thus become alien powers dominating human life against human will. The producers of the world are thus separated from the world as their product, it becomes ‘alien and hostile’. Human beings are alienated from their own powers, from themselves.

Marx makes his critical analysis more precise through the presentation of wage labour, an examination of the conflict between living labour and capital as dead labour, and the contradiction between social production and private appropriation. Marx, in other words, sees not a general process of rationalisation and the growth of systemic constraints imposing themselves upon the world as an iron cage. Behind the impersonality is class power and capital rule, an alienated system of production that is founded upon asymmetrical class relations between capital and labour. 'Separation' is thus less a process of modernisation but a case of expropriation, less efficiency and more class.

The formulation is important, since it gives Marx a way out of what could otherwise remain a pessimistic Weberian diagnosis. Labour as living labour, the producer of surplus value, is able to challenge the rule of capital as dead labour, subverting the process of capital self-realisation from within and reappropriating the dead labour seized from the producing subject. Essential powers alienated from wage labour and becoming independent of labour as capital, invested with existential significance, can thus be reappropriated, thus abolishing the alien character of the world.

Hegel remains the most contemporary and controversial of figures. For the question remains that of the relation between the state and civil society. Hegel noted both the self-destructive antagonism of civil society but also its creative and emancipatory achievements, and he proposed the sublation of this civil society within an ethical totality presided over by the positive universal of the state. Hegel can thus sanction the continued separation of public and private spheres as the most desirable and, indeed, the only possible resolution that is grounded in the realities of modernity. 

As such, Hegel is the most powerful of Marx's liberal critics, having both considered and rejected Marx's elimination of the separation between public and private spheres before Marx himself had even proposed it as the solution to modern diremption. Hegel considered this vision and rejected it as illusory, even dangerous in the modern world. Hegel's ‘end of history’ in the liberal representative state and commercial society has gained a new lease of life from the practical realisation of Marx's vision of a self-governing society in which public power loses its political power as a centralised state socialism which has depoliticised power only by suppressing conflict and removing power from popular control. Hegel had all along decried as simplistic the democratic model which would dissolve power into the aggregation of individuals, the formless mass. What Marx came to propose, it could be argued, from an Hegelian perspective, would not realise an ethical totality but, on the contrary, dissolve it into an unmediated existence of individuals under the rigid control of the monolithic bureaucratic state. Where Marx had emphasised that civil society should become political society, i.e. the self-governing society requiring the dissolution of the state and civil society, the criticism is that this was always a Utopian aim which could not but suffer distortion in practice and be realised as its contrary - the complete subsumption of civil society under the control of a centralised and bureaucratic political state. Weber's criticism of attempts to abolish private capitalism as leading only to state socialism, the dictatorship of public officials, had already been made.

The argument can be set out on the basis of the Hegel-Marx confrontation. Hegel believes that the state-civil society separation can be preserved within an ethical totality; Marx grasps this separation as a contradiction that cannot be so easily transcended. For Marx, Hegel's totality is really only an artificial unity that can establish community only at the abstract level of the state.

Thus Marx sets out to abolish the 'state-civil society separation. For capital rule is essentially a system of domination and exploitation that systematically produces asymmetries in wealth, power and status in society. The conflicts generated are thus structural realities which are necessary, not accidental, to capitalism. Remedial action by the state, cannot resolve these antagonisms and, on a higher level, realise community. Antagonism structured by class power is remediable only by the transformation of the relations of production themselves so long as these relations prevail 'democratisation' at the level of the state and civil society will remain Utopian. All the democratisation in the world cannot alter the alien and abstract character of the state as such. Political democracy will remain an abstraction, requiring indirect, passive representation.

The mechanisms and agencies of capital rule, on the other side of the modern separation, are by their nature subjectless, anti-democratic, subject to systemic imperatives of self-expansion. Democratisation, in any thoroughgoing sense, must necessarily involve freedom from relations of class exploitation and domination and from subjectless systems of alien control. The power of the demos/socialised humanity to exercise control realises freedom .as self-determination.

Without this, democracy can be realised in only a very limited sense, offering the demos only the illusion of power at election times, obtaining revocable concessions, participating only to the extent that processes of accumulation are not obstructed. 

One could be more critical than this and expose the fundamentally ideological nature of those who, by pursuing a 'double democratisation' on the basis of a formalised separation of the state from civil society conceal not only the capital rule denying democracy but also the symbiotic relation that actually exists between the state and capital.

One can, therefore, proceed from an argument made by Gilbert.

Some socialists and communists have attempted to delete from Marx's general theory the importance of class conflict and revolution and to adapt Marxism to a process of gradual economic evolution and peaceful reform. By the above criterion these attempts would abandon fundamental features of Marxian theory and allow its liberal competitors to replace it. In contrast, modifications of the theory that render class conflict (and its basis in exploitative modes of production) more comprehensible, highlight new possibilities of peasant radicalism or even socialism, and stress the primary political consequences of the theory such as internationalism, fit in with Marx's original project and makes no important concessions to rival theories.




Gilbert's argument is directed against the tendency within organised socialism to reduce the socialist project to the mere reformation of 'parasite state structures'. This attempt involves completely reorienting socialism away from abolishing the state as an alienated social power towards reforming/democratising this still alienated power. Gilbert shapes a defence of the revolutionary character of Marx's political activity. What it is proposed to do here is concentrate more upon the state-civil society relation and scrutinise democratisation in terms of separation, alienation and abolition. Gilbert's words on the Social Democratic/Eurocommunist tendency to reduce socialism to the gradual reform of the parasite state structures has to be considered ... in light of the positive explosion of works presenting precisely such a reform as the only viable future for the left. It may be compared with field's careful argument for democratisation as a double sided phenomenon entailing the 'reform of state power' and the 'restructuring of civil society' whilst preserving the institutional division between the two (Held 1987:283). It is precisely the feasibility of this view, judged according to its own 'principle' of democratisation, that is to be challenged.

Undoubtedly, what has encouraged scepticism towards Marx's critical approach to liberal democracy and what has encouraged the rediscovery of liberal democracy on the left has been the undemocratic and illiberal politics of Marxism-Leninism. And Marxism-Leninism did take its lead from Marx's critique of the abstract and formal nature of bourgeois liberty, equality and democracy. And, of course, Marx did expose the formal rights and freedoms of merely political emancipation to the social realities denying those rights and freedoms. The rediscovery of liberal democracy is, one suspects, apt to forget the pertinence of this classical Marxist criticism, though Bobbio recognises it only to give expression to his pessimism (Anderson 1992:115).

What is not appreciated is that Marx demanded the realisation of the principles of political emancipation and the transcendence of the abstract political sphere. He took political emancipation as the precursor of human emancipation in general. Marx fractured the bourgeois emancipation 'from within’, turning the universal and communal implications of political liberalism against the egoistic and asocial realities of economic liberalism, asserting the ‘freedom of man’ against the: 'freedom of property'. It is possible, in other words, to rediscover liberal democracy from within Marx's own project and to do so in a creative, forward looking way, without having to argue, as the likes of John Keane argues, that liberal democracy exhausts progressive possibilities.

The Leninist tradition, it may be argued, missed this connection of Marx's project with that of political emancipation/liberalism and, rather than appreciate the positive, could only approach 'bourgeois democracy' as a class dictatorship. This instrumentalist theory cleared the way for Lenin to pursue proletarian class domination through a party control and political centralisation that could dispense with political emancipation altogether. Liberal democracy was merely a 'shell' for class rule. Lenin, therefore, did not explore radical potentialities within political emancipation, which could be turned against capitalism. Marxism-Leninism, it follows, failed to incorporate as positive achievements the rights and freedoms of the liberal epoch. 

All of which goes to confirm Marxism as anti-democratic. The attempt to pull Marx clear from the debris of Communism - and state socialism generally - assumes, of course, that Marx can thus be distinguished. The objective is broader than merely rescuing Marx from the Bolsheviks. There is a tradition of anti-state socialism which is broader than Marxism and which itself is being restated (Hirst 1994). Here, there is an attempt to oppose associative democracy or associational self-government to the monolithic, centralised state. Marx is firmly repudiated as inviting the degeneration of the socialist movement into the state form (Hirst 1994).

One can be open to the attempt to recover the insights of the Guild Socialists and the notion of an associative democracy that avoids the old top down politics of socialism. But one can also learn from Marx the nature of the obstacles in the way of the realisation of such an associative democracy. One can also explore the similarities between such a notion and Marx's demand for an active suffrage, for civil society to make itself political society, and for a society resting upon the principle of self- or functional representation as against that abstract political representation through the alienated form of the state. Associational self-government thus embodies the real community as against the illusory community of the state.

It is the reality of social groups and associations which makes them the appropriate organisational form in which an active sovereignty can be embodied.

Dahl and Lindblom all but concede the truth of Marx's position when delineating the constraints effectively preventing the pluralism they had long advocated (Dahl and Lindblom 1976:xxxvi/xxxvii; Lindblom 1977:168/9 176). Dahl asks why democracy as a decision making power available to the collective is not available in the fundamental area of economic ownership and control. Dahl makes economic democracy a precondition of any genuine pluralist democracy. Workers must become 'citizens of the enterprise', Dahl argues. And this, in turn, requires a substantial equalisation of economic power.

How distinct is this from Marx's demand that citizenship should cease to be abstract and hence be incorporated into social relationships?

Liberal and democratic critics locate the authoritarianism of Marxism in the work of Marx himself, claiming to identify the essence of authoritarianism in the illusions involved in Marx's attempt to go beyond capitalism and liberal democracy. Marxism leads directly to the gulag, it is claimed, a fate which Marxists only avoid by failing to have the courage of their convictions. Thus Kautsky is a liberal in Marxist clothing. 

How is such a damning indictment to be reconciled with Marx's own concern for freedom and democracy? In the very least, any defence of Marx has to come to terms with Bolshevism, locate its political and intellectual roots, clarify its relationship with Marx. And the same has to be done with Second International 'orthodoxy'.

The issue of citizen democracy can be raised here. Antonio Gramsci, Sue Golding argues, is the theorist of citizen democracy (Golding 1992:13). The fact that he was, and defined himself as, a revolutionary Marxist socialist too, seems to be forgotten. The compatibility of the two can be questioned. The citizenry are a popular body whereas the class is a specific designation; the one is inclusive, the other exclusive. Yet ‘taking democracy seriously’ means looking at citizenship. Marx himself did examine citizenship and, if it is said that he rejected it as abstract, it can also be argued, with textual support, that Marx extracted the communal significance of citizenship and demanded its incorporation into social relationships. The realisation of a genuine citizenship, therefore, is bound up with questions of democratisation and social control. Class politics has the classlessness of citizenship as its end in Marx, an ambiguous, dialectical position that Marx has to carry off at the level of practical politics. For moral appeals to a classless social identity like 'the people’ will lack social relevance in class society. There is a necessary relation between class position and political arguments. For this reason, Marx is stuck with the difficulty of getting classlessness out of a class politics.

The problem with criticising Marx as Utopian given the facts of ‘complexity’, large scale production, representative institutions etc. is that the criticism assumes existing reality as natural/eternal. Thus the future could only ever be the present enlarged, since anything beyond that present is unimaginable once the facts of complexity are accepted as untranscendable. Marx’s aim is a post-class humankind, entailing a number of transformations which are considered unrealistic.

One of the latter expectations which looks particularly vulnerable is the doctrine of the withering away of the state. This slogan suggests that Marx envisaged the future society as one wholly without public institutions or dispute resolving mechanisms: a global federation of autonomous units, 'spontaneously' meshing, together in fraternal exchange. Without denying, the utopian inclination in Marx, it is equally, clear that Marx's own scathing critique of the Utopian socialists, his classicist image of vigorous public discourse and action, and his commitment to socially organised, science and technology, entails a considerable socialist public sphere in which decision making organs would have to play a significant part. Marx's apparent anarchism is more likely due to the idea that the state, as such, is by definition a class phenomenon. Public bodies, in non-class society, should, this implies, be called something else.
However, the implicit proposal for a new nomenclature for public institutions .. indicates a serious lacuna in Marxist political theory.. At the very least, the conception of a global socialist community based on direct democracy rather than representative institutions, is unrealistic by current standards - though it is not by that token merely fanciful. Marx's theory, for one thing, seemed to carry a somewhat naively benign view of technology and abundance as the prerequisite of communism. Moreover local and regional factors are bound to figure prominently in the 'formation of political’ and 'cultural identity'. Thirdly, there is no realistic foundation for assuming that everyone will want, or be able, to directly contribute to and determine all the decision making processes which profoundly affect their lives .. the image, of a polity without representative institutions and without significant variation in citizen motivation for things political seems to verge on fantasy.




Those who pursue 'double democratisation', maintaining the state/civil society separation, can be criticised from a Marxist perspective for conceiving ‘the economy’ - a euphemism for capitalism - as a public domain which, therefore, can be consciously governed by political institutions. Thus, through the democratisation of the state, the democratic will of the people can be translated into public policy. This, however, completely ignores the structural dependence of the public realm upon the process of private accumulation. Capitalism is a regime of private accumulation which exerts a systemic control upon the public realm. As Poulantzas argued, the environing system of socio-economic relations ensures that the state serves the long term interests of the capitalist class as a whole. The social structure constrains the state's freedom of operation. Given the structural dependence of the state upon capital, the state must facilitate the process of private accumulation as a condition of its own power. The state power is derivative; its resources drive from the private economy. Since this is so, state officials will not act against the interests of capital as a whole far fear of blocking the process of accumulation, causing an investment strike and a crisis that ultimately harms the state power and the popularity of public officials. It is constraints such as this, and not the direct ties between the state and the capitalist class, which Poulantzas argues gives the state an inherent bias towards capital (Poulantzas 1973).

Democratisation, in short, can only be effectively pursued through the restructuring of class relations. In short, democratisation must come to put class power and material interests into the centre of the controversy, politicising class struggle in such a 'public’ way that ideology can no longer conceal the class divided nature of reality,

Democratisation is at the very centre of contemporary political debate, put there, in part, by the changes which have brought down state socialism. Playing an important role in these changes have been the new social movements and the rediscovery of civil society. Marx and Marxism, in contrast, appear as an ‘old’ politics with a dubious relation to democracy and an historical connection to state domination.

Marx himself did not denigrate liberal democracy. It is not merely that Marx played an active role in directing socialists and the working class to support the bourgeoisie in their struggle for liberal rights and the extension of the suffrage, being a consistent supporter of liberal democracy when the bourgeoisie were often more than willing to compromise principles when seeking deals with the traditional rulers. More than this, Marx subjected bourgeois revolutionary struggles and achievements to close critical scrutiny, separating political liberalism from economic liberalism, radicalising political emancipation by extracting their communal and universal significance for all humankind and turning it against the egoism and atomism of their bourgeois class character. 

Given that not only aristocrats and conservatives but also liberals and even radicals - not to mention the members of the bourgeoisie more concerned with protecting their economic interests - could fear and resist democracy as an attack upon property and as conceding power to an ignorant and tyrannical mass, Marx can certainly be shown to be progressive on the issue of democracy. Indeed, given that Marx’s political commitment was international in dimension, his position can still be considered to be advanced. These points are worth making at this time when Marx's democratic credentials are being critically evaluated, when it is no longer Cold War conservatives asserting that Marxism and democracy are incompatible, but people who position themselves somewhere within the camp of the political Left.

At a deeper level, the criticism is that Marx is anti-democratic given the essence or logic of his political theory. Certainly, Marx did criticise merely 'political emancipation’ as an emancipation within the sphere of alienation. Liberal rights and freedoms are criticised as formal and abstract, detached from the socio-economic realities which alone could make them effective. In truth, this is not denigration at all but rather a demand for the realisation of the radical potential, particularly the universal 'human’ claims, of political liberalism. At a time when 'the Left' is being advised to seek its raison d'etre, in the completion of the project of liberal democracy it is worth reminding the 'new' democrats that Marx pursued precisely such a realisation. This means, however, going beyond the atomism and individualism created by private property and the class division created by capitalist relations, to embrace the communal significance of active citizenship - in short, socialism.

The idea that citizenship should cease to be abstract by being incorporated into social relationships takes Marxism into the controversial ground of post-liberal democracy. If one identifies democracy with the procedures and institutions of liberal democracy then there is nothing simpler than exposing Marx as anti-democratic. This, however, is clear evasion. Marx's arguments are an intellectually coherent and structured case for a new democratic order. And to this end the state/civil society separation, the abstraction, alienation and the ('distorted') representation that this involves and the (ideological) identification of democracy with the laws, institutions and procedures of the liberal state have all to be addressed. Democratisation from Marx's perspective can only involve the restructuring of the relations of class power, the achievement of which would fundamentally alter the character of the political order and hence democracy.

Nevertheless, there is a growing view from theoreticians in ‘the left' itself that the idea of a socialist democratic order, involving the abolition of class division and the creation of direct and participatory organs and structures, has to be abandoned as undesirable or unrealistic. The ambiguous relationship between socialist and liberal democracy has thus to be resolved on the side of liberal procedures and institutions. Pluralist competition and representative institutions are thus made the sine qua non of democracy, which amounts to the assimilation of democracy to Hegel's liberal representative state. Hegel himself made no claim that this state was democratic. 

The growth of a non or explicitly anti-marxist left arguing that the only meaningful socialist project is the completion of the liberal democratic project is, therefore, question begging. There might well be a radicalism implicit in liberal democracy which, potentially, can be turned against a capitalism in decline (Wallerstein's view). But if this anti-capitalism is the objective then why not make the commitment to a socialist position explicit?

The problem, however, lies with those who argue that the project of liberal democracy is not merely the necessary condition for socialism but the sufficient condition in itself. For Marx's critique of abstract and formal rights and freedoms purported to show that any such realisation meant the alteration of property and production relations, i.e. socialism. Even more controversial than the abandonment of Marx's criticisms of the abstract nature of political and civil liberties in relation to social and economic realities is the fact that socialists are being urged to retreat upon liberal democracy at a time when, it could be argued, the social roots of liberal democracy are disappearing (McDermott 1991). Socialism, once again, finds itself taking a defensive posture, fighting a lost cause.

 To say the very least, this abandonment of socialism is premature. Marx's argument can be reconstructed to show how he conceived of liberalism and capitalism as possessing a revolutionary potential which would ultimately lead beyond: existing society. This is a view that puts classlessness and statelessness back on the agenda as facilitating the 'true democracy' of socialism.

Once this is done, some of the other arguments on the left can fall into place. Citizenship, for example. The argument that citizens should acquire progressively greater control of areas and activities central to their lives is one that soon comes to reproduce the liberalism versus socialism conflict, between the idea that citizenship is a constitutional and political issue and the idea that it is something that requires embodiment in actual social relationships. The search for citizen democracy as the new project for the left means considering how citizens can come to exercise greater control over their practical, common affairs. And this, again, is not 'beyond' Marx at all but, rather, reinstates the centrality of 'control' to any progressive, democratic politics. Approaching this control through citizenship does have the virtue of reconstituting Marxism on a firmer basis as regards democracy, individual rights and political order.










39 SOCIALISM - GOVERNMENTAL AND ASSOCIATIONS

Socialism is the product of the modern labour movement, not its producer. This movement developed through the existence and then the struggles of the working class. What is in contention is the route that socialism came to take. For a socialism that becomes governmental, in the statist sense I define in this thesis, rather than associational comes to be severed from its roots in the working class movement and its concrete organisations. (I argue that Marx makes a distinction between government and state, something which enables him to revalue the governmental significance of associative civil society). 

This criticism applies to both Social (parliamentary) Democracy and Communism.

In truth, certain schools of socialism had always been elitist and authoritarian, looking to transform society from above given the assumption that the masses were corrupted by circumstances. This was a characteristic of both Utopian and conspiratorial socialists. Such traditions were quite detached from the labour movement in its ascendance (Marx Manifesto in REV 1973:94/7), though some strains were certainly quick in recognising the significance of the working class movement as the precondition of the socialist society (e.g. Owen and the Owenites).

In time, it came to be appreciated that the task of reformers was to intervene and participate in the practical and emancipatory struggles of the working class so as to and the class in understanding the link between their immediate demands and aspirations and the long term socialist objective. Socialism is implicit in the everyday practice and consciousness of the working class but needs to be made explicit. The struggles of the class, deriving from the immediacy of class relations, develops the workers consciousness and impresses upon workers the need to abolish capital and the wages system and their own centrality in this socialism.


From their practical struggles against the capitalist class, the workers educate themselves as to the reality of class society. Initially, they remain at the level of immediacy, pursuing aims within the, wages or trade union struggle. But gradually, through this struggle, workers come to penetrate to the fundamental reality underlying this struggle, to capitalist class relations of production.

It is through the practical struggles between capital and labour that socialism becomes comprehensible to increasing numbers, obtaining a reality as a popular movement.

The working class of the nineteenth century possessed a strong associational history (Morton and Tate 1979:107/10; Cole and Postgate 1961:378/84; Hobsbawm 1962:109/10 114/5). Indeed, it is through this associationalism that the workers came to announce their entrance on the political stage. This indicates the progression from utopianism and its authoritarianism to a workers socialism. The Saint Simonists developed the idea of the association of the workers in The Doctrine of Saint Simon, turning Saint Simon's defence of the technocratic state into the Association of the Workers. The Saint Simonists no longer referred generally to ‘les industriels’ but made a clear class commitment to the workers. Behind this transformation of Saint Simon's argument from utopianism to socialism lies the growing maturity of the working class. Socialism no longer need come from above, a point which Marx made in the Manifesto. A new word had been introduced into radical politics: association.

And this word, expressing working class self-activity, found its way into Marx himself as he sought to make sense of the vision of the perfect society he had derived from political philosophy. What the term association expressed was the notion of a society transformed and eventually controlled from its roots upwards by the associational activity of the working class.

The working class were active in this development. The change in meanings and in vocabulary was not the product of the radicalisation of the intellectuals. The activities of the intellectuals expressed the radicalism of the workers in their practical activity. The nineteenth century was a century of creativity and innovation in working class organisational activity. Volatility too, perhaps, as the workers attempted to give permanent form to their new and growing material strength.


To take one example. The Grand National Consolidated Trades Union was created out of the various workers organisations in an attempt to concentrate workers power through federation. But this concentration of power also showed a development in perspectives. For the G.N.C.T.U. represented a development of workers from merely trade union struggle and demonstrated an independence of the self-acting workers from, political reformers claiming to change society from above. The G.N.C.T.U. was an organisation for fighting the class struggle, helping the workers in their immediate struggle over wages and conditions but, more than this, working consciously for the objective of overthrowing the capital economy and replacing it with the cooperative labour of the producers organised in their associations. The G.N.C.T.U., therefore, operated as the social republic being built within the framework of the old society. Such organisation and activity possessed a clear prefigurative dimension. The aim was not first to win power and then to build socialism, something which separates processes which should be joined and something which leads again to bureaucratic, elitist politics 'from above'. Rather, the G.N.C.T.U. itself offered the framework of the new society within the old, expressing workers aspirations and translating these into reality.

The activists and leaders in the G.N.C.T.U. looked to combine the workers in all spheres of industrial and agricultural activity according to their role in the particular branch of production. Thus each industry would be self-governed by the actual producers and would connect the productive activity of the workers with the decision making or administrative function. As far as could possibly be achieved production was to proceed on a cooperative basis, with products being sold to customers at cost. Organisation on a universal basis, embracing all workers in industry and agriculture, would serve to unite society organically and to regulate productive activity for the good of the community. The productive basis of society would be organically integrated through workers organisations and their federation. The cooperating plants would exchange products through labour bazaars and the use of labour tickets. The gradual growth of this cooperative activity would, it was hoped, thoroughly transform society from the base up, ending capitalism and its competitive system.

The ideas may be criticised, for the reasons that Marx criticised Proudhon. But what is important to note here is that it is the working class movement itself which became conscious of the need to abolish the capitalist organisation of society and production and which looked to develop the organisations appropriate to this objective and which would constitute the basis of the new socialist order. As such, rapid development in workers perspectives came to be materialised in permanent organisations of the class. The movement of the working class is what is important. For it is when the class is moving that it is developing its political, organisational and intellectual capacities. And, since this is so, the class is better able to appreciate and assimilate criticisms, new ideas, etc.

The term association developed to the international level with the founding of the International Working Men’s Association in 1864. This development represented a revival in a radical and constructive workers socialism after a period of working within the confines of bourgeois society in the aftermath of Chartism (Morton and Tate 1979:117/9; Cole and Postgate 1961:385/8).

The central objective of the International was to unite the working class into a Europe wide movement. This alliance of the workers across boundaries was achieved on the principles of federalism which preserved for each particular section of the workers movement the space to reach a common goal from their specific conditions and conceptions. Thus, the International did not impose a particular social system upon the workers movements of each and within each nation but, rather, conceived itself as the institutional expression of a real but diverse movement of workers whose conscious principles would develop from their practical struggles in their material existence. The International would provide the greater framework for canalising these particular workers struggles as the workers obtained greater consciousness of a common cause as a working class fighting a capitalist class.

Thus, the main objective was to unite the workers of different countries so as to foster the understanding that their particular struggles derived from a common cause, the capitalistic organisation of production. The workers thus possessed a solidarity which transcended the national boundaries controlled by the state. Workers’ interests were not tied up with these nations but with class as a supra-national identity. It was a principle which Marx never ceased to recommend to the workers. Had it been better assimilated, organisationally and intellectually, the debacle of 1914 could have been avoided. Which is another way of arguing that socialist revolution was a possibility through appropriate organisation and orientation. This may seem somewhat self-evident and slightly tautological. It is intended, however, to underline the importance of politics, organisation and strategy in changing the world.

A brief comment may be in order here on the different approaches of the socialists to the workers. There are two traditions of socialism, ‘socialism from above’ and ‘socialism from below’ (Draper 1996). And these two traditions were evident in the nineteenth century. It is easy to distinguish some socialist schools. The likes of Blanc and Lassalle, for instance, are of the socialism from above tradition (Draper qualifiers this judgement as applied to Blanc the reformist). So too are the conspiratorial sects. The Utopians, for all their insistence on grass roots activity, a reformism from below, nevertheless possessed a determinist epistemology which meant only an elite could escape the corruption of circumstances. On the other side, the anarchists generally affirmed socialism from below, though again things are not so simple. For Bakunin would engage in the most elitist kinds of politics whilst Proudhon would curry favour with Louis Napoleon (Thomas 1985).

Perhaps between Lassalle and his attempts to build socialism via Bismarck and Proudhon and his attempts to seduce Napoleon III there is no great difference, statism and anti-statism as two sides of a coin that fetishizes the state power and does not grasp real relations (Thomas 1985). Marx's criticism of both wings is based upon this criticism. And it makes Marx's own position as ambiguous. Marx defined a socialism from below which recognised the need to go beyond trade union struggle and 'dwarfish’ cooperative experiments. Could this not imply the devaluation of workers associational activity? The abolition of the state that Marx pursued recognised the continuation of the state in a transitional period. Abolition, like the emergence of the state, would be the result of a gradual process. Would this not invite the preservation of the state?

Anarchists have generally categorised Marx as part of the socialism from above tradition. The truth is more complex. Marx, after all, sharply distinguished himself from the elitist politics of the Utopian socialists on the one hand and the conspiratorial politics of the Blanquist-Buonarroti tradition on the other hand (Geras 1986:134/7). In contrast to these, Marx assigned an active role to the working class.

And if he saw the need to go beyond trade union struggle to a revolutionary socialist politics, Marx also saw how the proletariat converted their economic movement into the political movement, affirming the necessary connection between the two. The Blanquists thought the trade unions to be merely reformist organisations working within the wages system; Marx saw the political significance of the wages struggle. The Lassalleans concentrated all their energies into creating the political party. Trade unions, for Lassalle, merely obstructed the political development of the working class and were to be criticised as an obstacle in the way of socialism. Marx, designating trade unions as the schools of socialism, is quite distinct from these traditions in the importance he assigns to the organisational activity of the working class.

Where the anarchists would dissent from Marx is in the approach to trade unions. Marx calls for the working class to constitute itself into a political party - which is a different notion to joining an already existing political party provided for the class - and thus insists on the need to convert economic into political struggle. The anarchist critics repudiate politics in this sense and argue, instead, that the role of trade unions is wider than the wages struggle and that the trade unions constitute the nucleus of the new social order, a view which the revolutionary syndicalists put in militant form when challenging not only capital and the state but also the socialist parties which had long since established themselves on the abstracted terrain of the political state. The criticism is that Marx valued trade unions only for the wages struggle and encouraged the working class movement to participate in bourgeois democracy through the formation of parliamentary parties.

Trade unions were to be considered as forming the nucleus of the socialist society and, therefore, one of the tasks of the International was to insist that trade unions develop this political consciousness. It should be noted that this was Marx's resolution accepted by Congress, although Marx, consistent with his principles, was influenced by the workers own activities and perspectives:

The Congress declares that all workers should strive to establish Associations for resistance in their various trades. As soon as a trade union is formed the unions in the same trade are to be notified so that the formation of national alliances in the industries may be begun. These alliances shall be charged with the duty of collecting all material relating to their industry, of advising about measures to be executed in common, and of seeing that they are carried out, to the end, that the present wages system may be replaced by the federation of free producers. The Congress directs the General Council to provide for the alliance of the trade unions of all countries.

In supporting the resolution proposed by the committee, Hins argued that 'by this double form of organisation of local workers' associations and general alliances for each industry, on the one hand the political administration of the committees, and on the other, the general representation of labour, regional, national and international, will be provided for. The councils of the trade and industrial organisations will take the place of the present government, and this representation of labour will do away, once and forever, with the governments of the past.

Here we have a clear distinction - and conflict - between two conceptions of socialism. On the one hand there is a governmental socialism 'from above' the working class and its self-organisation and self-activity. On the other hand, there is the workers associational socialism 'from below'. The one locates socialism in the political realm, the other in society. Marx himself belongs to the tradition of workers associational socialism.

What makes the position more complex is that Marx insisted that the workers develop the revolutionary consciousness and organisation which alone would be sufficient to challenge the power of the state and capital. Building the social republic within the framework of capitalism could degenerate into what can be called a ‘reformism from below’. Marx's revolutionary socialism from below insisted that the workers movement develop a political significance. What can make it appear as though Marx eventually signed up to the socialism from above tradition is when the political party, both the parliamentary and the vanguardist party, entered the Marxist tradition.

The argument to be developed here recognises this distinction between an associational workers socialism as an ascendant conception on the one hand and a statist governmental socialism as a descendant conception on the other hand. The view is that socialism was expropriated from the working class by a new middle class with their bureaucratic and reformist perspective, conscious of the need for a new capitalism. In this process, socialism was first colonised then transformed, adapted to the contours of bourgeois society and constituted by bourgeois modes of thought, action and organisation. The innovative, constructive activity of the workers in creating their own socialism, the fruitful ideas which made socialism vigorous and vibrant when expressing working class self-activity, was lost, systematically suppressed.

The evident failure of the state socialists to create anything remotely resembling a socialist society has provoked criticism throughout the twentieth century, raising demands for an alternative approach. The collapse of state socialism, not only of Communism but also of parliamentary socialism, represents the final demise of what have been the dominant, competing but closely related approaches to socialism in the twentieth century. This collapse of the traditional left has created the opportunity to re-examine and recreate the suppressed alternative of left wing politics.

Thus, despite the expropriation of socialism from the workers and its relocation from the social to the political realm - the social and the political still separated in classically bourgeois terms - and despite the marginalisation of marxism's revolutionary left wing as well as the disappearance of anarchism from the workers perspectives, one can affirm the existence of a socialist alternative, distinct from moribund state socialism, whose themes possess striking contemporary relevance. All the more so given what Miliband calls the crisis in the traditional agencies of labour (Miliband 1985:222 223). These traditional agencies militants have always understood to be the political party and the trade union incorporated into the institutional and structural framework of the capital system (Mattick 1978:76 124).

John Clark in The Anarchist Moment establishes four highly pertinent principles which clarify the nature of anarchist theory:

1.	a view of an ideal, non-coercive, non-authoritarian society; 
2.	a criticism of existing society and its institutions, based on this anti-authoritarian idea; 
3.	a view of human nature that justifies the hope for significant progress towards the ideal; 




Clearly, we live in an epoch when the old certainties are eroding fast. Not only socialism but the dominant institutions of capitalism and the state are in crisis. The crisis of socialism is part of a more general crisis, the crisis of an alienated institutional-systemic world. The central ideas of this world are being challenged by the social and cultural dynamics of an emerging world. The ‘new social movements' have been presented as in the process of creating new social relations. Many social agents are now putting forward a vision of an alternative society and are acting to build that society as they do.

It is in the context of these developments that one not only examines the nature of the crisis of socialism but attempts to recover something of Marx's emancipatory vision so as to overcome this crisis. The common ground between Marxism and anarchism may be explored.

We are now at a point in history at which the need for a new political vision is becoming acutely evident. In the industrialised West, we find increasing dissatisfaction with traditional political options and a loss of faith in formal democracy. This dissatisfaction has manifested itself thus far primarily through a process of depoliticisation in which there has been a drastic loss of confidence in political parties and non-voting on a massive scale..
One premise of the present discussion is that this disillusionment with both liberal capitalism and state socialism is justified. The prevailing world systems, in this view, no longer offer us a hopeful prospect of resolving the vast social and ecological crises which now confront humanity. In fact, it is becoming increasingly clear that these systems, with their deep commitment to such values as industrialism, high technology, centralism, urbanisation, and the state, have been instrumental in creating the social atomization and ecological imbalance which are at the core of these crises. For this reason, what is necessary is an alternative vision of society, the future, and indeed reality itself: a vision which departs from the traditional ideologies on all these fundamental questions. This vision, I will argue, is anarchism.

Clark in Ehrlich ed.1996:85 

The Relocation of Socialism from the Social to the Political
It is in this spirit that the perspectives of the left libertarian Marxists will be considered as keeping alive the critical and emancipatory themes of Marx in a century when orthodox and Western Marxism have been the dominant forms taken by Marxism, to the detriment of the revolutionary character of Marx's project.

My argument takes a critical approach to the political turn of the socialist movement, not in the sense of a rejection of politics, which would amount to a reversion to the most primitive form of socialist struggle, but in the sense of rejecting the assertion of purely political activity in abstraction from the social base and constituency of socialism. It is in this abstraction that the arrested development and, finally, the crisis of socialism is to be located.

Twentieth century socialism, in its dominant forms, reformist and revolutionary, has been distinctly political in the sense of being abstracted from the working class subject. This socialism is in general crisis. Communism has collapsed and continues to appear plausible only from the perspective of capitalist crisis. Parliamentary socialism, always parasitic on the capital economy, suffers from the crisis of the capital system.

The present ‘crisis of socialism’ would not surprise those anarchists who had always criticised the relocation of socialism from the social to the political realm. Marx himself is often blamed for this relocation. He did, after all, justify the pursuit of social reforms, the parliamentary activity of labour parties, and did reject 'political indifferentism'. Still, it is only fair to point out that Marx sought to bring the social and the political struggle together in an overall movement for social emancipation. The political organisation and consciousness is attained to this end.

Berkman's criticism, however, applies to the Marxist parties and the way that they divorced socialist politics from the social practices of the working class. Already, the revolutionary syndicalists had rejected Guesde and Jaurés, Marxist revolutionism and reformism, in equal measure.

True socialism is therefore radical and revolutionary. Radical, because it goes to the very root of the social trouble (radix meaning root, in Latin); it does not believe in reforms and makeshifts; it wants to change things from the very bottom. Revolutionary, not because it wants bloodshed, but because it clearly foresees that revolution is inevitable; it knows that capitalism cannot be changed to Socialism without a violent struggle between the possessing classes and the dispossessed masses.
‘But if a revolution’, you ask, 'then why do the Socialists want me to vote them into office? Is the revolution to be fought there?'
Your question is to the point. If capitalism is to be abolished by revolution, what do the Socialists seek office for, why do they try to get into the government?
Here is just where the great contradiction of Marxian Socialism comes in, a fundamental contradiction that has been fatal to the Socialist movement in every country, and that has made it ineffectual and powerless to be of any use to the working class.
It is very necessary to realise that contradiction clearly in order to understand why Socialism has failed, why the Socialists have gotten into a blind alley and can't lead the workers to emancipation.
What is that contradiction? It is this: Marx taught that 'revolution is the midwife of capitalism pregnant with a new society'; that is, that capitalism will not be changed to Socialism except by revolution. But in his Communist Manifesto, on the other hand, Marx insists that the proletariat must get hold of the political machinery of the government in order to conquer the bourgeoisie. The working class - he teaches - must grasp the reins of the State, by means of the Socialist parties, and use the political power to usher in Socialism.
This contradiction has caused the greatest confusion among Socialists and has split the movement into many factions. The majority of them, the regular Socialist parties in every country, now stand for the conquest of political power, for the establishment of a Socialist government whose business it will be to abolish capitalism and bring about Socialism.




It is in this context that one reconsiders an historical alternative to this dominant politicised socialism. The search for ways through the crisis of socialism as Social Democracy and Communism would be better informed by being aware of that marginalised tradition of left wing politics which has consistently criticised, in different forms, the statist route that socialism has taken in the twentieth century.







The Links between Anarchism and Marxism 

Here one can appreciate the work of Daniel Guerin:





Guerin is unusual as an anarchist in the way that he openly recognises the libertarian strand in Marx's thought (Guerin 1970:144/5). Guerin's work, practical as well as intellectual, represents an attempt to accentuate what unites Marxists and anarchists. Guerin makes it explicit that his Anarchism is less concerned with a presentation of anarchism in general as theory and practice than with that anarchism which is socialist and has clear affinities with Marxism. Guerin offers both a defence and a criticism of Marxism in anarchist terms in the sense that, in noting what unites Marx's Marxism and anarchism, he presents a case for Marxism that is capable of withstanding the demise of Social Democracy and Communism. Guerin defends what he calls libertarian communism, a conception which possesses clear affinities with both anarchism and Marxism (Guerin in Goodway ed. 1989).

Guerin's attempts to bring Marxism and anarchism together are likely to provoke the criticisms of those Marxists and anarchists who hold that anarchism and Marxism share neither the same end let alone the same means, and are fundamentally distinct in almost every respect. From the Marxist side this is a view given by Baritrop. From the anarchist perspective, Carter argues for the complete destruction of Marxism as the condition for the advance of the emancipatory politics of the left (Carter 1988:4 239 243 250 253/4 261 262/3 269). Debate, on these assumptions, is pointless. Anarchism and Marxism are enemies; one lives only by the death of the other. Marxists, since Marx himself, have demonstrated a very harsh attitude with regards to anarchism. Anarchists too have repudiated Marxist positions.

But, surely, this is far too simplistic. Anarchism and Marxism have learned from each other and possess common roots in the workers struggle. Bertrand Russell, in a book unsurpassed in its lucidity, noted the common ground between socialism and anarcho-communism (Russell 1918:46). He argued that anarchism and Marxism agree on the economic organisation of society, communism, but disagree as regards the political means to this end (Russell 1918:50). As Geoffrey Ostergaard has argued, 'some forms of western anarchism, notably anarcho-syndicalism, have accepted much of the Marxian class analysis of class in capitalist society'. Bakunin himself acknowledged the strength of Marx's critique of political economy and translated Capital into Russian. And Malatesta himself wrote that 'almost all the anarchist literature of the nineteenth century was impregnated with marxism'.

And if Marxism influenced anarchism it may also be argued that Marx himself, despite the hostility of the arguments directed against the anarchists, could actually appropriate anarchist themes within his own argument. From Stirner came a greater libertarian stress on the individual and individuality. Thomas (1985) stresses Stirner's importance in forcing Marx to make explicit his concern for individual freedom; from Proudhon a greater awareness of associational activity; from Bakunin the need to insist on proletarian self-emancipation. It is not that these themes could not have been developed from within Marx's own argument but that the anarchists criticisms forced Marx to develop the libertarian side of his Marxism.

Anarchism and Marxism have exercised a mutual influence upon each other, especially that communist anarchism and libertarian Marxism which stresses the centrality of the working class in the socialist revolution. It is at this point where anarchism and Marxism converge, if not exactly combine, that the suppressed, marginalised but recoverable alternative to Social Democracy and Communism may be located, both historically but also in the emancipatory struggles and practices of the contemporary workers movement.

With the governmental tradition now succumbing to exhaustion and bankruptcy there is a need for socialists to tap into the human roots which feed politics rather than to persist in the bourgeois autonomisation of the political. A socialism that is removed from its social roots will wither and die. The process has been underway longer than is generally realised.

Means and Ends
It is sometimes argued that whilst anarchists and Marxists theoretically agree in making the stateless, free communist society as the ultimate ideal they have nevertheless been diametrically opposed as to the means to this end. Marxism and anarchism both uphold a vision of the ideal, anarcho-socialist society and, given this common ideal, one can understand both why anarchism and Marxism have been drawn to each other and also so hostile to each other. Marx, however, rejected as Utopian the means that anarchists have sought to realise the ideal society. Marx's Hegelianism stood him in good stead here, locating the ideal in the real. Marxism could locate the socialist future in the activity of the workers movement and hence possessed a relation to the levers of change. Marxism prides itself on being realistic in the means to be employed in the transformation of society.

Nevertheless, is anarchism so Utopian? It is like asking is Marxism totalitarian? Indeed the former is much the more difficult question. At least with regards to Marxism there is an easily identifiable source for the doctrine - Marx himself. Anarchism is a protean doctrine. It all depends upon which anarchism we are referring of. The charge of utopianism stands as regards the failure to connect the ideal society with the conditions and agencies for its realisation. Some anarchism can be Utopian in this sense. Similarly that anarchism that condemns only capitalist competition but fails to grasp the central dynamic of the capital system is Utopian. So too, for that matter, is that Marxism which identifies social transformation with a change in property relations as opposed to the change in production relations.


Yet anarchism, like Marxism, is anti-utopian in rejecting blueprintism as prescribing for the living and as an open invitation to totalitarianism. Blueprintism imposes a model of the future society upon the present, thus removing the freedom of the living to create their own future out of present needs and possibilities.

But it can be doubted whether the end pursued by anarchists and Marxists really is the same at all. Marx is calling for the absorption of the state power into a self-governing civil society, something which Carter criticises for its retention of the state power in another form (Carter 1988:193). Carter is correct here, in that there is a principle of political authority in Marx. I would just argue that this is distinct from the old state based on relations of domination and exploitation. Anarchists are sceptical. It is here that the main point of division between anarchism and Marxism lies.

Self-Assumed Obligation:  The Principle of Rational Freedom
Yet does anarchism really propose a spontaneous, unmediated existence? I think there are ways of bringing Marxism and anarchism closer together with respect to a concept of democratically constituted social authority. Baugh's reference to self-assumed obligation has clear affinities with what Marx was trying to get at:

In a self-managing democracy, the vagaries of fate are replaced by conscious social control by socially competent and aware individuals freely associated with each other. Each member of the community has an equal voice in the management of social affairs. Social relationships are rendered transparent in the light of public discussion and debate. The opacity of custom and tradition is replaced by conscious articulation by the community in assembly of any rules that it may obey. Society is autonomous in the true sense of self-legislating. At the same time as people are bound by the rules they may create, they are superior to them in the sense that they may change them at any time, as new needs and circumstances arise. The assembly provides a forum for the expression of all the many interests of the different members of the community, not just the particular interests of certain groups, such as workers or men. This allows for the development of a truly general interest, and ultimately for the possibility of transcending the very notion of interest as such in favour of more expansive notions of solidarity and community.
Just as self-managing democracy creates a public realm distinct from the merely social, it creates a form of politics distinct from the State. The State is a hierarchical organisation exercising centralised power and authority over all those it claims to fall under its jurisdiction. Equal participation in the modern State is simply impossible due to its very size and complexity. The State cannot exist without a permanent bureaucracy and a coercive apparatus to impose order on the disobedient masses excluded from any real power.
Self-managing democracy is decentralised, so that social life is on a comprehensible scale. All members of the community participate equally in social rule.
The State is above all an involuntary organisation. Those who refuse to recognise its authority and obey its rules face imprisonment or exile. To constitute a political form truly distinct from the State, self-managing democracy must be conceived in voluntary terms. Only those who voluntarily agree to participate in the assembly can be bound by its decisions. Its jurisdiction is not based on geography or some notion of sovereignty, but on the notion of self-assumed obligation. By freely associating with others for the purpose of collective decision making, people create horizontal ties of political obligation between each other, rather than between themselves and some separate entity such as the 'State’.
Some notion of self-assumed obligation is necessary to ensure that self-managing democracy constitutes a form of political organisation from which domination has really been excluded.

Baugh in Clark ed. 1990:103/4

Baugh's argument concerning self-assumed obligation is developed by Robert Graham in terms which suggest that Marxism and anarchism may, after all, come closer together around the notion of a rational freedom which unites each individual with all individuals as opposed to individualistic freedom as involving universal constraint. The communal component, the linking of the freedom of each and all which was so important to Marx, is present in the notion of self-assumed obligation.

There can be no prospect of genuine community in a society composed of isolated individuals concerned only with their own interests. It is doubtful that there would be any society at all. In the absence of any on-going social relationships, the 'autonomous individual' would cease to exist, as there would be no human society from which such an individual would be able to emerge. It is a mistake to conceive freedom and autonomy as merely the absence of coercion or constraint; they are kinds of social relationships. This fundamental error effectively relegates the individualist anarchist ideal to the realm of intellectual fantasy.

Graham in Ehrlich ed.1996:77

Graham is dealing with the question of contract, the nature of agreement. This brings him to the classical problem of political obligation. He develops the principle he has defined.

Direct democratic voting can be seen as the political counterpart of promising or free agreement. By directly voting in favor of a particular law or proposal, the individual citizen assumes an obligation to abide by it. The citizen, in concert with others, defines the content of his or her political obligations, and in so doing must exercise critical judgement and choice. Political obligation in this context is not owed to a separate entity above society, such as the state, but to one's fellow citizens.
Although the assembled citizens collectively legislate the rules governing their association, and are bound by them as individuals, they are also superior to them in the sense that these rules can always be modified or repealed. Collectively the associated citizens can be said to constitute a kind of political authority, but their authority is based on horizontal relationships of obligation between themselves, rather than on the vertical relationship existing between the individual and the state.

The citizens do not exchange their obedience for the protection of the state, as in the social contract, but create reciprocal relationships of obligation in their collective undertakings and social life, from the workplace to the community, on the basis of their own voluntary choice. Each vote constitutes an express renewal of the social compact, which may be dissolved at the will of the parties, who remain free to dissociate from each other.

Society is conceived as a complex web of directly democratic voluntary associations. This scheme remains anarchist in the sense that there is no central authority, or state, claiming sovereignty over the various associations. Rather there is an association of associations, each having a directly democratic structure, freely federated with one another.

If this scheme looks familiar, it should, for it closely resembles the anarchist theory of federation. The relationship between anarchism and democratic theory has always been ambiguous. Many anarchists have advocated the application of democratic principles in the voluntary groups which they see as the base units of a future free society. Yet anarchists have claimed to reject all political authority, denouncing the tyranny of the majority and the fraud of universal suffrage.

Critics of anarchism would claim that this merely demonstrates the conceptual incoherence of anarchism. But if one conceives of direct democratic voting as an expression and extension of self-assumed obligation, as Carole Pateman does, then this supposed incoherence disappears. It is perfectly consistent for the anarchist proponents of free agreement to support direct democracy when it is conceived as giving political expression to the ideals of self-assumed obligation and individual autonomy. While this may commit the anarchists to some sort of political authority, it is not the same kind of authority as that claimed by the state.





When anarchists denounce universal suffrage as the counter-revolution they do not necessarily denounce democracy as such. Universal suffrage, by itself, is counterrevolutionary because it gives the people the illusion of self-government when in fact they remain subject to the authority of the state. Parliamentary forms of democracy score no great advance beyond aristocratic forms of government because the essentially hierarchical structure of political authority remains intact.

It is for this reason that anarchists have also denounced the socialist 'people's state’ as a dangerous illusion, because it still retains the distinction between the ruler and the ruled, a distinction which can only lead to the domination of the governed masses. Charges that anarchism is anti-democratic betray a confusion between parliamentary and direct democracy, between obligations which are imposed and those which are self-assumed.
Some confusion regarding the anarchist attitude to democracy results from the anarchists' own concern that democracy, no matter how direct, may constitute a new form of domination by the majority over the minority, and is therefore unacceptable. The question which then arises is whether the idea of direct democracy is necessarily tied to the concept of majority rule. If direct democracy is conceived as a form of self-assumed obligation, as in Pateman's scheme, then clearly it is not.

Graham in Ehrlich ed.1996:77/9

The development of anarchism in this direction would bring it more clearly within the older architectonic conception of politics and away from the atomistic liberal conception. Such an anarchism would be in a position to better appreciate the nature of the free association which Marx pursued, especially when located within the tradition of rational freedom. It is to pursue the principle of freedom through the likes of Aristotle, Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel. Marx's great achievement is to have turned this principle against the state. It is this that makes it possible to bring anarchism and Marxism closer together.

Clearly, much depends upon how the question is formulated. If anarchism is dismissed as the lament of the declining petty bourgeois and artisanal working class then no common ground is possible. If Marxism is dismissed as the ideology of a middle class, and is no more than the worldview of a techno-bureaucratic class, aspiring to power, then no alliance is possible. But in libertarian communism, anarcho-communism, revolutionary syndicalism, council communism and other such movements in which the working class has been allowed the freedom to act and to articulate its consciousness through its own forms, anarchism and Marxism can achieve a measure of agreement on common ground. Anarchism on its communist side and Marxism on its libertarian side, centred on a commune type of active democracy, come closer to each other.

The Division between Anarchism and Marxism
Marx himself refused to impose a social system or science on the working class (Marx CM in REV 1973:95), something which the anarchists have accused Marxists of doing. The point could be made differently. The idea that socialism is a correct ideology to be introduced into the proletariat 'from the outside' characterises Social Democracy and Communism but deviates from Marx's own position. Guerin notes that Marx even 'professed a faith in spontaneism’ (1989:114). In the Report to the Brussels Congress Marx argued that the I.W.M.A. 'has not been hatched by a sect or theory. It is the spontaneous growth of the proletarian movement, which itself is the offspring of the natural and irrepressible tendencies of modern society' (Marx 1974:99).

And yet, Guerin also criticises the way that Marx came to monopolise the International. Created by the workers the I.W.M.A. came to be dominated by Marx and Engels as brainworkers (Guerin 1989:15). Bakunin too suspected Marx of wanting to create a new state monopolised by intellectuals, with 'heads flowing over with brains' (Bakunin 1990:37/8; Berkman 1989:83/4), which would continue to exploit the workers. The anarchists were declared enemies of the state, of the new state that Marx and Engels were attempting to refashion the International into (Guerin 1989:115). It is a criticism that anarchists made at the time and have continued to make, although the truth of it is confused in the extreme (Thomas 1985).

The anarchist accusation is that Marx was leading the workers away from revolution into the petty politics of parliaments and elections that Social Democracy later practised in the Second International.

The Socialists' long political activity and cooperation with bourgeois parties gradually turned their thoughts and mental habits from Socialist ways of thinking. Little by little they forgot that the purpose of Socialism was to educate the masses, to make them see through the game of capitalism, to teach them that government is their enemy, that the church keeps them in ignorance, that they are duped by ideas designed to perpetuate the superstitions and wrongs on which present day society is built. In short, they forgot that Socialism was to be the Messiah who would drive darkness out of the minds and lives of men, lift them from the slough of ignorance and materialism, and rouse their natural idealism, the striving for justice and brotherhood, toward liberty and light.
They forgot it. They had, to forget in order to be 'practical', to 'accomplish’ something, to become successful politicians. You cannot dive into a swamp and remain clean. They had to forget it, because their object had become to 'get results', to win elections, to secure power. They knew that they could not have success in politics by telling the people the whole truth about conditions - for the truth not only antagonises the government, the church, and the school; it also offends the prejudices of the masses. These it is necessary to educate, and that is a slow and difficult process. But the political game demands success, quick results. The Socialists had to be careful not to come in too great conflict with the powers that be; they could not afford to lose time in educating the people.
It therefore became their main object to win votes. To achieve that they had to trim their sails. They had to lop off, little by little, those parts of Socialism which might result in persecution by the authorities, in disfavor from the church, or which would keep bigoted elements from joining their ranks. They had to compromise.
They did. First of all they stopped talking revolution. They knew that capitalism cannot be abolished without a bitter struggle, but they decided to tell the people that they could bring about Socialism by legislation, by law, and that all that is necessary is to put enough Socialists in the government.
They ceased denouncing government as an evil; they quit enlightening the workers about its real character as an agency for enslavement. Instead, they began asserting that they, the Socialists, are the staunchest upholders of 'the State’ and its best defenders; that far from being opposed to 'law and order’, they are its truest friends; that they are, indeed, the only ones who sincerely believe in government, except that the government must be socialistic; that is, that they, the Socialists, are to make the laws and run the government.




'Henceforth the links were broken between anarchism and socialism, a disastrous event for the working class, since each movement needed the theoretical and practical contribution of the other' (Guerin 1989:115). By exploring the common ground between anarchism and Marxism there is a need to examine Marx's responsibility not so much for the 'totalitarian' Communism that came to pass but for, in the first place, the Social (parliamentary) Democracy which led the workers away from their own activity in the social realm to reliance upon representatives at the abstracted political realm.

Anarchism, like revolutionary Marxism, had no role in this development. Marx himself had noted the reformist tendencies of Social Democracy and had distinguished his own revolutionary class politics from those being practised by 'well-meaning bourgeois and petty bourgeois’ colonising the socialist movement (Critique of the Gotha Programme, Circular Letter). Such a socialist movement had little need for Marx's Marxism and even less for anarchism. The wave of anarchist bombings was the pretext rather than the cause for the Social Democrats to finally settle accounts with the anarchists. The anarchists were excluded from the Second International, speakers and activists of the calibre of Gustav Landauer were forcibly removed. The result? A decrepit Social Democracy, bureaucratism and careerism, and a passivity that led the workers into the debacle of 1914 and world war.

Revolutionary syndicalism in France and industrial syndicalism in Britain were as much a reaction against the feeble, bourgeois character of the socialist parties as a workers offensive against capitalism. It is as such, with neither parties nor syndicalists unable to overcome the bourgeois separation of politics and economics, that Rosa Luxemburg explained the events leading up to 1914. And it is significant that revolutionary Marxists like Luxemburg and anarchists like Landauer were targets of the repression unleashed in the aftermath of workers struggles after the war, with the Social Democrats playing a leading role in the repression (Frolich 1994:289/92).

The old differences between Marxism and anarchism are hardly likely to be forgotten and, to the extent that they represent different perspectives, are hardly likely to go away. As a result, Marxism's criticisms of anarchism as Utopian, as a left liberalism, can be expected to continue in criticising green and red/green politics (Dobson 1990; Hulsberg 1985:17). If there is common ground there is also uncommon ground and one should be wary of attempts to close the gap. That gap may possess real social, historical and intellectual roots and could be removed only by violating these roots and both traditions.

Nevertheless, there is value in pursuing closer links in the aftermath to state socialism. After all Marx, like Godwin before him and Kropotkin after him, connected the oppression of the state and of capital ('accumulated property') with each other and demanded the abolition of both as a condition of freedom. Kropotkin’s demand for the abolition of the representative political system and the wages system has clear affinities with Marx, though Kropotkin aimed his argument against the Marxists.

In their plans for the reconstruction of society the collectivists commit, in our opinion, a twofold error. While speaking of abolishing capitalist rule, they intend nevertheless to retain two institutions which are the very basis of this rule - Representative Government and the Wages System.
As regards so-called representative government, we have often spoken about it. It is absolutely incomprehensible to us that intelligent men - and such are not wanting in the collectivist party - can remain partisans of national or municipal parliaments after all the lessons history has given them - in France, in England, in Germany, or in the United States.
While we see parliamentary rule breaking up, and from all sides criticism of this rule growing louder - not only of its results, but also of its principles - how is it that the revolutionary socialists defend a system already condemned to die?
Built up by the middle classes to hold their own against royalty, sanctioning, and, at the same time strengthening, their sway over the workers, parliamentary rule is pre-eminently a middle class rule. The upholders of this system have never seriously maintained that a parliament or a municipal council represent a nation or a city. The most intelligent among them know that this is impossible. The middle classes have simply used the parliamentary system to raise a protecting barrier against the pretensions of royalty, without giving the people liberty. But gradually, as the people become conscious of their real interests, and the variety of their interests is growing, the system can no longer work. Therefore democrats of all countries vainly imagine various palliatives. The Referendum is tried and found to be a failure; proportional representation is spoken of, the representation of minorities, and other parliamentary Utopias. In a word, they strive to find what is not to be found, and after each new experiment they are bound to recognise that it was a failure; so that confidence in Representative Government vanishes more and more.




The point to be made is that Marx's emancipatory project is not adequately contained within a framework that aims merely to conquer the state power and nationalise private property. Emancipation is not achieved by changing the title deeds on property. Rather, the alien powers of the state and capital are to be understood as interlocking so that their abolition has to be a total process that penetrates to the roots of alienation. Kropotkin's merit is to have urged the Marxist socialists to think again. Conquering state power and nationalising property keeps fundamental social relations unaltered and, as a result, preserves the alienation of control from individuals.

Rather than attempt to remove the gap between anarchism and Marxism it may be better to respect their different ways of formulating and resolving perspectives so that each is allowed to learn from the other.

Thus the anarchist identification of small, decentralist and participatory social forms as prefiguring the future society in subordinating institutions to individuals rather than, as under contemporary society, subordinating individuals to institutions, may be criticised for its vagueness as regards the revolutionary agency. Such anarchism is available to ‘the people’ in general. Marxism has been more specific as regards the social relevance of its political appeal. A 'classless' social identity does not exist under capital's class society. From this perspective Baritrop (1975) criticises anarchism for its vagueness. Indeed Baritrop goes much further than this. The popular view that anarchism and Marxism have much common ground is unfounded. The view that anarchism and Marxism pursue the same ideal of the stateless community, a view expressed by Levine (Levine 1987) is simply untrue for Baritrop.
For Coleman (1982) anarchists are idealists and do not understand the need to relate the end they pursue to the social system, as do the Marxists. Coleman agrees that anarchists and Marxists do not pursue the same end. And yet elsewhere he concludes with an argument that could be used to establish common ground. For if 'the chief battle of socialists today is the war of ideas' and if it is argued that 'once the majority has established socialism, doing so without leaders, there will be no government and no state' (Coleman 1990) then the grounds for sharply distinguishing anarchism and Marxism are less than clear.

William Morris
It is significant that the Marxist Coleman finds his way to anarchistic arguments via William Morris. Some socialists seem more concerned with establishing property rights over Morris, as though the main thing is to establish that Morris was a Marxist and not an anarchist - something which anarchists have quite openly acknowledged even when positively evaluating Morris's work (Paul O Flinn I3J 72 1996:102ff). Rights of possession are not important. It is more important to understand the libertarian character as well as the revolutionary character of Morris's Marxism, for it is this that made Morris sympathetic to the anarchists and which has made the anarchists quite comfortable with Morris's Marxism (Woodcock 1975:21).
In short, there is more to unite Morris with the anarcho-communists than there is to unite him with the vanguardist tradition in Marxism. In the socialist revolution envisaged by Morris the emphasis is placed upon 'workmen's associations', what would now be called workers' councils. These exist as organs of working class self-administration. 'In Morris's revolution it is these workmen's associations/workers' councils which both guarantee that the revolutionary movement will be multifocal .. and provide an environment in which workers' initiative can flourish ... Morris's vision of a process of working class self-liberation that is free from leadership stems from the strategy encapsulated in the maxim of the International Working Men's Association that "the emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself" (Crump in Coleman and O Sullivan ed.1990:64). Morris thus upholds Marx's view of working class self-education through practice. Socialist education is essential and important but cannot be reduced to a set of ideas that are introduced into the working class by socialist intellectuals (Crump in Coleman and O Sullivan ad 1990:65/6).

Morris took the view that understanding of communism is acquired, at least in part, through the workers' own activity in a communist revolution. For Morris, communist revolution is not simply a process whereby the working class changes the purpose and organisation of society. Part and parcel of a communist revolution is that, in struggling to change society, workers also change themselves.

Crump in Coleman and O Sullivan ed.1990:64/5

One should also consider Anderson's interpretation of Morris as a hard headed revolutionary whose political strategies for abolishing capitalism anticipated the Bolsheviks (Anderson 1980:178/83). Nevertheless, Morris is to be praised for his conception of revolution as process rather than as something to be engineered by 'the party'. This is consistent with the anarchist conception.

For social anarchists revolution is a process, a process leading to the total deflation of state authority. That process entails self and collective education and the building of alternative institutions as mechanisms of survival, of training and as models of a new society.

Ehrlich, Ehrlich, De Leon, Morris in Ehrlich ed.1996:1996:4

This could be called a strategy of prefiguration, the new society being gradually built within the framework of the old, superseding that framework in time. Such a conception of revolution as process could, from an anarchist perspective, judge Marxism a failure as a praxis of liberation.

If this analysis is correct, then the real alternative to the anarchist approach appears to be, not a liberal or social democratic optimism about global democracy, but rather Marxism-Leninism, which has enough awareness of the realities of economic power to realize that such a shift in power relationships will inevitably involve a process of global class struggle. But though anarchists may agree that the Marxist-Leninist approach can succeed in significantly reducing the extremes of economic inequality, it is judged to be a failure as a praxis of liberation. 

Among the most important arguments for this conclusion are the following: 

1.	that the Marxist-Leninist view of social revolution, with its strong commitment to statism and centralism, results in a new state-capitalist and bureaucratic-centralist form of class domination perpetuating political and often economic inequality;
2.	that Marxism-Leninism's uncritical acceptance of high technology leads to continued alienated production and the necessary development of a technocratic class interest and to continued domination of nature and destruction of the ecosphere; and
3.	that the economistic and productivistic orientation of Marxism-Leninism blinds it to many important areas of the struggle for human liberation, not the least of which are the cultural, the aesthetic, and the erotic, and weakens its analysis of many forms of domination (including political, racial, sexual, and psychological ones). 

These arguments are also directed at other statist and centralist positions and some of the analysis applies equally to technocratic liberalism (Clark in Ehrlich ed.1996:97).

40 ANARCHISM
Anarchism is a protean doctrine. Unlike Marxism it lacks a common source or authority against which later developments may be evaluated. Certainly there are major figures, like Godwin and Proudhon, but how is one to decide which is the true anarchist tradition, the individualism developing from Stirner or the communalism developing from Kropotkin? Marxists like Bottomore define anarchism as a left liberalism (1933) and, indeed, some anarchists, Like Chomsky, are quite conscious of maintaining liberal ideals. Yet Chomsky is also conscious of being a socialist, presenting himself as a libertarian socialist (Amove 1997:117/36). This conflation of liberalism and socialism is not as paradoxical as it may seem. Marx, it could be argued, positively criticised political liberalism in order to show that its claims as regards liberty and equality and citizenship imply an universality that is denied in the reality of class divided society and which demand communism. Anarchists like to present anarchism as a socialist critique of capitalism and a liberal critique of socialism (Goodway in Goodway ed. 1989:1).

Some socialists understand this as a typically evasive anarchist deception allowing anarchism to mean everything and nothing. But those with a vested interest in misunderstanding - and they are found on both anarchist and Marxist sides - are hardly reliable authorities. What would separate anarchism from Marxism is its failure to extricate itself from the liberal-individualism deriving from atomistic bourgeois society. Here one can give prominence to those anarchists exploring what may be called the Greek roots of citizenship and democracy, seeking an authentic public sphere in which individuals may participate as active citizens, a self-assumed obligation that unites all as individuals within a community of individuals (Baugh in Clark 1990:97ff; Bookchin 1987).

 Jennings argues that 'most of classical anarchist theory is a branch of liberal individualism’ (Jennings 1990). Godwin (1982), like Guerin has no doubts that anarchism is socialist. Neville (1990) sees anarchism as containing aspects of both liberalism and socialism.

For some there is a simple test:





This uniting point is the negation of the principle of Authority in social organisations and the hatred of all constraints that originate in institutions founded on this principle.
Thus, whoever denies Authority and fights against it as an anarchist.

Sebastian Faure Encyclopedie anarchiste

Thus the anarchist objects to power exercised through a politics institutionalised above the heads of people. Such a politics concedes liberty only as precisely defined under laws laid down by authority. This is a legal freedom under political authority and, as such, makes the state the condition of freedom. Anarchists, on the other hand, defend the freedom of the individual as something which is circumscribed only by the active and voluntary consent of the individuals concerned. Such a freedom does not require an impersonal, abstract institutional apparatus presiding over all. Anarchism's individual freedom is defined in opposition to the institutionalised constraint exercised by the state. Thus anarchism repudiates the idea that rule, obligation and government are something located above the heads of those ruled, obligated and governed in an abstracted, institutional realm. Goodway defines anarchism thus





Woodcock defines anarchism 





The attack upon centralisation, bureaucratisation and abstraction gives anarchism both a continuing relevance and a popular appeal. Anarchists criticise the large scale, centralised organisations and structures which undermine the autonomy of the individual and which institutionalise the interests of the political and economic classes which dominate the modern world. Whether in terms of the state, the corporations or the large bureaucratic organisations regulating society, 'giantism’ is attacked for being remote from the individual and, indeed, for removing the world from the control and comprehension of individuals. Such a world is dehumanising and exhibits an overall loss of meaning. It is a world that has grown far above human scale. Anarchists, therefore, criticise capitalism and socialism equally to the extent that they reproduce these large scale organisations and structures above human control. Socialism, indeed, is equated by many anarchists with state centralising bureaucratic regimes (Pepper 1993:155).

Anarchism thus effectively calls for the reappropriation of life and work by the community. As against the 'giantism’ of the modern world individuals must organise in the community to take their affairs back into their own hands. Only through struggling for this emancipation will individuals come to understand how to express their needs and come to understand how their true nature has been perverted under large scale, centralised and bureaucratised structures and organisations removed from the individuals they control.

The institutional world, then, is not a natural world of human freedom, spontaneity, consent and cooperation but an artificial, parasitic, false world designed to manage and manipulate individuals and ensure their obedience and subordination. By opposing the true nature of human beings to the unnatural character of the institutional world anarchists affirm the ability of so-called ordinary people to be able to organise their common affairs, thus producing a natural order as against the disorder and violence and tyranny of the artificial, institutional world.





Anarchism runs along the spectrum from individualism to collectivism. For Woodcock (1975) anarchism ranges by increasing degrees of institutionalised collectivity from individualism to mutualism to collectivism to anarchist communism to anarcho-syndicalism. A socialist anarchism is quite possible and there are grounds for arguing that the 'anarcho-capitalists’ are more individualists than anarchists (Miller 1984:31/6). One saying is that all anarchists are socialists even if not all socialists are anarchists and, certainly, the values of the anarchists are socialist. The link with liberalism is with the ideals of political liberalism and a demand for their realisation. The main point about a socialist anarchism, then, is not how anarchism and socialism can be brought together. What is interesting is to explore various points along the spectrum from individualism to collectivism to discover where anarchism and Marxism come closest. What anarchism forces Marxism to do is to develop its own libertarian side. Certainly anarchism forces Marxism to confront its own appearance in the guise of party-state socialism and take another direction. This may open Marxism to the criticism of the likes of Bookchin, who argues that Marxists have continually, cynically and opportunistically, looted anarchism for libertarian ideas as the bankruptcy of Marxist authoritarianism has been practically revealed (Bookchin in Ehrlich 1996).

As against this one, could argue that Marx's Marxism possesses a strong libertarian strain and is revealed in the commitment to human emancipation, communist individuality, the critique of capital and the state as alien modes of control, the demand for political and economic power to be embodied in individual relationships in society, the rejection of representative systems extraneous from common social roots. The point is that Marxists can generate a libertarian position from within their own tradition, without the need to import extraneous ideas.

Leaving aside Marx's libertarianism, it is necessary to explore further the character of anarchist socialism. In the first place one may refer to anarcho-syndicalism. In the years up to the 1914-1918 war this was referred to as revolutionary syndicalism. Revolutionary syndicalism may be described as the greatest but also as the last expression of anarchism in the workers movement. At the same time many of the revolutionary syndicalists considered themselves to be the true Marxists. The Marxists of the socialist parties had apparently abandoned the proletariat and the class struggle and were concentrating upon the political battle in abstraction from the workers struggles in society. As a result the revolutionary syndicalists - and the point applies to the industrial unionists and syndicalists too - sought to recover the principle of proletarian self-emancipation. As such they considered themselves, and not the socialist parties, whether reformist or revolutionary, to be the real Marxists.

The point is contentious. The reaction against the political parties and their attempt to wage the class struggle in the abstract, at some remove from the roots and reality of the struggle, is understandable. Whether represented by Guesde or by Jaurés, socialist politics seemed remote from the class and seemed incapable of representing the class in struggle. And, certainly, the activism of the working class is fundamental to Marx. But Marx argued for the working class to convert its economic movement into its political movement. Revolutionary syndicalism represents a retreat back to economic movement, the idea that the economic organisations of the proletariat would suffice to transform society and build the new social order. This reproduced the bourgeois separation of politics and economics and, to this extent, revolutionary/industrial syndicalism never quite managed to become completely Marxist.

What makes revolutionary syndicalism such an interesting phenomenon is the fact that with it not only did the working class begin to move as a class but that the movement encompassed people who thought themselves anarchist and Marxist. Of course, anarchists kept out of the movement, arguing that the syndicates are authoritarian organisations just as Marxists kept their distance on account of the unpolitical character of the movement. 

The significant point is that anarchists could join and participate in a movement of the working class which they considered to be consistent with anarchist principles whilst Marxists could also define their Marxism against the political practice of the Second International parties. This was a unity forged on the basis of working class self-activity and movement.

Anarcho-syndicalism is perhaps the most workerist form of anarchism in that it rests upon the material organisations of the working class. Both Marxists and anarchists have offered good reasons as to why the trade unions could not play the revolutionary role assigned to them (Anderson in Blackburn and Cockburn 1967:263/79; Malatesta 1993:23/31). But what makes syndicalism, whether one considers it anarchist or Marxist, important that it does represent the economic movement of the class and, as such, offers the basis for the development of a more political consciousness and organisation. Without the economic movement of the working class political development lacks content and becomes something abstracted from the class, imposed from above.

Anarcho-syndicalism is a doctrine and a movement that is directed against political socialism. That is, anarcho-syndicalism looks to locate 'polities' in the class organisation and movement itself rather than invest abstracted organisations like the party and the state with a greater significance as higher forms. Certainly it is a reaction against the political turn taken by socialism in the late nineteenth century and remains consistent to anarchist principles in seeking to free individuals from the authority of the state. The state is to be replaced by a federation of autonomous communities. The syndicalist component lies in the identification of the workers material organisations, the trade unions, as the principal organs of the socialist revolution and the socialist society. The economy is to be freed from the private control of the capitalist class and put under the control of the trade unions as natural organs rooted in the production process.

Of course, the investment of trade unions with revolutionary hopes is question begging. Surely trade unions are themselves bourgeois institutions which organise workers as wages slaves whereas what the revolutionary syndicalists are really searching for are institutions which organise the workers as producers capable of taking the initiative. In this sense, Gramsci's councilism represents a further, fruitful development of the old syndicalism, though certainly anarchists have pointed out that even here the factory councils remain within bourgeois forms, within factory production.

Anarchism retains its practical and intellectual validity from its consistent opposition to the giantism of the modern world. Anarchists advocate the abolition of centralised power, coercive organisations, bureaucratic and technocratic cultures, and political and economic monopolies. As against the capitalistically ordered society anarchists would seek to establish a free association of individuals in which the production process rests on cooperative labour.

The state and corporate organisation of the existing world, with their lifeless institutional and bureaucratic apparatus imposed upon society, are to give way to a federation of autonomous communities connected to each other not so much by common interests - interest a bourgeois concept - as by natural needs which may be satisfied by mutual, voluntary agreement.

One comes, then, to the conception of a stateless society. Anarchism as a word is derived from two Greek words: archon, meaning ruler, and the prefix an, meaning without. Anarchism, then, is literally a without-rulism. Anarchy is a condition of being without rule or ruler.

It is the doctrine which Proudhon named An-archism, a word derived from the Greek, and meaning not necessarily absence of order, as is generally supposed, but the absence of rule. The Anarchists are simply unterrified Jeffersonian Democrats. They believe that 'the best government is that which governs least’ and that which governs least is no government at all.

Tucker 1888 in Woodcock 1977:151

	(My view, developed in the context of rational freedom, follows Aristotle in conceiving the citizen as one who is capable of ruling and being ruled at the same time. Such a conception offers us a route of constituting a democratic form of authority.)

As Godwin argued, the anarchist holds that government is the principal source of social disorder and that a stateless society based upon voluntary organisation is a viable alternative that anarchists seek to create.





Society is not propped up by the state. On the contrary the state is parasitic upon society, drawing its strength from society and, in the process, weakening society's natural order. As a result, the state, far from establishing the order that its adherents claim to be its central function, the state presides over social disorder. The abolition of the state, then, implies the recovery by society of the powers alienated to and expropriated by the state - a process which Marx explained by the rise of the capital system - and hence the strengthening of society.

Anarcho-syndicalism upholds the view that trade unions are natural organs of the social order and, independently of capitalism, would make perfect sense as a means of organising society (Purchase 1990:8/9). But to approach this natural social order from a slightly different angle one may refer to that social anarchism which looks to the federation of self-governing cities.
 Thus Purchase points out that social anarchists argue for the free, autonomous and self-governing city as the natural unit of social organisation. Purchase thus looks to the 'flourishing of civic awareness' in the future (1990:10). Bookchin also argues for this civic awareness, for the recovery of a body politic and a civic community in which the city becomes a public body of active citizens (Bookchin 1995:173ff). Bookchin recognises that such a civic future is possible only if the material as well as the institutional aspects of civic life are secured (Bookchin 1990:188/9).

Whilst anarchism could retain the market as a coordinating mechanism which is compatible with decentralisation, anarchists are generally agreed that the future social order would be socialist rather than ‘anarcho-capitalist’ in having replaced competition with cooperation and put an end to class exploitation, wage labour, private property in the means of production and the distribution of the social product.

What is to be noted about this projection of the future society is that it entails a much more sophisticated kind of organisation than that established under liberal market capitalism and state socialism. Indeed these supposed alternative are revealed as varieties of the same species.

Anarchism in this sense demands a politically active and aware citizenry capable of participating in public affairs as rational beings and capable of regulating the social order consciously. Reason would replace coercion in politics. Those who would consider that the anarchist argument is utterly Utopian draw their strength from an existing politics in which might is right.

But three points should be considered here. 

In the first place, the existing political order resting on coercion is precisely what radicals, socialists, anarchists and, indeed, liberals have attempted to overcome. Indeed, - and this is the second point - the attempt to rest politics on the rule of law as an attempt to make a moral case for government characterises the tradition of western political philosophy. One can, therefore, refer to the works of Rousseau, Kant and Hegel to make the case for government resting on the morality and reason of law as opposed to force. Anarchists reject the institutional apparatus that the philosophers require for this project. In the third place, the case for the active citizenry educated by its own participation in politics is one that is strongly made in the tradition of liberal political thought, certainly by the likes of Mill and Wollstonecraft (Held 1987). Indeed Bookchin acknowledges the debt to Mill in making the case for active citizenship.





The debate thus resolves itself into the question here as to whether politics can rest on reason rather than force, whether human beings can consciously govern their affairs without recourse to power as might, and whether individuals can form themselves into an active citizenry? These are the interesting questions. For it can be shown that if anarchism's morally regulated order is Utopian then the case for ethicising the rule of the state and law, the project of western political philosophy, falls. If that case stands, then the Rousseau's, the Kant's and the Hegel's of this world lead to a non-coercive, ethico-rational anarcho-socialist free community.

Baugh makes this argument:





Thus it is in the creation of politics structures and processes that encourage rather than discourage citizen participation that the educating process of citizenship is activated. Through participating in what are now genuinely 'public' affairs, the citizens acquire the enlarged mentality which enables them to pursue the good of the whole as their own good. It is in this direction that anarchism can come closer to the Marxist position, enabling us at the same time to grasp the 'anarchism’ in Marx and the case for the rational and ethical community he extracted from the tradition of political philosophy.
One should seek to introduce here Marx's own critique of the state as an abstraction and hence his definition of democracy in terms of an active suffrage and citizenship (Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State, On the Jewish Question). Marx, it could be argued, is also attempting to abolish the institutional realm abstracted from the governed and thus to develop a conception of self-government.

There would still be room for debate here. Self-rule, self-obligation and self-government are still forms of rule, obligation and government and could, for that reason, be rejected by anarchists as in some way authoritarian. But not necessarily so. When Marx is arguing for the universality of the state's abstract citizenship to be absorbed within social relationships and argues that this is possible only if the state and capital as alienated social powers to be reappropriated by society his argument is not so far from Bookchin's argument that the municipality is the basic unit through which people recover the political power they have alienated to the state (Bookchin 1987).

In a self-managing democracy, the vagaries of fate are replaced by conscious social control by socially competent and aware individuals freely associated with each other. Each member of the community has an equal voice in the management of social affairs. Social relationships are rendered transparent in the light of public discussion and debate. The opacity of custom and tradition is replaced by conscious articulation by the community in assembly of any rules that it may obey. Society is autonomous in the true sense of self-legislating. At the same time as people are bound by the rules they may create, they are superior to them in the sense that they may change them at any time, as new needs and circumstances arise. The assembly provides a forum for the expression of all the many interests of the different members of the community, not just the particular interests of certain groups, such as workers or men. This allows for the development of a truly general interest, and ultimately for the possibility of transcending the very notion of interest as such in favour of more expansive notions of solidarity and community.
Just as self-managing democracy creates a public realm distinct from the merely social, it creates a form of politics distinct from the State. The State is a hierarchical organisation exercising centralised power and authority over all those it claims to fall under its jurisdiction. Equal participation in the modern State is simply impossible due to its very size and complexity. The State cannot exist without a permanent bureaucracy and a coercive apparatus to impose order on the disobedient masses excluded from any real power.
Self-managing democracy is decentralised, so that social life is on a comprehensible scale. All members of the community participate equally in social rule.
The State is above all an involuntary organisation. Those who refuse to recognise its authority and obey its rules face imprisonment or exile. To constitute a political form truly distinct from the State, self-managing democracy must be conceived in voluntary terms. Only those who voluntarily agree to participate in the assembly can be bound by its decisions. Its jurisdiction is not based on geography or The seeming 'effectiveness’ of Marxism - in replicating the state in the form of the party, in its appeal to state controls, and in its economism at the expense of new social and personal values - is its shortcoming. Marxist parties did not demolish the nation-state but rather incorporated the very substance of protest and revolution into itself, and in the process effacing libertarian traditions as 'archaisms' that were mere 'precursors' to a 'socialist science '.

Bookchin in Ehrlich ed. 1996:22/3

And this bourgeois character of Marxism leads Bookchin to claim that Marxism, in its emancipatory claims, is parasitic upon the genuine social movement of the people.

Not accidentally, Marxism has been most sharply alienated from itself. Attempts to 'update' Marxian theory, to give it contemporary relevance, have added an obfuscating, eclectic dimension to its ideological corpus. As early as 1905, in response to the general strike movement that was then shaking tsarism to its foundations. Rosa Luxemburg was cynically obliged to make the 'mass strike’ - a typically anarchist 'strategy' - palatable to the Second International by grossly distorting Engels's view on the subject and the anarchist view as well. Lenin performed much the same sort of acrobatics in State and Revolution in 1917, when events favored the Paris Commune of 1871 as a 'paradigm', assailing the anarchists while concealing Marx's own harsh denigration of the Commune in the last years of his life. Similar acrobatics were performed by Ernest Mandel, Andre Gorz, et al. in May-June 1968, when it seemed that all of France was being swept into a near-revolutionary situation.
What is significant here is the agility with which Marxian theory follows events that are essentially alien to its analysis. Marxist theorists initially dismissed the ecological and feminist movements that emerged in the late 1960's and the neighborhood movements of later years as 'petty bourgeois' phenomena. Only the sheer force of events obliged Marxists - and socialists generally - to acknowledge the importance of these developments, try to interpret them according to economistic Marxist criteria, then make every effort to absorb them, even claiming priority in evoking them under the rubric of 'new social movements'. At this point it was not anarchism, to which these issues are literally indigenous, that was acknowledged as the arena to which these developments legitimately belonged, but a bouquet of 'neo', 'democratic’, and even 'ecological' Marxisms and socialisms. These obfuscating developments have impeded the evolution of revolutionary consciousness at its very roots and gravely obstructed the development of a truly self-reflexive revolutionary movement.

Bookchin in Ehrlich ed.1996:23

The opposition asserted between anarchism as a social movement and Marxism as statist brings us again to the distinction between socialism from above and socialism from below. Anarchism is clearly presented as a social movement looking to generate changes from below.

One of the most important of these claims is that reliance on the state or a global superstate for change will lead to a continuation of many of the patterns of domination that the state has done so much to develop and reinforce in the past. If this is correct, the anarchist strategy of change 'from below' in people's everyday lives, in their families, in their work and community relationships, and finally, in society at large through associations rooted in these fundamental struggles, would seem much more promising.

Clark in Ehrlich ed.1996:101

Perhaps the most important thing to grasp here is the emergence, the existence and, finally, the abolition of the state and capital as a process. Each depend upon the other. This point is made in the attempt to undercut the debate between Marxists and anarchists as to whether the state or capital is most important. Which is determinant? Anarchists have tended to argue for the autonomy of the state (Carter 1988). The state is the central institution upon which all else depends. The Marxist justification for retaining the state in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat is thus looked upon with scepticism. Marxists, on the other hand, have viewed the state as the determined rather than the determinant (Miliband in Miliband and Saville ed.1965:280), with this view being expressed in the cruder form of the state as an instrument of class domination.

What both presentations lack is a view of the state as alienated social power. This is Marx's basic conception and it is one that is able to encompass theories of the state as autonomous and as instrument. Marx criticised alienation in both its economic and political forms. Both the state and capital are alienated social powers which emerged as part of the same process. Once this is understood it is possible to conceive an emancipatory politics that looks to abolish both the state and capital as alienated social powers to be recovered by society. Anarchist criticism thus compels Marxists to re-examine Marx's own critique of the state so as to be more critical of the possible role of the state in the socialist revolution. It means reinstating the social as against the political revolution.

It is impossible to compare anarchism and Marxism in the sense that anarchism lacks the central figure whose activities and works are the common authority from which the tradition springs. In many ways anarchism has been and is a people or folk movement, taking different forms in different times and places, but always proceeding from real people and the needs and aspirations. Anarchism, moreover, has not been represented by political parties in the way that Marxism has been, given that anarchists look to retain freedom and spontaneity in human action in actual situations.

It is not that anarchism is necessarily hostile to political parties but that it is critical of the way that parties have tended to replicate the characteristics of government and, indeed, have aimed at forming a government as their central objective. Anarchists have repudiated parties for the same reasons that Godwin repudiated government.

Government lays its hand upon the spring that is in society and puts a stop to its motion. It gives substance and permanence to our errors.

Godwin in Woodcock 1975:69/70 and Woodcock 1977:15

Godwin's case against government in Political Justice may perhaps be considered as the classic anarchist statement. Authority is contrary to nature and social disorder results from the fact that, through government, individuals are not at liberty to act according to their reason. Thus Godwin gives a lengthy criticism of government and presentation a free, decentralised society in which the basic political units are autonomous, self-regulating communities.

The danger of all political organisation is fetishism. To make a fetish of forms is indeed to collectivise individuals, instrumentalise practice, rigidify movement and concentrate alienated power at the centre. It is this kind of political form that anarchists reject, whether it takes the form of a party or a government. Anarchism upholds that the organisation of common affairs at the abstracted political level ought to be replaced by social organisation rooted in the actual affairs of the community and proceeding by the voluntary consent of individuals.

None of this means that anarchists reject organisation as such. What they reject is organisation that has become rigid, sclerotic, authoritarian and bureaucratic. The anarchist is not an individualist in the atomistic, liberal sense. Stirner, the most extreme of the anarchist individualists, himself recognised the social nature of the individual. Freedom can only be realised through cooperation between individuals in a community. For Kropotkin the individual is naturally a social being and that the natural form of organisation is voluntary cooperation. Because this is so the anarchist society, based on non-coercive organisation, achieves a natural and spontaneous order. It is organisations founded upon coercion that are unnatural and produce disorder. The world of gigantic organisation and centralised power thus stands condemned as an unnatural world of disorder (Woodcock 1977:15, 19).

Godwin’s Political Justice entails a thorough rejection of government in all its abstracted political forms. As such, it contains criticism of political representation and seeks to reduce even democracy to a minimum. All rule, whether by a minority or a majority, is to be rejected as a form of tyranny. Representation is an alienation in so far as it rests on the transfer of the individuals' responsibility to other individuals or institutions.
Anarchism thus presents a criticism of the system of political representation and seeks, instead, to arrange the determination of common affairs through arrangements which enable individuals to participate directly in issues of concern, reaching decisions with other individuals (Berkman 1964:31/2 37).

The argument that anarchism leads to narrowness based on local communalism relies on an exclusive direction of attention to the anarchist emphasis on community control and decentralisation and a lack of acknowledgement of the principles of federalism and mutual aid. From the time of Bakunin and Kropotkin, anarchism has stressed the importance of local, national and global federations of communities and worker collectives. There are two sides to the anarchist rejection of the nation-state: one is communalism and the other is internationalism (if 'nation' is taken in its cultural, rather than political sense). Anarchist decentralism is not a mechanistic formula for solving all 'social problems'. Rather, it is an integral part of a social practice through which humanity can recreate itself in a more personalized, self-conscious, and communal form. The anarchist 'commune’ is a community of people attempting to create relationships and institutions based on an organic, ecological, cooperative view of existence. The relationship between local communalism and global communalism is expressed well in the work of Martin Buber, who argues that unless the inhumane, bureaucratic, objectifying relationships created by the state, capitalism, and high technology are replaced by personalistic, cooperative relationships arising in the primary communal group, it cannot be hoped that people will have a deep concern for humanity as a whole. In Buber's view, unless we can see humanity in our neighbours it is impossible to expect us to overcome that 'narrowness' which prevents us from acting with a concern for the entire species'. But this is not a mere moral dictum; rather it is a call for communitarian praxis. As Buber states it, ‘an organic commonwealth’ - and only such commonwealth can join together to form a shapely and articulated race of men - will never build itself up out of individuals but only out of small and even smaller communities: a nation is a community to the degree that it is a community of communities.

Clark in Ehrlich ed.1996:94

In living and working towards the new society we must try to live by the principles we advocate. While we can all agree that the revolutionary process should be consistent with our ends in view, not everyone has recognised that 'consistency' isn't always apparent. We will not always know how to act consistently; we will not always be very consistent. But we do try. Like first generation immigrants to a strange culture, first generation revolutionaries will have a high casualty rate.
Let me recapture the assumptions I have just put forward. They are so simple that their power is deceptive. For if you have found yourself in agreement so far, you have become engaged in a social anarchist framework and it will be difficult for you to reject its transfer culture. I have said the following:

We must view revolutionary change as a process, not an end.
We must develop a view of the 'good society'.
We must act on the principles of the society we like to see.
Our means must be consistent with our ends.
We must act as if the future is today.

The kind of society we choose to live in is one in which freedom and equality are maximised. Here we confront the major dilemma of anarchist organisation. All social organisation places some constraint on individual behaviour. But we can not have an egalitarian society unless we are all free. And we cannot be free without equality. Our transfer culture, then, will be based on experiments in social arrangements, arrangements in which we will consistently be testing new principles of collective social organisation. We are attempting uniquely to build freedom in community.

Ehrlich in Ehrlich ed.1996:332/3

Bookchin demands a new politics, a new politics that reaches back to classical roots.

the issues that confront us today are more distinctly communal and ethical than they have been at any time in the past. They literally involve the recreation of a new public sphere as a civic, confederal counterpower to the state, structured around an institutionally new politics (to use the term in its Hellenic rather than its parliamentary sense) based on directly democratic institutions and full public participation. The fact that these issues and solutions are meaningless in a Marxian context reveals the extent to which Marxian ideas have become an 'ideology' in a socially accommodating sense and their perpetuation a typically academic exercise whose products feed university presses and professional journals.

Bookchin in Ehrlich ed.1996:24

The view that the creation of a public or civic sphere against the state is something meaningless to Marxism can be shown to be false. Marx's project, indeed, may most accurately be described as the search for the modern polis democracy in which political and social relationships are fused making possible an active citizenship. At this point, however, one is exploring the common ground where anarchism and Marxism could possibly meet. The point to take here is the opposition of the lifeworld of individuals to the system world of institutions and systems alienated from those individuals. This could be expressed as a preference for delegates over representatives were it not for the fact that anarchists reject the whole idea of the individual alienating responsibility for acting and deciding. Anarchists opt for mechanisms which enable the people themselves to express their needs, demands and aspirations in concrete situations, though certainly, to prevent majorities tyrannising minorities, anarchism seeks to ensure that all are self-governing as far as possible and hence resistant to the claims of others (Woodcock 1977:26).

Anarchism has consistently opposed the increasingly centralised, bureaucratic and technocratic regulation of society in the modern world. Thus anarchists are keen to avoid the development of elites, bureaucracies and concentrations of power.

There is nothing integral to the nature of human social organisation that makes hierarchy, centralisation and elitism inescapable. These organisational forms persist, in part, because they serve the interests of those at the top. They persist, too, because we have learned to accept roles of leadership and followership; we have come to define hierarchy as necessary, and centralisation as efficient. All of this is to say that we learned the ideological justifications for elite organisational forms quite well.
We could dismiss the question by pointing out that social motivations to power, elites and elitism and bureaucracy would not exist in an anarchist society. The question should not be dismissed, however, when we talk about building an anarchist society in the shell of another. In such a context we will inevitably be struggling against the life-denying values of our, socialisation. Hierarchy, dominance and submission, repression and power - these are facts of everyday life. Revolution is a process, and even the eradication of coercive institutions will not automatically create a liberatory society. We create that society by building new institutions, by changing the character of our social relationships, by changing ourselves - and throughout that process by changing the distribution of power in society. It is by the constant building of new forms of organisation, by the continual critical evaluation of our successes and failures, that we prevent old ideas and old forms of organisation from re-emerging. 
If we cannot begin this revolutionary project here and now, then we cannot make a revolution.

Ehrlich, Ehrlich, De Leon and Morris in Ehrlich ed.1996:5

Bookchin conceives anarchism as a social movement aimed against the state. For Bookchin, what should unite anarchist theories and movements is not simply their defence of society against the state but the commitment to participation in municipalist politics in its classical civic sense. This further involves the attempt to create a popular confederal counterpower to the state. Anarchism, for Bookchin, looks beyond class exploitation, whilst recognising its importance, to demand the abolition of hierarchical relations which are the source of domination as such. ‘The domination of the young by the old in tribal gerontocracies and of women by men in patriarchal families, and the notion that humanity is destined to dominate the natural world - these preceded class society and economic exploitation, and they would continue to exist even if classes and economic exploitation were eliminated. In fact, they remain the crucial residual spheres of authority that Marxism and socialism retain all too comfortably in their notions of a classless society’. 

In examining the nature of freedom and domination, anarchism goes beyond the conventional economistic nexus of capitalist society into the very structure, sensibilities, and nature of human consociation as such. Whereas Marx saw hierarchy as an inevitable extension of biology into society, which Engels considered indispensable to industrial activities in all circumstances, anarchism views it as a social and cultural phenomenon that can be eliminated in a free and rational society. ‘For anarchism, hierarchy and domination inevitably lead to the objectification of the natural world as mere natural resources, of human beings as mere urban resources - in short, to the reduction of the world itself to inorganic material and to the rise of a technocratic sensibility that sees humankind as a mere instrument of production'.

In 'Marxism as Bourgeois Sociology’ (in Toward an Ecological Society), Bookchin argues that Marx unwittingly extended this trend into socialism. For Bookchin, anarchism has the resources for a deeper, richer, and broader insight into and grasp of the dialectic of domination and freedom by looking beyond the factory and even the marketplace into hierarchical relations that prevail in the family, the educational system, the community, and the relationship of humanity to the natural world, not to speak of the state, the bureaucracy, and the party. ‘Accordingly, issues of ecological dislocation, sexism, ethnic oppression, and community breakdown are indigenous concerns of anarchism, issues that it has often raised even before they acquired social immediacy - not problems that must be tacked onto its theoretical corpus and altered to accommodate an economistic, class oriented viewpoint. Hence anarchism, by making these problems central to its social analysis and practice, can acquire a relevance that by far overshadows most trends in present day socialism. Indeed, to a great extent anarchism has become the trough from which socialism eclectically nourishes itself on a libertarian diet that it initially rejected, notably feminism, ecology and urban communitarian issues. Insofar as socialists have been taking up these issues in recent years, they have done so without trying to cohere them into a unified body of social ideas or rooting them in a theory of hierarchy and domination. As a result, they tend to deal with these issues in a fragmentary manner, or they artificially wed them to economistic revisions of traditional Marxist theories, such as Andre Gorz's attempts to explain the ecology crisis as a result of a dubious 'declining rate of profit’ or to highly abstract, often fallacious interpretations of what constitutes a 'working class’, to cite the most conspicuous of such 'neo-Marxist’ quirks’.

Bookchin addresses the paradoxes of structuring a revolutionary movement in the form of the very society it seeks to create. He rejects as ‘preposterous’ the notion that the state could be synonymous with a civic, confederal politics based on direct democracy. ‘What could uniquely distinguish anarchism from socialism today is a commitment to a community movement and a civic political culture based on the coordination of human scaled municipalities along confederal lines. At a time when consociation is faced with the corrosive phenomenon of dissociation, anarchism can advance municipal confederations in opposition to the nation-state, and individual empowerment through direct democracy in opposition to representative republics structured around bureaucratic and statist institutions’. 

Bookchin thus concludes that anarchism would not only be the practice of citizenship within a new public sphere, but the self-administration of the revolutionary movement itself. ‘The very process of building an anarchist movement from below would be viewed as a process of consociation, self-activity, and self-management that would hopefully yield that revolutionary self or citizen that can act upon, change, and manage an authentic society’ (Bookchin in Ehrlich ed.1996:27/9).

Bookchin repudiates Marxism as a state-centred politics. This may apply to the dominant political practice of Marxist parties but as a comment on Marx's Marxism itself it ignores the core ideas comprising the emancipatory project. Greater attention needs to be placed upon Marxism as an emancipatory project oriented towards the restitution of alienated social power. If one brings in here Marx's critique of Hegel's state, his conception of active democracy and his demand that the abstract citizenship of the state be embodied in social relationships through the abolition of the state-civil society dualism, it is arguable that Marx is not that far at all from the perspective outlined by Bookchin.
Bookchin, however, is adamant in his repudiation of Marxism in the definition of a new politics.

At a time when the proletariat is historically quiescent, I believe, as a revolutionary class and the traditional factory faces technological extinction, anarchism in its present form has raised to the foreground those ecological, sexist, and community issues that socialism began to cope with only much later. Anarchism has also explored at all times and from the outset the problems of self-empowerment, the forms of decentralisation, and the concepts of self-administration, that are now at the foreground of a new leftist politics generally. And it has raised these issues from within its very substance as a theory and practice directed against hierarchy and domination, not belatedly acknowledged them as problems that had to be 'coped with’ or 'integrated’ into class analysis and interpretations of economic exploitation.
These features of anarchism, particularly in its present day form, are much too important to ignore. They raise the profound question of whether socialists - particularly Marxists will exercise a degree of self-reflexivity that will make revolution and human freedom the real goal of their project rather than incorporate them into a reified theoretics that seems to have become an end in itself, subject to academic peer pressures that demand ideological conformity and are largely confined to the haven of the academy.

Bookchin in Ehrlich ed.1996:29/30

Bookchin's challenge is one that Marxists can take up. And whilst there is a risk of a reified theoretics in attempting to draw upon Marx's writings to conceptualise a new politics, it is arguable that there exists in Marx's critique of the state and of the state-civil society dualism a conception of a new 'civic' politics that rests upon notions of direct democracy and functional or self-representation that come close to the new politics that Bookchin is developing.

41 THE LOST TRADITION OF MARXISM AND ANARCHISM 

The Third Stream of Socialist Thought
With the demise of state socialism - the collapse of Communism and the internal degeneration of Social Democracy - one is witnessing the potential re-emergence of an independent socialist politics. Of course, the attempts to reassert socialism 'from below’ have been many. The orthodoxies of Social Democracy and Communism, if dominant, have never been uncontested. Working class militancy, from the time of the revolutionary syndicalists through the shop stewards movement and councilism to the industrial struggles of the 1960's and 1970's, has continually challenged existing forms.

The re-emergence of socialism 'from below' challenges the way that socialism has been institutionalised in the form of ‘the party’, Social Democratic or Communist. This enables aspects of Marx other than those appropriated by orthodox interpretations to be explored. Again, the recovery of Marx made possible by the struggles of the 1960’s subjected Marx's insights to the appropriation by the bourgeois academy. Marxism was used to inject some critical insight into an economics and sociology that had been paralysed by positivism. Marxism itself could be appropriated as another school of social science.

Yet, even if it is criticised as academic appropriation, the recovery of Marxism entails the first serious consideration of marginalised authors and traditions within Marxism. And there is no doubt that Marxism obtained greater sophistication in the works of the likes of Godelier, Goldmann and Althusser.

Authors and traditions long suppressed by Second International orthodoxy, Nazism and Communism, as well as the Cold War, could now be recovered as the hold of dominant perspectives began to weaken. Individuals like Luxemburg, Korsch, Pannekoek and Gorter, Mattick and Landauer, whose own socialisms had been suppressed by dominant political interests, could now be presented as offering an alternative. Gramsci's attempts to define a new socialist politics could now be appreciated without having to suppress critical insights for reasons of party. The difficulties and ambiguities that Lukacs' found himself in within the international Communist movement could now be resolved on the side of socialist revolution.

Perhaps the most important development of all is the opportunity that this collapse of old certainties and orthodoxies affords to actually read Marx without political blinkers. Marx has been released from the straight jacket that Social Democracy and Communism have imposed upon him. And Marx's emancipatory and critical project has been long submerged under the claims that Social Democracy and Communism have made to monopolise socialism and the working class constituency. One need no longer produce a Marxism for the parties, a process which begun with the Second International.

Instead, there is the freedom now not only to go 'back to Marx' - an old slogan - but to the very philosophical roots of the Marxian project so as to understand exactly where Marx was coming from and attempting to go to. Peter Singer has argued that Marx was first and foremost a 'philosopher of freedom’ (1980). The claim is misleading in the sense that Marx consciously transcended the philosophical approach to the world. Nevertheless, freedom is the primary intellectual and political goal and it is as an emancipatory commitment to the free social world that Marx is to be understood. This emancipatory commitment, in other words, is to be considered as fundamental whilst categories of class and capital and the politics that this analysis entails is to be thought historical and hence as possessing an inbuilt revisionism.

This approach offers a means of recovering Marx's Marxism as a critical and emancipatory project without necessarily restating an old politics as a new orthodoxy. This approach makes it possible to appreciate the democratic, emancipatory and revolutionary significance of Marx's Marxism as a critique, not a theory, of political economy, political philosophy and the fetishised social world of which these are the theoretical expression. And it enables us to recover the creative power of human agency in a self-made world as against that Marxism which, in its tendency to privilege structure against agency, has been complicit in the fetishism of the alienated world (Clarke 1991:51/2).

One of the intentions of this thesis, then, is to argue that there is a suppressed tradition of socialist politics which nevertheless continues as a subterranean movement in the struggles and practices of the working class, and 'the people' generally, as they continue to attempt to gain control over their world. This tradition is not only Marxist, but also anarchist, radical, democratic.

Indeed, there is a case for placing Marxism within a broader, historical communist tradition (Makdisi et al ad. 1996:2/4). Basically, we are dealing with the attempts of 'ordinary' people to reappropriate their life and work from an institutional and systemic world that operates above their heads and beyond their control. That socialism in its organised, political form has been willing to strike Faustian bargains and become a part of this abstracted, lifeless world is sufficient to explain the contemporary disillusionment with socialism. More than this, it challenges socialists to demonstrate that socialism need not entail such a conclusion (Saver 1991:147).

Although Bookchin can be criticised for his lack of sensitivity to the genuine libertarianism that there is a suspicion that Marxists have discovered libertarianism only with the bankruptcy of their authoritarian political practice. Thus many are concerned to limit the third stream of left wing thought to anarchism. To the likes of Bookchin, Marxism is part of the authoritarian world that is collapsing, a bourgeois ideology that produces only state capitalism administered by a bureaucratic class (Bookchin 1980).

the threads of an alternative tradition in political thinking are quietly drawn together: the works of Gandhi, Buber, Paul Goodman, Herbert Read, Lewis Mumford and many others are knitted into one coherent fabric. Here is a suppressed tradition of philosophy and politics which, as Marxist and capitalist ideology disintegrate or ossify, more and more people will be wanting to consider.

Peter Abbs in The Sociologist in Goodway 1989:16

The conclusion that is drawn is that anarchism itself ought to be considered as the suppressed tradition that is now available for recovery. Alan Carter makes no distinctions as regards Marxism. Though there are different species of Marxism they all share the same deficiencies leading to authoritarianism. Marxism has dominated the project of the left in the twentieth century, Carter argues, and has achieved nothing but totalitarianism. An emancipatory politics is possible only if Marxism, as whole, is repudiated (Carter 1985).

But, when all these points are considered, when the claims that anarchism and anarchism alone merits recognition as the only left wing tradition that has not been compromised by authoritarian practice in the twentieth century, when Marxism itself is located within a general communist tradition, it may still be argued that there is a kind of Marxist 'underground’ which has kept the dialectical, critical and emancipatory themes of Marx himself alive even when Marx's Marxism has been 'buried’ (Smith 1996:18/9) by the Marxists.

There are two trends converging to open up a very creative and innovative thought and politics. In the first place, the collapse of state socialism has confirmed what had been apparent since the sixties, that Communism and Social Democracy are degenerate forms of socialism with precious little to offer the new radicalism of the post war world. And this leads to the second trend. The new social movements have recovered the social, extra-parliamentary roots of politics and have raised issues of popular concern from within civil society. This 'new' politics exists outside of the old structures and organisations and cannot be encompassed by the traditional party.

But there exists also a subterranean Marxist tradition which has always been, in a sense, extra-parliamentary and extra-political. It is a Marxism of the workers and of class struggle which was never quite able to release the hold that Social Democracy and Communism had upon the working class, but which continued to exist nevertheless. It is a current that kept alive the revolutionary socialism of Marx through its contacts with the revolutionary class, the working class in struggle. In one way or another, these currents lead back to Rosa Luxemburg. And it is significant that Luxemburg consciously incorporated the anarcho-syndicalist thought and action of the years leading to 1914 in her own brand of Marxism. To argue that this was mere opportunism, as Bookchin suggests, is to fail to appreciate how Luxemburg developed and consistently applied the principle of proletarian self-emancipation (Basso 1975; Geras 1986:212/5).

Beneath the suffocating orthodoxies of Social Democracy and Communism there has existed a subterranean Marxism that has kept up the criticism of state socialism whilst developing the critical and emancipatory themes drawn from Marx. Individuals like Korsch, Pannekoek, Gorter, Roland-Holst, Lukacs and Gramsci, movements like the councilism of the 1920's and, more academically, like the Frankfurt School, have between them offered an alternative Marxism to the determinist, reductionist and bureaucratic models of Social Democracy and Communism. Here lies a Marxism which is quite distinct from that which has gradually ossified and collapsed. If Marxism is to be defined as the 'philosophy of praxis', then it is here in this suppressed tradition that the real Marxist tradition is to be found. It is in this subterranean tradition that has retained the emancipatory commitment, which has developed the critique of the alienated, fetishised world, which has prioritised revolutionary agency in overcoming the determinism of the world, and which has retained the centrality of praxis that any future for socialism is to be found.

Marxism’s Subterranean Tradition
To refer to a subterranean Marxist tradition that has kept alive critical and emancipatory themes obviously implies that these themes are ones that are present in Marx himself. What is required is some recognition of Marx's consistent stress upon decentralism, praxis, creativity and individuality. For the truth is that Second International orthodoxy came to reduce Marxism to a one sided stress on economic determinism and evolutionism. It is not just that the commitment to revolutionary socialism creating the free social world came to be lost in this process; so too were the critical and emancipatory themes which Marx had painstakingly developed in bringing together idealist philosophy and working class activity. The most damaging loss of all was the stress upon the constitutive praxis of individuals as they create the socialist society as an act of human freedom (Ferraro 1992).

None of which makes Marx an anarchist. Guerin is quite right to note that Marx refers to 'self-activity' rather than to the anarchist notion of 'spontaneity'. Marx's conception is a 'more restrained notion' than that of the anarchists (Guerin in Goodway 1989:122). Guerin is certainly correct to argue that a revolutionary party can admit a certain degree of self-activity but would always treat spontaneity as a threat to its pretensions at playing a 'leading role' (Guerin in 1989:122).

One could agree, except that Marx argued not for a 'revolutionary party' with a 'leading role’ but for the working class to form itself into a political party, an altogether different notion. Marx, indeed, could be criticised for investing too much hope in spontaneity, not so much in terms of a dramatic, one off revolution but as a more gradual process (Callinicos ISJ 2:11 Winter 1980; Wright, Levine, Sober 1992:39). Walton and Gamble give a contrary view (Walton and Gamble 1976:219/20). Spontaneity in this sense could refer only to the process of proletarian self-development, politically, organisationally and intellectually. One could also argue that to identify the anarchist position with 'spontaneity' as such is misleading. Certainly, all working class action involves spontaneity. But, certainly in its syndicalist forms, anarchism has never been spontaneist. Thus

In Pelloutier's view, any attempted revolution which did not rely upon the direct action of the workers themselves would inevitably lead to the re-establishment of hierarchical and authoritarian structures that would in turn once again enslave the proletariat. The question was whether the proletariat either possessed or could develop the intellectual, moral and technical skills and abilities required not only to carry out successfully the revolution but also to provide the basis of a new and regenerated future society. How could the workers prepare themselves for the revolution that would inevitably come? From 1894 onwards this issue became Pelloutier's abiding preoccupation.




Similarly, the whole notion of a prefigurative model, in which the future society is present in the very process of its creation, implies preparation and organisation. What Guerin is rightly concerned about is the tendency to elitism and rigidity in all organisations. But, on Marxist premises, one can resist the fetishisation of organisational forms. This is why Marx himself was so open as regards form. Marx certainly did not present a theory of the party. This is not an omission on his part but an affirmation of the creative of revolutionary agency.

How far Marxism is compatible with the new social movements can be questioned. There is a tendency for the debate to fall quickly into entrenched positions. Those who embrace the new social movements dismiss the working class and class politics as part of the 'old' society and system. Marxists cannot accept this dismissal of the value producing class and hence come to reaffirm the proletarian revolutionary agency (Meszaros 1995; Wood). An antithesis is quickly established therefore. Marxism is bourgeois, tied to an outmoded class politics and an outmoded class (Bookchin 1980). For Marxists, the new social movements lack revolutionary content, are middle class and degenerate into a left apolitical reformist liberalism (Smith ISJ 62 Spring 1994:3/51). 

Of course, lost traditions can never be strictly recovered. It is the values that the struggle is over. The values of anarcho-syndicalism of self-management, direct action, mutual aid, cooperation, spontaneity, are represented in the contemporary world less by a declining working class, paralysed by the crisis and the restructuring of capital, than by the new social movements. Thus Nicholas Walter refers to 'peace and green movements, youth and student movements, women's and gay movements, communalist and cooperative movements' (Walter in Rocker 1989:xviii).

But is there not a danger here of 'movementism’ here? This entails a kind of reformism from below that reacts against conventional politics and against the encroachments of the system world upon the life world (Habermas 1994:111; Anderson 1992:279/80 319 324 325 327/31; Viano and Binetti in Makdisi at al ed.1996:244/5; Miliband 1994:59/60 61; Aronowitz 1981:xxv 60 62/4 66 67; Jameson 1992:55/6 373/9), but lacking the material power to really change either. As such, a reformism from above is replaced by a reformism from below, a piecemeal approach to the problems facing human beings in society subject to the contradictory dynamics of the capital system. It is certainly possible to accept that the new social movements have mobilised pressure from below and have done something to shape a new political culture (Habermas 1994:90/1 91/2).





But Bookchin's admission that the new social movements, like the other movements he has supported as alternatives to workers socialism, have been incorporated by capitalism (Bookchin 1994:1) ought to provoke critical comment. For it is here that Marxists level the accusations of Utopian, idealist and anarchist. Of course, the working class can itself be incorporated but the Marxist will be able to point to the limits of this incorporation. The working class is a class in and against the capital system, a class possessing the structural capacity to transform the system from within. And it is this that turns us back to Marxism and the subterranean as opposed to the dominant Social Democratic and Communist traditions. But this subterranean tradition is a libertarian one that has more in common with anarchism than it does with Social Democracy and Communism. Hence Korsch as a Marxist finally found a home amongst the anarchists, hence Paul Cardan's libertarian Marxism led him to become a socialist anarchist.

Anarchism
As a starting point one may note that anarchism is a protest against the centralisation, gigantism and impersonalism of the modern world and, as such, can be approached in terms of Marx's critique of the alienated social world as a world of abstraction and fetishism in which structures, institutions and relations have all escaped human control and comprehension and come instead to control human beings as alien and hostile powers. Whether anarchism possesses as practical a grip as Marxism does upon this alienated reality and the conditions and agents of its transformation may be doubted. Marxists have continued to accuse anarchism of idealism. Anarchists, in reply, could point to the way that Marxists come to become a part of the world they seek to change from within. More important here is to note commonalities in that both anarchism and Marxism criticise an abstracted world that has grown beyond human scale.









Anarchism was a protest, a dedicated resistance to the worldwide trend since the middle of the eighteenth century toward political and economic centralisation, with all it implies in terms of the replacement of personal values by collective values, of the subordination of the individual to the state. The real social revolution of the modern age has in fact been this process of centralisation, toward which every development of scientific and technological progress has contributed, which has welded nations out of regions and which today is creating a single world where the fundamental differences between regions and peoples and classes are being levelled in uniformity. 

These passages show the strengths and weaknesses of the anarchist position. The principles of individuality, decentralisation, autonomy, humanity are valuable but, with anarchists ‘stood outside’ of material processes, anarchism is reduced to an impotent moralism. Indeed, the assumption that material processes represent an inexorable line of development toward gigantism and centralisation is a pessimistic one.

Marxism may have become entangled in these alienating processes in the twentieth century but at least retains the possibility of being able to overcome them and facilitate the diffusion of power into society. For the political and economic centralisation that anarchists, rightly, oppose is identified with the capital system as an alienated system of production which is subject to positive abolition rather than with some general process of industrialisation, rationalisation or centralisation which would indeed confine us all in an iron cage and reduce all criticism to impotent moralism, little hope for the future society and lament for the past society.

Why, then, make a point of assigning such importance to anarchism? In the first place the values of anarchism - autonomy, individuality, solidarity, cooperation, spontaneity - are values that are in the process of being systematically eliminated in the modern alienated world. These are values that are worthy of respect and support in themselves. They are the values of socialism as a humanism. In the second place, whilst Marxism can formulate the critique of the capital system and envisage a possible future beyond this alienated system much more precisely than anarchism can, there is no doubt that Marxism has shown itself to be as easily seduced by power as any political movement.

The ease with which Marx's emancipatory commitment was lost at the time of the Second International should foster a greater degree of humility on the Marxist side. Designated as an idealism and a moralism, anarchism at least makes its values so explicit and states them so consistently that the slide into a visionless, power hungry pragmatism and opportunism is all but impossible. Anarchism forces Marxism to make good its emancipatory promises.

Anarchism may be described, in part, as an extreme liberalism - or a more honest, consistent liberalism at the level of principle? - which reacted against the way that industrialisation was accompanied by the increasing scale of units of production, the centralisation of power in the hands of the state, the destructiveness of modern warfare, and the way that society became massified the more it was atomised. There is a certain reactionary character to some of these criticisms. One may note a certain similarity with reactionary conservatives like Bonald and De Maistre (Nisbett 1967; 1978). Which is not to dismiss anarchism as reactionary or reactionary conservatives as lacking insight. Marx too deals with these processes of political and economic centralisation, destroying a 'natural' rooted order of the corporate communities of the Middle Ages and creating an artificial, atomistic world of abstract social relationships. He just didn’t think that this lost past could be revived. Marx takes the high road out of modernity which, to some, leaves him open to allying with the very forces to be opposed.

In a certain sense, to condemn anarchism as unrealistic misses the point. Anarchism sets out to be and takes pride in being unrealistic given that the real world is characterised by centralisation, impersonality, militarisation. And, given the tendency to disorder in this vast, 'complex' world raised above human scale (Lerner in Joll 1971:50/52;Laing 1967:24/5; Rifkin 1985:79 33 89/90 90 93 102 172 183 197 204 223 256 264/5 273 275 230; The Ecologist 1972:106/9), is the stress upon small scale units and practices that human beings can understand and control so unrealistic? Small may or may not be beautiful but it could be essential to survival (The Ecologist 1972:50/3). The anarchists have always been able to counter the demand to be realistic, to conform, to adapt: 'Adaptation to what? To society? To a world gone mad?' (Laing 1967:55). It is Goodman's question too: 'Socialisation to what?' (Goodman in Pearson 1975:12).

It is these developments, threatening social collapse, nuclear war, and ecological catastrophe that make the anarchist case against the capitalist economic system and the political state at least relevant, maybe even compelling (Goodway 1989:3).

Passive Radicalism
If Marxism is seeking rejuvenation through recovering the libertarianism in its roots, then anarchism never really lost touch with its roots. The final and irrevocable parting of the waves between Marxism and anarchism came under the Second International. It is a parting that Marx had always sought. It is, perhaps, fitting then that Eleanor Marx was amongst those socialists of the Second International who physically denied the platform to the anarchists. One could, in mitigation, refer to the concern to avoid the splits which had secured the demise of the First International and to the risk that the anarchist bomb throwers would come to affect the reputation of the International. But there is another aspect to this. The socialist parties were clearly organising themselves on the terrain of bourgeois democracy or, where this terrain did not exist, were looking to create parliamentary regimes in which they could compete openly with other parties.

Marx himself had argued for the participation of socialist parties in parliamentary and electoral politics. This would facilitate the political education and organisation of the working class. That this education and organisation was intended to encourage the workers to go further to create the socialist society, having appreciated the clear class cleavage that existed, could be conveniently forgotten.
Revolutionary syndicalism, therefore, may be interpreted as the form taken by workers in struggle as they appreciated how the socialist parties, whether Jaurés's reformist party or Guesde's revolutionary party, had come to be detached from the workers. And in the movement were individuals who had abandoned the Marxism of the parties for anarchism (e.g. Le Pelloutier Jennings 1990). Pannekoek, another Marxist, condemned the 'passive radicalism' of the parties.

If the proletariat is to rule, it must seize state power, the fortress in which the ruling class has entrenched itself. The proletarian battle is not just a battle against the bourgeoisie for state power; it also a battle against state power. The problem of the social revolution can be briefly formulated as the need to raise proletarian power to a level where it exceeds state power; the essence of this revolution is the proletariat's destruction and liquidation of the state's sources of power.

Pannekoek in Bricianer 1978:124

Pannekoek takes the socialist parties to task. 'Elections, strikes, parliamentary action, indoctrination all continue in the same old way, gradually gaining political weight but making no essential change whatsoever - until the day when, thanks to an extraordinary combination of circumstances, a powerful rising of the masses will occur and will perhaps overthrow the regime. This will follow exactly the old pattern of the bourgeois revolutions, but with the difference that the party organisation is fully ready to assume power and to hog the fruits of victory, by appropriating, as the new ruling class, the chestnuts which the masses have snatched out of the fire' (Pannekoek in Bricianer 1978:129). The parties of the Second International simply waited upon events to evolve socialism whilst preparing to win state power by electoral means.

Contrary to our thesis of the revolutionary activity of the proletariat, who build up their power through an ascendant period of mass action and increasingly demolish the bourgeois state power, this theory of passive radicalism looks for no decisive change through the active intervention of the proletariat.

Pannekoek in Bricianer 1978:129

The parties sought to conquer state power for the working class whereas the task facing socialists was to facilitate the working class movement and promote working class self-development so as to be able to abolish the state power. When accused of anarchism by the Social Democrats Pannekoek simply responded 'so much for anarchism!' Once anarchism no longer operated as a term of abuse but as a synonym for revolutionary activism in the cause of the working class, Social Democracy had no more criticism to offer. It simply revealed itself as part of the institutional order to be abolished, playing a central role in the defeat of working class militancy and in the murder of Marxists like Luxemburg and Liebknecht in the aftermath of the war.

It is interesting to explore how the struggles of the likes of Pannekoek and Luxemburg against Social Democracy influenced Gramsci in defining his concept of 'passive revolution'. A socialism engineered from above under the authority of a political elite is completely lacking in content and has kept power relations unchanged. But one should note that as the gulf between anarchism and Marxism widened into a chasm that, via the likes of Luxemburg and Pannekoek on the one side and the likes of Landauer and Rocker on the other, a mutual influence was still possible.

This is not to make Gramsci an anarchist or a syndicalist, for he was explicitly critical of both as 'pseudo-revolutionary'. But it is to suggest that there is in the best Marxist writing a suppressed debt to anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism. One could argue this in terms of a critical appropriation, as in the case of Luxemburg. This is not, as Bookchin asserts opportunism (Bookchin in Ehrlich 1996:23), for there can be no doubting the thought and practice of Luxemburg and Gramsci as socialist revolutionaries; they had much easier routes to power than revolutionary socialism.

We can note, therefore, Guerin's point that the ‘Russian Revolution, and, later on, the Spanish Revolution finished deepening a gulf between degenerate Marxism and anarchism, a gulf which was to become not only theoretical but also bloody’ (Guerin in Goodway 1909:116).

And anarchists are justified in locating the problem in Marx himself, who reacted with hostility towards Stirner, then Proudhon and then Bakunin. Perhaps Marx's violent language actually clouds the valid points he brought against the anarchists. Their idealism would ensure only that revolution would be sidelined, worse, would seek allies against liberal bourgeois society an politics in the reactionary survivals of the feudal past (Thomas 1985:238/9).

More relevant here, though, is to argue that this gulf between degenerate Marxism and anarchism was also expressed in terms of a gulf between a realist Marxism institutionalising itself in the form of the party in the attempt to capture power and an emancipatory Marxism that retained a commitment to socialist revolution through the proletarian agency. Not only anarchists but revolutionary Marxists were sidelined as the socialist project settled down into a competition between Social Democracy and Communism.

One can begin to answer Guerin's question once the fine distinctions are made between and within anarchism and Marxism.

Were genuine Marxism and anarchism so remote from each other? If we look a little closer, it is not hard to realise that they had mutually influenced each other.

Guerin in Goodway 1989:117

'Countless are the various currents of anarchism', Guerin writes. As in his book Anarchism, though, Guerin concentrates on that anarchism which comes closest to authentic Marxism. Guerin thus clearly asserts an authentic Marxism against the forms that Marxism assumed in the twentieth century.

My conclusion is that the kind of anarchism least distanced from authentic Marxism is collectivist anarchism ... It is not at all by chance that it is this variety of anarchism, and it alone, which I have attempted to delineate in my Anarchism: From Theory to Practice. So what we have to attempt here is the comparison of collectivist anarchism (or libertarian communism) and authentic Marxism.

Guerin in Goodway in 1989:118

This is an ambitious project and, understandably, within the constraints of an article, Guerin can only note points of similarity and difference whilst tracing the historical development of Marxism through the competing strains of authoritarianism and libertarianism. Guerin concentrates on the political practice and, therefore, raises the question of Marx's approach to the state, to the revolutionary vanguard, self-activity and to self-management.

These are important issues and, indeed, have divided Marxists and anarchists at the level of practical politics. Anarchists are suspicious of the idea of a transitional state, hostile to the idea that communists form a vanguard on account of their 'advanced’ consciousness, and reject central planning and nationalisation (Guerin, however, does recognise the necessity of the transitional state Guerin in Goodway 1989 ed). But this begs the question as to how far an authentic Marxism involves any of these notions. There is a need, in short, to go right to the 'philosophical' core of Marx's Marxism, the principled framework that orients Marxist practice (or ought to). This remains to be done from this perspective of drawing collectivist anarchism and authentic Marxism together.

Then the anarchists observe severely that the Marxists are quite willing to use to their advantage the means and artifices of bourgeois democracy. Not only do they readily make use of the vote which they regard as one of the best ways of taking power, but it happens that they delight in concluding sordid electoral pacts with bourgeois liberal or radical parties, when they think they will not succeed in winning parliamentary seats without such alliances., the anarchists recommend quite different ways to vanquish the capitalist adversary: direct action, trade union action, workers autonomy, the general strike.

Guerin in Goodway 1989:123

Kropotkin's Relevance to Marxism
In The Conquest of Bread (1892) and Fields, Factories and Workshops (1899) Kropotkin developed his argument that representative government and the wages system prevented the emergence of a truly democratic society. The abolition of both, and private property in general, would begin the process of democratising society on a communal basis, changing the relations between individuals. Kropotkin drew a different lesson from the Paris Commune than Marx. It wasn't just that the working class couldn't lay hold of the ready-made state machine and wield it for its own purposes, hence must be smashed. Smashing the state could make sense only if self-government is being extended to all areas of life, independently of the state, not merely on a geographical basis but also embracing the everyday activities of the individual. Here one returns to Godwin's idea of a stateless society, which assumed that all natural and social wealth would be held by the community as a whole and used for the communal good. The economic life of the community would be carried out through the free cooperation of the producers.

Kropotkin takes the socialists to task on this issue.

In their plans for the reconstruction of society the collectivists commit .. a two-fold error. While speaking of abolishing capitalist rule, they intend nevertheless to retain two institutions which are the very basis of this rule - Representative Government and the Wages System.
Built up by the middle classes to hold their own against royalty, sanctioning, and, at the same time strengthening, their sway over the workers, parliamentary rule is pre-eminently a middle class rule. The upholders of this system have never seriously maintained that a parliament or a municipal council represent a nation or a city... gradually, as the people become conscious of their real interests, and the variety of their interests is growing, the system can no longer work. Therefore democrats of all countries vainly imagine various palliatives. The Referendum .. proportional representation.. and other parliamentary Utopias. In a word, they strive to find what is not to be found, and after each new experiment they are bound to recognise that it was a failure; so that confidence in Representative Government vanishes more and more.
It is the same with the Wages system; because, once the abolition of private property is proclaimed, and the possession in common of all means of production is introduced - how can the wages system be maintained in any form? This is, nevertheless, what collectivists are doing when they recommend the use of labour cheques as a mode of remuneration for labour accomplished for the Collectivist employer - the State.

Collectivists begin by proclaiming a revolutionary principle - the abolition of private property - and then they deny it, no sooner than proclaimed, by upholding an organisation of production and consumption which originated in private property.




The Scientific Marxist Tradition - Luxemburg and Lenin
The identification of Marxism with state socialism overlooks the fact that there always existed a significant number of Marxists who argued that both Social Democracy and Communism were deviations from Marx's Marxism. Rosa Luxemburg perhaps merits pride of place here in having challenged both Social Democracy (Reform or Revolution) and Bolshevism (Organisational Questions) before their degenerate character became obvious to all. Given that Social Democracy had, for the reasons given by Luxemburg herself, chosen a completely different goal to socialism, it is Bolshevism that is the more interesting phenomenon in the search for the authentic Marxist tradition. For Lenin and the Bolsheviks did identify themselves as Marxists, as revolutionary Marxists who did assert that the revolutionary activity of the working class was the condition of socialism.

It is too simple, in other words, to write Lenin and Leninism off as unmarxist. But there are grounds for believing that something had gone awry in the interpretation and application of Marxism. Lenin was quite justified in reacting against the political passivism of the Second International parties, but the likes of Luxemburg and Pannekoek, in the German and Dutch left, also reacted against this passivism. Both Luxemburg and Pannekoek had serious differences with Lenin. This could partly, even largely, explained by differences in circumstances. The revolutionary socialism of the German and the Dutch left was buttressed by the existence of a large, materially organised and politically mature proletariat in the west. This was an advantage not available to Lenin. Lenin had to make the best of more, but not wholly, unfavourable circumstances.

Nevertheless, when concessions are made to Lenin and when his achievements, especially the recovery of political agency, are noted, there still remains a tension within the revolutionary left. And the argument is that Lenin and Bolshevism introduced into Marxism the elitist and authoritarian politics that Marx, connecting revolutionary politics with the self-development of the proletariat, had sought to extinguish. Luxemburg clearly saw this and seized upon Lenin's designation of Social Democracy as Jacobin.

Luxemburg had expressed criticism of Lenin and his political and organisational conceptions as early as 1904/5. She argued that Lenin was looking to preserve the revolutionary purity of the Bolsheviks by insulating their politics from the actual life and practice of the working class. The argument that the working class was capable of spontaneously generating only a trade union consciousness in no way grasps the ambiguous class position of the working class, having to operate on the terrain of bourgeois society and the wages system whilst also conceiving and pursuing socialism as an objective. It is nothing to do with consciousness as such. There are material obstacles in the way of the class and socialism and these are not to be removed by correct ideology and vanguardist organisation. Lenin looked to put the proletariat under the tutelage of 'an all-knowing and omnipresent central committee' but this served to suppress the creativity of the working class, the very factor which is essential to socialist advance.

Luxemburg, of course, was not alone. Trotsky too, in Our Political Tasks, had criticised Lenin's view on party organisation as leading to the dictatorship of one man. Plekhanov and Martov also argued the same thesis. For the fact is that Lenin had undertaken his own bit of revisionism. It is perhaps too much to assert that Lenin sought simply to legitimate his own revolutionary vanguardism and, from here, a minority party dictatorship - for Lenin's constant reference to 'the masses' are genuine enough even if it can be argued that they exist more as references than realities in Lenin's practice. Paul Mattick makes a point familiar amongst the left wing Marxist tradition that Lenin was interested in the power and the power alone (Mattick 1978:55). And for Pannekoek, Lenin never knew real Marxism.

There is a widespread opinion that the Bolshevist Party was Marxist, and that it was only for practical reasons that Lenin, the great scholar and leader of Marxism, gave to the revolution a direction other than what Western workers called communism - thereby showing his realistic Marxian insight. The critical opposition to the Russian and Communist Party politics tries indeed to oppose the despotic practice of the present Russian government - termed Stalinism - to the 'true' Marxist principles of Lenin and old Bolshevism. Wrongly so. Not only because in practice these politics were inaugurated already by Lenin. But also because the alleged Marxism of Lenin and the Bolshevist Party is nothing but a legend. Lenin never knew real Marxism. Whence should he have taken it? Capitalism he knew only as colonial capitalism; social revolution he knew only as the annihilation of big land ownership and czarist despotism. Russian Bolshevism cannot be reproached for having abandoned the way of Marxism, for it was never on that way. Every page of Lenin's philosophical work is there to prove it.

Pannekoek in Bricianer 1978:252

The presumption is that it makes sense to write of a ‘real’ Marxism. The task, then, is to discover what principles and themes and concepts constitute the authentic Marxist tradition. The basic point is that Lenin revised what could be considered as authentic Marxism, both as a reaction against 'orthodoxy' but also to provide a rationale for his vanguardist practice (Harrington 1993:69) and that, in Guerin's words, the able theoretician 'who remained faithful to the genuine original Marxism was Rosa Luxemburg’ (Guerin in Goodway 1989:110).

One may, therefore, seek a route back to authentic Marxism via Luxemburg's own works. The most concise statement of principles came in What Does the Spartacus League Want?

The establishment of the socialist order of society is the mightiest task which has ever fallen to a class and to a revolution in the history of the world. This task requires a complete transformation of the state and a complete overthrow of the economic and social foundations of society.
This transformation and this overthrow cannot be decreed by any bureau, committee or parliament. It can be begun and carried out only by the masses of people themselves.
In all previous revolutions a small minority of the people led the revolutionary struggle, gave it aim and direction, and used the mass only as an instrument to carry its interests, the interests of the minority, through to victory. The socialist revolution is the first which is in the interests of the great majority and can be brought to victory only by the great majority of the working people themselves.
The mass of the proletariat must do more than stake out clearly the aims and direction of the revolution. It must also personally, by its own activity, bring socialism step by step into life. 
The essence of socialist society consists in the fact that the great labouring mass ceases to be a dominated mass, but rather makes the entire political and economic life its own life and gives that life a conscious, free and autonomous direction.
From the uppermost summit of the state down to the tiniest parish, the proletarian mass must therefore replace the inherited organs of bourgeois class rule - the assemblies, parliaments, and city councils - with its own class organs - with workers and soldiers councils. It must occupy all the posts, supervise all functions, measure all official needs by the standard of its own class interests and the tasks of socialism. Only through constant, vital, reciprocal contact between the masses of the people and their organs, the workers and soldiers councils, can the activity of the people fill the state with a socialist spirit.
The socialisation of society can be achieved only through tenacious, tireless struggle by the working mass along its entire front, on all points where labour and capital, people and bourgeois class rule, can see the whites of one another's eyes. The emancipation of the working class must be the work of the working class itself.

Luxemburg in Howard ed. 1971:368/9

Here is the distilled essence of authentic Marxism. The concisely stated points presented here can all be discerned in Marx's own work where they obtain lengthier treatment. This statement of principles may thus serve in the attempt to grasp the essential Marx. To this end, a number of points can be made.

Socialism is a revolutionary social transformation that concentrates upon the very foundations of society.

The socialist revolution is therefore more profound than the political revolution. The bourgeois era of political emancipation and revolution is thus superseded as the proletarian movement sets about transforming society from the roots in the capital system.

Hence the democratic nature of the socialist revolution. The 'immense majority' must participate in their own emancipation. The Jacobin tradition of political revolution via active, organised minorities is thus transcended by the emergence of the proletarian movement.

By its self-activity and self-organisation, the proletariat emerges as a class-for-itself, possessing a subjective existence as it realises socialism through its own practice.
In throwing off the domination of the state and capital, the proletariat strike a blow against determinism and for human freedom, putting an end to political and social alienation and hence enabling human beings to take conscious, free and autonomous control of their social existence.

The organisational forms of the socialist society are constituted by human agents themselves. There is a radical decentralisation through a network of councils as organs of popular self-government. These organs assume the power formerly alienated to the state and capital as external steering media and thus facilitate the emergence of an active suffrage or citizenship as the demos fill the new socialist order with a socialist spirit.

The emancipatory project of practical reappropriation of alienated powers thus enables the self-socialisation of society through democratic organs of social control.
The class struggle between labour and capital thus takes conscious, political form.
The principle of proletarian self-emancipation is integral to the abolition of the capital system and alienation and the establishment of the free social order.

All these points can be extracted from Luxemburg's statement of principles and given textual support from Marx. Luxemburg, as a consummate Marxist politician, was presenting principles in the midst of an attempt by the working class movement to change the world. Her 'authentic marxism' operated according to a principled framework deriving from Marx which was implicit in her activities as a writer and a politician. This framework can be made explicit, demonstrating how Marx set out and developed these principles.

The danger, of course, lies in presenting Marx's Marxism as a normative political philosophy. Such an exercise possesses undoubted academic merit, as Marx is placed alongside the Aristotle's and the Kant's and the Hobbes’ of this world. To concentrate upon political practice can fail to secure the principled foundations of the revolutionary project and it is this that can lead to the situation in which Marxists are left struggling over the authentic Marxist tradition. Theory and practice need to be understood as being in symbiotic relation in Marx’s work.

What can be argued is that Luxemburg kept alive ideas which gained fuller expression in council communism and which retained links to the commune democracy that Marx had put forward as a possibility in 1871 only for the idea to be stifled as Second International Social Democracy, of Lassallean state socialist vintage, took over.

Council Communism - Pannekoek
After Luxemburg's death, Anton Pannekoek continued to develop a conception of left wing communism which was at variance with Lenin's revision of Marxism. The tensions between western left wing Marxism in the west and Lenin's more vanguardist conception had been apparent long before the war. Now the tension was of the greatest significance. The Russian Revolution not only gave Lenin massive political authority in defining marxism; it also created a political regime whose existence, identified with building socialism, claimed priority in the international socialist movement.

Nevertheless, Pannekoek, as Luxemburg would have done (Melograni 1989:27/35), continued to argue that Bolshevism represented a deviation from genuine Marxism and that it simply would not do for the Communists to denigrate left-wing communism as anarchist, syndicalist or as an infantile disorder. In debating the point one should consider the evidence that Melograni offers to support his thesis that Lenin's policies had nothing to do with international socialist revolution and everything with stabilising relations within countries so as to secure the position of the Bolshevik regime in Russia (Melograni 1989). 

Rosa Luxemburg's genuine Marxism came to expressed in the post-war world in council communism. This left wing Marxism had links to Bolshevism and the way that the Russian Revolution raised the prospect of soviet democracy. Certainly Lukacs and Gramsci attempted to combine revolutionary councilism and international communism.

But the tensions with Bolshevism were quite evident in these two. Gramsci's idealisation of soviet democracy in Russia had the merit of presenting the principles of workers democracy. But as it became apparent that reality contradicted the ideal, Gramsci's perspective became much more critical. Lenin's democratic centralism had degenerated into bureaucratic centralism.

Similarly Lukacs proceeded from a revolutionary councilism only to have to make his peace with 'the party’, finally making the case, in The Process of Democratisation, for councilism again as against the bureaucratic imposition of the party. Other councilists, like Korsch, Mattick and Pannekoek himself made their break with Bolshevism quite unambiguous. This wing of council communism identified the Russian Revolution as a bourgeois revolution, with 'dialectical materialism' taking the form of the old determinist materialism and being associated with Jacobin forms of political organisation - state and party and dictatorship (Korsch 'Lenin's Philosophy', Living Marxism, IV:5, November 1988:138/44).

The council communists succeeded in divorcing the authentic Marxism that Luxemburg had struggled for from the traditions of Social Democracy and Communism. Of course, they had the advantage of seeing, as Luxemburg did not, Social Democracy and Communism in their developed form. In other words, in criticising Social Democracy and Leninism as deviating from authentic Marxism, Rosa Luxemburg nevertheless retained links with both until, finally, the war and the revolutionary aftermath forced her to revise her political connections. This process was cut short by her murder.

The council communists took this one stage further. Their basic principle was that the working class itself is the revolutionary agency and, as such, repudiated the vanguardist position which asserted the elitist view that revolutions were the product of active minorities (Aronowitz 1981:24). This could not be the socialist position, for the reasons that Luxemburg gave in condemning Lenin's Jacobinism. What the council communists did was to develop this principle of proletarian self-emancipation into a full blown conception of a socialism constituted by the council system.

In the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution, the demands for direct workers democracy constituted by councils came to be dismissed as 'ultra-leftist', an 'infantile disorder' endangering the new socialist regime in Russia. Mattick is in no doubt that Lenin's pamphlet 'Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder’ was designed to undermine the position of autonomous workers movements in the countries of the west (Mattick, 1978:86). This was a powerful piece of political blackmail which Lenin used to marginalise and undermine individuals and movements autonomous of Bolshevism, both inside and outside of Russia. The soviet democracy which had encouraged militants like Gramsci was gradually undermined as the Soviets lost their autonomy as popular organs and were subordinated to the political control of the party-state. Abroad, autonomous movements, like the Shop Stewards Movement, were brought under the authority of the Comintern and national Communist Parties themselves controlled by Moscow. Pannekoek took up these questions in World Revolution and Communist Tactics.
The council communists were not prepared to acquiesce as Bolshevism appropriated Marxism as an ideology of its political control. These were part of that minority who continued to point out the ways in which Leninism deviated from genuine Marxism. For the council communists the whole notion of a political party representing the working class is untenable. Even if some degree of representation is required at higher levels of political and economic coordination, the whole basis of the social order is constituted by popular organs rooted in the everyday affairs of individuals.

In this sense, it is not a ‘state’ as such that presides over the whole. Nothing 'presides' over the whole in this top down sense. Rather, the conception is of an organic society powered from below by autonomous, direct and self-governing organs. Delegates may be sent from lower to higher levels as one moves from the particular to the general, but these delegates lose the independence that representatives once had to misrepresent their constituency.

This view entails a conception of democracy as something active and rooted in the practical, everyday affairs and relations of individuals. It is a conception sharply distinguished from the bourgeois view which rests upon the separation of politics from economics, the state from society. It is a view of democracy as based on skill, capacity, function and purpose, inhabited not by passive individual electors but by citizen-producers.

This is a view that gained its earliest expression after the war from that group of left wing communists who had always been antagonistic towards Social Democratic reformism and Leninist vanguardism. The Dutch and the German Left - including the likes of Korsch, Gorter, Pannekoek and Roland-Holst - were of considerable importance in keeping a revolutionary Marxist alternative to organised political Marxism alive. Up to the war this Left could criticise Social Democracy from within, as Social Democracy's own left wing.

The parting of the ways made clear that Social Democracy was no longer Marxist but also that 'the Left' had lost its bearings. The Russian Revolution gave Bolshevism an authority and an identity that the Left lacked. As a result, the Left was marginalised in the competition between Social Democracy and Communism. Moreover, as Bolshevism moved to suppress genuine soviet democracy and silence the workers opposition, accusations of ultra-leftism, spontaneism, anarchism, the Luxemburg ‘pox’ could be made to contain and suffocate attempts at autonomous proletarian developments.

There was, in other words, a parallel between the way that Bolshevism established its authority over the workers movement in Russia and over autonomous workers movements in the west. Lenin's authority as the leader of the Russian Revolution was argument enough against those, following Luxemburg, who sought to retain the principle of proletarian self-emancipation. The possibility of workers democracy was suppressed under the international Communist movement designed to secure the position of the Russian regime (Aronowitz 1981:267; Jennings 1990:194; Melograni 1989).

Anarchism as Socialism
The journey through the libertarian, decentralist, councilist expressions of Marxism has been made to make the point, against those who equate Marxism with Social Democracy and Communism, that there is another Marxism. This Marxism has better claims to be the authentic Marxism in that it may be considered as expressing principles to be found in Marx's own work in a way that Social Democracy and Communism cannot. The point is made to suggest that, given assertions of a ‘third’ stream or alternative of radical thought this left wing Marxism comes fairly close to anarchism on its communalist side.

This exploration began with Marx's principles of decentralisation and autonomy moved to Kropotkin's rejection of representative government and the wages system and proceeded to left wing, councilist Marxism. The idea that such a thing as an authentic Marxism exists and that Rosa Luxemburg is a key figure in developing this Marxism has been central. It has been to examine from the perspective of left wing Marxism the grounds for closer approximation to anarchism to parallel Guerin's attempts from an anarchist position. A libertarian communism that manages to encompass anarchism and Marxism may be possible, especially if both traditions actually respect the principle of proletarian self-emancipation and, indeed, are prepared to broaden the principle to embody popular control of all aspects of life. There is no intrinsic reason why they should not be able to do so.





It is Herbert Marcuse who perhaps reminds us of the common ground shared by Marxism and anarchism. In a debate with Aron in 1972 Marcuse stated a case for communism which combined anarchist and Marxist arguments without explicitly arguing for either. Aron defended liberalism against Russian Communism as the best hope for protecting the safety and freedom of the individual. Marcuse responded not by defending this Communism, thus finding himself trapped in the narratives of the Cold War. Instead Marcuse argued for a genuine communism, a communism which, as against the Russian form, was both democratic and libertarian. This communism would be 'a society in which the individuals collectively determine the organisation and the direction of the economic and political life, and in which each individual has an equal opportunity to develop his or her individual needs' (Marcuse in Martineau 1986 31/2).

Is this anarchism or Marxism? Or, indeed, does this express the form that liberalism would take if it is serious about the values of individual autonomy? If so, would liberals be prepared to abolish the institutional characteristics of the liberal order in order to realise the central value of liberalism? That liberalism could lead to socialist conclusions once one begins to examine the social conditions required to realise the central value of individual autonomy is an argument made well by Lindley (Lindley 1986). Lindley, indeed, does what, arguably, Marx was attempting to do, shift the terms of the debate away from false antitheses (Stalinism and liberalism for Lindley, collectivism and individualism for Marx) and relocate it within the heart of liberal principles themselves (Lindley 1986:185). Marx thus turns the universalist content of liberal principles against their egoistic-atomistic character under bourgeois conditions.

Ultimately, we come to the social conditions for autonomy: 'from Marxism comes the basic and - it cannot be emphasised too strongly - entirely revolutionary idea that progress towards the liberal ideals of self-fulfilment will remain the prerogative of a privileged minority class until the accumulation of capital in private hands is systematically reversed' (McLennan 1989:274). And it is arguable that one of the things that Marx himself did was to divide liberalism between its political and economic aspects, turning the values of universality, equality, freedom and the communality of citizenship entailed in political liberalism against the inequality and unfreedom implied by economic liberalism.

It is interesting that Aron remained silent about the liberal values implied by Marcuse's libertarianism and instead criticised Marcuse's argument as abstract. Pressed for greater concreteness, Marcuse argued for general assemblies in the farms, factories and villages, at a local and regional level, sending delegates who ‘would be revocable - recallable at any moment’. If this is the anarchist principle, it is also the principle that Marx committed himself to in his writings on the Paris Commune. Aron identified it as an old argument of Lenin's which had proven to be a failure (Martineau 1986:31/2). Which presumes that Lenin’s commitment to these principles in The State and Revolution were genuine rather than tactical.

Aron's dismissal draws attention to the fact that the boundaries never were so clear cut on the revolutionary left. It can be doubted whether Lenin ever had a practical grasp of the difficulties in implementing the direct democracy he periodically praised. It can be doubted whether any such democracy could be implemented anyway, in the sense that implementation implies a central institution acting from above. Lenin himself never trusted the 'spontaneity’ of the masses.

Nevertheless, for all the deficiencies of Lenin's position - and his commitment to direct democracy is quite abstract - there still remains an affirmation of the capacities of 'ordinary' individuals to govern their own affairs. It may be a naive commitment and the absence of a sense of the process involved may have forced Lenin into bureaucratism to close the gaps. That is, if the gaps were the product of a genuine tension. Wolfe gives a fairly common view that the germ of a party dictatorship exercised over the proletariat was present all along in Lenin (Wolfe 1966:179/80. Nevertheless, there are still grounds for placing Lenin on the side of workers democracy (Geras 1986:138 186/7).

Now, in the late twentieth century the old certainties, buttressed by fixed, institutionalised positions, no longer hold. The collapse of Communism, the degeneration of Social Democracy and the new impetus to a social and civic politics defined in opposition to organised, institutionalised politics has significantly altered perspectives.

There are those who identify these developments as, unambiguously, signalling the death of Marxism (the final death, that is, since the obituaries have been written several times before). This is Bookchin's own position. But, more important than this settling of accounts, is the sense that the late twentieth century has recovered the social roots of politics and, in so doing, has proceeded to undermine the conventional politics conducted through the state and its institutions. The political party now appears as a crude and unsatisfactory instrument in expressing the democratic will. As individuals come forward as political actors and citizens, there are too many interests and issues to be adequately represented through conventional political forms. There is nothing necessarily socialist or anarchist about this. Indeed, one could argue that the restructuring of capital has emptied conventional politics of any power it once possessed, bringing about a crisis in the authority of the old institutions. At the same time the colonisation of the life world by the system world has provoked individuals to react to defend the social sphere against encroachment (Eder 1993; Habermas 1990).

In other words, the argument is not that, finally, after a century of propaganda, individuals have suddenly come to appreciate the anarchist or the libertarian Marxist case and have consequently abandoned institutionalised 'mass’ politics. There are material processes at work which require greater investigation. It is to argue, however, that, somewhere in these developments, that subterranean, marginalised, third stream of radical thought and politics continues to exist and will obtain greater relevance insofar as it can come to gain greater recognition.

For, despite the wishful thinking of those with a political position or a regime to defend, the 'death' of Marxism or of anarchism for that matter can never be administered. It is Sartre's old argument that Marxism will only dissolve when it has exhausted its historical purpose through the attainment of the truly free social order. Until the free society exists this underground tradition will exist, consciously or otherwise, in the emancipatory struggles and practices of any subaltern group or class and will continue to exist until the division of human beings through relations of domination and subordination end.

One can, then, from a Marxist position affirm the conclusion that Guerin drew from an anarchist position. Guerin refers to the 'renewal of libertarian socialism taking place today'. This renewal has created a fluid situation. Old forms and conceptions are in the process of being rendered obsolete. Interestingly, Guerin claims that 'there are hardly any watertight barriers any longer between the libertarian movements and those who claim to be Marxist-Leninists'.

This is a claim that anarchists and Marxist-Leninists might well contest. More than a few still wear the blinkers. Guerin may have been thinking more of the French context. He notes a 'non-sectarian permeability between these different movements' as individuals pass easily from 'authoritarian' Marxist groups to anarchist groups and vice versa. He recognises that there are still authoritarian Marxists who are virulently anti-anarchist just as there remain anarchists who are anti-marxist. Guerin's point would be that these groups are trapped in an outmoded narrative. He himself mentions his membership of the Libertarian Communist Organisation (OCL). The OCL is ‘positioned on the borders of anarchism and Marxism'.

It has in common with classical anarchism affiliation with the anti-authoritarian current which dates back to the First International. But it also has in common with the Marxists the fact that they both take their stand resolutely on the field of proletarian class struggle and of the fight to overthrow bourgeois capitalist power. On the one hand, the libertarian communists endeavour to revive all that has been constructive in the anarchist contribution to the past. On the other, they do not reject those things in the heritage of Marx and Engels which seem to them still valid and fruitful and, in particular, relevant to the need of the present day.

Guerin in Goodway 1989:124/5

Thus Guerin suggests that Marx's notion of alienation be integrated with the anarchists central value of individual liberty. One could put this another way and argue that Marx's concern in the critique of alienation was always the emancipatory concern with the liberty of real individuals in their real relations. How to subordinate alienative relations to conscious common control of individuals indicates the libertarian aspect to Marx's emancipatory project. Guerin also refers to Marx's principle of proletarian self-emancipation. If substitutes have intervened and made themselves the revolutionary agency, then this must be read as ensuring that the whole Marxist project, shorn of its emancipatory subject, misfires.




I should like to add, as my own conclusion, that a libertarian communism, the fruit of such a synthesis, would without a doubt express the deepest wishes (even if sometimes not yet wholly conscious) of progressive workers, of what is nowadays called 'the labour left’, much better than degenerate authoritarian Marxism or the dated and fossilized old-style anarchism. In spite of some negative and discouraging appearances, the remote future seems to me, beyond the double bankruptcy of private and state capitalism, to belong to libertarian and self-management communism.

Guerin in Goodway ad 1989:125

This, arguably, is the renaissance of an old current of thought. It is certainly apparent in Pannekoek. The proletarian battle is not just against the state power. There are material processes at work which require greater attention. Somewhere in these developments, however, a subterranean, marginalised, third stream of radical thought and politics continues to exist and will obtain greater relevance insofar as it can come to gain greater recognition.

This is not just a conflict with the bourgeoisie for winning state power; it also a battle against state power. ‘The problem of the social revolution can be briefly formulated as the need to raise proletarian power to a level where it exceeds state power; the essence of this revolution is the proletariat's destruction and liquidation of the state's sources of power’.

Pannekoek takes the socialist parties to task. 'Elections, strikes, parliamentary action, indoctrination all continue in the same old way, gradually gaining political weight but making no essential change whatsoever - until the day when, thanks to an extraordinary combination of circumstances, a powerful rising of the masses will occur and will perhaps overthrow the regime. This will follow exactly the old pattern of the bourgeois revolutions, but with the difference that the party organisation is fully ready to assume power and to hog the fruits of victory, by appropriating, as the new ruling class, the chestnuts which the masses have snatched out of the fire’ (Pannekoek in Bricianer 1978:129). The parties of the Second International simply waited upon events to evolve socialism whilst preparing to win state power by electoral means.

Contrary to our thesis of the revolutionary activity of the proletariat, who build up their power through an ascendant period of mass action and increasingly demolish the bourgeois state power, this theory of passive radicalism looks for no decisive change through the active intervention of the proletariat.

Pannekoek in Bricianer 1978:12


42 JACOBINISM - THE TWO FRENCH REVOLUTIONS

The Origins of Marx's Alleged Totalitarianism

Guerin's argument that at the heart of the French Revolution there were two kinds of revolutions offers a way of locating Marx's own revolutionary politics. Marx himself, it could be argued, was concerned to understand the contradictory aspects of the French Revolution. The basic contradiction, that between universalist ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity and the particularism of social reality he dealt with in terms of a contradiction between political liberalism and bourgeois society, heaven and earth. Marx himself was quite aware of the popular, artisanal dimension of the French Revolution. He nevertheless identifies the Revolution as bourgeois and as ushering in modern bourgeois politics and society. For Marx, then, it is not a case of backing the popular against the bourgeois revolution but to grasp the historical and material processes involved so as to be able to locate revolutionary politics in the historical process (Basso 1975:100/1).

For Guerin the two French Revolution's imply two opposed conceptions of power, the one formed by the left wing of the bourgeoisie, the other by a core proletariat of small artisans and wage workers. The former group was the force behind the development of the Revolution in an authoritarian, dictatorial direction. The latter group formed the popular, democratic, federalist aspect of the Revolution. This second group, Guerin argues, constituted itself through what would now be called workers councils, that is, the forty eight districts of Paris within the framework of the Paris Commune and the people’s societies in the provincial cities. This second conception of power is libertarian and, therefore, connects the French Revolution in its popular aspect with the Commune of 1871 and the soviet revolution of 1917.

Guerin notes the ambiguity of the term 'Jacobin'. Jacobin did come to be identified with political revolution, the state and its structures and centralisation and, as such, represents the left wing of the bourgeoisie as it institutionalises its social power against the old nobility. But the term comes from the name of a popular Paris club, the society of Jacobins. Indeed that tension between bourgeois revolutionaries and the popular revolutionaries, which came to be expressed in terms of an institutionalised division between the privileged and the propertied on the one hand and the unprivileged and the unpropertied on the other, ran right through the society of Jacobins. Within the society adherents of both wings of the Revolution could be found, increasingly coming into conflict as division became more conscious.

Eventually, as the bourgeois character of the French Revolution was established and institutionalised, as the bourgeoisie became the dominant political and social class, the term 'Jacobin' came to be equated with a revolutionary bourgeoisie taking control of the state, centralising political power and governing the nation from the top down by authoritarian means. It is this definition which has become familiar in anarchist and socialist literature. The revolutionary politics of the nineteenth century would all define themselves in relation to the French Revolution. The Revolution led to various strains of revolutionary politics.

The question is where Marx stood in this tradition. For the accusation of 'Jacobinism' has frequently cropped up in Marxist politics. That Lenin could style himself a Jacobin and that Luxemburg could use such a term as a criticism of Lenin implies a certain ambiguity with regards to the Jacobin tradition within Marxism. There are those who would, without qualification, identify Marx as belonging to the Jacobin tradition. Thus, anarchists like Bookchin and Carter equate 'Marxism' as such with the state socialism of eastern Europe and are dismissive of attempts to make finer distinctions within Marxism.

Rather than engage in unqualified, blanket condemnation it is more worthwhile to actually examine Marx's relation to the French Revolution and the various strains of revolutionary politics deriving from the Revolution. This will show Marx as having consciously attempted to lead revolutionary socialist politics out of the French revolutionary, ‘Jacobin’, tradition - both bourgeois and popular wings - into a modern democratic politics based upon the ascendant proletarian movement.

Thus the accusations that Marx's Marxism is totalitarian, Jacobin and statist are shown to be inaccurate at all fundamental points, though we have still to acknowledge that there are positions in Marx which do derive from the Jacobin tradition of political revolution.

Concerning the clash between anarchists and Marx, Guerin makes this argument:

Proudhon and Bakunin .. denounced the 'Jacobin spirit', rightly considered by them as a political legacy of the bourgeois revolutionaries. On the other hand, Marx and Engels had some trouble in freeing themselves from the Jacobin myth.. The libertarians, thanks to the keenness of their anti-authoritarian vision, were not duped by Jacobinism. They understood quite clearly that the French Revolution was not only a civil war between absolute monarchy and the bourgeois revolutionaries, but also, a little later, a civil war between 'Jacobinism' and what we will call ... communalism. This was a civil war whose outcome in March 1794 was the defeat of the Paris Commune .. the overthrow of the peoples power - just as the October Revolution in Russia ended in the liquidation of the factory councils.

Guerin in Goodway 1989:120/1

Guerin argues that Marx swung perpetually between this Jacobinism and communalism. Whilst this is true as regards Marx's attitude to centralisation - Marx did equate centralisation with modernisation and the triumph of the bourgeoisie, he did call for centralisation in Germany, and he did argue for the centralisation of the means of production in the hands of the state (in the context of the bourgeois revolution of 1848) but he also repudiated the centralising prescriptions of the Manifesto, did call for decentralised, commune democracy - it can certainly be questioned as to whether Marx was as ambiguous in his relation to Jacobinism as Guerin suggests.

One can contest this allegation of Jacobinism at four levels. Firstly, Marx can be read as consciously attempting to develop socialist politics beyond the various traditions deriving from the French Revolution. Thus, the old, elitist and conspiratorial politics from Babeuf to Blanqui and Buonarroti were rejected as Marx located revolutionary politics in the developing, organised working class. Secondly, Marx's project of practical reappropriation looked to society to recover the powers alienated to the state and capital and to organise these as social powers. Thirdly, his conception of revolutionary-critical praxis overcame the materialist determinism associated with the 'Jacobin' forms of party and state and instead affirmed the power of self-constituting human agency to revolutionise their own society and selves. Fourthly, Marx's attempt to overcome the separation between state and society is to be interpreted in an anti-Jacobin way, that is, as the reconquest of civil society as against the state encompassing civil society.

The Two Wings of Revolutionary Politics
The dominant tradition in revolutionary politics throughout the nineteenth century and, indeed, extending into the twentieth century in the political parties associated with Social Democracy and Communism has been Jacobinism. Deriving from the French Revolution, Jacobinism has been associated with such centralising political forms and structures as the state and the party and representative institutions. Jacobinism centralises political power and separates the political sphere from the governed.

It must, therefore, institute a representative system as against notions of direct democracy. Jacobinism thus upholds politics as the activity of a minority organised at the centre and ruling from the top down. The activists here are politicians, intellectuals, professionals and leaders of all kinds and their means are explicitly political. This Jacobinism sustains a dualism between leaders and led, government and governed, the state and civil society.

It is this dualism which Marx attacked. We need to understand the nature of Marx's critique and the purposes that would be served by the abolition of this dualism. The fact that the social democratic and communist parties of the twentieth century have continued to operate within the Jacobin tradition indicates not so much the truth of the anarchists accusation that Marxism never emancipated itself from Jacobinism but that the socialist project has adapted itself to the contours of bourgeois society, thus reproducing the split between politics and economics. This is a matter of practical politics rather than of Marxist Jacobinism. For these developments have proceeded in a direction quite contrary to Marx's intentions.

We therefore come to another strand of revolutionary thought. This has been anti-statist. There are two possible directions here. 
The first wing in this conflict between statism and anti-statism is one that fetishizes the state power. It is anarchist in the sense that anti-statism is itself an inverted statism. In the second place one can split the Jacobin tradition into two wings, reformist and revolutionary. And one can show how Marx transcended the limitations of both traditions.

The second wing of the revolutionary tradition is that anti-Jacobin wing established in the French Revolution as the bourgeoisie institutionalised its power. It is this wing which found expression again in the early twentieth century. Indeed the division between that governmental socialism of the political parties and the revolutionary syndicalism of the workers articulated that old tension deriving from the French Revolution. The syndicalists were opposing that socialism which had proved unable to extricate itself from bourgeois society and hence from Jacobinism at the political level. Here, in this second wing, the principle of proletarian self-emancipation is made the basis for organisation. The forms here are anti-Jacobin, with direct action, councils and communes replacing parties and states.


The split is one between the associational activity of the workers and the political action of leaders. The second wing continued its anti-Jacobinism through to a constant criticism of party political socialism, whether reformist or revolutionary. The revolutionary syndicalists thus rejected both Jaures and Guesde (Jennings 1990:225/7).

The truth is that there is a subterranean tendency, both anarchist and Marxist, which has continued to oppose Jacobinism and distinctly political conceptions of socialism and which has opposed the political expropriation of the socialist movement by the direct descendants of the Jacobin tradition. If there is a controversy to be had as to where Marx fits in precisely -  and there is, given the fact that Marx, contrary to the anarchists, did encourage the participation of the workers movements in democratic political institutions - then it may be argued that the fundamentally anti-Jacobin logic of Marx's argument is to be brought out more clearly than it has. For the critique of the state as an alienated social power, its practical abolition in favour of the self-governing society, the incorporation of the abstract citizenship of the state into active, individual relationships in society, and the institution of that association of free and equal producers define Marx's as an anti-state, anti-Jacobin project of human emancipation. And it is as such that Marx is to be presented first and foremost, before one gets to his economic ideas, his scientific analysis, his political strategy. For the latter is subordinate to the former.

Marx and Self-Emancipation
One could approach the argument from a more materialist perspective and argue that Jacobinism as such will never be ended until bourgeois society and its dualisms and separations are ended. For if Marx is accused of looking to reinforce the state power under the dictatorship of the proletariat it needs to be argued that dictatorship is itself a product of bourgeois society and Jacobinism. 

Rocker makes the point against Marx:





Rocker here neatly expresses the contradiction at the heart of the revolutionary tradition in relation to socialism. It is, however, this idea that Marx introduced Jacobinism into the socialist movement and, therefore, that the political expropriation of the workers socialism by Social (parliamentary) Democracy and Communism may be directly traced to Marx, that is to be disputed.

The question is relevant also to the thorny issue of vanguardism. Did Marx justify a revolutionary vanguardism? Those who argue that he did refer to the argument in the Manifesto where Marx refers to communists as advanced workers. But Marx is here arguing against the idea that communists form a vanguard:

In what relation do the Communists stand to the proletarians as a whole? The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working-class parties. They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole. They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement.
The Communists are distinguished from the other working class parties by this only:
1.	In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality.
2.	In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.
The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.
The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of all the other proletarian parties: formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat.
The theoretical conclusions of the Communists are in no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would be universal reformer.
They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes.

Marx CM in REV 1973:79/80

This is the passage to which Edgley has consistently referred to show the inherently proletarian character of Marx's Marxism. Edgley thus comments that Marx's science 'aligns itself with the working class by theoretically supporting the working class movement, as its theoretical mouthpiece actually calling for .. revolutionary change' (Edgley in McLellan ed. 1983:290/1). That Marx is arguing for a close, organic relationship between the working class movement and communism/marxism is plain enough. But Edgley, arguably, goes too far in arguing for this relationship 'according to which social scientific theory may express or be the mouthpiece of a social movement .. not simply as speaking of it but as speaking for it' (Edgley in Mepham and Ruben ed. vol III 1979:27).

The relationship is not as direct and immediate as this. Not all workers are communists and Marxists, not all workers are class conscious. The proletariat has to convert itself from being a class-in-itself to being a class-for-itself. What Marx was attempting to guard against was the insertion of politicians and intellectuals into this process of self-development, a communism external to and independent of the proletarian movement. Communism was still, however, an advanced position of class consciousness requiring that the proletariat develop its political, economic, moral and intellectual capacities.

Geras resolves this tricky question of self-emancipation and representation.

the emphasis on self-education does not of course mean, for Marx, that the working class movement has no need of intellectuals, and of intellectuals in particular who come from other classes than the working class..
So I have no intention here of trying to spirit away the massive theoretical labour by which Marx and subsequent Marxists produced a body of knowledge which might orient and guide the struggle of the working class. It would be simple naivety to imagine that workers could acquire that knowledge out of the experience of political struggle alone. However, it is this same body of knowledge that Marx refers to when he talks ... of the 'proletarian outlook’; it is this same body of knowledge that is said (in the afterword to the second German edition of Capital) to 'represent' the proletariat; and it is this same body of knowledge that is said (in The Poverty of Philosophy) to be a 'product' of the historical movement of the proletariat. By which I take Marx to mean the following: the political struggles of the proletariat which aim at the destruction of capitalist society are the condition of possibility of the science of Marxism which comprehends and explains capitalist society as one social formation amongst others, having a historical origin and a historical term. Without those political struggles, without the, class interests which they aim to realize, without the commitment of revolutionary intellectuals to those interests and their participation in those struggles, without the contradictions of capitalism. Marxism would not have been produced. In that sense Marxism is a class science...




That claim is idealist, as I have shown earlier in the thesis. 
The communists, Marx is arguing, are in no way separate from the workers but are workers themselves. They are 'advanced' to the extent that they have a deeper understanding of the class struggle but this in no way entails shaping the proletarian movement by sectarian principles. When one understands how Marx related social being and consciousness, it is clear that communism is the class consciousness of the working class.

Vanguardism is a definite political form resting upon an elitist and authoritarian relationship between leaders and led. It is a view that revolution is the activity of organised minorities and that the mass, too corrupt to act, remains passive. This fits into the Jacobin tradition in the sense that just as Jacobinism looks to the state power to organise society from above so vanguardism looks to a tight organisation to revolutionise people from the outside. Both Jacobinism and vanguardism define revolution as a political rather than as a social process.

And, it may be pointed out here, in assigning the revolutionary role to the proletariat and in making socialism dependent upon its class praxis and creative agency, Marx clearly took his leave of the Jacobin and the vanguardist tradition. Part of this break was his replacement of determinist Enlightenment materialism, asserting the passivity of human beings in relation to circumstances, with an active materialism which made real individuals the producers of circumstances. Human beings are not passive. The educator must also be educated. The old justification for elitist and authoritarian politics - that human beings are too 'corrupted' to act independently - is repudiated.

What is worth considering in arguing that Jacobinism is something generated by the dualisms and separations of bourgeois social relationships rather than by political traditions as such - i.e. the power of the traditions as resting upon a dualistic reality - is that the 'totalitarianism' that critics accuse Marx and Marxism of is actually inherent as a tendency in atomistic and individualistic society.


Jacobinism and Atomistic Bourgeois Society

For the individualism that the abstract, instrumental, exchange relationships of bourgeois society imposes fragments the people in society into separate, monadic individual entities. And the more that society is atomised, the more it is massified by the collectivizing powers of the state and capital. The more remote is the public power controlling society, the more that this 'mass’ is constituted by disempowered individuals, the greater the reliance upon an authoritarian ruler. 

We can take up here an idea of Claude Lefort's. Lefort argued that social systems generate an image of their own social unity which functions to conceal the divisions and conflicts inherent in that society. There are clear affinities between this idea of 'l'imaginaire social' and what Marx termed ideology, the concealment of the asymmetrical power relations of society. Lefort explores the idea in terms of the way that democracy, as a massification produced by atomisation, generates totalitarianism.





Lefort refers here to the fact that the reproduction of social unity, the People as One, requires the production of enemies and outsiders. He is therefore taking the point in another direction than the one being made here. The point here is that this collectivising activity in politics, with the state representing the People as One, is that Jacobin wing of the French Revolution again. And its roots clearly lie in society. The failure to really transform society and its abstract, atomising and alienative relationships will necessarily reproduce an elitist, top down, totalitarian politics. That socialism should have become entangled in this politics is another way of arguing that the proletarian transformation of society did not occur and that, consequently, bourgeois modes of organisation, thought and action came to dominate within the socialist movement.

Leninism and Jacobinism
Jacobinism, of course, became a contentious issue within Marxism in the controversy between Lenin and Luxemburg. Luxemburg, from a Marxist perspective, objected to Lenin's identification of Social Democracy with Jacobinism. The question of whether Lenin really was a Jacobin is a difficult one. He notoriously stated the case for a small, tightly knit, rigidly disciplined party of professional revolutionaries. Yet it could be argued that the position was forced on Lenin by the Russian situation, by Czarist repression, absence of a democratic politics and the absence of a large and organised workers movement. Lenin did constantly refer to the activity of the workers as playing a revolutionary role in a way contrary to Jacobinism, and when the workers actually did so act he had no hesitation in opening the party to them.

Nevertheless, when the necessary concessions have been made, there still remains something of a Jacobin quality about Leninism. The seizure of the state power and the reorganisation of society from the top down is not only an unmarxist notion, inverting the relations between society and the state established by Marx (Lichtheim 1961:350/1); it is the classical Jacobin project. Stalin, it could be argued, developed Leninism on its Jacobin side and, for this reason, the criticisms that Luxemburg brought against Lenin are of the greatest importance. It gives part of the explanation as to why, having broken with the French Revolutionary tradition, in both its state reformist and conspiratorial aspects, Marx could nevertheless be associated with Jacobinism again in the twentieth century.

If there is an ambiguity in Marx between the Jacobin and the libertarian positions, as Guerin argues, one needs to understand how this ambiguity could be resolved on the side of the state tradition. Why did Lenin and Kautsky win out over Luxemburg? That Luxemburg made the argument, however, suggests a tradition of authentic Marxism that may be rescued in the aftermath of the collapse of state socialism. This does not mean that this Marxism will be any more successfully applied this time than last time. There are material processes at work which may encourage socialism again to settle on the terrain of bourgeois society, in which case Luxemburg's authentic Marxism will be lost again.

But there is in this issue a clue as to why Marxism degenerated into Jacobinism. If Marx was not a Jacobin then he certainly looked to unite the social revolution from below with a conception of political revolution deriving from the tradition of the French Revolution. If Lenin wasn't strictly a Jacobin, his materialism and his politics in the context of a backward Russia could take Jacobin forms. 'Lenin .. showed himself to be much more of a Jacobin than his teachers Marx and Engels' (Guerin in Goodway 1989:121). And if Lenin concentrated on Marx's Jacobin politics to the exclusion of other essential aspects, 'Stalin was more of a Jacobin than a Communist’ (Aronowitz 1981:25). There is nothing necessary about this degeneration of Marxism into Jacobinism.

What it involves is politics in certain situations. But the ease with which Marx could be appropriated for a Jacobin politics, so that Rosa Luxemburg's attempts to differentiate between socialism and Jacobinism could be dismissed and, for decades, silenced, should make Marxists sensitive to question of Marx's alleged Jacobinism. We need to examine the nature and the status of ‘the political’ in Marx and insist, as Marx insisted, that it is the social revolution from below which is fundamental to the creation of the socialist society. This is to distinguish Marx's socialism more sharply from the top down, statist Jacobinism.

In so far as the Jacobin tradition is not eliminated from Marxist politics there will remain the possibility of the socialist revolution completely back firing and producing its opposite. For a socialist revolution resting upon Jacobin politics, as defined here, will lead to totalitarianism in the twentieth century sense (i.e. as distinct from the older idea of an organic, total community constituted by self-regulating parts). The process of degeneration here is familiar. The recourse to bourgeois forms of political organisation - the party, the state, the representative principle, the leader-lad relation - means that socialists organise themselves into an agency apart from society and from the demos. The purpose is to capture the state power and reorganise society from above, to 'build socialism' (a meaningless term from Marx's perspective (Djilas 1966:7).

The Anti-Totalitarian Resolution of the State-Civil Society Dualism
The conquest of state power is what all parties aim for, of course, by electoral means or otherwise. This in itself is not the full blown totalitarianism, though it does contain totalitarian tendencies. What makes the situation more dangerous is that Marx's project is that of overcoming the separation of the state from civil society. It is this project, taking us beyond bourgeois society and the institutional guarantees of liberalism, that opens up a new terrain. The problem is that a socialism organised on Jacobin lines must resolve this dualism of the state and civil society at the level of the state, thus encompassing every area of civil society and subjecting society to political control. Civil society is subsumed under the state (Habermas 1990). The state-civil society dualism is thereby resolved in a totalitarian fashion, reproducing the abstract character of the state through the agency of 'the party' as an alienated form of organisation.

This is quite the reverse of Marx's own argument. Marx called for the political investment of civil society through civil society making itself the political society. Totalitarianism, party-state socialism, approaches the state-civil society dualism from the opposite angle. Its Jacobinism is thus expressed in terms of totalitarianism.

Marx's critique of the state as an alienated social power was a demand for this power to be re-invested in. and exercised by society. Marx is seeking the political investment of civil society (Levine in Lukacs 1991:14 17). As Levine writes with respect to Lukacs:

The most important theoretic element in the founding of a Marxist theory of politics is Lukacs's recapturing of the distinction between civil society or species being and the state. The political question for Marx and Lukacs is the site of political empowerment. The issue is whether power should be located in the state, which has grown insulated from the everyday life of man, or should it be vested in civil society, which is the more immediate expression of the species life of man? Both Marx and Lukacs favor the political investment of civil society.
Since politics is an ever-present need in society, the question arises as to which realm, the state or civil society, can become the site of the political, the exercise of power or decision making. Both Lukacs and Marx believe in the politicisation of civil society because they feel that civil society is the more direct and immediate expression of the everyday life of humankind. The Soviets are the proper institutions for this politicisation of civil society.

Levine in Lukacs 1991:23

The definition of politics for Marx concerns the investment of power: politics is the art of investing power in the institutions of civil society so it can be most expressive of species interests.. Not only does a Marxist politics concern investment, but it also has to do with trusteeship. A Marxist politics is directed toward granting civil society trusteeship over political power.

Levine in Lukacs 1991:42

This political investment is achieved through overcoming the state-civil society dualism. This critique is linked, practically, to the conception of proletarian self-emancipation and workers democracy. Marx conceived socialist revolution, in other words, not simply in terms of the historical and structural conflict between labour and capital but also in terms of the demos generally coming to reinvest civil society with the political and economic power alienated to the state and capital. Revolutionary social transformation would therefore entail a process of practical reappropriation conducted through a self-organising demos and operating within and against the shell of liberal democratic institutions. Marx therefore distinguished human or social emancipation from political emancipation. The democratisation of power, then, would take place in civil society and would be intrinsic to the relations of production and the dialectic of everyday practical existence.

From this perspective, then, Social Democracy and Communism stand condemned for their failure to break from the Jacobin tradition, thus channelling socialism into the existing state apparatus on the fallacious assumption that control of the political levers would suffice to establish socialism. Not only does this fail to grapple with the capital system on its own material terrain (Meszaros 1995), thereby becoming subject to capital and its own totalitarian drives (compelling the state to regulate civil society from above to secure the conditions for accumulation Neuman 1942) but it prevents that political investment of civil society which is essential to socialism as a democratising process. Instead, the old idea of the state power as a thing to be taken over and society as a subject to be administered from above is reproduced (Meister 1990:127; Lichtheim 1961 350/1; Corrigan, Ramsay, Sayer 1973).

Centralisation and Decentralisation
The object of analysis is the issue of where Marx stands between decentralisation and centralisation. Critics argue that even if Marx envisages a decentralisation of political power the logic of his economics is thoroughly centralising. One thinks here of N Scott Arnold's demonstration that the abolition of money, of the market and of commodity production entailed by Marx's critique of alienation and exploitation must lead to a centralisation of control and a central planning authority in the operation of the economy (M Scott Arnold 1990). 

The language of the free association and the self-government of the producers implies that Marx is a decentralist in economics and hence an advocate of workers self-management and, indeed, that the society of the associated producers implies a structure that is fully consistent with his principle of political decentralisation. If Marx treats individuals in politics as active citizens able to participate in direct democratic forms, then in economics he treats then as active producers in conscious control of their products and productive activity. All relations have become transparent. If one focuses on the logic of Marx's critique, as N Scott Arnold does, then one can argue as much for decentralisation as centralisation. As Elster writes:






Elster, though, goes on to recognise that the complexity of the modern economy, combining both large and small scale productive units, makes exchange on the basis of face to face reciprocal relations Utopian. Similarly, such a complex economy cannot be run from the centre by a planning authority. Elster, therefore, makes market socialism the most feasible form that Marx's communism could take. Except that Marxists like Istvan Meszaros expose such notion to be a contradiction in terms. Which is also what N Scott Arnold seems to be indicating in pointing to the centralising logic of Marx’s economics.

There would indeed seem to be a paradox. On the one hand, Elster argues, Marx was vehement in rejecting the commodity form and, on this basis, would have located communism as far away as possible from the market. On the other hand, the stress on autonomous workers cooperatives asserts the value of self-realisation through work. The former possesses a centralising logic, the latter a decentralising logic.





N Scott Arnold's criticism is designed to show that Marx's communism is not a feasible society and that, consequently, Marx's critique of capitalism is vitiated. One could point out that he has abstracted economic arrangements from human beings and from the emancipatory values which were Marx's central concern. Marx is looking to subordinate institutional forms to the human subject. The rigidly centralised society that N Scott Arnold presents would involve human beings being as alienated as before, it would be some form of state capitalism denying the values of autonomy and self-realisation. But this is N Scott Arnold's point - that Marx's vision of communism as a non-alienated society, rejecting the decentralised mechanisms of economic coordination like the market, commodity production and exchange as alienating, could only reinstate alienation in a total form (N Scott Arnold 1990). There is, then, for Arnold, a contradiction, a contradiction that renders Marx's critique of dubious, Utopian value.

Elster proposes market socialism as a way out of the contradiction. At first sight this would seem implausible from a Marxist perspective, as Elster recognises. But there are Marxist grounds for embracing the potential of markets to act as sensitive, decentralising mechanisms of economic coordination in which individuals act as conscious agents. What the idealists of the market as a democratic institution consistently conceal is the asymmetries of power and resources of economic agents under capitalism as a result of the class structure. But asymmetrical relations of class power are the central target of Marx's critique. It could be argued that the abolition of class division and the attainment of symmetry in human relations actually enables the market to function as a democratic institution. Marx condemned not markets as such but their operation under capitalist relations of exploitation and domination (Harrington 1993:220). Marx’s principal target is commodification, particularly labour as a commodity. The problem for Marx is not so much markets as the social structure they express. Democratise social relationships and the markets will operate, as in the ideal, as democratic, decentralised facilitators of individual choice.

One could refer here to the approach taken by Marx to the passing of the Ten Hours Bill. This he argued in terms of the first victory of the political economy of labour over the political economy of capital. This legislative intervention in the operation of the capital economy could thus be described by Marx as a 'modest Magna Carta'. Marx would appear to be attacking the operation of markets under a laisser faire regime. Legislative intervention, it is suggested, changes the operation of the markets. Marx's argument here suggests that the abolition of the commodity form of labour and of class relations achieving symmetries in power and resources would ensure that markets operate differently than under a capitalist laisser faire regime.

There is some warrant, then, for arguing that markets function differently according to the social structure and that, with the replacement of capitalist relations by democratic social relationships, the market too will operate democratically. Marx did not make this argument. He referred instead to legislative intervention on the continued basis of capitalist relations. But even this 'modest Magna Carta’ altered the character of the markets.

Such an argument is unlikely to impress N Scott Arnold. Scattered remarks in which Marx writes favourably of reformist legislative intervention do not compare with the logic of the critique of the capital system as an alienated system of production. This - and it a fairly extreme ideological determinism - leads inexorably to a central planning authority and the equation of decentralised economic mechanisms with alienation.

Nor is the argument likely to impress Marxists. For it could be argued that the market is but one form of decentralised economic coordination and that others, producer and consumer groups, are available as forms of democratic planning.

What is pertinent about N Scott Arnold's criticism is that Marx's socialism, irrespective of the values of freedom and democracy, is defined in terms of centralisation and monopoly. Marx's communism could be realised only as a planned, marketless society governed by a central authority.

The argument puts aside the economic decentralist in Marx, the Marx of the free association and self-government of the producers. Nevertheless, there is another contradiction that may be explored. This is the contradiction between Marx the economic centralist and Marx the political decentralist.

Centralist Economic Means and the Decentralist Political End

The Paris Commune represented the living form of that society which had reunified the political and economic under social self-government. Marx's idealisation of the Commune operates as the paradigm for the radical democracy that Marx had outlined in his early critique of Hegel's political philosophy. The Commune put an end to the state bureaucracy and to the political division of labour producing salaried, specialist, hierarchical occupations. Those vested with the responsibility for implementing the laws of the Commune were directly elected by and accountable to the Commune assembly. The Commune democracy established in Paris was to be the model form of democracy in the whole of France. The overcoming of the separation between the state and civil society thus entailed a radical decentralisation, radical in that it rested upon the thoroughgoing democratisation of society and politics.

The Civil War in France is not the only statement that Marx made in favour of decentralisation. The principle is implicit in the project of abolishing the state as an alienated social power, in raising civil society to the status of political society and in the argument that freedom involves the complete subordination of the state to society, that is, from the critique of Hegel's political philosophy to the critique of social democracy.

Decentralisation, then, is both the stated aim and orienting principle of Marx's political project of abolishing the state power. What is a particularly important issue to examine is the critical awareness that there is some tension between Marx's politics and his economics.

Radoslov Selucky argues that 'Marx's economic concept of socialism consists of a single social wide factory based on vertical (hierarchical) relations of superiority and subordination'. Nevertheless, Marx's 'political concept of socialism consists of a free association of self-managed work and social communities based on horizontal relations of equality’. Thus 'whoever accepts in full Marx's first concept has to give up the latter, and vice versa: they are mutually exclusive' (Selucky 1979:xi).

The contradiction that Selucky notices between Marx's political and his economic concept of socialism exists within his economics, central planning versus workers self-management. There is another aspect to this contradiction, however, and that refers to the way that an economically centralising Marx has come to predominate over a politically decentralising Marx in the history of Marxism. One could argue here that Marx's decentralist model of politics based on a critique of alienation was replaced by a centralist economic model based upon a critique of capitalist exploitation.

Neil Harding argues this point slightly differently, in terms of a contrast between the early and the later Marx. He argues that the critique of alienation in the early writings contained a radically decentralist model and that this model was replaced after 1848 with a centralist model designed to abolish exploitation. Thus Marx came to argue for centralisation in ownership, planning and control, 'a second edition of Saint Simon's organic labour state' (Harding in Harding ed. 1984:9).

Harding does recognise the continuities between Marx's writings on the Paris Commune and the early decentralist model. He claims, however, that the recovery of the early model by the later Marx was only brief. And it is indeed true that Marx did not really follow up the train of thought reopened by the Commune and, as Bookchin points out, repudiated the Commune. It needs to be understood, however, just what Marx did repudiate. From the beginning Marx thought that the communards had no chance of succeeding. He also subjected their actions to criticism in that the communards failed to act decisively in ending the power of the capitalist class. Historically and tactically, then, Marx did repudiate the Paris Commune before, during and after the event. But repudiating the event is not the same as repudiating the ideal. And there is no evidence to suggest that he repudiated the ideal of commune democracy overcoming the state-civil society separation.

Harding argues that the political model of decentralisation in the early Marx came to be replaced by an economic model of centralisation in the later Marx as the issue of class exploitation came to dominate his thoughts at the expense of alienation. Without denying that arguments for centralisation can be extracted from Marx, for the dictatorship of the proletariat makes sense only in terms of some form of centralisation, the fact that the 'early' Marx keeps reappearing in the post-1848 writings - here attacking the parasitism of the state and its bureaucracy (Eighteenth Brumaire), there idealising commune democracy (The Civil War in France), next demanding the complete subordination of the state to society (Critique of the Gotha Programme) - makes the dichotomy of a young decentralist and a mature centralist Marx a highly dubious proposition.

Apart from anything else, the terms centralisation and decentralisation are themselves question begging. Just as decentralisation is not necessarily democratic so centralisation is not necessarily undemocratic. Decentralisation can quite easily concede power to dominant social groups and individuals. Centralisation, moreover, is implied in the anarchist principle of federation. The issue is whether centralisation proceeds from the bottom up or the top down, whether it is democratic and represents, as it were, a pooling of sovereignty, or undemocratic involving the alienation of sovereignty.
Returning to Marx, if the dichotomy between an early and a mature Marx is dubious, then so too is the antithesis between alienation and exploitation. In truth, alienation and exploitation are two sides of the same coin (Adams in Carver ed.1991:268). Nor is it the case that alienation is a political concept and exploitation an economic concept. Indeed, it is the critique of alienation in the early writings, particularly of the state as alienated social power, which led Marx to the critique of capital. Capital is itself an alienated social power, but the relations it rests upon are exploitative as well as alienative.

We may question, then, whether there are two Marx's, an early, decentralist, political Marx concerned with alienation and its abolition and a mature, centralist, economic Marx concerned with exploitation and its abolition.

We can disentangle Marx's political writings in terms of a distinction between an alien politics concerned with the practical reappropriation of social powers and a class politics concerned with the political victory, of the proletariat. It is a question of abolishing relations that are both alienative and exploitative at the same time. This, then, unifies rather than opposes the conceptions of alienation and exploitation, the criticism being that Marxism in its dominant party forms has opposed the two. Exploitation and alienation are two sides of the same coin. Marx is dealing with the tactical and strategic problems of the need for a class politics in a class divided society in which social identity is class based but also for a class politics aiming at the dissolution of the class designation in a truly human society. The victory of the proletariat is thus the self-liquidation of the proletariat, its dissolution into humanity in general.

The antithesis between an early political Marx and a later economic Marx cannot withstand textual analysis. For in the critique of Hegel's political philosophy Marx introduces the materialism of civil society as against the abstraction of Hegel's state as ethical community. In his mature writings Marx continues to demand the abolition of the state as an alienated social power.

One can accept that it is possible by selective quotation to present any 'Marx' on a spectrum from anarchism to statist social democracy. And one can accept that there are definite tensions in Marx's politics, seeking the abolition of the state via the dictatorship of the proletariat, sustaining a revolutionary socialist commitment whilst supporting a reformist parliamentary politics.

What one has to establish is what the end of Marx's politics was and then show how this end oriented his perspectives and unified what appears to be contradictory.
As regards the contrast between an early Marx concerned with alien politics and a later Marx concerned with class politics, the former stressing political agency, the latter stressing the material development of the capitalist mode of production, we need to recognise how much interpretation depends upon the perspective we take.

It is arguable that there is a shift in emphasis in Marx's writing as Marx comes to concentrate more upon the critique of political economy and of the capital system. Some suggest that something was lost in this process (Perkins 1993:2), that the stress upon the internal dissolution of the capitalist mode of production devalued the creative political agency of the proletariat. We could also add here the loss of the critique of political alienation, something which contained values of community and democracy and citizenship in individual and social relationships.

For those concerned with reinvigorating the social democratic project, what may be called neo-Bernsteinism, Marxists must finally lay to rest the ghost of Rousseauan democracy (Meister 1990:107), as, indeed, Hegel had done (Smith 1992). Stated thus, it amounts to taking Hegel's side against Marx's. Nevertheless something is retained from Marx, conflict, interests, classes and groups in political action. Thus Meister theorises a Marxist political materialism in which politics is a matter of interests, alliances and pluralism (Meister 1990:121/2). Yet, for this project, critics argue, neither the Marx of alienation nor the Marx of exploitation and class is adequate. As Pierson argues, Marx's whole approach, his capitalist model of politics, seriously undermines the possibility of Marxism ever supplying itself with an adequate democratic theory concerning the operation of political arrangements (Pierson 1986:17 29/30). Neo-Bernsteinism, then, is certainly 'beyond' Marx and Marxism. It is the position that is developed in the work of a wide and diverse number of writers - Hindess and Hirst, Offe, Habermas, McLennan (1989), Keane (1984), Bobbio (1987a 1987b), Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Held (1987) – and these will be analysed later.

One must question the nature of this democratic left project. It stresses the social democratic/political materialist aspect of Marx - at least those sympathetic to Marxism do - only to say goodbye to Marx's critique of alien politics (emancipation as 'millenarian') and his class politics ('economist'). This being so one ends up with the demands for the retention of the classic bourgeois institutional separation of the political and civil spheres with a call to democratise both at the same time (Held 1987:283).

A libertarian Marxist case against this dissolution of Marxism into a liberal democracy, the social roots and relevance of which are increasingly questionable in the modern world of corporate capitalism, may be put. In the very least one can only retain a great deal of scepticism towards this neo-Bernsteinism given its abstraction from social and economic realities of transnational capitalism. McLellan recognises that capitalism is not a public domain, subject to public regulation, but a regime of private accumulation (McLennan 1989:253) whilst Held also acknowledges the extent to which the process of private accumulation and asymmetrical power relations limit just what can be achieved by a reformist strategy (Held 1987:283ff). But, surely, these constraints upon liberal or parliamentary democracy - not to mention democracy in society - imply a revolutionary Marxist politics as against neo-Bernsteinian 'double democratisation' preserving the institutional and structural characteristics of the capital system. ‘Double democratisation’ is not a redefinition of socialism or a response to the process that has undermined parliamentary socialism; rather, it is a part of that process. Less than ever is capital available to such public control as may be democratised. Similarly, the state is so integrated in the new international division of labour as to render its proposed democratisation of uncertain value even if it could be achieved - for the power, surely, is systemic and private not institutional.

Harding's point may be more applicable to the way that Marxism developed. Here the point to argue is that the critique of alienation was lost under both an economic and a class reductionist in which socialism came to be defined in terms of economic laws, objective socialisation and the conquest of the state power for the proletariat. What was lost in this conception, with its heavy stress on the productive forces, class and exploitation, was the themes of community, democratisation, citizenship and humanisation as the positive appropriation of the human essence.

Nevertheless, what is clear is that there is a shift of emphasis in Marx's writing from a more general critique of an alienated world to a more precise, scientific, critique of the capital system and class relations. Harding dates this from 1848 and the Manifesto. In truth, there are better reasons for dating this shift from The German Ideology in 1845/6, with The Poverty of Philosophy (1846/7) and Wage-Labour and Capital (1847) leading to the perspective outlined, in the Manifesto. There are grounds, then, for arguing that Marx did develop a political materialism from 1845 and that this, increasingly focusing upon class and exploitation, generated a conception of socialism heavily dependent upon the evolution of the capital system. And it is here that economic determinism rears its head. For Marx's privileging of the economic risked introducing capital's own objective determinism into Marxism. Yet, as Jay has argued, this idea of the autonomy of the economic did correspond to the real experience of the capital system (Jay 1984:82). The question really refers to Marx's approach to capital's objective determination. Given that Marx criticised the capital system as an alienated system of production, this determinism is part of the external logic of things that alienation imposes upon human subjects. This external compulsion exerted systemically over and against individuals is how Schaff defines alienation (Schaff 1975:7/26).

The concern to assert human self-determination over external determinism is, however, not how 'scientific socialism' came to be understood. Once more, objective laws of motion were privileged over human agency. The alien determinism of the capital system was thus reproduced in Marxism as scientific socialism. Pierson traces this development of Marxism to Marx himself:









Which restates the point made earlier in the thesis that scientistic Marxism succumbed to the determinism inherent in sociological or theoretical projects studying the external world as an objective datum, losing the emancipatory and critical themes and devaluing creative agency of the proletariat/human subject. The question is whether Marx himself is responsible, partly or wholly, or whether it was the Marxists really did bury Marx (Smith 1996). In the former one has to turn Marx against Marx, in the latter one turns Marx against the Marxists.

Perhaps there is a suppressed or unstated Saint Simonism in Marx. Some have played up Marx's debt to Saint Simon (Bottomore 1956). And this may give some clue as to the ambiguity in Marx. For Saint Simon's writings contain arguments for both centralisation and decentralisation, mixing the technocratically run organic industrial state with conceptions of a socialistically ordered society from below. This ambiguity is to be found in other Utopian writers, like Robert Owen. Marx himself did acknowledge the value of these Utopians only to argue that, with the emergence of the proletarian movement, utopianism was no longer needed. And one does indeed notice how working class Owenites in Britain and Saint Simonists in France came to declare for their own associational activity against state technocracy. The Doctrine of Saint Simon claimed to be an exposition of Saint Simon's thought; but the workers who developed the doctrine fundamentally altered the character of the argument. Saint Simon's organic labour state, which Harding claims that Marx came to offer after 1848, was replaced by 'the ASSOCIATION OF WORKERS'. What we are dealing with here is the emergence of the proletariat as an organised and conscious class and movement, precisely the positive development that Marx embraced as the basis of socialism in the Manifesto. In other words it is a conception that runs directly against an organic labour state; associational activity takes the place of state control. The proletariat had, therefore, caused a shift in perspectives and had brought a new force into the equation the associational activity of the workers. As against the organic industrial state organised along technocratic lines from the top down, the emergence of the proletarian movement enabled an associational conception of socialism organised from the bottom up.

The real question concerns Marx’s position in all of this. There is no question that Marx assigned the revolutionary role to the proletariat in the attainment of socialism. The values of associationalism were also adopted by Marx, defining communism in associational terms in both the Manifesto and Capital. Really, the question comes back to the logic that N Scott Arnold finds in Marx's critique of the capital system. The abolition of money, commodity production and exchange and of markets contains a centralising logic (N Scott Arnold) which, for Harding, leads to a return to Saint Simon's organic labour state based upon state ownership, control and planning. However, one is entitled to ask what has become of the proletarian subject which Marx privileged in the overcoming of utopianism? Abstracted from the proletariat and its creative class praxis there is no doubt that a statist, technocratic Marx can be discerned. The serious point would be that, despite Marx's stress on workers autonomy and self-realisation, the logic of his critique of the capital system leads inevitably to the statist, centrally planned industrial regime.

Martin Buber has pointed to this ambiguity in Marx. Marx incorporates Utopian ends into his socialism but his political means for reaching this socialism are non-utopian. Thus Marx seeks the withering away of the state in upholding the view that socialist transformation pertains to society rather than the state. Effectively, Buber argues, Marx is attempting to reach a decentralist end by centralist means (Buber in Harrington 1993:37/8). The state socialists could exploit this ambiguity on the centralist side and thus turn the means into the end.

Lenin's Centralisation
Whether the ambiguity that one can find in Marx between centralisation and decentralisation is a full blown contradiction is a contentious issue. Without denying that Marx can be selectively quoted to give authority to mutually contradictory positions and without denying that there is an argument to be had over the economics of Marx's socialism (Nove 1983; Brus and Laski 1989; Selucky 1979; Meister 1990), contradiction expresses the tension too strongly.

There is a tension but is there a contradiction? In the first place, Marx affirms principles of autonomy, self-realisation and self-government as realised in communism as the truly human society. Politically, Marx argues for commune democracy based upon the federation of communes from the base upwards. The idealisation of the Paris Commune follows the demand for active suffrage and the incorporation of the abstract citizenship of the state into everyday individual relationships in the early critique of Hegel's political philosophy. The principle of 'active suffrage', then, finds its expression in a commune democracy constituted by small, self-governing communes in which individuals are active citizens and the relations between them are transparent. Here power is centralised only by being invested in delegates elected from and accountable to the community and recallable. Any centralised power, then, is revocable rather than institutionalised over against individual citizens. Marx's search for a modern polis democracy does indeed seem to have taken historical form in the Paris Commune, for his idealisation of the Commune does indeed seen to share common features with Periclean Athens, with slavery replaced by automation of course (Held 1987; Elster 1985:448; Kitching 1988:148/9).

As against this, though, Marx argued for a common, rational planning authority organising the economic activity of the nation. This, along with the logic of Marx's critique of capital, the commodity form and the markets as alienating, implies a centralisation of authority (N Scott Arnold 1990). Indeed, even in his most explicit statement for decentralisation Marx still defended the Communal Constitution for preserving ‘the unity of the nation' (The Civil War in France; Tucker 1970:58/9).

Kitching quotes that part of The Civil War in France in which Marx argues for cooperative societies which 'regulate national production upon a common plan' as evidence of Marx the centralist (Kitching 1988:148/50). But is Marx really arguing here for a national, centralised planning authority? Or, rather, isn't this national planning itself constituted by democratic forms working to a common plan? There is certain to be a tension. The more power that the centre has in determining the common plan, the less autonomy the communes possess. The more that self-government is realised, the less possible it is to establish a common plan.

Nevertheless, the passage that Kitching refers to is worth quoting in full in that the national controlling authority that Marx is establishing the need for is not centralising in the sense of being imposed from the top down but in the sense of being constituted from the bottom up through 'united cooperative societies'.





Two points are to be noted here. In the first place, the ending of the ‘anarchy’ of capitalist production always did entail some form of conscious, economic government. In the second place, the centralisation proposed constituted from the bottom up. Marx's language and argument is pluralist rather than unitarist. The common plan is not controlled and implemented by the central authority; the cooperative societies take it 'under their control'. It is this decentralised, democratic control that forms the basis of the common plan that ends anarchy.

That the centralisation implied by the national regulation of a common plan occurs from the bottom up is make clear by this passage.





This, in terms of the argument developed here, is the language of the working class Saint Simonists against Saint Simon, of the association of the workers against the organic Labour state.

Thus critics who find it difficult to understand how Marx could combine the case for self-governing, directly democratic political and economic forms with the need for a nationwide common plan overcoming the anarchy of capitalist production can themselves be criticised for failing to appreciate how the associational activity of the working class can create democratic planning authorities when vertically and horizontally integrated. These associations constitute the community served by the common plan.





this particular gap or incoherence in Marx's vision of the communist society, this unanswered question about how democracy and planning are to be squared (a question which is fudged by his convenient reference to 'society' as the body which both controls and is controlled, is the most serious weakness in Marx's thought. It is so serious, because in the real world, in real socialist societies, the gap must be filled, the question must be answered, if such societies are to be viable at all.




It is this gap or incoherence in Marx's thought on socialism which enabled Lenin to cite Marx's authority for his own, very coherent, centralism. Where Marx called for the common plan under the control of freely associated labour, Lenin turned the case for centralism against the autonomy of the Soviets and against the Workers Opposition. Marx, Lenin asserted, was an unambiguous centralist:

Marx disagreed both with Proudhon and Bakunin precisely on the question of federalism (not to mention the dictatorship of the proletariat). Federalism as a principle follows logically from the petty bourgeois views of anarchism. Marx was a centralist. There is no departure whatever from centralism in his observations just quoted. Only those imbued with the philistine superstitious belief in the State can mistake the destruction of the bourgeois State machine for the destruction of centralism!

Lenin Collected Works, vol.25 429

Harrington describes Lenin as an ambivalent figure: 'the mix of libertarianism and authoritarianism in his writings is an honest contradiction, not a pose' (Harrington 1993:63). From this perspective, one can accept that the Lenin of the State and Revolution, the Lenin of soviet democracy and the withering away of the state, is genuine enough. But, even more than Marx, he lacked a strategy to establish such a vision.










43 BUILDING THE SOCIAL REPUBLIC

Anarchism and Decentralism
Lenin's treatment of the opposition between Marxism and anarchism as an opposition between centralism and decentralism makes it necessary to look again at the anarchist principle of decentralisation.





The centralisation and monopolisation of social power by the state and the transformation of this social power into political force opposed to the citizens is precisely the way that Marx's critique and abolition of political alienation proceeds (On the Jewish Question). Indeed, Marx's target is wider than the state and embraces both the state and capital as alienated social powers instituted a mode of alien control. The restoration of human-social powers to individuals self-organising in 'society' is a principle of decentralisation. The existing alien centres, which is what the state and capital as totalising powers represent, will be disempowered. Here, at least, Marx and anarchism are not so removed as Lenin would imply.

Of course, the anarchists have many objections to Marxism, Marx's or anyone else’s for that matter. Perhaps the most interesting, in the context of a possible incongruence between Marx's political and economic concept of socialism, is the unity of means and ends. Emma Goldman's criticism of the Russian Revolution as conducted by the Communist Party - as distinct from the popular revolution - thus involves a thorough rejection of the way that the party organised and centralised its political power in the state but also of the way that the Bolsheviks thought it possible - whether genuinely or cynically - to sever the means and the ends.





Anarchists have continued to affirm this principle, all the more strongly indeed given the practical demonstration in eastern Europe of what results when means and ends are severed. As Neville puts it:





Anarchists thus continue to affirm the 'principle of the unity of ends and means without compromise' (Sekelj 1990:20). How far can Marx affirm the same principle? Lichtheim refers to Marx's argument that a decentralist end can be attained by the centralist means of the state as Hegelian. As Lichtheim puts it:





For Lichtheim it is here, where the state is made the chief instrument of political change leading to the dissolution of the state, that the Leninist model inserted itself (Lichtheim 1961:375). The disunity of the means and the end here may well invite would be totalitarians to enlarge the means into the end. Whether the disunity is as stark as Lichtheim presents it may be questioned, though the anarchists were clear that it existed at the time. It all depends upon how one defines the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. If one looks at Marx's Address it is clear that this dictatorship would actually be constituted by the proletariat, buttressed by proletarian clubs, councils and committees, rather than over the proletariat by a still external or alien power, that is, the old separation of the state from society will be overcome via proletarian forms of self-organisation.

But the defence of Marx is not the real point at issue here. It is to try to see how far we can go within Marx's Marxism with the view of revolution as process in which the means are actually the ends in the process of becoming. This is to interpret Marx according to the prefigurative model. And it certainly means revaluing proletarian self-activity and self-organisation in any so called transitional stage. For the anarchists, there should be nothing in the means which is not to be present in the end.





Anarchists, then, have continued to raise objections to the way that Marx approaches the state.

When Marx and his successors followed more avowedly reactionary political tacticians in arguing that the end justifies any means, the anarchists almost invariably replied that the means condition any end. In other words, to proceed through the use of power towards the abolition of power, as the Marxists implied in their theory of a transitional dictatorship of the proletariat, is an impossibility, a paradox that refuses to resolve itself.
The conflict is more than a mere struggle between Marxists and anarchists: it is a conflict between all socialists who propose to proceed to the just society through enlarging the powers of the state, and all libertarians who believe that the very use of the state dooms to failure any attempt to achieve even a modest increase in libertarian equality.

Woodcock ed. 1977:137 

The anarchist critique of





The point to be made here is that Marx can actually go some way in meeting this principle of the unity of means and ends. For one thing, the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' can be shown to be constituted by the real proletariat, not its representatives, acting as the revolutionary subject. For another, the value of the state to Marx is purely secondary, instrumental at best (Elster 1985:444; Tucker 1970:67/8). This is still dubious enough for anarchists. But, assuming the self-organisation of the proletariat and assuming that a party divorced from the proletariat has not sought to institutionalise its power, there is no necessary reason why the process of abolition cannot be in process under the dictatorship of the proletariat. And, finally, one can underline Marx's negative and critical assessment of politics in calling for social rather than merely political revolution (Meszaros 1995:436/7).

Guerin accuses Marx of 'evading the issue' (1989:21). However, in arguing that Rosa Luxemburg is the link between anarchism and genuine Marxism, with her conception of a socialism powered from the bottom up by revolutionary councils, he has also revealed an aspect of ‘genuine marxism’, Marx's Marxism, which indicates that the means are connected with the end. The dictatorship of the proletariat can generate a socialist society given the fact that it will be powered from below by the self-organising proletariat.

Thus, though anarchism and Marxism would appear to agree as to the end of the abolition of the state (though even here there are differences. Marx seeks to dissolve the state power into society, anarchists want to abolish this power and not merely the institution Carter 1988:193), Marxism would appear to want to retain the state for a transitional period. All the references in the world to the proletariat cannot, for the anarchist, conceal the fact that this proletarian dictatorship is a state. Is this not reinforcing the state power rather than preparing the way for its dissolution?
The anarchists are right to ask the question, forcing Marxists to take the principle of self-dissolution seriously. For the anarchists, this new state, concentrating political and economic power in its hands, would actually be more omnipotent than the old bourgeois state. This is an argument that Max Weber too has made. With such a concentration of power is it likely that the state could wither away or that the new ruling class which it would inevitably create could tolerate its withering away? This is scarcely credible, argue the anarchists. And, stated thus, it is indeed incredible.

But what is missing from the account of proletarian revolution is the proletariat itself. Without the activity of the revolutionary agency, the proletariat, the ensuing revolution would indeed be a political one lacking in social (and socialist) content.

Guerin leaves the possibility for an alliance of anarchists and Marxists.

there is an important difference between classical anarchists and what are called in France libertarian communists. We, the latter, do not believe that in a trice we could jump from the present capitalist state to a total non-state society. We regret that we are obliged to admit that a transitional space of time would probably temporarily exist. But, unlike the authoritarian socialists, we want to act in such a manner that the features of the libertarian society to come - workers' councils, federalist structure, self-management and so on - would already be present and developed during the transitional period, instead of reinforcing the centralised and dictatorial state, as do the Marxist-Leninists.

Guerin in Goodway ed. 1989:121

This is to be compared with the way that Marx envisaged the proletarian revolution.

Alongside the new official governments they [the workers] must establish simultaneously their own revolutionary workers' governments, either in the form of local executive committees and councils or through workers' clubs or workers' committees, so that the bourgeois-democratic governments not only immediately lose the support of the workers but find themselves from the very beginning supervised and threatened by authorities behind which stand the whole mass of workers.

Marx Address of the Central Committee 1973:326

Note the pluralism of Marx's argument here ('revolutionary workers' governments'). But, in making the bid for power, the proletariat has to organise itself, unite itself, as a class. Thus Marx does argue for the workers to centralise their power on the basis of autonomy. It is necessary that these self-organising workers 'shall be independently organised and centralised in clubs'. He calls for 'the centralisation of the workers' clubs under a directorate established at the movement's centre of operations. The speedy organisation of at least provincial connections between the workers' clubs is one of the prime requirements for the strengthening and development of the workers party.. ' (Marx Address in 1973:327).

Prefiguration - Building the Social Republic
Prefiguration is a term that has become increasingly popular. It sounds more modern than it is. It is the old idea of building the social republic within the shell of the political republic and is to be found in the statements of the Wobblies, the industrial unionists and the revolutionary syndicalists. It is the anarchists who, in upholding the doctrine of means and ends being consistent with each other, who have been most insistent upon what may be called the prefigurative model of social revolution. And it is on the anarchist side that the argument here concentrates. The prefigurative model makes it possible to conceive what individuals should do when attempting to bring about a revolutionary transformation of society. In the first place, revolution is not an end in itself.

That is an important principle because it directs us to three anarchist assumptions not always incorporated in other leftist theories. If revolution is not an end, then what is it? What are our ends? And what are the means of revolution, and how do they relate to our ends?

Ehrlich in Ehrlich ed. 1996:331

The end of the anarchist - and the Marxist for that matter - is the good society. Which means presenting some conception of what constitutes the good society. This conception would then exist as a regulative normative ideal that shapes practice and organisation. That is, in anarchist terms, the end does not so much justify the means as determine the character of the means. One could, in Hegelian terms, define the means as the end in the process of becoming. Which brings us to process. Revolution itself is to be conceived as a process and not, first and foremost, as an event. The event, that is, merely represents the culmination of the process. In Marx's argument this process is constituted by proletarian self-development in respect of organisational, political and intellectual capacities. The class-in-itself constitutes itself into a class-for-itself. This is not a precondition of the revolution but actually is the revolution as process.

From an anarchist/perspective Ehrlich argues

We must view revolutionary change as a process, not an end.
We must develop a view of the ‘good society’.
We must act on the principles of the society we would like to see.
Our means must be consistent with our ends.
We must act as if the future is today.

Ehrlich in Ehrlich ed. 1996:332

Gandhi summed it all up in one line, be the change you want to see.

The anarchist conception is one of social change as an immediate and ongoing process, not as something that may be postponed until the power to effect change is secured - i.e. the party has control of the state and has suppressed its rivals. It is a bottom up as against a top down perspective. And it is a conception in which human beings are actors rather than being acted upon. The means applied are appropriate to the end pursued.

The Marxist criticism here is that to define revolution as process may well be to opt for evolution instead. Some are open about this. Thus David Bouchier argues that for 'citizen radicals evolution is better than revolution because evolution works' (Bouchier 1987:139). But does evolution work? Bookchin praises the capacity of capitalism to incorporate every movement in which he has invested his hopes (Bookchin 1994:1 14/5). Bookchin retains an optimism as regards the ultimately revolutionary potential of ecologism as against the new social movements in general:





But isn't the point that prefiguring strategies - Marx used the phrase 'dwarfish experiments' - fall to mount that global challenge which is necessary to destroy the power of the state and capital (Coates and Topham ed.1970:xxxiv/xxxvi)? Prefigurative strategies attempting to undermine and replace capitalism end up being incorporated as the revolutionary process becomes an evolutionary gradualism arrested on the terrain of bourgeois society (Pepper 1993:220; Bookchin 1994:14/5).

Marx's Anarchism
Once one establishes Marx's Marxism as an emancipatory critique of the capital system as involving alienated systems of production and politics, then one appreciates that Marx's project is a humanism of a rooted and not an abstracted kind. This is how Marcuse puts the point

Once the humanistic idea is seen not merely as origin and end but as the very substance of Marxian theory, the deep rooted anarchistic and libertarian elements of Marxian theory come to light. Socialism fulfils itself not in the emancipation and organisation of labour but in its abolition. As long as man's struggle with nature requires human toil for procuring the necessities of life, all that can be attained in this sphere is a truly rational societal organisation of labour.. Freedom is living without toil.

Marcuse in Dunayevskaya 1988:xx/i

The libertarian, even anarchistic, elements of Marx's emancipatory critique are evident in the conception of communist individuality, of the free association of individuals, in the abolition of the state and capital in favour of social control, and the opposition of human emancipation in general to political emancipation.

Human emancipation, for Marx, entails human beings reappropriating their social human powers alienated to the state and capital. This would enable the attainment of free communism as the truly human society. This would enable human beings to recover and realise their communal essence as individuals. Indeed, communist individuality would be so strong that all constraining relations and institutions would be dissolved (Forbes 1990:234 235 236) and replaced by self-regulating communities constituted by many-sided, all round individuals, working in cooperative relations for the common good and, in so doing, realising their own individuality (Kamenka 1982a:12).





Marx, then, can be read as an anarchist of a Rousseauan kind, not in the sense of calling for a return to the noble savage - which is not what Rousseau called for anyway (Cole in Rousseau 1973:xii; Cassirer 1967:49/50 54/7; Marshall 1992:243) - but in the sense of looking forward to attain that community in which individuals may enlarge their freedom together in association. It could be argued that Marx brought out the anarchism implicit in the normative aspect of political philosophy, revealing the good society as an historical possibility to be established by human beings in the social life world of reciprocity, solidarity and cooperation as against being imposed through an institutional political apparatus resting upon ideals as ideology. This idea of the good society is something implicit in Aristotle's polis, in Aquinas' corporate community, in Rousseau's moral order, in Kant's noumenological society and in Hegel's Sittlichkeit. It is anarchistic in the sense that, once realised, the perfect society is regulated through the self-rule of individuals and not the institutional apparatus imposed on individuals. Marx criticised the inherent determinism of the capitalist mode of production and the way that this shaped as an external compulsion the life and consciousness of the individual. Capitalism represented the systematic and systemic denial of autonomy. Marx thus 'looked forward to a situation where such social forces were under human control... he wanted social change which would bring about the possibility of autonomy from determining social forces. Only in a society where wo/men had control of and responsibility for their circumstances could free individuality express itself and flourish' (Forbes 1990:222). Reason would be in control (Levine 1987:33/4), as in Godwin's Political Justice.

Deciding exactly where Marx stands in relation to this concern with the good society is a contentious issue. Marx demanded the abolition of the state and argued that human beings, as free, rational beings, no longer require that institutional apparatus above them, regulating them for the common good. He nevertheless retained a principle of the state as a rational and ethical agency, something which he took from Hegel in particular. ‘A state which is not the realization of rational freedom’ the early Marx wrote, ‘is a bad state’. This is a highly dubious notion from an anarchist perspective. The realisation of the principle of the state is, to the anarchist, a reproduction of the state. But there is a need to bear in mind that the principle of rational freedom is the unity of the freedom of each individual and all individuals. It is the institutional framework and social infrastructure that needs to be established.

Does Marx really advocate a spontaneous, unmediated, self-regulating community of free individuals? Forbes gives good grounds for arguing that the communist individuality that Marx sought would entail the dissolution of organised, institutional existence above the individual (Forbes 1990:236). But this dissolution would be quite compatible with the creation of organs under direct control mediating the relationship of the individual to the world and to other individuals. To this extent, Meszaros is right in arguing that Marx is not pursuing an unmediated world (Meszaros 1970:283).

The communist society, based upon communist individuality, establishes a common life in which individuals act for the common good as part of their own good. Social relations, therefore, have created social identities in which the individual can act for the common good without this notion implying self-sacrifice or moralism. A community is thus available in which individual action is necessarily connected with the common good (Kamenka 1982:12). Marx used the Paris Commune of 1871 as a paradigm for this community, based upon decentralisation, democratisation, federalism, participation (Kamenka 1982). The possibilities for radical democracy based upon this paradigm has never really been taken seriously and this has played a part in curtailing the revolutionary character of socialism (Gilbert 1981:268/9). In terms of the argument presented here, the marginalising of the idea of commune democracy and the associated definition of Marxism as Social Democracy meant that the Jacobin tradition won out over against the libertarian tradition. Libertarian socialists still offer this paradigm as an alternative to the dominant statist models of socialism (Gilbert 1981:ix; Schecter 1994:4 5/6 7; Pepper 1993:124).

Libertarian Communism
There are grounds for establishing a synthesis of anarchism and Marxism. Marx, in the first place, has to be read in relation to the tradition of political philosophy and its attempt to rest the state, law and political obligation on a normative basis. As the early Marx argued in Hegelian fashion, ‘A state which is not the realization of rational freedom is a bad state’. What Marx did was to show that the realisation of the principle of the state as rational freedom, in so far as this principle is not an ideology supplying norms for and rationalising the force of the state, entailed the abolition of the state.

Take Rousseau. Rousseau looked for a form of social organisation which individuals would have to join in the civil state but which would yet preserve and, indeed, enlarge individual freedom in and through association. Far from supplying the ideology of the nation state, as is claimed, Rousseau thought this possible only in small communities federating from the base upwards according to purposes. Organised in this way, individuals would abandon lesser freedoms in a state of nature for greater freedoms in a civil state. Individuals would join with each other as free citizens under the social contract. The natural freedoms of the individual in a natural state would be replaced by positive freedoms in a civil state. The basis of Rousseau's argument is the principle of self-rule. Individuals would rule themselves, but would do so in association with each other.

In terms of political arrangements, Rousseau's community of free citizens could only be small, enabling direct as against representative democracy. Rousseau is not an anarchist but certainly is anarchistic (Marshall 1992:241). It could be argued that Rousseau's is a viable anarchism for the modern world, something which Marx recovered from Hegel's attempt to provide a Rousseau for the nation (and liberal) state.

This can be developed into a libertarian communism. Perhaps not directly, for the search for the perfect community could be interpreted in terms of a hidden god/authoritarianism at the heart of political philosophy, something which leads only to the enclosed society, depreciating politics in the realised society, and hence possessing repressive implications (Connolly 1989:130). But when one brings in revolutionary socialist politics, the stress on the associational activity of the workers, the materialist premise of proceeding from real individuals and from the concern to subordinate relations to the control of these real individuals, one can accentuate the libertarian aspect of Marx's argument. The stateless, classless and moneyless society sought by the communist anarchist Kropotkin is not too remote from Marx, though the approach to authority, the key question, is (Fenn 1986:33/4).

That is why the anarchists called for an end to the 'cult of authority' in general and of the state in particular: without these social defences, groups, communities, and individuals will find it necessary to identify and to resolve their own conflicts. The removal, particularly of the state, is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the emergence of a wholly secular society.




In Field's, Factories and Workshops Tomorrow, Kropotkin presents the principles and practices of an anarcho-communist society that are very similar to those offered by William Morris. What is interesting here is that whilst Morris was a Marxist, anarchists (by and large) accept that Morris was a Marxist and yet anarchists would appear to be quite at home with Morris. As Woodcock wrote





Which is another way of saying that in Kropotkin and Morris, anarchism and Marxism come as close as they are aver likely to. The libertarian communism of Guerin and the libertarian Marxism of Marcuse have already been mentioned. The Marxist E.P. Thompson identified himself as a libertarian communist. One can mention too the socialist anarchism of the anarcho-syndicalist Purchase. Purchase draws attention to the fact that socialist anarchism has always affirmed .the necessity of the working class and trade unionism (Purchase 1990:12). Trade unions are natural forms of organisation, organising resistance to capital but also production in the socialist society. Unions have the ability to









44 POLITICAL PARTY/STATE SOCIALISM

The world is going your way at present, Webb, but it is not the right way in the end.

William Morris to Sydney Webb in 1895, quoted in Arnot 1964.

It is necessary that we should occasionally point out that .. Fabianesque 'state socialism' is far removed from genuine Democratic Socialism. The danger is that it may be used among the more unthinking portion of the workers as an argument against all forms of collective or common ownership.

Justice 9 May 1903

The relocation of socialism from the social to the abstracted political realm, the state, involved the replacement of the proletarian agency by the professional, educated 'new class'. This did not go uncontested. A German Social Democrat, Wertheimer, noticed the difference:





And this, with reference to the ILP, the supposed left alternative to Labourist. Whether the explanation of this relocation - of reformism - is sought in social, economic or organisational terms the truth is that the more politically conscious socialist workers were well aware of a transition taking place and, indeed, of a threat to socialism. The point is important given that 'Fabianesque state socialism' won out against socialism from below and proceeded to assimilate democratic socialism to the existing bourgeois political arrangements. The ‘democratic’ in democratic socialism came to be identified with the abstracted political realm removed from the demos.

This came to be known as Social Democracy, but even this term is misleading, concealing the transition that had taken place. Social Democracy had initially been the synonym of Marxism. It implied that democracy had to be realised in the real social realm of the demos and not merely in the formal political sphere. However, the relocation of socialism from the social to the political inverted the approach, locating socialism at the abstracted state level.

As a result, socialism came to be defined not as the transformation of social relations of production by the proletarian political agency but with the nationalisation of the productive forces through the alienated form of the party operating within the institutions of the state. Consequently, the working class continued to be confronted by their social power in the alienated form of state socialism (Clarke 1991:328).

For George Bernard Shaw, socialism could be introduced by the right people in parliament. Since all orders ‘come ultimately from the State - meaning in this country the House of Commons' then

a House consisting of 660 gentlemen and 10 workmen will order the soldier to take money from the people for the landlords. A House of Commons consisting of 660 workmen and 10 gentlemen will probably, unless the 660 are fools, order the soldier to take money from the landlords for the people. With that hint I leave the matter in the full conviction that the State .. will continue to be used against the people by the classes until it is used by the people against the classes with equal ability and equal resolution.

quoted in Richards ed.1978:9

Leaving aside the fact that parliament is but one of the institutions of the state and leaving aside the fact that the power of the state vis capital is secondary and derivative, Shaw's argument leaves 'the people' passive before their representatives, whatever the class origin of these representatives.

For Shaw 'The Socialism advocated by, the Fabian Society is State Socialism exclusively' (Report on Fabian Policy and Resolutions (Fabian tract no. 70, 1896) 5). And this statement, it should be noted, came exactly half a century before British parliamentary democracy rested on the principle of one person one vote.

Social Democracy is thus better called Parliamentary Democracy or Parliamentary Socialism. The latter expresses the contradiction clearly. The whole point of socialism had been to further the project of democracy from beyond the extension of the suffrage and the democratisation of representative institutions to the social realm. But, as Miliband argues, the Parliamentary Socialists were myopic in their parliamentarism and demonstrated nothing but complete indifference or even hostility to political action within civil society itself. This extra-parliamentary activity, especially by workers in industrial struggle, was condemned (Miliband 1972:13).

The Reversion to Petty Bourgeois Politics
Socialism as Social (Parliamentary) Democracy, in other words, had joined the state project of monopolising politics. The 'statist' character of 'Social Democracy' was actually well understood by Marx. He showed how the 'classless' pretensions of the petty bourgeois fitted in with the ideological project of the state as the representative of the general good.

Statism entailing socialism as nationalisation accords well with the 'classless' politics of the petty bourgeois democrats criticised by Marx. The petty bourgeois seek

a means of softening the antagonism between the two extremes of capital and wage labour and transforming it into harmony, not of superseding both of them. However varied the measures for achieving this goal, however much it may be edged with more or less revolutionary conceptions, its content remains the same. This content is the reformation of society by democratic means, but a reformation within the boundaries set by the petty bourgeoisie.

Marx SE 1973 (1977):176

This classless, statist petty bourgeois politics has come to have a new lease of life with the rise of the professional middle class (Harris 1991:95/124).

The attempt to recover the authentic Marxism as socialism from below, then, is aimed not only against the direction taken by the Bolshevik Revolution. The tendency to state socialism predates Bolshevism. The tendency to fetishize the state and invest it with existential significance is apparent in the British 'Fabianesque' tradition. In Ramsey MacDonald the tendency to anthropomorphise the state is presented in its bluntest form, no doubt deriving from MacDonald’s ill digested reading of the Oxford Idealists.

The State does not concern itself primarily with man as a possessor of rights, but with man as the doer of duties. A right is the opportunity of fulfilling a duty, and it should be recognised only in so far as it is necessary to the performance of duty.. Nor should the State grant the 'right' to the franchise unless by doing so it is promoting its own ends . . as man approaches the fullness of liberty which he can enjoy only when he is perfect, his rights become more ample.. The State regards the man as a carrier of human life between Past and the Future, and assigns to him the work of realising the Future from the Past. It shows him the path.

MacDonald Socialism and Government 1909, vol I, 11/2

A little knowledge is a dangerous thing. MacDonald’s extremely crude reading of the Oxford Idealists and their attempts to argue for the state as the pooling of the common sovereignty for the common good gives individualist liberals all the ammunition they need for proving a totalitarian impulse in Continental notions of freedom. In every line, MacDonald invests the state with an existential significance, having a life and a purpose of its own independently of the individuals composing the demos. This is not the view of Rousseau, Hegel, Marx etc.

One can understand how this tradition not only lost the essence of the socialist critique, it fell behind the position that liberalism had been evolving on democracy from the late nineteenth century. Thus, the ILP paper, the Labour Leader, rejected Fred Jowett's demand for the socialist transformation in the parliamentary system.

As Mr Snowden said, our central grievance is that we ourselves are not the Cabinet. With the rise of Labour to power many of the Parliamentary difficulties would tend to adjust themselves.

The only problem, in other words, lies in Labour not possessing parliamentary power, not in parliamentary power itself. Labour did finally succeed in their ambition of winning parliamentary power. In 1946, at the annual conference of trades councils, H.W. Harrison captured the complacency of the Labour view perfectly when asserting: 'We are no longer petitioning for a place in the counsels of the State, we are the State’.

The Political Expropriation of Working Class Socialism
One needs a little context here. Marx's critique of political liberalism embodied the demand for the abolition of an abstract formal political realm and a representative system extraneous from the real world. In his conception, socialism was to take the fight for the suffrage further, from the political to the social realm, removing the state-civil society separation. At the same time, liberalism itself begun to possess a more collectivist and socially pluralist character and sought to ways of accommodating social groups and organisations within the state. Beneath the political traditions the working class itself, and the British working class as much as any other, had a long and developing tradition of associational activity. Some new form of representative system was a historical possibility. Social Democratic state socialism, however, could make nothing of this developing movement and instead reasserted the old abstract system of representation.

By arguing that there are two kinds of socialism in collision here, a socialism from above through the agency of a new class and a socialism from below through the self-constituting proletarian agency one is attempting to draw attention to the relocation of socialism from the social to the political sphere which, in the context of a continuation, of the classical bourgeois separation of the state from civil society, amount to the political expropriation of socialism from the working-class by the new professional middle class. They, the pmc, would replace the private capitalists. Where Weber warned that the dictatorship of the proletariat would take the form of the dictatorship of the officials, the Fabian state socialists promised that this would be the case. The Webbs' contempt for the capacities of the working class and their overriding concern for system, order and efficiency is quite explicit and unapologetic (Callaghan 1990:35) and the Fabians defined themselves quite consciously in terms of a Benthamic collectivism in which individuals would be reduced to mere cogs in a 'great social machine' run by experts (Callaghan 1990:33). As for 'democratic socialism’, the democratic process had nothing to do with discerning the popular will for the Fabians but, rather, legitimated the activities of the experts. Beatrice Webb defined 'the function of the representative’ as that of acting 'as a "foolometer" for the expert' (Webb Our Partnership 231).

How could the political expropriation of the workers socialism proceed, if not smoothly, then certainly with the workers fighting only a rear-guard action? The Fabians had made their anti-working class state socialism quite explicit, after all. William Morris, and other socialist revolutionaries like Belfort Bax, had been alert to the attempt of the ‘new class' to ride to power on the back of socialism, changing the character of socialism at the same time. The working class, lacking appropriate material and political organisations for a revolutionary socialism, were compelled to operate on the terrain of bourgeois society. As a result, their socialism was easily channelled into parliamentary and trade union activity, paralleling the bourgeois split between state and civil society.

The relocation of socialism from the social to the political realm, therefore, shows the roots of reformism to have a social, economic and organisational basis. This paralysing the working class and made it incapable of exploiting the revolutionary potential of the crises which soon came to beset capitalism.

The struggle of the likes of Morris against the relocation of socialism in the 1880s and 1890s was taken up again, this time as a workers movement, in the years leading to the 1914-18 war by the revolutionary and industrial syndicalists. The working class activists here had now experienced state socialism and could not but react against its clear detachment from the class and its struggles. Syndicalism, asserting that the economic organisations of the working class would serve to build the social republic, thus stood consciously in opposition to state socialism as represented by the parliamentary socialist parties of the various countries.

Of course, as a reaction, the syndicalists could be criticised for merely inverting the one sidedness of the parliamentary socialists. As such, parliamentarism and syndicalism represent two sides of the same, dare we say 'bourgeois', coin. For there is a failure on both sides to overcome the split between the political and the economic which characterises bourgeois society. Instead the one is defined in opposition to the other. Thus syndicalism could be criticised for failing to develop the methods and organs to enable it to take effective action at the appropriate level once possibilities for transformation existed (Kendall 1967:45). But, at least, the importance of the real movement of the working class had been reasserted and the possibility for learning from experience, the workers converting their economic into political movement (Marx to Bolte 1871 MEW 33 p333 n.d.; Selected Correspondence 328/9) had been opened up.

The Two Socialisms
A whole number of issues have been raised here concerning the nature of socialism, revolution, agency and organisational form. The basic theme is the contrast between two conceptions of socialism. On the one hand there is what may be called the descending conception of socialism as a statist, bureaucratic and top down form of government conducted through professionals, politicians and experts. This is the socialism of the 'new class', the educated, the formally trained, the officials. On the other hand, there is the ascending conception of socialism constituted from the bottom up through the proletariat as revolutionary agency. And the two conceptions of socialism rest upon two conceptions of revolution. The one unambiguously locates itself within the project of the state and hence continues the centralisation and monopolisation of power in the abstract realm 'above' civil society. The other involves an expansive conception of revolution in which power is reinvested in civil society as social power. As Emma Goldman argued

The inherent tendency of the State is to concentrate, to narrow, and monopolise all social activities; the nature of revolution is, on the contrary, to grow, to broaden, and disseminate itself in ever wide circles. In other words, the state is institutional and static; revolution is fluent and dynamic.

Goldman in Woodcock 1977:156

The intention in this part of the argument is to pursue this dichotomy so as to define a workers socialism based upon self-centralism, self-emancipation and self-government as against the authoritarianism and elitism not to mention the abstraction of the state socialist alternative.

Two points from Marx will run through the entire discussion I/ the primacy of the social over the political revolution 2/ the insistence that the proletariat form itself into the political party, not be formed into it. These are Marx's basic principles made explicit at the International.

Considering, that against this collective power of the propertied classes the working class cannot act, as a class, except by constituting itself into a political party, distinct from, and opposed to, all old parties formed by the propertied classes.

That this constitution of the working class into a political party is indispensable in order to ensure the triumph of the social revolution and its ultimate end – the abolition of classes; That the combination of forces which the working class has already effected by its economical struggles ought at the same time to serve as a lever for its struggles against the political power of landlords and capitalists - The Conference recalls to the members of the International: That in the militant state of the working class, its economical movement and its political action are indissolubly united.

Marx Resolution of the London Conference on Working Class Political Action 1974:270

Organisational Forms - Revolution as Process
When it came to organisational forms, Marx could be described as open and pragmatic within certain parameters. Marx's overwhelming emphasis is upon the working class subject itself, the forms it develops, its conceptions and its consciousness (Miliband 1977:119/20). The organisational form is not to be prescribed in advance or from the outside but is to be generated from within the real movement of the class subject. What mattered to Marx was proletarian autonomy and subjectivity in this process of creating organisational form, the process in which the class constitutes itself as the revolutionary subject.

This openness is not to be confused with ambiguity. Marx is not ambiguous at all when it comes to the question of proletarian subjectivity, activity and consciousness but clearly pursues his argument that the working class is revolutionary or it is nothing. The organisational form is to be evaluated from the perspective of proletarian self-emancipation as the content of socialist revolution.

It is misleading, if not entirely wrong historically, to argue that completely differing political strategies can be discerned from Marx's writings (Boggs 1984:244/5). It may be conceded that selective quotation can lead to a syndicalist Marx concentrating upon the economic movement of the class, a Jacobin Marx stressing the conquest and centralisation of state power, a Blanquist Marx defining communists as a revolutionary vanguard, a Social Democratic Marx justifying participation in parliament's and calling for legislative intervention in the operation of the capital economy.









Marx could not, on his premises of proletarian self-emancipation, could not theorise the organisational form. For such theoretical activity implies an independence of the class subject and a prescribing for the class subject which denies precisely what Marx is attempting to affirm - the creative agency of the revolutionary subject.

Going back to Marx, however, does mean having a critical perspective on where Marxism has been in terms of organisational forms. This means working backwards. For openness is no defence against either opportunism or the substitutionist tendency of politics. There is no guarantee that the proletariat would come to constitute itself as a class, though some argue that Marx did indeed believe in such a spontaneous development (Femia 1981). There is no guarantee either that, even if the proletariat were to come forward as political agents, that organisational forms would be developed to materialise their power on the institutional terrain of bourgeois society and politics, in trade unionism and parliamentarism.

In other words, there are material processes at work at all times which shape the form which 'Marx’ and Marxism may come to take, independently of ‘the real Marx’. We need to explain why the authentically Marxist conceptions of Rosa Luxemburg could lose out to a diluted, passive Social Democracy. Indeed we need to understand how Marx himself came to become increasingly critical of the direction of Social Democracy towards the end of his life and yet could do nothing to alter it.

After the death of Marx, 'marxism’ quickly fragmented. One hesitates to use the term. The parties of the Second International possessed an interpretation of ‘marxism’ as the official ideology. This Social Democracy developed the economist, determinist and the reformist aspect of Marx. As against this, the revolutionary syndicalists concentrated upon the activist, workerist and class struggle aspect of Marx, as an unofficial and, indeed, largely unconscious, 'spontaneous' Marxism. Some syndicalists were politically conscious enough to consider themselves the real Marxists in following the principle of proletarian self-emancipation (Jennings 1990). Others were anarchist, many more were implicit Marxist communists in being simply workers in a condition of class consciousness.

But, it could be argued, neither reformists and syndicalists could be considered real Marxists. The one fetishised the political, the other fetishised the economic: neither could unify subjective and objective factors and ensure the interpenetration of the political and the economic which is crucial to socialist revolution.

But even the revolutionary left of Social Democracy which came to argue this point were split. Lenin's vanguardism had provoked Marxists to criticism long before the Bolshevik Revolution. In the chapter Down With Substitutionism in Part II of Our Political Tasks (1904), Trotsky famously predicted that one party would lead to one party rule, and finally to the rule of one leader. 

In the internal politics of the Party these methods lead, as we shall see below, to the Party organisation ‘substituting’ itself for the Party, the Central Committee substituting itself for the Party organisation, and finally the dictator substituting himself for the Central Committee.

Luxemburg wrote a detailed criticism in her pamphlet Organisational Questions of Russian Social Democracy. In time, Lenin's stress upon professional revolutionaries, educated leadership, hierarchical and disciplined organisation led to centralised state power.

Whether this vanguardism leading to statism is implicit or explicit in Marx, whether it is a necessary or merely a possible development from Marx (Kolakowski 1978 vol I 419) remains an important question. At this stage, we can draw attention to the fact that many Marxists, reformist and revolutionary, thought Lenin's conceptions quite unorthodox.

Proletarian Self-Organisation
In arguing that, for Marx, the organisational form is to be determined by the proletarian movement itself as it develops its own class, political consciousness the point to be stressed is that the question of the organisational form is not something that can be settled in abstraction from the real movement, of the class subject. The organisational form cannot be defined ideally and imposed upon the real movement of the class without it short circuiting the process of proletarian self-development which, for Marx, forms the very content of socialism. The character of the organisational form is determined by the self-development of the proletarian class subject at different stages in the process of constituting itself into a class-for-itself (Luxemburg in Howard 1971:273).

It is to begin to root out the elitism and bureaucratism implicit in the politicised conceptions of Marxism which rest upon an idealisation of organisational form, as though there is a fixed form for socialism. Though differing in perspectives, Social Democracy and Communism share a centralising logic in which politics is appropriated by an active elite and vested in an ideal organisational form determined independently of the class praxis of the proletarian subject.

The fixing and fetishisation of the organisational form for the proletarian subject tends to a bureaucratism that leads to a statist conception of socialism as something that proceeds from top down. Put bluntly the Kautsky-Lenin thesis of socialism 'from without' comes to be translated into a ‘socialism from above’ through the state (Basso 1975:100/1; Geras 1986:140 158).

The need to break with the authoritarianism and elitism implicit in bourgeois modes of organisation, thought and action thus serves as a key thesis distinguishing revolutionary socialism from Social Democratic and Communist forms. Luxemburg and Pannekoek made the same points, the one against Lenin's approach to organisational form, the other against the passive radicalism of Social (Parliamentary) Democracy.

There is nothing common to the corpselike obedience of a dominated class and the organised rebellion of a class struggling for its liberation. It is not by linking up with the discipline implanted in him by the capitalist state, by the mere transfer of authority from the hand of the bourgeoisie to that of the Social Democratic central committee, but by breaking, uprooting this slavish spirit of discipline that the proletarian can be educated for the new discipline, for the voluntary self-discipline of Social Democracy.

Luxemburg Organisational Questions in Howard 1971:291

	For Pannekoek, a passive radicalism conceives changes as occurring through the activity of organised elites working through political forms rather than through the self-initiative and self-activity of the working class subject.

Elections, strikes, parliamentary action, indoctrination all continue in the same old way, gradually gaining political weight but making no essential change whatsoever - until the day when, thanks to an extraordinary combination of circumstances, a powerful rising of the masses will occur and will perhaps overthrow the regime. This will follow exactly the old pattern of the bourgeois revolutions, but with the difference that the party organisation is fully ready to assume power and to hog the fruits of victory by appropriating, as the new ruling class, the chestnuts which the masses have snatched out of the fire.
Contrary to our thesis of the revolutionary activity of the proletariat, who build up their power through an ascendant period of mass action and increasingly demolish the bourgeois state power, this theory of passive radicalism looks for no decisive change through the active intervention of the proletariat.

Pannekoek in Bricianer 1978:129

It is this ‘active intervention of the proletariat’ which is crucial to Marx's political conception. The nature of the organisational form depends upon this active intervention and cannot be fixed beforehand without developing into a bureaucratism that inhibits further development. The basic theme to be traced, then, is that of the opposition between bureaucratic centralism and self-centralism.

Marx can be quoted as offering any number of organisational forms, from councils, clubs and committees to associations and unions and, indeed, to parties. He theorised none of these forms and, on his own premises of self-emancipation, could not. The formulation, moreover, is important. Marx argued that the proletariat form itself into a party, an altogether different notion from building the party for the proletariat. The former rests upon the self-constitution of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject, the latter implies the absence of the proletariat as revolutionary subject.

The party as alienated form of organisation is connected with the state as ideal agency. The absence of a revolutionary process of class constitution indicates the lack of democratic content.

The Fetishisation of Form – Incorporation
The basic problem in terms of socialist politics is how to delineate the organisational form without denying the principle of self-emancipation. To theorise this process of self-emancipation risks presenting the organisational form as an ideal agency.

As Marx wrote in the Report to the Brussels Congress with regard to the I.W.M.A.





In the same passage, Marx makes reference to ‘the latent power of the working class' (Marx 1974:99). It is upon this power of the class that organisational forms depend. For this latent power possesses the capacity to undermine existing forms and innovate new forms.

In putting the point this way it is intended to show that the emancipation of the proletariat is not something that depends upon the organisational form but that as the proletariat attains its own emancipation it creates the appropriate organisational form. The development of the organisational form, then, is part of the process of proletarian self-development and, apart from this process, becomes an abstracted ideal form containing the possibility of political alienation and arrested development. (Luxemburg in Basso 1975:101). The fetishisation of the organisational form means that the form becomes the end in itself to the neglect of content. Organisation becomes a rigidly imposed discipline that destroys the activity and initiative of the members and leads to the passivity and mediocrity that characterises bureaucratised forms. The ideal has been reached and further development is denied.

We need to address the question in terms of the incorporation of the class through organisational forms, through the failure to develop new forms, through, first and foremost, an inability to stress the class subject over the form through which its power is materialised.

We may therefore refer to what Miliband has called a crisis in the political agencies of the left (Miliband 1989:223). One can be more precise than this and refer to the crisis in the parliamentary parties and the trade unions, the dominant organisational forms of the working class in the last hundred years. Some would go further and argue that this crisis embraces the Leninist party also (Meszaros 1995:675; Negri 1991:198). Negri bases himself on the theory and practice of communist democracy and its tradition: 'from the Communards to the Soviets, from the IWW to the European autonomists in the 1970's. I am convinced that Lenin is not far from these positions' (Negri in Makdisi et al ed.1996:1-71).

That the organisational forms of the working class have operated not to canalise the incipient revolutionary socialism of the working class but to constrain the class within existing institutional forms is a critical observation that has been made frequently in the past. It is an idea worth exploring.

What still exists there in the form of parties, trade and industrial unions, labour fronts and other organisations is so completely integrated within the existing societal form that it is unable to function other than as an instrument of that society.
It is, furthermore, not possible to blame the most important theoretical expression thus far developed in the labour movement - Marxism - for the many shortcomings of the labour movement and for its present destruction. That labour movement which is now passing had very little to do with Marxism.

Mattick 1978: 75/6 

The Distinction between Proletarian and Bourgeois Forms
Thus, long before the collapse of state socialism and the crisis of the political agencies, Marxists of a certain kind were pointing out the un- and indeed anti-marxist character of the organisational forms defining the contemporary politics of labour. Thus, the political party and the trade unions were both presented as 'bourgeois’ forms appropriate to a labour movement operating - and constrained - within the existing institutional apparatus and social structure. In distinguishing between 'bourgeois’ and 'proletarian' forms or modes of thought, action and organisation, the work of Offe on new social movements is useful.
Monological forms of organisation correspond to the bourgeois society in which control is alienated from individuals and is vested in an institutional-systemic world raised above the life world. In these monological forms policy formation and action occurs at the leadership level and is transmitted downwards to the led. Power is imposed from the top down. Dialogical forms overcome this leaders-led dualism, involve those - subject to the decisions in the decision making process. Power is something which is exercised from the bottom upwards through the rank and file.

There is a need to recognise here the division that there has always been within socialist politics rather than identify socialism as such with monological forms. This is the socialism of bourgeois modes of action, organisation and thought, the socialism which has institutionalised itself on the terrain of bourgeois society as opposed to struggling to overcome the diremption of that society. Properly 'proletarian' modes, one should argue, are beyond the alienating dualisms and separations which characterise bourgeois society. The centralising, bureaucratising and abstracting tendencies which lead to monological forms are the product of bourgeois society and its separations. Socialism and its proletarian modes seek to transcend this society.

To state the distinction clearly, the political paradigm created by the new social movements is associated with what may be called 'dialogical' forms whereas the political paradigm of industrial capitalist society - which comprises the 'socialism' of parties and trade unions - is associated with monological forms. Of course those who, like Offe, are theorising the new politics represented by the new social movements would reject the identification of dialogical forms with a 'proletarian’ politics. A Marxist, concerned with the emancipatory project of abolishing the state and capital, would, however, repudiate the identification of 'proletarian' forms with the bourgeois modes of thought, action and organisation represented by the political parties and the trade unions. Such forms, it may be argued, correspond to the classical bourgeois separation of the political and the economic rather than attempt to overcome that diremption at the level of the social.

The old 'bourgeois’ paradigm was concerned with the process of accumulation, distribution of material resources, institutionalisation of interests groups and mediation of class conflict, and instituted mechanisms of collective bargaining and party competition. The new paradigm - whether one identifies it with the nsm or the proletariat - presupposes the emancipation of the life world of individuals from this institutional-systemic world in which control is alienated from individuals. Unfortunately, socialism as an organised political movement was inextricably involved in the very world it sought to transcend, hence its identification with the old monological or ‘bourgeois’ forms. However, understood in terms of Marx's original emancipatory project of overcoming the diremption of the political and the economic, abolishing the alien control of the state and capital, the proletarian modes of thought, action and organisation may indeed be depicted as 'dialogical'.





MODES OF ACTION		centralising and bureaucratising	decentralising and democratising




This little schema is useful in distinguishing genuinely socialist modes of thought, organisation and action from those appropriate to and created by the alienated social world to be abolished. This has a clear relation to the contemporary 'crisis of socialism'. The crisis of political agencies to which Miliband refers is part and parcel of the crisis of the capital system to which they are appropriate in representing the interests of labour. The crisis of capital is thus a crisis of these 'bourgeois' forms of labour politics. Socialist reformism is parasitic upon the capital system. Mattick continues











What Mattick's criticism draws attention to is the danger of the fetishisation of the organisational form, fixing it and imposing it upon the class subject thus constraining their autonomy and denying their creativity and initiative. To make a fetish of organisational form invites bureaucratisation and incorporation. Through the fetishised form it is more easy to control the class. The proletariat are confronted with the task of not only challenging existing institutions but also ‘their’ own forms which have constrained them to the existing system.

Autonomous Working Class 'Self' Activity
On this understanding, socialism can be achieved only when the working class, in the very process of constituting itself as the revolutionary class, create the organisational form appropriate to its autonomy and subjectivity. If the argument seems a little tautological then this is precisely because of the impossibility of dissecting this process in order to analyse the parts independently of each other without destroying the meaning. This whole restriction is implied in the designation self in proletarian self-emancipation. It is an inclusive and, indeed, exclusive phenomenon. The working class attains its own self-education through ensuring that their emancipation is their own work and, in so doing, taking the initiative in developing their own organisational, political and intellectual capacities rather than alienating that responsibility to politicians and intellectuals institutionalising proletarian incapacity in the form of the party. Party political socialism, whether in the form of Social Democracy or Communism, long ago lost their socialism in the institutions of a state power abstracted from civil society.

What the crisis of the political agencies means is that not only is the workers' path to socialism blocked by 'their' organisations but that these organisations can no - longer operate as they once did in securing moderate gains for the working class. Reforms always did presuppose a reformable capitalism. Now, the space for reform has been reduced. These agencies are suffering a crisis of authority.

From a revolutionary Marxist perspective the proletariat alone can resolve this crisis of the agencies by subverting existing forms through new forms. This means repudiating the bureaucratic organisational forms which have constrained the working class subject within the capital system.

It is in order to clarify this point that I look to provide a rigorous analysis of Marx's own approach to proletarian self-emancipation and indicate how such a principle could be realised in practice through workers' self-organisation coming to form the nuclei of the future socialist society. It is to argue again that Marx must be reinterpreted so as to make explicit the principle of proletarian autonomy and subjectivity that informs his perspectives on revolution as process.

The intention, therefore, is to show how Marx fuses together the class praxis and the organisational form of the proletarian revolutionary subject. Marx thus affirms the unity of subjective and objective factors, showing how, as the economic and the political struggle come to interpenetrate, there is a dialectical relation of the everyday struggle with the long term socialist objective. Central to this process is the creative class praxis of the proletariat.

The task of demonstrating this as being Marx's own view requires a painstaking analysis given that Marx did not and could not theorise proletarian self-emancipation. One needs to present the critique of the state and capital in emancipatory terms and, going on from here, piece together Marx's argument from his political pamphlets, from the reports at the time of the International and from his letters concerning revolutionary politics. This task is an important one. Clarity is essential so as to guard against the autonomous and subjective essence of the proletariat coming again to be destroyed by the organisational form and canalised into counter-revolutionary institutional and structural constraints of the capital system.

There is a positive side to the contemporary crisis of the political agencies of labour. The illusion that socialism involves the nationalisation of the means of the production under state control is no longer as plausible as it once was, to put it mildly. The limitations of socialism, as political abolition/expropriation ought now to be apparent (Meszaros 1995:713). The crisis of political agencies thus opens up the prospect of rediscovering that socialism is to be realised in the transformation of social relations of production. The future of socialism requires the final and irrevocable abandonment of state socialism. But to challenge the political parties and trade unions as 'bourgeois’ means possessing a degree of clarity as to the modes of organisation, thought and action which can make something material and permanent of the spontaneous development of the proletariat.

To define organisational form in terms of the process of proletarian self-emancipation as self-development has profound implications as to how socialist revolution is to be conceived. To state the thesis clearly, to employ a relational concept of power shifts the emphasis somewhat within Marxism. Power is not a 'thing' to be captured, monopolised and, wittingly or otherwise, reinforced. Rather, Marx defines power in terms of social relationships. Rather than concentrate upon conquering power as a thing- like entity, the socialist project must be oriented towards the transformation of social relations. Thus, the state and capital as alienated social powers are not captured as under the state socialist project but are diffused within a self-organising society. This ties in with the conception of revolution not as an event but as a process.

Thus, the target for criticism is not just Social Democracy and Communism, nor fetishisatlon and bureaucratisation in organisational form for the ways that they suppress the revolutionary will or what Marx calls the 'latent power' of the proletariat. The main cause of the crisis in which socialism finds itself, the real tragedy of Marxism, lies in having abandoned Marx's conception of proletarian self-emancipation. 

This is the conclusion of Simon Clarke (Clarke 1991:328; Gottlieb 1992:60) and it merits further treatment. It is worth clarifying just what this conception of self-emancipation is. In much of the socialism of the twentieth century it has functioned as something of a left piety. But it is very much more than this for Marx. It is no exaggeration to claim that it is the very essence of Marx's Marxism, for upon it rest emancipation, agency, praxis, consciousness, the abolition of alienation. The target for criticism, then, must focus upon the conception of revolution. For what has been the dominant conception of revolution has focused upon the event and has sought the state power as the prize to be won. The idea is that revolution is a physical, political event whereas Marx focuses upon a process originating in society and developing through the working class subject. Social Democracy and Communism lost the social and class roots of revolution. Instead, revolution came to be viewed as the product of methods of organisation. It is 'the party' and not the class which acts, the form is invested with existential significance whilst the class is robbed of subjectivity.





I argue that, despite everything that has happened under Social Democracy and Communism, we can go quite some way in meeting anarchist requirements for successful revolution by looking at Marx once more.

Revolution as Process
When conceived in terms of the self-development of the working class subject, the attainment of socialism is no longer conceived as an event, whether as an automatic breakdown of the capitalist economy or as the conquest of state power, but as a process which proceeds from within the capitalist social formation as a new mode of organisation, action and thought. This process may be grasped at a number of levels from within Marx:

1)	in terms of the emancipatory project of reappropriating social powers alienated to the state and capital and organising these within the self-organising society; 
2)	overcoming the separation between the state and civil society and hence creating a new relationship between the political and the social; 
3)	in terms of the unity of subjective and objective factors, a unity which forms the basis of the new society; 
4)	in terms of the process of proletarian self-development or class constitution, which itself forms the content of the revolutionary process.

These new modes of organisation, thought and action create a new relationship between the political and the economic but, more than this, as an emancipatory as well as a revolutionary process, they create a new relationship of human beings to the world. For what the revolutionary process is to achieve for Marx is not merely the abolition of the state and capital but also the abolition of the traditional dualism of leaders and led, rulers and ruled. This whole idea is contained in his critique of Hegel's political philosophy, where civil society actually constitutes itself as political society and the abstract citizenship of the state comes to be embodied in individual relationships in society. Marx's principle of active citizenship or ‘active suffrage’ is a principle of self-rule.

When one makes explicit the emancipatory dimension to the revolutionary process it is clear that for Marx the proletariat has an objective which is indeed 'the mightiest task which has fallen to a class’ (Luxemburg in Howard 1971:368). Luxemburg refers to the complete transformation of the state and complete overthrow of the economic foundations of society. Luxemburg also points out that, in contradistinction to bourgeois revolutions, the socialist revolution has to involve the vast majority of people as its very content. The revolution leading to socialism cannot be turned into an institutional process working from the top down but must be a democratic process involving and being defined by the active participation of the class as subject. The socialist objective, then, is not merely the abolition of the state and capital in a physical sense but involves a process in which human subjects recover their powers and, in the process of overcoming the dualism of state and civil society overcome also the dualism of leaders and led. This argument is the central thread in Marx's work from the early demands for an active citizenship to the later idealised presentation of the Commune.

Presenting socialist revolution in such a way renders the position of the political party, revolutionary or otherwise, highly problematical. It all depends upon the character of this party and, most importantly of all, how it is constituted. The theory of the revolutionary party has a massive question mark against it. For it presupposes that the knowledge of the socialist revolution is in some sense a priori. It rests on the claim that it is possible to know what the class is and how it is to act in advance of class praxis. It is as contradictory an argument as the notion of the theory of proletarian self-emancipation. The ability to theorise presupposes knowledge independent of the thing theorised. The theory of the revolutionary party denies proletarian subjectivity and autonomy. Such a party looks to the emancipation of the proletariat by organisational means provided for the proletariat as opposed to self-emancipation by means generated by the proletariat from within their class praxis.

The problem of the organisational form of the proletariat can in no way be resolved through the creation of an ideal form in the shape of 'the revolutionary party'. Indeed such an ideal party exists on the assumption of proletarian passivity and incapacity, as an ersatz proletariat as Aron put it (Merquior 1986:58). The party thus is revealed as an alienated form of organisation which claims to represent a class which, in Marx's terms, has to constitute itself as a class-for-itself and, in so doing, develop the capacity to represent itself through its own forms.

Thus, for Marx, the proletariat must form itself into a party. This is quite consistent with the notion that emancipation is something that the proletariat achieve for themselves rather than have some other ideal agency do it for them, either from above or from the outside. As Miliband argues, what distinguishes Marx is not the belief in the emancipation of the proletariat but the belief in the self-emancipation of the proletariat (Miliband 1977:119).

The problem of organisational form, then, is only avoided by a party organisation based upon a principle of representing a class subject that ought to be representing itself. What is called vanguardisrn is but the expression of this abstracted representation which retains the dualism of elite and mass, leaders and led, activity and passivity. This abstracted representation is a mechanism of alienating mediation that does confront individuals with the external character of 'their' organisations. 

This alienating mediation fetishizes an organisational form over those, the true subjects, subjected to it. The form is hypostatised and anthropomorphised, as though the self-emancipation of the proletariat depends not upon the proletarian class subject but upon the organisational form.

In this sense the political party rests upon theorising proletarian revolutionary incapacity, the revolutionary force lies not in the proletariat but in the organisational form. ‘The party’ is the institutionalised incapacity of the proletariat and, as such, must lead again to the state as an ideal agency existing in compensation for the failure of the class to constitute itself as a subject. Worse, 'the party’ short-circuits the process of proletarian self-constitution in which the proletariat does emerge as the revolutionary subject. The party thus represents an obstacle in the way of the proletariat and the socialist objective.

Hence the contradictory nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat taking the form of the dictatorship of the party subordinating proletarian organs of self-government to a political control institutionalised at the level of the state. Whilst anarchists had long argued that this was the only form that Marx's justification for the transitional state could take, there are grounds for arguing that for Marx the dictatorship would be exercised by the self-organised proletariat, with the central authority constituted by the proletariat organised into clubs and societies of various kinds. In other words, Marx's centralisation proceeds from the bottom up through the active participation of the proletariat. With Marx's conception the separation of the state from civil society has been overcome from below, civil society is in the process of making itself political society and, for this reason, one can foresee the end of the state.

With the intervention of the party, however, and with the party ideologically identified with the proletariat, a clear case of substitution has occurred via the principle of abstract representation, i.e. an organised political elite claiming to act in the place of a still passive mass, independent of that mass. This ‘party’ reproduced the leaders-led, state-society dualism within the socialist movement, thus subverting the proletarian challenge to bourgeois modes (Negri in Makdisi et al ed.1996:173/5).

But, from this leaders-led dualism, we return to the core of the problem and show how this continued domination of abstracted representation is founded upon the classic bourgeois separation of the political from the social. It is for this reason that we reinstate this classic dualism of state and civil society as the central target in Marx's emancipatory project. For the roots of reformism and state capitalism are not to be found in the betrayal and the careerism of leaders but in the inability to overcome the dualism of the political and the economic characterising bourgeois society. The introduction of bourgeois modes of organisation, thought and action in the socialist movement is always a possibility given a tendency to remain within the sphere of immediacy.

Marx's New Politics
The concept and system of abstract representation thus presumes the separation of the state and civil society. Within the traditional politics of labour the division between the political, identified with parliamentarism, and the economic, identified with trades unionism, coincides with that separation of the state and civil society characterising the bourgeois epoch. Failure to challenge and overcome this dualism makes the domination of bourgeois modes of thought, action and organisation all but inevitable.

The practical task, then, is to innovate new forms of political-material organisation through which the proletariat develops the capacity for self-determination. It is here that the nuclei of the self-organising, self-governing society is to be found.

In conceiving Marx's argument for revolutionary politics in terms of process, I am concerned to reinstate the democratic and the prefigurative dimension in the achievement of communism, something that looks to recover the themes of community, democracy, individuality and citizenship that are possibly overlooked within an explicitly class politics. The whole point of Marx's as an emancipatory project will thus be demonstrated to be to recover alienated power through the abolition of the state and capital and, in the process, to socialise, democratise and humanise this power. Human agency and the objective self-made world will thus be unified. In political terms, this translates into the extension of non-hierarchic and non-bureaucratic relations through the unification of political and social relationships. Individuals as active citizens will become themselves, in their own spheres, leaders.

Marx, from the early critique of Hegel's political philosophy, sought a new kind of political discourse, one that reaches beyond bourgeois society and its dualism and which looks towards a non-authoritarian and non-statist/political transition to the socialist society. Of course, Marx is political in the sense of arguing that the proletariat must convert its economic movement into political movement. Marx does argue for political organisation and, indeed, for participation in the parliamentary struggle. But we must here be careful to distinguish the strategic from the tactical. Parliamentary political activity and party political organisation is subordinate, clearly, to the social revolution. This is the relation between the social and the political revolution that Marx makes in the Critical Notes (1975 402ff) and which he made clear again in the Provisional Rules of the International when he argues that 'the economic emancipation of the working classes is therefore the great end to which every political movement ought to be subordinate as a means' (Marx 1974:82).

Quite clearly, this recovery of the importance of social revolution and proletarian organisation as process transcends the historical limitations of Social Democracy and Communism. From this standpoint one can begin to be a bit more clear as to the relation of the 'real' Marx and the 'authentic' Marxist tradition to be recovered. Any list of names and movements is problematical, especially when the Marxism in question points in the directions of self-emancipation and revolutionary vanguardism at once, as in the case of someone like Lukacs.

Rather than approach the subject in this way, it is more profitable to present Marx's politics in terms of a commitment, negatively, to the abolition of alienative and exploitative relations, of the old dualisms of the political and the economic, leaders and led and, positively to democratic reappropriation, proletarian self-activity, social self-organisation and social revolution. 

It is to contrast Marx's democratising, ascending, self-representing conception with the authoritarian, descending, abstractly representing conception of bourgeois modes of political organisation (including state socialism) (Meszaros 1995:468 723/9). This is essential so that the workers movement can actually confront the interlocking nature of alien power by overcoming its split into political and economic wings.






Despite the historical domination of Social Democracy and Communism there is nothing permanent about organisational forms. Forms must have content and, following the logic of Marx's argument that there are only people as subjects and the forms they engender (Marx 1975:85/6, 87/8), this content can always reconstitute form. 

It is possible for the working class to take the initiative against 'their' organisations and, indeed, to innovate organisational forms so as to materialise their subjectivity and autonomy. This is how Negri presents the problem, and it clearly undermines the Leninist conception of the party (Negri 1991:198/200). The working class, as subjects of the revolutionary process, possesses the capacity to subvert existing forms and innovate new forms in their place.

As C.L.R. James wrote:





As the proletariat develops new forms of organisation, what James refers to as 'disciplined spontaneity', the old forms are undermined. As James argues, this entails the destruction of the Communist parties which had become incorporated into the capital system. James made his repudiation of the Leninist party clear in the Preface to the second edition of State Capitalism and World Revolution (1956):

The political conclusions of this economic analysis can be summed up in its total repudiation of the theory and practice of the Leninist theory of the Vanguard Party for our era.

In determining the character of the new organisational forms, James' argument makes it clear that this has nothing to do with defining the ideal form for the class but recognising the working class as a subject capable of innovating its own forms.

The great organisations of the masses of the people and of workers in the past were not worked out by any theoretical elite or vanguard. They arose from the experience of millions of people and their need to- overcome the intolerable pressures which society had imposed upon them for generations .. the new organisations will come as Lilburne's Leveller Party came, as the sections and popular societies of Paris in 1793, .as the Commune in 1871 and the Soviets in 1905, with not a single soul having any concrete ideas about them until they appeared in all their power and glory.




James’ argument makes it clear why Marx insisted that whatever organisational forms were developed it was absolutely imperative that they were developed by the proletariat themselves, acting as an independent social force. This is how he referred to the International. There are a number of points which follow from this argument. The working class educate themselves politically only through their own organisational activity.

This could perhaps lead to a working class exclusivism, as seen with the revolutionary syndicalists, rendering Marx's own role within the workers' movement contradictory. Marx himself had no objection to extraneous forces in the proletarian movement, so long as they left their bourgeois and petty bourgeois baggage behind. What Marx feared was that ‘well meaning’ bourgeois and petty bourgeois would quickly come to dominate inside the socialist movement and impose their conceptions derived from outside of the proletariat upon the proletarian movement (Marx REV 1973:79 81; 1974:360). This would arrest the process in which the proletariat develop their organisational, political and intellectual capacities and hence ensure that socialism could be realised only in the compensatory, substitutionist, 'bourgeois' form of state socialism.

The process of proletarian self-development forms the content of socialism. From this perspective, socialism is possible only when the proletariat can initiate and sustain the process of self-development and are thus able to innovate and control the organisational forms capable of constituting the socialist social order. Thus proletarian self-education is also the best socialist education that there is and is in direct opposition to the conception that socialist consciousness is introduced into the proletariat ‘from the outside' via the intellectuals and politicians of the party as the ideal agency.

The proletariat thus comes to appreciate that not only must emancipation be their own work but that this self-emancipation is possible only if they initiative and participate in the revolutionary process and not allow it to be reduced to an institutional process governed by the politicians.

45 THE PARTY - BUREAUCRATIC VERSUS SELF-CENTRALISM

The Conflict between Ascending and Descending Conceptions of Socialism - Socialism from Above and Below
The idea of a contrast between ascending and descending conceptions comes from Walter Ullmann and the way he contrasts approaches to power in the Middle Ages. In the descending conception power flows downward from God to the king. Political authority, then, did not depend upon the consent or sovereignty of the people. In the ascending conception power flows upwards from the people.

The one conception of government and law, which was also chronologically the earlier one, may be termed the ascending theory. Its main feature is that original power is located in the people, or in the community itself... Since original power resided in the people, it was they who in their popular assemblies elected a war leader or a duke or a king, and the like. He had no power other than that which the electing assembly had given him. He was said to represent the community and remained therefore accountable to the popular assembly. . . Metaphorically speaking, power ascended from the broad base of a pyramid to its apex, the king or duke. The popular assembly controlled the ruler's government, and it was mainly as a court of law that the assembly worked effectively. This ascending theory of government may also be called the populist theory of government, because original power was anchored in the people.




The ascending conception of power derives from Aristotle's politics and the recovery of Aristotle in the thirteenth century (Ullmann 1965:159ff). Indeed, Aquinas can be interpreted as an attempt to make Aristotle safe for the existing political and religious authorities, so great was the Aristotelian threat to the theocratic-descending conceptions. A more generous reading sees the Thomist synthesis as introducing ascending Aristotelian themes into the Christian Middle Ages, establishing a bridgehead that could further the democratic revolution in  the following centuries. The ascending conception continued to grow in influence and developed into the notion that citizens were not subordinated to a political authority above them but that this political authority derived from the citizens. The 'thesis of citizenship' is crucial to the ascending-populist theory (Ullmann 1965:164).

The development of the concept of citizenship was crucial in establishing the democratic norm that the demos in a community possessed rights as genuine claims upon the body politic and not merely as favours from the monarch.





It is important to emphasise from the start that the conflict between socialism 'from above' and 'from below' will be located within the long term conflict between these two contrasting themes of government, the ascending and descending. The ascending theme of government asserts that the law locating power is located in the people. It is the population, the citizens or the demos, which is the bearer of the power upon which political authority, government and law rests. The organ of government, the state or the council or the assembly etc., is composed of representatives chosen by and responsible to the people. The fundamental principle of the ascending theme is that since power derives from the people, the people ought always to be in control of the direction of its own society. Consent on the part of the people forms a structural element of the ascending theme (Ullmann 1975:30).

The principle of representation is integral to the ascending theme. That is, representatives do not speak or act independently of the represented but on their behalf. Only in truly representing the represented is the representative empowered to give consent to legislation.

 It follows too that the ruler is a representative of the people, remaining responsible to the people and possesses no power independently of the people. Power ascends from below, from the people to the ruler. The people can check or change rulers and can restrict or modify the power wielded by the ruler.

Of course, the assertion that all power is located in the people and that political authority rests on the representation of the people does not exclude the possibility of misrepresentation. The theorists of the ascending theme were well aware of the possibilities of misrepresentation and hence developed theories of the right to resistance (Ullmann 1975:30; Allen 1923). But what this indicates is that representatives have come to obtain an independence of the represented and have come to turn popular power against the people. Marx's critique of abstract representation in the context of the state-civil society separation is obviously pertinent here. For this political alienation, arguably, involves the degeneration of the ascending theme into the descending theme.

The descending theme of government asserts that power is located not in the people but descends ‘from above'. Traditionally, the 'above' has been God; divinity is made the source of all power and this power is 'descended from above’ or distributed downwards in an hierarchical fashion. Here, the people are at the very bottom of the pyramid. At the top is the ruler receiving the divine power and distributing it downwards. Government is not conducted through the representatives of popular power but through the delegates of the divine power appointed by the ruler.





Marx’s starting point is the democratic revolution, which proceeded to assert the ascending theme, altering political institutions in the process. It is significant that Marx began with the critique of the state as an abstraction, closely examining citizenship, political liberalism, representation and universal suffrage from the perspective of 'true democracy'. Marx's true democracy entails the dissolution of all political institutions and relations which, in obtaining an independence of the demos, had come to deny the conception of popular sovereignty. If all power is located in the people, it should also be exercised, continuously, by the people. This is the language of radical, decentralised, participatory democracy.

That the doctrine of popular sovereignty could threaten to dissolve all political authority not derived from and subjected to the demos was made clear in the centuries following the Middle Ages. Paul Hazard's commentary on Spinoza is worth quoting in that it reveals how the democratisation of knowledge and power could proceed.

Of the Christian religion, all that remained was a soulless formalism and a blind credulity which turned men into brute beasts by denying them the exercise of their own judgement, and extinguishing the light of human reason. Reason must be the starting point of the new quest. In the name of Reason, a clearance would have to be made of two cities, one the City Celestial, the other the City Royal, both illogical, both fraught with disaster.




It is this development which Marx looked to take to the logical conclusion of an active democracy. The fetters which people forged for themselves could be broken given the power that they possessed as citizens.

Marx is to be located within the ascending theme of government. But where is Marxism placed? There are those, like Laclau and Mouffe, who would place Marx and Marxism within the theocratic-descending theme. Thus Laclau argues that:





This is a travesty of Marx's own position, though it could certainly apply to ‘Scientific’ Marxism and the claims made for 'the party’. We need to appreciate how this could be the case, how Marxism, emphasising the scientific knowledge of underlying essences and structures hidden from the popular mind, could locate power and knowledge in an elite governing the mass 'from above' rather than deriving this power and knowledge from below. The stark contrast between ascending and descending themes of government actually becomes a complicated problem within Marxism itself. Marx's praxis is to be understood in terms of the democratisation of knowledge, power and politics but there is also a sense in which the scientific aspects of Marxism have led to the devaluation of the democratic dimension and the reinstatement of authoritarian-elitist government 'from above'. This controversy will be the subject of the discussion.

Before continuing further with this theme of ascending and descending conceptions of power, democracy and socialism one should consider Perry Anderson's argument that it is

necessary to recall one of the basic axioms of historical materialism, that secular struggle between classes is ultimately resolved at the political - not at the economic or cultural - level of society. In other words, it is the construction and destruction of states which seal the basic shifts in the relations of production, so long as classes subsist. A 'history from above' - of the intricate machinery of class domination - is thus no less essential than a 'history from below’: indeed, without it the latter in the end becomes one sided (if the better side).

Anderson Lineages of the Absolutist State 1974:235/6

The Two Socialisms
The basic idea is that there are two contrasting conceptions of socialism, from above and from below. The turn of the century saw a battle between these two conceptions. Marx himself had seen the beginnings of this struggle within Social Democracy, attacking the well-meaning bourgeois and petty bourgeois taking over socialism (Circular Letter 1974:360). Luxemburg saw the victory of this element (Social Reform or Revolution in Howard ed.1971). It was a victory for a socialism from above, through the state over a socialism from below, through the workers movement.

Emile Durkheim defined the two socialism's:

There are two movements under whose influence the doctrine of socialism is formed: one which comes from below and directs itself towards the higher regions of society, and the other which comes from the latter and follows the reverse direction .. according to the place occupied by the theoretician according to whether he is in closer contact with workers, or more attentive to the general interest of society it will be one rather than the other ... The result is two different kinds of socialism: a workers socialism or a state socialism.

Durkheim 1896 in Gouldner ed. 1962:61/2

There are, then, two aspects to the discussion. One, the processes by which socialism came to be colonised by the middle classes and bourgeois modes as it came to be adapted to the existing political institutions and the social structure; two, the reassertion of a workers socialism from a Marxist perspective.


The Marxist Conception - Active Citizenship
My argument is an attempt to examine the political turn in Marxism and socialism from the perspective of a conception of democracy powered from below. The examination of this question proceeds in respect of the vicissitudes of Marxism as a party political socialism upholding a descending conception of knowledge and power. It will present an ascending conception of socialism as derived from Marx's engagement with the political philosophical tradition, from the tradition of the French Revolution and political liberalism, and from the associational activity of the growing working class movement.

What emerges from this background is the view that the process of democratisation, replacing the descending theme with the ascending theme, can proceed only if the abstract citizenship existing at the state level is understood in terms of the self-management of all areas of the practical lives of individuals. Thus citizenship is something embodied and actualised in individual relationships in civil society (Marx OJQ 1975:234).

Thus one begins with the conclusions that Marx drew from his critique of Hegel's political philosophy, that civil society must make itself political society, that this entails the abolition of the state, that the positive significance of universal suffrage lies not in democratising the state but in overcoming the state-civil society dualism. Marx thus pushes the ascending theme of democracy to its logical conclusion, past political institutions to the self-governing demos and a conception of active sovereignty. Bobbio (1987) asserts this ascending or, as he puts it, 'subversive' aspect against Marx's socialism whereas, according to the argument I make here, this aspect is integral to Marx's socialism.

In this framework, the idea of active participation in what is self-government comes to constitute society. Indeed, when one considers praxis in its widest sense - Marx did not restrict it to the production of economic goods, but production in terms of language, culture, society etc. (Kitching 1988:19) - then the incorporation of a principle of active citizenship in individual relationship entails the democratisation of all aspects of life. It is, no doubt, part of the process whereby the relationships between human beings are made transparent.

Marx's socialism, then, may be presented as a thoroughly democratic conception. Indeed, the basic premise, from which all else may be deduced, is that in human history there is only the demos and the social and political forms they engender (Meikle 1985:45/6). The conclusion follows that these forms should be subordinate to the conscious control of individuals. Marx's free association of individuals is based on both active citizenship and the self-government of the producers. Individuals are able to participate fully in the practices and decisions which affect their practical lives. This would entail a radically different conception of the public and public power and is certainly distinct from the idea of 'the state' as something apart from the sovereign people. Sovereignty could be considered only in the active sense of all decisions, institutions and the public realm in general being subject to popular control and scrutiny (Aronowitz 1981:258). It means the redefinition of sovereignty and citizenship.

Locating Marx within the historical theme of ascending power one is brought to democracy and democratisation. Taking up Marx's discussion of citizenship, representation and suffrage in terms of the critique of the state-civil society separation as entailing abstract conceptions one can conceive that the fundamental question in Marx's politics concerns a series of alienating dualisms which deny democracy (Marx 1975:80 85/6 87/8 88 89 89/90 106 137 143/4). The dualisms of state and civil society, government and governed, representatives and represented entail the alienation of sovereignty and the reduction of the sovereign people to passivity. It is in this situation that the social power of the demos comes to be alienated to the state and turns to oppose them as political force (Marx OJQ 1975:234).

Thus the fundamental problem of Marxist politics is this series of alienating dualisms and their abolition. This is not something that can be resolved through fixed organisational forms, for it is not strictly an organisational question but a problem of how social and political forms come to acquire an independence over against the demos.

A Marxist politics needs to proceed from Marx's discussion of citizenship, representation and true democracy. The critique of political alienation concentrates upon the dualisms in political arrangements which divorce the demos from their power and invests this power in institutions which confront the individuals constituting the demos as an alien form, that socialism came to reproduce this political alienation, by replacing the social transformation of relations of production with the nationalisation of the productive farces, is to be explained in these terms (Clarke 1991:328). Moreover, the critique of political alienation is to be developed into a critique of the bureaucratic centralism into which 'the party' degenerated.

Indeed, it is to be argued that what, separates the bureaucratic centralism of Lenin from the self-centralism of Luxemburg is precisely that conflict between descending and ascending themes of power. It is a conflict that exists within Marxism through the failure to integrate the conception of revolutionary-critical as the democratisation of theory, power and politics with scientific socialism as the knowledge of underlying laws, essences and structures. The former proceeds from the transformatory and knowledgeable agency of the human subject, the latter from the idea that a complex reality is accessible to an enlightened elite of politicians and intellectuals.

Marx's view of the proletariat, of organisational form and of revolution as process affirms the centrality of creative agency and, as such, prioritises the democratic dimension in overcoming the alienating dualisms and separations of bourgeois society and politics. Thus Marx will be read against that authoritarian-elitist politics in which an objectivist conception of reality and its 'laws' and of the class leads to a fixed organisational form. 'Scientific socialism’ privileging structure over agency privileges also those claiming scientific knowledge of structure and thus devalues the democratic dimension. Where Marx's original conception led to a new politics based upon a new relationship between the political and the social, the reinstatement of the authoritarian-elitist conception reproduces the old dualism.
Social Democracy and Communism came to reproduce the dualism between government and governed, maintaining these as bureaucratic relations in which an elite reserves the right to active participation in a politics monopolised by the state whilst the passive mass remains subject to this rule from above. It is bureaucratic because this elite makes an ideological claim to alone possess knowledge, reducing politics to management and manipulation (Sassoon 1987:xvi).

Centralism - Self Versus Bureaucratic
In the light of the identification of Marx with the statism of 'really existing socialism’, the issue is a crucial one for Marxist politics. Coleman, replying to the criticisms of the anarchists, underlines the fact that Marx does not, like Lenin, advocate a workers state, but insists that to gain power the working class must act to abolish the state, dismantling the coercive apparatus and acting to create that self-governing society in which the working class and the state have dissolved themselves (Coleman 1982 in Pepper 1993:213).

Thus it appears that Marxism can only be defined as an emancipatory project to the extent that it can finally extinguish Jacobinism, authoritarianism and bureaucratic - top down - centralism from its own revolutionary politics. It is to put the social before the political revolution so as to create a process whereby the political can be dissolved into the political. This means closer attention to the consistency of means and ends and the concept of the means as the end in the process of becoming. Marxism is thus finally to severe any historical and political links that it has had with the Jacobin-bourgeois tradition of political revolution and government. It is to reinstate the principle of proletarian self-emancipation in terms of social revolution as a democratising process of restitution.

Rosa Luxemburg's 'self-centralism’ is conceived in direct opposition to Lenin's Jacobin centralism. As Lenin was beginning to organise government in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution on top down lines, thus subjecting the Soviets to political control, Luxemburg was defining the conception of a socialist society powered from the base upwards through workers, councils (What Does the Spartacus League Want? in Howard 1971). 

There may be a danger of overstating the case, for Lenin too outlines a radically democratic conception against Social Democratic parliamentarism.

But there is a sense that Lenin reintroduced the Jacobin and authoritarian-elitist conceptions that Marx had consciously sought to overcome in revolutionary politics. Lenin introduced a bureaucratic centralism which, possibly justifiable in the conditions in which he worked, completely destroyed revolutionary possibilities and arrested a natural development of revolutionary politics when applied as an institutional model (Kendall 1969).

A vanguardism which assigns the revolutionary role not to proletarians but to professional politicians, a sectarian conception of 'the Party', a dogmatism in presenting 'marxism' as 'correct ideology', all reveal aspects of a politics that Marx had sought to supersede in relation to Enlightenment materialism, its determinist epistemology and conservative and authoritarian implications for politics, bourgeois separations and dualisms. It is this understanding which provoked Luxemburg to criticise Lenin's Jacobinism (Basso 1975:103/4; Howard ed.1971:288/90).

the Social Democratic centralisation cannot be based on blind obedience, nor on the mechanical subordination of the party militants to a central power. On the other hand, it follows that an absolute dividing wall cannot be erected between the class-consciousness kernel of the proletariat, already organised as party cadre, and the immediate popular environment which is gripped by the class struggle and finds itself in the process of class enlightenment.
For this reason, the construction of centralism in Social Democracy, as Lenin desires, on the basis of these two principles - 1) on the blind subordination of all party organisations in the smallest detail of their activity to a central power which, alone, thinks, plans, and decides for all; and 2) the sharp separation of the organised kernel of the party from the surrounding revolutionary milieu - seems to us to be a mechanistic transfer of the organisational principles of the Blanquistic movement of conspiratorial groups to the Social Democratic movement of the working masses. And Lenin identified this perhaps more rigorously than any of his opponents could when he defined his ‘revolutionary Social Democrat’ as the ‘Jacobin indissolubly connected with the organisation of the class conscious proletariat’.
The fact is, however, that Social Democracy is not bound up with the organisation of the working classes; rather, it is the very movement of the working class. Social Democratic centralism must, therefore, be of essentially other coin than the Blanquist. It can be nothing but the imperative summation of the will of the enlightened and fighting vanguard of the working class as opposed to its individual groups and members. This is, so to speak, a ‘self-centralism’ of the leading stratum of the proletariat; it is the rule of the majority within its own party organisation.

Luxemburg Organisational Questions in Howard ed.1971:289/90

Luxemburg thus refers to the 'building of a class conscious vanguard of the proletariat capable of self-direction’ (Luxemburg in Howard ed.1971:291).

The ‘discipline’ which Lenin has in mind is implanted in the proletariat not only by the factory but also by. The barracks, by modern bureaucratism - in short, by the whole mechanism of the centralised bourgeois state... There is nothing common to the corpselike obedience of a dominated class and the organised rebellion of a class struggling for its liberation. It is not by linking up with the discipline implanted in him by the capitalist state, by the mere transfer of authority from the hand of the bourgeoisie to that of the Social Democratic central committee, but by breaking, uprooting this slavish spirit of discipline that the proletarian can be educated for the new discipline, for the voluntary self-discipline of Social Democracy.

Luxemburg Organisational Questions in Howard ed.1971:291 

Trotsky too criticised Lenin's conception. The issue for Trotsky was whether the centralised party was to be created from above and on the narrow basis of a small but compact group of Marxist intellectuals, or from below and on the basis of an ever growing participation of the working class in the class struggle. Trotsky charged Lenin with choosing the former course, building a party which represents the working class only formally. Whereas Lenin in What is to be Done? made the mass revolutionary struggle dependent on the existence of the vanguard party, Trotsky was inclined to see the growth of the party and the activity of the workers as mutually conditioned phenomena. Thus it is the growing participation of the working class in political struggle which creates the real base for a centralised working class party, giving it a weight and political influence which would enable it to draw a broader range of people into its ranks. Trotsky’s position explicitly repudiated the Kautsky-Lenin thesis that, left to itself, the proletariat is incapable of arriving at a revolutionary socialist consciousness, and that the latter can only be brought to it ‘from the outside’ by bourgeois intellectuals. That thesis originated with Kautsky, and was cited with approval by Lenin. It may not be the whole of Lenin’s position, but it was targeted by Trotsky. Trotsky argued against the view that the principle of a centralised party and a socialist political consciousness could be unilaterally introduced into the working class movement from the outside. On the contrary, both the political organisation and consciousness should be the product of an interaction between the autonomous initiative of the masses, on the one hand, and the party's attempt to win them for socialism, on the other. In Our Political Tasks, Trotsky condemned Lenin's one sided conception of the relation between party and class as an attempt to 'substitute’ the party for the working class, in playing on the theme of ‘substitutionism’, envisaged a process in which 'the party organisation at first substitutes itself for the party as a whole; then the Central Committee substitutes itself for the organisation; and finally, a single ‘dictator’ substitutes himself for the Central Committee (Geras 1986:157/8).

Both Luxemburg and Trotsky emphasise the independent initiative of the working class subject over the organisational form. This enables them to safely negotiate a path for proletarian politics beyond bourgeois society and its alienating dualisms. The dualism which bureaucratic or top down centralism represents has its origins in the political division of labour in the bourgeois epoch - the division between state and society, the representatives and the represented, the government and the governed. Lenin can be criticised for developing a capitalist politics. Whether this produced, naturally enough, a state capitalism or, indeed, expressed the fact that Bolshevism, seeking merely a political abolition/expropriation of capitalism left the material terrain of the capital system unaltered is not the issue. The fact is that bureaucratic centralism reproduced the dualism which is inherent in bourgeois society.

The Dualism of the Political and the Social
Thus, in defining revolution as an organisational rather than as a democratic question, the organisational form was fetishised and came to obtain an existence abstracted from the class subject. 'The Party’ had become the ideal agency capable of instituting socialism from above the heads of a seemingly incapable proletariat. This conception was incapable of transcending the classic bourgeois dualism of the political and the economic and, indeed, represented a form of socialism compatible with that dualism. Lenin's denigration of 'economism’ amounted to a privileging of the political over the economic and, in turn, continued the autonomisation of politics.

The reduction of the attainment of socialism to an organisational question continued the fetishisation of form over the class subject. The mere creation of an organisational form, adhering to 'marxism' as the 'correct ideology', derives from the objectivist approach to social reality. The definition of the proletariat as an ideal type whose political consciousness can be read off from class location sustains a bureaucratic approach in which politics is abstracted and autonomised from class praxis, the process in which the class autonomises itself. It implies a conception of the revolution as an organisational process in which what matters is the creation of the right form and the right ideology as opposed to being a democratic process in which the revolutionary class develops its own forms and consciousness.

The historic task of the proletariat is to overcome the dualisms characterising bourgeois society and politics and this can only be achieved when power is conceived as flowing from the base upwards as in the ascending conception. Antonio Gramsci demonstrated his awareness of Marxism as a thoroughgoing democratisation when making this case for the party.

In order for the party to live and be in contact with the masses, it is necessary for every member of the party to be an active political element, a leader.

Gramsci in Sassoon 1987:86

Such a party could indeed develop into the 'regulated society' in which the dualism between state and society has been resolved at the level of a civil society having acquired a political significance. Gramsci's ‘regulated society’ enables the recovery of the meaning of Marx's argument that democratisation through the suffrage entails the demand that civil society actually become the political society. Adequate representation has to be a self-representation through social organs as opposed to an abstracted representation through the state. Politics in the alien sense, as power, initiative and responsibility concentrated at the centre and monopolised by the state, diminishes with the political investment of civil society. Social self-government ensures that the state-civil society dualism obtains a non-authoritarian, thoroughly democratic, resolution. The bourgeois conception of politics, with the independence of both political and social spheres and the domination of both by alien power, is thus transcended.

The Bureaucratisation of Socialism
The emphasis upon content over form, upon the constitutive power of the revolutionary subject as the basis for the unity to be given organisational form, does not necessarily entail the repudiation of the political party, as Gramsci's conception of the party demonstrates. It depends upon how the party is constituted, how it is oriented, and by whom. This stress upon the class subject actually creating its own forms as part of the process whereby it constitutes itself as a class-for-itself certainly entails the repudiation of all organisational forms created for the class, to represent the class, independently of the praxis of the class.

Hence my point in repeating that Marx demanded that the working class form itself into a political party. Marx did not state abstractly that the political party is the appropriate organisational form. It is not the form but the content which is the revolutionary form. To present the party as such as revolutionary represents the fetishisation of form. It needs to be argued that socialism, as the end, represents the culmination of the process of development and is constituted by everything in that process.

Socialism, then, is not an ahistorical ideal that can be defined in abstraction and reduced to a political programme to be implemented by the party as the ideal agency. Rather, conceiving the attainment of socialism as a process, one draws attention to the elements which constitute this process, especially the democratic dimension in which the people come to assert control over their social existence. Thus the elements which characterise the socialist society as free and democratic are actually created in the process of realising socialism. It is content, then, which is primary. The form is secondary.

The role of the organisational form is thus determined by the dynamic, dialectical process of proletarian self-emancipation in which the class, in constituting itself as a class, comes to autonomise itself against capital, and, hence become the revolutionary class. The organisational form cannot be fixed but must, on the contrary, be flexible according to the different stage that the proletariat has reached in the process of self-emancipation.






This is how Rosa Luxemburg, in the Organisational Questions of Russian Social Democracy, made the point against bureaucratic centralism:

Nothing will deliver a still young labour movement to the intellectual's thirst for power more easily than confining it in the straightjacket of a bureaucratic centralism which degrades the worker to a pliant tool of a 'committee'. And, on the other hand, nothing so surely protects the labour movement from an ambitious intelligentsia as the independent revolutionary action of the working class, as the increasing of their feeling of political responsibility.
If the independent action, the free initiative and political sense of the most advanced stratum of the working class are not let loose, if they are politically hindered and drilled by a Social Democratic central committee, than the game, of the bourgeois demagogues in a renovated Russia will be made easier, and the harvest of the present efforts of Social Democracy will tomorrow be found in the barns of the bourgeoisie.

Luxemburg in Howard 1971:301/2

Here one sees the defence of the democratic dimension of Marx's Marxism against a 'bourgeois' socialism, a workers socialism against state socialism if one employs Durkheim’s antithesis.

Of course, by itself, the self-activity and self-organisation of the working class does not necessarily lead to their emancipation. The working class can engage in what has been called a 'do-it-yourself reformism' (Cliff and Gluckstein 1988:53). Proletarian self-initiative, therefore, needs to repudiate a reformism from above and below which pursues incremental gains on the terrain of bourgeois society. Marx's argument, however, contains the possibility that the self-development of the class will proceed in an emancipatory and revolutionary direction as part of their attempt to autonomies themselves as against capital. This is to explore the revolutionary side of the labour-capital relation. It is to argue that the proletariat is the revolutionary force in this relation, something which theorists of 'the party' deny.

The development of the party conception of socialism into state socialism follows the fetishisation of the organisational form. The party as the ideal agency, alone escaping the determinism and fetishism to which the proletariat are subject, leads to the reconstitution of the state as the ideal raised above society. The experience of 'really existing socialism’ as a state capitalism has demonstrated that the only possible route to socialism lies in the process of proletarian self-development in which the class itself develops its own organisational forms. The socialist parties which succeeding in conquering state power served to reinforce the power of the state over society. Socialism became a political project which led in a completely opposed direction from the 'association of free and equal producers'. Revolutions engineered from above or controlled from above by the parties reproduced the bourgeois autonomy of the political and were thus incapable of transcending the dualistic mode of bourgeois politics. Socialism was identified with a political abolition/expropriation of capitalism as .identified with private property in the means of production but was quite incapable of putting an end to capital as a social relationship.

Rosa Luxemburg's reference to the danger of the labour movement falling prey to intellectuals seeking power is worth pursuing from the perspective of the bureaucratisation of socialism. How we explain this bureaucratisation is open to a number of interpretations, depending upon one’s perspective. Luxemburg is certainly drawing attention to the role of those 'well meaning' bourgeois and petty bourgeois whom Marx saw as an increasing threat to the socialism of the socialist movement (Circular Letter). Luxemburg develops the point further in Social Reform or Revolution.

One has the sense here of a process in which the emerging labour movement put socialism on the political agenda and, indeed, made socialism the subject of the chattering classes (The Nineteenth Century Goodwin ed. 1951:196ff; 213ff; 228ff; 23l'ff; 24lff) but also made socialism a highly attractive vehicle for professional and educated middle class liberals of a collectivist and bureaucratic persuasion. Socialism came to offer an alternative to laisser faire market capitalism to those who wished for greater conscious regulation of the economy through the state. By the 1890's the working class were literally fighting to retain control of the socialism that their activity and organisation had created. That there was such a fight is clear from the articles in Commonweal and Justice. Thus

Fabianism is the special movement of the government official, just as militarism is the special movement of the soldier and clericalism of the priest.

Belfort Bax Justice 9 March 1901

Here we see that conflict between a workers and a state socialism to which Durkheim referred. A socialist politics building upon the associational activity of the working class was a real possibility at the turn of the century. But this socialism from below was gradually subverted by social reform from above. The register was altered as class activity and social transformation was replaced by the activity of experts and officials administering the process of change through the state.

One sees here that petty bourgeois class neutrality that Marx criticised as fitting in perfectly with the 'classlessness' of the state as an ideological project. Socialism as the vehicle of the professional middle class thus replaced the class struggle taking place in society with the neutral, bureaucratic politics of the state. This prevented the further development of working class forms, restricted their space to the 'economism’ of civil society and hence prevented these forms from developing political significance. That new relationship between the political and the economic which the working class had the potential to develop at the social level was never realised. In the fight for socialism the 'bourgeois' conception won out, the working class was politically expropriated and socialism served as a vehicle in the collective regulation of the process of accumulation through the state. Socialism has been living with the consequences ever since.

This ‘authentic marxism’, to which reference has been made, a broad enough conception to embrace anarcho- and revolutionary syndicalism, can be interpreted as an attempt to resist the political expropriation of socialism and hence to ensure that socialism remained something that was generated out of the existing forms of proletarian self-activity and self-organisation. The great tragedy is that the Fabian state socialists succeeding in subordinating socialism to their collective, bureaucratic project of regulating capital through the state, effectively ensuring that a century and more of associational development came to culminate in an 'economistic' trade unionism clearly distinct from a socialist politics. The bourgeois split between the political and the economic was thus reproduced in the socialist movement in the form of parliamentarism on the one hand and a trade unionism on the other. This made it even more difficult to define a socialist politics as a democratising project closing the gap between the political and the economic.

State socialism is itself a contradiction in terms and it is this contradictory nature that continually reappears in the troubles of socialism in the twentieth century. For the political and the economic remain separated and hence deny that social unity and control which is essential to socialism. The socialist project thus continues to fall on the classic bourgeois separation and, failing to overcome this separation, develops its organisational forms according to the split (Clarke 1991:231 328; Negri in Makdisi et al ad 1996:173/75).

We may thus conclude with a deeper explanation. 'Bourgeois’ socialism is the product not just of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois colonising the socialist movement. For officials came also from working class backgrounds, especially from the trade union movement. At a deeper level one concentrates upon this bourgeois separation of the political and the economic as characterising bourgeois society. It is through adapting the organisational forms of the socialist movement to this split that the origins of reformism are to be sought. It is this that kept the class and its supposed representatives exposed to bourgeois modes of thought and action and which prevented autonomous development rupturing these modes. Organisational adaptation to this separation generated the tendencies to reformism. It is not, therefore, just a question of the betrayal or the class origin of the leadership.

We need, therefore, to be sceptical of the revolutionary syndicalist case against political socialism. For, as a reaction to the politicisation of socialism at the state level, it too restated the bourgeois separation, only this time on the economic side. Nevertheless, what the syndicalists offered was a basis for relaunching socialism from the solid foundation of the economic struggle, organisation and movement of the workers as a class.

The Syndicalist Criticism
A sceptical note may be struck from the start. Robert Michels argued that 'bourgeoisification' was a product not merely of the political party or the educated bourgeois dominating the party but of the organisational structure of the socialist movement as a whole and the necessary leadership roles in that movement. This applies as much to the trade union as to the political party, argued Michels. Immediately, then, there is a problem with the assertion of the socialist purity of the economic organisations of the working class. As the other side of the split to the political party, the trade unions were as 'bourgeois’ as the parliamentary socialists. Whatever the socialistic spirit and revolutionary aspirations of the most militant of the syndicalists, the syndicates were poor vehicles for social transformation (Jennings 1990:9) and continually demonstrated an incapacity to take action at the effective level whenever a revolutionary situation had been forced (Kendall 1969:45).

The central premise of the syndicalists was that the economic and the political spheres were quite distinct. What is apparent in the way that the syndicalists drew this distinction is that the economic terrain is defined as proletarian whereas the political terrain is defined as bourgeois. The economic organisations of the proletariat, the trade unions, therefore constituted the proletariat alternative to the bourgeois political sphere where, detached from the real world of production, the political party becomes the instrument of bourgeoisification and, with it, reformism, in the socialist movement.

It could be argued that trade unions themselves are instruments of bourgeoisification. As institutions for the sale of labour power, they organise the workers as wage workers and are quite appropriate to the wages system (Anderson in Blackburn and Cockburn ed. 1967:264/5), But, as the spontaneous expression of working class activity, the most immediate expression of the class, they nevertheless possess a ‘socialistic’ spirit which shows potential for further development. And it is this that led the syndicalists to be harsh in their criticism of the parties. One obvious target of syndicalist criticism was electoralism. The need to win votes compelled the party to address a vague electorate in classless terms. The party could not simply rely upon a class politics but had to attempt to win the votes of all members of the electorate equally. Not only are the class roots of socialism severed from the politics of the party, the socialism of the party is itself diluted.

But no one asks if it is compatible with the programme and interests of proletarian socialism to support the interests of bureaucratic parasitism... It is perfectly evident that a party which depends upon state employees and seeks their support cannot represent any serious threat to the political order.

Labriola The Socialist Movement 136, 1904, 8/9

This electoralism, however, emphasises, in the separation of the representatives from the represented, the basic separation of the state from civil society. The electoral party, working within parliamentary institutions, exists on the terrain of bourgeois politics. For Labriola parliament is an institution created by and for the wealthy for the securing of the necessary compromises between the various factions of the bourgeoisie so as to ensure the protection of private property. It is a view which is essentially that given by Marx in the Manifesto.

Rather than explore further the separation of the state from civil society and the possible consequences for the socialist movement, the syndicalists, representing the economic side of the bourgeois split, tended to concentrate on the colonisation of the socialist movement by the professional middle class. It was the degree to which this new class came to occupy strategic positions which really drew the critical attention of the syndicalists, though one could also have drawn attention to the ex-trade unionist officials also occupying such positions. Working within bourgeois modes of organisation, action and thought as a result of the continued separation between the state and civil society tended to generate bourgeois conceptions and politics.

What the syndicalists said of the professional middle class was true enough and was essentially what Marx and Engels had similarly said of them. They may have made a verbal commitment to proletarian emancipation but their whole approach to socialism was quite distinct from the proletariat. Moreover, they, and not the proletariat through the class struggle, would be the main agents of this emancipation. Indeed, the approach to the class struggle offers a good rule of thumb to distinguish between various socialisms. For the revolutionaries, the class struggle was the means of transformation; for the reformists the class struggle merely expresses the irrational features of capitalism to be modified through the remedial action of the state.

It is that contrast between a workers socialism and a state socialism again. Clearly, this state socialism of the professional middle class involved a hierarchical division of labour in which they, as the educated and trained class, would occupy the key positions at the apex. Hence Weber offered the spectre of 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' taking the form of the 'dictatorship of the officials', as both a criticism and a warning.

Lagardelle in Le Mouvement Socialiste spoke the unambiguous language of proletarian exclusivity. The bourgeois intellectuals, those with 'white hands', would claim superiority over and be parasitic upon the productive activity of the manual workers.

Most intellectuals scorn the manual worker; they readily imagine that they are omniscient and omnicompetent, and should therefore be omnicompetent. ‘Work to the workers, power to the educated’ is their slogan.

Lagardelle LMS no 183, 1907, p197

Hence their attraction to the state socialism that Durkheim defined as the alternative to the workers socialism. They, as public officials and bureaucrats, would replace the private capitalists in control of the production process. The working class would remain working class, their surplus value now being politically extracted. Weber considered that the position of the working class would be more free under the old private capitalism than under this state socialism/capitalism. The syndicalist perspective is in agreement, pointing frequently to the cases where the state proved to be an even worse employer than the private capitalist (Brown Industrial Syndicalist 1974).

The class conscious socialist revolutionaries from the first spotted the danger of the pmc and their state socialism.

They represent through the education they have received and the goal they pursue, the old parasitic, hierarchical society. They enter the labour movement as the bearers of traditional values, from whose influence it is precisely the mission of the proletariat to tear itself free. In conquering the state, in exalting the role of parties, they reinforce the hierarchical principle embodied in political and administrative institutions, which it should be the aim of the working class to eliminate or reabsorb within society itself.

Lagardelle LMS no 184, 1907:224

Lagardelle thus restates the principle that Marx made central to socialism, from the first (Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State) to the last (Critique of the Gotha Programme): that freedom means the complete reabsorption of the state power within society. A state or an ‘intelligentsia socialism’ is a complete contradiction in terms from this perspective in that it is based upon a political and economic division of labour that separates the demos and the producers from their political and economic life and subjects them to hierarchical systems of politics and production.

It is this argument that establishes some continuity with Marx. The syndicalists own project is for the abolition of the state power in favour of the organs of society, i.e. the trade unions. The point that the syndicalists continuously made, whether one refers to the Wobblies, to the industrial unionists, to the Italians or to the French, is that the socialist parties had all inevitably degenerated into becoming electoral organisations designed for returning bourgeois representatives to bourgeois parliaments. Given this degeneration the task facing the working class was to recover the original socialist impetus that had led to the formation of these parties in the first place. Given the experience of the parties in the parliamentary sphere this recovery could only proceed on the unambiguously class terrain of the economic, through trade unions as class organs.

It is at this point that the syndicalists went further. Far from being simply institutions for negotiating the sale of labour power, the trade unions formed the nuclei of the future socialist society. The syndicalists, in other words, upheld a prefigurative model of socialist revolution to the extent that the trade unions represented an alternative way of organising society from below so as to actualise a non-hierarchical society based on the self-government of the producers. Innocent of the bourgeois intellectuals the trade unions represent the point where labour confronts capital. Here, the workers could prosecute the class struggle without having to modify their activity so as to appeal to some vague, passive electoral constituency. The syndicalists thus sought to put an end to a politics extraneous to production and hence a society unmediated by representative power and institutions.

Assimilation to Bourgeois Modes
Whatever the explanation offered, the fact is that we are dealing here with the gradual assimilation of the socialist movement to bourgeois modes of organisation, action and thought. These modes became the traditional forms taken by the socialist parties, necessarily influencing the attitudes, policies and perspectives of the leadership of these parties. To argue the point in these terms is to begin to bring some depth to the contemporary crisis of the political agencies of the left. Some kind of crisis is implicit in the contradictory nature of these agencies given their 'bourgeois’ mode of operation and their proletarian class constituency.

These socialist parties set out to capture political power and employ it in the cause of socialism. But, incapable of challenging capital on its own material terrain, these parties learned the truth that the capital system is not a public domain, subject to political regulation, but a process of private accumulation which the public domain must facilitate (Held 1987). The parties, having already diluted their socialism for electoral purposes, thus ditched what socialism remained in order to facilitate the process of private accumulation. The state power is secondary and derivative; the state is determined and not determinant (Miliband in Miliband and Saville ed.1965:280). As such the power of the state is dependent upon the resources it can extract from the private economy and, since this is so, it must ensure that the private economy functions well (Held 1987).

In this context the socialist parties own position also rests upon the private economy. It is not coincidental that the greatest social democratic advance of the century has been parasitic upon the long boom. In the 1930's and the 1980's, social democracy/parliamentary socialism was a busted flush. The political power which the socialist parties set out to conquer had conquered them long before they were confronted by the truth that, in any case, this power was secondary to the private power of capital. The twentieth century is one long crisis of the political agencies of labour given the institutional and structural constraints within which they have had to work.

What we conclude from all this is the centrality of the agency of the proletariat in coming to constitute itself as the revolutionary subject to the socialist project. This self-constitution is not a precondition of the socialist revolution but actually is the revolutionary process given the existence of the proletariat as the class in and against capital. The revolutionary process is a process in which the proletariat comes to autonomise itself and, in so doing, subverts the power of capital.

The proletariat must create its organisational form as part of this process rather than have it supplied from the outside. It is to bring socialism back to the tendency to autonomy that exists in the proletariat and hence to reinstate the proletariat as the revolutionary subject. Proletarian autonomy does not derive from the inevitable capitalist breakdown nor from the capture of state power but from the continuous attempts of the proletariat as the class in and against capital, the always antagonistic subject, to emancipate themselves from relations of exploitation and domination, from capital's alien control (Negri 1991).

Dunayevskaya was right. No one followed the spontaneous movement of the working class more than Marx. Every sign of activity on the part of the working class promised to initiate a revolutionary process that made socialism a possibility. Perhaps this process has been much more complex and contradictory than Marx thought. As he discovered at the International, not all working class activity is socialist or revolutionary or unified. There are tendencies that pull in different directions or in no direction at all but remain on the immediate terrain.

Nevertheless, to be consistent with Marx's politics means to keep the attention fixed on the capacity of the working class to take the initiative against the state and capital by innovating autonomous organisations that materialise class power, thus subverting existing, outmoded or incorporated organisations. This is the true solution to the present crisis of the political agencies. It is to avoid or destroy those organisational forms which have vested power in an elite according to a descending theme of government. Such descending forms work to deny and suppress the autonomous movement in the broad base of the working class.

It is necessary, then, to pay more attention to the autonomous movement of the class, revaluing the political agency of the proletariat where the socialist parties have devalued it. According to the conflict between ascending and descending themes it as essential to examine critically the mechanisms through which the autonomous power of the proletariat is vested in the hands of party leaders and officials and representatives generally. The causes of this political alienation, which collectivises and instrumentalises and neutralises the class subject, have to be exposed and destroyed. One discovers the lack of self-initiative at the base as the cause of the working class failing to trust their own capacities and take political responsibility.





Instead, the class subject itself becomes an agent in its own political alienation, handing over its autonomous power to reformist, bureaucratic misrepresentatives. To affirm the autonomous power of the working class is to reaffirm that the working class is the subject of revolutionary socialist politics, that the principle of self-emancipation clearly establishes the proletariat as the conscious agent of its own emancipation.





The argument in this chapter will be based upon the view that the socialist consciousness is implicit in the daily activity of the proletariat. This means examining the related assumption of the innately revolutionary character of the working class. One of Marx's basic principles is that trade unionism and the labour struggle is a practical school which educates the class as to the reality of class division. The trade union is a university of experience that is far more educative than the tutelage of the politicians and the intellectuals with their 'correct ideology’ .

From here, the argument moves on to develop the implications of the view that in struggling, against capital the proletariat creates new social relationships in their organisational forms. Here, I argue that the autonomous action of the proletariat is the opposite of abstract-political action, the state politics of the party. This autonomous is inherently libertarian in its principles and seeks to diffuse power whereas the party is a form of organisation designed to win alien power.

The degeneration of socialism into the abstract-political means that the proletariat were prevented from attacking political power at its roots. Proletarian autonomy stresses the self-development of the class as the revolutionary subject as the condition of the socialist mode of production.

There is a need to underline the power of capital's alienated social world to incorporate and contain forces opposed to it, to the extent of being able to colonise the socialist movement and create a rationalised, bureaucratised socialism in its own image, a socialism which came to be experienced as alien and hostile to the proletariat. Thus bourgeois modes of organisation, action and thought came to penetrate socialism, and did so very early on, when Marx himself was still alive.

Finally, the argument reinstates the social over the merely political revolution, arguing for Marx's view that the revolutionary transformation requires more than a change within the political-governmental sphere of alienation - it is a question of more than conquering the state and making changes within the state. Moreover, the abolition of the state-society dualism is to be achieved through proletarian organs, not 'the party’. The democratic nature of this self-organisation derives from its function in creating the new form of government new relationships. The argument thus concludes with a huge question mark raised against Bolshevism from a Marxist perspective.

The principle of proletarian self-emancipation entails the view that the proletariat is capable of emancipating itself. This may seem an obvious enough statement, but the obvious contains needs to be fully explained and addressed in all its political implications. The principle of proletarian self-emancipation means that the proletariat are considered to possess the material and the epistemological capacity to emancipate themselves, potentially at least. Indeed, emancipation is the process of developing these capacities, actualizing potential.

From this perspective, what is underlined is that socialist consciousness is implicit in the practical, day to day activities of the working class, in the struggles and practices of the working class. The working class, as they cooperate in their social practices transforming the world and as they develop a common identity against capital, as they are organisationally united and technically integrated through the development of the capital system, the working class develop a practical socialist consciousness. This does not mean that they develop a theoretical consciousness in the sense of spontaneously evolving- the conceptual apparatus of Marx's Capital. But the workers do develop a practical understanding of the operation of the capital system.

There are implications here as regards political organisation and consciousness. For socialism cannot be defined in scientistic terms as the product of intellectuals abstracted from the class praxis of the proletariat. And, for this reason, the political party can no longer claim to embody this 'scientific’ socialist consciousness and hence claim to be itself the revolutionary agency representing the working class.

It is possible to argue that the role of the political party lies in making the implicit socialist consciousness of the proletariat explicit. This, indeed, seems to be the common theme in delineating the party-class relation (Cliff, Harman, Trotsky in Party and Class 1996; Geras 1986:138/9). But it all depends upon how one conceives socialism, its roots and development, and how one conceives the formation of the party. For the formation of the party has to be considered as part of the process in which the working class forms itself into the revolutionary subject. It is the class that forms itself into the political party, as Marx argued. The party is the organisational form taken by the proletariat and under its conscious and direct control.

But there is also a danger of conceiving the proletariat and its class interests objectively, ignoring the developmental process which forms the content of socialist politics, and proceeding directly to the socialist conclusion, expecting the proletariat to embrace the end as the result of an intellectual process, a process of inculcation, of introducing the socialist consciousness from without. From making the implicit socialist consciousness explicit, the function of the party comes to be that of formulating the socialist consciousness independently of the class and introducing it from the outside. Hence the Lenin and Kautsky thesis that the socialist consciousness has already been created by the bourgeois intelligentsia, especially Marx and Engels. It would seem, then, that the task of the party is to present socialism by saying 'here is the truth, on your knees before it!', which is the approach that Marx explicitly repudiates:





Advocates of the party, the Lenin-Kautsky thesis notwithstanding, argue that this is what the party actually does - developing new principles from existing principles, showing the class why it is struggling. Again, it is to argue that the role of the party is to make explicit the socialist consciousness which is implicit in the proletariat. Such a conception means that the socialist consciousness cannot be developed in abstraction from the praxis of the class. But this is quite distinct from the view that makes socialism the product of the bourgeois intelligentsia like Marx and Engels.

What Marx did do, arguably, is put in systematic form the workers’ implicit socialist consciousness and develop a critical conceptual apparatus pertaining to capital and class which the proletariat could incorporate into its own practice, informing and orienting this practice. At the same time, the intellectual development of Marx himself from radical philosophy and democracy to socialist was heavily influenced by the social and political struggles of the emerging working class movement (Callinicos 1985:3).

What needs further analysis are the implications for political organisation of the assumption of the implicitly socialist consciousness of the proletariat. For part and parcel of this assumption is the assumption of the innately revolutionary character of the proletariat. Since this is so, the block on revolutionary socialist politics is to be explained less by some ‘congenital incapacity’ of the proletariat, which Trotsky towards the end of his life was prepared to consider (Kolakowski 1978 vol III 211/3), but in a development arrested by some extraneous factor. The working class has shown the capacity to act, and to organise itself, for reformist purposes, for purposes of cooperation and, indeed, to take the offensive in the class struggle. But what could be argued is that the development of the class in the revolutionary direction has been constrained by the 'bourgeois' organisational forms which sought to represent labour interests within existing society (Levy ed. 1987:114).

Class Struggle, Politics and Representation
Hence we come to revalue the political significance of the class struggle. The material organisation and movement of the proletariat not only offers the class the possibility for defending or furthering living standards but also of education. Marx thus refers to trade unions as schools of socialism. It is from this class struggle in its immediate, economic form that the working class obtains its enlightenment and proceeds to draw the political conclusions necessary to combat the capital system as a whole. The practical experience and consciousness that the proletariat develops in its everyday struggles comes to be materialised in their organisational forms, deepening their understanding and broadening their political reach.

It is in this sense that Marx called for the working class to constitute the political party, to convert its economic movement and organisation into its political movement and organisation. By such means the working class transcends the sphere of immediacy, combines together as a class and acquires a subjectivity in its global struggle against capital. By the constant material and intellectual development of their practical experiences the working class develops its subjective identity and hence forms itself as the class subject. And in struggling against capital the proletariat creates communist social relationships in their organisational forms.

The idea of autonomous action by the proletariat points to the way that the class affirms its subjectivity by making itself independent of both the state and capital, disempowering both and, in the process, prefiguring the communist social relations through the autonomous organisational forms developed. As such, the autonomous organisation of the proletarian class subject moves in an entirely contrary direction to the abstract-political sphere of organisation. In the context of the proletarian movement it means being rooted in the economic reality of the social world.

The basic point, however, is that autonomous action, as the materialisation of the principle of proletarian self-emancipation, means that the power of the proletariat is represented directly by the proletariat themselves through their own organs as organs of a self-mediated existence. The idea of representation on the basis of a separation between the representatives and the represented is thus overcome by organs of self-representation. It is the idea of a functional representation which Marx opposed to Hegel's abstract representation (1975: 185,189/90,191). Power will not be expressed indirectly and abstractly through representatives but by the individuals most closely involved in a concrete situation and capable of satisfying a social need (Marx 1975:189). Here the point is to satisfy the needs of individuals not to win power over them.

Proletarian Autonomy and Libertarian Principles
What makes the definition of Marx's project in terms of autonomous action particularly appealing is that it prioritises the libertarian principles of freedom and independence within the socialist movement and orients the movement to realising self-determination. Autonomous movement affirms the independence of the proletariat from the state and capital and, in so, doing, strikes a blow against the external determination exercised over human society by the systemic and institutional world.

This orientation distinguishes Marx's socialist politics as an emancipatory, project in contradistinction to that form of revolutionary politics which is motivated by concerns to capture power as a 'thing’, as though the ability to monopolise this power is the prize of successful revolution. The emphasis upon the autonomisation of the class as it becomes the revolutionary subject, its autonomous action and movement and the way that this relates to the attempt at human reappropriation of alienated power, serves to ensure that the emancipatory and libertarian character of Marx's politics is made explicit in orienting the socialist revolution.

This orientation rules out the possibility of the revolution degenerating into the capture and reinforcement of the state power over society by the minority party of professional revolutionaries ‘representing’ the class. The subjectivity of the class, by its very nature, cannot be represented. It has to be directly, consciously and actively affirmed by the class itself. To be true to the emancipatory goal, it is argued here, the Marxist has to be committed to the principle of autonomy in relation to socialism in means and ends; it is a principle which is expansive and which grows at is exercised and which, in time, may proceed to communist social relations. This process is a far better, even if a more difficult, approach to that of a revolutionary party winning the state power and using it to 'build socialism' via this concentrated alienated power.

Party / State- Socialism
This affirmation of the autonomy of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject leads one to take a highly critical view of the way that politicians and intellectuals, and bourgeois forms generally, prevented the working class from developing its subjectivity and hence from materialising its power in permanent revolutionary form. The criticism here is that both the bourgeois in the socialist movement and bourgeois modes within the socialist movement came to arrest the development of the working class after a century of progress in class consciousness and organisation. This, in turn, prevented the working class from attacking the power of the state and of capital at the material roots. Instead, working class activity came to be channelled into a representative form of politics and organisation which looked to secure moderate aims within parliamentary institutions, and the wages system.

The political and economic agencies of labour, in other words, took the form of a 'pragmatic', reformist socialism designed to win piecemeal improvements in the proletarian condition but which, at the same time, incorporated the class within the forms of the political state and the capital economy. A 'pragmatic' socialism was a socialism adapted to the contours of capital's alienated social world and, as such, repeated, even magnified, all the abstracting, rationalising, centralising and bureaucratising tendencies of this world (Weber 1968:29; Rizzi 1985; Sayer 1991; Turner 1993).

Incorporation did have and does have material roots. There are powerful forces encouraging the restriction of proletarian politics to the sphere of immediacy, for the private ownership/control of the means of production gives the capitalist class and the state a powerful range of sanctions to employ against those with no option but to sell their labour power in order to obtain an income. Incorporation therefore remains on the level of immediacy conceiving the working class as a class 'in itself’ that is 'in' capitalist relations.

To rupture this social world and hence to resist incorporation, a socialist politics should affirm proletarian autonomy as a condition of a new mode of production. This means developing organisational forms assisting the process in which the proletariat comes to form itself into a class 'for itself’ that is 'against' and not merely 'in' capitalist relations.

There is no doubting the power of capital to penetrate all forms and forces operating within its alienated social world. Nothing is immune from the tendencies to abstraction in this world, certainly not a socialist movement whose revolutionary force derives from its immanent aim. There are those who would repudiate Marxism as such as 'bourgeois' on account of this immanentism (Bookchin 1995:195ff).

What makes it so important to ensure that proletarian modes of thought, action and organisation prevail over bourgeois modes is that it is indeed possible for immanentism to get arrested at the level of immediacy and hence result in incorporation. From the perspective of a workers socialism one has to insist upon social transformation as something that requires more than a change of governmental personnel, a merely political change that keeps the pillars of the building, of alienation, still standing.

The question, therefore, concerns more than the conquest of state power. The emancipation of the working class, a process leading to human emancipation in general, requires the abolition of all hierarchical political and economic structures. It is, therefore, not a question of conquering the state power but of dissolving it, of divesting it of its legitimate functions and locating these in society, of completely eliminating the class coercive functions of the state.

'The Party’ and the Abolition of Bourgeois Dualism
Marx's view is that the state would be abolished through society being able to recover its power from the state. In terms of the workers socialism versus the state socialism, the organisations of the proletariat would be able to reappropriate the social power alienated to the state and would be able to exercise the legitimate governmental functions, those serving the common good, hitherto exercised by the centralised state. Thus the overcoming of the state-society dualism is to be achieved through proletarian organs.

Whether or not there is a role for the political party in this process depends upon how the party is formed. Certainly, that party which maintains the separation of the social and the political, which appropriates the political for a realm abstracted from the social realm, engages in a state politics which must reinforce or reconstitute the old state power. Such a party is inextricably entangled in the alienative, mediative and representative politics of bourgeois society. In this sense, the political party can indeed be presented as the expression of the separation of the state and civil society which the purpose of socialism is oriented to abolish (Negri in Makdisi 1996:173/5; Bonefeld et al vol II 1992:98/9).

Rather than proceed from the political level, Marx's socialism proceeds from the attempts from within the social realm to develop a political significance for itself and hence to be able to reappropriate this political power. Thus, the abolition of the state-society separation cannot be achieved through the politics of 'the party' which is the expression of the separation of the social and the political. Instead, the attention has to be upon developing the political significance of civil society through the material organs of civil society coming to acquire the capacity to exercise legitimate governmental functions. Such an approach from below is compatible with the notion of a political party, but only insofar as this party is conceived in terms of an organic self-centralism that proceeds from below. Such a party as the embryonic social order must be constituted by the dynamism and activity of the parts, an active conception of sovereignty. Thus the actively democratic nature of the party is inextricably connected with its emancipatory goal, the restitution of human powers.

This is defined more precisely by Marx in terms of founding a new social order based upon a conception of functional representation and active sovereignty. In this society all those dualisms characterising bourgeois society will have been overcome - between the state and civil society, the representatives and the represented, consciousness and being, philosophy and the world, agency and structure, base and superstructure. Thus, the political organisation of the socialist movement has to consciously develop, in its means, that complex network of social relationships which are designed to transcend the institutionalised separations of bourgeois society. To the extent that the socialist movement fails to orient itself in such a way and hence reproduces the old hierarchical political division of labour, one remains within this reality of institutionalised separations. That organisational and intellectual development of the proletariat, which forms the content of socialism, is thus absent and results in the reproduction of bourgeois modes of thought, action and organisation (Sassoon 1987:168).

One may conclude here by introducing the subject of Bolshevism and its controversial status within the Marxist tradition. For all of Bolshevism's merits in recovering the importance of action and politics against the passive, evolutionist conceptions of 'orthodoxy', there is still that important sense in which Bolshevism deviated significantly from Marx. One can accept the superiority of the Bolshevik position over the politically and intellectually enfeebled position of Menshevism. Nevertheless, Bolshevism came to generalise itself within the revolutionary movement in such a way as to become a new, paralysing orthodoxy.

And it is worth going further. For the proletariat, in affirming itself as the revolutionary subject, possesses the capacity to constitute its own political forms and to dissolve those provided for it in the abstract. The presentation of Marx from the perspective of proletarian self-emancipation means repudiating the determinism and political alienation inherent in the objective conception of class as a thing. The movement which will constitute the future social order will be that of the revolutionary subject as it autonomises itself and hence subverts capital's own determination.

This is what Negri calls proletarian self-valorisation (Negri 1991:xxvi). This is a misleading term in that it could be confused with Marx's definition of valorisation in terms of the self-expansion of the value of capital. What Negri is getting it is the capacity of the proletariat to develop itself as the revolutionary subject. This subject is self-constituting and, as such, distinguishes itself from, the traditional organisational form of the party. What this conception of self-valorisation excludes is that objective definition of class and class interest which opens the way to the political party claiming to represent the workers. The workers can represent themselves and autonomously determine the forms with which to pursue these interests.

Class Constitution versus Party Building
By stressing that the proletariat developing its organisational, political, intellectual and moral capacities is crucial to socialism, we can appreciate that the idea of a political party organising the workers from above and from without presupposes either the failure or the inability of the class to emancipate itself. In which case the party exists as the institutional expression of proletarian incapacity, serving to confirm and reinforce this incapacity. The political party in this context effectively arrests proletarian self-development and justifies itself through continued proletarian underdevelopment.

My intention here is to shift the focus from party and state building to proletarian class constitution. Thus the question of socialism has been transformed from being a problem of political organisation compensating for proletarian underdevelopment above or outside the class to being a problem of proletarian self-development from below or inside the class.

Hence the importance of stressing proletarian autonomy. This suggests that socialism is not the result of a revolutionary vanguard party seizing political party nor of the inevitable breakdown of the capitalist economy, a conception in which the class is not a subject of the revolutionary process but is merely reactive or passive. Rather, proletarian autonomy suggests the conscious actualisation of the latent power of the working class. The autonomous action and movement of the working class locates the revolutionary principle and force in the class subject, as with Marx, and not with organisational form or circumstances.

Hence the concern to avoid the fetishisation of organisational form, in general or particular. The form is the expression of the real movement of the class and is not the revolutionary force in itself. It is for this reason that one can neither reject nor accept 'the party’ as the form of proletarian organisation. 'The party’ as such is an abstraction, lacking social and historical content. Which is not to deny that certain traditions have made a fetish of 'the party' and have come to identify socialist revolution with an endless routine of party building.

What can be rejected, therefore, is that alienated form of organisation resting upon an hierarchical division of labour, a bureaucratic centralism from above, and a tight discipline which stifles the creativity of the base. Nevertheless, some permanent organisational form able to materialise and centralise the power of the working class is necessary. The basic condition of this form is that it embodies and expresses proletarian autonomy and is an integral part of the process of self-development as the class autonomises itself (Meszaros 1995:675).

The problem, then, is how to conceive the permanent political organisation appropriate to the proletarian movement without succumbing to the temptation to fetishize political form and, indeed, reproduce political alienation through privileging the form over the content. The only way to do this, it may be argued here, is to locate the revolutionary principle and force in the proletariat and the developmental process in which the proletariat actualise their latent power. It is for this reason that Marx did pay such close attention to every example of spontaneous activity of the proletariat. And it is for this reason that Marx made it plain that political and intellectual conceptions - 'sectarian principles' - were to be entirely subordinated to the forms according to which the working class movement actually developed.

What Marx's example shows is that emancipation is not something attendant upon the socialist revolution but is something that is progressively realised through the process of revolution as both the form in which workers autonomous power is expressed and the consequence of this power being actualised in the communist society.

The political organisation of the class cannot be the old Social Democratic or Communist party which organises and governs the working class from without and above. Apart from the fact that the notion, of the working class as an easily identifiable and representable object and thing is no longer tenable, the emancipatory and revolutionary process always required that the proletariat itself threw off its 'objective' and passive status, even if this activity dissolved the existing forms which claimed to represent the class interests of labour.

The organisational form must be constituted by the working class as it autonomises itself against capital and hence comes to overthrow the law of value through its own struggle. Again, the contrast is with the political abolition/expropriation of capitalism which attacks only private property and thus retains the law of value. Here state socialism retains exploitative relations and institutes a system based on the political extraction of surplus value. Only a socialism from below can attack the power of capital on its own material terrain. A socialism from above is limited to political interventions which barely touch the roots of the capital system (Meszaros 1995:xxv/i 479).

Given that the proletariat creates the surplus value upon which capital rests, its autonomisation subverts the mechanisms of accumulation, investment and valorisation upon which the capital system rests. The proletariat alone, by nature of its character as the value creating power, can attack capital at its Achilles heel. The power of capital is secondary and derivative; it is the power of labour in alien form. And it is a power subject to reappropriation.

Thus the task of the proletariat is to subvert the power of capital from within its own material terrain. Labour possesses the structural capacity to break the command that capital has established over it and over society in general. The development of the proletariat's autonomous power, a process in which the class subject develops its own organisational forms, is recognised here as the affirmation of the power of society over the state, of the life world of human beings over the system world of the state and capital as alienated social powers. Since the autonomous action and movement of the working class is rooted in social needs, the socialist content of the revolutionary and emancipatory process is articulated in the social practices and struggles and organs of the workers.

It is in this context that the organisational form ceases to have the function of representing the class subject and can no longer be presented as representing the true consciousness and interest of the class. In proceeding to constitute itself as the revolutionary subject, the proletariat becomes capable of representing itself through forms developed by itself. The whole political organisation and movement of the class is constituted by the self-mediated organs of the proletariat which themselves already show the embryonic form of the communist society. The overall political organisation is based upon the principle of federal centralisation from below.

The Politicisation of the Socialist Movement
Socialism is to be defined in terms of the process of proletarian self-emancipation. It is as such, as an affirmation of the creative power of labour over the exploitative power of capital, that socialism can only be developed by the proletariat itself, generated out of the social practices and experiences of the class.

This is to affirm a conception of socialism that develops from below and within as against that conception that comes from above and without. It is to make a point of presenting Marx's as a project democratising power, knowledge and politics and, in so doing, making an irrevocable break with the old authoritarian and elitist conceptions. It is to argue that, for Marx, the creation of the socialist society is not something that can be instituted by instrumental, artificial and bureaucratic means but is something that is inseparable from the process of proletarian self-development.

It is the working class that creates its own organs and that contains within the development of its own capacities the forms and principles of the new social order. Bourgeois politicians and intellectuals and bourgeois modes of thought, action and organisation within the socialist movement all indicate an arrest in proletarian development.
The core of Marx's thought is the principle that the emancipation of the proletariat must be self-emancipation. Anything that may call itself by the name of 'marxism', it follows, must be present within and not abstracted from the practices, struggles and organisations of the working class. The whole point is to overthrow the capital system as inimical to human freedom and this means that the emancipatory goal relates to the class which alone is the agency capable of realising this goal.

Bolshevism can be condemned as something which was much more than a deviation from Marx. Given that circumstances and actors change through history, and given Marx's social and historical specificity, Marxism must necessarily deviate from Marx to some extent. The problem to be criticised here is that Bolshevism imposed itself as a new orthodoxy that suppressed spontaneous and rooted forms of proletarian activity in concrete social and historical situations.

 The presentation of the Bolshevik party and revolution as some kind of model for socialist revolutionaries to copy had destructive consequences for indigenous socialist traditions which had shown signs of developing over time. The spontaneous life forces of these traditions, the culture, the ways of acting and articulating the working class experience were suppressed. The Bolshevisation of the international socialist movement choked off the autonomous movement of the working class. To greater or lesser extent in various countries, what remained of revolutionary socialism was transformed into mere appendages of the Communist party. Worse still, this party had itself ceased to be revolutionary and was instead looking to appropriate the international socialist movement for the defence of Moscow (Melograni 1989:xii 121/3). This politics induced passivity in the proletariat, canalising its revolutionary socialistic spirit into sterile channels (Kendall 1967).

This strategy of securing the Communist control of socialist parties and trade unions possessed its sole rationale in the defence of the Russian regime (Melograni 1989). But it was counter-revolutionary in its effects on international socialism and played a key role in rendering the working class passive in the face of depression, fascism and war (McLellan 1980:173). The party modelled on Bolshevik lines was a singularly inappropriate one for western Europe with its own socialist traditions and organisations and its own working class movement with a century of experience behind it. Indeed, it could be argued that the Bolshevik model, in presuming proletarian incapacity, devalued the proletarian movement that had developed in western Europe in order to justify the party agency in the first place.

What is suggested here is that Marxism in Leninist form took a distinctly political turn that not only reinforced the separation of the political and the social but continued the bourgeois autonomy of the political and the subordination of the social to state politics. And so, one finds in the Bolshevik tradition a concentration upon party building which abstracts the political from and privileges the political over the class praxis of the proletariat as it proceeds within civil society. As a result the attainment of socialism is transformed into a political and organisational process in which building the revolutionary party takes the place of proletarian self-activity and self-organisation.

Of course, this party building in itself does not serve to attain socialism, for this requires the self-development by the proletariat of its own organisational, political and intellectual capacities. But this failure merely encourages further attempts to build the revolutionary party. Thus, over fifty years ago, Pierre Monatte castigated Trotsky for merely continuing his attempts to create the 'parti communiste ideal’ in order to fight against Stalinism (Jennings 1990:214). The failure of one episode of party building merely becomes the occasion for the beginning of another episode of party building, everyone trapped in their own circularity by the chimera of 'the party' as the ideal agency.

It is this whole approach to the socialist revolution which is being contested in this thesis. The socialist revolution is not to be translated into a political and organisation process which is abstracted from the proletariat as the revolutionary subject. The political and the organisational aspects of the socialist revolution must proceed from below and within the development and movement of the class subject, not from above and without. It is this argument that will be pursued in the critique of Bolshevism.

Bolshevism - The Critique of Vanguardism 
The Collapse of State Socialism
In the aftermath of state socialism and its collapse, socialists are anxious to avoid the snares of the party route to what is, after all, a social-ism, whatever the difficulties of dealing with the social. Socialism cannot be created by the conquest of the existing centres of power. For obvious reasons, socialists may be highly suspicious of vanguardism and, generally, of the elitism and authoritarianism implied by a hierarchical division of politics. Thus socialism as a social-ism can accommodate the anarchist position which argues that socialism cannot be created through the conquest of the centres of power but only by the 'abolition of the conditions of their power' (Ullrich in Sarker 1983:172), which, in turn, can be translated into Marxist terms as the demand for the restitution of human powers centralised as alien powers. Ullrich's point is that 'a society based on relationships of subordination and superposition cannot be overcome by means of a structure of subordination and superposition' (Ullrich in Sarker 1983:172). This is the basic anarchist principle that the means and the ends should be consistent with each other.

One concludes from this position that, for socialism to be realised, the working class has to 





That Marx assumed some form of spontaneous development on the part of the proletariat in this direction has been commented upon (Molyneux 1978:116; Callinicos ISJ 2:11 Winter 1980). This, it may be argued, is less spontaneity as such that an insistence upon the proletariat itself making the conscious and organised efforts to the socialist end.

Still, it could be argued, Leninism is that form of Marxism which, possessing little, if any, faith, in the capacities of the proletariat to emancipate itself, came to put the case for the revolutionary vanguard and the party as the substitute agency. From this perspective, the political party is the institutional recognition of the political and intellectual incapacity of the proletariat. It is too easy, to argue that there was some kind of unilinear development from Leninism to Stalinism. But since the devaluation of the proletarian agency is implicit in the case for the revolutionary party, Stalinism is a more than possible outcome of Lenin's politics.

In Protosocialism and Late Capitalism, Herbert Marcuse argued that





There are those who argue more than this and reject the Marxist model of socialist revolution in its entirety. Class politics is an 'exhausted myth' (Walford 1990). And what are the implications for revolutionary socialism when current tendencies in class relations show the increasing importance of a managerial class, an intelligentsia and a well-paid skilled and semi-skilled working class?	

What the increasing complexity of the class structure - and Marx was aware himself that his simple two class model of a homogeneous bourgeoisie and a homogeneous proletariat opposing each other corresponded less and less to reality - does indicate that it is increasingly untenable to adopt the representative approach to the working class the party representing the true class interest of the working class. For 'the working class' patently does not exist. And it is to this extent that the Social Democratic and Communist models of socialist politics have been rendered historically obsolete given that it is no longer possible to identify some homogeneous mass called ‘the working class' so as to be able to represent them. To be able to develop, another 'model for revolution' there is a need to reconsider Marxism from its origins in the way that Marx approached the world.

In tracing Marxism back to its roots in order to discern an alternative revolutionary model one can credit the anarchists with not needing to wait until 1989 and the collapse of Russian Communism to appreciate the need for fundamental revision.

Russia has shown us the way in which socialism cannot be realised, although the populace, nauseated with the old regime, opposed no active resistance to the experiments of the new government. The idea of workers' councils for the control of the political and economic life of the country is, in itself, of extra-ordinary importance.. But so long as the country is dominated by the dictatorship of a party, the workers' and peasants' councils naturally lose their significance. They are thereby degraded to the same passive role which the representatives of the estates used to play in the time of the absolute monarchies.

Kropotkin in Rocker 1989:95/6

It is now clear why the Russian Revolution, as conducted by the Communist Party, was a failure. The political power of the party, organised and centralised in the State, sought to maintain itself by all means at hand. The central authorities attempted to force the activities of the people into forms corresponding with the purposes of the party. The sole aim of the latter was to strengthen the state and monopolise all economical, political and social activities even all cultural manifestations. The revolution had an entirely different object, and in its very character it was the negation of authority and centralisation. It strove to open ever larger fields for proletarian expression and to multiply the phases of individual and collective effort. The aims and tendencies of the Revolution were diametrically opposed to those of the ruling political party.
Just as diametrically opposed were the methods of the Revolution and of the State. Those of the former were inspired by the spirit of the Revolution itself: that is to say, by emancipating from all oppressive and limiting forces; in short, by libertarian principles. The method of the State, on the contrary - of the Bolshevik State as of every government - were based on coercion which in the course of things necessarily developed into systematic violence, oppression and terrorism. Thus two opposing tendencies struggled for supremacy: the Bolshevik State against the Revolution. That struggle was a life or death struggle. The two tendencies could not work harmoniously; the triumph of the State meant the defeat of the Revolution.

Goldman 1924 in Woodcock 1977:153/4

Thus Goldman is part of that tradition that identified the Russian revolution with the spontaneous activity of the workers, peasants and soldiers. The Russian people in general had initiated and were carrying out the revolution. The Bolshevik party, according to this view, sought to rise to the state power on the back of the popular revolution, and, in reconstituting the state power over society put an end to the revolution (Miller 1984:91). It is the state politics of the Bolshevik party, which stifled and suppressed the libertarian and revolutionary aspirations of the people. And this is the nature of state politics reasserting the centralisation of political power over society.

47 THE NEGATIVE AND CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL ACTION

What needs to be reasserted here is Marx's negative and critical assessment of politics and the way that Marx sought to go beyond the limitations of a political revolution that worked within the sphere of alienation (Marx 1975:253/4) to the social revolution which would transform the relations between the social and the political, reempower the civil sphere and disempower the political sphere (Marx 1975:411/2, 412/3, 419/20).
Thus, Marx conceived socialism in terms of the social revolution as against the political revolution of the bourgeois epoch. The political revolution leaves the pillars of the building/alienation still standing (Marx 1975:253) whereas Marx is pursuing that social revolution which would fundamentally transform society from the roots upwards.

Thus the failure of the Russian Revolution is to be explained from its being a merely political revolution which, in reasserting the state power over society worked to suppress the social revolution that the population were undertaking. Through the agency of the revolutionary party, Bolshevism channelled the revolution into the political-institutional sphere, mistaking a change at this level for fundamental social transformation. Of course, what betrayed the Bolsheviks was their instrumentalist approach to socialism. The party, not the class, was the revolutionary agency, the conquest of state power was the objective of this party, the state power was the instrument to 'build’ socialism.

This is not Marx's conception, as he made explicit when resolving philosophy into the class praxis of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject.





One can therefore insist upon the conscious and active participation of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject as being constitutive of socialism. But there are statements, especially by Engels, which make anarchists more than a little sceptical of the Marxist conception of revolution. Here is Engels in On Authority.

A revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will on the other part by means of rifles, bayonets and cannon - authoritarian means if such there be at all; and if the victorious party does not wish to have fought in vain, it must maintain this rule by means of the terror which its aims inspire in the reactionaries. Would the Paris Commune have lasted a single day if it had not made use of this authority of the armed people against the bourgeois? Should we not, on the contrary, reproach it for not having used it freely enough?





And it is precisely this conception that the anarchists have in mind when criticising and repudiating the Marxist conception of revolution.

It is not only Bolshevism, Marxism and Governmentalism which are fatal to revolution as well as to all vital human progress. The main cause of the defeat of the Russian Revolution lies much deeper. It is to be found in the whole socialist conception of revolution itself.








But it is arguable that Marx's ‘idea of revolution’ is to be sharply distinguished from these instrumentalist conceptions with all their military metaphors and viewed revolution as issuing only from fully conscious proletarians and thus repudiated vanguardism. Coleman, therefore, addresses the criticisms of the anarchists (Coleman 1982 in Pepper 1993:212/3). Marx, he argues, conceived revolution as being the result of self-conscious socialists assuming power as the 'vast majority', as Marx defines the proletariat in the Manifesto. The revolution, for Marx, is democratic to the core and looks to complete the democratic revolution. Marx, thus did not conceive revolution in terms of a vanguardist politics or in terms of a military-political strategy designed to win state power.

Thus the Marxist justification for one party and, finally, one man rule was based upon the politicisation of the Marxist conception of revolution and the replacement of the proletariat by the party as the revolutionary agency. The authoritarianism that issued possessed some warrant in the way that Engels' formulated revolution. But this authoritarianism violated the democratic and emancipatory and libertarian character of Marx's conception of revolution. It is this character that Rosa Luxemburg clearly perceived when arguing that, in contradistinction to capitalism, socialism requires the conscious participation of the people to make its revolution. For this participation forms the very substance of socialism (Harrington 1993:79/80). Which is to say that, for Marx, the content takes precedent over form, that the form is determined by the content, that there are no short cuts to socialism through form.

My intention is not to oppose one organisational form against another as correct and incorrect forms, but to argue for Marx's flexibility on organisational form, making form dependent upon the self-determination of the class subject. Marx himself certainly does not specify one particular form of organisation. The socialist revolution does require an organisational form, but is nature cannot be settled in an a priori fashion. Rather, the organisational form is determined through the praxis of the class as it makes itself the revolutionary subject. The case has been made so strongly for 'the revolutionary party' in the twentieth century that it is striking to see just how deliberately open Marx was on the issue. He had no theory of 'the party’ or any other particular form and nor could there be on his own premise of 'proletarian self-emancipation. Only the objectivist reading of the 'laws of history’ and of the proletariat could justify the theory of the revolutionary party.

Bolshevism
Rosa Luxemburg began a long lasting criticism of the authoritarianism implicit in Lenin's organisational conceptions in 1904/5. Luxemburg accused Lenin of attempting to preserve the purity of the Bolshevik's socialism by keeping the real life of the workers distant from the doctrine. Luxemburg castigated Lenin's faith in the tutelage of 'an all knowing and omnipresent central committee’ which reserved to itself the right to voice the popular will, presuming to dictate to history itself.

What is always important for Social Democracy is not to prophesy and to preconstruct a ready-made recipe for future tasks. Rather, it is important that the correct historical evaluation of the forms of struggle corresponding to the given situation be continually maintained In the party, and that it understand the relativity of the given phase of the struggle, and the necessary advance of the revolutionary stages toward the ultimate goal of the proletarian class struggle.
However, to grant to the party leadership such absolute power of a negative character as Lenin does is to artificially strengthen to a dangerous extent the conservatism inherent in the essence of that institution. If the Social Democratic tactics are not created by a central committee but by the whole party - or, better still, by the whole, movement - then it is obviously necessary that the individual party organisations have the elbow room which alone makes possible the utilization of the means presented by the given situation to strengthen the struggle, as well as to develop the revolutionary initiative. The ultra-centralism which Lenin demands seems to us, however, not at all positive and creative, but essentially sterile and domineering. Lenin's concern is essentially the control of the activity of the party and not its fruition, the narrowing and not the development, the harassment and not the unification of the movement.

Luxemburg Organisational Questions in Howard ed. 1971:294/5

It is now possible, from the vantage point of 1989 and the collapse of state socialism to appreciate the points that Luxemburg made against Lenin and which Communists consistently failed to appreciate: that 'the party’ as the organisational form and that vanguardist politics which assume a dualism between an active, leadership and a passive mass generates a bureaucratic centralism which reconstitutes and reinforces the state power over society, and thus works in precisely the opposite direction to Marx's socialism as the emancipatory project of restitution. Further attempts to build 'the ideal communist party' (Monatte in Jennings 1990:213/4) are merely exercises in a state politics that proceed inexorably in the same direction.

There is a need, then, to avoid the fetishisation of the organisational form, whether this is the party or some other form. Lenin's authoritarian approach to politics led him to prioritise the party over all other organisational forms. Lenin’s hostility to proletarian spontaneity is well known. Lenin seemed to assume that the proletariat, by its own efforts, would remain the prisoner of bourgeois ideology. It seemed not to occur to Lenin that the forms that the class developed from its practical existence could never become remote from the class in the way that 'the party' could.

The argument here criticises Lenin's vanguardism from the awareness that the class as the revolutionary subject requires no representatives. The organisational form is thus not to be conceived as above and without but as being internal to the class constituting itself as the revolutionary subject, i.e. as the conscious and active participant in a revolutionary process which it determines as opposed to being the object of a process that, through the alienated agency of the party, has become external to it.

This affirms a dynamic, dialectical conception of the proletarian revolution and contrasts with the way that Lenin's approach reproduces the separation of the political and the social, the leadership and the led, the subjective and the objective (Basso 1975:101; Geras 1986:157/3). Whereas the Leninist conception of organisational form is meditative and representational, Marx's conception of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject has transcended the need for representation.

Proletarian subjectivity, by its nature, cannot be represented. The party can claim to represent the true class interest of the proletariat only on the assumption that the class itself has failed to identify and represent these interests for themselves. The party, in other words, is compensation for the absence of the revolutionary class, an attempt to make good by form the deficiency in content. Of course, this leads to a substitute socialism. Only the autonomous action and organisation of the proletariat itself overcomes the abstract approach to organisational form.

In conclusion, a thorough revision of the conception of the organisational has to proceed through the revaluation of the revolutionary class agency. The democratic dimension of Marx's proletarian revolution is to be recovered and the prospects for radical democracy, with clear affinities to the Paris Commune, are to be explored.

'The Party’ and Self-Mediation
As against this, Lenin's identification of socialism with the political and theoretical consciousness formulated in abstraction from the class praxis of the proletariat reproduced the dualism between leaders and led, theory and practice, the political and the social which characterises bourgeois society. Education, for Lenin, is not self-education but indoctrination, the introduction into the proletariat from the outside of socialism as the ‘correct ideology’. But such a notion clearly presumes to divide society into two parts, an active, intelligent part which is capable of escaping the general determinism and another part which is passive in relation to circumstances. The former is thus in a position to educate the latter. A step backwards has been taken from Marx's Theses, with disastrous consequences for the way that socialism is conceived. Lenin's organisational form comes to replicate those alienating separations and dualisms of bourgeois society.





What Mattick draws attention to here is the way that the political socialists, in the name of 'pragmatism', come to evaluate socialism in terms of the forms and relations and institutions prevailing in the world. Marx's emancipatory project, oriented towards the overcoming of human self-alienation, is completely negated as socialists make Faustian bargains with the very alien powers which are to be practically reappropriated. 

The party is thus an alienated form of organisation which is responsible for the degeneration of socialism into state socialism. The party representing the true class interests of the proletariat becomes the state representing the general interest. The bureaucratic centralism of the party is thus institutionalised as Hegel's 'universal class', the state bureaucracy, the very notion which Marx subjected to detailed criticism. By winning the state power and institutionalising its domination over the class, i.e. its right to represent the class, the party establishes itself as an obstacle to the radical commune democracy which Marx offered. For the seizure of the state merely reproduces bourgeois autonomy of politics.

When Marx argues that the proletariat convert its economic organisation/movement/struggle into the political movement/organisation/struggle of the class as a whole he is arguing that the class to develop the class struggle in a political direction that is conscious in opposing the state and capital. Marx is calling for the political orientation of the proletarian movement. But it is how he does this that is important. For the political mediation of the class in struggle is a self-mediation. The forms of mediation which unify the class and enable it to generalise its struggle against the state and capital, in other words, develop directly out of the praxis of the class.

The forms of self-mediation, then, are created by and remain under the control of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject. It is only when presented thus that one can conceive of the proletarian movement assuming and dissolving power in the same process. It is indeed a problem of power, but not, as with Lenin, how to win and preserve it, but how to dissolve and reappropriate it. The seizure of state power by the proletarian movement, for Marx, has to be rooted in the self-constitution of the class as a revolutionary subject capable of representing and governing itself. Without these roots in the proletarian movement, the winning of state power by 'the party' merely reproduces the separation of the political and the social, leaders and led, which characterises bourgeois society and which necessarily degenerates into a bourgeois socialism, a rational, planned capitalism.

Thus, Soviets are to be presented for the way that they overcome the separation of the state from society. Bolshevism's error lies in attempting to realise socialism through the workers state when Marx's point was to dissolve the state power into a society self-organised by the workers.

By framing the question in terms of political and social alienation and by ensuring that the emancipatory commitment orients the socialist movement to the creation of a participatory civil society invested with the power of control over its relations. This is to resolve the dualism of the state and civil society on the level of society, avoiding the totalitarian solution which incorporates society under the political control of the state.

Thus, conciliar forms of organisation, by stressing decentralisation and federation from the base upwards, grasp Marx's intentions more adequately than does 'the party' as a form of representation and mediation. These forms offer a solution to the state-civil society dualism. These are the forms which make the decisive shift from political to social revolution.

The political revolutions of the bourgeois epoch champion the liberty of the private individual and the abstract citizen but neglect to consider the real human individual. The formal level of freedom and equality presides over a reality of unfreedom and inequality. There is thus a direct contradiction between the citizen and the worker. By demanding that this abstract citizenship of the state be incorporated into the social relationships of the individual Marx is arguing that the identity of the citizen and of the worker be reconciled. This entails the abolition of the separation of the state from civil society.

From this perspective, the great error of Bolshevism derives from the way that it remains within the sphere of political revolution and, with this definition of the revolution as a political process, the way in which it asserted political control to suppress the popular social revolution. The Bolsheviks thus attempted to overcome the state-civil society dualism on the level of the abstract political realm. The bureaucratic centralism, made manifest under Stalin, has its origins in this party political approach to revolution and socialism. Where Marx called for the complete absorption of the state into civil society, Bolshevism absorbed civil society into the state (Habermas 1990: 70).

As a result, human agents in society, the Soviets and the producers, lost all autonomy and were subject to a regime based upon the political extraction of surplus value (Meszaros 1995:24/5 26). Thus, civil society was subjected to bureaucratic intervention and regulation from above, an approach which completely failed to create those democratic and participatory structures in civil society which are essential to Marx. The political control of the state over civil society was implicit in the Bolshevik approach to socialism and revolution.

This was something that both Luxemburg and Trotsky had discerned in the character of the organisational form proposed by Lenin in 1904/5. Forming itself into the state and thus reconstituting the state power, the Bolsheviks proceeded to destroy the idea of council democracy. The dictatorship of the party representing the proletariat in the abstract realm of the state entailed a descending approach to government which proceeds in a diametrically opposite direction to that of the councils.

The great potential of the council lies in the reconstruction of the social order from the bottom upwards, not only democratising the political and civil spheres but doing so by closing that gap between the two which characterises alienation. The attempt to remove this gap by political means could lead only to the complete subordination of society to the reinforced state power. Thus bureaucratisation takes the place of democratisation.

The council form of organisation proceeds from a completely different direction and is thus able to absorb the state power into society. In this popular, participatory form of self-government, the democratic will of the people is directly expressed from below. In the dictatorship of the party, however, the spontaneous, creative activity of society was subjected to the force of the political realm. These are two entirely contradictory systems of government and the one exists only through the suppression of the other (Arendt 1965:260/271).

Thus, one takes up again that idea of Marx's that, with the realisation of the abstract citizenship of the state in social relationships, the social power of human beings will no longer be separated from them and opposed to them as political force (Marx 1975:234). The argument here is that conciliar forms of organisation are the appropriate vehicles of this incorporation whereas 'the party’, presuming the separation of the political and the social, confirms the alienation of social power and its transformation into the political force controlling society (Negri 1991:190 198/9; Meszaros 1995:737).

Representation and Leadership
The intention here is to examine the extent to which Marxism entails an 'objectivism' which leads to political forms of representation and mediation which put the dictatorship of the party over the proletariat. This is to examine the relation between vanguardism and objectivism. This approach assumes that the working class is the true subject but nevertheless represents this class as an object rather than letting it represent itself as a subject. This is to question the old identification of the party with the proletariat and the view that this identification suffices to achieve revolution. What is to be argued is that the imputation of class consciousness does leave a gap for the vanguard party exercising control independently of the class and that Marx himself sought consciously to transcend that utopianism in politics which leads to an elite idealist vanguard as opposed to spontaneous material revolution through the conscious agency of the class as subject.

For Ernesto Laclau, this objectivism is inherent in Marxism. ‘Marxism constituted itself as an essentially objectivist conception, as an assertion of the rationality of the real, in the best Hegelian tradition' (1990:180/1).





It is hard to know what is in need of denial. The postmarxists have quickly gone from denying that structures exist to denying that subjects exist. One enters a completely vacuous world that exists only in its own circularity. Nevertheless, there is an important issue here as to how social relations and 'underlying structures' are to be grasped. Marx's essentialism can be defended as crucial to his – and indeed any - emancipatory project. And it can be distinguished from the determinism implicit in the sociological project. For Marx's argument that society is essentially something and something essentially is not an 'objectivism' in the sense that Laclau depicts it - though one has the impression that any view that there is such a thing as society may be condemned as 'objectivism' - but integrates subject and object, agency and structure.

What Laclau has failed to appreciate is that what Marx took from Hegel and his perspective on the rational and the actual is a critical perspective which sought to grasp how the actual may become the rational. Laclau, however, proceeds to criticise Marx's 'objectivism’ as entailing a dictatorship on the lines of Plato's philosopher king.





The criticism that is most relevant here is the view that Marx's dictatorship of the proletariat is based upon the assumption of a privileged access to knowledge. Before proceeding, it is worth making it clear that, contrary to Laclau, Marx's conception of revolutionary-critical praxis was consciously elaborated in the attempt to overcome that passive-contemplative approach to knowledge which presupposes the separation of philosophy and the philosopher from the world. Marx is looking to achieve the unity as against the disunity of theory and practice. By making human beings the active producers of circumstances rather than the passive products of circumstances and by resolving philosophical problems requiring intellectual treatment into, social problems requiring practical social transformation, Marx consciously subverted the old theoretico-elitist model of knowledge, power and politics in favour of a thoroughly democratic conception.

But there is another side to the question. For Marx's critical-emancipatory conception was, to all intents and purposes, lost in the development of 'scientific socialism' conceived along naturalist and positivist lines. And it is against such scientistic Marxism that Laclau's points have greater relevance.

What Laclau is arguing is that there is an inherent tendency to vanguardism in Marx's Marxism and it is this contention which is to be criticised. The question merits close scrutiny, not only in the positive sense of establishing that Marx upholds the democratisation of politics, power and knowledge but also, more negatively, it rejects what is becoming the conventional and much too easily accepted view. This conventional view is becoming also the view of Marxists. Thus Ken Post argues that 'the vanguardism and idealisation of the proletariat which were the bases of Stalinism were also embryonically inherent in Marx's and Engels' reading of Hegel' (Post 1996:17). Later, Post argues that 'the sensationalist philosophy inherited by Marx from the Enlightenment' means that there is an opening to vanguardism in Marxism (Post 1996:325).

One of the crucial tasks of the argument to be presented here is to establish that Marx, in critically appropriating idealist philosophy and identifying materialism with the production, of social reality, clearly left behind determinist and passive Enlightenment materialise and the authoritarian and conservative implications of this materialism.

But there is truth in the criticisms when applied to the scientistic reading of Marxism which, in rationalising the external, alien determinism of the capital system as iron laws, came to legitimate an authoritarian politics in which an elite of intellectuals and politicians alone claimed to know the course of history.

One may look more closely at the connections between objectivism and vanguardism in order to understand how Marxism could degenerate. The discussion must focus upon the way that the revolutionary subject is presented. Despite the attempts at profundity through terms drawn from linguistic analysis, the basic charge against Marxism is simple and clear enough - that the revolutionary subject has not selected its identity but has it selected for it. And this is what lies behind the theory of the vanguard party of the working class (Post 1996:222).

 But, as regards Marx himself, all evidence is to the contrary, unless one argues that simply identifying such an entity as 'the proletariat', grasping its position, in the capital system, and projecting it as the revolutionary class itself leads to vanguardism. In which case, it is difficult to know what politics could be about or that anything could be said about politics. Politics disappears into a world of the purest spontaneity.

For Marx, the working class is the revolutionary subject. Class consciousness thus takes precedence over other forms of social struggle. What is the major issue of debate here, however, is the nature of the class as the revolutionary subject, what class interest is, its objective identification leading to representation, its conscious identification by the class subject leading to self-representation. A major task is to show how, for Marx, the revolutionary subjectivity of the class is actually constituted through the process of self-development. This is a very different notion to the idea that class interest is to be objectively identified by the scientists and represented by the politicians. One can resist the imputation of true class interest and consciousness since this imputation is actually the denial of subjectivity. In other words, it is the ability of the proletariat to identify and, indeed, to shape its class interest and hence to attain class consciousness which forms the content of socialism.

In the Marxist tradition, it has been constantly argued that the proletariat, on account of its exploited and oppressed material condition, will become increasingly conscious and revolutionary. Marx himself referred to what the proletariat 'must’ become. Social Democracy, based on the Kautsky-Lenin thesis, came to express the dangers of imputation most clearly as the distinction was made between the 'economism' of the working class, consciousness restricted to the struggles surrounding the wages system, and the political or theoretical consciousness which could only be formulated by the scientists of socialism and embodied in the party. Imputation thus becomes an ideological claim to knowledge, power and representation.

In light of the collapse of party/state socialism, the way that it subjected the working class to bureaucratic political control, the party, vanguardism, representation, revolutionary subjectivity as the class constitutes itself as the revolutionary class are crucial issues to be examined (Post 1996:239/90). There is a need to follow through Marx's praxis as a thoroughgoing democratisation much more consistently and conclusively than Marx did himself. The question is how the proletariat comes to acquire revolutionary consciousness in the struggle for autonomy.

The vanguardist position assumes that the proletariat is the revolutionary subject only to deny this subjectivity in practice. The criticism here is that the crucial issue with the party vanguard is no longer the process whereby the working class develop their revolutionary consciousness and subjective identity but how the objective interest of the proletariat be identified. This comes with the corollary that the party comes to represents the proletariat as an object and that, therefore, the subjectivity of the proletariat is denied. In the argument presented here Marx's distinction between class-in-itself and class-for-itself will be considered as absolutely crucial in indicating that there is a process in which the workers themselves make the development from being a class with an objective identity to being a class possessing a subjective reality. It is this self-constitution of the class as a subjective reality which shows .how the class is itself, the agent of its own making (Thompson 1963). This is not a completely processual definition, in that it recognises the structural basis of this process (Elster1985:343).





I would like to see the evidence for this, something more concrete than deductions showing certain omissions and slippages that the critic may wish to present as the genuine Marx. For, from 1843 (Marx to Ruge September 1843 Marx 1975:206/9) through the denial of 'sectarian principles' and 'social science' in the Manifesto (1973:79, 97) to his affirmation at the International of the proletarian movement against a movement 'hatched by a sect or a theory' (Marx 1974:99), of proletarian self-development against sectarianism (1974:298/9) to the argument that one step of real movement is worth more than a dozen party programmes (Critique of the Gotha Programme 1974:340) and the final reaffirmation of the principle of proletarian self-emancipation against the attempts of the 'educated and propertied bourgeoisie' to claim leadership of the workers (Circular Letter 17/3 September 1879), Marx's whole argument moves in completely the opposite direction of bourgeois intellectuals and politicians seizing the podium to act as 'story teller and tutor’. The conclusion of the Circular Letter is to be quoted fully.

As far as we are concerned, after our whole past only one way is open to us. For almost forty years we have stressed the class struggle as the most immediate driving power in history and, in particular, the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as the great lever of the modern social upheaval; therefore, it is impossible for us to ally ourselves with people who want to eliminate this class struggle from the movement. When the International was formed, we expressly formulated, the battle cry: the emancipation of the working class must be the work of the working class itself. We cannot ally ourselves, therefore, with people who openly declare that the workers are too uneducated to free themselves and must first be liberated from above by philanthropic big bourgeois and petty bourgeois.

Marx Circular Letter 1974: 374/5

Marx broke decisively with all utopianism and idealism and subjectivism in politics by being able to prioritise the working class as the revolutionary agency. Marx overthrew authoritarian, elitist and conspiratorial politics through being able to locate the revolutionary force in the proletarian movement.

For Marx, Utopian socialism - Saint Simonism, Fouriarism, Owenism - expressed the attempt to grasp a future society the material conditions for which, had yet to appear. As a result, bourgeois intellectuals and leaders, concerned with the condition of the working class, would act on behalf of the class. And it is as this elite, authoritarian vanguard that Marx criticised the Utopians, even whilst acknowledging their merit's in projecting some image of the future socialist society. Marx, however, was concerned to replace idealism in politics by the spontaneous, material development of the proletarian movement.

Of course it could be pointed out that Marx's socialism incorporates the basic values of the Utopians (Harrington 1993; Goodwin and Taylor. 1982). And it could also be pointed out that Marx himself was of bourgeois origins. Does this, then, not make him one of those bourgeois who would look to emancipate the proletariat from above? Such is the implication of calling Marx the 'story teller and tutor', as Post puts it. But the difference, of course, as Marx makes clear in the Circular Letter, lies in the approach to the class struggle. Marx grasps the positive and creative dynamic of the class struggle. The class struggle, evinces future possibilities from within the real movement of the proletariat.

Liberal critics have frequently argued that Marxism is Utopian and hence totalitarian (Popper 1969:355/63; Nielson in Held, Nielson and Parsons 1972:17/51). These critics have argued that Marxism possesses an inherently exclusive and authoritarian character owing to its claim to possess secret, 'scientific’ knowledge. This claim to knowledge gives Marxism a right to govern and to dominate. It is only one short step from claiming to know the true nature of reality to claiming to know the true interest of people - instituting an authoritarian system of government on this basis. Though the dangers are obvious, this is hardly the way that Marx related theory and practice and nowhere in his writings is the argument for a dictatorship of the scientists to be found. Quite the contrary, Marx can be shown to have democratised knowledge, power and politics.

It is this idea of spontaneous development or the real movement of the class which perhaps causes most controversy. The argument is not that Marx expected proletarian revolution to simply happen. What he is getting at is that the socialist end is something that is immanent in and grows within the movement of the class itself. As such, spontaneity implies for Marx a growth in consciousness, unity and organisation that comes from within the class and is in that sense a natural, organic growth. It is a conception not that different from the revolutionary syndicalist Pelloutier (Jennings 1990).

But spontaneity has been subjected to heavy criticism from Marxists for its inability to transcend the terrain of immediacy. Thus theorists writing in the Bolshevik tradition express Lenin's notorious scepticism towards proletarian spontaneity and argue that proletarian spontaneity is doomed to remain within bourgeois horizons. For the spontaneous development of a socialist consciousness by the proletariat is prevented by the fetishism of capitalist social relations as well as by the hegemony which capital can exercise owing to its control of the means of mass communication, media, education, the processes of socialisation. Hence the justification for a revolutionary vanguard, an organised minority possessing the theoretical consciousness and political will, to lead a revolutionary struggle (Pepper 1993:212). It all depends upon how the question of the vanguard is formulated. For Geras, the revolutionary vanguard is quite compatible with the principle of proletarian self-emancipation - as indeed it was for Marx in the relationship between communist's and proletarians.

The truth contained in so-called spontaneist versions of Marxism seems to me to be this: the spontaneous disposition of the working class to struggle, at least periodically, not merely for this or that partial gain, but against the very roots of its exploitation and oppression, against capitalist society itself, is the necessary but, not sufficient condition of socialism. It is merely another way of saying that capitalist society embodies the objective contradictions which create the historical possibility (and I say no more than 'possibility') of socialism. If it is denied, then socialism becomes simply one ethical ideal amongst others, or the theoretical project of Marxist intellectuals, with no purchase on reality and as powerless against it as Rousseau's Legislator and its variants. Of course, just such a view of socialism has been and is widely held, from Eduard Bernstein to the countless contemporary opponents of revolutionary Marxism. I limit myself to saying here that if that view is correct, then Marxism is false. It is not surprising, therefore, that Lenin's thesis in What is to be Done? (that the spontaneous movement of the working class creates trade unionism and only trade unionism which is 'precisely working class bourgeois polities'), used as a polemical weapon against the Economists, is a thesis he soon abandoned.




Geras's qualifications are important. It can be noted that the conception of the vanguard as standing apart from and above an incapable, 'corrupted’ social agent has returned to the position Marx criticised in the Theses. For the justification for the revolutionary vanguard asserts a general determinism which some, on unexplained premises, can escape and come to acquire the dominant position. The materialist premise is broken, as it has to be if change is to be at all possible. The determinist epistemology, in other words, makes socialist revolution possible only through an idealist politics.

This is precisely the association of materialism and authoritarianism that Marx had sought to overcome. Hence the revolutionary vanguard presupposes the incapacity of the proletariat and invalidates the proletariat as the revolutionary agency. This devaluation of the political agency of the class-subject leads to 'the party’ as an alienated form of political organisation. It is here that the degeneration of Marxism is to be located and, since this is so, it is worth examining the issue more closely.

48 THE MEDIATION OF THEORY AND POLITICS

The approach taken in this chapter is that of the revolution from below against the revolution from above. This takes a critical view of that 'scientific socialism' which used the claim to scientific knowledge to legitimate a political elitism and which fossilised Marxism as an orthodoxy under the control of the party. Marx's Marxism is a scientific socialism which overcomes rather than confirms the gap between the knower and the known and which, in establishing the unity of agency and structure, human beings and the world, subject and object, theory and practice, upholds that knowledge is something active and democratic, i.e. available to all as knowledgeable, agents transforming the world to be known. From this perspective, Marx seeks to overcome that autonomy of politics and of philosophy/consciousness which, for him, characterise the bourgeois epoch.

It will thus be considered that the failure of spontaneous movement of the working class to develop into socialist revolution and the corresponding incorporation of the movement within a passive Social Democracy encouraged an examination of the social and ideological forces underlying reformism. This, in turn, led to the view that proletarian revolution requires a scientific knowledge and politics. As against Marx's constant affirmation of the principle of self-emancipation intellectuals and politicians were once more elevated to a position of being interpreters of the revolutionary movement. Marx's attempts to avoid the autonomy of theory and politics through their subordination to/distillation out of the real movement and praxis of the class were undermined as Marxism became a fossilised and, indeed, neutralised truth in the hands of the party. How this could have happened and what possible alternatives there could have been generated out of Marx will be examined.

Appearance and Reality
The acid test in determining ones position on this question is whether one affirms the capacity or the incapacity of the proletariat. That this is the acid test can be seen by the fact that it is the centrality of proletarian self-emancipation and the class struggle which, for Marx, serves to distinguish his revolutionary workers socialism from Social Democracy (Circular Letter).

But it is not Social Democracy that is the main target of criticism here but Communism. For the assertion of the claims of the revolutionary party has entailed a corresponding devaluation of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject. The more sophisticated attempts to justify this position concentrate upon the fact that the proletariat is the seemingly passive - product of capitalism. Proletarian subjectivity is denied from the start. The proletariat is not its own creator and so the whole Hegelian problematic which requires that the subject comprehend its object as its own creation invalidated (Callinicos 1976:27). The proletariat is the product of primitive accumulation and the continuing process of accumulation and, as such, cannot play the role, of the subject recognising the object as its own.

The theory of fetishism shows how it is argued, the proletariat is prevented from grasping the world around them. It is Marxism as a science which alone can grasp the mechanisms at work beneath the fetish world of appearances. What Marx's theory of fetishism underlines, in other words, is the radical disjunction between the world of appearances and real exploitation to which the proletariat are subjected.

This is a fairly sophisticated attempt to employ Marx to reinstate the philosophers and subvert the proletariat, i.e. to reverse what Marx had done. Remember, Marx had resolved the problems with which the philosophers dealt into social terms. Solving these problems was no longer an intellectual process but a practical one. Marx subverted the position of the philosophers and their claim to interpret the 'complex’ world and had assigned the revolutionary role of social transformation to those most capable of engaging in the transformative action curing the inversions which troubled philosophy - the proletariat.

Marx's 'science' came to be used to undermine the proletariat and reinstate the elevated position of the intellectuals. Science and science alone could grasp the mechanisms underlying the world of appearances. The proletariat remained entirely on the level of appearances and was thus the prisoner of fetishism. This is a sophistication of the old case for vanguardist politics - that the proletariat are too corrupt to act and so need an enlightened minority to act for them. The proletariat, it seems, cannot penetrate the world of appearances to grasp the social relations of exploitation which generate these appearances.

This is a subtle determinism which denies the epistemological capacity of the proletariat to see through social relations. And it sits very uneasily with Marx's argument. How scientific is science? The science of political economy affirmed the harmony of interests between capital and labour. The proletariat, on the other hand, had little illusions as to being subject to exploitation. This may not be a theoretical consciousness, to the extent that the proletariat could and can achieve an analytical rigour and conceptual precision in delineating the mechanisms of exploitation. But it is to suggest that science for Marx is not the elitist enterprise abstracted from class praxis which some seem intent to argue.

Callinicos argues that Marx asserts a sharp separation between thought and reality, going on to argue that 'the existence of the sciences presupposes their separation from reality' (Callinicos 1976:25). Thus Callinicos asserts the separation of thought and reality, consciousness and being as being the basis of Marx's materialism.

This argument profoundly misunderstands the nature of Marx's emancipatory project and implicates Marxism in a scientism resting on the separation of philosophy and the world, subject and object, agency and structure, consciousness and being. As a result, we return to the passive-contemplative conception of science whereas Marx upheld an activist conception. Of course, Marx did argue that there is a distinction between appearance and reality and that this distinction is the basis of science. This is not at issue. What is at issue is the nature of this science and its relation to the world and to agency. For it is to be argued that Marx argues for a democratic as against an elitist conception of science, a conception of science which interacts with reality and with conscious, creative human agency.
The scientistic conception, however, succumbs to objectivism and grasps objective laws, structures, relations and mechanisms as though these really are independent of human agency. It is this reproduction of the dualism between subject and object, structure and agency, which means that scientific socialism is implicated in the alien determinism of the capital system.

Of course, this determinism suits some political interests. For the assertion of a radical disjuncture between appearance and reality and the assertion that only the work of the scientists can grasp the objective structures and relations of this reality leads inexorably to the justification for the revolutionary party able to lead the proletariat to socialism. Why should the party be able to apprehend reality but not the proletariat? Because it embodies scientific theory. Why can the proletariat itself not incorporate this science into its own movement? How can the party escape determinism but not the proletarian movement? If the practice of the proletariat is necessarily impregnated with bourgeois ideology, as Callinicos argues, then there really is nothing for it but to subordinate the real movement of the proletariat to the revolutionary party.

There is something very ambiguous about the Leninist argument. For the party claims to be revolutionary because it embodies the true interest and consciousness of the working class. But the working class is disqualified from ever appreciating and articulating this interest and consciousness for itself. The claim that the party is revolutionary is based on the assumption that the proletariat is revolutionary. But the justification offered for the agency of the party is that the proletariat will never, by its own efforts, become revolutionary. Can the proletariat emancipate itself or not? The Leninist conceptions of science and politics clearly rest on the assumption that it cannot. And it is this assertion of the incapacity of proletarian agency which is to be rooted out of Marxism. For it has totalitarian implications which run directly contrary to the democratisation of knowledge and politics that Marx sought to achieve.

In answering the question of whether Marxism is inextricably connected with the totalitarian regimes of China, Cuba, Cambodia and the countries of eastern Europe, Heilbroner (1980:24/5. 142/3, 143/7) recognises the partial responsibility of Marxism for what has come to be established in its name. And the reason he does so is precisely on account of that definition of Marxist science which Callinicos defends. For if it is indeed the case that Marxism is concerned with grasping the underlying essences of things, something which people on the level, of ordinary appearances cannot do, then it follows that some, an elite of scientists separated from the fetishism of the world, possess an insight into the world, whereas others, Marx's 'vast majority' (Manifesto), are subject to the illusions of the world. Thus, society is divided into two parts again, an active elite privileged by their insight over a passive mass. A materialist determinism has again produced a political idealism which could only do violence to the real world and the people in it. It is in that context that Heilbroner acknowledges the criticism that 'the texture of Marxist thinking degenerates easily into dogma, that there is something inherently predisposed toward totalitarianism in the very cast of Marxist ideas' (Heilbroner 1980:143). Thus Marxist science tends to dogma and utopianism - idealism is a better term - inviting totalitarianism.

None of this implies that the distinction between appearance and reality be abandoned or that Marx's attempt to grasp underlying structures and tendencies ought to be rejected. For this would indeed mean that one remains, on the level of the ideologically constituted surface world of appearances (Parekh 1982). Worse, it means arguing that the world of appearances is the only world, as postmodernism does, a position which rationalises the capital system.

What is at issue is the relation of science/knowledge to agency in the world and the capacity of human agents to grasp the reality of the world through their praxis and incorporate the insights into the world gained by science into their praxis. It is to understand how, for Marx, knowing the world is conditional upon getting to grips with it in order to transforming it. Any science as such cannot be formulated in abstraction from the world but is distilled from the real movement of the world.

On this basis one can underline the democratic and active conception of knowledge developed by Marx and proceed from here to understand the libertarian political implications, of this position. And it is certainly to root out the political elitism and authoritarianism that has accompanied scientific socialism. For once society is divided into two parts, one raised above another as a privileged, insightful minority and a passive, determined mass, it is the purest naivety to believe that the proletariat will be allowed to emancipate itself from the authority of 'the party' identified with the proletariat.

Indeed, the irony is that the scientific socialists have failed to penetrate to the depths of the capital system and, instead, attack only capitalism. That is, the party/state socialists remain only on the abstracted political level and transform only property relations, not the more fundamental production relations. The relation between people and property changes as the state assumes proprietorial rights, but the relation between people remains exploitative. Only the proletarian agency is able to challenge the capital system on its material terrain. Only the proletariat can penetrate to the depths of the system.

From claiming the monopoly of insight into circumstances the party proceeds to claim the monopoly of the state power and the means of production. The proletariat, on all crucial points, is disqualified from acting and thinking for itself in such a way as to transform society from the roots up.

Where Marx saw human beings as the active agents in the historical process, the scientific socialists see people as necessarily impregnated by ideology. The fact is that it is hard to see how history, let alone revolution, is possible if human agents are necessarily imprisoned within the fetish character of existing systems. If existing systems protect themselves with a fetish veil how can it ever be changed into something else.

The categories of scientific socialism are rooted in the attempt to mediate between specialisation and totality, they are attempts to grasp the whole under conditions which induce fragmentation. What keeps the whole enterprise afloat is the party of professional revolutionaries, with their organised hierarchy, tight discipline and centralised command structures. The tendencies to fragmentation are thus kept in check by a military style organisation.

But a point that is avoided is that this whole justification for the autonomy of theory and politics does indeed assume that the proletariat is too stupid to emancipate itself. It runs directly against the principle of proletarian self-emancipation. Of course, the point is not presented so bluntly. Instead, it is asserted that the workers, by their own efforts, cannot achieve the socialist consciousness. The theory of fetishism is thus employed to give a more sophisticated rationalisation of Lenin's position, that by their spontaneous efforts the working class will remain prisoners of bourgeois ideology. It is thus pointed out that capitalism, with its division of labour and fragmentation and wages system, divides workers from each other and restricts within the sphere of immediacy. The conclusion that is drawn from this argument is that capitalism, despite its crisis tendencies, does not inevitably or necessarily lead to revolution. As a result, there is a need for political intervention and a scientific consciousness - the case for the mediation of theory and politics through the agency of 'the party’.

Two points should be noted here. In the first place, the case for the party has separated subject and object and so cannot understand how the crises and contradictions of the capital system are inextricably connected with the growing consciousness and politicisation of the proletarian movement. In the second place, there is no reason why the proletarian movement itself cannot generate its own political organisation and consciousness rather than have them supplied from the outside. The case for alien mediation by autonomous theory and politics grasps the proletariat only one-sidedly, in its economistic character, as a class 'in itself, 'in’ the capital system. What interested Marx was the progress that the class could make towards proletarian autonomy and subjectivity through constituting itself as a class 'for itself, 'against' capital. This is precisely the meaning of Marx's statement that the working class is revolutionary or it is nothing. The working class attains a subjective existence for itself or, to all intents and purposes, it exists as an object subject to exploitative and alienative relations.

The Political Implications
Marxism, as a revolutionary and emancipatory politics, is defined by the object of practically reappropriating human powers alienated to the state and capital, investing these powers in the organs created by human agents in society. Marx thus puts forward a view of the self-organising society. The problem with the mediation of autonomous theory and politics lies in the way that the struggle for restitution overcoming the state and capital is replaced by a struggle within the sphere of alienation. Thus, the task of creating the socialist consciousness loses the relation to class praxis and becomes instead a process of inculcation under the authority of the party.

The impression is given that it is 'ideology' that governs the world and that what matters is that a proletarian ideology, formulated by the bourgeois intelligentsia paradoxically enough, replaces a bourgeois ideology. 'The party' thus becomes absolutely essential in creating the 'proletarian' ideology. As such, the emancipatory character of Marx's politics is lost. The proletariat is incapable of abolishing the state. Instead, it is forced to rely upon a political organisation, the party, for disseminating and inculcating the ideology that governs the world. The mediation and autonomy of theory and politics thus places the proletarian revolutionary subject under the tutelage of politicians and intellectuals and as such reproduces the dualism of rulers and ruled. This dualism must be institutionalised at the level of the state.

Thus, the argument is that the mediation and autonomy of theory and politics reinstates the old dualisms of theory and practice, subject and object, agency and, structure, state and society. The attainment of the revolutionary socialist consciousness is thus a distinct, theoretical-political practice abstracted from the class praxis and material force of the proletarian revolutionary subject.

Korsch's position is worth quoting

The real contradiction between Marx's scientific socialism and all bourgeois philosophy and sciences consists entirely in the fact that scientific socialism is the theoretical expression of a revolutionary process, which will tend to the total abolition of all those bourgeois philosophies and sciences, together with the abolition, of the material relations which find their ideological expression in them.

Korsch in Callinicos 1976:55

What Korsch is drawing attention to is the distinction between the passive-contemplative approach to knowledge in bourgeois philosophy and science, which presupposes separation from the world as external and objective, and Marx's activist approach to knowledge in which science is distilled from the process of transforming the world. From this perspective, it can be understood that the idea of the socialist consciousness as something formulated by intellectuals in abstraction from the creative praxis of the proletariat actually entails a reversion to the passive-contemplative, position of the bourgeois. Where the passive-contemplative position is elitist and leads to an authoritarian politics, Marx's own activist science privileges the human agents as knowledgeable and transformative agents and is thus democratic in its premises and consequences.

Marx's view of the socialist revolution affirms the unity of subjective and objective factors, not a dualism in which the subjective is one thing and the objective is another, but the interpenetration of the two. The contradictory dynamics and crisis tendencies of the capital system thus contains objective and subjective elements. That is, whilst Marx does delineate the dissolution of the capital system as a result of its internal mechanisms - the rise in the organic composition of capital, the fall in the rate of profit - he also underlines the revolutionary class, the most important productive force, as internal to the system and its crisis.

Thus, there is every need to revalue the political agency of the proletariat and to criticise that socialist politics which devalued proletarian agency in the first place. The objective socialisation and the maturation of objective contradictions under the capital system must, therefore, be accompanied by the development of the subjective conditions of socialist revolution.

The formation of a revolutionary socialist consciousness by the proletariat is essential to the development of the subjective conditions. This is not in doubt. It is how this formation of a revolutionary consciousness takes place that is in question. Those who propose the mediation of theory and politics reproduce that autonomy of both which characterises bourgeois society. Against this, Marx argues for the political and intellectual self-education of the proletariat through its own practices and struggles. It is in this self-education that the proletariat develops itself into the revolutionary class, and develops the consciousness and organisation that is appropriate to a revolutionary class.

What this argument underlines is that affirming the unity of subjective and objective factors means arguing more than that the proletariat is reactive to capitalist crisis but is actually a creative agency in the attainment of socialise.

This, however, is a view not shared in the Social Democratic or Communist tradition. In the clash between the Social Democrats and the Syndicalists both sides claimed the authority of Marx. The revolutionary syndicalists continued to uphold the principle that the emancipation of the working class will be the act of the working class itself. And they emphasised Marx's castigation of those who wished to place the working masses under the tutelage of new categories of the professional intelligentsia (Le Mouvemant Socialist, 1907:223). And the syndicalists underlined Marx's commitment to an anti-statist radical democracy modelled upon the Paris Commune. Powers appropriated by the state would thus be restored to society (LMS 1907:224/5).

The Social Democrats, however, rejected the view that their parties and practices were responsible for reformism. Thus Kautsky argued that the working class, on its own, could develop only a bourgeois consciousness which was limited to trade union activities, trade unions, Kautsky acknowledged, were associations for improving wages and conditions and, as such, represented the workers according to their particular work, not as a class. Thus, trade unions reflected the specialisation of capitalism and narrowed the workers' consciousness to the fragmentary framework of bourgeois society. Only the political party could represent the interests of the workers as a class as a whole. The working class, by itself, is subject to bourgeois ideology.

It is the working class, according to the Social Democratic argument, which generates reformism. It is the political party which organises the class under the tutelage of politicians and intellectuals whose knowledge of the long term socialist objective qualifies them to introduce the socialist consciousness into the proletariat from the outside. Thus, in the Social Democratic argument, the political party and the bourgeois intelligentsia, far from being the force behind reformism within the socialist movement, are absolutely essential if the proletariat is to be able to overcome the limitations of its own position. The workerism of the syndicalists, then, condemns the proletariat to remain within the limited horizons and practices of bourgeois society.

Kautsky's argument is a curious mixture of half-truth, orthodoxy and rationalisation. Marx himself was neither a spontaneist nor a workerist. Marx did argue for the working class to transcend the limitations of trade unionism. But he argued that the proletariat itself as the revolutionary subject, in whose practices and struggles, in whose being, socialism was implicit, should develop its political significance. Moreover, one can question just how socialist the Social Democratic politicians and intellectuals really were in the first place. Long before the hollowness of their socialism was exposed by the war of 1914-8, the syndicalists has perceived the political passivity which Kautsky's theory attempted to rationalise. If, from Marx's perspective, the syndicalists are in error, reverting to the most immediate form of class struggle, at least they reinstated the centrality of the class struggle as a reaction against the Social Democrats classless parliamentarism the very tendency which Marx observed taking over Social Democracy in 1879 (Circular Letter).

Lenin himself appreciated the extent to which Social Democracy rationalised its political passivity and against this attempted to recover Marx's revolutionary politics. The interesting thing, however, is that Lenin shared precisely those Social Democratic assumptions which had devalued the political agency of the proletariat. Thus, as is well known - and is possibly given too much weight - in What is to be Done? Lenin argues that the working class, by its own efforts, could develop only a trade union consciousness. This 'spontaneous development of the working class movement .. leads to the subordination to bourgeois ideology'. The socialist consciousness, as distinct from the trade union consciousness, demands a scientific knowledge which transcends the everyday world of the workers. It requires a knowledge of capital, class, relationships, the state etc.

What Lenin is calling for is a scientific or theoretical consciousness, clearly that the working class should be acquainted with Marx. This is fair enough. What is controversial is the way that Lenin formulates this process of education. For he calls this theoretical consciousness, a socialist consciousness. And this is something that, paradoxically from Marx's position, the working class are disqualified from achieving. Only the bourgeois intelligentsia, separated from the class, can formulate this socialism. The whole theory leads to the justification of the party as the agency for the inculcation of socialism into the proletariat. And, stated thus, Leninism invites the same reaction against its abstract politics as that of the syndicalists against Social Democracy. For all of Lenin's attempts to recover revolutionary politics against the passivity of the Social Democrats, his whole position was hobbled from the start by the failure to relate socialist politics to the real movement of the class.

What is interesting to observe, when noting these shared assumptions, is that when exiled in Siberia Lenin translated the Webbs' Industrial Democracy and was clearly impressed and influenced by the work. This book supplied Lenin with the information, he needed to combat workers' 'primitivism' in organisational questions. For one of the basic themes in the Webbs' argument is that workers democracy had been tried and been shown to fail in the labour movement of the oldest industrial nation. Lenin could conclude, therefore, that it would be better for the rising industrial nation of Russia to avoid such a blind alley. Similarly, the Webbs' provided all the evidence that Lenin needed to reinforce his belief that the working class could not spontaneously reach socialism. Lenin could conclude - or could feel certain in a conclusion already reached - that the road from trade union consciousness to socialist consciousness would never be taken by the proletariat without the intervention of the revolutionary party. It is interesting to read the Webbs' case for the professional labour leader shaping the ideas and opinions of the workers (Harrison in Samuel ed. 1981:322/6). This professional labour leader is not Lenin's professional revolutionary, quite the contrary. But the shared assumption is that the working class, by its own efforts, cannot think or 'act in a way that transcends immediate, limited horizons'. The shared assumption is the political and intellectual incapacity of the proletariat.

This, frankly, is a libel against the working class. And we are well advised to scrutinise the vested political interests of those who perpetrate this libel. The Webbs' made their contempt for the working class quite explicit. They dismissed the workers and could see no creativity or intelligence in the working class beyond economistic questions (Callaghan 1990). And, of course, they had a vested interest in devaluing the proletariat in this way. They, the professionals, the educated, the trained, and they alone were qualified to run the new social order as officials, bureaucrats and managers. They would replace the private capitalists. They knew how to run the modern economy. That Lenin should so uncritically have used the evidence of the Webbs in developing his own position suggests that, after all, he too was attempting to substitute the agency of the organised political minority for that of the workers.

The criticism of the way that mediation has led to the autonomy of theory-and politics does not commit oneself to the view that Marx expected the socialist consciousness to arise spontaneously from within the workers movement. Marx was well aware of the backwardness of working class consciousness, as the correspondence with Engels shows (Levy ad. 1987:107). What Marx did expect was that the proletariat would develop its political and organisational capacities, the socialist consciousness would also develop.

The Party as Mediation
As the socialist revolution failed to materialise and as the spontaneous movement of the working class led to a Social Democracy that reproduced the split between the political and the social in the form of parliamentarism and trade unionism, the idea that, by its own efforts, the working class could not escape the illusions of bourgeois society could be confirmed.
Marxism began to break up as a consequence of this development. Social Democracy and Leninism represented reformist and revolutionary approaches to the need for political and theoretical mediation, given the incapacity of the class to emancipate itself. There remained the radical left of Social Democracy who continued to argue that, through the development of the class struggle, the. working class would throw off bourgeois institutional and ideological limitations. Rosa Luxemburg is a key figure here and the way that she began to distinguish a Marxism from Social Democracy and Leninism was taken further by the council communists, though. Luxemburg, like Lukacs and Gramsci, also has some links with the revolutionary politics of Bolshevism.

The main Marxist political tradition, however, was based upon the assumption that what Marx had referred to as the fetish of commodities threw a veil of illusions over the world which the working class, in its immediacy, could not penetrate. This veil could be penetrated only by the scientific knowledge developed by intellectuals. The political party would embody and apply this knowledge.

The problem with this position from a perspective that prioritises Marx's emancipatory commitment, is that one is led to reassert that radical disjunction between subject and object, theory and practice, the political and the economic which constitute the alienated social world under the capital system. The reason that the socialist politicians and intellectuals are led to do this lies in the separation between reality and appearance. The working class, on the level of immediate experience, is restricted to trade union issues and hence cannot grasp the underlying relations of exploitation. It is this separation of appearance and reality - and the assumption that the working class cannot bridge the gap by constituting itself as a class-for-itself - which leads to a growing emphasis upon the autonomy of theory and of politics institutionalised in the form of the party. That this should reproduce political alienation is no surprise. For the whole justification for the party lies in its separation from the working class. There has to be this separation. The purity of the socialist doctrine is guaranteed only by insulating it from the workers and their 'bourgeois' ideology.

The all pervasiveness of the veil of illusions thrown over the social world by the fetishism of commodities means that socialist consciousness cannot be developed from experience. The class praxis of the proletariat can do no more than generate trade union issues, as though the wages struggle cannot be explored and developed for its political significance as the struggle between capital and labour. Only scientific knowledge could grasp the 'objective' laws and processes of the capital system, the laws of motion and the laws of history. Of course, one could look at the question from another direction and argue that the whole notion of 'objective' laws is a rationalisation legitimising the need for an elitist and authoritarian organisation like the party.

If there are such things as secret essences and laws which only those possessing scientistic understanding can grasp and if the experience and the praxis of the proletariat is debarred from grasping these essences and laws, then indeed there is nothing for it but to defer to the authority of the party (Bonefeld et al ed.I 1992 :xvii/xviii). A socialist politics and consciousness is no longer derived from the practices and struggles of the class but only from the activities of the scientists working in abstraction from the world of experience. Marxism was no longer rooted in the class praxis of the proletariat.

Politically and theoretically, Marxism was detached from the proletariat, from the revolutionary subject whose self-emancipation, for Marx, formed the key to human emancipation in general. The mediation of theory and politics, in these terms, reinstated the alienating bourgeois dualisms and represented an institutional obstacle to Marxism as an emancipatory project.

The implications were nothing short of profound, disastrous even. Socialist politics came to take the form of a struggle between parties for the right to 'represent' the class and bolster the power of the organisation in the process. Marxism less and less concerned the development of the working class through its own struggles and practices and instead focused upon the struggles to ensure the hegemony of one party over another.
Dialectical materialism, first defined by Plekhanov, came to reinstate the old philosophical materialism. This restated the ontological priority of matter. This dialectical materialism lost the 'active side’ developed by idealism and which Marx incorporated into his own materialism. The reinstatement of the old materialist determinism once more made human beings the passive products and prisoners of circumstances. The effect was to present Marxism as a science of a positivist character, confirming the separation of human agency from the social world which is the- condition of alienation. Worse, 'marxism’ was codified as a theory of history and economics which was insulated from the world of experience and from the agents in this world, transforming this world.

Marxism was codified as 'orthodoxy' under the Second International and the deterministic, positivist reading of Marx left no room for the conscious, creative class agency of the proletariat. Unfortunately, Lenin broke only with the political implications of Second International orthodoxy, rejecting Social Democratic conservatism but retaining that dialectical materialism that failed to connect Marxism with class praxis. The political party of the politicians and the scientists retained the prerogative of defining the Marxist truths to be handed down to the rank and file.

Marx, it is worth restating, constantly emphasised the centrality of proletarian self-emancipation. He also continually argued that the proletarian movement must, above all, ensure its independence from all other classes, movements and parties and must press its interests unambiguously in class terms. From this perspective, the main objection is that the mediation of politics and theory assumes the political and intellectual incapacity of the proletariat and, on the basis of this assumption, fails to grasp the process of proletarian self-development and legitimises the subordination of the proletariat to the party. What we have here is a reproduction of the rulers-ruled, elite-mass dualism of bourgeois society from within the tradition of Marxism.

Marx's work, in other words, is read in such a way as to justify the party as an alienated organisational form that puts the proletariat under the domination of a ruling class. Marx, in arguing that the working class should assert its independence, did not argue for workers exclusivism. What he did argue is that members of the bourgeois intelligentsia, like himself, were merely facilitators of the real movement of the proletariat, a movement which is internal to the class and which politicians and intellectuals do not and cannot create. Marx, from 1843 to his death, made it very plain that theory is to be distilled from practice and is not to be imposed upon the proletarian movement as dogma deriving from a priori principles of political rationality. Marx unambiguously rejected the rationalist model.

The proletariat's immediate experience is expressed only in the form of trade union consciousness and practice, that is, as the struggle over wages and conditions, the reproduction of labour within bourgeois relations. But this immediate existence is not the 'real' nature or interest of the class, and Marx showed why in examining the exploitative relation between capital and labour. But, since the working class could not penetrate the world of appearances to this underlying reality of exploitation, some other agency had to intervene to represent the real interest of the class - the party. The risk of substitution here ought to be obvious. What has been missed is the developmental process whereby the workers actually do, progressively, come to identify and, become conscious of their class interest and identity. It is through the economic, social and political struggles of the working class that the fetish appearances of the real world are penetrated. In the same process, the workers convert themselves from being concerned with immediate economic issues, separated from each other in their immediacy, into a conscious class.

By reinstating this developmental process and showing how it is the central theme of Marx's writing on the class - the reason why he did not and could not develop a theory of the party or of any other form - my intention is to undermine the case for the mediation of scientific theory and the political party and once more re-establishing the centrality of the real movement of the class, For this mediation, proposing the autonomy of theory and politics, their abstraction from a class praxis imprisoned in bourgeois ideology leads only to the institution of a leadership over the working class, representing the class on the assumption that it is incapable of representing itself. The mediation of theory and politics leads to a scientifically privileged and self-legitimising vanguard of professional revolutionaries who can only institutionalise their power by reconstituting the state over society. There is nothing, moreover, in this conception which could lead one to believe that the party-state is engaged in a process of self-liquidation once socialism is 'built'. On the contrary, the conception leads to the reinforcement of the state power.

There is no denying that the wages struggle alone is restricted to the wages system and, alone, cannot generate socialism. It is how one approaches this observation that is in question. For the assumption of those who argue for the mediation of politics and theory - i.e. their autonomy, 'from the outside’ - is that the working class is capable only of such a trade union consciousness and activity. The historical record shows that the proletariat, even from within the union movement, to be able to elaborate principled demands transcending the wages struggle and to be able to struggle over political issues concerning control and be quite conscious in doing so. Trade union struggles over wages and conditions do not exhaust proletarian activity; proletarian activity is more than economistic and reactive. It is incumbent upon Marxists to ‘be alert' to the creative, reality constituting class praxis of the proletariat and to seek to develop and orient this praxis, from within the real movement, towards the long term socialist objective. Thus, workers struggles, even wages struggles are to be examined from the perspective of the self-education of the working class is the only sure way of developing the socialist consciousness.

And it means picking through the case for the mediation of politics and theory, exposing the way that it devalues the proletarian agency and indicating the possibilities of proletarian self-development.
The Kautsky-Lenin thesis - that only the party enables the proletariat to overcome the one sidedness of its immediate existence - introduces a notion of mediation into Marxism which is not present in Marx. For those upholding the mediation of theory and politics, the party embodied the scientific basis of socialism and the true class interest of the proletariat. The party laid down the scientific basis for socialism and put itself forward as the vanguard of the attempt to realise socialism. Socialism is not inevitable and could only be realised through the 'correct ideology', as Lenin put it, and the correct form of political organisation. Should the proletarian lack either then it will remain within the limited horizons of bourgeois economism. Without the formation of a political party that embodied Marxism as scientific knowledge, the socialist revolution lost its inevitability (Aronowitz 1981:11).

The mediation associated with Social Democracy and Communism lead to the autonomy of politics and theory from the real movement and experience of the proletariat, indeed, rests its legitimacy precisely on this separation from a class doomed to spontaneously generate only bourgeois ideology.

Internal and External Mediation
What should give cause for suspicion is that the very heavy emphasis upon what the proletariat organisationally, politically and intellectually cannot do is diametrically opposed to where Marx placed the emphasis - on proletarian self-emancipation. For if the proletariat is as incapable as the justification for autonomous mediation uphold then it is invalidated as the revolutionary class, it is in the position of the French peasants of whom Marx spoke so disparagingly. Hence the class needs someone or some agency to represent it. But this acceptance of representation would only indicate the lack of revolutionary content in the class being represented.

Such mediation did not go unchallenged. The Dutch and the German left continued to argue the case for self-emancipation leading to the self-organising society constituted by workers councils. The most prominent names here are Luxemburg, Korsch, Gorter, Pannekoek, Roland-Hoist. What one can argue from this perspective is that the intervention and domination of the bourgeois intelligentsia in the proletarian movement actually prevented the development of the proletariat and hence produced the very incapacity which justifies mediation in the first place. The argument is about the kind of mediation being proposed. Mediation 'from the outside' based on the autonomy of politics and theory reproduces the alienating bourgeois dualisms and separations which Marx's, emancipatory project is designed to overcome. Whatever mediation is appropriate to this emancipatory project has to be supplied from within the workers movement and, to the extent that it is not generated, then we are still some distance from socialism. Socialism emerges in this process of self-development or not at all. The attempt to supply the missing mediation from the outside is really a substitutionism that reproduces representative and alienative politics.

Lenin's reaction to the left wing arguments for workers councils and a socialism self-organising from below can be understood in a number of ways. Lenin's Left Wing Communism - An Infantile Disorder continues to sell well. Which is curious enough in itself, given that the reasons motivating Lenin's polemic have long since lost historical relevance. What was Lenin up to? For he was now savaging a position that he himself had justified in the middle of the revolutionary year of 1917 in The State and Revolution.

The standard defence is that Lenin was attempting to lead the workers away from futile struggles and away from a sectarian rejection of politics. The working class should be organised and should act in ways which would ensure long term success. Of course, these prescriptions come with the case for the Bolshevik Party as the appropriate political form. There are those for whom Lenin was simply preparing the way for winding down all workers organisations independent of the Bolshevik Party (Mattick 1978:86). The path would thus be cleared for the Bolsheviks to establish their hegemony. There are those for whom Lenin was engaged in a desperate attempt to protect the Bolshevik regime in Moscow. Lenin did not need the workers of these countries engaging in revolutionary action against the very governments whose aid and trade Lenin sought. Ironically enough, the very last thing that Lenin needed, once he realised that international working class revolution was not on the agenda, was world revolution. The doctrine of socialism in one country started here (Melograni 1989:57/8 119/123). The Third International 'was not founded to export revolution, but simply to defend the state’ (Melograni 1989:xii).

But, most important of all for our purposes, is that 'Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder' is Lenin at his brutally honest best - the proletariat is incapable on its own and requires the political and ideological intervention of the party. And, no doubt, continues to need this institutional crutch after the revolution, for all the assertions of the withering away of the state. Can the party, once possessing state power, ever renounce its vanguard role, given the stated need for this political and theoretical mediation in the first place? It is hard to see how.

It is, perhaps, not enough to argue that the approach to mediation exhibited by Social Democracy and Communism is contrary to Marx's argument and therefore is to be rejected as such. That something somewhere had gone wrong is indicated by the fact that the militant struggles of the working class before the war actually took place independently of and often in conscious opposition to the socialist parties. A very unmarxist divorce between class and party had taken place. But, arguably, the workers still failed to generate their own political alternative to Social Democracy and Communism. The workers did not by their own efforts, redefine politics and establish new, relationships.

And the argument is that, to the extent that, despite expectations, the revolutionary working class did not come forward in any sustained or general form, questions of politics and theory and, indeed, culture had to be examined. Later, both Lukacs and Gramsci and, later still, the Frankfurt school, came to examine the ideological and cultural roots for capitalism's ability to survive beyond economic and political crises. These questions come forward and will continue to come forward given the underdevelopment of the proletarian movement.

In other words, Social Democracy and Communism could be explained as attempts to compensate for the deficiencies of an underdeveloped proletarian movement though, once established, they both institutionally underdeveloped: the proletarian movement, becoming an obstacle to the resolution of the problem. Until the class has finally developed itself into the revolutionary class it will always be underdeveloped relative to the revolutionary objective. There will, therefore, always be a case put forward for the necessary mediation to compensate for existing deficiencies. 

But is mediation the cause or the consequence of underdevelopment? Marx himself leaves no doubt. The proletariat, in its infancy, appears to the Utopian socialist to be a class 'without any historical initiative or any independent political movement'. The underdevelopment of the proletariat is also the underdevelopment of the productive forces. At this stage, without the material conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat, the Utopian socialists look to their 'social science' (i.e. science in the archaic sense of doctrine.





Marx unambiguously repudiates the case for mediation which is based upon the autonomy of theory and politics. Any such mediation has to be supplied by the class from its own internal movement.

Lenin built upon what had become Social Democratic orthodoxy. The proletariat could not transcend its immediate, ideologically constituted, existence and therefore was imprisoned within bourgeois ideology. Only the revolutionary and scientifically guided politics of the party could rescue the class from the quagmire of bourgeois ideology. The working class, by its own efforts, is bourgeois and reformist.
Here, Lenin was building upon Kautsky's assumptions. For Kautsky it was 'entirely wrong' to argue that the socialist consciousness was the necessary product of class struggle. Socialism, for him, derived from a wholly different source - from the scientific knowledge of the objective world and its 'laws'. The agents of socialism, then, are not the proletariat but the scientists, the bourgeois intelligentsia. Marxism as scientific socialism would be inculcated into the class from the outside. The socialist consciousness thus arose from the study and not from the class struggle. Thus, a reversion to the passive-contemplative approach to knowledge away from Marx's activist conception took place.

Conclusion: On the Workers’ Revolution
In conclusion, the failure of the spontaneous workers revolution to materialise induced an examination of the illusions of fetishism. In truth, Social Democratic reformism, as expressed most of all by Kautsky, had already assumed the political and intellectual incapacity of the proletariat. The proletariat, by themselves, could not be the revolutionary agency. Still, as Marx's 'material force', possessing the structural capacity to transform society, the proletariat represented a social class which aspiring bourgeois could ride into power. The idea that the proletariat required the scientific knowledge and politics of 'the bourgeois intelligentsia thus fitted perfectly with the aspirations of the new class.

Lukacs made this case for mediation in its most sophisticated form. Though he is ambiguous, and underlines the centrality of the proletariat as the subject-object of the historical process, Lukacs presents a sophisticated expression of Lenin's theory and practice of the party. The failure of the proletariat to emerge as the revolutionary subject thus confirmed Kautsky's old Social Democratic thesis - that without the mediation of scientific theory and political leadership the proletariat could not become a socialist force. The task now was to reconcile this need for alien mediation with a revolutionary politics, i.e. how to avoid rationalising the political passivity of the Social Democrats.

A common theme of both Social Democratic and Leninist arguments is that there is no inevitability to the socialist revolution. But Luxemburg had been amongst the first to argue this. It is the conclusions drawn from this understanding that differ so widely. For Luxemburg this meant stressing the subjective factor in socialist revolution - consciousness, class struggle, proletarian organisation and action. All of this, as the subjective factor, is internal to the class. As against this, Social Democracy and Leninism interpreted the failure of proletarian spontaneity to entail the devaluation of the class subject and the justification of the party form of organisation. What is abandoned in this conception is Marx's faith in the capacity of the proletariat to emancipate itself (Clarke 1991:309).

The revaluation of the subjective factor, begun by Luxemburg, would have been a more promising development than the intervention of the substitute agency of the party as a form of compensation. A substitute agency could lead only to a substitute socialism. As against this, the need was to understand, the proletariat in terms of a process of self-development. This means underlining once more that, for Marx, socialist revolution, its very substance, depends upon the capacity of the proletariat to constitute itself through its social and political struggles as the revolutionary, history making subject.

Everything in Marx's socialism as an emancipatory project depends upon this capacity - for the class struggle is a struggle between labour and, capital, between living and dead labour, a struggle against an alienated social world and for human freedom as self-determination in this world. There can be no short cuts to human emancipation in general. Substitutionism, representation, pragmatism, politicise all lead to an involvement in the fetishised structures and institutions of capital's alienated social world. The proletariat alone, as the class most subject to alienative and exploitative relations, can strike, the blow for the recovery human agency and freedom. It is the class upon whose oppression and exploitation the alienated social world depends for its existence. It has to reappropriate its power for these alienative and exploitative relations to be destroyed.

Lukacs reads so ambiguously because his justification for Lenin's theory of the party was based upon the tacit recognition that his definition of the proletariat as the subject-object of history was deficient. Lukacs looked for explanations behind the failure of the proletariat to constitute itself as the revolutionary class, explanations deeper than those which made leaders and organisations responsible. The fact that reformist Social Democracy and its political passivity could win the allegiance of the proletariat in the first place required explanation. Lukacs found these explanations in reification, rationalisation and the division of labour.

These explanations, however, for all their Marxist formulation, owe more to Weber than to Marx. Marx, by locating the problem in the capital system as an alienated system of production, offers a way out of the impasse. To look not at the alienation of labour but a general process of rationalisation offers no way out, no positive principle through, which to reverse the processes of the modern world (Clarke 1991). Lukacs' explanations put forward the case for the mediations of theory and politics - the proletarian consciousness was restricted to immediate experience and could not penetrate the underlying relations through which capital dominated. For all the sophistication; Lukacs’ argument, in essentials, is the old thesis that Lenin took from Kautsky - the working class alone was capable only of a trade union consciousness and that socialist consciousness could only be formulated and introduced from the outside.

Lukacs was attempting to retain the case for the proletariat as the revolutionary class whilst reconciling this case with the mediation of theory and politics as autonomous from the class. But, the question has to be asked, in asserting the structural and epistemological incapacity of the proletariat to generate a revolutionary consciousness and politics, is it not the case that the whole notion of proletarian self-emancipation and the proletariat as the revolutionary class has been discarded?

Lukacs thus undermined the notion of the revolutionary class. His continued adherence to a revolutionary politics is not strictly allowed by his premises. The theory of reification and rationalisation offers no path to socialist revolution, self-mediation or external mediation. Ultimately, Lukacs drew back from the implications of his theory, arguing that the growing crises and contradictions of capitalism, proletarian organisation and socialist politics would suffice to produce revolutionary praxis. Nevertheless, Lukacs had given prominence to Marx's theory of fetishism and had presented a version of this theory which owed more to Weber and Simmel than to Marx. The category of fetishism was employed to emphasise the incapacity of the proletariat, the inability of the proletariat to get to grips with capital. Capitalism, it seems, had thrown a protective veil over its exploitative social relations. Lukacs, therefore, showed why Marx's expectations of proletarian revolution had failed to materialise. Lukacs theorised the reason why the proletariat had not become the revolutionary class and overthrown capitalism. Lukacs' arguments on alienation, reification and fetishism show how bourgeois society necessarily mystifies consciousness (Perkins 1993). 

But Lukacs' position is full of ambiguities. Lukacs provides





Here is the case for the mediation of theory and politics from the outside. Perkins points to two things, to Marx's theory of alienation, which offers the guarantee of resistance, and to Lenin's theory of the party, which develops a form of organisation required by the class in struggle. Lukacs integrates these two themes. One could point out here that a more adequate presentation of the revolutionary political agency of the proletariat may be derived from the notion of alienation than mere resistance. Marx's critique of alienation can be presented in such a way as to deny the need for external mediation. After showing how Lukacs theorised the incapacity of the proletariat. Perkins concludes that





This work, arguably, still needs to be done. Lukacs himself was dealing with the implications of the defeat of revolutionary hopes and the mediation of theory and politics in the form of the party. The proletariat was no longer being seen as the structurally and epistemologically privileged class which it was for Marx (Parekh 1982). Instead, it was the incapacity of the class which was being assumed in practice and which was to be justified in theory. This invited the intervention, politically and ideologically, of an external educator. This is to reinstate the philosopher and subvert the proletariat.

 One should be aware of the way that Marxism read as a philosophical critique of alienation and fetishism replaces the class struggle with 'consciousness raising' (Cleaver 1979:43). Marxism becomes a philosophy of alienation which theorises and, in so doing, rationalises the domination that human beings suffer subjected to their own powers. Rather than call for the emancipatory politics of practical reappropriation, this Marxism reproduces the image of the alienated world, of all powerful alien power and impotent human subjects. This philosophy of alienation establishes a sophisticated version of capital's economic determinism and perceives only those negative aspects of the system which disempower people. As a result, transformation comes to appear possible only as a transformation 'from without', via the external mediation of theory and politics. 

How, then, is the problem of consciousness, action and organisation in relation to the proletarian class subject to be properly conceived? The fetish condition of capital's alienated social world does indeed impose limitations upon how far it is possible to attain class consciousness without succumbing to further mystification. Certainly when the proletariat is restricted to the level of immediate experience and the only alternative in the external mediation of theory and politics. But there are no such mediative solutions to this problem, since such mediation from the outside reproduces that representative and that autonomous mode of theory and politics which characterises bourgeois society as an alienated society. That is, it confirms rather than overcomes bourgeois dualisms and separations and, what is more, institutionalises them within the socialist movement.

The Dialectical Synthesis of Organisation and Action
Marx's conception of revolutionary-critical praxis needs to be explored for the way that it demonstrates that mediation is supplied from within the real, internal movement of the proletariat. The subjectivity of the class is to be respected as the substance of the socialist revolution and this means developing Marxism from within the social struggles and practices of the class itself, not from the outside as a 'correct ideology’.

There is, then, a dialectic of organisation and action within the process of proletarian self-development. The proletariat, through its constitutive class praxis, equips itself with the organisational form which materialises its power and consciousness. Moreover, praxis, as the unity of theory and practice develops a fluidity in organisational form in which organisation gives practice a permanent structure and, through embodying the knowledge generated by practice, a conscious orientation. Practice thus generates the material for reflection. Theory is thus distilled from practice. Both theory and practice assimilate the knowledge that each generates and incorporates this knowledge in a dynamic, dialectical unity. The organisation is a form of self-mediation which structures the ongoing dialectic of theory and practice.

This is how Gramsci approaches organisation.

'Organicity' can only be found in democratic centralism, which is so to speak a 'centralism' in movement - i.e. a continual adaptation of the organisation to the real movement, a matching of thrusts from below with orders from above, a continuous insertion, of elements thrown up from the depths of the rank and file into the solid framework of the leadership apparatus which ensures continuity and the regular accumulation of experience. Democratic centralism is 'organic' because on the one hand it takes account of movement, which, is the organic mode in which historical reality reveals itself, and does not solidify mechanically into bureaucracy; and because at the same time it takes account of that which is relatively stable and permanent, or which at least moves in an easily predictable direction, etc. This element of stability within the State is embodied in the organic development of the leading group's central nuclei, just as happens on a more limited scale within parties. The prevalence of bureaucratic centralism in the State indicates that the leading group is saturated, that it is turning into a narrow clique which tends to perpetuate its selfish privileges by controlling or even by stifling the birth of oppositional forces. In parties which represent socially subaltern classes, the element of stability is necessary, to ensure that hegemony will be exercised not by privileged groups but by the progressive elements - organically progressive in relation to other forces which, though related and allied, are heterogeneous and wavering.
In any case, it needs to be stressed that the unhealthy manifestations of bureaucratic centralism occurred because of a lack of initiative and responsibility at the bottom..
Democratic centralism offers an elastic formula, which can be embodied in many diverse forms; it comes alive in so far as it is interpreted and continually adapted to necessity.

Gramsci SPN 1971:183/9 

Adorno explains the point as regards theory in this way:





The emancipatory creativity of class praxis thus requires an organisational form. Adorno, however, is not arguing for a mediation from the outside. Neither theory not politics are autonomous but form a dynamic unity with the real movement of the class. Thus the 'science’ of Marxism, in clarifying real relations and contradiction, is also a force within the emancipatory, struggles and practices of the revolutionary subject as it attempts to transform the world. In such a way theory and practice do indeed form a reality constituting dynamic unity as opposed to an alienating dualism.

The centrality of praxis as both critical and revolutionary is to be reaffirmed. The role of the socialist intellectual is to both express and give conscious orientation to the class praxis of the proletariat, its transformatory significance and the relation of forces at work in society. Of course, in the process of self-development the working class become knowledgeable agents. Social transformation through the proletarian agency is also the self-transformation of that agency. The working class, in other words, generates its own intellectuals as it develops itself as the revolutionary subject.








Marx and Social Democracy

Marx can be and has been read in two contradictory ways. On the one hand he can be read as denigrating parliamentary democracy and formal rights and freedoms (Merquior). As against this he may be criticised for leading the working class down the cul de sac of bourgeois parliamentary politics (Rocker). The liberal condemns Marx for not being a liberal parliamentarian, the anarchist condemns Marx for being a liberal parliamentarian. Both criticisms can be found as stock criticism of Marx from liberals on the one hand and anarchists on the other. Both criticisms cannot be true. I suggest both liberal critics and anarchist critics have made the mistake of taking part of Marx’s position on politics and political action to be the whole. Thus, the liberal focuses on Marx’s critical appraisal of politics, whilst the anarchist focuses upon Marx’s justification for political action and organisation.

The truth is that Marx's position cannot be reduced to a simple for and against on this question. What can be said is that Marx had no abstract objection to the working class engaging in parliamentary politics and, indeed, thought it useful from the perspective of political, organisation and education. But this participation in what became known as 'bourgeois democracy’ is not the end of proletarian politics. Marx was aware of the reformist possibilities of legislative activity and clearly thought it wise for the working class to exploit its enfranchisement in this direction rather than seek the purity of abstention (Against Political Indifferentism). Moreover, apart from anything else, the workers movement itself, regardless of what Marx said for or against parliamentary politics, was moving in this direction. Given that Marx made a point of repudiating the anarchist case for abstention, the anarchists may feel entitled, given the experience of Social Democracy/parliamentary socialism.





The criticism of Marx, then, is that he had no principled objection of parliamentarism and is implicated in directing the workers movement into the sterile channels of bourgeois democracy. This participation of the workers and their representatives in the abstracted politics of parliament has encouraged the class to seek an institutional redress to what is a social problem, class division, has prevented the class from striking directly at capital, and has tied the workers up in parliament whilst capital, an extra-parliamentary power, has reigned almost unchecked.

Of course, Marxists like Pannekoek and Luxemburg soon appreciated that parliamentary and electoral politics entailed the gradual dilution of socialism out of existence so that parties could make a vague appeal to a 'classless' mass electorate. The price of success in electoral terms would be the discarding of all distinctive socialist elements in one’s programme. As a result, participation in parliamentary struggles, even forming governments has not brought these parties representing labour anywhere remotely close to socialism. Worse still, such an abstracted politics has fostered the illusion amongst the working class that socialism is something to be delivered from above rather than something that has to be achieved by themselves through their own action.

Participation in parliamentary politics has affected the socialist labour movement like an insidious poison. It destroyed the belief in the necessity of constructive socialist activity and, worst of all, the impulse to self-heIp, by inoculating people with the ruinous delusion that salvation always comes from above.




Rocker can put the charges of passive radicalism from the anarchist perspective. He has both Social Democracy and Communism - and Marx himself as the figure behind both - as his target.





It is this 'internal decay' and the colonisation of the socialist movement by bourgeois elements that was the subject of Marx's criticism in the Circular Letter of 1879. A decade before the inauguration of the Second International Marx had begun to perceive the future drift of socialism away from the workers and the class struggle and towards the old petty bourgeois illusions of being above class politics.

Rocker next turns to Communism.





To portray Bolshevism as the left wing of state socialism really brings us to the heart of the issue. For the question is one of proletarian modes versus bourgeois modes. The approach to the state determines to which camp one belongs. But, before coining to this, one has to establish Marx's position. Was Marx proletarian or bourgeois?

Marx certainly did argue for the organisation and activity of the workers in the sphere of parliamentary politics. In doing so he had to counter anarchist criticisms that such parliamentarism would detract from the real social struggle. Marx felt it necessary to write a lengthy justification of his position (Against Political Indifferentism). The most important point to get across, however, is that, just as he had argued that political emancipation presaged human emancipation in general, so participation in 'bourgeois democracy’ represented a stage to the socialist end beyond parliamentary democracy. The anti-statism of the anarchists, for Marx, was really an inverted statism (Avineri 1968) that allowed no room for exploring the possibilities for, development contained in certain state forms but not in others. Marx, it may be argued, was alive to the possibilities contained in that democracy realised within the abstract realm of the state for going beyond the state to socialism.

Marx's texts may be selectively quoted to justify the view that Marx entertained the possibility of a parliamentary road to socialism. And one could certainly quote Marx's Amsterdam speech of 1872 alongside Engels' Preface of 1895 to show that Marxism issued in Social (parliamentary) Democracy. Engels’ revision of Marx's revolutionary politics is drastic enough and corresponds to the interests of the SPD closely enough to warrant suspicion. And, sure enough, there is evidence that SPD politicians' were guilty of manipulation and censorship, as Luxemburg herself had suspected (Frolich). But, even without this, there is enough in Marx's own statements and political activities to justify a Social Democratic interpretation of Marx.

Nevertheless, supporters of an anti-Social Democratic reading of Marx do not need to place together fragments from his works or seize upon speeches at particular moments of history, but have the consistent theme of absorbing the state power within society to draw upon, from the works criticising Hegel's political philosophy to the Critique of the Gotha Programme. Of course, one can also cite isolated sentences which indicate that Marx well knew that the suffrage, far from leading to socialism, could be reactionary (the suffrage viewed 'not to be a weapon for the proletariat - but a trap', 'harmless' to the ruling class, leading to 'parliamentary cretinism' ('The Chartists', 'Speech at the Hague Congress').

The conflict between the reformists and the revolutionaries could be argued to reflect an ambiguity in Marx himself (Pierson 1986:20/1). For Marx called for the abolition of the state whilst arguing for the participation of the working class in parliamentary politics. Marx was alive to the reformist possibilities of 'society' forcing the legislative correction of social abuses. The struggle over and the passing of the Ten Hours Bill as the classic example here. Through an act of parliament, Marx argues, 'the political economy of the middle class succumbed to the political economy of the working class'.

The question really is whether this places Marx in a contradictory position. For Marx is putting the reformist case, surely. Rosa Luxemburg, however, shows that there is no contradiction here. Socialism cannot be against social reforms. It is not a question of separating social reform and social revolution as two distinct things, opposing them to each other as alternatives. The daily struggle for reforms and for the amelioration of the proletarian condition within the existing framework offers 'the only means of engaging in the proletarian class struggle and working in the direction of the final goal the conquest of political power and the suppression of wage labour' (Luxemburg in Howard ed. 1971:52).

The problem with Social (parliamentary) Democracy, therefore, is that it turns the means into the end, forgetting the socialist objective. Social reforms become the end (Luxemburg in Howard. ed. 1971:53), which is hardly Marx's argument. Thus, there is no contradiction in Marx's argument so long as one retains the revolutionary socialist objective. There is only a contradiction if, following Bernstein's lead, one separates social reform and social revolution to make the former the end and to ditch the latter.

Thus, the reformist, parliamentary activity for Marx represented his support for both political activity by the class and legislative activity of benefit to the class. Marx's case against political indifferentism, therefore, is not the same as a claim that socialism could gradually be legislated into existence.

Certainly Marx argued in favour of the bourgeois democratic revolutions of the 1840’s, for political emancipation as an emancipation, for the winning of the suffrage. And he was also aware that the numerical superiority of the working class - the ‘vast majority’ - would increase the possibilities contained in political democracy for the legislative amelioration of social conditions.

But there is nothing in Marx's arguments to justify the view that he had turned reform into revolution, means into ends. Political democracy contained possibilities which the working class should exhaust to the full. But even more profound possibilities lay beyond the political realm. Thus, universal suffrage represented for Marx not one person one vote but the overcoming of the separation of the state from civil society. In short, political democracy is not the vehicle of socialism or its attainment but is the precursor of a future society beyond the abstract political realm. Marx did not argue that the winning of the suffrage and the politically organised working class sending representatives to parliament would suffice to achieve socialism, and offers reasons why this happy Social Democratic Utopia could not occur. Rather, Marx's position is that political organisation facilitates the proletarian struggle for power but is not to be identified with the attainment of that power (Pierson 1986:21).

Workers Associations versus the Organic Labour State 

The Free Association of the Producers

Marx rejected utopianism and blueprintism in a couple of senses. In the first place, Marx's socialism is the vision of the immanent society (Parekh 1982:177). For Marx, politics is the projection and realisation of possibilities inherent in the social structure. Marx thus opposes the presentation of socialism as art ideal detached from the conditions and agencies for its realisation. Thus, for Marx, communism is 'the real movement which abolishes the present state of things,' and whose conditions ‘result from the premises now in existence’ (Marx GI 1999: 57). In the second place, Marx repudiates the notion of an ideal blueprint of future society. For the socialist society he has in mind is a creative process, not a static model. Marx puts the emphasis upon the self-realisation and self-development of the people through achieving socialism. The communist society, then, is not the perfect, completed society.





For some (e.g. Cohen 1990), it is to be regretted that Marx did not go inter greater detail concerning the institutional framework of the future society. We may doubt whether Marx could have gone into greater detail given both his historicist premises and his stress upon human beings as the constitutive agents of the future society out of immanent potentialities. Nevertheless, Marx's modesty created the opportunity for the 'unfortunate deformities in interpretation’ (Cohen 1990) which followed in his name.

This point, however, can be stretched too far. There are good reasons for Marx's modesty when it comes to prophesying the future society. Marx could not know the immanent potentialities of any but his own time. Marx's social and historical specificity precluded prediction and projection. Moreover, to give a detailed picture of the socialist society risks blueprintism, gives the impression that the socialist society is a static ideal, and certainly denies human agency in prescribing for the human beings to realise this society.

Moreover, Marx is not as silent on the nature of the future society as may be imagined. There are the principles in favour of the self-organising society which Marx developed from his critique of Hegel's political philosophy. Marx's presentation of the Paris Commune, moreover, is part historical and part idealisation, and gives a fairly detailed outline of the form of government under what could be called commune democracy.

It could also be argued that Marx, in rejecting Utopian socialism, nevertheless incorporated the values of the Utopians in showing how the stateless, moneyless society is an historical possibility. In this sense it could be argued that Marx's socialism is the vision of the immanent society (Parekh 1988) and, as such, combines a view of the desirable society (the Utopian, strand) with a view of the possible society (the realist strand). This all follows from the overcoming of Kantian dualism, the location of the 'ought to be’ in the 'is'. Marx's 'scientific' politics thus involves the projection and the conscious realisation of immanent potentialities through being able to identify the material force structurally capable of realising the 'ideal' society inherent in the real society.

By framing Marx's project in this way it is possible to go some way towards answering those critics for whom Marx's vagueness or silence concerning details led to the dehumanising, totalitarian and bureaucratic nightmare which existed in the east of Europe and elsewhere. Liberal critics have not hesitated to draw the conclusion that 'really existing socialism' shows the truth of Marxism in practice. Is it not more plausible to argue that misrepresentation by Marxists to rationalise a party-state socialism is something which liberal critics are happy to confirm rather than contest?

Marx is actually much more principled and detailed in delineating the future socialist society and, as a result, gives us a possibility of critically evaluating the ways in which Marx's 'vision' was realised and has been criticised.

Something that this approach enables us to do is to distinguish between socialisation and nationalisation. There are arguments within Marx which could be quoted in favour of nationalisation. Most particularly, in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx calls for 'centralising all the means of production into the hands of the state’. Nevertheless, even here, in what appears to be the clearest case for nationalisation in Marx, the context is that of the proletariat using their political supremacy to wrest all capital from the bourgeoisie. He thus defines the state as 'the proletariat organised as the ruling class'.
This still leaves open the possibility of identifying socialism with state ownership but it also opens other possibilities. Much hinges upon how one conceives of this proletarian organisation. In the 1872 Preface to the Manifesto Marx affirms his historicist premise, arguing that 'the practical application of the principles will depend .. everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing'. Marx now refers to the ‘improved and extended party organisation of the working class' and the experience of the Paris Commune making it clear that the workers cannot 'simply lay hold of the ready-made State machinery and wield it for its own purposes'. The reference to The Civil War in France is significant. For this is the language of the 'self-government of the producers'.
Of course, it could still be asserted that Marx never analysed self-governing socialism in any great detail. By the same token he never theorised the operation of the centrally planned command economy. And the point is that those who search Marx for a blueprint concerning the management of the modern economy have radically misunderstood Marx's project. Marx is not a Fabian. Marx is concerned with the principles to be realised in the future society as a rational, ethical, harmonious society. He isn’t concerned so much with the institutional means and mechanisms of that society – those are the responsibility of the agents who create them and make them work.
It is impossible, on these premises, to theorise the detailed operation of the socialist society. We can, as Marx argues in the 1872 Preface, identify the principles of the socialist society. But one cannot know what the future society will look like. What can be established, however, is that this socialist society for Marx will embody a new relationship between the producers and the world of production - the abolition of capital - and will have overcome the separation of the rulers and the ruled - the abolition of the state.
We can argue from this perspective that Marx's socialism is not that of 'really existing socialism', of state ownership and control and hence the bureaucratic regulation of society from above. Instead, the project of the practical reappropriation of human powers and their restoration to social control works in entirely the opposite direction. It may thus be demonstrated that the authentic Marxism of Marx is a workers and not a state socialism and opposes the decentralisation and democratisation of society to the centralisation and bureaucratisation of the state. Marx reaffirmed the position he outlined in On the Jewish Question in the Critique of the Gotha Programme.

It is by no means the goal of workers who have discarded the narrow mentality of humble subjects to make the state 'free'. In the German Reich the 'state' has almost as much 'freedom' as in Russia. Freedom consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed on society into one thoroughly subordinate to it; and even today state forms are more or less free depending on the degree to which they restrict the 'freedom of the state'.
The German workers party - at least if it adopts this programme - thus shows that its socialist values do not even go skindeep, for instead of treating existing society (and the same holds true for any future one) as the basis of the existing state (or future state in the case of future society), it treats the state as an Independent entity with its, own ‘intellectual, ethical and liberal foundations'.

Marx Critique of the Gotha Programme 1974:354

Thus, the authentic socialism of Marx is not state control but the reabsorption of the state into society. This entails democratisation in terms of political and economic decentralisation. 'Society’ will be in control. Society will itself exercise 'legitimate governmental functions' (The Civil War in France) whilst the class, coercive functions of the state will have been completely extinguished. 'The state' continues only in the form of' a juridical framework which is designed to ensure the common good of the whole and the prevention of self-interested behaviour. Thus the self-government of the producers is not to degenerate into private monopolies of producers and the restoration of capitalist competition.


The socialist objective established by Marx is the simultaneous abolition of capital, wage labour and the state. It is the self-organising proletarian movement which is to bring about this revolutionary transformation and it is to do so through the socialisation of the means of production. Marx, it can be shown, affirmed the social control of the producers to the alien control of the state and capital as alienated social powers. 'Society' is in control in the sense of enabling human self-determination as against being subjected to the uncontrollable, 'anarchic' process of private accumulation. Social labour is no longer supplied through the alienated value form but directly through the freely associated producers. Society is emancipated from the fetish system of capital expansion and contraction and is instead constituted, by the collective conscious control exercised by the producers at the level of society.

Through developing Marx's principles in such a way one can thus argue that there can be no such thing as socialism, in Marx's perspective, without the free association and self-government of the producers. This might still be criticised as a little vague (Nove 1983) but it does establish the direction in which Marx's thought tended. This is not the language of a centrally planned command economy. On the contrary, with the development of the productive forces, and hence of the proletariat, the remaining task is 'to free wealth producing, powers from the infamous shackles of monopoly, and subject them to the joint control of the producers, who till now, allowed the very products of their hands to turn against them and be transformed into as many instruments of their own subjugation’. 'The labouring classes have conquered nature; they have now to conquer man' (1954:58 in Sayer 1991:52).

This socialism, for Marx, is immanent in the potentialities created by capital itself. Thus Marx argues that capitalism has created unimagined forces of production and has proceeded to extend its social relations on a global basis. These 'two different sides of the development of the social individual', 'which appear to capital as mere means, and are merely means for it to produce on its limited foundation’, now establish 'the material conditions to blow this foundation sky high' (Marx Gr 1973:705/6).

For Marx, capitalism had generated a massive expansion in the forces of production but at the same time had turned human powers against human beings. Capitalism had thus become the 'greatest barrier' to 'the universality for which [it] strives'. And this contradiction becomes all the more evident as capitalism develops. What prevents capitalism from realising its own promise is its own social relations of private property and wage labour. Capitalist relations have outlived their historical justification in revolutionising the forces of production:' 'this antagonism between the productive powers' and the social' relations of our epoch is a fact, palpable, overwhelming' (Marx 1977:300).





In conclusion, one can argue that Marx's socialist society is one that would be characterised and constituted by the voluntary and free association of the producers. This identifies Marx's conception as the conception of the decentralised, self-governing society federated from the bottom upwards. It is a vision of a libertarian communism in which social relations, hitherto possessing an independence of human beings, are brought under the common, conscious control of individuals (The German Ideology 1999).

At the heart of Marx's vision is the conception of the appropriately scaled society in which the social individual would be realised and able to develop in autonomy as the free individual. To progressively attain this end, the state as an alienated social power would be abolished, the social powers and common interests that it had appropriated from society being restored to society. Thus, far from centralising the means of production in the hands of the state as an alienated social power - the project of nationalisation - Marx's vision would lead us to overcoming the political and economic centralisation entailed by - the alienation/concentration of social power and hence to the diffusion of this power in society - the project of socialisation.
This, therefore, is the vision of a communal ownership and control as social control versus the alien control of the state and of capital. It would be organised and governed by workers organisations and whatever coordinating agencies would be required to secure the common good. This idea of a decentralised system of self-government is consistent, with the principle of proletarian self-emancipation in which the working class would educate itself and develop its capacities for self-government through its own organisations. What bears repetition given the experience of state socialism is that at the core of Marx's argument is the view that the emancipation of the working class is a self-emancipation. The means of tills self-emancipation lie in the organs that the proletariat create, rooted in their practical life as the producing class, which may subvert the capital system and constitute the new order.

'Socialisation’ is a crucial term. Marx may be credited with the clearest awareness as to how capitalist competition leads to concentration and centralisation, even to the need for greater state intervention in 'the economy’. Capital, in other words, had an inherent tendency towards an objective, unsocial socialisation. The Second International complacently argued that this socialisation would evolve into socialism whereas Marx's argument was that the socialist significance of this socialisation could be appreciated only through the transformation of social relations. Thus the socialisation that Marx justified entailed humanisation — the abolition of alienation - and democratisation - the reappropriation of social powers by society.
Alec Nove criticises Marx for his vagueness in arguing that 'society’ would assume the direction of the economy. Nove has a point but also misses the point. Marx was attempting to delineate the alternative to the control exercised externally over society by the state and capital. This said, 'society’ is a vague term and is compatible with different forms of government and control. Indeed, in the Manifesto, Marx implies that the state could indeed represent society. Marx also justifies commune democracy in The Civil War in France. Marx may be criticised for referring to 'society' in the singular. He thus risks the suppression of the pluralism of the real society, leaving the way open for centralisation under the reconstituted state, once more appropriating the general interest.
And yet Marx is not as vague as has been suggested. He refers to more than 'society', he consistently refers to the free association and to the self-government of the producers, which commits Marx to a direct and participatory workers democracy as against bureaucratic, centralised planning. This is indeed entailed by the case Marx makes for the direct supply of social labour as against the supply of social labour indirectly through the value form. 

One can therefore challenge Neil Harding's argument that Marx replaced the decentralising vision of his earlier writings with a 'second edition of Saint Simon's organic labour state’. To the end of his life Marx insisted upon the complete reabsorption of the state power into society as the definition of freedom, thus repeating the definition of human emancipation in On the Jewish Question. He also made it plain that, the commune democracy sketched by the Paris Commune showed in living form the character of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The System of Council Democracy - Marx's Commune State 
Councils as Public-Private Organs of Social Self-Government

Social Democracy, classically, has conceived the achievement of socialism in terms of the conquest of state power by the socialist political party. The state power, albeit democratised, would nevertheless remain intact. Democracy, then, is to be realised within the abstraction of the state. The reasoning is that the state as a democratised institution could be put at the service of the working class. This was the view of Kautsky (Salvadori 1990:144 196/7 203 224/5 220 231/2 232/3). For Kautsky 'the objective of our political struggle remains what it has been up to now: the conquest of state power through the conquest of state power through the conquest of a majority in parliament and the elevation of parliament to a commanding position within the state. Certainly not the destruction of state power’ (Kautsky in Salvadori 1990:162). The 'new tactics' of extra parliamentary struggle is described by Kautsky as the 'cretinism of mass action'.

In a period of extraordinary tensions, mass political strikes and street disorders can unleash significant forces in favour of some of our demands. The greater class conflict and mass anger are, the more quickly and frequently we must expect such explosions to erupt. But they remain an unpredictable phenomenon and cannot be considered permanent and normal methods of proletarian struggle. To direct the entire workers' movement toward mass actions is merely to replace the old one sidedness for which Marx coined the expression parliamentary cretinism with a new cretinism, which we may define, continuing the metaphor, as a cretinism of mass actions'.

Kautsky in Salvadori 1990:162/3

As a criticism of spontaneity and as a demand that the proletariat convert their immediate economic struggles and movement into a permanent political form, Kautsky's argument is consistent with Marx. As a denigration of mass struggle it is inconsistent. Kautsky seems to want to orient the workers movement towards parliament and away from mass action. There is a split here that Miliband has noted to be at the heart of parliamentary socialism (Miliband 1987). Yet this was a Marxism at variance with Marx himself. Marx came to realise that the working class could not take over the state machinery ready-made. The working class should destroy the state machinery and replace it with popular organs of self-administration (Marx 1965:2).

Marx was quite aware of the way that the state had appropriated interests and activities of common concern from the community and hence appeared to serve the common interest (Marx Eighteenth Brumaire 1973(1977):237/8). Thus he was also aware that the destruction of the state would mean that alternative ways of securing community interests would have to be found. That the state did serve common interests in this way is no defence of the state. The state has appropriated community interests and has done so in the service of capital. The community, Marx concluded, must take its community interests back within itself.

In short, Marx did not succumb to the ideological project of the state as did Social (parliamentary) Democracy (Marx 1974:354). The state cannot be democratised in anything but an abstract sense, i.e. still removed from the demos. Thus Marx defines the political republic as 'democracy within the abstract form of the state’ (CHDS 1975:89). The state, moreover, has appropriated the common interest for its own political project, not to serve this interest. Marx's orientation is towards the political investment of the real community. Proletarian emancipation is not to be secured by perfecting the machinery of the state, democratising it and making it serve the common purpose. The community where the demos have their practical existence must possess this common purpose as a reality, not project it as an ideal to the state.

Marx's critique took living form in the Paris Commune, when the communards won state power only to proceed to dismantle it and begin to outline a new form of self-government. Marx saw in the Paris Commune a new form of government federated from below, the embryonic socialist society. It is this alternative that Social Democracy worked to suffocate.

The Paris Commune expressed the aspirations of the people for popular organs of self-government under the direct control of the agents. As such, the Commune looked forward to conceptions of soviet or council democracy in being based upon an active conception of democracy, popular participation and the complete diffusion, exercise and accountability of power - empowerment from below (Schecter 1994:74). It is this connection that will be explored through its relation to the basic themes of Marx's emancipatory project.

The Marxist Goal
The discussion may proceed from the idea put forward by Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, that of the 'proletarian public’. This 'proletarian public' is 'characterised by its direct, sensual and collective mode of experience' and, as such, is in direct opposition to the 'mediated, intellectual, mode of the bourgeois'. It is 'a public grounded in the process of production' in contradistinction to the bourgeois separation of the public and the private (Medick Samuel and Stedman Jones eds. 1982:87; the notion of the ‘proletarian public' is discussed further in Bookchin 1980:217 and Aronowitz 1981:302/2).

This sets up the contrast between bourgeois and proletarian modes of organisation, thought and action very well indeed. What distinguishes the socialist from the bourgeois order is the overcoming of the state-civil society separation, abolishing alienative relations and hence replacing abstraction and representation which takes political and economic activities and processes away from the conscious control of individuals. The socialist mode is to realise the ideal of individuals as active democratic citizens.

This establishes a wider context on the controversy over the colonisation of the socialist movement by the bourgeoisie and by bourgeois modes of thought. Given the terrain that the labour movement operates on, especially the institutionalised separation of the political and the economic, it can be appreciated how bourgeois modes can come to prevent the development of a 'proletarian public’. The socialist movement itself comes to get entangled in the rationalised, abstract and representative modes of bourgeois society and politics. The professional middle class careerists help this degeneration and certainly work to prevent the redefinition of politics towards the 'proletarian public’. But there are powerful tendencies constraining the labour movement within the terrain of immediacy. Individuals of working class origin themselves become ex-worker officials in the political and labour bureaucracies.

It could be argued, then, that the modes of organisation, action and thought in the socialist movement came to replicate the dualistic, abstract, intellectualised and representative modes of the bourgeois order. Such a socialism suited the social and political interests of the professional and educated middle class as it began to assert its power in the late nineteenth century.
For Max Weber, the characteristics of the rationalised bourgeois world, especially, abstracted bureaucratic organisation, were so rooted as to be recommended for their 'objective indispensability'. Weber's 'realism' led him to argue that the only possible socialism was a kind of rational state socialism, the dictatorship of the officials - which amounted to arguing that socialism was impossible and Utopian. The socialists, consciously or otherwise, would have to accept the political and economic division of labour which characterises the bourgeois mode (Mommsen in Levy ed. 1987:279). And, arguably, this is what the organisational forms of socialism came to accept, consciously in the case of Social Democracy, practically in the case of Communism.

It is arguable that the relationship between the proletariat and socialism is not as 'natural' and spontaneous as maybe Marx thought it was. Indeed, some of the roots of reformism lie in the failure of the working class to transcend immediacy (Beetham in Levy ed.1987). Of course, one powerful factor in this failure is the power exercised over the class by the state and capital and by the material constraints upon class actors as individual wage slaves. The workers' movement continually shows tendencies towards that 'proletarian public’ but will never be allowed to evolve in that direction by either the state or capital. The sanctions that are available to the ruling and the capitalist class combine with the rootedness of the characteristics of the capital system to generate powerful tendencies to reformism within the revolutionary class subject.

Nevertheless, in recognising the difficulties, it can still be argued that the proletariat has demonstrated tendencies to autonomous movement in the direction of the 'proletarian public’. And it is from these moments when the class does look to transcend immediacy, challenging bourgeois modes deriving from the political and economic division of labour, that a Marxist politics must proceed. It is to reinstate the goal of socialism as that of creating a direct, sensuous and collective mode as against an abstracted, rationalised and dualistic bourgeois mode, a rooted citizen democracy against an abstracted representative system (Levy in Levy ad. 1987:282).

The basic goal of Marx's politics is the abolition of the separation of the state from civil society so as to realise a citizen democracy through the incorporation of the abstract citizenship of the state in individual relationships in society. Marx proceeds from Hegel's attempt to overcome the diremption of civil society to show what form the real sublation of civil society would take if it were to actualise Hegel's idea of an ethical totality. The state, Marx argues, cannot operate as an ethical agency capable of overcoming the diremption of civil society. It is not the state that creates civil society but civil society which creates the state. The state cannot rise above civil society in the way that Hegel postulates. Rather, the state must serve the functional imperatives of civil society and is thus the institutional expression of social alienation, of civil society's ruptured ethical life. Thus, the ethical life that Hegel pursues has to be realised in civil society itself. Marx understands this as the abolition of the state in favour of the self-organising society.

This is an idea that may be explored in relation to the way that Gramsci formulates Marx's communism as the 'regulated society'.

In a doctrine of the State which conceives the latter as tendentially capable of withering away and of being subsumed into regulated society, the argument is a fundamental one. It is possible to imagine the coercive element of the State withering away by degrees, as ever more conspicuous elements of regulated society (or ethical State or civil society) make their appearance.
The expressions 'ethical State’ or 'civil society’ would thus mean that this 'image' of a State without a State was present to the greatest political and legal thinkers, in so far as they placed themselves on the terrain of pure science (pure Utopia, since based on the premise that all men are really equal and hence equally rational and moral, i.e. capable of accepting the Law spontaneously, freely, and not through coercion, as imposed by another class, as something external to consciousness).

Gramsci SPN 263 

Thus Gramsci highlights two crucial aspects of Marx's political project, the normative dimension, drawn from the ideal of the ethico-rational community (the principle of self-legislation and self-rule) and the overcoming of the state-civil society separation through the absorption of the state power into civil society (i.e. the political investment of civil society with what Marx called legitimate governmental functions and the outright abolition of the coercive-class character of politics).

Thus the tendency to overcome the dualism between political and civil society is to be conceived as progress towards the realisation of the ethico-rational community based upon the principle of self-assumed obligation as against externally imposed law or rule. As active citizens, individuals accept the law freely and spontaneously rather than having to have an institutional apparatus imposing the law; it is self-administered, internal rather than external to consciousness. Reason is in control in the ethical totality.

The New 'Public'
The new relationship between the political and the social can no longer be fixed by the institutional separation of the state from civil society but, rather, is rooted in a new, active conception of democracy and citizenship as integral to social relationships. Individuals as participate in a new 'public' as citizenship is rooted in practical life (Sassoon 1987:225).

From this perspective the task of socialist reconstruction pertains to the attempt to create the 'regulated society' in which individuals as citizens and producers possess conscious control over their practical existence. This presumes that the power alienated to the state and capital is brought under social control so that individuals can exercise control in their practical existence. Marx's basic premise is libertarian and democratic. There are only individuals and the social and political forms they engender. It follows that these forms should be subordinated to the conscious control of human beings for freedom as self-determination to be realised. Where these forms are fetishised, where there is the inversion of the subject and the object, there is an external determinism denying human freedom. Human beings are the only creative element, whether one defines this creativity in terms of sovereignty or labour. It is out of this conscious, creative agency that the possibility of the free social order arises (Meszaros 1995:463 430 495).

And this is the crucial point. The task of socialist reconstruction is that of freeing human beings from all the constraints that the fetishisation of their forms places upon them, thus recovering the power of sovereignty and labour for a free society powered from the base upwards. Human beings are emancipated from alienative and exploitative relations, putting an end to the state and capital, freeing society from the alien constraints of the institutional and systemic world abstracted from the human subject.

This is to be based upon the integration of political and social relationships so that democracy is active and direct. A 'proletarian public’ is thus based upon the abolition of representative institutions extraneous from the practical lives of citizens as producers of all social existence. This is the society of active citizenship and cooperative labour. The integration of political and social relationships makes available a social identity in which the interests of the individual and the interests of the community are one and the same rather than, as under the abstract, exchange and instrumental relationships of bourgeois society, detached from and in opposition to, each other.

There is a sense in which Marx's socialism may be presented as a modern polis or citizen democracy. Here, citizenship ceases to be abstract but becomes active and direct as in the original definition (Aristotle Politics 1981:167/71 432/3). This modern polis democracy, participatory and direct, is, ultimately, the regulated society in that it is rationally and morally ordered through individuals consciously administering the law to themselves, as part of their free, spontaneous consciousness.

This fits in with the idea of a 'proletarian public' in that, with the unity of political and social relationships, the end is that of the society controlled directly by workers. This, in turn, reinstates the central objectives of Marx's revolutionary socialism - the abolition of classes, wages system and capital. Such a society is feasible only through the participation of workers in all decisions.

The assumption of state power by the political party thus entails not the abolition of alienative and exploitative relations but their continuation under political control. It means a change in the character of the ruling class. Instead, the abolition of the state-civil society separation means that the self-organising society is powered from the bottom upwards under the social control instituted by the workers. The abolition of capital, the wages system and class relations is not to be understood as of mere sloganizing significance, as has been the case more often than not with socialist parties, comes to take on programmatic significance orienting the socialist project as it attempts to attack the power of the state and capital at the material roots. This perspective orients the new organisational forms assumed by the socialist movement, transcending the old abstractly political project which attacked only the proprietorial-legal surface of the capital system.

Thus, the socialist project is no longer institutionalised in the alienated form of 'the party’ claiming to act for and 'represent' the working class but instead affirms the capacity of the working class, as the revolutionary subject, to act for and represent itself. It is the aim of the new organisational forms to exercise a direct social control. It affirms that the socialist society is only realised through the direct and active participation of the working class as the producers of the social life; this is the form that citizenship would take in a ‘proletarian public’ - rooted, material, direct, participatory, and affirmative. More negatively, socialism is impossible on the basis of a separation between producers-citizens and organisers and the means of organisation (Mattick 1978:85). Socialism is the self-organising society transcending the abstractly political project (Meszaros 1995:468).

The abolition of the separation between the political and the social, between the individual and the common life, is the fundamental characteristic of the ‘new citizen politics’ to be discerned in Marx. And it entails the elimination of the old abstract, dualistic, contradictory conception of representation (Marx CUDS 1975:141,186/7). In contrast to the ideal, abstract citizenship of the political state, which may be considered as the greatest achievement of political liberalism, the subject of Marx's socialism is the material life of individuals as the true reality of these individuals. Thus bourgeois social relationships are criticised for dualistically separating the individual between homme privé and citoyen (Marx OJO 1975:220/1).

But in arguing that the material life of individuals is the true life of individuals as against the abstract citizenship of the state, Marx ought not to be interpreted as simply opposing homme privé to the citoyen. He is not asserting one half of the dualism against the other but attempting to overcome that dualism. Thus, the abstract citizenship of the state embodies a principle of universality and communality which is denied in the society atomised into individuals. Thus Marx criticises the egoistic character of the individual in real society (Marx 1975:230/4) and demands the realisation of citizenship in everyday life (Marx OJQ 1975:234).





One can agree with Lukacs’ basic theme of opposing the subjective agency, of the producing class to the bureaucratic control of this class but it may be too convenient and question begging to make Stalin responsible for the bureaucratisation of socialism in Russia. The controversy has to be examined from the premise of the council form of organisation as the one that best embodies the spontaneous life force of the subjective agency of the workers. One needs then to consider how other abstract and representative political forms come to deny this subjective agency and reduce it to a passive, represented condition. This degeneration into bureaucratic control cannot adequately be explained by the thirst for power by an individual but in a conception of revolution, organisation and class capacity (or, with 'the party', class incapacity).

Proletarian Self-Development and Socialism
This is to argue that the limitations of Communism – and Social Democracy for that matter - possess social roots in the bourgeois separation of the political from the economic. Lenin's rejection of 'economism' does possess a Marxist rationale in the sense that economism represents one half of a dualistically organised bourgeois society. But the resulting devaluation of workers spontaneous, self-activity fails to appreciate the process of class constitution in which the class raises itself above the level of immediacy and becomes not only a class 'in' itself but a class 'for' itself, not only a class 'in’ capital but a class 'against' capital (Post 1996:170 171/2).

Post posits a distinction between the ontology and the epistemology of the class, between its being and its becoming. It is a distinction between what the proletariat is objectively, as determined by the relationship to the means of production, and what the proletariat makes itself subjectively. This is how Post makes the point: 'this involves distinguishing between the social relationships which determine to what class a given individual belongs - class as being - and the creation of the class subject (and agent) in terms of consciousness and action - class as becoming’ (Post 1996:220).

Such a conception, it may be argued, offers a means of reconciling the structural and the processual definitions of class. The working class is not what it is simply on account of an objective relationship to the means of production. A process of 'making' itself a class takes place on the basis of the structure. This puts the emphasis upon the process of proletarian self-development, the process by which the working class attains a subjective self-identity as a class.

The working class thus possesses the capacity for converting its economic struggle and movement into political struggle and movement (Marx to Bolte 1871). In rejecting 'economism' and in failing to perceive the political significance of workers activity, Lenin embraced 'politicism’, the other side of the bourgeois dualism. With this bourgeois autonomy of the political, the attempt to realise communism could only take the form of a totalitarian resolution from the top down with civil society subsumed under the state. 

It is for this reason that the Soviets were deprived of their character of autonomous social self-government and made subject to the political control of the party-state.

The limitations of Social Democracy possess something of the same character, only here the capitulation to the dualism of bourgeois society was more conscious and deliberate. Social Democracy organised and represented labour within the framework of the representative state and capitalist relations. The social democratic agencies of the working class thus institutionalised the class struggle on classically bourgeois terrain. Not only did these social democratic agencies come to replicate that dualistic aspect of bourgeois society which formed the central object of Marx's critique - the separation between politics and economics - but that it constrained the working class within agencies adjusted to, incapable of transcending and dependent upon the bourgeois terrain - the parliamentary party - and the trade unions. This has been the dualism characterising the Social Democratic tradition (Sassoon 1987:45), explaining its hostility both to revolutionary socialism and political action by workers in civil society (Miliband 1987) and its parasitism upon the capital economy and its paralysis before capitalist crisis.

The Proletarian Transformation of Politics
In Marx's argument what distinguishes socialist politics is that, through workers' self-activity and self-organisation, it constitutes a new mode of production based upon new relationships between the political and the economic. This new society has overcome class division and hence has overcome the coercive class aspect of politics. This aspect disappears with the dualism of the state from civil society. The end of the socialist revolution, then, is fundamentally different from that of any previous revolution and it means that the new organisations developed by the proletarian agency must develop an organisational form and a political content appropriate to that end (Sassoon 1987:131).

The socialist transformation of politics is thus based on a changed relationship between state and society. Marx's great originality lies in the way he demonstrated that the ethical community of the political philosophers may be actualised through the unity of political and social relationships. He thus demonstrated the ethical community of rational, self-legislating citizens to be an historical possibility through the transformation of the relationship between the state and civil society.

In conceiving the socialist revolution as a process which is based upon the constitutive subjective agency of the proletariat Marx ensures that his project possesses a democratic dimension. It is the class subject itself which is the revolutionary agency, not the organisational form. Socialist revolution is a democratic rather than an institutional process. The tendency to postpone questions as to the character of socialism until after the conquest of state power is to make concentrated, institutionalised political power itself the condition of revolution. This continues the fetishisation of the political form over the human subject. The party comes to reconstitute the state power as essential to socialism, the class subject becomes the object of a political process which has been rendered external to it.

This conception has been a fundamental limitation of both Communism and Social Democracy. The recovery of Marx's original conception offers a basis for rethinking the nature of socialism in terms of a citizen democracy and a socialist civil society. By posing the question in terms of the integration of political and social relationships, Marx offers a way past the state form without having to extinguish politics itself.

One may thus present the collective self-activity of the proletariat in terms of the reappropriation of politics. Thus, in contrast to Social Democracy and Communism in the way that they safely lock politics away in the attic of the abstracted state, Marx's Marxism looks to the reappropriation of politics as an activity in which all may participate as citizens.

This is the conception of radical, decentralised, participatory democracy. This active democracy is effectively and systematically blocked by the alienation of control from real individuals in the material lives under the capital system: ‘The capital system is an irrepressibly expansion oriented mode of social metabolic control. Given the innermost determination of its nature, the material reproductive and the political functions must be radically separated in it - producing thereby the modern state as the structure of alienation par excellence - just as production and control must be radically divorced in it’ (Meszaros 1995:71).

Thus the abolition of the state and of capital as alienated social powers and the simultaneous abolition of the dualism between the political and the economic is to be conceived in terms of democratisation. The reappropriation of social power is the empowerment of individuals in their practical life. It enables individuals to exercise their power and hence it is to realise an active conception of democracy. Thus, the abolition of the political state and its bureaucratic apparatus and coercive aspect entails the creation of new popular organs of direct control as means of exercising social power (Meszaros 1995:468 480).

And it raises the possibility of a system of workers control and communal self-management. One needs to underline, following Lukacs, the character of the councils or Soviets as the nucleus of the future socialist society. By defining the socialist revolution as a social and a democratic process rather than a political event that may be bureaucratically engineered and institutionalised, one hopes to change the register within Marxist politics. The important thing is not to conquer the state power but to be able to dissolve it into society through the creation of popular organs of social self-government. The former conception makes the state and the party the agency of the socialist revolution whereas the latter conception priorities the class itself as the revolutionary agency. The class acting for itself and organising itself is not the precondition for the socialist revolution but actually is the process of socialist revolution. When this process has proceeded far enough, the attack on the state power may be initiated and, with its success, would be in a position to dismantle the state power after having 'conquered’ it.

In other words, since the point is to dissolve rather than capture the state power, the socialist project has from the first to constitute itself democratically so that organisationally the class is prepared to absorb the state power into civil society (Meszaros 1995:24/5 463).

Neither Communism, with its bureaucratic centralism and elitism, nor Social Democracy, with its parliamentarism, could develop Marxism on its democratic side. For both traditions have prioritised form over content and have institutionalised the separation of this form from content. The demos have merely a passive role in both traditions. Both Social Democracy and Communism locate politics in the state and hence are removed from the individuals constituting the demos in civil society.
The councils or Soviets operate in the socialist society as organs fusing the public and the private. These are the organs of the 'proletarian public’ par excellence in that they tend to be the spontaneous form of organisation formed by the class making itself the public (Arendt 1965:262) and that they combine political and economic functions. They are organs which sustain a political realm rooted in the everyday material life, connecting individuals as citizens and as workers, thus removing that internal dichotomy for which Marx criticised the bourgeois epoch (Marx 1975:222). Thus, the council form of organisation realises that active conception of democracy on the basis of the fusion of political and social relationships. The council form thus unites the material issues of everyday activity with issues, of government. The councils are thus empowered to act as political centres and are capable of relating the production and the government of social life to the conscious control of individuals. Here, the workers transcend their corporate and their representative, agencies, to practical activity as citizens and producers.

The Organisational Principle
The logic of the way that Marx treats agency, class, revolution and organisation is that one should repudiate fetishised or idealised organisational forms as implying that it is the form itself and not the class which possesses the revolutionary force. For Marx, the revolutionary force clearly belongs to the proletarian class subject. It follows that socialist revolution is a process which develops as the class subject itself develops - and develops itself. The idea of 'the party' substituting itself for or subordinating under its political control the organisational forms which the class subject develops for itself reveals the failure to break with the bourgeois tradition of political revolution. Such an alienated form of organisation could institutionalise its power only in the form of the state raised above civil society.

What has to be established, in Marx's perspective, is an evaluation of the organisational forms of the proletarian movement according to the end of socialist revolution. But this means prioritising the self-development of the class subject and locating socialist politics in the processes and practices whereby the class constitutes itself as the revolutionary subject. This, and not party or state building, is the stuff of Marxist politics in that it affirms the political, organisational and intellectual capacities of the proletariat as against that revolutionary tradition which suggests that the class is too corrupt and determined and passive to act. By underlining process one indicates that the organisational form cannot be determined in the abstract as an ideal agency and introduced into or imposed upon the proletariat from outside of the spontaneous processes of proletarian self-development. This fetishisation of form ruptures and arrests the process of self-development and hence prevents the emergence of the revolutionary subject which is the very condition of socialism.

For the socialist society is made by the proletarian class subject or not at all. A substitute agency creates a substitute socialism instituted at the state level. Only through the process of self-development does the proletariat develop the organisational capacities and the organs which are able to order the new society. This order is no longer the abstract, sphere of the political state but embodies the real social control of production and politics through the demos, what Marx calls 'socialised man’. The new relationship between the political and the economic requires completely new organs and these are only made available through the ability of the proletariat to develop its own capacities as the revolutionary subject and, in so doing, developing organisational forms transcending bourgeois society and its dualism. This is something that the abstract approach to organisational form is unable to achieve, as the history of Communism and Social Democracy has shown (Sassoon 1987:47).

These observations on the implications of Marx's perspective on socialist revolution were expressed by Rosa Luxemburg. For Luxemburg, the socialist revolution is actualised through the organisational forms which the workers create for themselves. The most important aspect of these forms is that they demonstrate an autonomous capacity on the part of the proletariat. The workers are not to be put under the tutelage of the politicians and the intellectuals and, indeed, have no need of such tutelage given the demonstration of their organisational capacity. Luxemburg understands that the proletariat has to develop the organisational and intellectual capacity for self-government through its practice. This is to affirm the principle of proletarian self-emancipation. Without this process of proletarian self-development the socialist revolution lacks content and, inevitably, has to substitute form.

What distinguished Pannekoek from Social Democracy and Communism is that he refused to fetishize the organisational form and instead concentrated upon the attempts of the proletariat to develop new forms of organisation. These attempts measure the progress or otherwise of the revolutionary process.

Hence the criticism of the traditional agencies of the working class, the political party and the trade union. These are hierarchical and bureaucratic agencies which represent labour within the bourgeois epoch but which prevent proletarian development beyond bourgeois society. To push further means that the proletariat has to create new organisational forms and, hence, supersede the political party and the trade union as 'bourgeois' organs appropriate to dualistic bourgeois society (Schechter 1994:75).

The idea of council democracy clearly gained strength from the role of the Soviets in the Russian Revolution. Gramsci, it may be argued, idealised the nature of soviet democracy in Russia but, in so doing, he offered a model of the socialist society. Korsch did so too.

Thus a new and fruitful idea, with clear affinities to Marx's idea of a commune democracy, grew from the recognition that every new organisational form alters the relationship between and the character of the political and the social. Thus socialism had to equip itself with its own political form. Putting an end to representative forms extraneous to the practice of everyday social life, the council system of direct, participatory democracy offered the concrete embodiment of socialism.

The state is thus criticised as the political agent of the capitalist class and, as such, a class instrument. A state socialism reinforces the state power by instituting a new class system. Hence the claim that Marxism is the ideology of a new techno-bureaucratic class (Carter 1988). I would argue that class needs to be identified more precisely in terms of social relations. The point is not to capture the state power as an instrument of class domination but to dissolve it and end all political forms in which social power is opposed to human beings as political force. Thus, the organisational forms of the socialist movement are in contradiction with those of bourgeois society, putting a clear question mark against the political party (Rocker 1989:73). This party exists as a microcosm of the state, aims at and hence constitutes itself as the state power. Through the political party socialism becomes the plaything of the politicians.

Thus, socialism moves in an entirely contradictory direction to the state politics of the parties. Which underlines again the distinction between a workers and a state socialism. The reorganisation of society on a socialist basis must proceed the workers' own organs, hence the relevance of the council system of social self-government. This idea of a council system for labour is antagonistic to the state and aims at the dissolution of the state power into society. The 'dictatorship of the proletariat', which has continued to cause controversy, needs to be defined clearly as pertaining to the self-organising and self-acting class. The dictatorship of the proletariat, in other words, is not to invite the dictatorship of the party or the officials under a new state power as under Communism and Social Democracy (Rocker 1989:76).

Thus, a Marxist politics prioritising the self-development of proletarian political, organisational and intellectual capacities is oriented by the development of autonomous thought and action. Marxist politics is in direct opposition to the centralising and substitutionist tendencies of the political parties. That is, centralism is to be understood in terms of a bottom up federalism as opposed that institutional centralism that proceeds from the top downwards and which leads to the bureaucratisation of socialism as a false collectivism instituted by the state. Thus, Gramsci condemns bureaucratic centralism as the product of a lack of power and initiative and responsibility at the base, with such an empowered base, centralism could only proceed from the bottom up and be based upon autonomous modes of organisation, thought and action. The dictatorship of the proletariat is thus to be interpreted according to the principles of a federal centralism through the free combination of the workers from the below upwards, insisting on the free self-determination of workers’ organs.
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